The Soviet Army, Counterinsurgency, and the Afghan War
Abstract
The military situation that confronted the Soviet army in Afghanistan during its nine-plus years of occupation (December 1979 to February 1989) differed significantly from the Soviets' prewar expectations. Soviet forces were committed into Afghanistan on the false presumption that the rapidly destabilizing situation could be put right by means of a quick, violent coup-de-main on the model of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Soviet planners were fully aware of the growing resistance movement in Afghanistan, yet the Soviet army entered the country expecting little opposition, prepared only to fight a few short, conventional actions if necessary. Afghanistan, the Soviets found, is not Czechoslovakia. Soviet forces became mired in an extended counterinsurgency campaign against a classic guerrilla force. This article will show how the Soviet army responded to the unexpected dilemma it met. Further, it will analyze how the Soviet ground forces adapted and failed to adapt to the peculiar conditions of counterinsurgency warfare in a large, dry, mountainous region, and it will draw conclusions on the suitability of the Soviet army for such operations.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1989
- Accession Number
- ADA529242
Entities
People
- Scott R. Mcmichael
Organizations
- United States Army War College