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JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

Colonial Roots, Conflict and Peacekeeping in Africa:
Defining the Need for an African Airlift Consortium

by

John E. Patchett



Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force Reserve

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature: _____

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Thesis Adviser: Doctor Paul Melshen

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ABSTRACT

The African Union is building an indigenous peace keeping capability in order to contribute to the broader stabilization of the continent. Success in this effort depends on creation of a robust air mobility system. The lack of major road infrastructure requires development of an air transport system capable of moving troops and equipment into both remote and urban areas. The United States can play a key role by assisting in the development of an African Airlift Consortium with a rapid response capability and the technical means and infrastructure to support it. Creation of a robust air mobility capability will enable the African Union to achieve its goal of deploying indigenous peacekeeping forces throughout the continent. The United States must play a major role by assisting the African Union in designing and developing this system.

INTRODUCTION

If the African Union was to take on an even larger share of the continent's peacekeeping activities, the international community must help the United Nations' evolving regional partner (the African Union) secure the financial and material resources to support future short-term deployments and its capabilities for the long term¹

Romano Prodi

The former Italian Prime Minister and now head of the United Nations – African Union Panel on Modalities for Support to African Peacekeeping Operations made these comments on March 18th 2009 to the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. He was addressing the purpose of this new United Nations panel, which has the goal of assisting the African Union's "ability to respond to crises and in its need for a capacity that is capable of promoting long-term stability on the continent."² As a regional partner to the United Nations, the African Union (AU) is seeking assistance in this effort.

The African Union endeavors to build an indigenous peace keeping capability in order to contribute to the broader stabilization of the continent. Success in this effort depends on creation of a robust air mobility system. The lack of major road infrastructure requires development of an air transport system capable of moving troops and equipment into both remote and urban areas. The United States can play a key role by assisting in the development of an African Airlift Consortium with a rapid response capability and the

¹ Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 210th Meeting, "If African Union Expected to Assume Larger Share of Peacekeeping, World Community Must Help Regional Partner Financially, Materially, Special Committee Told", (United Nations Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New York), <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gapk201.doc.htm> (Accessed September 16, 2009).

² Lexis Nexis Academic, "Funding Hurdles Thwart Expansion of AU Peacekeeping Capabilities - Ban", (All Africa, Inc., Washington, D.C.), http://www.lexisnexus.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T735789922&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T7357899929&cisb=22_T7357899928&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8320&docNo=1 (Accessed September 16, 2009).

technical means and infrastructure to support it. This enterprise must encompass a joint effort between U.S. military services and international allies as well as inter-agency and private sector partners.

Creating a robust air mobility capability will enable the African Union to achieve its goal of deploying indigenous peacekeeping forces throughout the continent. The United States must play a major role by assisting the African Union in designing and developing an African Airlift Consortium.

One of the key factors in creating a successful peace keeping operation is for the participating troops to have a high level of cultural awareness and sensitivity. This is a primary reason that the African Union has developed plans to build their own indigenous peace keeping forces. While most “traditional” peacekeeping efforts involve posting forces as a buffer between two hostile nation states, missions in Africa are generally between clashing ethnic factions within the boundaries of a single nation. Although these conflicts do occasionally cross national boundaries and become regional, they remain largely along ethnic lines. With this in mind, it seems logical that the most effective force for peacekeeping operations in Africa is one which is indigenous and culturally sensitive. With the proper force identified and assembled, the challenge then becomes deployment through a viable means of transportation.

The vast remoteness of and lack of transportation infrastructure on the African continent makes movement of forces a daunting challenge. There is not a sufficient network of roads or railways which makes the movement of troops over land feasible. While sea transport is effective and efficient, it only allows access to coastal areas. This leaves significant portions of the continent inaccessible to deploying forces. The answer,

therefore, is the development of an air transportation capability. This force must be able to access the most remote areas of the continent as well as populated, urban areas.

Building such a capability holds significant challenges for the African Union. Financial, economic, infrastructure, experience and knowledge challenges seem insurmountable for the Union to confront on its own. For this endeavor to be successful, the Africa Union must rely on the United States and other partners to assist in its development.

The complexities of developing a workable proposal for American assistance in this endeavor require a thorough analysis of the past in order to understand the present. This analysis will begin by describing the roots of conflict in modern day Africa. This should begin with a brief study of conflict on the Continent in the post-colonial era. For purposes of this analysis, post-colonial Africa” will be broadly defined as the period emerging in the mid- to late 1960’s. This is an important starting point since much of the present-day strife in Africa has its roots in the turmoil caused by the rapid granting of independence by imperial powers during the 1960’s. This lingering conflict is festering to this day and is the impetus driving the need for peacekeeping in Africa.

In order to develop the model further, one must continue with a study of United Nations peacekeeping efforts and overall philosophical approach to peacekeeping. Many international security scholars view United Nations peacekeeping operations as among the more successful endeavors of the organization. Although, at times, such operations are challenged with financial corruption and abuses by military forces, they are generally successful in the goal of introducing stability into areas of conflict.

After studying the United Nations’ approach to peacekeeping, the proposed model will be further developed by introducing the unique dynamics and requirements

present in the need for modern day peacekeeping forces on the African continent. Again a brief background is required. This study will explore case studies on peace keeping operations in Africa specifically. These will serve as a background to emphasize the importance of developing an African self-policing capability. This need has been identified within both the United Nations and the African Union and has resulted in creating new organizations to promote peace and stability on the Continent.

One of the first peacekeeping institutions which merits discussion is the African Union Peace and Security Council. Modeled loosely after the United Nations Security Council, this body formed under the authority of the African Union is charged with promoting stability and security among member nations. It is not only a forum for developing consensus on security policy, but it is also the body in which commitment to a peacekeeping operation is initiated.

Another peacekeeping institution which merits discussion is the United Nations-African Union Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations. As the United Nations embarks on a new approach to international peace and security, it has made it a goal to work with regional organization partners like the African Union. The purpose of this cooperation is to provide a means for members of regional organizations to solve regional problems collectively and with some autonomy. The creation of this panel is a concrete and bold step on the part of the United Nations to provide expertise and assistance in this transition of responsibilities to partner regional organizations. Further, as part of this concept, a new approach toward peacekeeping operations is developing in which the regional partners will provide rapidly deployable forces capable of stabilizing a conflict while a more permanent force under United

Nations authority is assembled and deployed. This new approach adds emphasis to the need for a robust transportation capability.

With the background sufficiently set, this analysis will move into the development of a plan for building an African Airlift Consortium capable of rapidly deploying peacekeeping forces in the initial phase of operations. This will be followed by a discussion of the composition of a typical force and identify the requirements for transporting it. Once these areas are addressed, there will be an analysis of the current capabilities on the Continent to meet these requirements. This analysis will demonstrate that here is a tremendous need to increase these capabilities, especially in the area of air transportation. This presents an opportunity for an in-depth identification of requirements for aircraft capabilities, infrastructure, maintenance, air traffic control and command and control (dispatching.) Once these are identified, the actual proposal for building the system will be addressed, including recommended air frames, basing and airfield selection and an operations concept. In conclusion, the proposed system will be analyzed, exploring why said system is important to develop and recommendations as to what partners should participate in its creation.

CHAPTER 1

COLONIALISM IN AFRICA AS A ROOT OF CONFLICT

It is ironic that people continue to credit European explorers of the nineteenth century with the “discovery” of rivers, waterfalls, and such in Africa when it is obvious that Africans living there already knew these things existed. Obviously, discovery simply meant that a European had verified in writing the existence of something long known to others³

This quote exemplifies the Western-centric view of our relationship with Africa. In beginning the study of conflict in post-colonial Africa, one is well served to look back at the colonization of the continent, which many have referred to as “the scramble for Africa.” It is important that this view be less Western focused. To gain the proper context, it is important to discuss the historical roots of colonization in Africa.

Colonization developed mostly along geographic and political divides while African societies tended to form along ethnic, tribal and sociological lines. One must then gain an understanding of the two major forms of colonial rule that developed on the continent: direct and indirect rule. The discussion of these two forms of colonial rule will then be followed by a discussion of the ethnic and tribal aspects of and difficulties arising from colonial rule.

After this discussion, the focus will then turn to what will be referred to as “the independence decade” of the 1960’s and how the rapid and sometimes ill-planned granting of independence across the continent converged with the detrimental aspects of the colonial system to create areas of civil strife and conflict. This will lead into a

³ Thomas O’Toole “The Historical Context,” April A. Gordon and Donald L. Gordon, eds., *Understanding Contemporary Africa*, 4th ed., (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 44-45.

discussion on theory of civil war and conflict resulting from colonialism and how it is apparent in Africa.

The Dividing of a Continent

While roots of the colonial period in Africa go back further, and volumes could be written on this subject alone, for the purposes of this study, the colonial era in Africa will be defined as beginning in the early nineteenth century. Much of European interaction with the continent during this period was the result of trade. This included such commodities as palm oil, tropical agricultural products, gold, ivory and even human beings. Trading outposts and merchant companies were quite well developed at this time, especially along the west coast of Africa. As the Europeans began to have more and more interaction with Africans, they developed a vision of the continent through their own eyes. They saw the Africans as somewhat backwards, lacking any real significant history, and devoid of significant political or governmental structures.

In Victorian England, for example, anthropologists of the time theorized that human society developed through three stages: 1. Savagery, which was characterized by such activities as food gathering and hunting; 2. Barbarism, during which settled agriculture emerged; 3. Civilization, as evidenced by the emergence of commerce.⁴ Many believed that Africa stalled in stage 2 and attributed this to a theory known as “tropical abundance.” This theory stated that advanced civilizations developed in temperate regions where organization was critical to the acquiring of food and shelter and thus to human survival. Due to the ease of agriculture in tropical areas, these cultures were not

⁴ Muriel Evelyn Chamberlain, *The Scramble For Africa, Seminar Studies in History* (London: Longman, 1974), 5.

forced to organize sufficiently and became stuck in the agricultural or barbarian stage.⁵ This paradigm resulted in a general impression of the African as being lazy, indifferent, and to a degree barbaric. As this impression persisted, it resulted in a dominating belief that Africans needed organizing and direction. In fact, “Nineteenth century Europe had become so used to seeing political power embodied in national states that Europeans found it almost impossible to recognise any other form of political organization, and came to regard the absence of identifiable states as proof of anarchy”⁶

It was a perception of anarchy and chaos on the continent (this was an impediment to forwarding their economic interests) that led European powers, especially France and Britain to move solidly toward colonization. “The British and French were determined to put things in order and establish a clear administrative hierarchy with Europeans at the top and Africans below.”⁷ This attitude was not limited to just the French and British. In fact, there were strong colonization initiatives by Belgium, Portugal, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany.

The growing view of Western Europe, especially, as a superior and civilizing force on the continent, culminated in The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, which was convened by Otto von Bismark of Germany. Thirteen European powers (plus the United States) met in Berlin over a three-month period under the pretext of once and for all stamping out the slave trade on the African continent. Although on the surface this was certainly a noble undertaking, the real purpose of the conference was for the European powers to carve up Africa in order to meet their *real* strategic and economic objectives of

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Chamberlain, *The Scramble For Africa, Seminar Studies in History*,4.

⁷ “The Story of Africa: Africa and Europe (1800 - 1914),” BBC World Service, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/index.shtml> (accessed October 23, 2009).

“protecting old markets and exploiting new ones.”⁸ The result of this conference, along with numerous additional agreements over the next several years, was that the participants had divided the continent up into fifty countries⁹ “which in places, divided ethnic communities.”¹⁰

Dr. Saul David noted the complete disregard for ethnic and cultural considerations of these imperial decisions when he wrote, “the Berlin Conference began the process of carving up Africa, paying no attention to local culture or ethnic groups, and leaving people from the same tribe on separate sides of European-imposed borders.”¹¹ The imperial powers had in fact created “geometric boundaries in the interior of the continent, disregarding the cultural and linguistic boundaries already established by the indigenous African population.”¹²

Although the revelation that many peoples of common tribes and ethnic groups were left separated by artificially created borders demonstrates the human (family/social) suffering imposed by colonialism, Geographer Matt Rosenberg identifies the true, and highly negative, legacy of these actions:

What ultimately resulted was a hodgepodge of geometric boundaries that divided Africa into fifty irregular countries. This new map of the continent was superimposed over the one thousand indigenous cultures and regions of Africa. The new countries lacked rhyme or reason and

⁸ Saul David, “British History in Depth: Slavery and the 'Scramble for Africa',” BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/abolition/scramble_for_africa_article_01.shtml#two (accessed November 15, 2009).

⁹ Matt Rosenberg, “Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 to Divide Africa: The Colonization of the Continent by European Powers,” About.com, The New York Times Company, <http://geography.about.com/cs/politicalgeog/a/berlinconferenc.htm> (accessed November 15, 2009).

¹⁰ Colin Legum, *Africa Since Independence* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 19.

¹¹ David, “British History in Depth: Slavery and the 'Scramble for Africa'.”

¹² Rosenberg, “Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 to Divide Africa: The Colonization of the Continent by European Powers.”

divided coherent groups of people and merged together disparate groups who really did not get along.¹³

While Colin Legum and Saul David rightly noted the travesty of *dividing* people of common ethnic groups, Rosenberg's focus was on the division or separating of peoples. Rosenberg brings to the forefront the real issue of how lack of cultural awareness during the carving up of Africa by the colonists came to haunt the continent for generations: the forcing together of peoples who "really did not get along" into artificial nation states (albeit under colonial rule). This is exemplified by the fact that colonial Nigeria combined approximately 300 different linguistic groups into a single national state.¹⁴

Years later as the colonial powers dissolved their rule and control over African countries, they left behind groups of people who sometimes had no real ethnic or cultural ties, and who, in many instances, held deeply rooted enmity. While this source of tension was a major contributor, it was not the only legacy of colonial rule that led to conflict and tension in post-colonial Africa.

Ruling a Continent

Once the European powers had divided the continent among themselves, they then took on the task of ruling or administering their colonies. Even their different forms of governance later became roots of conflict. The British and French conducted a significant portion of the colonization of Africa. Each took a somewhat different approach to governing their colonies. "Considerably oversimplified, colonial policies can be divided into direct and indirect rule with the British portrayed as indirect rulers and the

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Matthew Lange and Andrew Dawson, "Dividing and Ruling the World: A Statistical Test of the Effects of Colonialism on Postcolonial Civil Violence" (paper, McGill University, Montreal), 7, <http://mrgec.mcgill.ca/ColonialismCivilViolencePaper.doc.doc>.

French as direct rulers.”¹⁵ Although each approach was different, they both left legacies that became the source of much of the conflict in postcolonial Africa. A brief discussion of each type of administration will be helpful.

Indirect rule, as practiced by the British in Africa, involved utilizing local chiefs to implement and promote their policies and regulations. “British authority was not to reach directly down to each individual African subject. While the British retained overall control of a colony’s administration, it was to be made effective at the district level by cultivating and by molding the governments of the traditional African rulers.”¹⁶ The British awarded these positions to people whom they knew to be sympathetic to their positions and goals. Thus, they were able to effectively control the population with as little direct effort as possible. British theory and application of indirect rule was primarily the brainchild of Lord Frederick Lugard, Baron of Abinger.

Lugard began his experiences in Africa 1888 when he took command of a group of British settlers fighting against Arab slave traders in Nyasaland. During the campaign, he was severely wounded, effectively ending his military service. However, through his experiences, he discovered his true calling was in Africa. He went on to serve in a number of capacities, working for the British East Africa Company and the Royal Niger Company. Later, he was appointed by Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain to form what became known as the Western Africa Frontier Force, a regiment of African troops commanded by British officers. His success in using this force to thwart French

¹⁵ Kevin Shillington, *History of Africa*, Rev. ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 354.

¹⁶ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s.v. “History of Western Africa,” Encyclopedia Britannica Online <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/640523/history-of-western-Africa> (accessed November 22, 2009).

expansion efforts on the continent resulted in his being appointed High Commissioner for Northern Nigeria.¹⁷

While in Britain recovering from the wounds he received in Nyasaland, Lugard began to “press the needs of the missionaries, and of the tribes ravaged by the slave-trade, for the protection that only British rule could give.”¹⁸ Although he had a deep love for the continent, Lugard exemplified the Western/Euro-centric view of Africa during this period as shown by the quote of Thomas O’Toole introducing this chapter.

Lugard’s philosophy toward Africans is evidenced in his writings where he epitomized the Western superiority expressed in the theory of Tropical Abundance.

When describing Africans he wrote:

In character and temperament the typical African of this race-type is a happy, thriftless, excitable person, lacking in self-control, discipline and foresight, naturally courageous, and naturally courteous and polite, full of personal vanity, with little sense of veracity...his thoughts are concentrated on the events and feeling of the moment...his mind is far nearer to the animal world than that of the European...¹⁹

As with the process used to carve up Africa during the Berlin Conference, the architect of the British approach to colonial rule demonstrated a complete lack of cultural and societal understanding. This, also, would have ramifications for generations to come. It was, however, not the only form of colonial rule that would be the root of much strife on the continent.

The French took a different approach to colonial rule in Africa. They undertook a system known as direct rule. This system was in stark contrast to the British approach of

¹⁷ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s.v. “F.D Lugard,” <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/350925/F-D-Lugard> (accessed November 23, 2009).

¹⁸ Frederick John Dealtry Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, [5th ed. (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1965), xxxiii, (introduction by Margery Perham).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 69.

using local tribal chiefs and leaders as their proxies. The French system of direct rule was rooted in the belief that their African colonial subjects should (and would) be assimilated into the greater French culture, society and governance. The French merely regarded their African colonies as “ ‘territoires d’outer-mer’ (overseas provinces) of the mother country.”²⁰ The initial goal of French administration was to assimilate their subjects into “cultural Frenchmen, regardless of their skin color.”²¹ One of the key French officials to advocate the indirect rule approach to governing colonies in Africa was Louis-Gabriel Angoulvant, Governor-General of the Ivory Coast. On November 26th, 1908 he wrote in a communiqué to civilian administrators of the colony:

Not that I have the slightest notion of attempting here any experiment in indirect administration. Except in a few northern districts, the Ivory Coast does not have, among its own natives, any subjects capable of even roughly discharging the role of native officials, of holding even the slightest fragment of public authority...

We must confine ourselves to practising direct administration, which is in any case the most moral system in Negro countries...I believe we are in this country precisely to change the social order of the people now submitted to our laws...It is our mission to bring civilisation, moral and social progress, economic prosperity. We will never succeed in this if we...preserve a deplorable situation...²²

Here again one sees the Euro-centric view of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Africa. Angoulvant viewed traditional African systems of governance and sociological organization as a “deplorable situation” and the French were determined to bring “civilisation” and “social progress.” Unfortunately, the French approach of direct

²⁰ A Adu Boahen, *Topics in West African History*, Forum series. (London: Longmans, 1966), 134.

²¹ Shillington, *History of Africa*, 354.

²² Bruce Fetter, ed., *Colonial Rule in Africa: Readings from Primary Sources* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), 84-85.

rule was different from the British indirect rule not only in how it was administered, but in how the continent was colonized.

Although both British and French interests in Africa were primarily driven by the economics of gaining access to and the exploitation of resources and commodities, they were imposed in very different ways. The British primarily used their “overseas trading companies” as civilian enterprises establishing centers of gravity and pushing out across the continent. The British government used its indirect rule (often through the heads of the companies) to secure access to trade and commerce. Conversely, the French used a system of colonization primarily using the military as the “empire builders.”²³ As the French military moved across the areas of the continent to which they had laid claim (and had been given at the Berlin Conference), theirs took on much more the scope and appearance of military conquest than did British expansion. The French systems of direct conquest and direct rule would have their own negative impact as roots of conflict in post- colonial Africa. However, while the “scramble for Africa” and the approaches to governance significantly contributed to post colonial conflict, there is one last aspect which must be addressed: the way in which independence was granted across the continent.

By the early twentieth century, (mainly) European control of Africa had been effectively consolidated. The key players were largely Britain and France, with Portugal, Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands also playing major roles in some areas. It is not insignificant to note that at the end of World War II there were only four

²³ Ali Ali-Dinar, “French in West Africa,” Africa Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania, http://www.africa.upenn.edu/K-12/French_16178.html (accessed November 25, 2009).

independent countries on the continent: Ethiopia, Liberia, South Africa, and Egypt.²⁴ It was, in fact, many of the events of World War II in which one finds significant roots of the African independence movement.

World War II came early to Africa when, in 1935, the Italians invaded Ethiopia. In October of that year, 120,000²⁵ Italian troops crossed the border utilizing all the destruction of “modern” warfare including airplanes, armored cars, modern artillery, and even poison gas.²⁶ Certainly it is true that Africans took an active role in defending Ethiopia as well as having an active role in the conflicts of Germany’s push across North Africa and the Allied liberation. However, African participation outside the continent played a major role in forming the foundations of the independence movement.

When war erupted on the European continent, 80,000²⁷ troops from French West Africa were sent to help defend France from a German invasion. Additionally, approximately 90,000 Africans fought in the Burma campaign with over half of that number being from Nigeria.²⁸ With this in mind, it is easy to understand how many Africans began to ask the question “if we are fighting and dying so Europeans can be free, why am I not?” Along with their direct experience in the war, Africans took special note of the words of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill when they said that their countries

...respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live . . .[and] wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.²⁹

²⁴ Salvatore Foderaro, *Independent Africa* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), 41.

²⁵ Shillington, *History of Africa*, 366.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 365-366.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 367.

²⁸ “Africa's Forgotten Wartime Heroes,” BBC NEWS, Front Page, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8201717.stm> (accessed November 28, 2009).

²⁹ Douglas Brinkley and David R. Facey-Crowther, eds., *The Atlantic Charter* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), xvii.

Of course, Africans viewed themselves among the people who had these “sovereign rights forcibly deprived of them.” Therefore, as World War II came to an end, a movement for de-colonization and independence began to take hold.

Independence for a Continent

In the post World War II period, both France and Great Britain sought to change their relationships with their African colonies. Their intent was to move from a relationship of control to a relationship of counsel. Much of the colonists’ efforts in the late 1940’s were focused on providing counsel and direction to help Africans develop the necessary governmental and societal “infrastructure” to enable them to self-govern. These initiatives included improving education at all levels, modernizing agricultural activities, building fisheries and providing new social and medical services.

However, the advisors who were trained in these areas and sent to serve in Africa came to be viewed by local people as a “second colonial invasion.”³⁰ Although the colonists, especially the British, had the intent of “nation building’ by assisting in these direct development activities, their efforts had a somewhat negative impact. First, they seemed to be continuing to impose their will on the African people. Additionally, these efforts brought more and more people in direct contact with colonial officials than ever before and allowed more and more people to see the actual deep involvement of imperial powers in running their lives. Even people in small local communities began to see that “decisions affecting their lives were still being taken far beyond community control.”³¹

³⁰ John D. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa*, 2nd ed. (London ; Longman, 1996), 118.

³¹ *Ibid.*

Thus, as the continent entered the 1950's there was a growing air of discontent and more vocal calls for independence.

By the end of 1951, there were only five independent countries in Africa: Ethiopia, Liberia, South Africa, Egypt and Libya. However as more and more Africans became exposed to the reality of colonial rule through the developmental programs of the imperial powers, nationalist movements began to take hold first in the urban centers and then moving to the rural areas. Ironically, many of the leaders of the nationalist movements were men who had fought in World War II and received training in the armies of the European powers.³² They were now leading a struggle against those very powers.

For five years, the nationalist movements continued in a mostly political struggle against colonial rule, but there were no additions to the list of independent African nations. Then in 1956, the Sudan was granted independence along with Morocco later that year. In 1957, the “first independence of a completely Negro-African country south of the Sahara took place”³³ when Britain ended its colonial rule of the Gold Coast, which then became known as Ghana.

The tide of independence continued to grow in the late 1950's and early 1960's. By then end of 1961, there were a total of 28 independent states in Africa³⁴ and 31 by the

³² L Gray Cowan, *The Dilemmas of African Independence*, [Completely rev. ed.]. (New York: Walker, 1968), 2.

³³ Foderaro, *Independent Africa*, 45.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 47

end of 1964.³⁵ The number reached 42 by the end of 1969 with the final African nation to earn independence, Namibia, doing so in 1990.³⁶

During the height of the independence movement in the early 1960's, there were serious debates over whether African nations were sufficiently ready to gain their independence or not. Many believed that it was too early to grant independence for a variety of reasons. On April 15, 1961, a debate was held on the NBC show "The Nation's Future" between Kenneth Kaunda, President of the United National Independence of Northern Rhodesia Party, and J. Freire d'Andrade, who had recently retired as an attaché at the Portuguese embassy in Washington, D.C. They argued "Is Africa ready for Independence." d'Andrad asserted that the answer was "no" for five major reasons:

1. "Under today's conditions in the world . . . it is a great danger to submit a new country to the task of establishing itself as a nation without being a burden to the others [countries of the world]."
2. ". . . the danger of economic chaos produced in Africa by the granting of independence too early"
3. "[Freedom.] When African leaders . . . are faced with economic chaos . . . they take away the freedom of their own people. . ."
4. "The freedom of Europeans [in Africa] has been threatened"
5. "Many countries in Africa are not ready for independence because of the fact that they do not think as we do and have a different conception of progress than ourselves."³⁷

³⁵ Cowan, *The Dilemmas of African Independence*, 1.

³⁶ Arthur Lewin, "Independence Years and Dates of African Countries," *Indigenous People of Africa and America Magazine*, 2009, page nr. http://ipooa.com/african_independence.htm (accessed December 7, 2009).

³⁷ Kenneth Kaunda and J. Freire d'Andrade, "Is Africa Ready for Independence," *Africa Today* 8, no. 4 (April, 1961): 6-7.

* These brief quotes do not give justice to his arguments which, in retrospect, eerily foreshadow much of what occurred in Africa over the next 30-40 years.

While it will later be demonstrated how d'Andrade's first four points actually hold significant truths for what happened in Africa over the next three decades, his fifth and final point "they do not think as we do and have a different conception of progress" bring to full circle this brief study of colonization in Africa. Once again a Western/Euro-centric attitude is demonstrated where Africans are thought of as being inferior and less capable than their European colonists. Nonetheless, decolonization occurred with relatively little violence through a process "not of pitched battles to wrest power from the hands of a reluctant colonial authority, but . . . in the form of a grant of independence."³⁸

The colonization, administration/rule and decolonization/independence of Africa is one of the most complex studies in world history. Each of these aspects has had a tremendous impact on stability, conflict, and strife on the continent over the past one hundred fifty years. As European powers held conferences to divide up the continent, they forced together disparate ethnic and tribal groups who had little or no common interests, histories or sociological ties. As they administered their colonies they put in place different systems, direct and indirect rule, each of which had the effect of creating conflict and power struggles between ethnic/tribal entities. The British approach of indirect rule placed a few favored tribal rulers in positions of authority who were then able to create benefits to their group at the expense of others. The French system of direct rule had a similar effect by

³⁸ Cowan, *The Dilemmas of African Independence*, 4.

allowing those selected to participate in the French administration of colonies to reap the benefits of better education and increased economic opportunity at the expense of other ethnic groups and tribes. Finally, as the colonial powers began their “scramble *out*” of Africa, they left political, economic and sociological disparities that’s haunt the continent today.

With an historical background on the aspects of colonialism in place, it is now possible to turn to a study of conflicts in Africa rooted in each of these factors.

CHAPTER 2

PEACEKEEPING: IN SEARCH OF A DEFINITION USING THEORY AND PRACTICE

Peacekeeping refer[s] to any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes.¹

Peacekeeping is the reverse of military action: it is the peaceful application of a military presence in the interest of a political process...the main purpose of the peacekeeper is to ensure the status quo, or a controlled impasse.²

Peacekeeping...an interim step – a stop gap – to buy time for active diplomacy.³

Peacekeeping policies prescribe courses of collective international action aimed at preventing or halting armed conflicts.⁴

Peacekeeping has been defined as an expression of the will and intention of the international community to prevent or forestall a conflict.⁵

Finding a universally accepted definition of peacekeeping proves difficult at best. As seen above, five scholarly works provide five different definitions of the term. As the main purveyor of peacekeeping operations in the world, one expects that members of the United Nations (UN) would have long ago agreed upon a definition. In fact, “the United Nations itself has no established definition of peacekeeping.”⁶ One finds that they actually sidestep the issue of defining peacekeeping on the United Nations Peacekeeping

¹ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 4.

² George L. Sherry, *The United Nations reborn: conflict control in the post-cold war world*, vol. 1990:2 of *Critical Issues*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990), 30.

³ Augustus R. Norton and Thomas George Weiss, *UN Peacekeepers: Soldiers with a Difference* (New York, N.Y.: Foreign Policy Association, 1990), 31.

⁴ Roger Coate and Donald Puchala, “Global Policies and the United Nations System: A Current Assessment,” in “The Challenge of Global Policy,” special issue, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 27, no. 2 (May, 1990): 127.

⁵ A. B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 125.

⁶ Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, 5.

Website: “The term ‘peacekeeping’ is not found in the United Nations Charter and defies simple definition.”⁷

The following pages of this chapter, will outline a working definition of peacekeeping. The first step will be to place the concept in its historical context by examining the roots of the United Nations and the provisions in its charter that are most commonly used to justify undertaking peacekeeping operations. This will be followed by a brief study of some of the peacekeeping missions that the United Nations has undertaken. A study of these missions will lead to an analysis of the emerging idea that UN peacekeeping can be broken up into “first generation,” and “second generation” operations. With this background in place, a definition peacekeeping as it will be used in the remaining chapters of this thesis will be set forth.

World Failure Breeds...

The United Nations has its roots in failure...the failure of the League of Nations (established following World War I) to effectively manage international disputes and prevent another war. Even before World War I ended, political leaders from several European countries and the United States began meeting to discuss ways to maintain peace and prevent wars in the post-war period. The participants’ efforts culminated in the approval of the Covenant of the League of Nations (which had been negotiated as part of the Treaty of Versailles) on April 28, 1919. Because the League was negotiated as part of the treaty, the actual founding is marked as of the ratification of the Treaty on

⁷ “United Nations Peacekeeping,” United Nations, We the peoples...A Stronger UN for a Better World, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/> (accessed December 16, 2009).

January 10, 1920. Forty-two⁸ member nations participated in the endeavor to focus on bringing more stability to the world.

The major areas of focus for the League were social, political, and economic issues. Although the main goal was to provide an international apparatus to resolve conflicts and prevent wars, the international community found it hard to empower a body that could threaten the national sovereignty of member states by forcing imposed resolutions to international disputes. In fact, in 1919, nations simply were not ready to give control of military forces, and submit their sovereignty, to mandatory conflict resolution by a world body. Thus with all its lofty goals, the League of Nations did not have sufficient institutionalized legitimacy and power to prevent war from once again erupting in Europe as Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939.

The Road from London to San Francisco

As war raged in Europe for the second time in twenty years, world leaders, as they had during World War I, began meeting to discuss the creation of a world body to resolve conflict and prevent wars in the next post-war period. All in all, there were fifteen conferences⁹ which lead to the formation of the United Nations. This analysis will focus mainly on three: The Inter-Allied Declaration, The Atlantic Charter, and The Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. These, along with the other conferences culminated in the first meeting of the United Nations in San Francisco.

⁸ A LeRoy Bennett, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 23.

⁹ Sigrid Arne, *United Nations Primer* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, inc., 1945), Introduction.

This time it was mainly Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, along with the other nations allied against Germany, who initially set the framework for the new international body. This process began in London in June, 1941, with a conference held by Britain and the governments in exile from continental Europe. The resulting Inter-Allied Declaration did not specifically propose the formation of an international body. However, the signatories did affirm their intent to cooperate in eliminating the threat of aggression and to promote peace along with economic and social security. Two months later, even before the United States entered the war, Churchill and Roosevelt met aboard a ship off the coast of Newfoundland and developed the Atlantic Charter.

The Atlantic Charter was released on August 14, 1941. It was not a signed document but rather a communiqué from Churchill and Roosevelt outlining eight common principles upon which they would “base their hopes for a better world.”¹⁰ These principles included a desire to see no territorial aggression, a commitment to respect the rights of people to choose their form of government, a goal of access to the trade and raw materials needed for economic prosperity for all, improved labor standards for all, economic advancement and social security for all, the right of people to live their lives in freedom from fear and want, freedom of the seas, and the abandonment of the use of force.¹¹ Churchill had pushed to include a call for the establishment of “an effective international organization”¹² to accomplish the goals but Roosevelt believed that wording to be too strong.

¹⁰ Brinkley and Facey-Crowther, eds., xvii.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Bennett, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, 43.

Despite Roosevelt's above-stated concerns, just a few months later in January, 1942, twenty-six nations allied against the Axis powers met in Washington, D.C. to sign a document supporting the principles outlined in the Atlantic Charter. This document, the Declaration by the United Nations, was the first time the term 'United Nations' was used, and the Declaration set the stage for other major conferences that paved the way to the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations.

On October 9, 1944, a document was published following meetings at the Dumbarton Oaks estate in the Georgetown area of Washington, D.C. The results of these meetings were built upon the groundwork laid at a conference held by the 'Big Three' (the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union) in Moscow in November, 1943. In Moscow, the three powers pledged that their "united action for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security"¹³ (this author's emphasis). They further stated that they recognized the need for establishing "at the earliest possible date a general international organization...for the maintenance of international peace and security"¹⁴ (this author's emphasis). With this groundwork laid, the nations of the world met at Dumbarton Oaks in August, 1944 and began the work of establishing the framework for the charter of this new world organization.

The meetings at Dumbarton Oaks focused mainly on the security provisions of the emerging Charter. It was here that the concept for the United Nations Security Council was hammered out. The Security Council was established to ensure that the dominance

¹³ Arne, *United Nations Primer*, 30.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 31.

of the great powers in the war would be “carried over into the peacekeeping measures for the postwar period.”¹⁵ It was at Dumbarton Oaks that the now ‘Big Four’ (China had been added) powers of the world learned that they could indeed get along, which resulted in the production of the first draft of the “World Charter, known as the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.”¹⁶ This accomplishment set the stage for a meeting of the world in San Francisco in April, 1945 to finalize the conceptual design and write the Charter of the United Nations. It was an accomplishment lauded by participants:

Every nation here has had a part in making the Charter. Sentence by sentence, article by article, it has been hammered out around the conference tables. We have spoken freely with each other...this is the way to friendship and peace.¹⁷

Edward Stettinius, U.S. Secretary of State

Even as World War II still raged in the Pacific, fifty nations of the world penned the Charter of their new world body to codify their dream of living in a world of ‘friendship and peace.’

Promoting and Enforcing Peace

Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary General of the United Nations, once referred to peacekeeping as belonging to “Chapter Six and a Half”¹⁸ of the United Nations Charter. He made this analogy because the Charter of the United Nations has two chapters dealing with promoting and enforcing peace and security, Chapters VI and VII.

¹⁵ Bennett, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, 45.

¹⁶ Arne, *United Nations Primer*, 109-110.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 130.

¹⁸ “United Nations Peacekeeping,” United Nations, We the peoples...A Stronger UN for a Better World, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/> (accessed December 16, 2009).

Chapter VI of the Charter was written by the Committee on Peaceful Settlement¹⁹ at the San Francisco Conference and is titled *Pacific Settlement of Disputes*. The main goal of Chapter Six is to provide the Security Council, and to some extent the General Assembly of the U.N., with tools to enable them to peacefully resolve disputes between nations. Chapter Six, Article 33 of the Charter asserts that:

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.²⁰

Article 33 establishes the authority of the Security Council to investigate any dispute which has the potential to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment, and to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.²¹ As one can see, Chapter VI establishes the principle that member nations should use peaceful and negotiated means to solve disputes. In Chapter VI there are no provisions for the U.N. to take any forceful actions. It just calls for actions such as negotiation, mediation and arbitration. This contrasts sharply with the provisions in Chapter VII.

“Chapter VII of the Charter provides the teeth of the United Nations...In this Charter, governments have for the first time undertaken to conclude agreements to provide armed forces and attendant facilities to

¹⁹ Edward R. Stettinius, *Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 81.

²⁰ “Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” United Nations: We the Peoples...A Stronger UN For a Better World, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter6.shtml> (accessed December 2, 2009).

²¹ *Ibid.*

be used on the call of an international agency in enforcing international peace and security.”²²

Thus, in his Report to the President, the chairman of the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference, Edward Stettinius, highlighted the major shift in attitude and practice from the concepts of the League of Nations to those of the U.N. Unlike in 1919, when nations were hesitant to subjugate some aspects of national sovereignty to an international body with the power to initiate armed conflict, members of the United Nations agreed to allow this new body to commit their men and women to intervene in conflicts.

Chapter VII provides for several ways in which the U.N. may actively intervene in conflict and disputes:

Article 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions...[including] complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42: ...it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.²³

In combining the intent of Chapters VI and VII, the world body hoped to create a new system and process that would first seek to diffuse conflicts by peaceful means. If those efforts failed, their purpose was to demonstrate resolve and commitment to apply military force when necessary. Thus, by accepting Dag Hammarskjöld’s premise that

²² Stettinius, *Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference*, 88.

²³ “Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” United Nations...We the Peoples: A Stronger UN for a Better World, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml> (accessed December 2, 2009).

peacekeeping lies somewhere between the two concepts reflected in Chapters VI and VII, there is now an area in which to begin narrowing the focus in the development of a useful definition of the term.

Finding Chapter Six and a Half


It can be argued that the United Nations' lack of a definition for peacekeeping is rooted in failure, just as the institution itself is rooted in the failure of the League of Nations. In this case, however, the founders of the U.N. failed. As they conceptualized the institution, their main goal in the arenas of peace and security was to provide mechanisms to help prevent the world from falling into yet another large-scale international conflict or World War. Their focus was state vs. state conflict and their answer was Chapter VI and Chapter VII.

Chapter VI provided the new international body ways to impose on member states (even non-member states can petition for assistance) methods to resolve conflicts through arbitration, negotiation, imposed solutions, etc. If those failed, Chapter VII allowed the Security Council to undertake more aggressive actions, up to and including the authorization of armed intervention. However, the founders failed to think in terms other than preventing what they had already experienced, massive state on state conflict. They did not use any creative, imaginative thinking to predict what other types of conflict could arise as the prevalent source of disrupting world peace and security. In fact, since the end of World War II, the major source of conflict has shifted from state vs. state to internal conflict within a individual countries. In a brief analysis of the United Nations' peacekeeping role since its inception, Norman MacQueen presented the following:

[D]ata sets which deal with the characteristics of international conflict show that from 1900 to 1941, 80% of wars were between armed forces of two or more states, whereas from 1945 to 1976, 85% were on the territory of one state only and were internally oriented²⁴

While the data that MacQueen presents above ends in 1976, the chart below (not the source of his data) shows the same general trend in the post World War II period.

However, it extends out through 2001. This chart graphically shows the major shift in the predominant types of conflict in the world after 1946:



²⁵ (contextual boxes added by this author)

Figure 1

When the framers of the United Nations sought to create a body to promote peace and security, they were working within the paradigm (and their experience from 1900 – 1941) that 80% of conflict in the world was between nations at war. However, the reality of the world after 1946 demonstrates that the vast majority of conflict has occurred within the

²⁴ Norman MacQueen, “Ireland and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus,” *Review of International Studies* 9, no. 2 (April, 1983): 95-108.

²⁵ Gene Schackman, “Brief Review of Trends in Political Change: Freedom and Conflict,” The Global Social Change Research Project, <http://gsociology.icaap.org/> (accessed December 28, 2009).

boundaries of a sovereign state and has been manifested in internal wars. Thus, one finds the need for the 'elusive' Chapter Six and a Half in the realm between the provisions that the U.N. *did* make: negotiated settlements (Chapter VI) and armed intervention between states at war (Chapter VII). Somewhere between these two options, will be found a definition of peacekeeping, and the above data indicates that there should perhaps be a shift away from the founders' paradigm of international conflict and in favor of ways to address internal conflicts. With this in mind, the next step is to examine some examples of U.N. peacekeeping operations to help lead to a definition of the term.

The Practice of Peacekeeping

Having found the theoretical realm in which United Nations peacekeeping operations occur (and still in the absence of an official U.N. definition), it is time to turn to the *practice* of peacekeeping as a guide to help develop a definition. Through brief studies of three United Nations peacekeeping interventions, one can see by the actions of the United Nations, how it perceives the concept of peacekeeping. The focus of this analysis will be upon operations conducted by the U.N. in Africa. To that end, U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Congo in 1960-1964, Mozambique in 1993 and the Sudan in 2005 will be examined. These studies will focus upon operations in which the U.N. deployed international troops as opposed to observers. This is the first distinction which will be made in the *practice* of peacekeeping: the deployment of armed forces.

Peacekeeping in the Republic of the Congo

The first United Nations peacekeeping mission occurred in 1948 to monitor the cease-fire that ended the Arab-Israeli conflict of that year. In 1960, when the U.N. deployed international troops to the Republic of the Congo, it was its fifth peacekeeping

intervention as a result of conflicts in the world.²⁶ This mission was identified as United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC).

As was discussed earlier in a general manner, the conflict in the Republic of the Congo was rooted in the way in which it was decolonized by the Belgians. “Within a week of independence on 30 June 1960...civil war erupted”²⁷ when Congolese troops mutinied.²⁸ Belgian troops quickly deployed to protect the safety and lives of Europeans in the Congo. In response, the United Nations called upon the Belgian government to withdraw its troops from the Congo by passing Security Council Resolution 143. This resolution also authorized the U.N to provide “such military assistance as may be necessary...until the national security forces [of the Congo] may be able...to fully meet their tasks.”²⁹ The goal of the Security Council in passing this resolution was to affect the withdrawal of Belgian forces and to assist the Congolese government in maintaining law and order.

As the conflict in the Congo expanded and threatened to destabilize the region, the Security Council expanded the mission of ONUC by passing Security Council Resolution 161 on February 21, 1961. It authorized the United Nations to:

take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for ceasefire, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort.³⁰

²⁶ Donald C. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 102.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 207-208.

²⁸ Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 14.

²⁹ U.N. Security Council, 15th Year. "Resolution 143 [The Congo Question]" 13/14 July 1960 at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/157/32/IMG/NR015732.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed December 28th, 2009).

³⁰ U.N. Security Council, 16th Year. "Resolution 161 [Resolution of 21 February 1961]" 21 February 1961 at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/171/68/IMG/NR017168.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed December 28th, 2009).

The effect of this resolution was to expand the mission to include preventing civil war and protecting the territorial integrity of the Congo. This resolution authorized the use of military force.

The final resolution regarding the conflict in the Congo was Security Council Resolution 169 passed on November 24, 1961 which authorized the Secretary General

to take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and mercenaries...³¹

This resolution once again expanded the mission of ONUC to include the U.N.'s authority to forcibly detain and deport advisors and combatants not under their command.

Through the expanding authorities in these three resolutions, one can see that the original intent of the U.N. mission in the Congo was ill defined and not well planned. After all, the first resolution was passed only days after the civil war erupted. There was obviously no significant effort made to develop a serious or well thought out plan. One can, however, learn from the progressive nature of the resolutions and gain some insight into the intentions of the United Nations in the *practice* of this peacekeeping effort.

The major goals expressed in these resolutions were for the U.N to oversee the peaceful removal of foreign troops from a sovereign nation, to impose themselves as a neutral third party between the rival factions in the Congolese civil war, and to undertake the removal of foreign 'mercenaries' and advisors. It is important to keep these goals in mind as this analysis continues.

³¹ U.N. Security Council, 16th Year. "Resolution 169 [Resolution of 24 November 1961]" 24 November 1961 at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/171/76/IMG/NR017176.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed December 28th, 2009).

[It is an ironic historical footnote that Dag Hammarskjöld (whose words began the search for the Chapter Six and a Half definition of peacekeeping) lost his life in a plane crash on the night of September 17, 1961, while en-route to negotiate a cease fire between U.N. troops and Congolese rebels]

Mozambique

After a rather protracted war that began in September, 1964, Mozambique gained its independence from Portugal on June 25, 1975 with Samora Machel as the head of state of a Marxist government. Within two years, however, a civil war erupted in 1977, when forces of the Resistência Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO) began a campaign against the government. RENAMO was supported by the governments of South Africa and Rhodesia, with the goal of disrupting the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). ZANLA was engaged in an insurgency campaign in Rhodesia and was staging the majority of its operations from Mozambique. The civil war in Mozambique lasted for almost fifteen years until the two sides signed a peace agreement in Rome on October 4, 1992. The peace accords paved the way for the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).

On December 16, 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 797 in which it approved “the report of the Secretary General dated 3 December 1992 and the recommendations contained therein.”³² It was this report by the Secretary General that established the purpose and goals of the mission. ONUMOZ had a multi-faceted and very complex mission. Its mandate consisted of four major aspects:

³² U.N. Security Council, 47th Year. "Resolution 797 [Resolution of 16 December, 1992]" 16 November 1992 at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/824/85/IMG/N9282485.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed December 28th, 2009).

1. Political: To impartially facilitate the implementation of the Rome Peace Agreement.
2. Military: To verify the cease fire, supervise the demobilization of forces and destruction of weapons, monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces, monitor the disbanding of private armed forces and provide for the security of U.N. forces and officials in the country.
3. Electoral: To provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process.
4. Humanitarian: To coordinate and monitor all humanitarian activities especially those dealing with refugees, displaced persons and demobilized armies.³³

Narrowing the Definition

When comparing the *practice* of peacekeeping in the examples of the Congo and Mozambique, one sees a maturation of the U.N.'s vision of the concept. In the Congo, the United Nations acted hastily to pass a resolution and quickly interjected military forces into an already established and on-going conflict. United Nations peacekeeping forces actually engaged in combat operations against rebels in the Congo. This contrasts sharply with the mission in Mozambique. The U.N. agreed to deploy peacekeeping forces in Mozambique only after a peace agreement between the warring factions had been signed. As part of the peace negotiation process, both the government and RENAMO agreed to the interjection of U.N. peacekeepers to supervise the four aspects of the mandate expressed in the Secretary General's Report. This is a key aspect pertaining to how the U.N. views the peacekeeping mission as taking place *after* opposing sides have reached a negotiated settlement. One sees this concept adopted *doctrinally* by the United Nations in 2008 when the organization published *United*

³³ Richard Syngé, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 181-82.

Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines. In this document the U.N. comes the closest it has to actually defining the term *peacekeeping*.

Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.³⁴

While this description of peacekeeping is helpful, it is just that, a description. In fact, it is somewhat discouraging that the U.N. chose to only go as far as calling peacekeeping a ‘technique’ as opposed to providing an actual definition. However, if one reads the entire document, it does provide enough detail on guiding principles and practices that it is very helpful in developing an understanding peacekeeping, and it somewhat implies a definition.

A Term Defined

An examination has been made of the historical context within which the United Nations was founded and of the emphasis in its Charter on preserving *peace and security*, particularly between nation states at war. Also, special attention has been paid to the fact that the historical paradigm and goal of protecting against large scale international conflict perhaps caused the founders of the U.N. to focus only on that aspect of conflict. However, historical trends have shown that those types of conflicts have been largely overshadowed by intra-state or internal conflict (civil wars). The combining of all these factors with a brief study of actual U.N. peacekeeping operations and an examination of current United Nations doctrine regarding peacekeeping, allows one to propose the definition of peacekeeping as it will be used in the remainder of this paper:

³⁴ J.M. Guéhenno, ed., *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York: The United Nations, 2008), 17.

Peacekeeping is the interjection of armed forces acting under the direction of the international community, as organized in a legitimately recognized international or regional body, to enforce and supervise the terms of a peace agreement reached to end hostilities between opposing sides in an inter-state or internal conflict. A requirement exists that the warring factions have negotiated a peace agreement, terminated hostilities and agreed to third party intercession.

With this definition in mind, one may now begin to apply it to conflict in Africa by focusing on the importance of peacekeeping operations on the continent as well as the characteristics and structure of a peacekeeping force that will make it most effective there.

CHAPTER 3

THE IMPORTANCE OF AFRICAN SELF POLICING

The end of the Cold War in the late-1980's brought a change in the attention paid to Africa by the international community. During the Cold War, Africa was an area of significant strategic interest for both the United States and the Soviet Union as they worked to gain dominance and influence through surrogate relationships on the continent. The political influence of the superpowers, along with their willingness to support United Nations interventions on the continent, created a relatively stable environment. In the post Cold War era, however, conflict has increased largely as a result of the absence of the external influences of the superpowers. Thus, the need for peacekeeping operations has also increased. This chapter will discuss the major aspects of conflict in Africa after the end of the Cold War. There is a common characteristic of ethnically based conflict during this period. With this in mind, this chapter will also develop the concept of the ethnically and culturally aware peacekeeper and stress his importance in successful operations. The chapter will conclude by discussing the United Nations' goal of forming partnerships with regional organizations in creating a new, 'hybrid', peacekeeping model.

Ethnic Conflict in Africa, Post Colonial Period and Post Cold War

[E]thno-political conflicts [in Africa] since the end of the Cold War are a continuation of a trend that began as early as the 1960's. It is a manifestation of the enduring tension between states that want to consolidate and expand their power, and ethnic groups that want to promote and defend their collective identity and interest.³⁵

³⁵ Adebayo Oyeboade and Abiodun Alao, eds., *Africa After the Cold War: The Changing Perspectives On Security* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1998), 125.

It is important to note that the trend of increasing ethno-political violence in Africa began in the 1960's as decolonization was rapidly taking hold. As has been discussed previously, many aspects of colonization in Africa became the roots of ethnic conflict.

First, the way in which the continent was divided among the colonial powers created national boundaries that were geographic rather than sociological, cultural or ethnic. This fact was widely recognized and address by the All African People's Conference held in 1958. The delegates to this conference condemned "the artificial boundaries drawn by the imperialist powers and dividing African peoples and called for their wiping out after proclamation of independence."³⁶ However, the reality of the situation on the continent and the difficulties involved in re-shaping national boundaries became readily apparent. Therefore, in its first general session held in July, 1964, The Organization of African Unity (OAU) passed a resolution stating that the Union "SOLEMNLy DECLARES that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence."³⁷ Thus, early on, the members of the OAU themselves formally institutionalized much of the ethnically based conflict on the continent. This was, however, only one remnant of colonialism that fueled ethnic conflict.

The second aspect of colonial rule in Africa that helped create ethnic based strife was in the administration of the colonies. When looking at either major form of administration, *direct rule* or *indirect rule*, (see Chapter 2) one finds that both led to ethnically based tensions. One of the main results of governance is the creation of a

³⁶ R N. Ismagilova, *Ethnic Problems of the Tropical Africa, Can They Be Solved?* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), 8.

³⁷ *Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Held in Cairo, UAR, From 17 to 21 July 1964* (Addis Ababa: Organization of African Unity, 1964), 17.

socio-economic system. As was discussed earlier, the colonial powers looked at things in Africa very much through a western-centric prism. Each form of colonial administration sought to impose European constructs on the colonies. Through the concept of direct rule, colonial powers created a system in which they centralized administration in Europe. This, however, called for creating a class of indigenous administrators and government officials who realized the benefits of better education and lucrative public sector careers. These individuals were drawn largely from the urban areas thus creating a disparity of opportunity between them and the ethnic/tribal groups in the rural areas.

Conversely, the indirect rule approach to administration had the same effect. By choosing local tribal leaders to be the instruments to promote their policies and managing through the proxy of state sponsored corporations, the colonial powers again created a class of ruling elites. As power became geographically consolidated, the chosen tribal leaders began to have significant advantages and exercised these in promoting the social and economic interests of their ethnic group over others. An example of this occurred in 1972 as increasing tension developed in Sudan between the ethnically based factions in the northern and southern parts of the country. Dunstan Wai, who later became head of a division of the World Bank for 'capacity building' in Africa, described the situation:

A feeling of *relative economic deprivation* is growing, and the intransigent refusal of the Arab Sudanese to share real political power and revenue from within and aid from without with the Southern Sudanese will gradually erode any desires in the South to identify with the Sudanese state.³⁸

³⁸ Donald S. Rothchild, *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 30.

In this example, one can see how ethnically based imposition of self interests by one ethnic group causes disparate economic situations between the group in power and those of a less influential group. This disparity causes the group faced with economic deprivation to regard themselves less and less as part of the socio-political structure as represented by the national government. This makes it possible for “reactionary circles to utilize ethnic antagonisms and the ideology of tribal separatism in the struggle for power.”³⁹ It is easily understood, therefore, that individuals or groups seeking to wrest power from a current government can solicit support from those who are economically deprived . In Africa, much of this economic disparity is ethnically based.

Decolonization is the third aspect of colonialism in Africa that proves to be a root of conflict. The way in which the Republic of the Congo fell into civil war almost immediately following its independence was briefly discussed earlier. This situation will now be examined more closely to develop an understanding of the complex ethnic issues that contributed to this conflict.

The situation in the Congo is exemplary of the way in which much of independence came to Africa. As the process of independence and decolonization that began in the late 1950's gained momentum through the 1960's, there was almost a rush to see how fast the colonial powers could divest themselves of their control on the continent. This led to a situation where there simply were no competent cadre of trained government officials and administrators to effectively govern. During the rush to leave to the continent the

³⁹ Ismagilova, *Ethnic Problems of the Tropical Africa, Can They Be Solved?*, 11.

Belgians simply walked away leaving a significant power vacuum. This invited chaos within the country.

On attaining independence the country [The republic of the Congo] would have been faced in normal circumstances with many economic, social, political, military and administrative problems. The almost complete lack of trained civil servants, executives and professional people among the Congolese and the striking absence of administrative and political experience created a serious situation for the young republic. But the situation was made worse by a complete failure (on the part of Belgium) to arrange for any organized hand-over to the Congolese of the administrative machinery of government and essential services⁴⁰

U.N. Special representative to the Republic of the Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal, made the above assessment in a report to Secretary General Hammkjöld in September, 1960. The lack of a functioning government with the strength to effectively govern the country caused the country to fall into civil war. When describing the situation in the Congo, Jean-Claude Willame wrote: “in the 1960’s, identity was reduced to ethnicity.”⁴¹ And the resulting ethnic conflict played a major role in the Congolese civil war.

The former Belgian Congo had arbitrarily grouped together in one political unit over 200 distinct peoples. The threat that these ethnic differences posed to national integrity became dramatically apparent to the world community almost from the moment of independence in 1960. Revolt, tinged with ethnic conflict, spawned separatist movements through-out the country, but most notably in Katanga Province...⁴²

In December, 1961, George W. Ball described the problem in Katanga as “the threat of armed secession by a tribal area.”⁴³ As has been seen in the above analysis by Janice

⁴⁰ Daniel and Hayes, *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, 217.

⁴¹ Elisabeth J. Porter, ed., *Researching Conflict in Africa: Insights and Experiences* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2005), 91.

⁴² Janice Spleth, “Narrating Ethnic Conflict in Zairian Literature,” *Research in African Literatures* 29 (1998): 103,

<http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst;jsessionid=LQ3VqrS1lbXYrPVvywd6zmC81Q31hznPr57nVb2DnPpCj5Dq8yGy!-39901454!-797993493?docId=98494073> (accessed January 20, 2010).

⁴³ Ernest W. Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965), 72.

Spelth, the post-colonial conflict in the Republic of Congo was rooted in all three aspects of colonial rule previously identified in this paper. The Belgians forced together over 200 disparate ethnic groups, administered the colony in a way that failed to develop an indigenous governing capability and decolonized so quickly that the country fell into a civil war with significant ethnic implications. This experience is indicative of much of the ethnically based conflict on the continent post colonialism and post Cold War. With this in mind, it is time to address the importance of ethnically and culturally aware peacekeeping forces.

CHAPTER 4

THE IMPORTANCE OF ETHNICALLY/CULTURALLY SENSITIVE PEACEKEEPERS


Following the end of the Cold War, the nature of international conflict shifted from interstate conflicts (handled by traditional methods of coercive diplomacy and crisis management through the superpower rivalry) to predominantly intrastate conflicts that require different responses by the international community. In terms of peacekeeping, this demanded a more committed performance beyond that of unsubstantial conflict containment. Traditional operations...were exchanged for an increasing number of highly elaborate multilateral and multifunctional operations. At this turn...peacekeeping became the most widely employed means of managing violent conflict and contributing towards its ultimate resolution.¹

As was discussed in the previous chapter, the shift from interstate to intrastate conflict has been progressing virtually since the end of World War II. It has only accelerated since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This trend held especially true in Africa. The colonial powers provided a stabilizing influence on the cultural and ethnic tensions on the continent. In the post-colonial period, some ethnic and cultural strife began to plague the continent, but such strife was still held in abeyance by the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War has seen a dramatic rise in the incidence of ethnically/culturally based conflict in Africa.

This paper has only briefly touched on examples of ethnic conflict in Africa (The Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Sudan, etc.) simply as examples. These are by far not the only ethnically based conflicts. There have been mass genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. Additionally, there have been ethnically based conflicts in Somalia, The

¹ Tamara Duffey, "Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping," *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 142.

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and a host of other countries. The post Cold War period in Africa is rife with intrastate conflict. In fact, the majority of worldwide deaths due to armed conflict over the past two decades have occurred in Africa.



As we see here, 88% of the world’s deaths resulting from armed conflict between 1990 and 2007 occurred on the African continent (this includes all deaths, not just those of armed combatants). This is a staggering statistic but becomes even more daunting when one examines the actual numbers. Over 7 million³ people have died in conflicts in the Great Lakes Region of Africa alone. In a mere 100 days, over 800,000 people were killed during the genocide in Rwanda, which was a result of “the manipulation of ethnic factors by the elites over access to power and resources.”⁴ As the international community seeks to resolve these and future conflicts a rhetorical question must be asked: ‘who is best suited to deploy forces once an amenable environment is created for the insertion of peacekeeping forces between protagonists in a conflict?’

² Virgil Hawkins, *Stealth Conflicts: How the World’s Worst Violence Is Ignored* (Aldershot, England :: Ashgate, 2008), 25. (Author created chart with cited data).

³ Hawkins, *Stealth Conflicts: How the World’s Worst Violence Is Ignored*, 30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 31.

“The degree of cultural identification and ethnocentrism among the peacekeepers is a critical factor...[to the successful resolution of intercultural challenges presented in today’s peacekeeping missions].”⁵ There is a growing school of thought suggesting that the most successful peacekeeper is one who is culturally/ethnically aware or trained. In fact, many assert that the risk of confrontation between peacekeepers and combatants greatly increases when communications break down and cultural differences are emphasized.⁶

The importance of ethnically sensitive/aware peacekeepers came to the forefront in a study of peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Haiti by Northwestern University sociologists Charles Moskos and Laura Miller. They published the results of their research which showed that in Somalia and Haiti (both with predominantly black populations) “service members from certain demographic groups were more likely to support the peacekeeping operation than were other service members,” and that “black service members were less likely to dehumanize the Somali natives than were non-black service members.”⁷ This study demonstrates that when looking at even the most basic definition of ethnicity (the color of one’s skin), ethnically sensitive peacekeepers showed an ability to make an empathetic, cultural connection with the population. However, there is more to ethnicity than just the color of one’s skin. It involves many social, religious, tribal, societal and cultural factors. All these combine to create the *culture* in which the peacekeeper will be operating. Tamara Duffey (2000) discusses this:

Maintaining good relations with the local community, a prerequisite for successful operations, relies on the peacekeepers’ understanding of the

⁵ Harvey J. Langholtz, ed., *The Psychology of Peacekeeping* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), 62.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Thomas W. Britt and Amy B. Adler, eds., *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper: Lessons from the Field* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), 77.

local population's culture and respect for their cultural traditions. The reality is, however, that peacekeepers often lack cultural insight into the population they are attempting to develop positive community relations with.⁸

In his essay *Cultural and Ethnic Issues of Conflict and Peacekeeping*, Paul R. Kimmel advocates for cultural and ethnic awareness training for peacekeepers in their home countries prior to deployment, in a common facility near their deployed location, and in the field once deployed. He asserts that the function of this training is “to provide a better understanding of cultural differences and their implications for their [the peacekeepers] own behavior.”⁹

Although there are numerous ethnic and cultural characteristics on the African continent, it is obvious that Africans themselves would have the strongest chance of success in developing culturally sensitive and ethnically aware peacekeeping forces through this type of training.

⁸ Duffey, “Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping,” 151.

⁹ Langholtz, ed., *The Psychology of Peacekeeping*, 62.

CHAPTER 5

MOVING TOWARD THE HYBRID PEACEKEEPING MODEL

The United Nations and the Hybrid Peacekeeping Model

As the United Nations was founded resulting from the failure of the League of Nations, roots of failure are now becoming apparent in the U.N. itself. As the Cold War came to an end, hopes were high that the Superpower rivalry on the Security Council would subside (which it did) and the U.N. would be able to take a more active and constructive role in maintaining peace and security in the world. Historically this role assumed the form of peacekeeping missions. These hopes were emboldened with the U.N.'s success in the Gulf War. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, Max Boot outlines that at the beginning of the 1990's these high hopes were expressed even by Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. In his 2000 article, however, he states that U.S. officials are no longer making similar suggestions because "they have been chastened, presumably, by the U.N.'s almost unrivaled record of failure in its peacekeeping missions."¹ In a November, 1995 article published in *Reader's Digest* titled *The Folly of United Nations Peacekeeping*, Dale Van Atta describes much of what has plagued U.N. peacekeeping operations: "incompetent commanders, undisciplined soldiers, alliances with aggressors, failure to prevent atrocities and at times even contributing to the horror. And the level of waste, fraud and abuse is overwhelming."²

Even the United Nations itself has acknowledged the failures within its peacekeeping construct:

¹ Max Boot, "Paving the Road to Hell: The Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 2 (March/April 2000): 143.

² Dale Van Atta, "The Folly of United Nations Peacekeeping," *Reader's Digest*, November, 1995, 19-20.

At times, peacekeeping missions have failed - sometimes dramatically so. The inability or unwillingness of the international community to respond in Rwanda and Srebrenica revealed the limits of UN operations. So too did the failure of UN peacekeepers to contain violent attacks in the Congo in the 1960s, Somalia in the 1990s and Sierra Leone in 2000. Elsewhere, peacekeepers may have succeeded in a narrow sense, while failing in the broader international response to conflict. In earlier missions in Haiti, Liberia and Timor-Leste, for example, UN peacekeeping deployed alongside international assistance that was poorly adapted to creating the conditions and structures for a sustainable peace. Peacekeepers departed, perhaps too early, only to return.³

In the capstone document, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for U.N. Peacekeeping*, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations collaborated with the Office of Field Support to propose charting a new path for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The proposed concept centers on building global partnerships to support peacekeeping operations that have international support, a specifically defined mission statement, identified funding and specified roles for participating nations. While this document does not specifically state that the United Nations seeks to begin using partnerships with regional organizations to conduct peacekeeping operations, it clearly shows a renewed focus on global partnerships. Additionally, one can deduce from the activities of other U.N. organizations that this is clearly a goal. The creation of the African Union-United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations in 2008 marks a significant milestone in U.N. cooperation with and support of regional organizations undertaking peacekeeping operations.

³ *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for U.N. Peacekeeping*, ed. Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra (New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, July, 2009), 3.

Evidence of an evolving approach to United Nations peacekeeping operation is found in a variety of U.N. resolutions, Security Council resolutions, studies, and committee actions. A new model for peacekeeping operations has slowly emerged over the last several years. This is especially true regarding peacekeeping operations in Africa. In the resolution establishing the African Union-United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations, the Security Council made several statements indicating its attitude toward peacekeeping activities on the African continent. The following are excerpts from Security Council Resolution 1809 passed on April 16, 2008 at their 5868th meeting:

The Security Council

Welcoming the role of the African Union in efforts to settle conflicts in the African Continent and expressing its support for the peace initiatives conducted by the African Union, and through subregional organizations...

Emphasizing the need to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the prevention of armed conflicts, and stressing utility of developing effective partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union...

Recognizing that regional organizations are well positioned to understand the root causes of armed conflicts owing to their knowledge of the region which can be a benefit for their efforts to influence the prevention or resolution of these conflicts... [an affirmation of the argument previously presented in this paper for culturally aware peacekeeping forces]

Stressing the importance of further strengthening cooperation with the African Union in order to assist building its capacity to deal with common collective security challenges in Africa, including through the African Union's commitment of rapid and appropriate responses to emerging crises situations, and the development of effective strategies for conflict prevention [and] peacekeeping...

Recognizing the importance of strengthening the capacity of regional and subregional organizations in conflict prevention and crisis management, and in post conflict stabilization...

Expresses its determination to take effective steps to further enhance the Relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter...

Welcomes and further encourages the ongoing efforts of the African Union and the subregional organizations to strengthen their peacekeeping capacity and to undertake peacekeeping operations in the continent, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.⁴

This shift toward the United Nations creating partnerships with regional organizations to accomplish peacekeeping operations began in the late 1990's and early 2000's. Hikaru Yamashita, of the National Institute Studies in Tokyo and a visiting scholar at Columbia University in 2008-2009, describes the relationship between the U.N. and regional organizations during this period as "subcontracting."⁵ He asserted that regional organizations were operating under U.N.-delegated responsibilities and that the "U.N. and regional peacekeeping organizations were thought of as mutually exclusive organizations"⁶ with little interest in cooperation. He observes that since 2000, a networking framework has developed creating a more pragmatic partnership between the U.N. and regional organizations.⁷ He additionally notes "the UN is now meeting global demand by partnering with regional peacekeeping organizations. This new perspective is based on a realistic acknowledgment of regional peacekeeping organizations as legitimate

⁴ United Nations Security Council, 5868th Meeting, *Resolution 1809 (2008)*, 16 April 2008 (archived document available at <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4016126.09624863.html>), accessed February 19 2010).

⁵ Hikaru Yamashita, "Peacekeeping Partnerships Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations and the Future of UN Peacekeeping: Lecture," *Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Electronic Newsletter, Columbia University* 16 (May, 2009): <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/siwps/images/newsletter16/siwps16.html> (accessed February 19, 2010).

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Yamashita, *Peacekeeping Partnerships Between the United Nations and Regional Organizations and the Future of UN Peacekeeping*

actors.”⁸ This new paradigm (as applied to Africa) was evident in a report by the United Nations Secretary General to the Security Council on 18 September 2009.

In his report, *Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations Authorized by the United Nations*, Ban Ki-Moon presented “practical ways to provide effective support to the African Union in undertaking peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations.”⁹ He outlined five broad principles to develop a United Nations-African Union partnership in peacekeeping and regional security. The first principle he outlined is agreement that the two bodies will take concrete steps to enhance their relationship and move forward on areas of common interest. Second, he proposed a framework for providing United Nations funding for U.N authorized and African Union led peacekeeping operations “on a case-by-case basis, for up to six months, to be provided...only when there is an intention to transition the mission to a United Nations peacekeeping operation.”¹⁰ (This is a key point to remember later as the “hybrid” peacekeeping model is presented). The third proposal he made was to develop a multi-donor, international trust fund to provide the African Union with the financial resources to support peacekeeping missions. The fourth point he made, and a key principle to keep in mind for the ensuing portions of this paper, is for the U.N and international community to assist the African Union in developing “its logistics capacity through innovative options.”¹¹ Finally, the Secretary General recommended creating a joint United Nations-African Union team to determine the best way to implement these recommendations. It

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ United Nations General Assembly, 64th Session, *Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations Authorized by the United Nations*, 18 September 2009, 1-2. (Archived document available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A%2F64%2F359&Submit=Search&Lang=E, accessed February 19, 2010).

¹⁰ Ibid., 2.

¹¹ United Nations General Assembly, 64th Session, *Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations Authorized by the United Nations*, 2.

is in this context that one sees a more formalized expression of what has been developing during the last several years, the “hybrid” peacekeeping model.

The African Union and the Hybrid Peacekeeping Model

It has been suggested that the only way to deal with the inherent failure of the UN to respond rapidly (as was the case in Rwanda) to dangerous situations is to create hybrid rapid reaction forces, possibly led by ‘coalitions of the willing’. The hypothetical argument is that rapid deployments could easily be facilitated outside the auspices of the UN in situations where powerful countries (such as the US) can take the lead in providing funding, equipment and training to ‘lead states’ or regional powers.¹²

The Secretary General’s report cited in the previous section reveals the conceptual basis for the hybrid peacekeeping model. The idea centers on developing partnerships with regional organizations that have a more rapid response capability than the U.N. The regional organizations would provide the initial contingency force required for peacekeeping operations. This allows the U.N. time to organize a more robust operation in concert with the broader international community. After an initial period (six months are stipulated in the report), the regional organization would turn operations over to a more long-term United Nations peacekeeping force. In the case of Africa, the African Union Peace and Security Council is the regional power conceptualized in the above quote. In fact, for the African Union, it is imperative that conflict on the continent be settled “before there is any chance of achieving prosperity.”¹³ The Council, which can deploy military forces in the event of genocide or crimes against humanity as well as authorize peacekeeping operations, strives to replace the old Organization of African

¹² Othieno , Timothy, and Nhamo Samasuwo. "A Critical Analysis of Africa’s Experiments with Hybrid Missions and Security Collaboration." *African Security Review* 16, no. 3 (2007): 25-39. <http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=295> (accessed February 27, 2010).

¹³ “Profile: African Union,” BBC News Front Page, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/country_profiles/3870303.stm (accessed February 27, 2010).

Unity philosophy of non-interference with one of “non-indifference.”¹⁴ The force created by the African Union for these endeavors is the African Standby Force (also referred to as the African Rapid Response Force.)

“Time is one of the most crucial factors in preventing an emerging crisis from erupting into a major war.”¹⁵ It could take from three to six months¹⁶ for the United Nations Security Council to authorize a peacekeeping operation, solicit participation from U.N. member states and deploy the force. It is clear that the hybrid peacekeeping model, especially considering a standing military force under control of the African Union Peace and Security Council, is much better suited to rapidly inserting forces on the continent. This is further enhanced by the fact that the African Standby Force is divided into five geographically distinct Regional Standby Brigades (northern, southern, eastern, western, and central) consisting of 3,000-5,000 troops each. However, in order to deploy at the direction of the African Union, these forces must be transported. Focus will now shift to an examining transportation of peacekeeping forces.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Vanessa Kent and Mark Malan. “The African Standby Force: Progress and Prospects.” *African Security Review* 12, no. 3 (2003): 73. <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/12No3/EKent.pdf> (accessed March 3, 2010).

¹⁶ Ibid.

CHAPTER 6

TRANSPORTING PEACEKEEPERS: A CASE STUDY

Since 1990, there have been numerous peacekeeping missions on the African continent. Each of these required moving a significant number of troops and military equipment. The following pages will provide a brief example of coordinated efforts to transport peacekeeping forces to Darfur, Sudan. The peacekeeping mission in Darfur was one of the first “hybrid” missions between the United Nations and the African Union. It required tremendous logistical support, especially in the area of airlifting troops. Many nations and organizations participated in this effort including the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and NATO. This case study will demonstrate the importance of providing airlift as logistical support.

Strife in Darfur, Sudan

Sudan has been at war with itself for more than three quarters of its existence. Since independence, protracted conflict rooted in deep cultural and religious [ethnic] differences have slowed Sudan’s economic and political development and forced massive internal displacement of its people. Northerners, who have traditionally controlled the country, have sought to unify it along the lines of Arabism and Islam despite the opposition of non-Muslims, southerners, and marginalized peoples in the west and east. The resultant civil strife affected Sudan’s neighbors, as they alternately sheltered fleeing refugees or served as operating bases for rebel movements.¹

One of the most visible aspects of the ethnic conflict in the Sudan has been the genocide in the Darfur region. In 2003, a civil war between two major rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLMA) and the Justice and Equality Movement

¹ "Sudan ." U.S. Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm> (accessed March 13, 2010).

(JEM), and the Sudanese government supported by an Afro-Arab militia group known as the Janjaweed. In an effort to quell the SLMA/JEM insurgency, the Janjaweed (with tacit approval of the Sudanese government) began a campaign of destroying the villages from which the rebel groups recruited fighters. This led to mass dislocations of indigenous populations and the wholesale human slaughter that caused then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to apply the term “genocide.” The African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security Council together brokered “The Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement” signed by the warring parties on April 8, 2004.² The African Union approved the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) on May 28, 2004 with an initial force of 80 military observers (to monitor the ceasefire) and 600 soldiers to protect them.³ The Peace and Security Council later enlarged the force to over 7,000 military personnel and civilian police along with a support staff of over 3,300.⁴ The mission and forces deployed in support of AMIS grew over the next three years while the U.N. Security Council worked through the politics of approving a more permanent United Nations force to deploy in concert with and eventually replace AMIS. In U.N. Security Council Resolution 1769 dated 31 July 2007, the Security Council authorized “the establishment, for an initial period of 12 months, of an AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) as set out in this resolution and pursuant to the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June

² Henri Boshoff, “The African Union Mission in Sudan: Technical and Operational Dimensions.” *African Security Review* 14, no3 (2005): 57. <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/14No3/ASR14No3.pdf> (accessed March 3, 2010).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

2007.”⁵ As of February 28, 2010, the combined force in Darfur totaled 21,800 uniformed personnel⁶ and thousands more civilian support forces and staff. The U.N. re-authorized in July 2010 under Security Council Resolution 1881. While authorizing this peacekeeping mission required the coordination of the five members of the Security Council, the logistics of transporting them proved a significant challenge for the international community.

As of February 2010 there were military personnel from 38 countries are currently deployed to Darfur.⁷ While it is unfeasible to document how every person arrived, it is possible to identify the major efforts, primarily by air, undertaken to deploy this combined force. One of the major contributors to the airlift of military personnel and civilian police to Darfur was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO was one of the largest contributors supporting AMIS. The alliance’s activities occurred from June 2005 through the end of December 2007 when AMIS transitioned to UNAMID. “Overall, since the start of the mission, NATO-EU Air Movement Coordinators 57harmonized the airlift of some 37,500 troops, civilian police and military observers in and out of the Sudanese region. NATO alone coordinated the airlift of over 31,500 AMIS troops and personnel.”⁸ NATO members, who also contributed under the auspices of the European Union. Included Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The United States operated 89 C-17 Globemaster III missions transporting

⁵ U.N. Security Council, 5727th Meeting. "Resolution 1769 [Resolution of 31 July 2007]" 31 July 2007 at [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1769\(2007\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1769(2007)) (accessed April 10th, 2010).

⁶ “UNAMID: African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur,” The United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml> (accessed April 10, 2010)

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ "Assisting the African Union in Darfur, Sudan." NATO - Homepage. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49194.htm (accessed April 17, 2010).

over 4,000 personnel deploying to support AMIS.⁹ Additionally, Japan, South Africa, Canada and members of the African Union provided limited airlift support. As the mission in Sudan transitioned to UNAMID with growing participation from around the world, the need for logistical support in the form of airlift arose once again.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1769 of July 2007 established the combined U.N. African Union peacekeeping operation in Darfur. The effort was initially hampered by significant shortfalls by donor nations, especially in the area of logistical and transportation support. Political differences between the African Union and United Nations as to the scope and purpose of the mission added also contributed to delays in the effective transition to UNAMID. The United States fully supported the mission however, budgetary shortfalls seriously delayed direct American support:

The sheer size and expense of the UNAMID mission was unforeseen in the [U.S.] President's Fiscal Year 2008 budget, meaning that the United States [was] short an estimated \$725 million for its share of UNAMID for the fiscal year starting on October 1 [2007].¹⁰

With much of the actual military force in place as UNAMID haltingly took over responsibility for peacekeeping in Darfur, The U.N. identified the need not only to continue transporting troops but also equipment and sustainment supplies to the area. On January 7, 2009 President George W. Bush announced a U.S. commitment to airlift equipment to support the peacekeeping force in Darfur. It was one year from the official transfer of responsibility to UNAMID and yet only sixty-three percent of the planned

⁹ Major David Corrick, "American Airlift: Europe's Strategic Interim Solution," *The Navy Supply Corps Newsletter*, July, 2008. <https://www.navsup.navy.mil/scnewsletter/2008/jul-aug/highlights3> (accessed April 17, 2010).

¹⁰ Prendergast, John, Colin Thomas-Jensen and Julia Spiegel, "How to Get the UN/AU Hybrid Force Deployed to Darfur (Strategy Paper)," Enough! The Project to End Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity. <http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/how-get-unau-hybrid-force-deployed-darfur> (accessed April 17, 2010).

force was in place in Darfur.¹¹ On January 14, 2009, a U.S. C-17 flew the first mission from Kigali Rwanda to the Darfur region of Sudan. The C-17s transported over 150 tons of Rwandan equipment and supplies “including nine oversized vehicles, water purification systems, water trailers, tents, and spare parts.”¹² These missions were also significant as they represented the first operational employment of U.S. Africa Command’s air component, U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s 17th Air Force headquartered at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.¹³ In addition to The United States’ effort, NATO, The European Union, Germany, Canada, the Netherlands and South Africa have all contributed to airlift requirements for UNAMID.

This brief study of aspects of the airlift operations required to move African and United Nations peacekeepers into the troubled Darfur region of Sudan clearly demonstrates the need for logistical support. It is obvious that both the United Nations and African Union both require tremendous air transport support in order to carry out operations such as this. The need is clear and the United States is one of the few nations capable of assisting the African Union in developing an organic airlift capability.

¹¹ “Darfur: Ban Welcomes US Pledge to Airlift Supplies to UN-African Union Force,” *UN News Centre*. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29482&Cr=darfur&Cr1> (accessed April 17 2010).

¹² Eric Elliot . "Air Force Begins Airlift of Peacekeeping Equipment to Darfur." United States Department of Defense. <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=52683> (accessed April 17, 2010).

¹³ Ibid.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is useful to refer back to the quote by Romano Prodi that opened this discussion:

If the African Union was to take on an even larger share of the continent's peacekeeping activities, the international community must help the United Nations' evolving regional partner (the African Union) secure the financial and material resources to support future short-term deployments and its capabilities for the long term¹

Breaking down this statement will reveal the important aspects covered by this thesis. It is vitally important for the African Union to “take on an even larger share of the continent's peacekeeping operations.” Much of the present-day conflict in Africa has its roots in the continent's troubled history dating back to her colonial experience. From a western perspective, we have failed to understand the historical African experience. This is true especially of Western Europeans as they began to explore the continent in the mid to late 19th century. Their inability to understand that African societies were evolved but organized along different lines fostered an attitude that Africans must be “civilized.” This combined with the rich and abundant natural resources of the continent made it an easy target for colonization. The colonial powers divided the continent along generally geographic and economic/resource boundaries. This all too often split peoples who were ethnically similar and grouped together ethnically diverse peoples (sometimes with great enmity). Many of the ethnic tensions are causes of conflict today.

Additionally, the way in which colonial powers ruled and administered their colonies in Africa often created a multi-tiered society. This too often happened along ethnic lines. The British empowered local tribal leaders to act on their behalf. These indigenous

¹ Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 210th Meeting, “If African Union Expected to Assume Larger Share of Peacekeeping, World Community Must Help Regional Partner Financially, Materially, Special Committee Told.”

leaders were then able to secure economic benefits and sociological advancement for themselves and their tribe (ethnic group). Likewise, as the French administered their colonies by making essentially part of the country, they too created a tiered class system that fell along ethnic lines. The French greatly encouraged education and sought to build a “governing” class. This group was primarily urbanite. Many of these people were educated in France then returned to their native lands to become part of the government administering the colony. Since these people were largely from the cities they rapidly advanced socio-economically compared to the tribal/ethnic groups outside of the urban centers. This too later became a root of ethnic strife and conflict in Africa.

As World War II came to a close many African colonies sought independence. This movement took root slowly but by the mid 1960’s it was in full swing. European colonial powers deserted the continent almost as fast as they carved it up. This often left either power vacuums filled by strong-handed dictators or indigenous governments that found themselves ill prepared and unable to administer their countries effectively. The resulting strife and conflict resulted in numerous interventions by the United Nations, the African Union and other organizations conducting *peacekeeping* operations.

Founders of the United Nations did not envision it as a world peacekeeping force. Their aspirations were to replace the failed attempt at world governance symbolized by the League of Nations’ failure to effectively prevent the catastrophe of World War II. Thus, the concepts expressed in the Charter of the United Nations call for specific responsibilities in peacefully settling international disputes. It also, for the first time, gave a world body the power to assemble, deploy and engage a military force. The founders had the goal of preventing massive state-on-state international conflict. It is

ironic that since the U.N.'s founding, this type of conflict has greatly diminished while internal strife within nations (civil wars, etc) has emerged as the main source of conflict in the world. Many of the world's peacekeeping missions operate in this arena and the majority of those occur in Africa. Logic dictates that Africans must play an increasingly larger role.

It is important that Africans begin taking the lead in maintaining peace and security on the continent. The formation of the African Union's Peace and Security Council along with the African Union-United Nations Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Peacekeeping (chaired by Romano Prodi) is a major step in this direction. One reason for this importance is that Africans must actively solve uniquely African problems.

Otherwise, it is easy to give the impression of the world once again colonizing the continent and directing its future. Additionally, research indicates that ethnically/culturally sensitive and aware peacekeepers provide the foundation for the greatest success in peacekeeping missions. As Prodi suggests it is necessary for the international community to help the African Union secure the resources necessary to make this a reality.

One critical resource is simply institutional support. The African Union-United Nations Panel is key to this effort. The purpose of this committee is for both organizations to work together to identify areas of logistical and financial support necessary to build African peacekeeping capacity. Another form of institutional support is the ongoing conceptual development of the of the "hybrid" peacekeeping model. Under this approach, regional organizations such as the African Union are the international "first responders" to a developing crisis requiring peacekeeping forces. As

Secretary General Ban Ki-moon suggests, the initial deployment of these regional organization peacekeepers should be for up to six months. This will give the United Nations time to solicit/build international support, pass the required resolutions, secure donor nations' support and deploy the more permanent peacekeeping force. The fact that eighty-eight percent of the conflict related deaths in the world between 1996 and 2007 occurred in Africa (see page 46), clearly indicates that the African Union will be the most significant "regional partner" called upon in the hybrid approach. Thus, the A.U. created five regional rapid response forces of approximately 5000-7000 troops each. These brigades represent the initial response forces for Africa envisioned in the hybrid peacekeeping model. Many lessons were learned from this approach to peacekeeping in the African Union-United Nations hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur.

The Darfur peacekeeping experience highlights a significant area of logistical support necessary for effective peacekeeping operations in Africa...transportation, specifically airlift. The mission called for the initial deployment of African forces with a more robust United Nations force to follow. It took participation by many nations, including the United States to transport the initial peacekeeping forces from Africa to the region. This effort did not as efficiently, effectively or expeditiously as it might have. "One of the reasons for the delay in sending African troops to Darfur has been the absence of adequate funding and airlift capability. ***With no airlift, virtually no peacekeeping operations are possible in Africa.***"²

² Jonathan Katzenellenbogen. "AU Peacekeeping Unit Needs Teeth." *News from Africa*. http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_6517.html (accessed April 17, 2010).

Recommendations

...“the international community must help...secure the financial and material resources to support future short-term deployments.”³ This admonition by Romano Prodi, accompanied by the Katzenellenbogen quote referenced above, clearly identifies one of the most important ways forward for the international community to provide material and logistical support to the African Union as it endeavors to build a rapid response capability. This response capability is the lynchpin in the United Nations’ emerging concept of the hybrid peacekeeping model. The critical logistical component needed by the African Union is an airlift capability to deploy these forces. In his article, Katzenellenbogen goes on to say about the African Standby Force:

If the force is to be worthy of the "standby" in its name, the issues of funding, airlift and logistical support in the field have to be sorted out . Ad hoc arrangements with wealthy nations are insufficient to guarantee political credibility, speed and effectiveness.⁴

The United States can play a key role in the United Nations goal of assisting the African Union develop the logistical capabilities required to deploy peacekeeping forces. The United States has the most advanced and capable military airlift capability in the world. As such, we can play a vital role in building African peacekeeping capacity by leading collaborating with the Africa Union, United Nations, European Union, other willing partner governments and the private sector to develop an African Airlift Consortium. The multinational Strategic Airlift Consortium (SAC) based at Papa Air Base, Hungary is the leading example to follow in this endeavor. The operational component of this

³ Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 210th Meeting, “If African Union Expected to Assume Larger Share of Peacekeeping, World Community Must Help Regional Partner Financially, Materially, Special Committee Told.”

⁴ Jonathan Katzenellenbogen. "AU Peacekeeping Unit Needs Teeth."

consortium is called the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW). The HAW currently operates three C-17 aircraft to conduct strategic airlift missions for the member nations which include ten NATO nations (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Romania and the United States) as well as two Partnership for Peace nations (Finland and Sweden).⁵

...the SAC initiative is a groundbreaking example of multinational cooperation in rapidly developing critical capabilities for the Alliance and other SAC members. The aircraft meet the strategic airlift requirements of the SAC member nations for national missions, including missions in support of NATO, the EU and the UN.⁶

Imagine for a moment if this initiative were undertaken by the United States in partnership with members of the African Union. A quote from a future newspaper article might read:

...the AAC (African Airlift Consortium) is a groundbreaking example of multinational cooperation in rapidly developing the critical airlift capability required by AAC members and the African Union to enable them to rapidly and effectively deploy indigenous peacekeeping forces on the continent. This capability will greatly enhance peace and security on the continent and enable the AU to become a more capable regional organization partner in advancing the emerging hybrid peacekeeping model favored by the United Nations.

The United States has the opportunity to, once again, play a key role in contributing to world peace and security. This time in Africa. For after all... ***With no airlift, virtually no peacekeeping operations are possible in Africa.***⁷

⁵ USEUCOM. "Multinational Strategic Airlift Consortium Completes First Flight in Support of ISAF." United States European Command; Stronger Together. www.eucom.mil/english/fullstory.asp?art={ADBE9CB9-F4C3-4DB4-BA6F-D2FB06B12C40} (accessed April 18, 2010).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Jonathan Katzenellenbogen. "AU Peacekeeping Unit Needs Teeth." *News from Africa*. http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_6517.html (accessed April 17, 2010).

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Vita

Colonel John E. Patchett Patchett is currently attending the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, National Defense University, Norfolk, Virginia.

Colonel Patchett was commissioned through the Air Force ROTC program at Colorado State University in 1985. He attended Undergraduate Pilot Training at Williams AFB, AZ. After completion of C-141 Initial Qualification Training, he was assigned to the 63rd Airlift Wing, Norton AFB, CA. During this assignment, he served as Chief of Squadron Safety, Chief Pilot Scheduler, Wing Special Assignment Airlift Mission Planner and the Wing Airlift Director. Lieutenant Colonel Patchett was then assigned as a C-141 Combat Crew Training School Instructor/Examiner Pilot, Altus AFB, OK. He served as Chief of Safety, Squadron Executive Officer, Flight Commander and Assistant Operations Officer. In 1995 he was named Air Education and Training Command's Top C-141 Instructor Pilot. He was then assigned to HQ Air Force Flight Standards Agency, Andrews AFB, MD, where he served as Chief, Emerging Avionics Branch and flew the NC-21 conducting in-flight testing of emerging avionics, navigation systems and procedures.

Colonel Patchett then moved to the 457th Airlift Squadron, Andrews AFB, MD. In this position he flew the C-21 and served as Chief of Training. In 2000, he associated with the 459th Airlift Wing (AFRC) Andrews AFB, MD. During his time at the 459th he served as Chief of Current Operations and played a key role in the wing's conversion to the KC-135. In 2007, he became commander of the 756th Air Refueling Squadron. During his tenure as commander he deployed twice as an Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron commander and an Air Expeditionary Group deputy commander.

Lt Col Patchett is a Command Pilot with over 4,500 hours in the C-141, C-21 and the KC-135.