Hole of Government: Sealing the Gap in U.S. Stability Operations
Abstract
United States performance in the nine and seven year wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, has illustrated the inefficiency of national means to influence stability operations there. This is indicative of a systemic problem caused by changes in the operational environment, a lingering conventional power paradigm within the U.S. national security establishment, and the relative resistance of trans-national terrorist and criminal non-state actors to U.S. conventional combat dominance. Demographic pressures, globalization trends, and empowerment of non-state actors favor the development of weak, liberated, and occupied states beyond historic 20th century norms. The U.S. must hone effective national means to influence these conditions in order to succeed in that strategic environment. This paper analyzes the operational environment to argue that competent stability operations are the most effective means to influence the population-centric vulnerabilities of prevalent adversaries. Lessons from the post-WWII occupation of Germany, CORDS efforts in Vietnam, and extensive U.S. stability operations history clearly demonstrate that security, expertise, and unity of command are the critical tenets of successful stability operations. Thesis recommends integration of these three tenets into the U.S. military for rapid adaptation of national power to the strategic environment. The efficiency of the U.S. to intervene successfully in failed states is dependent on security, expertise, and unity of command.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 15, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA530049
Entities
People
- Patrick J. Hannifin
Organizations
- National Defense University