

The Modalities OF The Japan-US Security Relationship In The Post Cold War Era: Problems
And Prospects In The Next Decade

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INTRODUCTION

Is the Japan-U S alliance changing its mission in accordance with the end of the Cold War? During the harsh confrontation of the East and the West, the bilateral security relationship between Japan and the U.S. played an important role in containing the Soviet expansion in Northeast Asia. The security alliance also contributed to the basis of the broader relationship of the two countries.

During the Gulf Crisis (which coincidentally broke out on the same day U.S. President George Bush proclaimed victory in the Cold War and predicted regional conflict as a future concern), Japan contributed nearly \$14 billion in financial support to the coalition forces. Nevertheless, Japan gained a negative reputation in the international community for not providing military support as well. At about the same time, the honeymoon stage of the Japan-U.S. relationship began shifting to a competitive stage of their respective economic interests.

There have been several instances of friction within the alliance during its history. Most of the ordinary people in Japan ambiguously perceive the importance of the alliance. However, they do not notice that nearly fifty thousand American soldiers stationed in Japan are critical for the security of Japan. Similarly, some Americans are likely to agree that the "U.S. should examine [its] one-sided, archaic military pact with Japan"¹ since the Russian military is no longer a threat, and, even more importantly, Japan now has enough power to be able to defend itself. On the other hand, some Americans also hold the idea that it is only the U.S. military that keeps the Japanese jinni in the bottle.

Japanese domestic factors cannot be ignored in an examination of the Japan-U.S. security

arrangement. First, the cabinet of the Liberal Democratic Party , which had been the ruling conservative party for thirty eight years, collapsed in August 1993. Since then, the coalitions of ruling parties have frequently changed. This political instability shows that Japanese politics is entering a transition period after forty years of little to no change. This political path is not a negative one; rather it is an indispensable one that Japan has to overcome. Japan has seen a lot of evidence of indispensable change during this transition period, including the Social Democratic Party of Japan's (SDPJ) abandonment of its forty-year-old basic security policy of non-armed neutrality or anti-Japan-U.S. security treaty and anti-Self Defense Forces. When the "1955 regime" (political confrontation between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the opposing former Japan Socialist Party) in the Japanese political world was over, it entered the new era of substantial debate over the national security policy.

In the economic sphere, Japan suffers various problems, primarily due to the after effect of the so-called "Bubble economy," bankruptcies of some banks, bad housing loans, rapid appreciation of yen, and increasing unemployment rate.² However, Japan has the world's second most powerful economy, next to that of the U.S., and it has enormous influence not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also in the rest of the world. Japan, consequently, has an obligation to contribute to the free world economy. In the national security arena, the historic changes brought about by the end of the Cold War have posed questions about the direction Japan's security should take, particularly in the role of its defense capability and the modality of that capability. In recognition of this question, the government of Japan (GOJ) held a series of sessions of the National Security Council, and on November 28, 1995, finally adopted the "New National Defense Program Outline" to serve as the guideline for the defense policy of Japan for the

upcoming years. The new modality of the Japanese defense would also significantly affect the bilateral security relationship.

This paper will identify new rationale for the Japan-U.S. security arrangement in the midst of the numerous questions which have been raised concerning the bilateral security relationship since the end of the Cold War. First, the historical background of the bilateral security relationship and Japan's defense policy is reviewed. Secondly, the status quo of the bilateral security arrangement, which constitutes a broader basis of the relationship between the two countries, is analyzed. Thirdly, factors which would affect the bilateral security arrangement, such as domestic situations of both countries and the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, are analyzed. Finally, future rationale of the Japan- U.S. security arrangement and recommendations for future modalities are proposed.

CHAPTER ONE

Historical Background

After World War II (WWII), Japan's Imperial Army and Navy were dismantled. With the harsh confrontation between the West and the East, especially with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, General MacArthur, Commander of the Allied Occupation of Japan, ordered the establishment of a National Police Reserve of 75,000 men to fill the gap created by the dispatch of Occupation Forces to Korea. Two years later, in 1952, Japan opted for an alliance with the United States in regaining independence.³ Later in 1954, with the passage of Self Defense Forces Law, the Defense Agency was established, and existing forces were reorganized as the Self Defense Forces (SDF), comprising three services: Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self Defense Force (ASDF). The term " Self Defense" is used in the official title because the 1947 constitution of Japan prohibits the nation from possessing military forces, but, according to the GOJ, the constitution does not prohibit the nation from maintaining the ability to defend itself. Since the end of WWII, Japan has continued to enjoy peace and prosperity for nearly half a century in the ever-changing world community.

Since 1958, Japan had drawn up four defense buildup programs, each of which covered a period of three or five years. In the 1970s, Japan initiated a review of its mid-term defense buildup program. The Japanese government conducted the first substantial debates on defense policy and the bilateral security relationship since the establishment of the SDF. After the Fourth Defense Buildup Program came to a close, the "National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)," adopted in October 1976, served as a guideline for Japan's desirable defense posture, stipulating

the level of defense capability that Japan should maintain in peacetime. The defense goal, articulated in the NDPO, is "to be the maintenance of a full surveillance posture in peacetime and the ability to cope effectively with situations up to the point of limited and small-scale aggression. The emphasis is on the possession of the assorted functions required for national defense, while retaining balanced organization and deployment, including logistical support."⁴

Given an international situation under which dialogue for improving mutual relations in the international community will continue and efforts for preventing conflicts and stabilizing international relations will be sustained, the NDPO stipulates that Japan's defense policy is based on prevention of armed aggression by building up a defense system capable of dealing with any form of aggression, by possessing its own appropriate scale of defense capability in concert with maintaining the Japan-U.S. security arrangement. It also stipulates that should aggression occur, Japan shall repel it at the earliest possible stage in cooperation with the U.S.

The NDPO was initially supposed to be reviewed in case of the strategic environment surrounding Japan had changed. However, even in the face of energetic military buildup of the former Soviet Union in the Far East region, the NDPO was not touched because of the harsh confrontation in the Diet between the ruling and opposition parties. The NDPO served nearly two decades as a basis for mid-term defense buildup programs.

Until the mid 1970s, the Japanese defense planners focused on building up the defense capability, mainly aimed at outlining the scope of procurement of equipment. They could not afford to develop the concept of operational cooperation with the American forces. On the other hand, American interest in Asia was absorbed by the Vietnam War. Reflecting the disastrous Vietnam War, then-President Nixon issued a policy statement during his trip to Southeast Asia in

1969. This statement, later called the Nixon Doctrine, basically planned to leave the fighting to Asian nations while the U.S. provided economic assistance, unless a nation was directly threatened by a major foreign power. The GOJ, which was concerned about the American isolationist attitude after the Vietnam War, initiated a defense dialogue with the U.S. In August 1975, Defense Minister Michita Sakata met Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and agreed to initiate the effort to develop some guidelines for bilateral security cooperation. On the basis of that agreement, the Japan-U.S. Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation was established under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee.⁵ The establishment of the NDPO, articulating Japan's defense concept, gave the alliance an incentive to develop the bilateral defense cooperation.

Under the studies and discussions on the modality of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" were adopted in November 1978. The "Guidelines" serve as guidelines for the conduct of future studies and give orientation to matters of basic importance, such as the postures for preventing aggression in advance; actions to be taken in the event of an armed aggression against Japan, including concept of operations, command and coordination, intelligence, and logistic support activities; and the consultation of Japan-U.S. cooperation in the case of Far East crisis which will have an important influence on the security of Japan. In accordance with the "Guidelines," a broad range of studies were conducted, including those on combined operation plans.⁶

In the next chapter, the broad range of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement, such as security dialogues, cooperation in equipment and technology and host nation support, will be discussed.

CHAPTER TWO

THE JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY ARRANGEMENT

Given the foundation of the studies by the "Guidelines," the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation has made remarkable progress compared to that of the 1960s. The cooperation was accelerated in response to the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 in order to cope with their aggressive movement in the Northwest Pacific. The Japan-U.S. security arrangement is a broader bilateral security relationship comprised of security dialogues from summit meetings to working levels, Japan's significant host nation support, cooperation in equipment and technology, and combined exercises.

The security arrangement in this chapter includes 1) security dialogues, 2) cooperation in equipment and technology, and 3) Japan's host nation support to the U.S. Forces in Japan.

In addition to regular diplomatic relations, the two countries have conducted a close exchange of views on security matters at various levels, from summit talks between the Japanese Prime Minister and the American President and top-level meetings between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the U.S. Secretary of Defense to working-level meetings of officials and uniformed personnel in charge of defense affairs of both countries. At the summit meeting held in January 1995, Prime Minister Murayama and President Clinton exchanged views on bilateral cooperation in the area of security with recognition that it is important for both countries to continue to develop a cooperative relationship. Regarding Japan-U.S. security arrangements, they discussed host nation support from the viewpoint that the stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan remains important for securing the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. They

agreed that both countries would make further efforts on issues relating to U.S. forces' facilities and areas in Okinawa.⁷

In September 1995, the governments held the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting, which has recently been called "Two Plus Two." The Committee consisted of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of Japan and the Secretaries of Defense and State of the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher concluded the meeting by saying,

"Today's meeting is the culmination of a year-long review of U.S.-Japan security relationship. With the Cold War over, the landscape has undergone a great transformation of the Asia-Pacific region, but through this far-reaching review, the U.S. and Japan have concluded, not surprisingly, that we have an abiding community of interest that continue to justify, indeed requires for purpose of stability in the region our continued close cooperation.... Our security ties with Japan undergird a broad and multifaceted partnership with increasing global dimensions. In the past two years our two countries have cooperated to support reform in Russia, peace in the Middle East, peace in Cambodia and stability in Haiti."⁸

Further close consultation will be needed for substantial cooperation in case of crises on the Korean Peninsula or on the Taiwan Strait.

Most recently, the newly-selected Prime Minister Hashimoto had a short meeting with President Clinton on 23 February, 1996, in Santa Monica, California. Although *The Washington Times* says "the American isolationist mood, accelerated by Pat Buchanan's victory in New Hampshire primary, prompted Mr. Hashimoto to decide to take this trip," his real intention was supposedly to show the American leaders that his administration considers the Japan-U.S. relationship as critical. The two leaders "will reaffirm the U.S.-Japan security treaty while announcing further progress on trade issues at their Tokyo summit meeting."⁹

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty calls on the two countries to cooperate in maintaining

and developing their respective defense capabilities. The "Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States" provides the framework for mutual cooperation in the area of procurement.¹⁰

In view of the improvement in Japan's technological level and in response to critics from the U.S., then-Prime Minister Nakasone decided in 1983 to open the way for transfer of its military technology to the U.S. as an exception to the Three Principles of Arms Export.¹¹ In accordance with this decision, Japan has since decided to transfer to the U.S. technology related to portable Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), technology for the construction and remodeling of U.S. naval vessels, technology related to the support fighter FS-X (since renamed F-2), technology for the Digital Flight Control System (DFCS) to be installed on P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft, and joint research on a ducted rocket engine. The prototype FS-X (F-2) rolled out in January 1995, as the first test case of joint research and development of equipment by the two countries. The F-2 successfully completed a test flight in October 1995. Japan and the U.S. have regularly held the bilateral Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) to enhance their cooperation on defense-related technology. The cooperation in the areas of technology and equipment would enhance the interoperability among both forces.

Japan is obliged under the Status-of-Forces Agreement to furnish facilities and areas to the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) at Japan's own expense in accordance with agreements reached by the Japanese and U.S. governments.¹² The USFJ also needs a Japanese workforce to be supplied with Japanese assistance under the Status-of-Forces Agreement. The financial burden borne by the U.S. for the stationing of the USFJ has increased considerably since the 1970s due to soaring commodity prices and wages in Japan and changes in the international

economic situation, such as the yen's appreciation.

For facility construction and maintenance, since FY1979, Japan has undertaken improvement of barracks, family housing, administration buildings, sewage disposal facilities, and noise suppressors for the USFJ. In the past, the U.S. bore the labor costs for Japanese employees. However, in order to reduce the financial burden on the U.S. and to ensure the stable employment of these Japanese workers, Japan has shared the welfare expenses and other employee costs since FY1978. Since FY1979, Japan has shouldered expenses, such as the language (interpretation) allowance, which do not exist in the wage system of Japanese national public service employees. Furthermore, noting the drastic reduction of the U.S. defense budget and relative appreciation of the yen against the dollar, Japan decided to implement new cost bearing measures as part of its effort to ensure the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement. The new agreement called for Japan to bear the basic wages and all allowances of the Japanese employees and the utility costs by FY1995.¹³

The whole burdensharing for host nation support (HNS) to the USFJ in FY 1995 was approximately \$6.4 billion (1\$=100yen). This amount represents more than ten percent of Japan's total defense budget. It is almost the same amount as the defense expenditures of Malaysia and Thailand. For the U.S., it is less expensive to have forces in Japan than in the continental US because of Japan's HNS.¹⁴ In September 1995, at the "Two Plus Two" meeting, both governments agreed to a new Special Measures Agreement which sets forth HNS by the GOJ for the next five years.

In the next chapter, how domestic factors such as political, economic and security policies of both countries are affecting to the future security tie will be analyzed.

CHAPTER 3

DOMESTIC FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE BILATERAL SECURITY TIES

In the political arena, Japan is experiencing a transition period. The thirty eight year rule of the LDP in the Diet (Japanese legislative branch) ended in July 1993. At that time, the ideological confrontation between the LDP and the largest opposition party, the SDPJ, formerly known as the Japan Socialist Party, also ended. Since then, four prime ministers - Hosokawa, Hada, Murayama and Hashimoto - all formed coalition cabinets in a span of only three and a half years. Ryutaro Hashimoto, known as a tough negotiator at the trade talks with the U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, took the office of the Prime Minister of Japan in January 1996. Many Japanese people believe

the next step in Japanese democracy is the emergence of a strong two-party competition between the LDP and the New Frontier Party [NFP], which is controlled by Ichiro Ozawa and many other former Liberal Democrats. This is a step forward for Japanese politics. A race between the two parties led by Hashimoto and Ozawa would lead to substantive debates on issues, which is rare in Japanese politics.¹⁵

A harbinger of the substantive debate on the security issues has already emerged. The NFP's national security committee announced the "The Security Policy Outline Looking Toward the New Century -new thinking of the national security and defense" in November 1995. The Policy Outline presents three major points: the firm retention of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, nuclear deterrence under the credible U.S. strategic force, and the strengthening of the crisis management posture. Among those particular points which should be emphasized are the national security policy's change of the interpretation of collective self-defense; the strengthening

of the Defense Agency's authority not only as a management agency, but also as a policy-making ministry concerning the national security; and the strengthening of the Joint Staff Council so the joint and combined operations can function appropriately in case of crisis.¹⁶

These basic national security policy's recommendations, made by the competitor for the LDP, could lead the substantive debate on the national security issues in the parliament. The two rivals saw no major differences on security matters. In another important factor of the security policy, the major parties recognized the Japan-U.S. security arrangement as vital for Japan. Within a few years, Japan could emerge as a more flexible partner for the U.S. on security matters in the Asia-Pacific region.

During economic talks regarding cars and car parts in the summer of 1995, the words "trade war" filled newspapers and economic magazines both in Japan and the U.S.¹⁷ With the Cold War over, some political analysts said the next salient issues for America would be a conflict of economic interests. Prosperity through economic progress is normally one of the highest national interests for most nations. However, seeking economic interest does not contradict gaining security interest. Furthermore, trade friction between Japan and the U.S. seems to be declining.

First, Japan's current-account surplus with America and other industrial countries is shrinking. Japan's trade surplus with the U.S. in November 1995, was 45.5 % lower than it was a year earlier, the sixth consecutive month in which the figures were below those of 1994, when the figure reached an all-time high of \$55 billion.¹⁸ Secondly, many American companies have recently been successful in the Japanese market. According to a recent newspaper article, "In the

Ginza, Tokyo's famous shopping district, the hot news star is the Gap, drawing young shoppers looking for style and low prices. Elsewhere in the city, Tower Records and Toys"R"Us have been so successful that shopping mall developers are trying to woo similar American retailers."¹⁹ For example, although it started selling in Japan only a few months ago, Packard Bell Electronics Inc. has already raised its sales projections for the first year, ending in August 1996, to 120,000 units from 80,000 because of unexpectedly strong sales. Tower Records expects sales for the fiscal year ending in April 1996 to be about \$350 million, a forty four percent increase compared with that of the previous year, despite the recession. Beef imports from the U.S. grew by more than eighteen percent in 1995.

One of the reasons for the surge of American companies' sales is the low value of the dollar, which tends to make U.S. products more competitive in Japan. The other reason is the "price destruction" which is developing in Japan. During the severest recession in Japan since the end of WWII, its complicated distribution system is fading. The people in Japan are aware that paying relatively higher prices caused by a series of middlemen is meaningless. The American products with reasonable price and quality attract the Japanese people. This consumer trend in Japan will definitely be irreversible, and the Japanese market will become more accessible to foreign makers.

Although Japan remains a rival (or competitor) for the U.S. in the economic field, it is also becoming a more important trading partner and better customer.

As the world's second largest economic power, Japan has also sought improvement in its participation in political and security activities. The Gulf War was a turning point. During the period from August 1990 to February 1991,

Japan appeared totally unprepared to make timely and meaningful responses to this first international crisis of the post-Cold War era. Not only the government but also the general public seemed unprepared to make up their minds swiftly; pros and cons of various measures were voiced while Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu vacillated in the middle.²⁰

Japan's only contribution was the dispatch of minesweepers in April 1991 after the cease-fire formally took effect. Through the deliberations in the Diet, the enactment of the "Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations" and the "Law to Amend Part of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams" in June 1992 provided a statutory framework for Japan to address the task of positively pursuing activities for international contribution with human resources.

Under the "PKO" law, the SDF dispatched an engineer battalion with approximately 600 personnel and military observers to Cambodia for about one year in 1992 - 93, to Mozambique from May 1993 to January 1995, and to Zaire and Kenya from September to December 1994. This participation won Japan high acclaim from these and other foreign countries.²¹ Japan also dispatched the SDF contingent and personnel to Golan Heights as part of UNDOF missions in February 1996. The SDF has steadily gained public support in Japan and has won high international acclaim. Even in the political turmoil, "it has become clear that the extent of Japan's participation in U.N. peace operations is a matter of national consensus."²²

The internal review of the NDPO, stipulated in the Mid-term Defense Program (FY 1991-1995), started in 1991. In early 1994, the Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa established an advisory panel on defense issues for restructuring the SDF. Almost one year later, in July 1995, the first cabinet-level meeting "National Security Council" on the "New NDPO" was convened. After a series of meetings, the GOJ adopted the "New NDPO" in November 1995 after 19 years

of the first NDPO's compilation. This new policy reflects the current international environment as well as other factors such as advances in science and technology, long-term downward trend of young population, and severe economic and fiscal conditions. It also calls for the restructuring of the SDF both in scale and functionality, making it more efficient, compact, and mobile.

The "New NDPO," notes that "the security arrangements with the United States are indispensable to Japan's security and will also continue to play a key-role in achieving regional peace and stability, and establishing a more stable security environment."²³ It stresses four items in order to enhance the bilateral security relationship: to improve the exchange of information and policy consultation; to establish an effective posture for cooperation in operational areas including joint studies, exercises, and training, as well as enhancement of mutual support in these areas; to enhance a broad mutual exchange in the areas of equipment and technology; and to implement various measures to make the stationing of the USFJ smooth and effective.

Looking toward the American domestic situations, in politics, the people experience a Presidential election every four year. During a campaign or at the start of a new administration, a consistent foreign policy cannot be expected. The Presidential candidates are inclined to devote themselves to domestic issues such as employment, business, welfare, medical care, and education because these issues easily get a score among constituencies. For example, "Richard Lugar, the one Republican presidential candidate to stress his knowledge of foreign affairs, got almost no votes in their primaries."²⁴ Coupled with the political trend, there seems to be a growing isolationist tendency among the public. A recent public opinion survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Gallup Organization shows that,

while Americans are still ready to endorse euphonious generalities in support of internationalism, there is a marked drop-off when it comes to committing not just words but money and lives. Defending the security of American allies, rated very important by 61 percent of the public in 1990, fell to 41 percent.... Public support for the protection of weaker nations against foreign aggression fell from 57 to 24 percent.²⁵

Although this tendency may be a reflection of the neglect of domestic problems during the Reagan-Bush administrations, it will become a negative factor for strengthening the bilateral security relationship.

Furthermore, the American national security strategy is increasingly focused on an economic interest. The Clinton's administration's strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement" articulates that "a central goal of our national security strategy is to promote America's prosperity through efforts both at home and abroad. Our economic and security interests are increasingly inseparable."²⁶ This strategy sometimes causes economic frictions with foreign countries. The administration has tried to get an immediate answer and has sought a visible and urgent outcome in trade talks.

Despite the above mentioned tendency, the announcement of the East Asian Security Strategy, initiated by the Department of Defense, was remarkable for reassuring the U.S. commitment in the Asia-Pacific region. The Report also says in the chapter of "Engagement: Modernizing and Strengthening Our Alliances and Friendships" with Japan, that

we must not allow trade friction to undermine our security alliance, but if public support for relationship is to be maintained over the long term, progress must continue to be made by both sides in addressing fundamental economic issues.²⁷

In the field of the bilateral security arrangement, the American key strategists define three major objectives in its security relationship with Japan as; 1) maintenance of the U.S. forward

presence and preservation of the balance of power in Asia, 2) Japan's more active participation in partnership with the U.S. to address new threats to the security of the region, 3) Japan's restraint of developing new unilateral missions or capabilities.²⁸ There seems to be no major differences in the objectives of both nations' security relationship. In the security field, there are many accelerating factors to strengthen the security ties.

In the next chapter, the implication of the new strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region to the Japan-U.S. alliance will be examined.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
AND THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE

"The Asia-Pacific region is currently the most economically dynamic region in the world."²⁹ Efforts for stabilizing the area have resulted in dialogue on regional security issues and the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum. At the same time, as economic power increases, many countries in the region are endeavoring to modernize their national defense capabilities by increasing defense spending and introducing new equipment. Being geographically and historically diverse, the countries in the region have diverse outlooks on national security. In this region where the structure of the East-West confrontation was not as evident as in Europe even during the Cold War era, issues such as those of Japan's Northern Territories, the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the Spratly Islands remain unsettled even after the end of the Cold War. The following discussions are on 1) China, 2) Korean Peninsula, 3) Russia in the Far East, and 4) Southeast Asia.

China, one of the biggest players in the region, holds immense political, economic, and military potential. In recent years, China has promoted reform and open-door policies, placing top priority on economic construction. China has been actively working to expand exchanges with neighboring countries, holding the perspective that a stable international environment is necessary for the promotion of economic construction. However, China's relations with western countries cooled due to the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989.

Since the end of WWII, China continuously engaged in armed conflicts with neighboring and other countries, such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the U.S. during the Korean War, India in 1959 and 1962, former Soviet Union in 1969, and Vietnam in 1979 and 1988. In addition to these combat situations, China supported the communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia. China has made maximum use of its military power in the region as well as in the international political field. The recent tension in the Taiwan Strait showed that the United Nations Security Council could do nothing for easing tension because China has a veto as a permanent member of the Security Council. China's aggressive military activities in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait are growing concerns among neighboring countries.

Economic relations and human exchanges with Taiwan have been deepening through the promotion of trade and investment and exchanges of culture, science, and technological affairs. On the political and diplomatic fronts, China is wary of Taiwan's movements toward the advancement of its status in the international community. In January 1995, General Secretary Jiang Zemin made an eight-point proposal concerning the unification of Taiwan, and Taiwan's "President" Li Denghui made a six-point proposal in response in April. To date, basic positions of both sides remain unchanged.

China has recently been strengthening operational stations on the Spratly Islands and expanding its range of maritime operations, as seen in the construction of an airfield on Yong Xing Island of the Paracel Islands. China promulgated and enforced the Territorial Waters Act in February 1992, illegitimately stipulating that the Senkaku Islands are Chinese territories. Their sovereignty is clearly under Japan both in terms of history and international law. At the 14th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 1992, the party made it clear that

defending the interests of the territorial waters is part of the military's mission for the future. In February 1995, China built structures on "Mischief Reef" on the Spratly Islands, causing tension to mount among countries involved.³⁰ Although it is unlikely that China will attempt to seize the entire Spratly Islands by military force in the immediate future, "some are concerned that China may only be buying time until it has acquired the military capability to enforce its territorial claims. These concerns are compounded by uncertainty over what the influence of the hard liners will be in the next few years."³¹

China's defense expenditure increased more than twelve percent every year for seven years in a row. 1994's rate of annual increase was about twenty two percent, and 1995's rate of increase was twenty one percent, which accounted for approximately ten percent of the total fiscal spending. However, the actual amount of money China is spending on military purposes is thought to be larger than the announced defense spending. Furthermore, China's income share in the world, which was 8.8 % in 1993, is estimated to increase to 13.0 % in 2003. This share will rank China second to the U.S. Japan, which enjoyed the world's second largest share in 1993, will fall down to third place.³² Furthermore, Gerald Segal predicted that China will emerge as "the world's largest economy by 2010."³³ If China continues its investment into the military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will become a well-equipped, highly-motivated, modern army, accelerated by its rapid economic growth.

Recent serious concern about China is tension in the Taiwan Strait. When the U.S. and China normalized their relation in 1979, no one predicted that Taiwan would become a newly developed democratic country with its own economy. However, since 1980s, Taiwan has emerged as one of the Newly Industrialized Economies. Taiwan is now the seventh largest

trading partner for the U.S. As the economy has progressed, Taiwan has become confident of its economic power and more distinct from mainland China. China is very sensitive about Taiwan's movement toward independence. Last year, the PLA allegedly conducted the largest exercise along the Chinese coastline in decades, and it provoked widespread jitters among business people and politicians in Taiwan and neighboring countries. Again "China plans to conduct a large military exercise in the next two months in the strait that separates the mainland from Taiwan, as part of an effort to intimidate Taiwan's leadership and populace before a March 23 presidential election there."³⁴

The most challenging task for both Japan and the U.S. will be how to associate with China. Some say that we should contain China as we did the Soviet Union during the Cold War. These critics see a strong, growing China as an implacable threat to American interests. Others, such as Secretary of Defense William Perry, emphasized the engagement policy toward China by saying,

"By engaging the PLA directly, we can help promote more openness in the Chinese national security apparatus in its military institutions, its strategic intensions... Our policy of engagement is rooted firmly in reality and in self interest. And it recognizes that seeking to contain and confront China can only slowdown the pace of positive change that is occurring there."³⁵

Furthermore, despite the recent and frequent statements made by high Chinese Communist Party officials that "China will not seek hegemony," many informed China experts have concluded that "regional hegemony is exactly what China wants."³⁶ Close coordination between Japan and the U.S. is vital for engaging China. First, both Japan and the U.S. should urge China to be more forthright about its defense spending, long-term defense program, strategy, and doctrine. Second,

Japan's and the U.S.'s respective military dialogues with China should be maintained through either periodic high level visits, participation in professional fora, or functional exchanges within their judgments. These dialogues should be orchestrated because frequent exchanges of the opinions are indispensable between the two countries. Thirdly, in a case such as the recent Taiwan Strait tension, Japan and the U.S. should immediately discuss the problems and announce a joint statement of their common concerns. These joint actions will send the clear intention of the Japan-U.S. alliance to China, then make it refrain from conducting more ambitious adventures.

The Korean Peninsula remains one of the most unstable regions in the world. On the peninsula, more than 1,500,000 ground troops of the ROK and North Korea have been confronting each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) since the Korean War in 1950. Even the end of the Cold War failed to alter this continuing confrontation. In addition to being suspected of developing nuclear weapons, North Korea is also suspected of conducting research and development to lengthen the range of its missiles and deploying about two thirds of its ground forces near the DMZ. Such North Korean movements heighten military tension on the Korean Peninsula and result in serious uncertainty about the security for all of East Asia, including Japan.

North Korea has enhanced its military force since 1962 under four-point military guidelines: The whole people should be armed; the whole country should be fortified; all soldiers should be trained as cadre; all arms should be modernized. Despite the country's serious economic situation, North Korea is still placing priority on allocating national resources to the

military. This allocation may account for twenty percent to twenty five percent of North Korea's gross national product. Military personnel represent a very high ratio of North Korea's population, with active soldiers estimated to be about five percent of the population. North Korea's armed forces, made up primarily of the Army, have a total of approximately 1,130,000 personnel; whereas, Japan's SDF total personnel is about 240,000, about one fifth the size of the North Korean forces. In recent years, North Korea has been believed to possess biological and chemical weapons.³⁷

In addition to the serious military-to-military confrontation, "as many as 130,000 [North Korean] people may face starvation in the coming months, but few nations have stepped forward to help the world's last great Stalinist stronghold."³⁸ A starving North Korea could be more dangerous than a well-fed, secretive, and self-isolated regime. An outbreak of military hostility on the Korean Peninsula, as well as North Korea's self-corruption, will have a great impact not only on the security of Japan but also on Japan-U.S. security arrangement. Such a case will be a litmus test of whether Japan can actively cooperate with the U.S. Japan should clarify to what degree it can cooperate with the United States under the framework of Japan's constitution and its relating laws.

The former Soviet Union has consistently built up its military strength in the Far East since the mid-1960s, both in quality and quantity. However, quantitative reductions began to appear in 1990, and have continued since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian forces' activities in the Far East are slowing down as a whole, and Russia's readiness posture has become lower than before, largely because of its severe economic conditions and smaller ranks

due to the increase in the number of draft dodgers. Although the pace of military equipment modernization in the Far East has been moderate, it is considered that part of the equipment the former Soviet Union had shifted to areas east of the Urals from areas subject to the CFE Treaty before the signing of the treaty, as well as part of Russian forces' equipment withdrawn from Eastern Europe, is now being deployed in the Far East.³⁹

After its marginal victory over Russia in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan entered a period in which it lost sight of the Russian threat. The subsequent Russian revolution dramatically reduced Russia's influence in the Far East. During this period, Japan neglected the potential threat in Asian continent. Thus, Japan began its ambitious adventure on the continent, leading to the devastating war against not only the Soviet Union but also the Anglo-American powers. Russia's military trend in the Far East is a continued concern for Japan.

Today, although Far East Russia seems to be of little military concern, the Russian military force is still quite large enough to defend its soil. As a result, the long-term trend of the military situation, coupled with the nationalistic or conservative movement in Moscow, remains a Japanese concern. In view of the change in the international situations and in Russia's foreign policy, the Japanese Defense Agency started the military dialogue with the Russian Armed Forces. "Up to now, the Russian side has not disclosed the total picture of its military forces in the Far East region."⁴⁰ In order to promote the transparency in Russian forces in Far East, the same approach as mentioned for China would be applicable to Russia.

Currently, Southeast Asia is enjoying economic development. According to statistics, the income share of members of ASEAN will increase from 2.8 % in 1993 to an estimated 4.0 % in

2003,⁴¹ making it the fastest growing economic region in the world. Along with their economic growth, members of the ASEAN are increasing defense spending to modernize their defense capabilities, primarily through replacing obsolete equipment and introducing new fighter aircraft and naval ships. Among such recent movements are Malaysia's purchases of F/A-18 and Mig-29 fighters and Thailand's introduction of Chinese-made frigates and purchase of Spanish-made helicopter carriers.

Geographically, Southeast Asia encompasses the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and waters around Indonesia and the Philippines, and it occupies a vital position for traffic linking the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Countries in this region are making efforts toward political stability while striving to deepen mutually dependent relations with other countries both within and outside the region. However, in this region, there exist factors for instability, such as the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands and ethnic issues.

The Spratly Islands are located in the central part of the South China Sea and comprise approximately 100 islets and coral reefs. Natural resources, such as oil and natural gas and abundant fishery resources, are considered to exist around the islands. The islands are also an important focus for maritime traffic. At present, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei lay territorial claim to all or part of the Spratly Islands. In March 1988, the Chinese and Vietnamese navies had an armed clash over rights to the Spratly Islands, temporarily raising the tension between the two countries. Recently, tension mounted as China built structures on the "Mischief Reef" (alias) off Palawan Island in the Philippines.⁴²

The stability of the South China Sea and the principle of free navigation in the high seas are vital for both Japan and the U.S. More than seventy percent of the oil moving from the

Persian Gulf to Japan passes through the sea lanes of the South China Sea.⁴³ In addition to the South China Sea, the Malacca Straits are also vital for American trade. Since the U.S. lost its naval access to the Subic Bay in the Philippines in 1992, the U.S. Naval bases in Japan are increasingly significant for the U.S. to maintain the forward presence in the region.

In face of China's growing naval power in the South China Sea and its rapid economic advance in the region, ASEAN countries favor the U.S. presence and Japan's partnership in order to balance the major powers. Singapore's senior leader Lee Kuan Yew said "what is needed is a military and industrial 'counterweight,' and that means the United States, anchored in an alliance with Japan."⁴⁴ The U.S. maintains its forward presence of naval and marine forces stationed in Japan as the stabilizing anchor. On the other hand, Japan has gradually been gaining a favorable reputation, despite its negative past. The Japanese SDF's successful participation in the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations in Cambodia removed the negative image of the Japanese defense establishment. The Defense Agency has been engaged in security dialogues from ministerial-level to working-level, an exchange of military students, and port visits with the ASEAN members.

The Asia-Pacific region has formed one of the economic centers of the world, and it is still in rapid progress. On the other hand, the political structure of Northeast Asia has remained basically unchanged even since the end of the Cold War, leaving China as Communist China and the Korean Peninsula as the site of some of the highest military tension in the world. The interests of major powers, such as the United States, Russian Federation, China, and Japan, are concentrated in Northeast Asia. In addition, the world's six largest armies - China, Russia, North

Korea, Vietnam, the U.S., and the ROK - exist or have interests in East Asia. The Japanese Prime Minister's Advisory Group on Defense Issues recommended in its report that "Japan, situated as it is in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific where interests of these world military powers interact, cannot help but be sensitive to security problems in this region."⁴⁵

Although modern technology in information, communication, and transportation is making rapid progress in the region, it is impossible to change the geographical relations of the countries in Northeast Asia. Japan is located off the east coast of the Asian continent, and its archipelago inevitably controls three international straits: Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima. Either of these straits could provide an outlet for the Russian Far East to the Pacific Ocean. China dominates the Asian mainland. Russia stretches its territory from the east end of Eurasia to Europe. The Korean Peninsula is in a difficult location, connecting directly with two big powers of Asian Continent and facing Japan, the East China Sea, and the Sea of Japan. Taiwan is just ninety miles off mainland China. As a result, in Northeast Asia, there still exist unstable factors and potential risks. U.S. presence in the region is imperative for the stability. Furthermore, America's global power projection capability, its dynamic market economy, its energetic people, and its ideals for freedom and democracy are the driving forces for promoting peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. No other country can assume this role.

CONCLUSION

This paper has reviewed the historical background and the status quo of the Japan-U.S. security alliance and has shown the importance of the alliance even after the end of the Cold War. The security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in Northeast Asia, will remain uncertain and unstable for the foreseeable future. While devoting its energy to modernization, China faces a lot of problems, such as those that exist across the Taiwan Strait, the transfer of Hong Kong and its status, and the economic disparity between the inland-agricultural and coastal-industrialized areas. One of the serious concerns about China is its future direction concerning maritime strategy, as can be seen in the South China Sea. The Korean Peninsula continues to have military tensions involving more than one and a half million ground troops on both sides of the DMZ. Many serious concerns resulting from North Korea, such as suspicion of nuclear arms development, missile deployment and biological and chemical weapons development, and possible starvation chaos, have not been resolved. Russian Far East armed forces have shown the tendency to reduce their quantitative level and their activities since the end of the Cold War. However, coupled with the inclination of Moscow's leaders toward more nationalistic thinking, continuous attention should be paid to the uncertainty of Russia's politics and the future direction of its military strategy. The fact that the oil line from the Persian Gulf to Japan and the U.S. passes through Southeast Asia cannot be neglected. Any of these concerns can directly affect the interests of Japan and the U.S. In order to maintain the stability or to cope with them in case of actual crises, close cooperation between Japan and the U.S. is

critical. No country in the region would feel comfortable if a dominant power were to prevail over the Asian continent.

Historically, China was the lord of the region for thousands of years. However, in the late 19th century, with the decrease of the Qing dynasty's power, Western countries, with their industrial incentives and territorial ambitions backed by the modern national armies, became the rulers. Japan emerged as a major military power by early 1900s and temporarily formed the "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" in the early 1940s. During the Cold War, the region experienced two "hot" wars: one in Korea involving both Koreas, the U.S., and China, and the other in Vietnam involving Vietnam and the U.S. Because major powers have been more or less involved in the region throughout history, countries in the Asia-Pacific region cannot help but be sensitive to the interaction of them now.

The Asia-Pacific region will be the major power center of the world in terms of wealth and politics in the 21st century. The classic theory of the "balance of power" will have to be re-evaluated in the region as the region makes deliberate efforts to keep its balance among the major powers. The close cooperation between Japan and the U.S. will play a crucial role in these efforts because both countries accept democracy, free market economy, and freedom of navigation in high seas as core values. At no other time in history has a close bilateral relationship based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty been more critical.

Although the United States deploys about 47,000 soldiers to Japan, the deployment itself is not only for the defense of Japan. The deployment of U.S. forces in Japan is imperative for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and coincides with American interests of growing

economic relations with countries in the region and free trade backed by the free navigation principle in the high seas. Supported by Japanese HNS, this financial cost is more economical for the U.S. than having troops in the continental U.S. In this respect, the political will of having approximately one hundred thousand young American soldiers stationed in the Asia-Pacific, far away from the homeland, is tested. The U.S. government should keep the public informed that the stationing of American troops in the region, almost half of which are in Japan, corresponds with American interests.

Japan is the biggest trade partner for the U.S. in the region. Since the American rule at the end of WWII, democracy has deeply rooted in Japan, the SDF are under strict civilian control, and the defense establishment understands the values of democracy and freedom. Japan is one of the most credible partners for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region. For the Japanese, the cost of maintaining the Japan-U.S. security arrangement is its fiscal burdensharing of about \$6 billion and the mental burden of stationing American troops on its own soil. The total amount of Japan's HNS accounts for more than ten percent of its defense budget. Due to economic and fiscal constraint in Japan, there is no doubt that increasing the HNS ratio among total defense expenditure year by year is becoming one of the suppressing factors for the rest of the defense expenditure. Separating HNS funding from the defense budget might be a reasonable solution for assuming this burdensharing without hampering Japan's defense capability.

A challenge for the Japanese people may be how to overcome the burden of having foreign troops in its land. The rape incident involving three American servicemen in September 1995 in Okinawa triggered a growing outcry to evict the American troops and bases from Japan and strained the security relationship. The outrage of the people in Okinawa was not necessarily

directed against the U.S.; instead it was against the central government of Japan. Although the local government of Okinawa consistently requested realignment of U.S. facilities in Okinawa, the central government was reluctant to respond. The accumulated discontent exploded in Okinawa after being triggered by the rape crime.

The announcement of U.S. Ambassador Mondale on 12 April to return a key air station in Okinawa to Japan was attributed to the result of serious efforts by both governments. Given the rising tensions in Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, this base realignment might introduce controversial debates. However, much attention should be paid to the fact that "the 100,000 U.S. troops in East Asia are not going home."⁴⁶ From now on, more serious and substantial discussions on the bilateral security cooperation will be required in order to maintain the USFJ more operable and flexible in case of a crisis in the region among the base closures. Prime Minister Hashimoto" has said Japan is also willing to reconsider the (logistical) support it could give if a war were to break out in the region."⁴⁷

The security arrangement has served not only as a direct contribution to the national security of Japan but also as the stabilizing anchor for the Asia-Pacific region. For a nation which lacks natural resources and depends heavily upon foreign trade for its prosperity, it is profitable to foster the stable environment in the region as well as in global perspective. Japan's only way to embody this principle, is to promote peaceful movement in the region by strengthening security ties with the United States. The challenge for the Japanese government is to convince the public that the Japan-U.S. security arrangement has the above mentioned rationale, even in the post Cold War era.

In the Asia-Pacific region, numerous potential destabilizing factors can be counted: the

future directions of mainland China and the Korean Peninsula, tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and territorial issues in the South China Sea, especially on Spratly Islands. In either case, the U.S. is expected to play an "honest broker" for most of the Asia-Pacific nations.

Under the bipolar structure of the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. security arrangement served explicitly as a war deterrent. In the post Cold War era, the arrangement is going to be shifting to a framework to allow Japan and the U.S. to cope appropriately and punctually with numerous unstable factors in the region. In the Cold War, questions of the arrangement were part of a simple equation; the only variable was the "common threat." Now, the two countries are entering an era in which they have to solve a more complex equation with many variables. In no other time in the history has a closer relationship based on the Japan-U.S. security treaty been required for such a fluid and complex situation. Both governments have to endeavor to persuade their citizens of the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance. They must make an effort to restructure the alliance so that it is truly beneficial to each partner.

In order to promote the close coordination in the bilateral security field between Japan and the U.S., the two countries must begin many initiatives. This coordination requires substantial critical consultations regarding the promotion of stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Fortunately, the summit meeting between Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton is scheduled to take place this coming April. On this occasion, both leaders' declarations will strengthen the bilateral security arrangement. Although both leaders are always distracted by domestic issues and faced with elections, they should share the common recognition of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region and then strengthen consultations on security agenda in the

region. In order to enhance the defense cooperation, both countries should initiate the following actions:

/ Give more authorization to the "Guidelines" or review it.

/ Initiate case studies on Far East crises under the reinforced "Guidelines."

/ Create a framework for mutual cooperation in logistical, medical, and fiscal areas.

/ Strengthen the Japan-U.S. cooperation in international peace operations.

The bilateral security framework and consultation forums already exist. The existing framework of the "Guidelines" should be reviewed. The "Guidelines" contributed to the enhancement of defense cooperation in 1980s. However, the "Guidelines" have limitations because they give generic orientation to matters of basic importance and only define study areas which can be done. They are not authorized to implement any concrete means through studies. The conclusion of the studies is left to the judgment of the respective governments, and the governments are not under obligation to take legislative or budgetary action. The "Guidelines" should be given more authorization in order to deepen the defense cooperation substantially.

A more urgent task regarding the "Guidelines" is to initiate case studies on Far East crises, described as "Japan-U.S. cooperation in the case of situations in the Far East outside Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan" of Article three in the "Guidelines." The study was not implemented in the past due to a harsh confrontation between the pro-U.S. ruling party and the pacifist pro-socialism party in the political environment and the lack of coordination among the administration. The barrier has been removed since most of the political parties accept the Japan-U.S. security treaty as a national consensus. Consultation as to what extent Japan can cooperate with the U.S. in case of crisis in Northeast Asia will be a key

agenda item. This kind of case study and consultation will greatly strengthen the bilateral security arrangement and will clarify the direction in which both countries should advance in the defense cooperation. Above all, the political leadership by both countries is the overriding premise for substantial consultation.

The second probable step for the defense cooperation will be to create a framework for mutual cooperation in logistical, medical, and fiscal areas, as can be seen in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Although the SDF and the U.S. Forces have conducted combined exercises since the late 1970s, both forces have always had difficulties dealing with these areas due to the lack of a legal basis. A study regarding mutual support of logistical and other areas should be started immediately.

Thirdly, areas such as cooperation in international humanitarian activities have not been touched. The recent participation by Japan in U.N. PKO activities is favorable evidence that Japan is sincerely tackling the issue of international cooperation. In this field, there is room to discuss the desirable cooperation between the two countries. For example, in the case of the dispatch of the Rwandan Refugees' Humanitarian Relief contingent composed of the SDF personnel, the SDF were faced with difficulty finding transportation from Japan to Africa. At present, the ASDF's longest transport aircraft is the C-130, with a radius is just 2,000 nautical miles. It was too short for a global airlift. Ironically, the GOJ finally decided to charter the "Russian Antonov" instead of the U.S. airlift. If there had been a framework of bilateral cooperation in the international peace operations between Japan and the U.S., Japan's decision would have been different. Furthermore, creating a new framework in such areas as transportation and logistical support for both the defense of Japan and international activities like

U.N. PKO could be beneficial to both countries. This kind of cooperation will provide a broader basis for the bilateral security relationship.

It is often said that "there is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we have with Japan. It is fundamental to both our Pacific security policy and our global strategic objectives. Our security alliance with Japan is the linchpin of the United States security policy in Asia."⁴⁸ These immediate actions must be taken in order to reaffirm the importance of the security alliance between Japan and the U.S. and to assure the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.

¹ Ted Carpenter, "U.S. should examine one-sided, archaic military pact with Japan," *The Washington Times*, November 17, 1995.

² See, for example, the article "The decline of faith and discipline," *The Economist*, November 18, 1995.

³ For the excerpts of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, See Reference 11, *Defense of Japan 1995* (a white paper on Japan's Defense), Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo, 1995, pp. 240-241.

⁴ For the full text of the NDPO, see Ref 26, *Defense of Japan 1995*, pp. 265-270.

⁵ The purpose of this Committee is to study matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the area of security. The Committee is the highest forum for Japan-U.S. consultations on security matters.

The members of Japanese side are Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense. U.S. side was headed by U.S. Ambassador to Japan and Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command before December 1990, then upgraded to Secretaries of State and Defense.

⁶ For the full text of the "Guidelines," see Ref 25, *Defense of Japan 1995*, pp. 260-264.

⁷ For further details of the security dialogues, see *Defense of Japan 1995*, p. 68.

⁸ Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Remarks at 2+2 signing ceremony, New York, September 27, 1995

⁹ Clyde V. Prestowitz Jr., "The New Asian Equation," *The Washington Post*, April 14, 1996

¹⁰ For the excerpt of the treaty, see Ref. 11, *Defense of Japan 1995*, pp. 240-241.

¹¹ On April 21, 1967 then-Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared the three principles during a House of Representatives' Audit Committee meeting.

The principles provide that arms export to the following countries shall not be permitted: 1) Communist bloc countries, 2) Countries to which the export of arms is prohibited under United Nations resolutions; and 3) Countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts.

On February 27, 1976, then-Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced the government's view during a House of Representatives' Budget Committee meeting that, from the standpoint of Japan as a pacifist country, in addition to the above-mentioned principles, the export of arms to other areas which are not subject to the principles shall be restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution and other laws.

For details, see Ref. 18, *Defense of Japan 1995*, pp. 250-251.

¹² For further details of the agreements, see References 15 and 16, *Defense of Japan 1995*, pp. 245-248.

¹³ For further details of Japan's HNS, see *Defense of Japan 1995*, pp. 69-70.

¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Case for Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 74 No. 4, July/August 1995. Dr. Nye says that "Japan pays nearly all the yen-based costs of the 46,000 American forces, or nearly 70 percent of the troops' overall costs. If those troops were moved back to American bases, the cost of their maintenance would rise rather than fall."

¹⁵ Kevin Sullivan, "Assertive New Face on Japan's Future: Hashimoto Seen As a More Forceful Prime Minister, But With Few Policy Changes," *The Washington Post*, January 12, 1996.

¹⁶ "NFP's Security Committee Recommends Collective Self-Defense," *Asagumo Shinbun*, November 30, 1995.

¹⁷ See, for example, the articles of *The Economist*, July 1st, 1995, pp. 13, 65-66.

¹⁸ Sandra Sugawara, "Made in America' Is Making It Big in Japan: Strong Yen, New Retailing Strategies Give U.S. Imports a Lift," *The Washington Post*, January 23, 1996.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Akihiko Tanaka, "The Domestic Context: Japanese Politics and U.N. Peacekeeping," *UN Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives*, edited by Masashi Nishihara and Selig S. Harrison, A Carnegie Endowment Book, 1995, p. 92.

²¹ This point is referred as, "The refugee relief activities of the SDF units were given high marks by U.N. Secretary General Boutros Ghali and U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata, as well as by Ivory Coast Foreign Minister Amara Essy (president of the U.N. General Assembly) who represented 48 African countries," in *Defense of Japan 1995*, p. 116.

²² Ibid., p. 102.

²³ "New NDPO was adopted," *Asagumo Shinbun*, November 30, 1995.

²⁴ "America and Japan: Friends in Need," *The Economist*, April 13th, 1996.

²⁵ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 74 No. 4, July/August 1995, p.7.

- ²⁶ The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington D.C., February 1995, p. 19.
- ²⁷ Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, Washington D.C., 1995, p. 10.
- ²⁸ Patric M. Cronin & Michael J. Green, "Redefining the U.S. Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program," *McNair Paper 31*, November 1994, p. 14.
- ²⁹ *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, p.6.
- ³⁰ For detail, see *Defense of Japan 1995*, pp. 50-53.
- ³¹ Richard E. Hull, "The South China Sea: Future Source of Prosperity or Conflict in South East Asia?," *Strategic Forum*, Number 60, Institute for National Strategic Studies, February 1996, p. 3.
- ³² Marcus Noland, "Economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: openings for the U.S.?", *Great Decisions 1996 Edition*, Foreign Policy Association, New York, p.34.
- ³³ Gerald Segal, "China's Changing Shape," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 73, Number 3, May/June 1994, p. 44.
- ³⁴ R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Plans Maneuvers Off Taiwan," *The Washington Post*, February 5, 1996.
- ³⁵ Luncheon Speech by Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry at the National Defense University on February 13, 1996.
- ³⁶ Denny Roy, "Assessing the Asia-Pacific 'Power Vacuum'," *Survival, The IISS Quarterly*, Autumn 1995, p. 53.
- ³⁷ For details about Korean Peninsula, see *Defense of Japan 1995*, pp. 37-44.
- ³⁸ Kevin Sullivan, "N. Korean 'Famine' Debated," *The Washington Post*, January 27, 1996.
- ³⁹ For details about Far East Russia, see *Defense of Japan 1995*, pp. 45-50.
- ⁴⁰ *Defense of Japan 1995*, p. 152.
- ⁴¹ Marcus Noland, p. 34.

⁴² For details about the South China Sea, see *Defense of Japan 1955*, pp. 53-56.

⁴³ Richard E. Hull, p. 3.

⁴⁴ Keith B. Richburg, "Contain or Tame A Waking Giant? Region Sees China's Growth As a Double-Edged Sword," *The Washington Post*, March 17, 1996.

⁴⁵ Advisory Group on Defense Issues (to the Japanese Prime Minister), *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century*, Tokyo, August 12, 1994, p. 6.

⁴⁶ Kevin Sullivan and Mary Jordan, "Clinton Expected to Emphasize Security Over Trade in Visit to Japan," *The Washington Post*, April 14, 1996.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, p10.

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