

The United States Strategy in East Asia-Pacific-Implications for Australia's Defenses

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SUBJECT AREA National Security

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: US Security Strategy in East Asia-Pacific - Implications for Australia's Defense.

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Thesis: The US cannot sustain the military component of its engagement security strategy in the East Asia-Pacific region. Diminishing US forward presence and a reduced force projection capability will have a significant impact on Australia's capability to deter and defend against aggression.

Discussion: The paper begins by establishing that conflict in the East Asia-Pacific region has been a constant reality this century and the potential for large scale conflict is still perceptible. Furthermore, protagonists have varied the characteristics and reasons for fighting, but ethnicity and ideology have been dominant. Although conflicts have generally been isolated and have involved guerrilla type warfare, the increasing economic power of many regional countries, particularly China, is the reason there is still potential for large scale war.

After establishing focal points for US security strategy in the region, the paper examines the reasons why the strategy will be unsustainable. Dominant reasons are the declining defense budget, loss and potential loss of forward bases and a dangerous shift to reliance on the other components of national power. Once the paper has established these reasons, it explains why a decreasing US presence, and reduced capability to rapidly respond to crises in the region significantly affects Australia's "continental" defense policy of self-reliance within a framework of alliances.

Finally, after establishing the reasons why Australia needs the US to stay regionally engaged the paper examines possible US courses of action. In response to the US situation the paper then proposes a number of adjustments to Australia's security strategy that the Government could make to help the US stay engaged.

Conclusion and Recommendation: The paper concludes with several arguments for why Australia needs to shift its alliance focus to the US. For mutual benefit, the paper recommends the establishment of a combined, joint training facility in the north-west of Western Australia. Such a facility will help the US sustain its forward presence, provide a credible backbone to Australia's defense strategy and allow Australia's defense forces to maintain critical interoperability skills with the US.

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Introduction

The Australian Government inextricably links Australia's future security and prosperity to the security and prosperity of Asia and the Pacific.¹ This statement has been the foundation of defense and economic planning in Australia during the 1990s. The Government's main effort has been to engage Australia in Asia to ensure that the country, which previous governments have historically linked to Great Britain and the United States, rides on the peak of the Asian economic wave. While we see such a move as logical because of geography and economics, the indisputable fact remains that Australia's heritage and ancestry is, like the United States', Anglo-Saxon not "Asian." The relevance of this may not be immediately obvious but realists will acknowledge that ethnicity, especially when linked to power by wealth, has been a dominant historical catalyst for human conflict.

When Charles Darwin published *The Descent of Man* in 1871 he made the civilized world reel in controversy. Darwin had produced scientific evidence to suggest that life was a continual struggle for survival. He argued that the intellectually superior would out-breed the inferior, only the strongest would survive, and the rich will leave more offspring than the poor. What is more important, nation-states would subsume, in time, weaker nation-states by force. According to him these were the laws of nature, applicable equally to individuals as for nations. While one could question Darwin's theory about the rich out breeding the poor, his other "laws" seem real and proven. Perhaps contemporary governments are ignoring Darwin's theories in today's world.

¹ Commonwealth of Australia. Minister for Defence, *Defending Australia* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994), 3.

Many nation-states, particularly in East Asia, are growing stronger while others are weakening. The weak states are vulnerable to subjugation by the resource hungry strong. For example, Japan's early and mid 20th century conquests were driven by a need for natural resources, a perceived superiority over the Chinese and a need to rid Asia of the hegemony of the white race.² So what does this mean today for Australia? It means that Australia's current defense policy of self-reliance within a framework of alliances is probably credible for the remainder of this century, but sufficient evidence suggests this may not be the case in the next ten to twenty years.³

Australia's defense policy and force structure is predicated on the assumption that Australia's defense planners would get "indicators" of a large scale threat in adequate time to build a sufficient force to defend its sovereignty. What has not been articulated is the type of indicator and at what stage it represents a clear and present danger to Australia. Therefore, to hedge against expensive premature force expansion or guard against inaction, Australia has to rely on outside assistance. Although the 1994 White Paper states that the ANZUS Alliance does not automatically mean the US will come to Australia's assistance if attacked⁴, an underlying belief, especially among the public, suggests that it will.⁵ This belief is not only a political necessity but according to the recently retired Chief of the General Staff; Australia "would have to rely on a powerful

² David Homer, "Conflict in Asia - A Hundred Years of War." *In The Army and the Future*. Ed. David Homer, 20-21. Canberra: Directorate of Departmental Publications, Defence Centre, 1993.

³ *Defending Australia*, 13.

⁴ *Defending Australia*, 13.

⁵ *Defending Australia*, 95.

friend [to defend Australia] in the short term."⁶ This situation is the nucleus of this paper. What is the future of the United States in East Asia-Pacific? Will a relatively slowly growing economy be able to sustain its current security strategy of "engagement and enlargement" at a time when Americans are questioning the sustainability and durability of the American dream?⁷ Why should the United States pay for the "oxygen" that enables Asia and the Pacific to thrive?⁸ What are the national interests of the United States in Asia-Pacific? Are these interests the same as Australia's? What are the possible near and long term threats? This paper will address these questions to support a hypothesis that the military component of the US East Asia-Pacific security strategy is not sustainable and Australia needs to take notice.

The hypothesis is supported by evidence from five areas:-

- Interviews with Washington policy advisors and their professional staff
- Increasing pressure on the size and apportionment of the defense budget.
- The impact of the "Bottom Up Review (BUR)" at the "military's sharp end."
- Indecision on US force structure for a policy of "forward presence" and "force projection."

⁶ Cameron Stewart, "We Can't Defend Ourselves," *The Australian*, 5 December 1995, 1.

⁷ The United States' rate of economic growth has not been as high as many East Asian countries, especially China, for the past ten years.

⁸ US Assistant Secretary for Defense, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Uses the metaphor "Oxygen" when describing the importance of US engagement in Asia. It is used in: Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*. (Washington: Department of Defense, 1995), 1 and see Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "The Case for Deep Engagement." *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 1995): 91.

- The perceived diminished utility of US military power due to low tolerance of casualties.

Analysis of these areas gleans conclusions and implications for Australia's Defense policy, defense planning, and a recommendation for continued US presence in the region. The paper suggests what the US will be forced to do and what Australia should do to help keep the US militarily engaged in the East Asia-Pacific region.

To set the scene, the paper begins with a brief discussion on recent regional history Chapter Two goes on to examine three countries that will influence US and Australian security equations the most, China, Japan and Indonesia. Chapter Three looks at Australia's course, highlighting the inadequacies of its policies and defense structure to meet potential threats posed by resource hungry or hegemonic powers. The chapter concludes that Australia has to do more to keep the US militarily engaged. Chapter Four analyses why the US will find it increasingly difficult to sustain its regional military presence. Finally, Chapter Five links all the arguments and analysis and makes a recommendation to help keep the US engaged.

Scope

The paper's focus is limited to the Pacific Rim. South Asia, the Indian subcontinent in particular, is outside the scope of this discussion. Readers should not assume the impact of this area is negligible when discussing Australia's future defense requirements, particularly as India and Pakistan are nuclear powers, but we assume that countries in this region will continue to focus on each other's ambitions and instability on their other land borders.

Chapter One

Historical Background and Overview of the Regional Situation

Empires in the Sun

Wars this century have shaped the Asia-Pacific area we know today and the effects of war manifest many ongoing strategic issues. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical background to the current key strategic issues and outline the common and divergent focuses of the US and Australia. Subsequent chapters refer to the situations that this chapter and chapter two summarize and describe. The Asia-Pacific area includes Russia, the Koreas, Japan, China, Taiwan, ASEAN countries⁹, all Pacific island states, New Zealand and Australia.

At the start of the twentieth century all but two of the Asia-Pacific countries were colonies or semi-colonies.¹⁰ Russia had colonized Siberia and parts of Manchuria, the Korean peninsula and Taiwan were colonies of Japan; China was semi independent but an economic colony of several European powers that had grabbed enclaves like Hong Kong. Indo-China was France's as were several island states in the South Pacific; Britain had colonized Malaysia, Singapore and, like France, many Pacific Islands. The US had "inherited" the Philippines from Spain. The Netherlands had the extensive colony of what we now know as Indonesia; Portugal had small but significant colonies in East Timor and Macau. Germany had a colony in New Guinea. Australia was about to

⁹ Vietnam became the seventh full member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July 1995. The other members are: Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Brunei, Thailand and Singapore.

¹⁰ Horner, 13.

become a semi-independent colony of Great Britain and New Zealand was still a British colony. The only independent states were Thailand and Japan.

Not only was Japan one of the two independent countries but, because of its geographic location and homogeneous population, it escaped the impact of European colonization. Another reason Japan escaped was that it was, and is, a country poor in natural resources, the objective in most cases of colonization.¹¹

Ironically it was for this last reason Japan went empire building to feed its rapidly industrializing economy in the late 19th and early 20th century. China at the time was an easy target as was Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria. The seizure of Manchuria provoked Russia into war with Japan, but to the shock of the once all powerful Europeans, Japan decisively defeated the Russians and firmly established its position in Asia and the World.¹²

World War I allowed Japan's economy further to industrialize as it fed the voracious appetites of the combatant powers. Japan was "nominally on the side of the allies"¹³ which enabled it to consolidate its empire and inherit Shantung in China and other German territory in the central Pacific after the war.

The Rising Sun

Between the World Wars Japan continued to industrialize and consolidate its empire. During this period other countries of the Asia-Pacific area hardly changed, politically or economically. The United States had promised the Philippines

¹¹ Horner, 14.

¹² Horner, 14.

¹³ Horner, 14.

independence, and Australia and New Zealand had gained independence from Great Britain. Its continued reliance on Great Britain for defense qualified Australia's independence. In fact Australia did not ratify the Statute of Westminster, showing Australia's independent status, until October 1942 although it passed in London in 1931.¹⁴

The course and outcome of World War II in the Pacific are well known. It ended with the humiliating defeat of Japan and the establishment of a new Japanese democratic government and constitution. Although the European powers, which had helped the US defeat Japan, were keen to reestablish their colonies in Asia, a new environment confronted them. Communism had gained great prestige after Russia's defeat of Hitler, and the United States backed up its World War II rhetoric that it was not fighting to restore European overseas empires when it immediately declared the Philippines independent.

Wars of National Liberation

Depending on the viewpoint, from 1945 until the end of the war in Vietnam in 1975, different types of war continually affected the region. Protagonists fought wars of "containment," national liberation, civil wars, or wars of national consolidation.

("Containment" was the US and West's policy of preventing the spread of communism.)¹⁵ The first war, which really started before 1945, was the Chinese Civil War that ended in 1949 with communist victory and defeated nationalists fortifying the island of Taiwan. Taiwan remains a disputed territory as does Pratas Island for similar reasons (see Map 1).

¹⁴ Homer, 19.

¹⁵ Alan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, *For The Common Defense* (New York: The Free Press, 1984): 471-507.

Map 1.
Boundary and Territorial Disputes in East Asia



Source: Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region. (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1995):19.

Containment of communism was the reason used by the US to intervene in North Korea's attempt to reunify the peninsula in 1950, and similarly to stem communism in Vietnam in 1965. The US, which had no desire to help European powers restore their colonies, entered these conflicts because communism was a threat to fair democratic government.¹⁶ Fear of the spread of evil monolithic communism drove the US's post World War II decision to stay engaged in world affairs. This distinct policy shift from post World War I isolationism made the US, compared with Great Britain, an inexperienced participant in world affairs. Inexperience contributes to the difficulty the US has in establishing credibility and trustworthiness with many countries that do not share the same culture, such as China. Chapter three addresses this point further.

While the United Nations was containing communism in Korea, guerrilla wars broke out on the Malay peninsula and in Borneo. Communists were trying to wrest power from the colonial power but Britain thwarted their effort when it bestowed independence to their colonies on the peninsula and Borneo. Indonesia, who had just won its war of liberation over its Dutch colonial masters, saw the new large state of Malaysia as a threat and tried to assert sovereignty in Borneo. However, unlike other conflicts, the Indonesian insurgents were not communists. Military nationalists seized power in Indonesia although the Soviets supported them with equipment, and the Chinese with moral support.¹⁷ Indonesian power was militarily and ethnically sourced and a more moderate general, Suharto, ousted the first post-colonial military leader, Sukarno. Suharto realized conflict with neighbors would not enhance economic development.

¹⁶ Homer, 22.

¹⁷ *Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook*, 531.

However, Suharto did not "return" the former Dutch colony of West New Guinea that Sukarno had annexed although its people were ethnically different; nor did it prevent him from seizing the former Portuguese territory of East Timor in 1975 whose people are also not "Indonesian." This last point remains contentious, although Australia and the US do not list East Timor as a disputed territory.¹⁸

While Malaysia and Indonesia were gaining their liberation, Vietnam's bitter struggle for independence had started and was to continue until 1975. First the French, then the US, backed the South Vietnamese attempts to stem communism. Communism also spread in Laos and Cambodia.

The final war of liberation documented here took place in the Philippines. The US installed democracy survived attempts by communist backed guerrillas to unseat it, but the threat from Muslim separatists in the South continues today.¹⁹


Consolidation and Disputes

The period 1945 to 1975 was not conducive to economic or political progress in East Asia, but since this time the "Tigers" of Asia have led the world in rates of economic growth. Table 1 shows the relative economic performance of several Asian countries compared with the US.

¹⁸ Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 19.

¹⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Nelson Allaga, The Philippines Defense Force. Interview by author, 19 November 1995.

Table 1. Relative World Economic Performance 1960 to 1994



Source: Ross Babbage, "Trends in Asia-Pacific Security." *The Army and the Future*
David Horner,
Ed. (Canberra, Directorate of Departmental Publications, 1993): 45

The current US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,

The current US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Joseph S.

Nye Jr., believes that among the reasons for East Asian and Japanese prosperity, including their high savings rates, is the "oxygen" continual US engagement supplies, particularly by military forces, in the region.²⁰ He uses the metaphor implying East Asia will suffocate without the US presence.

Chapter four addresses the question whether the US is actually supplying the "oxygen" to East Asia.

On the other hand, the growth in East Asia has provided benefits to the US, for instance, "trade with Asia accounts for almost three million jobs."²¹ Additionally, the open-ended strategy of "engagement" by, among other things, providing a military umbrella has without doubt enabled many East Asian countries to consolidate their economies and governments.

²⁰ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Case for Deep Engagement." *Foreign Affairs*, (July/August 1995): 90.

²¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "US Presence: Oxygen for Asia." *The Washington Post*, 8 December 1995, A27.

What needs addressing, however, is the lack of US policy that covers the possibility that Japan, China, and even Russia, may recognize that the US "oxygen" is increasingly unnecessary and may eventually tell the Americans that their presence is no longer useful or required.²² The lack of such a policy is significant for Australia because, as chapter three explains, Australia's defense strategy hinges on a continued US military presence.

Discussion to this point has only mentioned positive post 1975 consolidation. North Korea's economy has not followed those of its neighbors or other East or South Asian countries. The economy has declined for seven consecutive years.²³ It has defaulted on \$770 million (US) of foreign debt and has an economy that is nearly in complete collapse.²⁴ Despite its poor economic power North Korea is a nuclear power with ballistic missiles that can reach Japan, is led by a leader whose grip on power is unclear, and is still technically at war with the South. The reunification of the Korean Peninsula will remain a focal point for some time to come. North Korea's resilience has proved some observers wrong when they thought the country would implode like the Soviet Union. However, although we must re-question its resilience because there is evidence that it cannot even afford to feed its people, North Korea keeps a nuclear arsenal and, because of this reason alone, it must be included in East Asian security equations.²⁵

²² Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy." *Foreign Affairs*, (July/August 1995): 103.

²³ Sidney Beaman Ed. "Statement on the Korean Peninsula," in *Strategic Survey 1994/95*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 176.

²⁴ Russell D. Howard, "US Security Interests in the Pacific Rim." *Military Review*, (September 1994): 44.

²⁵ Bearman, 177.

Australia committed forces to support the UN in 1950 but the current policy of continental defense means that involvement would only be considered on merit.²⁶ US commitment on the other hand is assured. "North Korea's conventional military threat to the Republic of Korea has not abated, and requires continued vigilance and commitment of United States forces."²⁷

Map 1 depicts boundary and territorial disputes that are ongoing in the Asia-Pacific area. Prominent among the disputed areas is the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Six Asian nations who see either possible economic benefit from any oil that might be present, or the strategic value of their proximity to the major sea trade route, or both, are laying claim to part or all of the islands. Less commentary is available on the other disputed territories but one cannot ignore the impasse over Taiwan from China's perspective. This subject is discussed further in the next chapter.

Before examining, in the next chapter, several focal points that require more detailed analysis about the paper's hypothesis, this chapter concludes by summarizing the wars that have shaped today's East Asia-Pacific. This is beneficial because future threats might be identified. People have fought the following types of war in the East Asia-Pacific region in the last one hundred years:

1. **Between States for Resources and Hegemony:**

Late 19th century and early 20th century invasions of China, Korea and Manchuria by Japan
North Korea's invasion of South Korea
Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia

²⁶ *Defending Australia*, 105.

²⁷ Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 18.

China's attack on Vietnam
Indonesia's invasion of East Timor
Japan in World War II

2. **Colonial Liberation:**

Indonesia against the Dutch
Vietnam War against the French
Malaysian emergency

3. **Containment of Communism:**

Korean War
Vietnam War
Malaysian emergency

4. **Civil War:**

Chinese communist vs Nationalists
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia
Communists and Muslims in the Philippines
North Vietnam vs South Vietnam
Korean war

5. **National Consolidation:**

Muslim separatists and East Timorese in Indonesia
Muslim separatists in the Philippines
Bougavilleans in Papua New Guinea

Most of the wars have involved guerrilla warfare against government forces and/or one ethnic

or ideological group against another. The list shows that protagonists fought some conflicts for more than one reason, but common to all, less the civil wars, is ethnic conflict. We must remember this point when Australia's common heritage, values and ancestry with the US are discussed later. Apart from Japan, there has not been any large scale empire building nationalist-based motivation for conflict. Neither has there been a predominance of large scale conventional war. In *On Future War*, Martin Van Creveld takes an extreme view that the era of what he terms "Trinitarian war" (that Carl

Von Clausewitz theorized to involve the government, the people and the army), or war between states, is over. He states: "In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom today we call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves."²⁸ He argues that conventional war may be at its last grasp.²⁹

Van Creveld published his book before the 1991 Gulf War disclaimed his notion that the 1980-1988 Iran/Iraq war would be the world's last conventional war and the Asian trend described here would be the future. However, to further diverge from Van Creveld's idea, the economic and government consolidation in Asia-Pacific is uncovering trends that have historically led to large scale conflict. For example, according to a congressional advisor on East Asian affairs, China's ideology of communism and isolationism is shifting; it is shifting back to its historical tendency of nationalism and attentiveness to sovereignty. National fervor and intent upon sovereignty is replacing communism, not democracy as the US would hope.³⁰ Although not articulated, this shift may be the reason current US security strategy in East Asia and the Pacific cites Japan as the lin³¹ The continued bilateral arrangement with Japan is vital, not so much to contain North Korea, but China. With this conclusion, the next chapter focuses on China and Japan, two key Asian countries, whose influence, for different reasons, will affect future security planning in Asia-Pacific. Also, to increase awareness of its relative power

²⁸ Martin Van Creveld, *On Future War* (London: Brassey's 1991), 197.

²⁹ Van Creveld, 205.

³⁰ Jason E. Bruzdinski, Professional Staff Member, House National Security Committee. Interview with author, 12 December 1995.

³¹ Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 10.

and potential, and because Australia has just signed a bilateral defense treaty, the chapter will also examine Indonesia. It is interesting that the US groups ASEAN countries in its security strategy although it has bilateral security arrangements with two members.³² This may suggest a desire, on the US's part, to recognize ASEAN as a security-based organization or provide a cover for the lack of distinct policies for all the ASEAN nations.

³² Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 11-12. The US has bilateral treaties with the Philippines and Thailand

Chapter Two

Focal Points for East Asia-Pacific Security

China

The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the stimulus that linked many Asia-Pacific defenses.³³ Contemporary literature on Post Cold War security in Asia-Pacific points to a shift to China as the new center of security calculations. Certainly for the US, China may be the common interest required for any future multilateral security arrangements.³⁴ Similarly, in Australia China is becoming a focal point, but as *Defending Australia* states, China must not be isolated in any security dialogue:

Over the next decade, China is likely to be the most powerful new influence on the strategic affairs of our wider region. As with other regional countries, we seek a better understanding by China of regional perceptions of security issues and China's place in them. To this end, we will develop further our strategic dialogue with China and encourage China to participate fully in regional and other multilateral security discussions.³⁵

Whatever the view, there is plenty of evidence that China's military capability is increasing.

The deductions from this are twofold. First, Chinese family-orientated Confucian culture, which requires dedication to hard work and education, provides a solid foundation to why China's modernization and economy building efforts are proceeding so

³³ Karl W. Eikenberry, "Does China Threaten Asia-Pacific Regional Stability?" *Parameters* (Spring 1995): 82.

³⁴ Mr Thomas Donnelly, Secretary House of Representatives National Security Committee. Interview with author, 16 December 1995.

³⁵ *Defending Australia*, 91.

rapidly.³⁶ Second, China's growing economy is, by some calculations, only surpassed in size by the US and Japan.³⁷ The Chinese Government is transferring some benefits of the increased wealth and motivation to modernizing the huge Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). There are conflicting interpretations of the size of the PLA budget. For instance, *The Washington Post* cites an increase of 140 percent between 1988 and 1994 from \$2.5 billion (US) to \$6 billion (US).³⁸ Conversely, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that PLA spending has risen only 13 percent from 1985 to 1992 from \$19.8 billion (US) to \$22.4 billion (US) because of the high inflation rate China has experienced during this time.³⁹ Despite the size of the increase, immediate regional concern is China's continuing nuclear testing and ballistic missile development, including the DF-41 that could have a range of 12,000 km.⁴⁰ Moreover, although commensurate development of some power projection forces, particularly the blue water navy, is apparent, there is no published evidence of a significant amphibious expeditionary force.

³⁶ Eikenberry, 82. To support this statement one only has to look at the extraordinary business performances of ethnic Chinese in other countries around the world. If one translates this performance to the 1.2 billion population of China, the world is in for a significant shift.

³⁷ Asra Q. Nomani and Robert S. Greenberger, "China's Economy World's No.3, IMF Calculations." *The Wall Street Journal*, 21 May 1993, A6.

³⁸ William Branigan, "As China Builds Arsenal and Bases, Asia fears a Rogue in the Region." *The Washington Post*, 31 March 1993, A21, A27.

³⁹ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1993-1994* (London: Brassey's, 1993), 226. The IISS actually lists estimates of spending which are far higher than are stated in China's budget, that according to IISS is "not published".

⁴⁰ IISS, *The Military Balance 1994-1995*, 165.

China's military capability does not, by itself, constitute a threat to the Asia Pacific region.

We generally recognize threats as capability combined with intent. Whereas capability takes time to build and train, intent can change very quickly.

Although the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident made the possibility of any external use of the PLA remote, in 1996 this may be changing. Ongoing border and sovereignty disputes (see Map 1), a shift from ideologically based development to national fervor illustrated by the determined bid for the 2000 Olympics, and extraordinary economic development are the key indicators. China's long history before communism suggests little willingness to compromise on disputes about sovereignty.⁴¹ One has only to look at China's uncompromising position toward reasserting sovereignty over Hong Kong, and before this, "China's gains in the Paracels (see Map 1) were acquired [in 1974] at the expense of the soon-to-be-extinct government of South Vietnam."⁴² Furthermore, Taiwan must be considered a flash point; similarly, if the South China Sea reveals oil, this may ignite conflict. In respect to Taiwan, Singapore's elder statesman, Lew Kuan Yew, has warned that China is ready to go to war over Taiwan and Tibet and has urged the US to accept that each is part of China. He said, ". . . this is a very dangerous zone to prod. Anything that threatens China's unity is cause for war. China [would] compromise on disputes like trade and intellectual-property rights, but if the US interferes with the unity of China, that is a hostile act.

⁴¹ Bruzdinski, 12 December 1995.

⁴² Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," *International Security*, Vol.19, No.1, (Summer 1994): 169-194.

They will respond, and damn the consequences."⁴³

Commentators have duly warned the US administration that fixation on an "engagement" vice a more assertive strategy with China may be undermining US security interests and is shortsighted and dangerous.⁴⁴ As a result of China's coercive March 1996 military exercises off Taiwan, ongoing reports of human rights abuses, reputed nuclear weapon technology sales, and continuing violations of copyright, the Clinton administration's fight to maintain its policy of Most Favored Nation (MFN) will be under siege when it comes up for renewal in June 1996.⁴⁵ The Republicans will probably frighten the electorate and label the Clinton administration's China policy as dangerous. In an election year, the vision of a missile firing China will probably be more persuasive than the issue of 150,000 jobs if MFN is maintained.⁴⁶

Australia, like the US, recognizes Tibet as an autonomous region under Chinese rule and both recognize Taiwan on an "unofficial" basis.⁴⁷ From a military perspective it should be noted that Taiwan is conspicuously absent from Australia's defense White

⁴³ Associated Federal Press, "China would fight for Taiwan: Lew Kuan Yew," *The Canberra Times* (Canberra), 12 October 1995, 2.

⁴⁴ James Anderson, "Perils of Growth Mongering," *The Washington Times*, 7 February 1996, A17.

⁴⁵ Melinda Liu and Sam Seibert, "Chinese Fireworks," *Newsweek*, 18 March 1996, 30-33.


⁴⁶ The number of jobs threatened and financial implications of a change from MFN status is contentious. The figure of 150,000 jobs was taken from *Newsweek* but other reports and newspaper articles put the figure much higher.

⁴⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Fact book 1995*. (Washington D.C.: CIA, 1995), 473. (It is interesting that Taiwan's entry in this publication is last in the alphabetical listing of countries).

Paper and is only regarded a brief mention in the US's security strategy.⁴⁸

The following graphs compare China's rate of steel production from 1975 to 1992 as an indicator for modernization, economic development and potential for military expansion, to that of Japan from 1914 to 1939. If Japan could build a force to conquer Asia surely China's capability to assert sovereignty and power status over disputed or resource rich territory is real.

Table 2. Japanese Steel Production 1914 to 1940




Source: W.S. Waytinsky and E.S. Waytinsky, *World Population Trends and Outlook*, (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953):1118

⁴⁸ *Defending Australia*, says that: "In time, opportunities also may arise for constructive contact with Taiwan on defence and security issues." (91) It is interesting and relevant that the new Australian Government (elected 2 March 1996) has immediately been approached by the South Australian state government about the sale of 10 Australian built, state of the art, Collins class diesel submarines to Taiwan. The new Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, speaking on Radio Australia on 28 March, refused to rule-out the possibility of the \$6.5 Billion sale.

Table 3. Chinese Steel Production 1975 to 1992

Millions Metric Tons



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 104th Ed and 113th Ed. (Washington D.C.,
Department of Commerce, 1995): 864

Japan

There is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we have with Japan. It is fundamental to both our Pacific security policy and our global strategic objectives. Our security alliance with Japan is the linchpin of United States security policy in Asia.⁴⁹

The reason Japan is the "linchpin" is complex. Since the end of World War II, the US has maintained a permanent presence in Japan, first as an occupation force, then as a protector, and now as an ally. Therefore, considering Japan is allied to the US, why is Japan a focal point for this paper? The reason is, as Lew Yuan Yew has said, other Asian countries, including China, need the US to maintain its current position in Japan because if Japan is "let go" it will create instability in the region.⁵⁰

Other nations echo Lew Yuan Yew's concerns although some ASEAN countries, Thailand and Indonesia for example, see a pro-western democratic Japan as a counterbalance to growing Chinese power. Similarly these countries see improved ASEAN relations with Russia as a similar counterbalance to China.⁵¹ It is for the reasons of stability, particularly in North Korea, that the US wants to remain in Japan. Similarly, Australia recognizes the importance of continued US presence in Japan although it does recognize that "Japan will eventually become more active in security issues in the region."⁵² The table below summarizes how various Asian people perceive modern Japan.

⁴⁹ Department of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 10.

⁵⁰ Lew Yuan Yew, "China would fight for Taiwan: Lew Yuan Yew." *The Canberra Times* (Canberra), 12 October 1995, 2.

⁵¹ Robert Karnol, "Second ARF Security Summit held in Brunei," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, (August 1995): 20.

⁵² *Defending Australia*, 91.

Table 4. How is Japan Perceived in Asia?

City	Has come to be trusted by Asia?		Has Japan compensated for its war time actions?
	Yes (%)	No (%)	No (%)
Bangkok	79	21	28
Beijing	15	85	70
Jakarta	85	15	26
Manila	55	45	48
Seoul	39	61	92
Singapore	62	38	55
Shanghai	21	79	70

Source: Survey conducted by *Asahi Shimbun*, interviewing about 800 people in each city. Published in *The Australian*, 15 August 1995.

The paper discusses the future of the Japan-US alliance in chapter four. At this point it is necessary to explain just how significant a player Japan is in any security equation. The Japan of 1996 is a world economic superpower. "In total Gross National Product, Japan ranks just behind the United States as the second richest nation on earth. On a per-capita basis, the Japanese have far surpassed the Americans, with per-capita income of \$31,450 (US), compared with \$25,135 (US) in the United States ...[which are] the latest figures available."⁵³ How did Japan achieve such incredible wealth from a country shattered by war fifty years ago and bereft of natural resources? The answer to this is a combination of its human resource that is so resilient, hardworking and

⁵³

T.R. Reid and Paul Blustein, "Japan's 50-Year 'Miracle': From Rubble to Riches." *The Washington Post*, 15 August 1995, A1, A14.

committed, and, while other nations spent heavily on defense during the Cold War, Japan enjoyed the protective umbrella of the US. Japan concentrated solely on its economic development.

In the 1990's, Japan has become less politically isolated.⁵⁴ It has played intermediary and enhancement roles in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, Japan was host to the summit to reestablish the Cambodian government, and after much effort in 1992 the Japanese government passed a bill to let Japanese troops serve abroad with the United Nations' peacekeeping force in Cambodia.⁵⁵ While this has occurred, Japan's economic involvement has shifted from the US to Asia.⁵⁶ As for military isolation, Japan's defense budget is now, behind the US's, the worlds second largest although its only one percent of GDP.⁵⁷ With the funds available and because of external threats, principally North Korea's ballistic missile capability, Japan's Self Defense Force has modernized its defense systems. Of particular note was on 28 July 1993 Japan's Foreign Minister remarked that Japan must have the will to build nuclear weapons to defend itself against North Korea and conveyed an intent for discussions with the US for a ballistic missile defense system. The technology and means to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ballistic missile defenses and power projection forces are undoubtedly available in Japan. This is very impressive, but the brake is Japan's post

⁵⁴ *Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook*, 599.

⁵⁵ Joint ventures with China have become more numerous and Japan began implementing a six year \$US5.442 billion aid package in 1990. See *Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook*, 599.

⁵⁶ Frank Ching, "The Dynamics of Tripartite Relations: Economic Dimensions," Lecture presented at the 1996 Pacific Symposium. Washington, DC, 13-14 February 1996.

⁵⁷ IISS, *The Military Balance 1994-1995*, X.

World War II constitution which is containing Japan's military capability and therefore its role in maintaining peace.

Its post World War II constitution and its alliance with the US contain Japan. Evidence that Japan is tired and frustrated of this constraint is apparent. "A low key, three year effort by Japan to define a strong role for itself in Asia has come up short, with its chief rival in the region, China, emerging as the new giant."⁵⁸ A poll published in the Japanese *Asahi* newspaper in August 1994 sought opinion on which country would have the most influence in Asia next century; the poll results were 40% for China, 30% for US and only 16% for Japan.⁵⁹

The reasons for the perceived lack of influence are Japan's relatively declining economy (the World Bank in 1995, estimated that China's economy is already 20% larger than Japan's), its inability to negotiate a favorable settlement with Russia over the disputed Kurile Islands (see Map 1), and its inability to "knit a web of alliances to contain China, starting with Japan's strongest regional ally [ASEAN]."⁶⁰ Part of the reason for Japan's perceived impunity may be its diluted efforts to apologize to its neighbors, particularly the Koreans, for its conduct in World War II. Although former Prime Minister Murayama, Japan's first socialist Prime Minister in forty-seven years, wanted to use the 50th anniversary of the end of the war to settle reparations and send a deep apology, Parliament thwarted his efforts. His party was only a coalition member of the Government and the move was not unanimous. "The impasse over history, however,

⁵⁸ Edith Terry, "China Checks Japan's Power in Asia." *The Christian Science Monitor*, 10 January 1995, 7.
⁵⁹ Terry, 7.
⁶⁰ Terry, 10.

bodes ill for the current course of this nation ... President Kim Young Sam of South Korea and officials in China have told Japan that they will consider the planned resolution an important sign of Japan's thinking on peace and security in Asia,"⁶¹ if and when an apology is forthcoming. A state of tension continues between these nations and North Korea.

Finally, before moving to the next focal area, the US and regional countries cannot ignore Japan's reliance on imported raw materials, especially oil, as a catalyst for future conflict. Many of Japan's imports have to pass through the disputed areas of the South China Sea.

Indonesia

Whereas much of the discussion on Japan reflected the importance of the United States, the swing to Indonesia in South East Asia has more immediate significance to Australia.

Indonesia is particularly important to the security of Australia and in the strategic affairs of South-East Asia. As its economy grows, it will become increasingly influential in Asia and the Pacific ... The stability, cohesion, economic growth and positive approach to the region which have characterized Indonesia's environment since 1965 have contributed much to the stable and generally benign strategic environment which has prevailed in South-East Asia since the end of the Vietnam War. This, in turn, had done much to ensure that the demands on Australia's defense planning have remained manageable.⁶²

Australia sees Indonesia as a "shield" to the northern approach to its immense natural resources. This view is contrary to the time of the 1960's confrontation in Malaysia that reinforced the idea that Indonesia could pose a threat to Australia. The 19

⁶¹ Sam Jameson, "Japanese Politicians Fail to Agree on WWII Statement." *The Los Angeles Times*, 3 June 1995, A10.

⁶² *Defending Australia*, 86-87.

December 1995 "Defense Treaty" between Australia and Indonesia has surprised Australians and Americans alike.⁶³ Chapter Three discusses Australia's treaties and relationship with the US; at this point, however, understanding why good relations with Indonesia are so important to Australia is significant.

President Suharto has led Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, with an iron fist since he came to power in 1968. Like Deng Xiaoping in China, Suharto's successor is a point of much debate in the Asia-Pacific area. However, the US and Australia generally agree that his successor will, like him, come from the military.⁶⁴ Military leadership generally invokes ideas of dictatorship and repression, not democracy and peace, for which Australia and the US are looking. Moreover, as alluded to in the introduction, relationships with people of different cultural, religious, and historical background, and perhaps aspirations, are not the norms. Yet when one looks at Asia as a whole, they are not all "Asians" - there are: Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Taoists, Shintos, Confucianists, Christians and Jews. Therefore, it makes sense for Australia to be friendly with a neighboring nation of 230 million Muslims rather than be a foe.⁶⁵ It seems that the US and Australia can overlook human rights violations when economic interests or power is at stake. For instance, as previously mentioned, the US maintains

⁶³ Mr Bob Hutcheson, Overseas Security Department, Department of Defense, The Pentagon. Interview with the author, 22 December 1995. Mr Hutcheson explained that former Chief of the Australian Defence Force, General Peter Gration, was in Washington (he thought) to brief key security officials on the details of the Treaty. No coverage appeared in any Washington newspaper. Also, in a letter from Lieutenant Colonel M.P. Crane, Staff Officer, Strategy and Concepts, Headquarters Australian Defence Force, 23 December 1995, there was no foreshadowing of this event.

⁶⁴ *Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook*, 532.

⁶⁵ Dennis Warner, "Living with Asia," *Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter* (March-April 1995):16.

MFN status with China even when the US documents continued human rights abuses and exports of missile technology.⁶⁶ For Australia, it has carefully avoided the situation on East Timor, where since 1975, more than one-sixth of its population has died in civil confrontation with the Indonesian military.⁶⁷

From a security perspective the new treaty could have been easy to reach if they perceived China as a common threat to both countries. This point, while probably relevant, has, for fear of Chinese and probably Malaysian repercussions, not been articulated. While Australia and Indonesia have both had "frosty" relations with China, Suharto has only just restored Indonesia's relationship with China after they cut bilateral diplomatic relations after the Tiananmen Square incident. It makes sense for Australia that a treaty with Indonesia is a shield against Chinese expansion. Interestingly, in an interview with Mr Paul Berkowitz, a Congressional Advisor on the House International Relations Committee, when asked about combining US and Australian efforts to hedge against Chinese expansion in Asia he commented: "Australians do not voice displeasure at China when the Chinese break Australian/US Memorandum of Understandings - for example when evidence was found of China exporting ballistic missile parts to Iran, they [Australia] elected to keep a lid on it ... Australia prefers no provocation that might hurt trade ... any mention of a word that resembles containment, we stop dialogue."⁶⁸

⁶⁶ The current interdependence of the Chinese and American economies was made clear when President Clinton decided in 1994, after considerable thought, to delink MFN and human rights, recognizing that America cannot damage the Chinese economy without serious damage to its own. From Frank Ching, "The Dynamics of Tripartite Relations: Economic Dimensions," Lecture presented at the 1996 Pacific Symposium. Washington, DC, 13-14 February 1996.

⁶⁷ *Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook*, 532.

⁶⁸ Mr Paul Berkowitz, Advisor, House International Relations Committee.

Although Mr Berkowitz was not specific, his comments implied that the Australian representatives, more so than the American, avoided discussion that implied reduced business with China. This suggests that at the working level, security discussions are stymied between Australia and the US and there is a reluctance to "heat" the debate, jeopardize the current "engagement" strategy, or more importantly, risk trade.

While Indonesia has steadily increased its prosperity, it has ongoing disputes in East Timor and in Irian Jaya, which wants reunification with its ethnic relations in Papua New Guinea. The US Defense Department does not list these disputes in the unclassified US security strategy for East Asia-Pacific. While this is so, Indonesia does share the US's uncertainty about Chinese territorial ambitions in the South China Sea, and the build up of Indian military power. To counter this uncertainty, the Indonesian military is modernizing, training as a joint force, and engaging in international training activities.⁶⁹ The US is a major trading partner for Indonesia, and maintains normal diplomatic relations. Strategically, for the US, Indonesia controls the western side of the critical Straits of Malacca that lead into the South China Sea.⁷⁰

Summary

This chapter has outlined three major focal areas in the security debate concerning the Asia-Pacific region. The discussion has scrutinized China, Japan and Indonesia because, for different reasons, they will be most influential on the paper's central hypothesis of implications to Australia's security if the US's regional military

Interview with the author, 12 December 1995.

⁶⁹ Indonesian paratroopers participated in the combined military exercise, KANGAROO 95, in Australia in July/August 1995.

⁷⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, 199,200.


engagement declines. Pressure on the US to maintain a "lid" on Chinese expansion is critical. Without it, not only Australia and the US but many other nations' prosperity will diminish. Recognizing this is important for Australia; Australia needs to do what it can to keep the US engaged. From the discussion, the potential for conflict in the South China Sea is foremost. Fuses for this powder keg are many. North Korea's fuse is short and relatively unstable but is checked by Japan's status quo. China's fuse is probably longer but unpredictable, its ignition force is more powerful as communist ideology shifts to nationalist fervor. Countries with strategic and economic interests associated with the Sea are reluctant openly to hedge against Chinese sovereignty ambitions because of the inextricable link between peaceful relations with China and prosperity. China's emerging economy epitomizes the link between economic strength and international power.

The following Table shows the growth trends in the economies of developing Asia compared with the rest of the world. Asia's economic performance is unmatched as is their relative modernization and technological development. Their manufacturing, transport, communications and other infrastructures have substantially developed.⁷¹

71 Ross Babbage, "Trends in Asia-Pacific Security." In *The Army and the Future*. Ed. David Horner, 47-48. Canberra: Directorate of Departmental Publications, Defence Centre, 1993.

Table 5. Trends in Asian Economic Development

GDP Percentage Growth



Source: Asian Market Atlas, Business International Asia/Pacific Ltd, Hong Kong,

Chapter Three

The United States-Australia Relationship and Australia's Security Strategy

Purpose

This chapter's purpose is to outline why Australia has a close relationship with the US, identify the key issues that will impinge on Australia from the issues discussed in the previous chapter, and summarize Australia's security strategy and its shortcomings. The discussion reveals why a continued US presence in Asia-Pacific is vital for Australia's security.

Background

The term security is used frequently in this discussion; its definition is very broad nowadays. It encompasses military and nonmilitary elements. "Comprehensive security covers political, economic and defense dimensions. That is, a nation has to be politically stable, economically strong and resilient, its population united and strong-willed, and last, but not least, it has to be militarily sufficient."⁷² For Australia to achieve security it has to achieve these things itself, and above all, ensure the region is conducive to enable it to happen. On this basis Australia has had to seek assistance to be militarily self-sufficient because its geography dictates that the other factors, no matter how strong, cannot overcome the fact that it is a huge country with only a small population to protect immense natural resources.

⁷² The Hon. Datuk Seri Mohamed Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak, "Towards Cooperative Security and Regional Stability, the Malaysian View." *The Army and the Future*. Ed. David Horner, 136. (Canberra: Directorate of Departmental Publications, 1993).

Australia shifted its military alliance focus from Britain to the US after the fall of Singapore in 1942. From this time, until the US withdrew from Vietnam in the early 1970's and adopted the Nixon inspired "Guam" or forward presence doctrine, Australia had a global perspective that the "superpower" would protect it from the communists.⁷³ After the US withdrawal from Vietnam, until today, two ideas -- forward defense with allies or continental defense in depth -- have produced divergent opinions and pressures on the formulation of security policy and force structure.⁷⁴ Proponents of the former idea argue that forward defense with allies, like MacArthur used in 1942, would gain ascendancy; particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, because structuring for it would be cheaper and easier than a force required for continental defense. This did not happen. The preeminent defense paper that has led to Australia's current posture and policy is the 1987 "Defence White Paper." In this document the focus is "self-reliance" and continental defense, and it emphasizes that the Government should only procure defense capabilities if they are relevant to this strategy.⁷⁵ The Government has subsequently conducted a review of the force structure in 1990-91, and after the Soviet collapse, it revisited security and issued new guidance in *Defending Australia, Defence White Paper 1994*.

⁷³ Following the 1957 Suez Crises, the Australian Prime Minister, Menzies, announced that US standards and equipment would serve as the future guide for Australian armed forces. *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates*, 6 Elizabeth II, 572-5, 4 April 1957.

⁷⁴ Thomas-Durrell Young, "Australia's Defence Planning after the Cold War," *The Pacific Review*, Vol.4 No.3 (July 1991): 222.

⁷⁵ Department of Defence (Australia), *The Defence of Australia*, 1987, (Canberra, AGPS, 1987): 6-9.

This latest document builds on the 1987 focus of continental defense and self-reliance; it stresses the requirement to "engage" in the region to ensure that it is stable and trouble free. *Defending Australia* hinges on the assumption Australia would get ten years notice of a sizable threat that would require up to twenty-five divisions to counter.⁷⁶ While defense planners have validated this assumption, one must question what constitutes the sizable threat and how they identify the "start point". As discussed, the intent component of threat can change very quickly so the emphasis for defense planners has been on adversarial capabilities, although this paper argues that they should not lose sight of the ingredients of intent. Australia's current defense preparedness for self-reliance is inadequate, and the Government should form a stronger mutual alliance with a country that shares similar interests, values and ethnicity, like the US.

Treaties and Agreements

Defending Australia conveys a strong message that the US will remain the strongest military power in the world, for at least the fifteen years covered by the paper. Further, "it will be a key influence in the security of Asia and the Pacific; and it will have a central place in any multilateral security arrangements which emerge and in the negotiation and implementation of arms control and disarmament measures ... with the passing of Cold War certainties, we will need to work hard to make sure that the alliance continues to meet the needs of both parties."⁷⁷ The basis for this statement is the Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty (ANZUS). The three countries ratified the

⁷⁶ General Douglas MacArthur and Australia's planners thought 25 divisions would be the minimum required to defend continental Australia from the Japanese in 1942.

⁷⁷ *Defending Australia*, 95-96.

ANZUS security treaty on 29 April 1952. The need for such a treaty arose from a requirement of the Australian and New Zealand Governments to guarantee national security if the US and Japan concluded a moderate peace treaty. It also reflected steady development of the relationship between Australia and the US that this paper has discussed.⁷⁸ Two articles of the treaty have particular significance for this discussion:

Article II. In order to more effectively achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III. The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Clearly, these articles point to no NATO-like agreement that guarantees that the US would come to the aid of Australia if it, or one of its territories like Christmas Island, was attacked; or if a conflict in the South China Sea, which cut Australia's vital export routes, would mean immediate US intervention. The words mean that no party is bound to make any specific contribution to the defense capacity of the other, at any particular time or over any given period.⁷⁹ ANZUS essentially relies on the good faith of each party, and for the United States, especially considering recent debate, it must have an interest. Before briefly looking at other treaties that impinge on US-Australian relations, saying that US good faith seems assured is important, and as stated in the introduction,

⁷⁸ J.G. Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), 1-4, 36,46-62.

⁷⁹ L. Oppenheim, *International Law, Vol 1, Peace* (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1955), 966-7.

common ancestry, values and interests are also meaningful. In an interview, Congressmen Paul

McHale, a Member of the House National Security Committee enunciated this faith:

It is my belief any President of the United States, within the mainstream of American political thought, would be prepared to argue, and would argue successfully to the American people that a military threat to Australia would warrant the military intervention of the United States, including an intervention that might well result in American casualties. While in the short term we have a focus in the Balkans, in the long term, the true national security interest of the United States, both militarily and economically will be focused on the Pacific Rim.⁸⁰

While Congressman McHale argued that the US would most likely intervene if military forces threatened Australia, when asked about the possibility of intervening in Cambodia, because democracy is again under pressure, his answer was concise: ".... the likelihood of a deployment anywhere in South-East Asia is remote to nonexistent. If it was a hard sell to get troops to Bosnia, it would be an impossible argument for Cambodia."⁸¹

The US, like Australia, is more at ease engaging with democratic countries like Japan. Historically democratic countries talk, are open and thus expose or reveal any "intent" toward hostilities. With non-democratic countries, China for instance, it is much harder to gauge "intent", therefore planners and policy makers should "weight" capability to factor against unclear intent.

⁸⁰ McHale, The Honorable Paul. Member United States House of Representatives and Member House National Security Committee. Interview by author, 12 December 1995.

⁸¹ See Footnote 80.

With the discussion now focused on South-East Asia, mentioning Australia's other treaties in this region is appropriate -- first, the "Five Power Defence Arrangement" (FPDA). The British Government originally conceived the FPDA in 1967-68 as a transitional measure to sustain confidence in Malaysia and Singapore in the aftermath of the confrontation with Indonesia. It was to give assurances to these countries that the British withdrawal from east of the Suez would not leave them at risk. Delegates from the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and Great Britain signed the Agreement in 1971, and they undertook continued cooperation in their respective defense policies. If any force attacked Malaysia or Singapore, the governments would immediately consult on the measures that they should take jointly or separately in response to the attack.⁸² The US has a treaty relationship with Great Britain and New Zealand, but only recent cooperation agreements with Malaysia and Singapore.⁸³

Australia's other treaties include the Radford Collins Agreement, which provides a military plan for the implementation of Allied naval control and protection of shipping as required in the Indian and Pacific Oceans; the Joint Declaration of Principles, a 1987 bilateral agreement between Australia and Papua New Guinea; and lastly, a bilateral agreement with Indonesia, signed in 1995. In respect to the latter, a report in *The Straits*

⁸² Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Army), *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, (Sydney: HQ Training Command, 1993), 54-55.

⁸³ The US has signed a three year agreement to use Singapore as a base for logistics for naval operations. (Combined Task Force 73). This assists the Navy's forward presence in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea, but it is nothing like a Subic Bay facility. Malaysia has offered the US facilities for the repair and maintenance of warships on a commercial basis. See The Hon. Datuk Seri Mohamed Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak, 132.

Times says that Jakarta has downplayed the agreement with Australia, saying it is not a defense or military pact but an agreement for cooperation in defense and security.⁸⁴ The US published *Defense News* and the Australian press reported the 19 December 1995 signing of the security agreement as a mutually beneficial arrangement and would help "bond" Washington with Indonesia because of Canberra's ties with Washington.⁸⁵ The Australian Prime Minister at this time, Paul Keating, supported the *Straits Times*' view when they quoted him saying the "[the agreement] is not a defense pact or alliance with an automatic agreement on support in the event of an attack."⁸⁶ The Joint Declaration of Principles is similar to the ANZUS and FPDA Treaties in that an armed attack on any party does not mean automatic defense assistance.

Australia's bilateral and multilateral security treaties are noncommittal. There is no NATO style multilateral treaty in Asia. This is not a surprise when considering the factors discussed in the previous chapter, particularly the different ethnicity of the region and the reluctance to recognize a common threat for fear of economic ruin. However, a nationalist China, looking for sovereignty over disputed territory or resources will threaten Australia's security and its economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, although not stated, there is a strong argument to encourage Japan to take a more assertive security role and to ensure Russia remains committed to the region. Because Australia has little influence on these issues, keeping the US engaged is vital,

⁸⁴ Reuter, AFP, "Indonesia and Australia seal security agreement," *The Straits Times Weekly Edition*, 23 December 1995, 11.

⁸⁵ Gregor Ferguson, "Indonesia's Australia Accord May Boost US Link," *Defense News*, 18-24 December 1995, 3.

⁸⁶ Ferguson, 11.

and engaged not just economically but militarily. Rather than enhancing Jakarta's bond in Washington, Australia's recent treaty with Indonesia may send mixed messages to Washington, namely a perception in "foggy bottom" that the US's South Asia-Pacific influence is waning.

While not a security treaty like an alliance, Australia's efforts to thwart other countries' nuclear ambitions by instigating and ratifying the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ) combined with its recent efforts through the World Court to make the construction and use of nuclear weapons illegal has clashed with US policies. The 1995/96 French nuclear tests in the South Pacific were catalysts for Australia's latest anti-nuclear moves. Unlike in 1986, when Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke made a direct plea to the US President to intervene in the highly charged debate,⁸⁷ the 1995 Australian protests to Washington were at a lower level. If President Clinton had attended the October 1995 Osaka, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, Prime Minister Keating may have raised the issue.⁸⁸ Despite this and Australia's concerns about Chinese nuclear proliferation there is little evidence that the US has curtailed its nuclear deterrence policy. Although Australia warmly received President Bush's policy to remove tactical nuclear weapons from ships and submarines, the US's efforts on counter proliferation (in North Korea and Iraq for example), although high on the national security agenda, are not well publicized in Australia.⁸⁹ Furthermore, Australia has

⁸⁷ Brian L. Kavanagh, *The Changing Western Alliance in the South Pacific* (Maxwell: Air University Press, 1987), 32.

⁸⁸ Michael Crane, Staff Officer Strategy and Concepts, HQ Australian Defence Force. Interview by author, 14 October 1995.

⁸⁹ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, (Washington: US Printing Office, 1994), i, 1,11-12.

enjoyed fifty years of protection that the US nuclear umbrella provides, and observers could construe its stance on France's nuclear tests as hypocritical, considering the revenue raised by uranium sales to France.⁹⁰

ASEAN and APEC

The definition of security at the beginning of this chapter stresses the significance of economics and its obvious links to a country's prosperity. The governments of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines established the Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 as an organization to "promote economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in South-East Asia."⁹¹ It was not until 1994 when the ASEAN governments agreed to establish a splinter security organization, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF is the forum where security, including military security, is discussed away from the main ASEAN agenda. They probably accelerated this shift as early as 1979 after ASEAN tried to assure one of its members, Thailand, that it would not be threatened by a destabilized Cambodia.⁹²

Australia and the US have bilateral security links with all but two of the ASEAN members; the US with Thailand and the Philippines, Australia with Singapore, Malaysia (FPDA) and now Indonesia. The only ASEAN countries without a link are Brunei and Vietnam. Current US and Australian security policies recognize the potential for a

⁹⁰ In a surprise move the US, Great Britain and France signed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in Suva, Fiji, on 25 March 1996. The signing should help repair strained Australian / French relations. See "France, Britain, U.S. Sign Pacific Anti-Nuclear Pact." *The Washington Post*, 26 March 1996, A17.

⁹¹ Richard Woolcott, "ASEAN: Why it matters," *The Weekend Australian* (Sydney), 23-24 December, 29.

⁹² Woolcott, 29.

multilateral arrangement, but there is considerable opposition to such a move, from within ASEAN, Australia and the US.⁹³ Former US President George Bush said succinctly that there was no common threat in Asia (compared with the old Soviet threat in Europe) and a NATO like arrangement in Asia excluding some parties would be counterproductive. The US and Australia still recognize this and more effort is directed to expansion of bilateral arrangements and regional "engagement."

The APEC forum, like ASEAN, is principally for economic cooperation, but this paper has explained the economic link to security. However, commentary by former US Ambassador to China and now by US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord, appears a little skewed when it argues;" strengthening APEC is the cornerstone of Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, but it will not become a security organization."⁹⁴ Australia, on the other hand ,sees APEC as a critical establishment for Asia-Pacific security because economic interdependence leads to mutual trust and confidence.⁹⁵ The paper revisits APEC in chapter four where the discussion focuses on the implications of the attention given to China over the US by delegates at the October 1995 APEC summit.

⁹³ See the *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 12-13 and *Defending Australia*, 93.

⁹⁴ Winston Lord, "US Goals in the Asia Pacific Region." *Asia in the 21st Century*. Ed. Michael D. Bellows, 14-15. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994.

⁹⁵ *Defending Australia*, 8.

Australia's Strategy of Self-Reliance

The rationale for developing a strategy of "self-reliance" in the Australian 1987 White Paper (see p34.) was based on the requirement for continental defense. There is, of course, nothing wrong with adopting this strategy, especially when the government assumes that no country can mount a major threat against the continent in the next ten years. However, in reality, recent exercises have proven that Australia requires allied support in key areas to defend the continent even against the lower level of the threat spectrum.⁹⁶ The Government and Defence Department calls these threats "short warning" contingencies.

If the lessons learnt from the large KANGAROO series of exercises, held in the North of Australia every three years, are of any relevance, they point to critical inadequacies in self-reliance. In 1989, 1992 and 1995 the Defense Department officially showed that the ADF can defend its sovereignty over a *short period* but only with considerable assistance from the US.⁹⁷ The recently retired Australian Chief of the General Staff, General Grey, backed up this opinion, when he said Australia needed a powerful friend (US) to provide air defense, early warning (AWACS), operational/strategic mobility, and until Australia sorts out its Reserve system, manpower.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ The document outlining the 'short warning' threats to Australia is classified. Needless to say, however, it is less than existing regional capabilities and does not include ballistic missiles.

⁹⁷ The major inadequacies are in target acquisition, air, ground and sea; tactical and operational level mobility (US Marines provided hovercraft and light armored vehicles in K95); and inadequate forces to cover all possible approaches.

⁹⁸ Cameron Stewart, "We can't Defend Ourselves - General," *The Australian* (Sydney), 5 December 1995, 2.

Although the Australian Department of Defence classifies the official post activity report for KANGAROO '95, it is likely that the conduct of land operations will probably come under the closest scrutiny.⁹⁹ The exercise tested the concept of defense-in-depth, an extraordinarily difficult task over such a vast continent. Participants proved that defense communications, vital for command and control of dispersed operations, were inadequate and ground forces were forced to use the civilian telephone network.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, although it is not reported, the Australian Army lacks tactical and operational level mobility to respond to any detected incursion. The ADF recognizes this mobility deficiency and the Australian Army is addressing it, but gains in mobility can only be effective if target acquisition is efficient. Although Australia can access US satellite information at the strategic level, if Australia had closer ties with the US it could make use of the excellent operational and tactical level acquisition and dissemination capabilities that the US possesses. Perhaps to attain this, Australia should provide something the US does not have easy access to, such as a large training area.

Defending Australia does recognize that self-reliance is a strategic reality because Australia's alliances, as discussed, do not guarantee assistance.¹⁰¹ However, the White Paper goes on to explain that "diplomatic support and cooperation with friends and allies are critical for "our own efforts for the defence of Australia."¹⁰² Moreover, it admits that

⁹⁹ Kevin Wolfe, "Kangaroo 95 - surveillance operations highlighted," *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, (November-December 1995):14.

¹⁰⁰ Wolfe, 15.

¹⁰¹ *Defending Australia*, 13.

¹⁰² *Defending Australia*, 15.

“...the undertakings in the ANZUS Treaty, and the United States' strong record of standing by its allies, means that we would expect substantial and invaluable help in a crises.”¹⁰³ The comments made by Congressman McHale (see p37) support this, but if the US is unable to sustain already reduced forces in the Pacific, how can Australia "plan" on immediate support, identified as so necessary for the short warning defense of the continent and its offshore dependencies? The paper addresses the realities of this question in the next chapter. The relevance of interrelationships between China, Japan and Indonesia discussed in the previous chapter will become more evident. Is Australia's new treaty with Indonesia a hedge against US withdrawal?

Recent security debate in Australia has swung between the lack of capability of self-reliance and Australia's posturing to be "Asian." The just replaced Prime Minister, Mr Keating, accused the then liberal/National coalition opposition of "pointing a gun" at the South East Asian region because they have taken a pro-US, anti-Asian defense strategy that is more relevant to the 60's than 90's.¹⁰⁴ The coalition countered with arguments that a policy to shift attention to North Asia and boost military ties with the US was not anti-Asian, but responsive to the current and projected situations.¹⁰⁵ Coalition leader, now Prime Minister, Mr Howard, has said that Australia is missing investment opportunities in Asia by not developing closer ties with North Asia (China, South Korea and Japan). He has not alluded to the reasons why boosting ties with the US is critical. Perhaps the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, has said it for him. "It is difficult to

¹⁰³ *Defending Australia*, 96.

¹⁰⁴ Cameron Stewart, "Liberals' Defence Policy Not Anti-Asia: Downer," *The Australian* (Sydney), 9 October 1995, 1.

¹⁰⁵ Cameron Stewart, 1.

define Australia as an Asian nation," referring to his often publicized views that there are vast cultural differences between "Asians" and Australians, different styles of diplomacy, and Australia has a tendency to lecture Asian nations.¹⁰⁶ As stated in the introduction and as postulated by Samuel Huntington, historically and in the future, conflict is likely to be along ethnic lines.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Richard Woolcott, 29.

¹⁰⁷ Samuel Huntington, "A Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, (Summer 1993): 22-49.

Chapter Four

The United States' Security Strategy for East Asia-Pacific - Continued Engagement?

Current Strategy

The US Department of Defense published the United States' security strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region in February 1995. As a joint Defense and State Department document, it closely follows the content, intent and style of the *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, published by the White House in July 1994. "Engagement" refers to using all elements of national power to strengthen alliances and friendships, while "Enlargement" translates to "democratization" of the globe. The White House's central goals are to enhance security by maintaining a strong defense capability, promoting cooperative security measures, opening foreign markets and spurring global economic growth, and finally, to promote democracy abroad.¹⁰⁸

President Clinton was elected in 1992 because Americans are concerned about the future; they are worried about America's relative decline as an economic force.¹⁰⁹ As this paper has argued that economics inextricably links national security, the US's preeminent position as the only post Cold War true global military power may be being usurped and made irrelevant. However, the US Defense Department argues that US military presence has provided, and will continue to provide, the secure environment in Asia and the Pacific that is necessary for the region's continued growth and the spinoffs the US receives.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington: The White House, 1994): i, ii.

¹⁰⁹ Douglas A Hartwick, "America's Asia Policy." *Essays on Strategy XII*. Ed. John, N. Petrie, 46. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994.

¹¹⁰ Joseph S. Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs*, (July/August 1995): 90,91.

Contrary to opinion, economic figures show the US has a trade deficit with Asia,¹¹¹ but specific US interests in Asia are: investment by US companies attracted by the expanding market, particularly in China; and three million jobs in the US.¹¹²

The "secure environment" that the US security strategy stresses is provided by a commitment to provide "a force structure requiring approximately 100,000 personnel in Asia... [and] modernization initiatives to improve flexibility and lethality of all our forces."¹¹³ Moreover, the Defense Department has based the US strategy for the military to be able to fight "two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies" (MRC), on the likelihood of a west Asian conflict and the containment and subsequent prosecution of a conflict on the Korean peninsula. This strategy is driving Pentagon force structure and joint doctrine. The security strategy further postulates:

- Almost every country in the region views a continuing United States military presence as a stabilizing force.¹¹⁴
- United States efforts in arms reduction will prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- In thinking about the Asia-Pacific region, security comes first, and a committed United States presence will continue to serve as a bedrock for America's security role in this dynamic area of the world.
- There is no more important bilateral relationship than the US's one with Japan. The security alliance with Japan is the linchpin of United States policy in Asia.

¹¹¹ The Security Strategy states that the Pacific Rim is, collectively, "the United States' largest trading partner." This is misleading because it would include South America and Canada. According to budget estimates exports are increasing to Asia, but imports from Asia are rising at a faster rate.

¹¹² *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 2,3.

¹¹³ *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 32.

¹¹⁴ *Defending Australia*, 8.

- Work with ASEAN and others to explore new "cooperative security" approaches through the ARF.
- Engage China and support its constructive integration into the international community... and foster transparency in its defense policy and military activities.

In summary, the major components of the US strategy for peace and prosperity in the East Asia-Pacific region are the continued military presence and economic and diplomatic engagement. Postulating which component of national power is most important is interesting. Perhaps the view taken by a congressional policy advisor is insightful: "Asians respect actions not words."¹¹⁵ Dr Cha Young-Koo supports this view; the Director of Arms Control Research Center at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses says that the actual presence of US forces in Asia has not only "prevented a spiraling regional arms race, but has also put a tight lid on the development of independent military capabilities of each regional actor."¹¹⁶ Therefore, there is a strong view that continued US military presence in the Asia Pacific region is not only vital for Australia, but for continued regional peace and prosperity. However, to counter Dr Cha Young-Koo's view that the US presence has prevented an "arms race" in Asia, one only has to look at any number of journals that cite defense procurements. For instance, Singapore's defense budget has grown by 91 percent between 1986 and 1994, Malaysia has bought MiG 29s and F/A 18s as well as missile carrying vessels, and many countries including Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan are in the market for submarines.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Jason E. Bruzdinski, Professional Staff Member, House National Security Committee. Interview by author, 12 December 1995.

¹¹⁶ Cha Young-Koo, "Security Strategy of South Korea." *Asia in the 21st Century*. Ed. Michael D. Bellows, 78. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994.

¹¹⁷ "Asia's Arms-Trade Boom." *Foreign Report*, 7 March 1996, 3-4.

The purpose of the remainder of this chapter is to explore the reasons why the US probably cannot sustain its current military presence in the East Asia-Pacific region and suggest some alternatives. The discussion settles toward the emerging relevance and significance of Japan and China in Asia-Pacific security equations.

The Domestic Focus - Balance the Budget and Will

For the US, like any democratic nation, it must have the will and the means to fight a war in the East Asia-Pacific region. National treasure provides the means --money and manpower. For one of the oldest democracies, it is erroneous that the President has the power to commit military forces without the vote of the constituent's representatives in Congress. Bosnia has been an example of this power.

The emerging determining factor for the will component of military force is "national interest." Interestingly, Congressman McHale, during an interview with the author, stated that common ancestry and values would make a US commitment to defend Australia an easy sell, whereas convincing Americans that expenditure of national treasure on defense of an "Asian" country or region would be harder.¹¹⁸ Selling an ethnic-based reason for interest is politically hard, so economics is usually at the forefront. However, in reality, ethnicity, while not prevailing over economics, is undoubtedly a significant factor.

Recent commentary by a *Washington Post* journalist, T.R. Reid, says emerging confidence in Asia is ethnic based. No longer do "Asians" aspire to be like Americans,

¹¹⁸ See Footnote 80.

but their own lives and values are better and divergent from America.¹¹⁹ However, consider Japan and the view of Dr Toshiyuki Shikata, a former Japanese Self Defense Force Lieutenant General and now Senior Research Associate at the Japanese Institute for International Policy Studies:

During the years of the Cold War, Japan desired to come back to the West by means of economic development ... [although] the attention of the world is shifting to a rapidly developing and dynamic Asia, for Japan, the old option of a 'return to Asia' is no more. The people of Japan are increasingly internalizing not only Western values but also the universal values dear to all mankind.¹²⁰

However, speaking for the remainder of East-Asia, Singapore's former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, suggests that American military presence in East Asia is of declining value because "nobody believes that an American government that could not sustain its mission in Somalia because of an ambush and one television snippet of a dead American pulled through the streets of Mogadishu could contemplate a strike on North Korean nuclear facilities like the Israeli strike on Iraq."¹²¹ Being objective about an issue that involves human nature is hard, and to dismiss the utility of American military force in East Asia-Pacific on this basis alone is probably folly. For instance, George Bush managed to secure Congressional support, just, for the US deployment to the Gulf in

¹¹⁹ T.R. Reid, "Confucius Says: Go East, Young Man," *The Washington Post*, 19 November 1995, C2.

¹²⁰ Toshiyuki Shikata, "Japan's Grand Strategy in the Succeeding Era." *Asia in the 21st Century*. Ed. Michael D. Bellows, 69-70. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994.


¹²¹ See Chalmers Johnson and EB. Keehn, "The U.S. in East Asia: Stay of Go?" *Foreign Affairs*, (July/August, 1995): 105.

1990, to stop Iraq's hegemonic ambitions. America's interest was economics and power, not protection of Anglo-Saxons or democracy.

At the start of this section it stated that the US must possess the means to fight to deter or win war. A country derives the means from national wealth. In the US, Congress controls the national wealth although the Executive sends the plans for expenditure to Congress via Presidential concurrence. Although his campaign did not say it, President Bush's first defense budget proposals sent to Congress signaled a change from the big spending Reagan years.¹²² He had realized that the budget deficit was contributing to the US economy's relative decline. Bush's attempt to reduce the deficit was stymied by very poor growth figures, and increases in non-defense spending offsetting decreases in discretionary defense expenditure. To compound the defense issue was the "loss of way" for the Defense Department following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The electorate wanted a "peace dividend" but the unemployment shock of suddenly cutting acquisition and operating costs would affect domestic politics and output. Therefore, the largest reduction in defense was in personnel costs. Active-duty personnel were reduced by 320,000 between 1992-1995 with a similar cut in Reserves. Table 6 shows the planned spending reductions.

¹²² Dennis S. Ippolito, *Blunting the Sword: Budget Policy and the Future of Defense*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1994): 40.

Table. 6. The Clinton Administration's Defense Spending Levels



Source: Dennis S. Ippolito, *Blunting the Sword: Budget Policy and the Future of Defense*. (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1994): 102.

President Clinton is still struggling with a huge deficit and increasing national debt.

Interestingly, the 95/96 defense budget eventually received bipartisan support in Congress and surprised defense officials when Congress increased expenditure by \$7 billion (US) over what the Department proposed. Major Congressional opposition came from members upset about the version of the bill that prohibited abortion in military hospitals!¹²³ -- unbelievably nit-picking when considering the expenditure on items that can or will affect global peace. Nonetheless, this year's reduced defense expenditure has significantly eroded US capability, to the extent that the current force would be unsustainable because "so much equipment would be wearing out

¹²³ Dan Morgan, "House Republican Factions Reject Defense Bill," *The Washington Post*, 30 September 1995, A1, AS.

around 2000 [and] that current spending levels could not maintain planned force strengths.¹²⁴ The only anomaly to this is the extraordinary expenditure on hardware for which the Services have not the manpower or requirement. The third Seawolf Submarine is a good example. It will cost taxpayers \$2.4 billion (US), but as Senator John McCain, a self confessed defense "hawk" said, "the 1996 defense bill included \$1.2 billion (US) for these [Seawolf and B2 bombers] exorbitantly expensive and military unnecessary relics of the Cold War. Lacking any mission to justify its cost, the Seawolf is nothing more than a jobs program ... at the expense of urgent defense priorities."¹²⁵ When quizzed on apparent misdirection of defense funds, the Secretary of the House National Security Committee, Mr Donnelly, was hesitant to answer and wanted no attribution to his comments. Naturally, he was covering a consensus that many politicians, particularly the preponderance of "freshmen" Representatives, are more concerned about jobs in their electorate than national security.¹²⁶

The Republican and Democratic parties both forecast that the defense budget will shrink. They forecast it to "increase" from \$264.7 billion (US) this year to \$286 billion (US) in 2002 -- but this is in current dollars, so it represents a fall when current and predicted inflation is considered.¹²⁷ A former Reagan security adviser, Lawrence Korb, has said, contrary to Secretary of Defense Perry, "readiness" is the prime candidate for cutting because high states of readiness were only necessary during the Cold War.

¹²⁴ *Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook*, 1245.

¹²⁵ John McCain, "Defense Pork," *The Washington Post*, 26 October 1995, A31.

¹²⁶ Mr Thomas Donnelly, Secretary House National Security Committee, interview with the author, 12 December 1995.

¹²⁷ William Matthews, "An inevitable 2nd Draw down," *Navy Times*, 1 January 1995,

Regardless, US Defense Department Comptroller, John Hamre, says that the current two MRC strategy will not be sustainable on the current budget forecasts. To confuse this view, Secretary Perry has not ruled out another "Bottom-Up Review" style draw down,¹²⁸ an extraordinary possibility when some military personnel are already commenting that they are trying to do too much with too little time, equipment, training and money.¹²⁹

Moreover, Secretary Perry, when asked by defense writers on 24 January 1996 about increasing budgetary pressure on defense, admitted; "If we had to make a major cut in force structure, one of the first things that would have to go would be the military strategy that supports two MRC's."¹³⁰ He quickly added to this response by saying further troop reductions will not be necessary, and he went on to justify current high states of readiness. Secretary Perry believes the US will maintain current levels of activity and structure by saving money by not spending on unnecessary equipment such as the B2.¹³¹ This extra spending is being injected by Congress and Secretary Perry is concerned that unless the money is spent on current structure and readiness the US technology advantage will diminish and infrastructure and current equipment will degrade as investment and maintenance expenditure declines.¹³² For example, the US Navy

¹²⁸ Matthews, 10.

¹²⁹ Discussions with the author and US field grade officers attending the USMC Command and Staff College, Quantico 1996.

¹³⁰ Bradley Graham, "Hill Risks 'Catastrophe' in Funding, Perry says," *The Washington Post*, 25 January 1995, A23.
Graham, A23.

¹³² Bradley Graham and John F. Harris, "White House may Beef Up Order for B-2 Bombers," *The Washington Post*, 4 February 1996, A8.

needs to build ten ships per year to maintain BUR fleet level. Now they are building only three or four ships.¹³³

Furthermore, critical for Australia's strategic security planners, Congressional Budget Office Director Reischaur, would like to eliminate five aircraft carriers and give the US Air Force more long range bombers for power projection.¹³⁴ Carrier aircraft would be among the first sustainable assets, along with Marine forces, to reach Australia in a crisis.

Although the money to provide the means to maintain the defense umbrella in the East Asia-Pacific region is declining, with obvious effects, it appears that convincing the 'young congress'¹³⁵ that sustainable means is necessary is hard when there is little understanding of the issues, and the security policy is not concise or sufficiently long term.¹³⁶ Additionally, Chalmers Johnston and E.B. Keehn, in their criticism of the East Asia-Pacific security strategy, also see the policy is too short term and it deserves more attention to ensure the US does not become "impotent."¹³⁷ If the Clinton Administration's intention is to continue to supply "oxygen" to the region it must sell the reasons well to

¹³³ Non attributable US Navy Flag Officer addressing 1995/1996 United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 30 January 1996.

¹³⁴ Steve Ryan, "America's ASEAN Commitment," *Asian Defense Journal* i/95, (January 1995): 44.

¹³⁵ Mr Donnelly and Senator McCain refer to a new generation of Congressmen (and women) who did not grow up with the fear of nuclear war and the draft - who have little or no understanding of international security affairs. Mr Donnelly also alluded to the Defense and State Department's "wishy washy" policy.

¹³⁶ Alan Young, Deputy Assistant, Regional Security Policy (East Asia Pacific Bureau), US State Department, interview with the author, 8 November 1995.

¹³⁷ Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, 114.

get the support from a Congress that sees "Asian" economies booming, and saving, while the US is struggling to reign in a \$5 trillion (US) debt.¹³⁸

The Defense Department, in an effort to establish a force structure and equipment table commensurate with the National Security Strategy and reducing budget published, in September 1993, *Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era*.

The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) and Beyond - What does it mean for the East Asian-Pacific Region?

"The purpose of the BUR was to define the strategy, force structure, modernization programs, industrial base, and infrastructure needed to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities."¹³⁹ Force structure planning was based on the requirement to fight the two MRC strategy. The reason for this was to "hedge against the possibility that a future adversary - or coalition of adversaries - might one day confront us with a larger than expected threat ... we must maintain military capabilities that are flexible and sufficient to cope with unforeseen threats."¹⁴⁰ Basing most of the reduced US force in the continental US (CONUS) led to a concept that the MRC forces will have rapid strategic mobility, and the 100,000 troops retained in North East Asia would precede them. (See Table 7 for the planned BUR force reductions).

Strategic mobility is vital for any contingency in the vast East Asia-Pacific region. The Defense Department has not yet fulfilled the rapid deployment capability required

¹³⁸ Bilver Singh, "The Dynamics of Tripartite Relations: Great Power Interactions in the Era of the Paradigm Shift," Lecture presented at the 1996 Pacific Symposium, Washington, DC, 13-14 February 1996.

¹³⁹ Les Aspin, *The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era*, (Washington D.C.: Defense Department, 1993): 1.

¹⁴⁰ Aspin, 10.

by the BUR. For example, although the C17 has had a reprieve and is in production, there will not be enough to replace the aging C141 fleet.¹⁴¹ Similarly, the Department appears to have slipped the requirement for additional roll-on/roll-off and amphibious shipping and has canceled the requirement for light, rapidly deployable tanks. These decisions have an impact of the US's ability to rapidly project force from CONUS.

Table 7 outlines the draw down in forces and major equipment reached at the end of the decade. The figures do not include the simultaneous loss of US registered merchant shipping and mariners. One study predicts there will only be about 185 US registered ships and only 10,800 personnel to man them by the year 2000.¹⁴² As an example of the impact of this, to execute a rapid deployment from CONUS, the *Desert Shield/Desert Storm* operations uncovered the seriousness of insufficient shipping to support the one MRC in 1991!¹⁴³ The National Security Strategy of the United States says the ability to project power from CONUS will underpin strategy more than ever,¹⁴⁴ so the diminishing means to do this seems incongruous. Following the release of the national strategy, Congress directed the Department of Defense to decide the future mobility requirements for the Armed Services and develop an integrated mobility plan. The Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) that followed recognized the requirement for

¹⁴¹ Bob Huddleston, Research Assistant, East Asian Affairs (Australia), Department of Defense, The Pentagon. Interview with the author, 22 December 1995.

¹⁴² Carl Douglas and Christine Meers, *Crewing the Merchant Marine for Mobilization*, (Washington D.C.: Maritime Administration Office of Technology Assessment, 1990): 1-2.

¹⁴³ Jonathan Christian, *Sealift and the US. Merchant Marine. Vulnerabilities and Implications for Defense*, (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 1993): xii, xiv, 72.

¹⁴⁴ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, (Washington D.C.: The White House, 1994): 6-7.

enhanced shipping, expansion of the Ready Reserve Force (ships), improvement of CONUS movement, expansion of C17 project, and the requirement to pre-position equipment.¹⁴⁵

Implementation of these recommendations appears slow. For the East Asia-Pacific region there must be reason to suspect, from this discussion, the ability of the US to deploy credible forces to the region is waning. Australia's defense planners must recognize this.

Before moving onto the next section there are two more points, associated with the BUR, that are relevant and influence the discussion about the US's ability to assist Australia in a crisis. First, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) has been least effected by BUR reductions, and in 1995, for the first time, the Department of Defense recommended the continued development of the V22 tilt rotor tactical transport aircraft. This aircraft has the capability to rapidly deploy troops and equipment from amphibious ships or aircraft carriers to targets well inland. Its ability to land vertically is ideal for operations in the expanse of Australia. Previously, it was Congress that put this project into the defense budget, not the Department.¹⁴⁶ Second, the Commander-in-Chief of US Pacific Forces (CINCPAC), at a symposium on East Asia security in September 1995, went to great lengths to stress the continued deployment of 100,000 troops in the region.¹⁴⁷ A Congressional policy advisor contradicted this in an interview with the author. He said that confirming the US commitment with numbers was dangerous; the

¹⁴⁵ The Department of Defense, *Mobility Requirements Study, Volume 1*, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1994), ES-5, ES-6.

¹⁴⁶ IISS, *The Military Balance*, (London: Brassey's, 1995): 13.

¹⁴⁷ Michael Crane, Interview with author, 1 December 1995.

Table 7 U.S. Drawdown of Forces and Equipment

Assets/Year	1990	1995	2000
Army Divisions			
Active	18	12	60
Reserve	10	6	5
Aircraft Carriers	13	12	11
Carrier Air Wings			
Active	13	11	11
Reserve	2	2	2
Battle Force Ships	545	451	346
Submarines			45
Tactical Fighter Wings			
Active	24	15	13
Reserve	12	11	7
Strategic Bombers	268	181	184
Marine Expeditionary Forces			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
	Manpower (Thousands)		
Active	2069	1653	1400
Reserve	1128	906	850
Strategic Nuclear Force			
SSBN			18
B52H			94
B2			20
Minuteman ICBM			500

Sources:

1. *An Analysis of the President's Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 1992*, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 1991): 69, and
2. *Les Aspin, The Bottom-Up Reviews*, (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1993): 17

continued US presence and commitment to the region should be expressed in terms of capability, because there is no way they will maintain 100,000 in the long term.¹⁴⁸

ASEAN and APEC

The paper has explained the link between economics and security and, in the last chapter, has explained the rising significance of ASEAN and APEC. For the past two years, President Clinton has been a moving force behind APEC's effort to create a free trade area by the year 2020. Commentators in Japan and other Asian countries believe that Clinton's absence from the 1995 Osaka Summit signaled a turning point in the US's influence in Asia.¹⁴⁹ The effect of Clinton's absence was a gravitational pull to the Chinese delegation and the alienation of the US and Australian ones.¹⁵⁰ One must question the ethnic and cultural motivation for this against China's current economic magnetism. Former Prime Minister Keating admitted, "I was disappointed the President was not here; [that the US] had to deal with its domestic problems at the expense of attendance here was a disappointing development."¹⁵¹

In a perfect scenario, ASEAN would go beyond the US efforts to encourage the ARF and its bilateral security treaties with the Philippines and Thailand. In this scenario it would become a NATO where combined and joint training is the norm, they would undertake common procurement of weapons, and they would impress total

¹⁴⁸ John Heffren, Policy Advisor, House International Relations Committee, interview with author, 12 December 1995.

¹⁴⁹ Sandra Sugawara, "Clinton Cancellation Stuns Osaka Summit," *The Washington Post*, 17 November 1995, D3.

¹⁵⁰ Bruce Houser, White House Liaison Officer for APEC Delegation, interview with author, 5 December 1995.

¹⁵¹ See "Gore Tries to Mollify Japan, APEC", *The Washington Post*, 20 November 1995, A15.

interoperability. Unfortunately this scenario is unlikely. Despite the lack of a common threat (which the paper has discussed), various internal disputes have hampered ASEAN defense integration: Singapore and Malaysia over Pedra Branco (approach to the Straits of Malacca), Malaysia and Indonesia over Sipadan and Ligitan, Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah, and the continued debate over the Spratlys.¹⁵² The US is unlikely to be able to influence a swing to the perfect scenario until they identify a common threat, or, more likely, the US umbrella is withdrawn east and Japan becomes the power balance.

Japan

The Department of Defense, in its East Asia-Pacific security strategy, may see Japan as the "linchpin" of its policy, but the future of this defense arrangement is under enormous pressure -- with significant consequences to the region. The existing US-Japan treaty was drawn up when Japan was weak and exposed to the power struggles of the Cold War. Washington continues to subsidize Japan's defense, at significant cost to the US taxpayer, while, as previously discussed, Japan only commits one percent of its GDP to defense. The US subsidy amounts to approximately \$900 billion (US) (in 1995 dollars) since the early 1950s -- and Japan's current commitment of \$5 billion (US) a year only covers a fraction of the total cost of US security obligations in East Asia."¹⁵³ While the Defense Department defends its commitment because maintaining the troops in Japan is cheaper than in the US, there are more sinister ramifications of the treaty that make the

¹⁵² Steve Ryan, "ASEAN after America's Exit," *The Asian Defense Journal*, (11/94): 23-31.

¹⁵³ Ted Galen Carpenter, "US Should Examine One-Sided, Archaic Military Pact With Japan," *The Washington Times*, 17 November 1995, A17.

longevity of the current situation more tenuous. These ramifications are not just economic.

The paper has discussed that a "free, pro-western" Japan would, according to some countries, i.e., North and South Korea and China, upset the power balance in East Asia. Be this as it may, Japan is not likely to use military force in the new world environment to import resources, especially oil, to survive. Another emerging fact is that Japanese see themselves as more "Western" than Asian and the majority want Americans out. These points require further analysis because they steer to reasons why the US is likely, in the next ten years, to withdraw its military forces from Japan and adjust the current alliance.

Locking Japan and the US in the Cold War posture is Article Nine of the US bestowed Japanese Constitution. This Article renounces the Japanese right to wage a war. (It took a political battle to recognize the right of self defense that led to the establishment of the current Self Defense Force.) The will to change the constitution is currently absent because of the World War II generation is still politically influential¹⁵⁴--but this is likely to change. The newly elected Japanese opposition leader, Ichiro Ozawa, who may succeed Prime Minister Hashimoto, is sending mixed messages. Although he wants to keep Japan's military at "minimum defensive strength" (to save money), he wants to increase Japan's participation in international affairs.¹⁵⁵ However, to sit at the table, particularly in Asia, historically one must have the means to back up your position.

¹⁵⁴ Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, 107.

¹⁵⁵ Kevin Sullivan, "Kingmaker to Head Japanese Opposition," *The Washington Post*, 28 December 1995, A19.

China could cut off Japan from its resources by restricting access through the South China Sea, so how can it participate without a significant and independent (from US constraints) military when China's military and economic power starts to close with Japan's?

The current US policy argues that it must contain the Japanese military for its own good, and for the good of Asia. The US historically bases this on the assumption a Japanese military, operating internationally, would run out of control.¹⁵⁶ While there is no proof to say this would not happen, it does sound outdated and naive, especially considering the rapid growth of China that the paper has discussed in chapter two. Another obstacle to the expansion of the Japanese Military is the lack of will among its people. "Postwar educational pacifism has insured that the vast majority of Japanese people still maintain a strong aversion of anything military."¹⁵⁷ However, there is significant evidence that new generations of Japanese are restoring faith and respect in their military. When the Government deployed Japanese troops to help clean up after the Kobe earthquake disaster, some people threw rocks at them; "But when tens of thousands of the troops left Kobe three months later, after rescuing people, cooking food, clearing rubble and providing water, they were applauded."¹⁵⁸

Turning to the US perspective, the current alliance with Japan means that Japanese forces would not help the US unless a force attacked Japan itself. This means in

¹⁵⁶ Chalmers and E.B. Keehn, 108.

¹⁵⁷ "Strategy and Force Structure Responses of Japan and the United States to the New Security Environment in North East Asia," Pacific Forum CSIS Special Report, June 1995, 24.

¹⁵⁸ Mary Jordan, "Japan Turns Assertive," *The Washington Post*, 15 November 1995, A19.

a Spratly Island or Korean confrontation, for instance, US soldiers would die while the Japanese would watch and, at best, pay for its survival. Recognizing the recent US withdrawal from Somalia and the pains to get a US force to Bosnia, how could a US government convince its people that its sons should die for Japan? The recent Okinawa rape incident has fueled the debate about US presence in Japan. Although probably not the majority, many Japanese, particularly the Okinawans want the Americans out.¹⁵⁹ Defense Secretary Perry has, according to former Prime Minister Murayama, agreed to maintain current troop levels, although the US has agreed to "give back" some occupied land.

Moreover, newly appointed Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda, in a visit to Washington in January 1996, reaffirmed Japan's commitment to the US-Japan security partnership. He said US troops in Japan are "vital" to the security of the potentially unsafe area; the policy is the "pivot" of Asia-Pacific stability.¹⁶⁰ Foreign Minister Ikeda conveyed the reason for the Japanese Government's concurrence for US presence in Okinawa and the main archipelago when he noted that "China's defense spending had been increasing by about 20 percent a year ... [and this] military buildup must be taken into account"¹⁶¹

If Japan is to remain the "linchpin" of the US security strategy in East Asia-Pacific, it must reconsider its treaty with Japan. Why should Japanese benefit from the "umbrella" when they could afford to spend three percent of their budget, like other

¹⁵⁹ According to one television poll, 77 percent want a reduction in US forces. See Mary Jordan, A19. Also, Mary Jordan, "Perry Rules Out Reducing Troops in Japan Despite Groundswell of Opposition, *The Washington Post*, 2 November 1995, A25.

¹⁶⁰ Thomas W. Lippman, "Japanese Foreign Minister Delivers Message of Commitment to the US," *The Washington Post*, 21 January 1996, A26.

¹⁶¹ Lippman, A26.

developed countries, on defense. Such an increase would send a clear but safe message to Beijing about any sovereignty ambitions it may have. Japan has a clear interest to maintain peace for prosperity. For the US, like Australia, it cannot afford to maintain policies that spend when the respective countries need to save and reduce deficits.

Finally, before moving onto the next issue, looking back to chapter one, the US must consider how effective its military has been in the past. East Asian capitalist governments eventually halted communism and wars of national liberation in the region (less the Khmer Rouge whom communist Vietnam disposed!), so it is not surprising there were no outcries when the US withdrew from Clark and Subic Bay in the Philippines.¹⁶² However, the pull out from the Philippines occurred before the current debate about China.

Forward Presence - US Forward Basing

By helping to preserve peace, expenditure on our continuing defense presence [in the East Asia-Pacific Rim] deters conflicts whose costs would be far greater. Forward deployed forces... discourage the emergence of a regional hegemon; enhance our ability to influence a wide spectrum of important issues in the region; overcome the handicaps of time and distance by the vast Pacific Ocean ... Nothing conveys the same clear message of our security commitment as much as our visible United States military presence ...¹⁶³

The US policy seems related to the earlier observation that actions are more important than words. However, forward deployed forces are seen, from some countries' perspectives, as a "shield" against Chinese expansion, or second, for Japan for instance, as a money saving windfall, or both. If the US understands, and its policies and the

¹⁶² Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, 111.

¹⁶³ *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 7,23.

discussions in this paper say it does, why does this East Asia-Pacific strategy continue to draw a distinction between military and economic power? As Japan's Late Foreign minister said: "An army in uniform is not the only sort of army. Scientific technology and fighting spirit under a business suit will be our army."¹⁶⁴ The current US strategy seems to use military power as a substitute for an alternative economic strategy. While the Department of Defense pushes this argument, the "young congress," who will eventually interpret China's growing stature and wealth to reflect future sovereignty ambition will recognize that a responsive, i.e., forward deployed military force, is the only viable deterrent to this. Unless, as discussed previously, the US can negotiate a new and favorable treaty with Japan.

Meanwhile, pressure to reduce the "100,000" troops in the region will stay because of the shrinking budget's pressure on force structure and readiness. To prevent this there is military debate to try to focus US attention on the East Asia-Pacific region. Commandant USMC, General Krulak, and, according to him the Secretary of the Navy, is "very, very interested in the Pacific and what that means to the nation," and "boy, we'd better wake up, because something is happening out there. By 2010, seven of the top ten economic nations in the world will be found in the Pacific -- and number one will be China."¹⁶⁵ Similarly, Army Chief of Staff, General Reimer, when asked by the author where the US Army's focus will be over the next ten years, answered unequivocally in Asia and the Pacific.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ See Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, 112.

¹⁶⁵ General Charles Krulak, Commandant USMC, in an interview with *The Navy Times*, 1 January 1996, 18.

¹⁶⁶ General Dennis J. Reimer, in response to a question asked by the author after a

Krulak has dismissed Australian observations that many countries believe that there is a reduced confidence in the US to intervene in a regional crisis, by saying that new US-Asian trade links mean that, more than ever, "we will shed our blood for what is going to keep our nation healthy."¹⁶⁷ Krulak's concept to support this commitment is forward presence, including advanced bases and prepositioned war stocks. His concept needs the US to stay forward based. Loss of bases in Japan and Korea would be critical and alternatives would need to be found, especially when considering US limitations in strategic mobility this paper discussed.

To add to the uniformed debate is the recent round of US base closures under the auspices of Congressional Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC). The BRAC closed itself on 29 December 1995 but not before closing 243 military bases, including, according to the latest list, three facilities in Guam!¹⁶⁸ If the main effort is to maintain forward presence in the Pacific, the arguments have to be persuasive to Congress, where, according to Mr Donnelly, the Executive Branch is turning too because of a lack of direction in policy.¹⁶⁹ "Today, however, neither the Democrats nor the Republicans are willing to offer new views on how US strategic interest in East Asia should change to enhance regional security and mutual prosperity."¹⁷⁰ Australian policy

lecture presented at the United States Marine Corps' Command and Staff College, 29 January 1996.

¹⁶⁷ Richard Halloran, "The Krulak Doctrine," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (September 1995): 32.

¹⁶⁸ Karl Vick, "Its Closing Time for Base Commission," *The Washington Post*, 29 December 1995, A21. Paul Berkowitz, Policy Advisor, House International Relations Committee, interview with author, 12 December 1995.

¹⁶⁹ Thomas Donnelly, interview with author, 12 December 1995.

¹⁷⁰ Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, 113.

makers must be aware of this, the "treaty" with Indonesia is a signal that Australia is concerned about regional security, but will such an agreement provide security from ballistic missiles, submarines or large lodgments?

Policy Alternatives

This chapter has painted a gloomy picture for those who see sustaining US military presence in the East Asia-Pacific region as vital. In the previous chapter, for example, the paper argued that Australia, for credible defense, requires the assistance of the US military to defend its sovereignty, including immediate defense against "low-level" or "short warning" threats. In view of what this paper has presented what are the security strategy options for the US?

1. Adoption of a single MRC continental strategy. This would involve basing rapidly deployable forces in CONUS. To be more viable and to hedge against the likelihood of simultaneous contingencies, this strategy may have to be combined with option 4.
2. Adoption of a continental and forward defense using ballistic missiles defense (BMD) technology. This option would be considered unlikely because the Clinton administration has thwarted efforts to develop BMD because it would scuttle the disarmament treaties (START I and II) with Russia.¹⁷¹ On the other

¹⁷¹ William Perry, Secretary of Defense, in an interview with *The Navy Times*, 1 January 1996, 12.

hand, an element of the Republican Congress sees a "fortress America" approach with BMD is becoming a viable and cost effective defense policy.¹⁷²

3. Adoption of a single MRC(+) with forward bases strategy. This option would involve expenditure on forward presence rather than strategic mobility assets. On current posturing, especially with Japan, this option seems most likely. However, if the US does "lose" Japan and significant power projection forces as this paper supposes, the US's ability to respond to a crisis in Australia would be eroded.
4. Adoption of a single MRC strategy and a renegotiation of the treaty with Japan. This strategy would involve the "release" of Japan to allow it to reassert itself as a "complete" world power, commensurate with its economic status. This option appears unlikely in the foreseeable future, but as the World War II generation moves on, particularly in Japan and Korea, it will become more likely.

¹⁷² Thomas W. Lippman and Bradley Graham, "Helms Offers Bill to Force US Out of ABM Treaty," *The Washington Post*, 8 February 1996, A20.

Chapter Five

Implications for the Defense of Australia, Conclusions and Recommendation

The US and Australia have enjoyed a long tradition of close political and military cooperation, consultation, kinship and friendship, especially since 1942. The speed of economic development and circumstance in the East Asia-Pacific region that this paper has discussed has melded the US's and Australia's security strategies. The strategy of engagement through a framework of alliances, friendships and mutual trust is common to both countries; the US's engagement by forward military presence is a stabilizing factor enjoyed and viewed as necessary by most regional countries, including Australia. In *Defending Australia*, Australia recognizes the importance of US military presence in the region. Important because Australia's defense strategy of engagement and continental defense by self-reliance is only really viable with continued US presence.

The purpose of this chapter is to focus on the implications for Australia's defense planning and policy if the US military does disengage from the East Asia-Pacific region. Finally, it recommends a course of action that will be mutually beneficial. The content of this chapter builds on the conclusions from the proceeding ones. From chapters one and two are the historical precedence and the presence of emerging capabilities, such as in China, that could threaten the prosperity of the US and Australia. From chapter three is the argument that the mutual understanding, trust, heritage and values that Australia share with the US should be fostered and built on. Finally, from chapter four, is the reality that

the US military is under immense pressure to be able to sustain its current security strategy of engagement by forward presence and power projection.

Chapter one concluded that the East Asia-Pacific region has a long history of conflict this century. The spectrum of conflict has been great, but other than Japan's large scale empire building nationalist conquests, East Asia's war's have been contained, and ethnic and ideological movements against government forces have characterized them. However, the chapter concluded that shifting ideology and increasing wealth in China may signal the formulation of another large scale nationalist-based resource hungry threat. Australia, like the US, links its economy ever more to the East Asia-Pacific region, and any regional destabilization is a clear and present threat to prosperity and development. Although China's President Jiang Zemin recently attempted to steer back to Mao's communist ideology, there is little hope of turning a mega colossus that has gathered nationalist and economic momentum from the ailing but still alive senior leader, Deng Xiaoping.¹⁷³ Burgeoning economic development provides critical markets for US skill, loans and manufactured products and Australia's agricultural and mineral commodities. Be this as it may, Chinese culture combined with their economic development makes China more assertive and less cooperative, and is historically likely to use force to achieve its political goals.¹⁷⁴ The Chinese remain highly averse to

¹⁷³ Steven Mufson, "China's Leader launches Mao-Like Political Drive," *The Washington Post*, 3 February 1996, A14.

¹⁷⁴ Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon," *International Security* Vol. 19, No.1, (Summer 1994): 150.

interdependence, subjugation to international norms, outside interference and alternative regimes.¹⁷⁵

Potentially hostile because of its shift to nationalism and emerging military capability, China is a potential threat to Australia's and the US's future prosperity and security. The US, since World War II, does not have a good record of warfighting in the East Asia-Pacific region. Writers have pointed to the political level for the basis of the weakness, where there have been dismal failings, in Vietnam and China for instance, at understanding the opponent's motivation and capability for fighting. Though the 1991 Gulf War has reversed the US military's "Vietnam" reputation, potential adversaries must have noted the fragility of US commitments to other contingencies, like Somalia. The US's modern-day sensitivity to casualties and its reluctance to commit military force without a clear national interest is noticed by potentially hostile countries like North Korea and China. As potentially hostile nations continue to grow, become resource hungry and militarily well equipped with long range WMD, etc., friendly democratic countries will turn to the US for help. Exposed natural resources and its isolation will, for the foreseeable future, mean Australia needs the US's help. Australia possesses no ballistic missile defense or a robust force structure for a continental defense now, and is unlikely to be able to develop and build such in the time it takes intent to change.

Chapter three concluded that Australia's security strategy is not viable without significant assistance from the US against short warning threats, let alone a large scale invasion. To hedge against invasion Australia maintains bilateral and multilateral

¹⁷⁵ Michael Oksenberg, "The China Problem, " *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 70, No.3, (Summer 1991):10.

alliances with Asia Pacific nations including the US, but the treaties are non-binding if somebody attacks one party. Australia recognizes this, and looks to "engage" other countries rather than rancor them which is probably why it has become so friendly with Indonesia, a country that is technically an autocracy and not the usual type of regime democracies negotiate security treaties with. However, the Keating Government's move with Indonesia is tangible recognition that the current strategy of "self-reliance" is not realistic and it is becoming less so every day. As stated before, it makes sense to be friendly with a neighbor of 230 million who mutually distrust the Chinese.

For fear of isolating China, or any other militarily capable country, there is little likelihood of a multilateral treaty in East Asia-Pacific. Secretary Perry has stated that engagement with China is not appeasement because ongoing human rights violations and exports of dangerous weapon technology to dangerous regimes like Libya, Iraq and Pakistan can be countered without endangering US economic prospects.¹⁷⁶ While this strategy of using non-threatening forms of national power makes sense now because the US economy is so highly linked to China, the longer term strategy seems ambiguous. We allowed Nazi Germany's violations to go unchecked and look what that led to! Although construing the US approach with China as appeasement is possible, Perry argues that it is not careless, or as potentially costly or unproductive as containment.¹⁷⁷ Nonetheless, paper has cited evidence that the US and Australia are reluctant to take any firm action against China when arms exports violate the prospects for international peace and

¹⁷⁶ William H. Perry, "US Strategy: Engage China, not Contain It," *Defense Issues* Vol. 10, No. 109, November 1995, 3.

¹⁷⁷ See Footnote, 176.

democratization. Current policy may be beneficial to the greedy "me" generation, but for future generations it may be folly to ignore Charles Darwin's theory about stronger states subsuming weaker ones.

Although ethnicity does not translate to a threat to the US and Australia, there are two factors from chapters three and four that need highlighting. First, there is no such thing as an "Asian"; Asia is a geographic area. The people of Asia are from diverse ethnic groups that possess different values and heritage. Historically for example, the Chinese Confucian culture has feared and distrusted foreigners and distaste cooperation. Planners should factor such intangible factors into any defense planning that plans against opposing capabilities alone.¹⁷⁸ Second, Australia should recognize the common heritage it shares with the US. Congressman McHale believes this bond, more than economics, is sufficient for the US to help Australia in a crisis. Australia needs to recognize this and as we move into a more uncertain period embrace the US's commitment a little more. After all, Australians easily recognize Americans as friendly.

Friendly faces, like in 1942, would be welcome in Australia today during a time of need. However, unlike in 1942, there is unlikely to be comparable time to develop large scale interoperability and integration of US forces in the defense of Australia, its offshore dependencies or near neighbors. Chapter four identified, at an unclassified level, the current shortcomings of Australia's ability for self-reliance. The fact intent can switch quickly largely negates the assumption that adversaries would give considerable notice of a larger scale threat because they can launch their WMD and power projections forces,

¹⁷⁸ Roy, 168.

like submarines, against Australia well inside the period Australia requires to build and train a large well-equipped defense force. Current Australian Chief of Defense Force, General John Baker, has taken steps to integrate the three Services by establishing a single operational level headquarters to plan and execute the continental defense of Australia.¹⁷⁹ This restructuring goes some way to addressing command and control deficiencies and readiness at the operational level but, as chapter four highlighted, Australia lacks the force structure to defeat short warning threats let alone large scale lodgments, ballistic missiles or crippling submarine attacks.

The ADF has taken the qualitative military capabilities it possesses, and the land force in particular has taken steps to develop doctrine and force structure within the finite resources it can muster to defeat incursions into Australian sovereignty. Unfortunately, exercise after exercise proves this is not enough. The Army's doctrine that shifts from divisional operations to independent brigades or "task forces" takes into account the global shift from linear battlefields, but Australia's *enormous* battlespace means Commander Australian Theatre must have the ability to command and control a force to dominate each medium¹⁸⁰ While this concept makes sense for an integrated continental defense, exercises have proven that there are not enough Australian assets to cover the battlespace and defeat even a "short warning" threat. It is therefore nowhere near robust

¹⁷⁹ Gregor Ferguson, "Australia Plans to Revamp Military with Unified Command," *Defense News* Vol. 11, No.3, 22-28 January 1996,13.

¹⁸⁰ Commander Australian Theatre is the title proposed by the Australian Chief of Defence Force, General John Baker, for the officer charged to plan and conduct operations in the Defense of Australia. It is proposed, for unity of command, that he commands each Service's component in a Joint Area of Operations that encompasses Australian land, sea and air possessions.

enough or sustainable for protracted high tempo operations that adversaries *could* array with little warning. Moreover, as Australia moves away from "conventional" warfighting doctrine at the operational level it shifts from credible interoperability with allied forces, both in Australia, and if required, offshore. Additionally, because technology changes even faster than doctrine the issue of interoperability is vital and needs to be addressed. Before recommending a course of action that could do so, we must recognize the strengths of Australia's current security strategy and possible courses Australia could adopt to enhance it is important.

Like the US, Australia sees engagement and openness as a key to continuing peace and conflict resolution. However, unlike the US, Australia does not possess the same measure of deterrence or persuasion. Instead of quantity, Australia sensibly focuses on quality and advanced technology. While this approach will keep Australia ahead as a credible regional power for the remainder of this century -- the "gap" is closing. The "gap" is particularly noticeable in air, missile and underwater (submarine and mines) defense and land-based mobility, target acquisition and firepower capabilities. To ease this concern is a motivated and capable defense industry that has proven its abilities. However, as costs of readiness and operating a "high-tech" military increase, the defense industry's "piece of pie," is likely to decline, closing the "gap" even more.

Before considering some options and making a recommendation to enhance Australia's future security, reviewing the US position is important. The US military is under immense pressure to downsize its post Cold War force and review its strategy. The strategy of global engagement by forward presence and force projection with the ability to fight two MRC's is proving difficult to sustain. Government is making sustainment difficult because of the shrinking defense budget, declining merchant marine, reduced force structure and a

more questionable "will" founded on a more isolationist Congress and population. Moreover, essays and editorials are pouring out of US institutions about the US's treaty arrangements with Japan. This paper has concluded, like many others, that the US should reconsider its treaty with Japan. The policy of providing "oxygen" to East Asia and the Pacific is becoming increasingly untenable as the US electorate sees the "Tiger's" economies surging while their own crawls. Moreover, Japan's one percent of GDP for defense is not enough; it is time to reexamine the old fears of Japan becoming a militant power. Civilian control of the military is embedded in Japan's new population and democracy. The collapse of the Soviet Union suggested isolationism does not work and global economic interdependence is the only way to prosper and provide a comfortable living for a population. Therefore, a return to a cold war environment in East Asia, if Japan returns to be a strong military power, is remote. However, for Australia, no forward deployed US troops in Japan further exposes Australia to short warning threats because US capabilities deployed in East Asia-Pacific have proven, by exercise, critical in defeating such threats.

Understanding that Australians recognize Americans as friendly and not "foreign," and realizing the possibility that they may "leave" the East Asia-Pacific region, what are the implications for, and options available to, Australia? This paper sees four major adjustments that Canberra could make to the current security strategy:-

A Strengthen ANZUS to be a NATO style arrangement where an attack on one member is seen as an attack on the others. The implications of this would include possible alienation by regional nations that would read unfriendly and untrustworthy signals. It would also mean that Australia's forces could be committed to defending US interests outside Australia in an environment (nuclear, biological or chemical) that Australia's forces are not collectively equipped to fight in.

B. Australia could help US policy of forward basing and presence by expanding current military facilities or establishing a mutually beneficial training facility. This would be politically hard to sell in Australia. There would have to be a shift in the electorate's understanding of the entire Asia-Pacific security situation, including Australia's vulnerability and the mutual interests it shares with the US.

C. Formation of a multilateral Alliance. The most serious implication is the effect on security if the alliance omits any country. For instance, Russia has rattled sabers in response to the possible inclusion of East European nations in NATO. This would be the least likely course of action because it is provocative.

D. Australia could adopt a more isolationist policy that builds on its self-reliance strategy without the framework of alliances. Russia has proven that isolationism does not work. In a time of economic interdependence for prosperity, this policy is likely to lead to a lower standard of living because of Australia's small population and its reliance on access to overseas markets.

This paper has argued strongly that Australia should pursue strategy B. World peace relies on the vigilance of democratic powers. The US, since the end of World War II, has borne the most cost for the vigilance. The US's commitment to world peace has enabled many countries to develop and prosper, but the cost of the vigilance is taking its toll, and the burden needs to be shared. Chapters one and two suggest that peace in East Asia-Pacific is not assured. Hegemonic ambitions by China in particular are very real. Chapter three has said that the Government does not equip Australia to defend itself, and chapter four concludes that the US's ability to maintain its strategy of global

vigilance through engagement, forward presence and force projection is waning. If Australia is realistic and is not afraid to admit that a generous warning of a major threat to its resources is not a secure assumption to build a defense strategy around, it can strengthen its current policy by embracing the historically and culturally linked US. There is little doubt the US will eventually lose its forward bases in East Asia; Australia needs the US to stay militarily engaged and therefore should adopt course B.

The time to push this issue is now. John Howard led the Liberal National Party coalition to a big victory at the 2 March 1996 Australian federal election. The Coalition's defense policy, although drafted when in opposition, has the ANZUS alliance as a pillar. "A Coalition government will aim to further strengthen the ANZUS alliance and we will join with regional countries in encouraging the US to remain fully engaged in the Asia

Pacific region."¹⁸¹ The policy goes on to say that, "we will evaluate the potential for the US to preposition equipment in Australia," and ". . . aim to increase Australian-US exercising and training opportunities."¹⁸²

Recommendation

In line with strategy B, Australia and the US need to establish a combined/joint training facility in Northwest Australia at Yampi Sound. The aim of the facility would be to enable Australian and US joint forces to train and develop the skills and doctrine necessary to defeat a threat to Australia. Furthermore, it would enable forward deployed US forces to train for forcible entry and other operations in the Indian as well as Pacific Ocean areas that are vital for world peace. Although the past Labor Government would not immediately embrace such a recommendation, the new Coalition government recognizes more freely that, given the end of the "superpower" tensions, the US may withdraw from the region, and has argued for an increase in the US military presence in Australia. For example, early in 1992 the then leader of the Opposition, Dr John Hewson, endorsed a proposal for the US to establish a naval repair facility in Darwin.¹⁸³ Although the Coalition's policy does not specifically state a requirement for a joint/combined training facility, there are sufficient "hooks" in the policy to formalize such a proposal.

¹⁸¹ John Howard, *Australia's Defence*, Coalition Defence Policy. Authorized and printed by A. Robb, Melbourne, February 1996, 10. The author attempted to interview the then Shadow Minister for Defence, Jocelyn Newman, but election commitments precluded this. However, a copy of the Coalition's policy was forwarded.

¹⁸² John Howard, 10.

¹⁸³ Thomas-Durell Young, *Australian-US Security Relations in the Post-Cold War World*, (Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993): 5.

The selection of the 575,000 hectare (1,420,853 acres) Yampi Sound training area (see Map 2) is based on its size and strategic location. It is within easy access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it has deep water and amphibious access, access to a large all weather F111 capable airfield and has a 57,000 hectare (140,850 acres) impact area.¹⁸⁴ Another benefit is its isolation. The isolation of the proposed facility will allow activity to occur without large public relations support or opposition protests. Although the training area sounds "ready to use," it is very immature. As well as appropriate environmental impact studies, a development proposal would have to include road and range construction, permanent port development, accommodation (for transiting trainees and permanently stored equipment), and communication facilities. The costs for development and maintenance would have to be shared between the US and Australia, with the greater burden being borne by the US. To extend the proposal to include the permanent basing of US forces (the Marine forces from Okinawa for example) is considered premature.¹⁸⁵ However, if a US withdrawal from Japan or the Republic of Korea is imminent, such a proposal should be immediately considered. We should pursue this opportunity to enhance Australia's defense and future prosperity.

¹⁸⁴ The author has been advised, through the Australian Army's chain of command, that the future of the Yampi Sound Training Area will be addressed as part of a national review conducted in 1996. The report is due in September. As an additional footnote, Army has acquired a new northern Australian training area to "satisfy the training requirements of the 1st Brigade [armored/mechanised brigade moved to Darwin 1995-2000] and also provide an opportunity for appropriate use by foreign forces." This training area, located north of Timber Creek, is not really coastal, although bounded in the north by the Joseph Bonaparte Gulf, but it is much larger than Yampi Sound at 8,700 square kilometres.

¹⁸⁵ On 12 April 1996, the Clinton administration announced that the US Marine Corps' Futenma Air Base, on Okinawa, will close in the next five to seven years. See Willis Witter, "U.S. to Withdraw from Okinawa Base," *The Washington Times*, 13 April 1996, A14.

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