The Air Force in the Cold War, 1945-60. Birth of a New Defense Paradigm
Abstract
Since the earliest years of the Republic, jointness for America's military services has been a rare occurrence, most visibly manifested in the Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Vicksburg campaigns in the Civil War and those of the South Pacific in World War II. Jointness was not necessary at other times because of a simple paradigm that governed the American military in peacetime--the land and the sea, two military departments, Army subordinate to Navy. The system worked--the Navy was the first line of defense, receiving and deserving the bulk of the defense budget because of its need for constant preparedness and because of the long lead time required to produce its weapons. The Army could always mobilize later, during an interregnum provided by the Navy. A new technology--the airplane--added air to the land-sea paradigm but left its priorities unchanged, as aircraft became auxiliary to land and sea forces. The first serious threat to this status quo came from Brig Gen William Mitchell, who, beginning in 1921, labored to reverse the paradigm's priorities, arguing that aircraft had made armies and navies less important or even obsolete for future wars. His court-martial in 1925 muffled such talk and extended the life of the paradigm for two decades. Meanwhile, the Air Corps remained officially subordinate to the Army, which was subordinate to the Navy in defense of the United States. Behind the scenes, airmen continued to challenge the paradigm's priorities, while the inevitable advance of technology chipped away at its underlying assumptions.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 07, 1996
- Accession Number
- ADA529787
Entities
People
- Stephen L. Mcfarland
Organizations
- Air University