Did the Marines Better Understand the Nature of the Vietnam Conflict and was the Combined Action Program more Suitable than Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in Dealing with Insurgents?
Abstract
General Westmoreland believed that pure military action, mass mobilization, and search and destroy missions were the solutions to defeating the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong guerrillas. The Marines better understood the nature of the Vietnam conflict and on a small scale, without sufficient support, were able to combat the spread of communism more effectively than any other civilian or military organization there. During the Vietnam conflict the Marines of 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, reconstituted a program that had been used during military action in Haiti and Nicaragua. The Combined Action Program (CAP) was an effective means of combating insurgent/guerrilla actions. The Viet Cong relied heavily on the popular support of the people and the Marines understood the importance of separating and safeguarding the people from the guerillas. By doing this the Marines effectively reduced the Viet Cong's access to food, ammunition, supplies, money, and, most importantly, recruits. Without the support of the people the Viet Cong would eventually cease to function. General Westmoreland failed to understand how important this lifeline was. Instead, he pursued the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army through conventional warfare. Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) was established in Vietnam in 1960 and was a myriad of civilian agencies providing support to the South Vietnamese people. However, it was not until 1967, under the leadership of Robert Komer, did these agencies combine their efforts in conjunction with the U.S. Army. Although the new CORDS experienced some success in the cities and heavily populated areas, it failed to address the needs of the villages where sympathy and support for the Viet Cong were strong. CORDS was too late and in the wrong place. The Marines were still left with the responsibility of confronting the overwhelming insurgency problem until the lack of money and resources forced them to abandon the concept.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2000
- Accession Number
- ADA529494
Entities
People
- Kenneth E. Wynn
Organizations
- Marine Corps University