

Force Protection: From Beirut to Khobar Towers, What Have We Learned?

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Subject Area – Topical Issues

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Force Protection: From Beirut to Khobar Towers, What Have We Learned?

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Thesis: There were many recommendations made after the tragic bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983. If the lessons were truly learned from the deaths of 241 service members, then the loss of nineteen others would have been prevented thirteen years later.

Discussion: The issue of force protection is not a new one. Two major events over the last fifteen years have brought the topic to the forefront; the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon on 23 October 1982, and the Khobar Towers bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996. Together these tragedies have accounted for the deaths of 260 service members and the wounding of many hundreds more.

The recurrence of many of the same problems in the second tragedy leaves it unclear whether the Department of Defense (DoD) is able to learn its lessons. The issues of lack of command involvement, failure of the intelligence support, and failure to adopt adequate, prudent force protection requirements are evident in both situations.

The support of the intelligence community is examined closely. The role of the intelligence community in supporting the DoD in this area can not be overestimated. However, it will only work if the mechanism to share information is in place. In both cases, the sharing of information was either not present, or was completed in an ineffective manner.

Conclusion(s) or Recommendation(s): There have been many improvements to both the DoD and intelligence community systems since the Khobar Towers incident. The critical link between the DoD and the intelligence community has been modified and enhanced in the hopes of solving many of the former problems. It is extremely unfortunate that these changes were not made after the Beirut bombing. Hopefully the DoD will be vigilant with these changes and will create an environment within which these types of incidents are less likely to occur in the future.

As part of any standard deployment, no matter what size or duration, there should be one individual assigned to do nothing but force protection. This individual could be called the Force Protection Officer (FPO), and should be a new military occupational specialty (MOS). The military does not lack the personnel, but rather the expertise to apply to this problem.

These changes do not mean that the military can relax its commitment to the protection of our forces — the dangers are very real and ever present. The United States Government must continue its efforts in earnest, on every level, in order to truly provide the maximum protection possible to our men and women in uniform.

INTRODUCTION

The current national policy of the United States is one of engagement abroad. Today, with the "Cold War" over, the United States is the only true super power able to effectively project its military power anywhere on the planet. Our Nation is currently in a position of economic, political, and military strength and stability that is unmatched by any other on the globe. This does not mean however, that we do not face real danger: regional instability, terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the growing threat from information warfare and other similar concerns will continue to challenge us well into the next century. To meet these challenges, the current President is committed to a foreign policy that includes such tenets as: "continue to be an unrelenting force for peace. . . continue to move strongly to counter growing dangers to our security.. . [and] have the diplomatic and military tools to meet all these challenges."¹ Such policy statements affect the roles of a wide variety of governmental organizations; however, more and more the Department of Defense (DoD) is becoming a key player as an instrument of foreign policy. "The Military has an important role in engagement — helping to shape the international environment in appropriate ways to bring about a more peaceful and stable world."² Further, "overseas presence is the visible posture of the US forces and infrastructure strategically positioned forward, in and near key regions. Forces present overseas promote stability, help prevent conflict, and ensure the protection of US interests."³

In examining such policy guidance from both the White House and the Pentagon, it is clear that the deployment of US forces overseas will be a key ingredient of United States foreign policy for the foreseeable future. When men and women enter the armed forces, they assume a certain degree of risk or danger; this is especially true during times of war. However, when our

men and women are deployed overseas, for reasons that our elected officials have determined are in the interests of the stated policies, it is incumbent (on the United States together with the host government) to provide them the safest and most secure working and living environment possible. These men and women must be able to concentrate on the mission at hand and not to be consumed worrying about their personal security. Thus, the protection of our men and women in uniform becomes a paramount obligation.

There have been two incidents in particular over the past fifteen years that have greatly disturbed the American public and seriously called into question their government's ability to protect its military personnel. They are the October 23, 1983 bombing of the Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) Headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon, and the June 25, 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers United States Air Force Housing Complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Together these tragedies accounted for the deaths of 260 service members and the wounding of many hundreds more.

It is the intent of this paper to examine these two tragedies (with focus given to the discussion of intelligence support to these units prior to the tragedies), and highlight the major recommendations of the post-incident investigations. The status of Force Protection in the DoD today will also be discussed as well as changes that have come about as a result of these incidents in both the DoD and the intelligence community.

Since the term "Force Protection" is both a term that is very difficult to define and one that can cover a wide variety of topics, it is important to form a basis for this discussion. "In its broadest sense, force protection might be considered as encompassing everything from dental care to sophisticated air defense measures."⁴ All of the actions that would be included in this range of protective measures would degrade the availability of troops and pose a serious problem

for the commander in accomplishing his mission. The various branches of the armed services have differing definitions for force protection: the US Army's definitions speaks of things such as soldiers' health and morale, safety and the avoidance of fratricide; the US Navy mentions rescue and recover, disaster relief, and operational aerospace and missile defense; and the US Marine Corps's (USMC) definition refers to everything from hardening facilities and camouflage to preventive health measures. Joint doctrine defines force protection as the following:

Security programs designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.⁵

In an attempt to focus on the cooperation and link between the intelligence community and the military, this paper views force protection mostly in the role of combating terrorism. The importance of this cooperation is emphasized by remarks made by the current Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet during his confirmation hearing. "There are issues on which we simply cannot afford to fail... First and foremost, the intelligence community is working to protect the lives of our men and women in uniform and to ensure that they dominate the battlefield when they deploy to remote parts of the world."⁶

As our troops deploy to these remote parts of the world, unfortunately terrorism and scenarios other than all out combat will continue to be pervasive. Thus the subject of force protection is very important. This paper will review the lessons from the past, examine present strategies and make recommendation for the future of force protection.

BEIRUT TRAGEDY

BACKGROUND

Although it is not within the scope of this paper to examine the many complex reasons leading up to the deployment of US Marines in Lebanon in the early 1980's, it is critical to have a broad understanding of the environment preceding the 1983 bombing.

The religious-based conflicts that fester, multiply and grow in the Middle East today are as old as the sands in the desert. For many years the state of Lebanon existed in the form of a very fragile sectarian state, based upon the cooperation of its many different religious groups. The arrival of a great number of Palestinian refugees to Lebanon over a period of years and the arrival of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership in 1971 placed Lebanon in the center of the bitter Arab-Israeli conflict. Attacks on Israel from PLO bases in Southern Lebanon brought the wrath of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) into Lebanon with the invasion, on 6 June 1982, which brought the IDF to the outskirts of Beirut within three days.

These actions by the Israelis created a tense international diplomatic crisis. "Some 15,000 armed personnel (Palestinians and Syrians) were evacuated from Beirut under the auspices of a Multinational Force (MNF) consisting of French and Italian contingents and the 32nd MAU [Marine Amphibious Unit]. All MNF forces were withdrawn by 10 September 1982."⁷ The MNF's withdrawal from Lebanon did not last long. Several acts during the middle of September 1982 — most notably the assassination of president-elect Bashir Gemayel and the massacre of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in refugee camps —forced the international community to reconstitute the MNF and on 29 September 1982, Marines of the 32nd MAU returned to Beirut.

"The 1,200-man Marine Contingent occupied positions in the vicinity of Beirut International Airport (BIA) as an interpositional force between the IDF and the populated areas of Beirut."⁸ Over the next thirteen months, the nature of the USMC mission, the environment in which they were working and living, and the situation in Lebanon would change drastically. When the Marines arrived in country, they were in a "non-hostile" environment, and were welcomed as "Peacekeepers" by all sides and were considered relatively safe. This all changed drastically with the April 18, 1983 destruction of the US Embassy in Beirut, by a massive explosion which took the lives of 17 US citizens and over 40 others. The bomb was delivered by a pickup truck and detonated.⁹ It is interesting to note that this clearly overt action against Americans was a large car bomb that was delivered by a suicide bomber — this should have obviously heightened awareness to this type of attack. The unfortunate aspect of this tragedy was that the Marine commander on the ground did not feel that this attack was in any way related, or posed a threat to the US Marines in the multinational force. The functions of the US Embassy were then relocated to the British Embassy and to the Duraffourd building. Members of the USMC forces at the BIA were required to supply armed guards for protection of the new offices at both locations.

The situation in Beirut continued to deteriorate. During this time, USMC personnel were training, supplying, and performing combined patrols with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). USMC positions at the BIA continued to receive small arms fire and mortar rounds over the next few months, as the LAF forces attempted to control the opposition factions. The environment for the Marines in Beirut was clearly changing, but no one in the chain of command seemed to notice or do anything about it as will be evident during the examination of the after-action report.

BOMBING

Lance Corporal Eddie DiFranco, manning Post 6 (see figure 1), one of the two posts in front of and south of the building housing the Headquarters compound and attached elements of BLT 1/8 (Battalion Landing Team 1/8, built around the 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment), closely watched a yellow Mercedes Benz stake-bed truck, which entered the parking lot south of his post. The truck circled the lot once, then departed. At 0622 hours the same yellow Mercedes truck enters the same parking lot again, then headed toward the wire barricade separating the parking lot from the BLT building. Once at the wire, the truck ran over the wire barricade and sped between posts 6 & 7 into the lobby of the building where it detonated with the explosive force of more than 12,000 pounds of TNT.¹⁰




Figure 1: USMNF Compound at BIA¹¹

The bomb costs 241

Americans their lives (220

Marines and the rest Navy and

Army personnel assigned to the

MAU) and served as a watershed

event for serious reflection by

American policy makers on all

issues regarding Lebanon and the

larger issue of peacekeeping.

There was much self-

examination after the bombing, as

there often is in such a situation, and

the entire role of the USMC

presence in Lebanon was called

into question. Shortly after the

bombing at the Marine barracks, the Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger established a DoD

Commission to investigate this incident. The Commission was commonly referred to as the "Long Commission," after its Chairman, retired Navy Admiral Robert Long.

AFTERMATH

The Long Commission examined all aspects of the USMC mission in Lebanon prior to the bombing. The commission had access to all information, classified and unclassified, that was relevant to events leading up to and following the attack. The commission interviewed eyewitnesses, visited all pertinent command headquarters, and personally inspected the rubble of the BLT headquarters building. The following is a discussion, grouped by subject matter, of the major findings of the commission.

Rules of Engagement

Rules of Engagement (ROE) are "directives issued by competent military authority that specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered."¹² ROE were critical for several reasons. The Marines who were assigned to the BIA were under "Peacetime" ROE; this meant that basically force was only to be used in self-defense. After the bombing of the US Embassy in April, the Marines assigned to guard duty at the new temporary location were under a different set of ROE from those Marines at the BIA. The Marines that did duty at the temporary Embassy buildings were under so called "Blue Card" ROE, which expanded their use of force to help counter the vehicular and pedestrian terrorist threat to those buildings. This ROE expanded the definition of a hostile act to include attempts by people or vehicles to breach the perimeter of these buildings, but this was only in effect while at the Embassy. For clarity, Marines on post at BIA were issued "White Card" (Peacetime) ROE. All Marines were required to carry the appropriate card for their location and know its contents while on duty.

There were several reasons that the Marines at the airport did not change their ROE even after the bombing at the Embassy. According to Dr. John B. Matthews, Lt. Col., USMC (Ret.), who was the Commanding Officer (CO) of BLT 3/8 (1 Nov 1982-15 Feb 1983), "there were six 'accidental discharges' (AD) during the period of May to June 1983. Therefore, the MAU Commander, Col. Timothy Geraghty, changed the standing orders for his internal posts (to include posts 6 & 7 [see figure 1]) because he did not want anyone at BIA to be hurt (injured or killed) by an AD. The commander determined that the risk of someone getting hurt outweighed the security of his forces."¹³ This is the reason that Lance Corporal DiFranco, and others manning "internal posts" did not even have a magazine in their weapon when the terrorist came through the fence on the morning of October 23rd. Needless to say, the situation of having two separate rules of engagement was very confusing to the Marines working post. According to Dr. Matthews, "this created an impression to the Marines that the environment at the airport had to be less dangerous [or at least less important, which is both a morale and security issue] than the Embassy since they were under a peacetime ROE there. This created a problem where the Marines did not have their 'head in the game' at the airport, something that is absolutely critical in force protection."¹⁴

Changing Environment

As mentioned earlier, when the Marines landed in Lebanon they were welcomed by all sides as "Peacekeepers," and were under no real threat. Their mission required the MNF to be regarded by all as neutral. This however would change with the overt US support to the LAF — thus most Lebanese citizens did not view the Marines as being neutral. As the situation on the ground in Beirut changed, there was no acknowledgment by the chain of command that the environment was becoming hostile and that the troops must change their posture. The Marines

were placed into Beirut as part of the multinational force on a stated mission of "presence." Dr. Matthews stated that "the mission of 'presence' was viewed differently by all of the different MAU commanders. It was seen as everything from being the 'cop on the street' to nothing more than 'showing the flag'."¹⁵ Dr. Matthews recounted a telling story in which some of his Marines were patrolling the airport side road in December 1982, when they were told to stop this practice by USCINCEUR (Commander in Chief United States European Command) as it would appear that the US was protecting the IDF main lines of communication to the Shuff mountains. Dr. Matthews felt that after this incident "the USMC lost all of its credibility, they had no mission after this, and their role was just to stay at the airport and not get hurt."¹⁶

It was obvious that the situation in Beirut was changing. The destruction of the Embassy was the largest and most obvious incident, but there were many others recounted by the commission. Incidents of mortar fire, grenades, small arms fire, and sniper fire against the Marine positions at BIA, all created an obvious hostile environment for the Marines in Beirut. There was no guidance given to the Marines in Beirut from superiors who should have recognized this changing environment, and then adjusted the ROE accordingly to reflect that now they were in a dangerous environment. At the very least, measures should have been taken to better allow the Marines to protect themselves. The inability of those in charge, up to and including the highest levels of military leadership in Washington, to recognize or admit to a change in environment contributed greatly to tragedy.

Chain of Command

The Commission found that problems in the Chain of Command were major factors leading up to this incident; The Chain of Command at the time of the bombing, shown in figure 2, represents a standard US Navy chain of command for the Mediterranean theater in the early




Figure 2: Chain of Command for Marines in Beirut¹⁸

structure which was further complicated by the addition of "special representatives." The White House, the Chairman of the Joint Chief, the USCINCEUR, and State Department all had additional personnel in theater who were attempting to inform their respective bosses of the progress of the Marines and the general condition in Beirut. Needless to say, this created a less than favorable and very confusing situation for the Marine commander on the ground.

The Commission concluded that the failure of the USCINCEUR operational chain of command to inspect and supervise the defensive posture of the USMINF constituted

1980's. "The Commission believes that there was a fundamental conflict between the peacekeeping mission provided through the chain of command to the USMNF, and the increasingly active role that the United States was taking in support of the LAF."¹⁷ In light of the changing environment mentioned above, the chain of command did not pay adequate attention to the issue of security for the troops on the ground.

Dr. Matthews describes a bulky chain of command

tacit approval of the security measures and procedures in force at the BLT Headquarters building on 23 October 1983.¹⁹

The problems with the chain of command in Beirut will unfortunately be evident again in our history, and arguably continue to this day. The commander on the ground must be totally responsible for all of the troops under his command.

Intelligence

The intelligence support provided to the troops in Beirut was concentrated in two distinct areas: that of conventional military actions and that of terrorist threats. It was generally agreed that the intelligence provided relative to conventional military threats was very good; it would be the other category that would haunt the Marines. The problem that existed in Beirut was not a lack of information, there were "over 100 warnings of car bombings between May and 23 October 1983,"²⁰ but as the Commission and Dr. Matthews would agree, a 'cry wolf' situation was created. When this great number of warnings did not develop into actual attacks, the Marines could not help but become nonchalant about the warning system. Dr. Matthews recalled that when he was in country "the Marines would report movements up the Intel chain of command, and then get the same information regurgitated back down in the form of finished Intel reports . . . there was no mechanism to share with, or get information from the intelligence community . . . we witnessed a serious breakdown of Intelligence support in Beirut."²¹ The Marines were getting a great deal of raw information presented to them, but there was no one of credible position to stand up and say, "this is what you need to take seriously." "The USMNF commander received volumes of intelligence information, but none specific enough to have enabled the prevention of the attack or provide him other than general warning."²² This

statement underscores the lack of authoritative intelligence analysis tailored to the needs of the commander, as the major problem with intelligence support to the military on the ground.

LONG COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

At the conclusion of their investigation, the Long Commission made nine specific recommendations to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) on all aspects of the tragedy. The major recommendations deal with the issues discussed above: Rules of Engagement, Chain of Command, and Intelligence. The commission suggested that the SECDEF take whatever administrative or disciplinary actions he felt appropriate against the members of the chain of command. In the important area of intelligence, the commission presented two important recommendations:

- (a) That the SECDEF establish an all-source fusion center, which would tailor and focus all-source intelligence support to US military commanders involved in military operations in areas of high threat, conflict or crisis.
- (b) That the SECDEF take steps to establish a joint CIA/DoD examination of policy and resource alternatives to immediately improve HUMINT support to the USMNF contingent in Lebanon and other areas of potential conflict which would involve US military operating forces.²³

Unfortunately for the US military, these recommendations would not be carried out to the necessary conclusion, and we see very similar recommendations thirteen years later after another tragedy.

KHOBAR TOWERS TRAGEDY

BACKGROUND

The United States views the area of the Persian Gulf as one of vital national interest and is prepared to take whatever steps necessary to protect these interests. This was evident in 1990-91 when President Bush committed US troops in Desert Shield and Desert Storm to restore Kuwait's sovereignty and also protect US vital interests (mainly the oil supplies of our allies — most notably Saudi Arabia). The US did not enter the Gulf War with a plan of developing long-term bases for troops in the area. However, the continued deployment of troops was necessary to ensure Saddam Hussein's compliance with United Nations resolutions that were part of the cease fire agreement.

In the years since the end of the war, Saddam Hussein has tested US resolve in the region several different ways: attacks against the Kurds, violations of the no-fly zone, and a continued WMD program. These are all examples of reasons why the US feels the need for a continued military presence in the Gulf. This presence is in the form of personnel and equipment pre-positioned in the Gulf region to deter, respond to and monitor actions of Saddam. One of the main missions of the US military is best depicted by the following example.

Nearly 5,000 US Air Force men and women in Operation Southern Watch. . . conduct combat air missions from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, enforcing the No Fly Zone over Southern Iraq that restricts Saddam Hussein's ability to oppress his people and threaten the peace and stability of the region.²⁴

While this is only an example of the many missions performed by US military personnel in the Gulf region, it is a good illustration of the type of mission being performed.

Prior to the tragedy at Khobar Towers, there was another important and unfortunate event in Saudi Arabia. On November 13, 1995, a terrorist exploded a car bomb outside the Office of

the Program Manager/Saudi Arabia National Guard (OPM/SANG) building in Riyadh, killing seven Americans and wounding many others. Prior to this attack "the pervasive mind-set was that Saudi Arabia was a safe place to live: it was a low-threat security environment; the Saudi government had the security situation firmly in hand; and the country was immune to terrorist incidents."²⁵ These assumptions were a reflection of the long standing close relationship between Saudi and US governments, assumptions that were to be re-evaluated after OPM/SANG, and shattered only seven months later.

BOMBING

Shortly before 10:00 p.m. local time on Tuesday, June 25, 1996, a fuel truck parked next to the northern perimeter fence at the Khobar Towers complex (see figure 3). Air Force guards posted on top of the closest building, Bldg. 131, immediately spotted the truck and suspected a bomb as its drivers fled the scene in a nearby car, , . The blast completely destroyed the northern face of the building. . . nineteen American service members were killed and hundreds more were seriously injured.²⁶

This attack shook the American people and called into question U.S. continued presence in the region and more importantly, again, the government's ability to protect its sons and daughters in uniform.

AFTERMATH

Several days after the bombing, Secretary of Defense William Perry appointed a task force to investigate the circumstances surrounding the event and to recommend changes for the future. This task force and its subsequent report are more commonly referred to by the name of their chairman, retired Army General Wayne Downing. General Downing and his task force interviewed many survivors, reviewed all pertinent documentation and visited many US military installations in the US Central Command's (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) prior to issuing its findings and recommendations. Ironically, most of the major findings of the




Figure 3: Khobar Towers Complex²⁷

Downing Task Force were similar to those of the Long Commission. These include chain of command responsibility/confusion, intelligence structure shortcomings, and a lack of comprehensive approach to force protection.

Chain of Command

Some of the passages in the Downing Report hauntingly echo almost verbatim from the Long Commission when discussing the issue of chain of command. Phrases such as the following indicate that DoD did not learn its lesson regarding chain of command from the earlier tragedy:

The DoD must clarify command relationships in the US Central command to ensure that all commanders have the requisite authority to accomplish their assigned responsibilities...review of organization and structure must occur frequently to allow adaptation to changing threats and missions... inconsistent, and sometimes inadequate, force protection practices among service forces, joint headquarters, and different countries resulted from insufficient command involvement...the command relationships established in the region did not support unity of effort in force protection.²⁸

Perhaps the following indicated the depth of the command problem; "No member of the US Central Command chain of command inspected force protection at Khobar Towers."²⁹ This points to a lack of attention by the chain of command to the issue of force protection. However, had inspection visits been performed, we can not assume that all senior commanders would have the expertise to properly inspect and make corrective recommendations regarding protection.

Former Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch stated that "General Downing hit the mark in two major points in regard to Khobar Towers. First that the military chain of command was not paying attention to force protection issues, and second that there was confusion in the chain of command with the particular wing commander."³¹ "Force protection is the responsibility of command."³² As was the case with the chain of command in Beirut, the military commander on the ground did not have total control




Figure 4: US CENTCOM Command Relationships³⁰

over the troops under his responsibility. This confusion in the chain of command relationships can be seen in figure 4.

As shown in figure 4, there are problems with the command relationship. The authority of the Commander, Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia (CJTF/SWA) is limited by this arrangement.

Under tactical control (TACON), he can assign units to accomplish missions., he does not have the authority to direct those units to carry out specified tasks, such as directing where they can live and what specific force protection measures they are to take. Only the commander who has operational control (OPCON) over these forces can direct the execution of these specified tasks.³³

From this it becomes clear that the commander on the ground, in this case the CJTF/SWA, must have operational as well as tactical control over the forces for which he is responsible, in order to successfully complete the mission in every aspect. This in essence is the recommendation of the task force. Force protection is one of the major "battlespace functions" for which every commander is responsible — even during military operations other than war. It then stands to reason, that there is no one better to make recommendations and decisions regarding the welfare of the troops than the commander on the scene.

Intelligence

Former DCI Deutch stated that: "the intelligence community must give the DoD intelligence in the right amounts and at the right levels. Not only do you need to give the right information at the right time, but also give it to the right person, and that person must be a good listener. In relation to Khobar Towers, we gave Intel at several levels, but the recipients were not listening."³⁴

After the OPM/SANG bombing, there was a great increase in the amount of intelligence provided to the commander in the gulf region. After the attack, Secretary of Defense Perry

stated that: "We had intelligence and we acted on it, but we lacked the specificity necessary that would have made the critical difference in this incident. What was missing was the hard tactical data of an impending attack."" DCI Deutch responded by saying, "we must not give false alarms. Rather, we must give warnings of danger in given areas based on solid information, and in the case of Khobar Towers, warning was provided. It is totally unreasonable to expect exact date and time type intelligence to be provided, and I do not believe that is what the Secretary meant."³⁶

General Downing stated in an interview that:

There was a considerable body of information and intelligence that would... indicate a credible terrorist threat. . . also there were a series of ten suspicious incidents in three months preceding the bombing that indicated surveillance on that site [Khobar Towers]. . . information that led the commander to improve his security, but not enough.. He did not protect himself from a standoff bomb.³⁷

Clearly the problem prior to the Khobar bombing was not a lack of information. The intelligence was provided to the commander, but was not given the right emphasis, the proper analysis, or delivered from a credible source that could ensure that the commander took action when necessary.

DOWNING TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS

The detailed sections above are only some of the major recommendations from the approximately 26 findings and recommendations issued as part of the lengthy report by General Downing's Task Force. As mentioned earlier, the task force's investigation and report were extremely thorough, and other recommendations of note are in the areas of, lack of physical security standards for DoD, lack of or inconsistency in training practices, lack of funding for force protection measures, confusion in threat level assessment because of differing threat level guidelines given by DoD and State Department regarding the same areas, cooperation with host

country nationals, lack of utilization of available technologies to help in this effort and a recommendation to learn from our allies who have a great deal to offer in the area of force protection (mainly the British and the Israelis). The most far-reaching recommendation was the fact that the DoD had no central office or group that was dealing with this critical issue. This realization, coupled with the many strong recommendations from the Downing Report, would drive force protections issues to the forefront of the Defense Department.

FORCE PROTECTION TODAY

The Downing Assessment Task Force Report would become the battle cry for improvements in the area of force protection for the foreseeable future. Many excellent and necessary changes have come about as a direct result of this report, both within the DoD and intelligence community.

CHANGES WITHIN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

The tragedy at Khobar Towers was a true catalyst within DoD. The changes that came about as direct result of this incident were many and sweeping. The necessary changes were not fully implemented after the Beirut bombing to prevent the same type of mistakes and prevent another tragedy. Hopefully this latest loss of life will serve as a painful wake-up call within the Pentagon to make the permanent changes to the system in order to protect our men and women to the best of our ability.

Perhaps the biggest change that has occurred for the long run is that the Secretary of Defense placed force protection issues under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

As the primary, high-level advocate for force protection, the Chairman will help ensure that this requirement is placed as a major consideration along with other mission goals as we plan military operations, and that the focus on force protection is maintained throughout the operation.³⁸

Although the ultimate responsibility for the protection of forces lays with the commander in the field, it seems critical to have one central office at the Pentagon to focus training, dollars, research, and coordinate with other governmental agencies as well as other governments.

Although I agree with the formation of this new office, I do not believe that the ground commander needs another link in the chain of command. This office must concentrate on providing the tools necessary to help the commanders make the common sense solutions on the

scene. Force protection should be an area of concern and responsibility for deployed military troops — I believe it is a mistake to remove responsibility from the field commander or post stander. It is a mission for all military personnel to perform.

J-34

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General John M. Shalikasvili, created an office within the




Figure 5: Organization of J-34³⁹

Joint Chiefs area to deal with these challenges. The office, which officially came into being in October 1996, is called the Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism, Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Director for Operations (J-3) — or more simply, J-34. The organization of this office can be seen in figure 5.

As seen in the figure, this new office covers many different areas. Col. Hal Johnson, the Chief of Current OPs stated: "that J-34 is the 'advocate' for the CINCs, who are ultimately

responsible for defending troops... we are working funding, training, 'commo', policy development and other issues for them."⁴⁰ The mission of J-34 is simply to "Ensure Antiterrorism protection for the US armed forces, so that they can focus on their essential missions around the world."⁴¹ As mentioned in the introduction, this is an essential task of the DoD and an obligation that must be carried out.

The objectives that J-34 have developed for themselves are spelled out below:

1. To provide the CJCS unity of effort in dealing with all matters of combating terrorism;
2. To assist the CINCs/Services in the execution of their force protection responsibilities;
3. To make available emerging technologies to combat terrorism;
4. To develop a uniform approach to our doctrine, standards, education, and training on combating terrorism;
5. To Enhance coordination with our allies in combating terrorism.⁴²

These goals speak to the mission given, but also answer many of the recommendations that came directly out of the Downing Report. This office is a major and critical step in the right direction for DoD to ensure that many of the areas overlooked in the Khobar tragedy can have one focal point.

It is important to realize that the DoD believes that fighting terrorism is a combination of both Antiterrorism (AT — or the defensive measure) and Counterterrorism (CT — or the offensive measure). The office of J-34 views both CT and AT as subsets of the bigger issue of Force Protection (FP), although most often the issue of FP is combined with the defensive efforts of AT. The office is built on the premise that a strong national AT/FP posture is the only way in which we can successfully achieve our National Security Strategy, Such a strong posture will hopefully deter possible attacks and allow the troops to concentrate on their primary missions,

As noted in figure 5, the office activities are divided into four major areas; Current OPs, Policy & Plans, Programs & Requirements, and Training/Doctrine & Assessment. Each of these deserves a closer look. The Current Operations Branch is tasked with preparing the military to face the possibility of a terrorist attack from any type of asymmetric threat. Their job is to become familiar with the enemy, to know the threat and take whatever measures are possible — knowing that they can not prevent everything. They are working very closely with the intelligence side of the house to fuse the two together. Col. Johnson stated that "since operators create intelligence, it is essential for the Intel and OPs to work together to create the preventative early warnings."⁴³ He went on to say that "the DoD is doing a good job at hardening itself, and decreasing its vulnerabilities, the big questions now becomes, what to do next given our limited resources of time, money and people?"⁴⁴

The Plans & Policy branch is actively updating the many DoD Directives, Instructions and Publications that deal with this subject. They are also very active in the coordination of new Memorandums of Agreement between the Defense Department and the State Department in order to clarify the responsibility for installations overseas. This branch is also involved with our allies, and coordinates the writing of any necessary agreements between the US and host governments concerning the security and structure of our military installations overseas. This task is a critical one, in order to ensure that when the commander in the field needs reference material on this subject, he is provided with it, and it is the most up to date and clear guidance available.

The Programs and Requirements Branch is ensuring that the area of force protection is receiving the necessary funding that is required, and that force protection is not lost in the budget cycle. They are also responsible for coordinating logistical support in order to sustain an

effective antiterrorism program. The Downing report found that the armed services were not taking advantage of the latest technologies that could aid in the fight against terrorism. This branch of J-34 is tasked with ensuring that the commanders in the field are kept abreast of the latest technologies, and provide them with vendor demonstrations when practical. "As commanders identify new deficiencies or needed capabilities resulting from changes in threat level, political situation, doctrine, standards or assessment; J-34 will ensure potential solutions are identified and made available for procurement."⁴⁵ Another important change here is that since technology advances so quickly, in order to put equipment in the hands of users in a timely fashion; "when Services are unable to provide essential funding of AT/FP solutions, J-34 may avail the Chairman's Readiness Initiative Fund (RIF) to commanders as an alternative for required FP funding."⁴⁶ This is certainly a welcome option available to commanders resulting from giving this issue attention at the proper level within DoD.

The final branch within J-34 is the Training/Doctrine & Assessment Branch. These officers are concentrating on two critical issues; the training of members of the DoD, and the performing of vulnerability assessments on DoD facilities. The Downing report found that there were serious problems with the lack of training regarding antiterrorism given to the troops deploying in the Gulf region. Training must be timely and topical and focus on the potential type of threat that an individual or unit might face. Lt. Col. Donald Fields, and officer assigned to this branch stated that "we are the POC for AT training for all the services and the service schools. We are committed to a thorough program of training which will start when soldiers first enter the service and then throughout their careers — a cradle to grave AT/FP training program."⁴⁷ He stated that the goal is to increase AT awareness on a continuing basis to all members of the DoD, both civilian and military, and that the training thus far has been very well received. The training

program consists of Levels I-IV; starting with individual training awareness for the service member and family and ending with level IV which is an executive seminar for flag officers given at the Pentagon. In addition, Lt. Col. Fields stated that they have been conducting training exchange programs with our allies, and that this sharing of information has been very helpful.

In addition to coordinating the education program, this branch conducts the critical Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments (JSIVAs). These JSIVA teams are augmented with experts from the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA). These assessments, performed at the request of the CINCs, will review the installation's force protection awareness, physical security, threat assessment, and crisis response plans against the DoD standards. Feedback will then be provided to the commander of the particular installation, the CINC, Service Chief, and the trends and results will be tracked by J-34. With this analysis data, J-34 can track the status of force protection, effectiveness of new technologies and procedures and constantly monitor and improve force protection measures for the entire DoD.

Health and Comfort

Although the safety of our men and women is of paramount concern, the health and comfort of the troops in the field, especially when they are on assignments in difficult parts of the globe, must come into question. This will involve a change in the mindset by the members of our armed forces.

At the time of the Beirut bombing, Dr. Matthews advised that "fifty (50) of the 241 Americans killed, were cooks and messmen who were ashore as a direct result of the comfort issue mandated by the commander. . . also at the time of the bombing, there was an Administrative Battalion ashore just to handle the paperwork for the ADs."⁴⁸ Various issues of health and comfort caused all of these extra people to be ashore at the time of the bombing.

There is obviously the need to feed the troops and complete paperwork, but there must be better ways of getting these missions accomplished, thus the change in mindset.

There was also the issue of third party nationals in the building at the time of the explosion. The Long Commission spoke of a Lebanese national who ran the vendor's shop on the ground floor of the BLT building. "The vendor sold candy, soda, souvenirs, and health and comfort items. He often slept in his shop's storage area and is believed to have been killed in the explosion on 23 October."⁴⁹ Dr. Matthews said that everyone knew this individual as "Shuffles of Lebanon" and did not give any thought at the time to his presence in the building. In all likelihood, this individual was an honest person just trying to make a living selling a few items to the Marines. However, in the environment that they were living at the time, third party nationals of any kind should not have been in the building, and most certainly not staying in the building. Again, it is not being suggested that the troops should be without the type of items being sold by this individual, but sound judgment must be used in determining the extent of interaction with third party nationals.

In the Persian Gulf there are also many issues surrounding health and comfort that were called into question after the tragedy. Secretary Perry stated that "at the time of the Khobar Towers bombing, we sponsored nearly 800 military dependents in Saudi Arabia alone. This no longer seems prudent."⁵⁰ There was also the issue of length of tours of duty in the region. To create a situation where the service member would not be away from home for too long, most airmen were assigned for a 90-day temporary rotation. This setup did not allow the necessary building of area knowledge nor did it allow the military police to develop relationships with the local guard force that assisted our military troops. Although it is admirable to try and create a situation where the service member is not away from home for too long, there are certain

situations which require a longer deployment. The operation in the Gulf is a long-term US commitment, but the US Air Force was treating it, in respect to staffing policies, as a short-term operation. With 90 days as the norm for a rotation in the region, the Downing report concluded that:

These extremely short tours adversely affected the continuity and effectiveness of force protection teams and individuals...this inhibited the development of institutional knowledge of the security environment...frequent rotations of intelligence and counterintelligence personnel in the region have had adverse impacts on both intelligence collection and force protection...experienced collectors in the region noted that, given the nature of the host country culture, counterpart relationships take at least one year to establish.⁵¹

Given these observations by the commission, it is clear to see that there is a need to reexamine how troops are assigned to these long-term commitments.

CHANGES WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

In a September 1996 speech given at Georgetown University, then DCI John Deutch spoke on ways in which the intelligence community has improved in the area of fighting foreign terrorism. In what would become recognized as a very important speech on the subject, the DCI spoke of the ever present danger of terrorism to national security and the dedication by the many governmental agencies to fight this problem — most notably the intelligence community's Counterterrorist Center (CTC). CTC is truly a "community" organization, with professional officers representing all concerned entities within the US Government, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and State Department. The Director spoke of CTC's successes in determining who had been responsible for previous acts of terrorism, and their commitment to advise of events before they occurred.

We will strive to provide warning of all attacks before they occur, but this is an enormously difficult task. This type of tactical information depends upon access to dedicated terrorist groups who are well financed, skillful and determined to commit atrocities... One of the most critical elements in both warning of attacks and detecting those responsible is clandestine human collection or HUMINT.⁵²

The Director also stated that the intelligence community is dedicated to putting more resources into HUMINT collection, especially against targets such as terrorists. This speaks to the criticism of the intelligence community in regard to lack of HUMINT attention to this problem, as well as the issue of providing "tactical" information about a possible attack — as was the criticism post-Khobar Towers. The Director's commitment to HUMINT collection is encouraging, however, it seems that he underestimates the incredible difficulty in collecting this data. As he accurately points out, HUMINT and terrorism are very problematic — penetrating these terrorist targets is not only "enormously difficult," but also almost impossible. I am sure

that the Director's comments regarding warning of "all attacks before they occur" is the ideal situation. It is imperative that we not be lulled into a false sense of security regarding HUMINT collection. I am a strong proponent of increasing our HUMINT capabilities. However, we must recognize that HUMINT data collection is only one aspect of an overall force protection package and is not guaranteed to provide tactical data.

Later in his remarks, the Director announced a new four-point program. He stated that the number of HUMINT officers assigned to work on terrorism will increase, both overseas and in the CTC, as well as the intelligence community's ability to forcibly act against foreign terrorists worldwide. The next two points will be discussed in some detail.

The DCI announced that he would be creating a new national level Terrorism Warning Group (TWG) within the CTC. "This highly expert group will have as its exclusive focus the review of intelligence from all sources to provide warning of possible terrorist attacks against US and allied personnel, interests and facilities."⁵³ The Chief of this newly created office was interviewed and he discussed the ways in which the TWG improves the warning of possible terrorist attack. He stated that this office was created as a direct result of the Downing Report, as a way to capture the attention of senior policy makers when the warning is produced. As mentioned earlier, the intelligence community cannot give false alarms and hope to remain credible. Thus the new warning system has a high degree of accountability. To be issued as a warning, it must have "good solid reporting, corroborated reports from verifiable sources, meeting a very high threshold of information, and the warning must be made to have an impact [a function of how the information is formatted to the user]."⁵⁴ These threats are formatted into a very specific format containing three distinct sections; the threat, summary and actions taken. These warnings are given to a very specific list of twenty-four (24) of the highest level policy

makers, and the top eight (8) on the list get a personalized note from the DCI to emphasize the report. This list of 24 people can fluctuate based on the specific threat — if the threat is in a particular AOR, then it will be sent right to the responsible CINC. These reports are *hand-delivered* to the right people, the people who can do things about it. Chief, TWG called a warning "a serious threat to a target, which is imminent, from a credible source and the information gets to an audience that can do something about it."⁵⁵ He went on to say that the "Actions Taken" section of the warning has become the best received section by the senior customers, and the SECDEF and DCI have personally commented on this section. The actions taken reflect the coordinated actions taken by all relevant elements of the intelligence community.

The last of the Director's four points stated that he plans to expand support for force protection through the National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST) — these are administered and led by senior CIA officers. In an interview with the former DCI, I asked him about his commitment to the NIST teams.

The NIST is the way to go for the intelligence community. These are not just CIA deployments, but rather the NIST fuses together all elements of the intelligence community for the purpose of support to the military in many different areas, and not just force protection. NISTs have worked very well in both Bosnia and Iraq, and they should be part of every military deployment.⁵⁶

As the DCI pointed out, the NIST provides the military commander on the ground with the direct conduit to many different elements of the intelligence community to get the information that he needs in a timely manner. This of course is what any commander wants from the intelligence community, and the NIST seem like a logical step in helping to provide information at the right time to the right people.

The Paradox of Warning

During all of the personal interviews conducted for this project, without exception, everyone mentioned the "Paradox of Warning." The last thing that the intelligence community wants to do is to give false alarms or cry wolf. What does it mean if the information is provided, the alarm is sounded, and nothing happens? Does it mean that the information was incorrect — that an attack was never forthcoming? Does it mean that the warning and subsequent measures taken prevented the attack? Or does it mean that the attackers realized that the target was alerted and moved to another target? In the warning business, if the job is done correctly, the answer will never be known. This is a very big Catch-22 situation for the commanders, especially if they are dealing with a situation that might be inconvenient or unpopular. If the commander does not take action and there is an attack, then he is personally liable, but if there is no attack, then the warning people are said to cry wolf. If the commander takes appropriate action or countermeasures the terrorist may amend or abandon their attack plans. If everyone does their job, then the terrorist planners or attackers will not be capable of finalizing their plans or intentions. Therefore, the warning system, especially with regard to counterterrorism is indeed problematic and must be given the highest priority and resources available.

How is success measured? If nothing happens the next day, is that success? If nothing happens over the next week, month, year, two years, then is that success? While one characteristic of the American public is their lack of patience, a characteristic of the terrorist groups is their abundance of patience. With the new improvements to the warning system with the creation of CTC/TWG, any warning that is issued is agreed upon by the majority of the intelligence community and is said to be very credible. If a commander were to ignore one of these warnings, then he would be seriously derelict. Does this solve the entire problem of the "Paradox of Warning?" As all of the interviewees would agree, the intelligence community must

ensure that solid information is given to the right person and it must be given by a person of some authority to stress to the commander the true critical nature of certain information. It is the finding of the Downing Commission that there was strategic level warning of a possible attack, but not information which was stressed to the commander.

There is another change within the intelligence community that is especially worth mentioning. That change is the addition of a representative of the CTC directly in with DIA's Terrorism Warning Division (TWC) on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. This individual has been in this position since June of 1997 and provides an invaluable link to senior military leaders from the CTC. This individual was interviewed and stated that he is able to read operational traffic as it comes in from the field and thus provide the necessary warning to senior military leaders — usually J-34 — based on raw information at the earliest possible time,

CONCLUSIONS

I believe that the issue of force protection is an absolutely critical one for the US military in order to operate effectively today and into the future. Having worked with the intelligence community, I feel that this is an area in which it has played a great part and must continue to improve cooperation and service to their biggest customer, the DoD. Military commanders should be concerned about force protection for many reasons. The first reason is that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has named "Full-Dimensional Protection" one of the four tenets for Joint Vision 2010, the document which will guide warfighting in the next century. Another reason is that force protection is critical for any commander because it is both a moral obligation for which he is held accountable, and critical to conserving his forces in order to complete his mission. The issue of force protection is very unique for commanders because it is present at all levels of conflict — from total war to peacetime. The topic of force protection seems to be a 'buzzword' around Washington as of late. I hope to have shown that this is not, nor can it be, a passing fad.

The two tragedies examined were disturbing to the American public, and produced the need for answers to many questions. Public confidence in our leaders might have been shaken, but never the support to our troops in the field. There were many findings and recommendations after the Beirut bombing; was anything actually learned from this costly human tragedy? It would seem not. With the reoccurrence of many of the same findings thirteen years later after Khobar, it can be argued that the military did not learn their lesson. Perhaps this second tragedy awakened the national energies.

The bombing at Khobar Towers will forever be referred to as the one event that served as the critical turning point in this area. In its aftermath, the recommendations from the Downing

Report have produced a great number of sound changes to the way in which the military goes about the business of force protection. Secretary of Defense Perry and CJCS Shalikashvili (and subsequently Secretary Cohen and CJCS Shelton) seem to have taken their responsibilities seriously in the wake of this tragedy and made earnest strides toward preventing another occurrence. It would be foolish to suggest that a similar event could never happen again. The nature of the world in which our service members must operate dictates that we must always be on our toes. In the words of the former CJCS; "to protect our vital national interests we will require strong armed forces, which are organized, trained and equipped to fight and win against any adversary at any level of conflict."⁵⁷

The ancient Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu stated that you should "know the enemy, know yourself and your victory will never be endangered."⁵⁸ This axiom is as true today as when it was written almost 2,500 years ago. The major lesson for any potential enemy of the United States after the Persian Gulf War is not to allow the US to build up troops and then fight force on force. The most realistic threat to the US military today, I believe, is in the form of asymmetrical threat, i.e., terrorism. Given Sun Tzu's advice, we must ensure that when we deploy forces to various parts of the world, we are intimately familiar with any potential adversaries in that region. All aspects of a potential enemy, especially an asymmetrical one (ideology, goals, objectives, type of attack prevalent, method of delivery, weapons of choice, etc.) must all be learned and understood by commanders in the field.

The nineteenth century Prussian Carl von Clausewitz stated that "one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point which all our energies should be directed."⁵⁹ I believe that the center of gravity

for the United States (at the strategic level) is the public opinion of the American people.

Without public support, our leaders are extremely hesitant, if not outright reluctant, to move in any given direction. This can be seen very clearly even today as the administration canvases the country in an attempt to gain support for its Middle East policies.

Potential adversaries understand this center of gravity, and the immense power of the "CNN Factor." Now that our world has become dependent on immediate access to information, potential enemies have incredible ability to strike quickly at this US strategic center of gravity. Furthermore, realizing that seeing American service members coming home in "bodybags" is the best way to erode public support of any policy, terrorists will continue to pursue asymmetrical attacks against US forces. In this vein, force protection boils down to reducing or eliminating from the enemy, what Clausewitz would call, our critical vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities, or what an adversary perceives as our vulnerability, is where asymmetrical attacks will be aimed. Recognizing our own critical vulnerabilities, and recognizing that these vulnerabilities change depending on the situation, requires constant vigilance and attention. Not only the current security posture of any deployment must be examined, but also a continuing evaluation of the environment in which service members are deployed.

It seems that the military continues to focus on things they understand (i.e., Chain of Command, ROE, etc.). While these issues are all important, we have already seen that the modern battlefield will not be business as usual for the US military. The recommendations from the major after action reports following Beirut and Khobar offer ways to fix current things that are broken, but offer little suggestions for new and creative alternatives to business as usual. It is only human nature to focus on what we are most comfortable with or what we do best, especially in times of crisis; however, it is imperative that the military thinks creatively and develops new

techniques, technologies, and concepts to deal with this complex issue. They need to acquire special counterterrorism expertise and intelligence capabilities. The size and nature of the Khobar blast was not new or much different from other similar attacks. Surveillance, appropriate stand-off, counter-surveillance, intelligence liaison and authoritative intelligence analysis always seem to be overlooked in DoD post-incident studies.

This stresses the absolutely crucial link between our military and the intelligence community. The cooperation in this area has improved, but must continue to get better. The role of the intelligence community to assist the DoD in this area cannot be underestimated. Currently, various organizations within the intelligence community possess, organic to them, many of the above mentioned capabilities. These functions can be shared, taught, or simply utilized by the military as appropriate. However, this can only work *if* the mechanism exists to share information and resources. The improvements to the warning system and the addition of liaison officers between organizations are leaps forward toward an era of true mutual cooperation, but this issue must remain at the forefront.

Force protection is, I believe, an intelligence problem. Warnings are effective, but are not enough anymore and do not provide a deterrent. The military must be proactive in order to prevent and avoid terrorist attacks. The only way to truly accomplish this is with a robust intelligence capability. We have seen with both the Beirut barracks and Khobar Towers attacks that the enemy will bring to bear what is needed to defeat established defensive measures. This is not to say, however, that defensive measures are not required. They harden targets, and at least in the case of Khobar, save some lives and often serve as a deterrent to attack. The failure of force protection in these examples was the inability to see the attack plan develop. After both of these tragedies, the military complained that they lacked the tactical warning of an event;

however, even if the intelligence community was to provide tactical warning information, it is too late. The military must deploy proactive units that are specialized in counter-surveillance, pre-attack recognition, etc. The modus operandi of terrorist organizations is not a secret to the US government; it just takes training and expertise to recognize it.

The US military must evaluate what their real threat is. During the offensive stage of Desert Storm, there were 111 Americans lost to the Iraqis.⁶⁰ During the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, in one single incident, the US military lost 241 lives. Thus there have been more than two times as many service members lost to one terrorist attack, than in all of the past twenty-three years of "combat," I am certainly not arguing that the military stop preparing for the major contingencies, for which they do an outstanding job. I am saying that we need to take a close look at the ratio of effort that we are applying to a threat that has been so deadly to us over the past three decades.

With this in mind, I suggest that as part of any standard deployment, no matter what size or duration, there is one individual assigned to do nothing but force protection. For sake of discussion, let us call this individual the Force Protection Officer (FPO). Realizing that the ultimate responsibility resides with the commander, the FPO can give all of his time and energies to this issue, whereas the commander is preoccupied with many various responsibilities. This cannot be another "additional duty" for a senior military policeman, junior intelligence officer or a staff officer punching a ticket, this must be a full time responsibility. Understandably, in this era of force reduction and manpower shortages, many commanders might scoff at this suggestion; however, the alternative to not paying enough attention to this matter is unacceptable.

To take this one step further, I believe that the FPO should be a new military occupational specialty (MOS). The military does not lack the personnel, but rather the expertise to apply to this problem. Given that force protection is a true intelligence problem, this new MOS should come under the intelligence field. The need for a new MOS exists because the focus of current military intelligence (order of battle, battlefield preparation, etc.) does not allocate the time needed to concentrate on force protection. The creation of a special intelligence and counterterrorism field within the DoD, through cross-fertilization and cooperation with CIA and IC/CTC, would indicate that the DoD is truly prepared to get serious about this issue.

The FPO must be tasked with always asking the question, "What If?" Asking this questions allows the officer the opportunity to try and think like the adversary, preparing for all possibilities/contingencies, examining potential weaknesses, and thus help to respond to Sun Tzu's axiom. The FPO must be a very dynamic officer, having not only a complete understanding of the myriad of complete security requirements, but also and very importantly, an ability to understand the given cultural and political setting in which our troops are deployed. It would probably be very helpful if the officer was language capable for the area he was to be working in. This officer must be able to provide information/recommendations with credibility, authority, and without fear of reprisal. Assigning this person as the primary focal point for force protection does not eliminate the inherent obligation of the commander, and of every service member assigned to the deployment of their security responsibilities. However, this might be a firm step in the right direction toward aiding the commander in meeting this critical requirement.

Each deployment of US troops will be very different. We can not expect the same methods of force protection to work in Bosnia as we did in the middle of the Arabian desert.

Furthermore, as witnessed in Beirut, security arrangements sufficient at the beginning of a deployment might not be appropriate for the entire duration, and is subject to change on short notice. As Dr. Matthews warns, "you can not go out and build 'Fortress America' in whatever environment that you go to, you must often times be out and about with the people to get the mission accomplished. We need to look into urban training scenarios as well, such as the British do in preparation for Northern Ireland."⁶¹ This is one of the greatest challenges facing our military today, how to deploy in such a way that the troops are protected, but not in such a way that is overly obtrusive to the host government, and allows us to accomplish the given mission.

The Downing Report was critical of the lack of physical security standards within the DoD. This is an important area to consider; however, as I have pointed out, no two deployments will be the same. Thus, we must ensure that these standards are a tool for the commander to use in the protection of his forces and not an instrument of bureaucracy that ties his hands with regard to accomplishing the mission. For example, many measures required for the construction of a new facility at the site of our choosing would not apply to the occupying of an existing building, whose location is perhaps chosen due to political considerations. This is where the common sense and adaptability of the commander must be trusted to do what is right for his troops. The Pentagon can not create an environment where the commander on the scene is afraid to make decisions regarding the welfare of his troops.

Another major consideration, proffered by Dr. Matthews, is to minimize the 'footprint' of troops ashore. Limiting the number of people assigned to a mission creates an environment in which it is easier for the troops to defend themselves, while at the same time putting fewer lives at risk — this refers back to the issues of health and comfort for the service members which was discussed earlier. Something that can certainly work in the case of the Marine Corps is, although

nothing is guaranteed, it is generally agreed that our troops are much safer aboard ship than they are on the shore. Thus, the military must consider very carefully the requirement for sending every individual to a deployment. In addition, the length of a deployment must be closely monitored and concluded at the earliest time — whenever possible we should, get in, get the job done, and get out. Of course this approach will not work in all situations, and many times the duration of a deployment becomes a political decision and is out of the hands of the military. However, attention to simple matters such as "footprint ashore" might be just the thing that creates a safer environment for our troops.

Members of the CTC who have traveled to Bosnia in support of our troops deployed there recount cases where the troops were not prepared regarding their protection. Some sentries were on duty without loaded weapons — reminiscent of the Marines standing post in Beirut at the time of the bombing. Realizing that the soldiers are in Bosnia in a peacekeeping role (as were the Marines in Lebanon), I am not aware of any current ROE in Bosnia which permits having a loaded weapon for self-defense. At one of the US camps, the living quarters were reportedly too close to a main road — reminiscent of Khobar Towers. Also, at the same camp, too many entrance gates were being used for the sake of convenience, at the expense of operational security, and stretching thin the troops responsible for perimeter defense.

Further, the basic use of technology was lacking and some of the entrances were void of the most rudimentary physical barriers. Another colleague from the Counterterrorist Center recounted an additional story from a trip to Bosnia. Apparently the main base at Tuzla could not acquire, in a timely fashion, hand-held magnetometers via the Army procurement system. The CTC personnel purchased some through commercial channels and were able to get the equipment deployed to the field when it was needed. In addition, X-ray interpretation training

for USAF personnel at the Tuzla airbase was provided. He went on to say that, officers and men in Bosnia knew little of the terror groups operating in theater or how to detect hostile terrorist pre-attack surveillance — i.e., marching right past parked vehicles (parked for several days) close to the perimeter fence-line of Tuzla Main. All of these incidents are very disturbing to hear. Force protection is a continuing process and our troops cannot lose focus, even for a short period of time.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of these stories is that they hit at the heart of the issues that J-34 professes to target. Awareness, education, and rapid deployment of new technologies are all areas in which J-34 must do as it is advertising. This is not an area where we can afford to offer only "lip-service."

The military has made many strides to improve force protection over the last year and a half, but this does not mean it can relax. The issue of force protection is, and must remain a constant concern to our civilian and military leaders. This issue must remain, a high priority within our military and not move to the back burner once these tragedies are not as vivid in America's memories.

Terrorism directed against America today is a by-product of our enhanced military status and capability, and will continue to challenge for all leaders in the future. America's enemies have not gone away, they are simply less capable of waging conventional warfare against us. Guided by *Joint Vision 2010*, we must become preeminent in antiterrorism and force protection.⁶²

Our men and women in uniform deserve it and our nation demands it.

NOTES

- ¹ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, Washington, DC: 1997, ii.
- ² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States*, Washington, DC: 1997, i.
- ³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States*, 3.
- ⁴ LtCol. Donald B. Vought, USA (Ret.), "Force Protection: The Stepchild of Military Operations." *Military Review*, (May 1992): 87.
- ⁵ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-07.2. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*. Washington, DC: (12 November 1997): GL-3.
- ⁶ George J. Tenet, *Statement Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Confirmation Hearing*, 6 May 1997, 3.
- ⁷ Long Commission, *Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983*, Washington, DC: 1983, 29.
- ⁸ Long Commission, 29.
- ⁹ Long Commission, 30.
- ¹⁰ Beins M. Frank, *US Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984* (Washington, DC: History & Museum Division HQs USMC, 1987), 1-2.
- ¹¹ Long Commission, 84.
- ¹² Army, FM 101-5-1: Operational Terms & Symbols (Washington, DC: HQs Department of the Army, 1985), 1-63.
- ¹³ Dr. John B. Matthews, Lt. Col., USMC, (Ret), Associate Dean for Academic Administration, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, interview by author, 12 November 1997.
- ¹⁴ Dr. John B. Matthews interview.
- ¹⁵ Dr. John B. Matthews interview.
- ¹⁶ Dr. John B. Matthews interview.
- ¹⁷ Long Commission, 55.
- ¹⁸ Long Commission, 52.
- ¹⁹ Long Commission, 56.
- ²⁰ Long Commission, 63.
- ²¹ Dr. John B. Matthews interview.
- ²² Long Commission, 65.
- ²³ Long Commission, 136.
- ²⁴ US Congress, House, National Security Committee, *DoD Report to the President on Khobar Towers Bombing*, 18 September 1996, 3.
- ²⁵ Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict. *DoD Comments on the Report of the Accountability Review Board (Bombing of the Program Manager/Saudi Arabia National Guard, Riyadh, November 13, 1995)*, Washington, DC: July 1996, 1.
- ²⁶ US Congress, House, National Security Committee, 1.
- ²⁷ Downing Assessment Task Force, Force Protection Assessment of USCENTCOM AOR and Khobar Towers, Washington, DC: Pentagon, 30 August 1996, 50.
- ²⁸ Downing Assessment Task Force, viii.
- ²⁹ Downing Assessment Task Force, 47.
- ³⁰ Downing Assessment Task Force, 22.
- ³¹ John Deutch, Former Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of Defense, telephonic interview by author, 28 September 1997.
- ³² Downing Assessment Task Force, 9.
- ³³ Downing Assessment Task Force, 21,
- ³⁴ Deutch, telephonic interview.
- ³⁵ US Congress, House, National Security Committee, 11.
- ³⁶ Deutch, telephonic interview.
- ³⁷ Jim Lehrer, *Newsmaker Interview with Jim Lehrer*, "Transcript of an interview with Deputy Secretary of Defense John White and General Wayne Downing," 16 September 1996.
- ³⁸ US Congress. House, National Security Committee, 9.

- ³⁹ Lt. Col. Donald Fields, United States Army, Operations Officer, Training/Doctrine & Assessment Branch, Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Combating Terrorism Overview*, Washington, DC: 1997, Looseleaf.
- ⁴⁰ Colonel Hal Johnson, United States Army, Chief, Current Operations Branch, Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism, Joint Chiefs of Staff, interview by author, 5 November 1997.
- ⁴¹ Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Force Protection Campaigning Plan (FPCP) [Operation GUNSIGHT]*, Washington, DC: 25 August 1997.
- ⁴² Lt. Col. Donald Fields, *Combating Terrorism Overview*, 3.
- ⁴³ Col. Hal Johnson.
- ⁴⁴ Col. Hal Johnson.
- ⁴⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff; *Force Protection Campaigning Plan (FPCP) [Operation GUNSIGHT]*, 10.
- ⁴⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Force Protection Campaigning Plan (FPCP) [Operation GUNSIGHT]*, 10.
- ⁴⁷ Lt. Col. Donald Fields. interview by author, 5 November 1997.
- ⁴⁸ Dr. John B. Matthews interview.
- ⁴⁹ Long Commission, 76.
- ⁵⁰ US Congress. House, National Security Committee, 6.
- ⁵¹ Downing Assessment Task Force, 18-19.
- ⁵² Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence, "Fighting Foreign Terrorism," Speech presented at Georgetown University, Washington, DC: 5 September 1996,3.
- ⁵³ John Deutch, "Fighting Foreign Terrorism", 4.
- ⁵⁴ A Source, Mid-Level Intelligence Professional at the Director of Central Intelligence's Counterterrorism Center, who wishes to remain anonymous, interview by author, 1 October 1997.
- ⁵⁵ A Source, Mid-Level Intelligence Professional at the Director of Central Intelligence's Counterterrorism Center.
- ⁵⁶ Deutch, telephonic interview.
- ⁵⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, Washington, DC: 1996,4.
- ⁵⁸ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). Page 129.
- ⁵⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Eds. and Trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 595.
- ⁶⁰ There has been much discussion post-Desert Storm about deaths from fratricide. This figure is taken from Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War* (New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 457, and accounts for the 35 Americans killed by 'friendly fire'.
- ⁶¹ Dr. John B. Matthews interview.
- ⁶² Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Handbook 5260. Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness*, Washington, DC: 1 January 1997, i.

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