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Huge outlays of foreign aid to Africa have failed to help countries in the region develop. Africa lags the rest of the world in almost any measure of development. A growing scholarly consensus suggests the reasons foreign assistance has failed relate to the design of assistance programs. Studies show that policy preconditions are critical to the efficacy of foreign aid. For decades, aid donors have underestimated the importance of the policy environment in recipient countries. However, taking this new research into account, some aid programs now assess a country's receptivity to aid through objective measurement of indicators of a favorable policy environment.

Through programs collectively referred to as Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), the new Geographic Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM) will assist selected militaries in Africa. TSC, though limited to military matters, is a form of foreign aid; therefore, lessons learned from the delivery of foreign aid in Africa are applicable. Drawing on lessons from the failure of foreign assistance in Africa, this paper asserts that AFRICOM should take advantage of this new thinking in planning a program of TSC for Africa.

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REINFORCING SUCCESS:
USING LESSONS LEARNED FROM FOREIGN AID DELIVERY TO PLAN
THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN AFRICA

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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Abstract

Huge outlays of foreign aid to Africa have failed to help countries in the region develop. Africa lags the rest of the world in almost any measure of development. A growing scholarly consensus suggests the reasons foreign assistance has failed relate to the design of assistance programs. Studies show that policy preconditions are critical to the efficacy of foreign aid. For decades, aid donors have underestimated the importance of the policy environment in recipient countries. However, taking this new research into account, some aid programs now assess a country's receptivity to aid through objective measurement of indicators of a favorable policy environment.

Through programs collectively referred to as Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), the new Geographic Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM) will assist selected militaries in Africa. TSC, though limited to military matters, is a form of foreign aid; therefore, lessons learned from the delivery of foreign aid in Africa are applicable. Drawing on lessons from the failure of foreign assistance in Africa, this paper asserts that AFRICOM should take advantage of this new thinking in planning a program of TSC for Africa.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) has taken this scholarly consensus into account by targeting assistance to countries where objective criteria suggest a favorable environment, or capacity, to use the aid wisely. While this approach is relatively new, there is optimism that this method of prioritizing aid will help Africans capitalize on foreign assistance and improve the performance and accountability of their governments.

The MCC criteria, if used for planning TSC, would provide AFRICOM with metrics to predict whether a country has the capacity to benefit from assistance. By

prioritizing or tailoring assistance using the MCC eligibility criteria as one of several planning factors, AFRICOM can improve the likelihood that its limited ability to assist countries in the region will result in lasting positive changes.

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I. Introduction

Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies. Improving the way we use foreign assistance will make it more effective in strengthening responsible governments, responding to suffering, and improving people's lives.¹

National Security Strategy

The newly formed Department of Defense (DOD) Africa Command (AFRICOM) has an historic opportunity to export security, a concept that Thomas Barnett posited in his book *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the New Century*.² Barnett argues persuasively that security for the United States now and in the future is best understood through the lens of globalization. Most of the countries in the world have benefited from an extraordinary increase in wealth and a concomitant increase in standard of living through increased economic ties. However, there are still a number of countries that do not have healthy economic ties to the rest of the world. Barnett calls the countries that are integrated economically, the “core” countries. Future conflict will likely originate from countries that are failing to integrate economically, which he calls the “gap” countries. Put another way, “the non-integrating gap countries are the expeditionary theater for the U.S. military in the 21st century.”³ Barnett's notional map of the gap includes most of Africa.

There is increasing realization that Africa is strategically critical to the United States. In less than ten years, Africa will provide the U.S with up to 25% of its crude oil imports.⁴ West African oil has distinct characteristics that could cause it to become even

¹ White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington: March, 2006, 33.

² Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty First Century* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 2004), 154.

³ Ibid.

⁴ James Jay Carafano and Nile Gardiner, “U.S. Military Assistance for Africa: A Better Solution,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1697, October 15, 2003. <http://www.heritage.org/research/africa/bg1697.cfm> (accessed December 28, 2008).

more critical to the U.S. than economists currently forecast. This oil tends to be light, which refers to the components most beneficial for refining motor fuels, and sweet, which refers to low sulfur content, which also makes it more desirable for refining. Perhaps even more importantly, African oil can be transported to major markets in the U.S. without moving through any strategic choke points such as the Straits of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, or the Straits of Malacca. Finally, much of the proven West African reserves are offshore, making the oil relatively immune to disruptions from instability ashore.⁵

The Global War on Terror makes Africa of vital strategic interest to the United States. Al Qaeda or affiliated groups operate in a number of African countries and Africa has seen several major terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, notably the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.

One of the primary tasks that AFRICOM will handle is the growing cooperation between the U.S. Department of Defense and African states. Part of this engagement will take the form of what is called Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). “TSC is the means by which the DOD encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with [the U.S.] to achieve strategic objectives.”⁶ In essence, TSC is foreign aid. However, unlike other forms of foreign aid, TSC is focused on developing and strengthening military institutions. Roger C. Riddell defines foreign aid as, “... all resources – physical goods, skills and technical know-how, financial grants (gifts), or loans ... – transferred by donors to recipients.”⁷ He further asserts that this definition, “... would also include

⁵ Nicholas Shaxson, *Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 3.

⁶ *Operational Art and Campaigning Primer AY 09-10; Joint Operation Planning Process* (Norfolk, VA: Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2009), 127.

⁷ Roger C. Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 17.

resources provided to help achieve military aims and objectives.”⁸ Therefore, in this paper TSC will be considered a form of foreign aid, and recommendations for changes in how it is prioritized and targeted will be made in light of lessons learned from African foreign aid in the post-colonial era.

The thesis of this paper is that AFRICOM should use objective measures of a country’s capacity to benefit from assistance to plan discretionary TSC in Africa. While TSC must be delivered in certain countries according to priorities the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff determines, AFRICOM retains significant latitude in how to deliver TSC in those countries. Furthermore, the Combatant Commander (COCOM) has latitude to deliver TSC in other countries where it is not mandated. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), one of the primary U.S. instruments for delivering foreign aid, developed eligibility criteria that are an excellent barometer of a country’s capacity to use assistance wisely. This paper proposes including their criteria with the other statutory and geopolitical planning factors that currently guide AFRICOM planners. This approach to selecting countries for assistance incorporates new ideas about how best to direct foreign aid. The MCC considers certain preconditions to help forecast a country’s capacity to intelligently use assistance, which helps ensure the aid is effective. More effective aid will advance regional stability as well as American strategic interests. Using MCC eligibility criteria as part of the calculus for prioritizing TSC, and as a guide for what type of TSC to deliver, will improve the effectiveness of assistance to African militaries, while reducing the risk that those countries will waste or misuse their improved military capability. The result will be far better for long-term U.S. strategic interests.

⁸ Ibid.

In order to demonstrate the thesis, this paper will broadly outline the situation in Africa, including two destabilizing influences in Africa that hinder the advancement of AFRICOM's agenda to build partnerships with African militaries: the corrupting influence of oil and gas development, and the terrible history of Africa's militaries in subverting legitimate civilian governments. Next the paper will examine the history of foreign aid in Africa, the failure of that aid, and the generally accepted reasons it has failed to improve conditions in Africa. The lessons derived from the history of foreign aid will point to the soundness of the MCC eligibility criteria. Finally, this paper will suggest a framework for African TSC that is informed by a country's capacity to make effective use of assistance using the Millennium Challenge Corporation eligibility requirements.

TSC is a complex and important undertaking. Nothing in this paper suggests that the effort to prioritize and tailor TSC is easy, or that one simple analytical tool will suffice. Planners must consider very complex and confusing factors when planning military assistance, such as the War on Terror, energy security, and American foreign policy, all of which are difficult to quantify. There are statistical methods for factoring MCC criteria with the planning factors AFRICOM now uses to determine a country's capacity to use assistance intelligently. AFRICOM could of course choose to take advantage of these methods. The US Coast Guard uses a method called the Analytical Hierarchical Process, which assigns weights to different factors through quantification of expert opinion. However, examining these statistical tools is beyond the scope of this thesis. The taxonomy proposed in chapter VI of this paper is a basic first step for improved planning.

While the ideas suggested here may be useful elsewhere in the world, this paper only examines the utility of this approach in Africa. The sale of military hardware to African governments, while an important component of U.S. military foreign assistance, is also beyond the scope of this paper.

II. The Current State of African Affairs

Instead of serving their people, most African states function as vehicles for the self-enrichment of political elites that have inherited none of the public-spiritedness of their colonial predecessors but all the latter's contempt for the African masses.¹

Edward N Luttwak and Marion L. Tupy

A brief survey of African affairs follows that describes the political and economic context that exists today. Making sweeping statements about the state of Africa is a questionable undertaking because of the expansive size and complexity of the cultural and political landscape. "You can drop the United States into Africa four times and the edges would scarcely touch. [Africa is] infinitely more complex than the U.S."² The continent is huge and the troubles in Zimbabwe do not necessarily apply to Morocco. The artificial construct of country boundaries in Africa, which European colonial powers decided, bears no relationship to cultural or tribal ties within national boundaries. Hundreds of different languages and dialects are spoken in Africa. While this is not unique – many countries in the world speak a number of dialects within their borders – it is a particular problem in Africa. Language is one of the main mechanisms for defining culture, for binding people together. In Nigeria alone, over 500 distinct dialects are spoken. The national languages are Edo, Efik, Adamawa Fulfulde, Hausa, Idoma, Igbo, Central Kanuri, Yoruba, and English.³ English serves as the language of government across Nigeria, but indigenous languages still define clan and tribal connections. Likewise, many modern African states have similar linguistic diversity, which results in

¹ Edward N. Luttwak and Marion L. Tupy, "The aid Africa can't afford," *Los Angeles Times*, July 8, 2008, <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-luttwaktupy8-2008jul08,0,3973792.story> (accessed December 27, 2008).

² Robert Calderisi, *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn't Working*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 3.

³ Ethnologue.com, "Languages of Nigeria," http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=NG (accessed December 28, 2008).

cultural divisions and a tendency toward political fractures along ethnic lines. Political elites in some countries seek to exploit or exacerbate these divisions.

The diversity across the continent seems obvious, yet there are consistent themes that can constructively add to this discussion. Africa is home to a wide array of religious traditions. Again, Nigeria is instructive. Just as ethnicity, defined by language or dialect, tends to splinter Africa politically, religious differences also cause unstable fault lines. The North of Nigeria is predominantly Muslim; the South is predominantly Christian. Violence between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria is increasingly common.⁴

According to Robert Calderisi, a former World Bank official, 70,000 skilled workers leave Africa every year.⁵ He asserts this brain drain is devastating, but the fact points to a cause, not just to the effect – the underlying poverty in Africa where skilled workers cannot get a decent job or are paid wages that do not support a decent standard of living. African scholar, George B. N. Ayittey, using infant mortality data, argues that 70 aid recipient countries in Africa were poorer at the time of his writing – 1999 – than in 1980. So in nearly 20 years, 70 countries moved backward economically. He asserts that 43 were worse off in 2005 than in 1970.⁶ His conclusions generally comport with other observations on Africa.

The rate of democratization in Africa over the last several decades has been dramatic. This will be discussed in some detail later. However, despite the favorable signs in this arena, there is still cause for concern. The African political landscape includes terrible dictatorships, such as the incredibly repressive regime of Robert Mugabe

⁴ Al Arabiya News; “Nigeria’s Muslim-Christian clashes kill hundreds,” <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/11/30/61083.html> (accessed December 28, 2008).

⁵ Calderisi, *The Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn’t Working*, 5.

⁶ George B. N. Ayittey, *Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa’s Future*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 159.

in Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia. Zimbabwe, at the time of this writing, has the highest inflation rate of any country in the world:

Zimbabwe is the first country in the 21st century to hyperinflate. In February 2007, Zimbabwe's inflation rate topped 50% per month, the minimum rate required to qualify as a hyperinflation (50% per month is equal to a 12,875% per year). Since then, inflation has soared. ... Absent current official money supply and inflation data, it is difficult to quantify the depth and breadth of the still-growing crisis in Zimbabwe. To overcome this problem, Cato Senior Fellow Steve Hanke has developed the Hanke Hyperinflation Index for Zimbabwe (HHIZ). This new metric is derived from market-based price data ... for the January 2007 to present period. As of 14 November 2008, Zimbabwe's annual inflation rate was 89.7 Sextillion (10^{21}) percent.⁷

Later, in the same article, the author, Steve Hanke, indicated that the quality of economic data from Zimbabwe had declined to such an extent that the inflation rate could no longer accurately be determined. Therefore, Cato suspended attempts to track the inflation rate there.⁸ The grim reality of inflation on this scale is difficult to comprehend.

While African leaders have been reluctant to criticize the Mugabe regime because of his heroic resistance to the odious racist policies of the former Rhodesia, there are finally signs that other African leaders are also disgusted with Mugabe's repressive regime. Recently, South African civil rights leader, Desmond Tutu, called on other African leaders to demand that Robert Mugabe step down in Zimbabwe. "He [Mugabe] has ... mutated into something that is quite unbelievable. ... He has really turned into a kind of Frankenstein for his people."⁹ Recently, the Prime Minister of Kenya, Raila Odinga, joined the international chorus of condemnation of Mugabe. Odinga suggested that the African Union or the United Nations prepare for military intervention because of

⁷ Steve H. Hanke, "New Hyperinflation Index (HHIZ) Puts Zimbabwe Inflation at 89.7 Sextillion Percent," *Cato Institute Zimbabwe Update*, <http://www.cato.org/zimbabwe> (accessed December 26, 2008).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ CNN; "Tutu: Mugabe is a Frankenstein for his people." <http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/06/25/tutu.mugabe/index.html> (accessed December 26, 2008).

the worsening situation in Zimbabwe as evidenced by a severe outbreak of cholera in August of 2008 that has reportedly killed hundreds.¹⁰ Given the unreliability of reporting from Zimbabwe and the fact that Mugabe forbids many foreign reporters, the death toll may be far worse, which points to the possibility that the health care system in Zimbabwe is on the verge of collapse.

While Zimbabwe seems poised for collapse, a number of other countries have already collapsed, including Somalia, which has been an international basket case since the early 90s. Currently Somalia is known as an essentially lawless base for piracy. Somalia's pirates have captured the attention of much of the world's news media for the brazenness of attacks on shipping off the Horn of Africa. By November 2008, pirates in Somalia had attacked 92 ships, successfully hijacked 32 ships, held 268 crewmembers hostage and held 14 ships for ransom.¹¹

Failed or poor governance begets poverty, which leads to major health problems such as the cholera outbreak in Zimbabwe. It has also led to other health crises in Africa. HIV/AIDS infection rates are astronomical in many parts of Africa. AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa is a terrible plague and a drain on resources. According to the United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS and the World Health Organization, eight countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have an AIDS infection rate for adults above 15% based on data collected in 2005.¹² In the region, only Zimbabwe experienced a measurable decline in adult infection rates, if reporting from Zimbabwe can be believed. However,

¹⁰ International Herald Tribune, "Kenyan prime minister calls for military intervention in Zimbabwe;" (accessed December 27, 2008).

¹¹ BBC News, "Q & A: Somalia Piracy;" November 25, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7734985.stm> (accessed December 27, 2008).

¹² Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and World Health Organization (WHO); "07 Sub-Saharan Africa AIDS epidemic update: Regional Summary;" UNAIDS, Geneva, Switzerland, 2008; http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2008/jc1526_epibriefs_ssafrica_en.pdf (accessed December 27, 2008).

one of the studies reporting the decline in Zimbabwe notes that use of prostitutes has recently declined in Zimbabwe, which is plausible given the current economic chaos.¹³ With the exception of Mozambique, where infection rates have continued to climb, other countries in the region have seen a leveling off of infection rates. However, by any measure, the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic has been and will continue to be significant. Millions have died and many more are infected.

HIV/AIDS is not the only serious health challenge in Africa. Drug resistant strains of tuberculosis are increasing in much of Africa, often coincident with AIDS infection.¹⁴ Polio, a disease the world health community believed eradicated, recently spread across a wide swath of Africa originating in Nigeria. Health officials believe Nigeria's Muslim Clerics and politicians failed to enforce national immunization requirements in the north of Nigeria, which caused the outbreak.¹⁵

A recent improvement in malaria infection rates in some countries paints a more positive picture. In Zanzibar, an Indian Ocean island that is now part of Tanzania, malaria infection rates have dramatically improved.¹⁶ This improvement is directly attributable to well-targeted and well-designed foreign aid, which enabled Tanzania to distribute mosquito netting treated with DDT. Malaria is still one of the main causes of infant and childhood mortality in Africa, but the success of the program in Tanzania and some other sub-Saharan countries points to some key lessons for any foreign aid project. The aid to reduce malaria infection rates is specifically targeted at countries that have

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Gilbert Da Costa, "Setback for Nigeria's Polio Fighters" *Time*, <http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1675423,00.html> (accessed March 29, 2009).

¹⁶ Peter Baker, "Zanzibar's Example in Fighting Malaria," *The Washington Post*, February 19, 2008, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/02/18/ST2008021802418.html> (accessed March 29, 2009).

reasonably effective health delivery systems in place and to countries, like Tanzania, with governments committed to addressing the problem.¹⁷

In some countries, notably Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia, the current political and economic situation is so dire that experts have seriously begun to discuss a new form of colonialism - internationally sponsored regimes on the model of the former Trust Territories of the United Nations.¹⁸

Colonialism in Africa is an emotionally-charged subject because so many African politicians and African observers blame many of modern Africa's problems on the ills of European colonialism. In fact, many Westerners have accepted at face value that colonialism is to blame for many of Africa's failure to keep pace with the rest of the world. Because the subject is so emotionally charged and so much a part of the archetype of how the West views Africa, the call for a new form of colonialism is quite remarkable. This is a testament to the intractable nature of problems and the degree of despair in the international community for the situation in parts of Africa. It also demonstrates the need for new approaches to assisting African countries, approaches that planners can and should embrace when designing an effective program of TSC for Africa.

Summary

The combination of difficulties in Africa, and the growing strategic importance of Africa to the United States make Africa a difficult vineyard in which to labor. These realities are clearly contributing factors to the decision to create AFRICOM. TSC is the primary mechanism in AFRICOM's tool kit to positively influence the direction of

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Stephen Ellis, "How to Rebuild Africa," *Beyond Humanitarianism: What You Need to Know About Africa and Why it Matters*, ed. Princeton N. Lyman and Patricia Dorf, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2007), 152.

Africa. The next chapter will examine two challenges that AFRICOM must consider when planning TSC in Africa.

III. Stability and Resource Security – AFRICOM's Twin Challenges

There is another thing about oil. Consumers of oil benefit by being able to burn it in their cars and boilers; these benefits are dispersed widely through society. But for producers of oil, the benefit is money, which comes from a point source, controlled by the rulers, who decide how to share this out as they see fit. The benefits of Africa's oil are not bottom up, but top down.¹

Nicholas Shaxson

But the great majority of military men who carried out coups were dictators who obliterated the media, jailed, tortured, and killed rivals or opponents, and provided themselves with corrupt, greedy, and inept ministers while filling overseas bank accounts with funds stolen from foreign aid or earnings from exports. They surrounded themselves with well-paid soldiers and police whom they relied on to maintain them in office.²

Robert B. Edgerton

Disrupting or destroying al Qaeda in Africa must be an important part of AFRICOM's focus. In fact, this may well be AFRICOM's *raison d'être*. To achieve national security objectives in Africa, planners must also attend to problems in Africa that are not directly related to the Global War on Terror. Because of the critical need for energy security, the presence of energy supplies must be a determinant of whether a country should receive TSC. The National Defense Strategy says, "The United States will continue to foster access to and flow of energy resources vital to the world economy."³ However, if AFRICOM makes the fight against terrorism and energy security the only factors for determining where and how to deliver TSC in Africa, then aid will flow to countries, which due to their incompetence, corruption and/or bad economic policies will almost certainly squander the assistance. Worse yet, the aid could well be used for nefarious purposes.

¹ Shaxson, *Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil*, 40.

² Robert B. Edgerton, *Africa's Armies: From Honor to Infamy: A History from 1791 to Present*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 142.

³ U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, Washington, June 2008, 16.

One dilemma AFRICOM faces involves African militaries. Security is an essential precursor for human development. Militaries are a necessary component of providing for human security. Yet, strengthening Africa's militaries has the potential to destabilize Africa instead of improving the security environment. There are at least three reasons for this: 1) African militaries have a long history of overthrowing governments in Africa; 2) African militaries, because they often function as internal security services, are sometimes used to crush domestic opposition to governments; and, 3) African militaries have been used in regional conflicts where it can be argued that the country sending the militaries had no legitimate security interest.

Another dilemma is related to a key element of U.S. vital interests in Africa – securing U.S. and world access to resources, particularly energy resources. Trying to stabilize countries that are energy rich, risks stabilizing very odious regimes. Oil and gas production in Africa has a long history of corrupting governments. According to Calderisi, “[C]orruption is so endemic on the continent ... that ... the rest of the world must radically change the way it tries to help Africans.”⁴ Therefore, focusing military assistance in oil rich countries to ensure energy market stability runs the risk of assisting governments that do not deserve it or frankly should not be legitimized.

AFRICOM will operate in a difficult neighborhood with competing demands to ensure stability in order to deny terrorists sanctuary and support and to ensure the free flow of energy resources to world markets. President Bush articulated that AFRICOM would promote development, health, education, democracy and economic growth.⁵ This is clearly an unusual portfolio for a Combatant Commander. Nevertheless, TSC is the

⁴ Calderisi, *The Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn't Working*, 87.

⁵ Sean McFate, “Briefing: US Africa Command: Next Step or Next Stumble?” *African Affairs*, 107, no. 426, (January. 2008), 114.

primary tool available to AFRICOM to carry out U.S. objectives. This chapter will explore some of the inherent difficulties of delivering TSC in Africa to promote stability and energy security.

The Corrosive Role of Militaries in Africa

Barnett's thesis that disconnectedness from the benefits of globalization will cause conflict is borne out in Africa. Currently there are active bloody conflicts in Somalia, Algeria, Sudan and the Sahel. The United Nations has peacekeepers in Liberia, Sudan, Chad, The Central African Republic, Western Sahara, Ethiopia, The Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ivory Coast. The number of current or contemplated U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa is nearly equivalent to all the peacekeeping missions in the rest of the world.⁶ Though difficult to catalog, the terrible aftermath of conflict still afflicts a number of other countries in Africa in the form of poverty, health issues, and dislocated populations.

Several scholarly works have examined the role of militaries in Africa. Here the perspective of their role in the overthrow of legitimate regimes is considered, as well as the role they play as essentially a check on governmental reform. According to Robert B. Edgerton, "When independence came to Africa, African military men seized political power in country after country The result has been catastrophic – civil war, genocide, hunger, disease, economic collapse, and a steadily declining quality of life as well as life expectancy itself."⁷ The number of African military coups is very high. By 1990 there had been at least 60 military coups and many additional attempted coups.⁸ Since then,

⁶ United Nations Peacekeeping Website, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp> (accessed October 10, 2008).

⁷ Ibid., vii-viii.

⁸ Chuka Onwumechili, *African Democratization and Military Coups*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 55.

numerous additional coups have occurred across Africa. Moreover, according to Africa scholar Chuka Onwumechili, the threat of military coups in much of Africa remains.⁹

There appear to be five obstacles to preventing military takeovers in Africa. According to Onwumechili, they are 1) the willingness of African militaries to use arms, 2) a decline in military professionalism, 3) increased perception that the military is a viable alternative to thoroughly corrupt governments, 4) a lack of a prolonged democratic culture, and, 5) deplorable support for military takeovers from some corners of the globe.¹⁰ Sadly, among ambitious, educated young people in Africa, the military is seen as a quick route to political power.¹¹

Examples abound of U.S. military aid going to the wrong regimes. This was particularly true in the Cold War period, when the primary incentive to support African countries was whether they aligned with the Soviet Union or the West. For example, Zaire, formerly ruled by Mobutu Sese Seko, aligned with the West and therefore received support from the U.S. Because it points to the farce inherent in supporting Mobutu, it is worth noting that Mobutu gave himself the name, “Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga,” which translates to “the all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake.”¹² This would be funny were Mobutu’s reign not so obscene. During the period the U.S. supported him, he looted billions from his country. Estimates of his personal fortune ranged as high as \$10 billion.¹³ Zaire, now split into the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo, has been plagued by horrific civil war and

⁹ Ibid., 75.

¹⁰ Ibid., 78.

¹¹ Ibid., 71.

¹² Edgerton, *Africa’s Armies: From Honor to Infamy: A History from 1791 to Present*, 137.

¹³ Ibid., 137.

ethnically inspired bloodshed since Mobutu's government collapsed. Furthermore, the prospects for recovery in the foreseeable future are dim.

The U.S. also assisted Liberia's brutal dictator, Charles Taylor. Taylor destabilized the entire region and the atrocities his regime committed are shocking. Liberia now qualifies as one of Africa's failed states and is the focus of a multi-billion dollar, primarily U.S. funded, U.N. peacekeeping effort. The situation in Liberia is the inspiration for the serious discussion of a new form of colonialism mentioned above.¹⁴

The story of post-colonial Sierra Leone is tragically representative of how militaries in Africa have often had a destructive influence on civil society. When Sierra Leone gained independence from England, there were "... roads, electricity, schools, and medical care. It was known as the 'Athens of West Africa.'"¹⁵ Sierra Leone also possessed the means to develop income streams to support decent government. The country was "...one of the richest countries in Africa, thanks to its wealth of rutile [a mineral composed primarily of titanium dioxide, iron and significant amounts of niobium and tantalum], bauxite, iron ore, titanium, gold, and rich deposits of the highest quality diamonds in the world."¹⁶

After several military coups, Sierra Leone was in a shambles. By 1991 horrendous civil war engulfed the country. The leader of one of the warring factions, Foday Sankoh, a former corporal in the Sierra Leone army, with help from Charles Taylor of Liberia, rampaged across the country in "... a reign of appalling, sadistic terror."¹⁷

¹⁴ Ellis, "How to Rebuild Africa," 152.

¹⁵ Edgerton, *Africa's Armies: From Honor to Infamy: A History from 1791 to the Present*, 162.

¹⁶ Ibid., 162.

¹⁷ Ibid., 164.

Creating his personal monument to terror, Sankoh ordered his growing numbers of teenage revolutionaries to prove to the people of Sierra Leone that their government could not protect them ... by launching vicious attacks throughout the country's remote rural areas. The [rebels] not only burned villages, forcing villagers to labor for them, they randomly killed and mutilated men and women of all ages. Their trademark was amputation. Using machetes or axes, they chopped off people's noses, lips, hands, or arms. Many of the victims were small children.¹⁸

U.N. peacekeeping forces entered Sierra Leone in 1998. However, it was not until 2000 when British paratroopers entered the country under U.N. auspices that some measure of peace resumed. U.N. peacekeepers remained until 2005, and then turned the mission over to another (non-enforcement) U.N. mission to consolidate peace.¹⁹

The plague of military government overthrows continues in Africa. In August 2008, a military coup in Mauritania occurred when President Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi fired several top-ranking military officials, including the head of the Mauritanian Presidential Guard, General Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. Abdel Aziz led the coup and now leads a military council that is governing the country.²⁰ As of this writing, the council leaders have not re-established constitutional government. However, in a positive sign for the continent, the African Union (AU), the only authoritative regional diplomatic body, has denounced the coup and ousted Mauritania from the union until the leaders restore constitutional government.²¹

Despite the atrocious history of many of Africa's armies subverting legitimate civilian rule, there is hope in Africa. In parallel to the demand for democracy, resistance is growing to military rule. "Africans from all over the continent have ... participated in

¹⁸ Ibid., 163.

¹⁹ United Nations Peacekeeping, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp> (accessed February 8, 2009).

²⁰ VOAnews.com, "Mauritania's Coups Leaders Meet Missions, Prepare Government Amid Condemnations;" <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-08/2008-08-08-voa26.cfm> (accessed December 27, 2008).

²¹ Ibid.

widespread strikes and demonstrations against military and single party governance.”²²

Nevertheless, because of the history of Africa’s militaries and because of the still relevant propensity for military strongmen to overthrow civilian governments, planners at AFRICOM must consider any engagement with African militaries extremely carefully.

The Corrupting Influence of Oil and Natural Gas Development

The corrupting impact of oil and gas production and export in Africa is huge, and there appears to be no sign it is abating. Many, perhaps most, of the big oil producers in Africa - Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea - are cesspools of corruption, poverty, and collective misery. Yet, in order to ensure a stable energy supply, world markets need these countries to be reasonably stable. As Fantu Cheru stated, the “fundamental challenge for U.S. policy in Africa is how to reconcile Africa’s needs ... with [U.S.] interest in securing an oil supply.”²³ Nigeria, the largest producer in West Africa, provides instructive evidence of the difficulty of promoting stability to ensure uninterrupted oil supplies flow to world oil markets.

Like many African countries, Nigeria has multiple ethnic groups, but Nigeria is almost two distinct countries. Northern states are predominantly Muslim and officially practice Islamic, or Sharia, law.²⁴ The South is predominantly Christian. To make matters worse, Nigeria is the focus of Saudi Arabian-funded proselytizing that promotes an extreme fundamentalist form of Islam. The result is a resurgence of tensions between the Muslim North and the Christian South.²⁵ Nigeria has seen multiple military

²² Onwumechili, *African Democratization and Military Coups*, 59.

²³ Fantu Cheru, “Aid and Trade Policies: Shifting the Debate.” *Africa – U.S. Relations: Strategic Encounters*; ed. Donald Rothschild and Edmund J. Keller, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006), 218.

²⁴ Jane’s Sentinel, *Country Risk Assessments: West Africa*, (Surrey: United Kingdom, 2008), 544.

²⁵ Robert G. Berschinski, *AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The Global War on Terrorism, “Capacity Building,” Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 29.

governments, terrible ethnic and religious violence, and civil war. At the end of November 2008, between 200 and 400 Nigerians were killed in violent clashes between Muslims and Christians after a disputed local election. The town in central Nigeria where this occurred, Jos, was the site of similar clashes in 2001, with attendant loss of life.²⁶

Much of the tension between Muslims and Christians is rooted in disagreement over allocation of revenues from oil and gas development. Virtually all oil and gas fields in Nigeria are in the Niger Delta region, which is predominantly Christian. However, until recently, most of the military dictators of Nigeria have been Muslims from the North. Sani Abacha, one of the most notorious, led the country from 1993 to 1998. During Abacha's rule, residents of the oil region in the Niger Delta protested the lack of economic development and environmental degradation in the Christian South. Abacha's government accused the leader of that movement, Ken Saro Wiwa, along with eight other dissidents from the Ogoni ethnic group, of murder and executed them on November 10, 1995. British Prime Minister John Major called the executions "judicial murders."²⁷

Southern Nigeria, where oil and gas is produced in prodigious quantities, is indeed horribly poor, under-developed, and environmentally degraded from years of poorly regulated oil production. There is also oil theft on an industrial scale in the Niger Delta, near Port Harcourt. The theft, called bunkering, involves tapping into oil pipelines, usually at night, and siphoning oil into barges or drums. Loss estimates range as high as 200 thousand barrels per day, which is significant given that Nigeria is capable

²⁶ Sky News, "Hundreds Die in Nigeria Clashes" November 29, 2008, http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Nigeria-Violence-Hundreds-Die-And-Thousands-Flee-Jos-As-Christians-And-Muslims-Clash/Article/200811415166344?lpos=World_News (accessed December 7, 2008).

²⁷ BBC, "Nigeria Hangs Human Rights Activists" On This Day, 1995, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/10/newsid_2539000/2539561.stm (accessed February 8, 2009).

of producing over two million barrels per day.²⁸ The scale of the criminal activity is vast and the theft is sophisticated, giving rise to the belief that there is high-level Nigerian government involvement. Observers have implicated some of the most senior politicians in the country as being in charge of the syndicates that oversee the theft.²⁹

Nigeria is not unique among African oil producers. Under pressure from international observers to increase transparency, BP promised to publish financial information about its operations in Angola. The Angolan government threatened termination of its contract with BP. Immediately, “BP snapped back in line.”³⁰ BP did not publish the promised financial data. Equatorial Guinea, another West African oil producer, according to an unnamed diplomat, who Nicholas Shaxson quoted, was described as “... a festering pustule in the armpit of Africa.”³¹ Clearly, helping Equatorial Guinea secure its oil production will be a tricky business. In fact, sensible people should question whether it should be undertaken, despite the demand for stability in world energy markets.

While the plague of difficulties in African countries that produce oil have multiplied, there is growing investment in oil infrastructure in West Africa, much of it offshore. In 2000, oil companies invested \$626 million in deepwater production. By 2003 offshore investment was \$4.5 billion. In 2006 oil companies invested \$6 billion. Between 2005 and 2010 “... dozens of projects are scheduled for development in Africa ...”³² Corruption and a military with a history of multiple *coups d’état* threaten the security of that oil.

²⁸ Jane’s Sentinel, *Country Risk Assessments: West Africa*, (Surrey: United Kingdom: Jane’s Information Group, Limited, 2008), 554.

²⁹ John Ghazvinian, *Untapped: The Scramble for Africa’s Oil*. (Orlando: Harcourt, Inc., 2007), 47.

³⁰ Shaxson, *Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil*. 29.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 29.

³² *Ibid.*, 87.

Summary

AFRICOM's efforts to promote stability and ensure energy resource security are immensely complicated by the history of militaries in Africa undermining or overthrowing legitimate civilian governments. This is further complicated by the corrupting influence of oil and gas extraction in Africa. Planners must be cognizant of these two salient issues when designing military assistance programs in Africa. Not taking this into account would be a mistake. The next chapter explores the history of foreign aid in Africa to glean important lessons that AFRICOM can use in designing an effective program of TSC in Africa.

IV. African Foreign Aid – A History of Failure

Aid is social engineering par excellence. But after 50 years and hundreds of billions of dollars, it should be clear that aid has failed to make the modern state viable in most of Africa. Instead, it has prevented the emergence and growth of authentic African polities rooted in African traditions.¹

Edward N. Luttwak and Marion L. Tupy

Despite this corrupt environment, everyone continued to lend.²

Dambisa Moyo

Foreign aid in Africa has a checkered history. Some aid programs or projects have arguably been successful. However, billions of dollars have been spent and large sums of it, perhaps even most of it, have been wasted. Ayittey wrote:

Africa is a mess – economically, politically and socially. Despite Africa's vast natural resources its people remain mired in the deadly grip of poverty, squalor and destitution, while buffeted by environmental degradation and brutal tyranny. Most Africans are worse off today than they were at independence in the 1960s. African leaders have failed Africa. African politicians have failed. African intellectuals have failed Africa too. The failure is monumental and the international community is fed up with incessant African begging.³

Enter the U.S. military. While the U.S. military is not “fed up” yet, it needs to approach relations in Africa with a clear idea of Africa's problems. In 2004, Robert Guest, a journalist for *The Economist* with extensive experience in Africa, reported a declining standard of living in Zambia, as indicated by per capita income, despite the fact that Zambia received more foreign aid per capita than any other country in Africa.⁴ Perhaps it could be argued that Zambia would be even worse off now had it not been for

¹ Edward N. Luttwak and Marion L. Tupy, “The aid Africa can't afford,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 8, 2008. <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-luttwaktupy8-2008jul08,0,3973792.story> (accessed December 27, 2008).

² Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa*, (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 23.

³ Ayittey, *Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa's Future*, 402.

⁴ Robert Guest, *The Shackled Continent: Power, Corruption and African Lives*, (Washington: Smithsonian Books, 2004), 150.

the aid. Yet, the standard of living in Zambia was so low in 2004, conditions in large parts of the country so squalid, it would have been hard to imagine what could be worse unless one were to imagine total state failure on the order of what has happened in Somalia, Liberia, and elsewhere in Africa. Since Guest made his assertion in 2004, according to many objective measures, Zambia now appears to have turned a corner. Still, one cannot help but wonder if the billions in aid over the years was a terrible waste. Robert Guest asserts that, "... corruption, incompetence and bad economic policies can often be relied on to squander any amount of donor cash."⁵ Corruption, incompetence, and bad economic policies are rampant in Africa. One can reasonably conclude that these problems have caused, and will continue to cause, any form of assistance, not just cash assistance, to be squandered.

There is a growing consensus that foreign aid in Africa has been a failure. This chapter will examine the reasons. There are likely many reasons for the general failure of foreign aid in Africa. However, two closely-related issues are clearly primary causes. The first is wholesale corruption in Africa. The second is ineffective or even incompetent governance. Leadership is examined here as a component of governance. The chapter concludes with an analysis of past failures, which provide valuable lessons for AFRICOM planners.

Leadership, Governance and Corruption in Africa

Writing in 2005, Ayittey noted that foreign aid and investment inflows into Africa totaled \$18 billion annually. Yet capital flight – money moved out of Africa – exceeded \$80 billion annually.⁶ That some of the money moving out of the country was stolen aid

⁵ Ibid., 152.

⁶ Ayittey, *Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa's Future*, 23.

money appears almost certain. Part of the reason for capital outflows is that Africa is unattractive for foreign direct investment, which is commonly understood as an investor or a company risking capital in another country. Ayittey, using data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, notes that the reasons there is so little direct investment in Africa are “... civil unrest, starvation, deadly diseases and economic disorder”⁷ All of these are symptoms of failed leadership and governance. However, it is clear that corruption, which allows aid funds to be stolen and moved offshore, must also factor into business decisions about investing in Africa. In the same vein, leadership and governance, and corruption must be factors in decisions about where to deliver foreign aid.

The lack of foreign direct investment in Africa is tragic because risk is often well rewarded. Robert Guest, writing about the Guinness Brewery in Cameroon notes that Guinness, despite having to deal with stifling corruption is actually quite profitable. He reports that Guinness earns 16% return on capital in Cameroon.⁸ The list of obstacles that Guinness must continually overcome is instructive – and nearly unbelievable.

Guest rode through remote areas of Cameroon with a Guinness company driver and described interactions with government officials throughout the journey. In one town, the local police decided that the driver lacked a required permit, and demanded 8,000 *Communauté française d'Afrique* (CFA) francs (the currency in Francophone Africa), or the equivalent of about \$12.00 at the prevailing exchange rate. Guinness company policy forbids the payment of bribes, so their driver demanded a receipt. The result was more than three and a half hours of delay while the police squabbled about

⁷ Ibid., 6.

⁸ Guest, *The Shackled Continent: Power, Corruption, and African Lives*, 180.

how they could give a receipt for an obvious bribe.⁹ On this same journey Guest observed a disturbing, yet darkly humorous, interaction with a police official. Guest relates the story best:

The pithiest explanation of why Cameroonians have to put up with all this came from the policeman at road block number 31, who had invented a new law about carrying passengers in trucks, found Martin guilty of breaking it, and confiscated his driver's license. When it was put to him that the law he was citing did not, in fact, exist, he patted his holster and replied: "Do you have a gun? No. I have a gun, so I know the rules."¹⁰

Transparency International tracks governmental corruption throughout the world. Their website ranks countries according to the level of corruption in each country using what they refer to as the "corruption perception index," which is based on surveys and other indicators. Clearly this approach is not an exact measure of corruption in a particular country. Nevertheless, it is instructive. In 2008, of the bottom 25 countries out of 180 tracked, 14 were in Africa. In the same index only two African countries ranked in the top 50: Mauritius and Botswana.¹¹

In addition to corruption, incredibly poor leadership and the ways that leadership is manifested in government policies are part of the problem. Sometimes the results of the incompetence of African governments are tragic. In South Africa, as recently as 2004, South Africa's Minister of Health was recommending a diet of garlic, olive oil, and lemon juice to alleviate the effects of HIV/AIDS infections.¹² South African Prime Minister Thabo Mbeki's argument regarding the relationship between the HIV virus and

⁹ Ibid., 175.

¹⁰ Ibid., 175.

¹¹ Transparency International, "The global coalition against corruption, corruption perceptions index 2008," http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008, (accessed February 7, 2009).

¹² Robert Calderisi, *The Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn't Working*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 59.

AIDS was even more egregious. For years, he refused to believe that the HIV virus caused AIDS.¹³ Mbeki also refused to accept that AIDS was transmitted through sexual contact. He went so far as to suggest that the West invented this line of reasoning to intimate that Africans were immoral. He said, “We are blamed as criminals and seen as human beings of a lower order that cannot subject its passions to reason ... as natural-born, promiscuous carriers of germs unique in the world, doomed to a mortal end because of our unconquerable devotion to the sin of lust.”¹⁴ Perhaps this ridiculous notion could be overlooked had it not played directly into how South Africa’s Ministry of Health treated the most dire medical crisis to ever afflict the country.

For years, South Africa’s health ministry also refused to acknowledge the link between HIV and AIDS, with many thousands condemned to death because of egregious governmental policies that took their lead from Mbeki. The damage from incompetent South African governance is difficult to comprehend, given that approximately 18% of the population in South Africa was infected with the HIV virus during the time Mbeki refused to accept the well-known relationship between HIV and AIDS, and that HIV/AIDS is a sexually transmitted disease.¹⁵ According to a recent Harvard study, “... the South African government acted as a major obstacle in the provision of medication to patients with AIDS.”¹⁶ The study attributes 334,300 deaths between 2000 and 2005 to the government of South Africa’s policies.¹⁷

¹³ BBC News Africa, 20 September 2000, “Mbeki Digs in on AIDS”, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/934435.stm> (accessed 11/07/2008).

¹⁴ Guest, *The Shackled Continent: Power, Corruption, and African Lives*, 17.

¹⁵ Pride Chigwedere, et al, “Estimating the Lost Benefits of Antiretroviral Drug Use in South Africa, Perspectives: Epidemiology and Social Science,” *Journal of Acquired Immune Deficit Syndrome* 49, no. 4, (December 1, 2008): 410, http://aids.harvard.edu/Lost_Benefits.pdf (accessed February 13, 2009).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 412.

Unfortunately, Mbeki is typical of many African leaders. The post-colonial history of Africa's failures is one of failed leadership. In a discussion with a group of African students, Ayittey "... challenged them to name just 10 good post-colonial leaders – out of 198 – since 1960; they could not come up with 10 names."¹⁸ Calderisi allows that other factors have also contributed to Africa's problems. "Slavery, colonialism, the Cold War, international institutions, high debt, geography, the large number of countries, and population pressures all have had an effect on Africa. ... [Yet] none of these can explain why the continent has been going backward for the last 30 years."¹⁹ Poor leadership can explain some of the problems. "The tragedy of Africa is that it is a continent with so much economic potential mired in abject poverty. ... The real problem has been leadership."²⁰

During the wave of independence movements in Africa beginning in Ghana in 1957, large numbers of heroic leaders that overthrew colonial rule, often through guerilla or insurgency warfare, assumed government leadership positions. Unfortunately, the skills necessary to run a country are not learned or practiced when leading a military insurgency. Over and over again, these skilled revolutionary leaders took political power in Africa – and failed. Part of the problem stems from these leaders choosing to adopt forms of government that required a centrally-managed economy. The choice of government structure may have been a rejection of the Western governments that had ruled much of Africa in the colonial period. Whatever the reason, the results were, and remain in much of the continent, a disaster.

¹⁸ Ayittey, *Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa's Future*, xxiv.

¹⁹ Calderisi, *The Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn't Working*, 30.

²⁰ Ayittey, *Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa's Future*, 398.

One leader in the immediate post-colonial period who stood out for his integrity is Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika, which became Tanzania in 1964. He is still respected today, though his controversial economic policies failed, and his leadership became dictatorial. Perhaps his best-known economic policy was the formation of village farming collectives, called *Ujamaa*, which according to the British Broadcasting Corporation failed due to the lack of individual incentive.²¹ The *Ujamaa* program removed tens of thousands of subsistence farmers from their land and forced them into collectives on the Soviet model. According to Victoria Stoeger-Eising, Nyerere's forced collectivization contradicted his political thought as evidenced in his speeches and writing at the time:

... [T]here is a sharp break, perhaps even a flagrant contradiction, between Nyerere's thinking, on the one hand, and his actual political decisions on the other, especially concerning the implementation of the *Ujamaa* village programme. [Thirty three] cases of forced villagisation that took place after 1973 constitute a dark chapter in Nyerere's career.²²

Most observers agree that Nyerere had the best interests of his country at heart, and unlike most modern African leaders he lived modestly, didn't loot the national treasury, and stepped down from power voluntarily. Nevertheless, he instituted one-party rule after Zanzibar joined Tanganyika to become the modern country of Tanzania, and essentially ruled as a dictator. Thus, the most revered political leader in modern Africa, with the possible exception of Nelson Mandela, set himself up as a dictator, and forced tens of thousands of the poorest inhabitants of his country into soviet-style collectives

²¹ James Robbins, "Julius Nyerere: The conscience of Africa," BBC News, October 14, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/441768.stm> (accessed November 11, 2008)

²² Victoria Stoeger-Eising, "*Ujamaa* Revisited: Indigenous and European Influences in Nyerere's Social and Political Thought," *Africa*, 70 (2000): 134.

that failed. One can imagine that the leaders in post-colonial Africa that are not revered must be terrible indeed.

While Nyerere is still respected, a list of other post-colonial leaders in Africa is a rogue's gallery of thugs, buffoons, and international criminals. The list includes Charles Taylor and Samuel Doe of Liberia, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Sani Abacha of Nigeria, Idi Amin of Uganda, Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. The list goes on and on. Political leaders in Africa have failed the people of Africa for decades.

Aid Donors Failed to Account for Poor Policy Environments

Foreign aid to Africa, from all sources, has typically and naively failed to take into account the state of African corruption, leadership and governance. When aid donors have considered these issues, they have chosen to pressure the recipients to reform. "Can aid persuade bad governments to shape up? Probably not."²³ For years many governments have agreed to whatever donors required, and then ignored the requirements.²⁴ "From the 1970s and up to the twenty-first century, considerable effort and resources were invested in cajoling the ruling vampire elites to reform the African mafia state. But much of this drive fizzled with billions of dollars wasted."²⁵ Moreover, according to Dambisa Moyo, a Zambian economist with Goldman Sachs, aid actually encourages corruption.²⁶

Donor nations continued to push for reforms in recipient governments. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), major sources of African aid,

²³ Guest, *The Shackled Continent: Power, Corruption, and African Lives*, 158.

²⁴ Ibid., 158.

²⁵ Ayittey, *Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa's Future*, 23.

²⁶ Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa*, 54.

also pushed governments to make structural reforms as a condition for assistance.

Whether this has been, or ever can be, successful is doubtful. Roger C. Riddell undertook an extensive study of whether foreign aid has been effective. However, his study is handicapped because little analysis of foreign aid effectiveness is undertaken. “Only a small portion of the hundreds of thousands of aid projects and programs ... have ever been formally evaluated.”²⁷ Furthermore, most of the analysis has been done by the agencies that deliver the aid, not by third parties, which calls the validity of the analysis into question. Riddell notes that there are extensive areas where there is no data on whether aid is effective. He devotes an entire chapter in his book to the difficulty of accurately assessing aid effectiveness.²⁸ However, one can deduce that few aid programs were studied to determine if they were effective because the donor institutions had a bureaucratic tendency to ensure the aid did not end; bureaucrats’ jobs depended on the programs. Extensive impartial study of aid effectiveness could have led to aid projects being suspended or ended outright.

Calderisi argues persuasively for a change in the way foreign aid is delivered. He is not alone. According to Moyo, “...it is virtually impossible to draw on Africa’s aid-led development experience and argue that aid has worked. The broadest consequences of the aid model have been ruinous.”²⁹ There is a growing consensus that foreign aid delivery has been and remains in many cases fundamentally flawed, and doomed to fail. “An empirical study of foreign aid in Africa shows there was no significant correlation between aid and [economic] growth, but that government consumption rises by approximately three quarters of total aid receipts.”³⁰ In other words, most aid – the vast

²⁷ Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, 169.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 166.

²⁹ Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa*, 27.

³⁰ Ayittey, *Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa’s Future*, 155.

majority of aid – fuels the growth of bureaucracy. As has already been discussed, much of that bureaucracy is inept or thoroughly corrupt, or both.

When considering the amount of aid that leaves Africa in the form of stolen funds in combination with the aid that funds bureaucracy, the amount of aid that actually reaches the people of Africa must be insignificant. This seems to be borne out by the “facts on the ground” – declining health, declining life expectancy, and increasing infant mortality. The state of affairs in Africa is so bad it has led to the rather far-fetched idea that foreign aid was actually intended to keep Africa poor and dependent on the West.³¹ Though still a minority, a growing number of scholars of foreign aid suggest that all aid should stop. Edward Luttwak and Marion Tupy argue that point in a *Los Angeles Times* article timed to coincide with a recent G-8 summit where foreign aid was a major agenda item.³²

In her compelling book condemning foreign aid, Moyo, asserts that development aid is the cause of Africa’s economic woes. “The notion that aid can alleviate systemic poverty, and has done so, is a myth. Millions in Africa are poorer today because of aid; misery and poverty have not ended but have increased. Aid has been, and continues to be, an unmitigated political, economic, and humanitarian disaster for most parts of the developing world.”³³ Moyo suggests that Africa should be weaned from low interest loans or grants from international donors. According to her thesis, the most appropriate source of development financing is the international bond market.³⁴ A salient point in her

³¹ Guy Arnold, *Aid in Africa*, (London: Kogan Page Limited, 1979), 32.

³² Edward N. Luttwak and Marion L. Tupy, “The aid Africa can’t afford,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 8, 2008. <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-luttwaktupy8-2008jul08,0,3973792.story> (accessed December 27, 2008).

³³ Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid; Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa*, xix.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 78.

argument is that the more creditworthy a country's fiscal policies are, the lower the financing costs will be.

As early as 1985, Alan Rufus Waters of Wake Forest University, and a former Chief Economist for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), said that foreign aid contributed to, rather than alleviated, Africa's economic woes. "... [F]oreign aid is not the answer to Africa's troubles; in fact, aid may be a major culprit contributing to Africa's anguish. Financial, technical, and intellectual aid excuses and therefore helps to support and sustain those African domestic economic policies which are the root of Africa's problems."³⁵ More recently, Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, endorsed the idea that foreign aid should stop in an article responding to Moyo's book. "Some of Ms Moyo's prescriptions, such as ending all aid within five years, are aggressive. But I always thought this was the discussion we should be having: when to end aid and how best to end it."³⁶

While Luttwak, Moyo, Kagame and Waters call for an end to all aid to Africa, Calderisi asserts that only some forms of aid should end.³⁷ What they agree on, however, is that foreign aid to Africa has been flawed. This has begun to resonate in the agencies and institutions responsible for foreign aid delivery. A growing theme in the aid community, and increasingly, among Africans themselves, is that Africa's problems are the fault of Africans. Even those who disagree with that position generally agree that the solutions are mostly up to Africans. As USAID said in their recent study of foreign aid,

³⁵ Alan Rufus Waters, "In Africa's Anguish, Foreign Aid is a Culprit," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder # 447, August 7, 1985, <http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg447.cfm> (accessed November 10, 2008).

³⁶ Paul Kagame, "Africa has to find its own road to prosperity," FT.com, (May 7, 2009), <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d1218c8-3b35-11de-ba91-00144feabdc0.html>

³⁷ Calderisi, *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn't Working*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 14.

“No amount of resources transferred or infrastructure built can compensate for – or survive – bad governance.”³⁸ Calderisi, quoting Paul Theroux, said, “The tyrants love aid. Aid helps them stay in power.”³⁹

The idea of aid conditionality is not new. For years the IMF, the World Bank and other donor agencies have tried to reform Africa’s policies to help aid be more effective. What is new, or relatively new, is the idea that to some extent the recipients of aid should have already started to reform. The concept is the same as the axiomatic notion that military tacticians and strategists call “reinforcing success.” TSC planners can apply this concept in Africa.

Summary

Independent third parties have rarely evaluated foreign aid programs. However, when they have, analysis revealed an appalling failure of foreign assistance. Observers have closely examined the state of Africa in light of the billions and billions of aid for Africa since the wave of independence beginning in the 1950s. Their observations support the consensus that most aid has failed. However, lessons learned from the failed programs are now being applied to design new aid programs. The next chapter will examine why this new approach, which targets governments with favorable policy environments, has a reasonably good chance for success.

³⁸ USAID, *Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity*, July 8, 2003, http://www.usaid.gov/fani/Full_Report--Foreign_Aid_in_the_National_Interest.pdf (accessed November, 29, 2008).

³⁹ Calderisi, *The Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn’t Working*, 14.

V. A New Approach to Foreign Aid

Study after study done by the World Bank during the 1990s connected poverty reduction and sustainable development with a good policy environment – meaning a well-governed country.¹

Elizabeth Spiro Clark

A steady outflow of ... World Bank studies ... argued that aid does work, particularly when provided to recipients who are committed to using it well, supported by policies and institutions which facilitate its efficient use.²

Roger C. Riddell

Countries must have effective governments as well as a decisive stake in how aid is used for there to be a reasonable chance the assistance will be effective. To understand whether aid will work when based on the capacity of a government to use the aid effectively, this paper will examine the state of democracy in Africa. There is a great deal of debate within the United States and internationally about whether the United States is naive to assert that democracy should be the standard for good governance. However, the U.N. Millennium Development goals make the same assertion.³ The debate also overlooks that the U.S. National Security Strategy makes a careful distinction between democracy, and institutions that foster democracy. It is the official policy of the United States to build ... “the infrastructure of democracy.”⁴ Inherent in that idea is an important nuance. The policy allows that many countries that remain undemocratic can be shaped in a positive way by helping to foster the institutions that support democracy. Militaries that uphold the rule of law and that are subordinate to legitimate constitutional governments are just such institutions.

¹ Elizabeth Spiro Clark, “The Millennium Challenge Account: Spur to Democracy” *Foreign Service Journal*, (April 2005): 32.

² Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, 40.

³ United Nations General Assembly, *Road Map Towards Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration*, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a56326.pdf> (accessed December 29, 2008).

⁴ White House, *National Security Strategy*, Washington DC, March 2006, 31.

This chapter will also examine how the concept of reinforcing success by using objective measures of a country's capacity to use aid effectively is an appropriate mechanism to ensure assistance works. Several examples of how this is done in foreign assistance programs will be covered, with emphasis on the MCC eligibility criteria. This framework would be easy to incorporate into AFRICOM's planning process.

The Growth of Freedom in Africa

The fall of the Berlin wall had a profound effect all over the world. Africa was no exception. "In Africa ... citizens took to the streets of the capital cities in some fourteen African countries to express discontent with economic hardship and political repression and to demand democratic reform."⁵ Perhaps the most dramatic expression of this was in Benin, where democracy demonstrators essentially overthrew the military government of Mathieu Kerekou in what has been described as a peaceful "*civilian coup d'état*."⁶ The events in Benin, which occurred around the same time that South Africa released Nelson Mandela from prison, were an inspiration to Africans and demonstrated that it was possible to transition to democracy without violence.

After an essentially complete collapse of the economy in Benin, Kerekou called a national assembly to address the country's problems, which included a bankrupt government, failure and disintegration of the national banking system, and massive unemployment.⁷ The leaders invited to participate in the assembly took it upon themselves to design a new democratic form of government. Remarkably, the military

⁵ Onwumechili, *African Democratization and Military Coups*, 21.

⁶ Michael Chege, "Democratic Governance in Africa at the Start of the Twenty-first Century: Lessons and Experience," *The Fate of Africa's Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions*, ed. Leonardo Villalon and Peter VonDoepp, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 268.

⁷ Bruce A. Magnusson, "Democratic Legitimacy in Benin: Institutions and Identity in a Regional Context" *The Fate of Africa's Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions*, ed. Leonardo Villalon and Peter VonDoepp, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 82.

chose to remain on the sidelines even though the assembly discussions were broadcast to the whole country over the radio. Political scientist Bruce Magnusson lists the conditions in Benin at the time of the turn to democracy that would have suggested the failure of Benin's democratic experience: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita less than \$500, a small middle class, no previous experience with democracy, historically elevated levels of ethno-regional tension and inequality, and dependence on less democratic Nigeria.⁸ Nevertheless, Benin is still democratic today and has had relatively peaceful transfers of power to opposition parties several times, most recently in 2006.

Even in some of the outstanding failures of democratic experiments in Africa, there have been "... examples of formidable determination by opposition groups."⁹ According to Freedom House, in 1972 only 11 states had any semblance of political freedom. In 2003, 32 countries were considered free or partly free. Looked at another way this point is even more illuminating. In 1989, three million citizens of African countries could be considered free. In 2003, the number had reached 100.8 million free or partly free citizens.¹⁰ Certainly some of this change is fragile – as evidenced by the fact that many are not labeled fully free. The fragility of African democracy has spawned a growing literature predicting the demise of democracy. "But ... in all fairness, the death of democratic governments in Africa has been vastly exaggerated."¹¹

The majority of African states still have immature democracies. The process of consolidating, or maturing, democracy is well underway in South Africa, Botswana,

⁸ Ibid., 77.

⁹ Chege, "Democratic Governance in Africa at the Start of the Twenty-first Century: Lessons and Experience," 272.

¹⁰ Ibid., 271.

¹¹ Ibid., 267.

Tanzania, Kenya, Senegal, Benin, Ghana, Mali, Namibia, Malawi, and Zambia.¹²

However, there are several countries that went from elections to civil war or coups, or both. They include Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Rwanda, and Burundi.¹³ The problem continues today. Since research on this paper began, Guinea fell to a military junta, led by Moussa Dadis Camara, upon the death of long-time Guinean strongman, General Lansana Conte.¹⁴ According to some political scientists, there are also countries that have elected governments, but remain essentially autocratic. These include Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Togo, among others.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the difference in the number of Africans who now live in democracies is quite significant and bodes well for the success of foreign aid as well as the greater success of Africa in general. For example, the AU will not seat a new member that comes to power through unconstitutional means.¹⁶ The AU barred Guinea and Mauritania, from a recent summit in the aftermath of military overthrows of the governments in both countries.¹⁷

Ayittey argues extensively that traditional African society before (and during) the colonial period practiced participatory forms of democracy. Villages were run by chiefs who relied heavily on the input of councils who in turn tried to gain consensus on

¹² Anthony Lake and Christine Todd Whitman, "U.S Interest in Democracy and Human Rights Promotion," *Beyond Humanitarianism: What You Need to Know and Why It Matters*, Eds. Princeton N. Lyman, and Patricia Dorf, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2007), 7.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁴ Rukmini Callimachi, "Army Coup in Guinea Has a Familiar Ring," *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 11, 2009, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/11/MN2M152SH6.DTL> (accessed February 14, 2009).

¹⁵ Lake and Todd Whitman, "U.S Interest in Democracy and Human Rights Promotion," 7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, xi.

¹⁷ Peter Heinlein, "AU bars Mauritania, Guinea; Condemns Pending ICC Warrant for Bashir," *Voice of America*, January 29, 2009, <http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-01-29-voa26.cfm> (accessed January 31, 2009).

important decisions. Onwumechili also argues that Africa has a history of participatory democracy. He emphatically rejects the idea that Africa has an “authoritarian personality.”¹⁸ Given the rapid rise of democracy in Africa – from 3 million free to over 100 million free or partly free in fewer than 15 years - it is abundantly clear that Africa is very fertile for the spread of democracy.

The rise of freedom and democracy in Africa leads one back to the earlier point about how to deliver aid to Africans. The responsibility for success – or failure – rests with Africans. “...Africa is now responsible for most of its own problems and ... outsiders can help only if they are more direct and demanding in their relations with the continent.”¹⁹

Foreign Aid That Reinforces Success Works Best

The idea that donor countries must be more demanding with countries is different from the previous form of conditionality that the IMF and the World Bank used in Africa – using aid as bribes to encourage economic or governmental reforms. What Calderisi and others are now calling for is a much more hard-nosed notion that no aid should flow to countries that have not already begun the necessary reforms of their own accord. Furthermore, there is a growing commitment among donors and others to insist that aid stop when governments regress. Calderisi takes that idea even further by suggesting that any country that jails a journalist for criticizing the government should immediately be cut off from further aid.²⁰ This thesis does not embrace that particular element of Calderisi’s argument; however, it demonstrates the level of frustration in the aid community and the growing call for major changes in the way aid is delivered in Africa.

¹⁸ Onwumechili, *African Democratization and Military Coups*, 1.

¹⁹ Calderisi, *The Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn’t Working*, 7.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

There is now a refreshing and healthy agreement among many Africans that donor countries should direct aid to countries that demonstrate that they deserve it through their political and economic policies. The World Bank has concluded that aid should be directed to countries with high Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scores. CPIA scores, which the World Bank developed to ensure better targeting of aid, take into account 20 characteristics related to macro-economic and development policy, economic and public sector management, and institutional capacity and competence.²¹ That aid works best in countries that function well seems axiomatic. Nevertheless, there is a deep temptation to deliver more aid to failed or failing countries. After all, it is in those countries where the need is greatest and where there is likely to be the most misery and human suffering. Yet, “forty years of foreign aid have established one unsurprising fact; ... successful countries are those that have chosen the right policies for their own reasons and see foreign aid as a complement to their own efforts rather than as a bribe for undertaking difficult reforms.”²²

During the 80s and 90s, the World Bank and the IMF required promises of “structural reforms” of governments’ fiscal and monetary policies as a prerequisite for aid. However, many countries simply made the required promises to reform, and then proceeded to ignore their promises after donor institutions delivered assistance. The lessons learned in this period made it clear that foreign aid works best when the governments that receive it are well along in reforming their own government and economy. Additionally, countries that are committed to the aid’s intended purpose use it

²¹ Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, 233.

²² Calderisi, *The Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn’t Working*, 7.

more wisely. Both of these lessons are addressed in the design of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).

The United Nations General Assembly published the roadmap toward the implementation of the Millennium Declaration on September 6, 2001. This declaration expressed the world's commitment to improve lives in some of the poorest areas of the world. Though the UN did not intend that the goals be directed solely at Africa, it did single out Africa for special attention. Language in the Declaration called for, among other things, the consolidation of democracy in Africa, increased foreign direct investment, and helping Africa improve capacity to fight the threat of HIV/AIDS.²³ Though much of the Millennium Declaration is anathema to free markets, there is clearly language that resonated with the United States and with the Bush Administration. The call for consolidating democracy in Africa fit neatly with the evolving foreign policy goals of the United States, which called for the support of democratic institutions, as expressed in the National Security Strategy. The Declaration's call for assistance with fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa found expression in President Bush's call for a massive multi-billion dollar program to eradicate AIDS in Africa (and also Haiti) in his 2003 State of the Union Message. The program called for \$15 billion over five years to target AIDS in "... Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia."²⁴ Aspects of the program also found voice in the creation of the MCC, which President Bush created to improve the effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid delivery.

²³ United Nations Millennium Declaration, *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 55/2*, <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm> (accessed December 7, 2008).

²⁴ White House, "Key Initiatives of the President's State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003," <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-14.html> (accessed December 7, 2008).

The United States designed the MCC to reinforce success by delivering aid to countries with the capacity to use assistance wisely. USAID reports that this is “... based on the proposition that countries ruling justly, investing in their people, and encouraging economic freedom will receive more U.S. Aid.”²⁵ First, countries are qualified based on per capita gross national income (GNI); countries that do not need assistance are disqualified. More countries are disqualified because of their support of terrorism or their involvement in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.

Countries that are not disqualified for the reasons cited above are considered for aid based on objective measures in three broad areas, which make up the eligibility criteria – ruling justly, investing in people, and encouraging economic freedom. MCC produces none of the measurements within the three criteria, thereby protecting the objectivity of the data used to determine where aid should flow. The criteria for ruling justly include metrics for: 1) civil liberties (Freedom House), 2) political rights (Freedom House), 3) voice and accountability (World Bank Institute), 4) government effectiveness (World Bank Institute), 5) rule of law (World Bank Institute), and, 6) control of corruption (World Bank Institute). The criteria for investing in people include metrics for: 1) immunization rates (World Health Organization), 2) public expenditure on health (World Health Organization), 3) girls’ primary education completion rate (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)), 4) public expenditure on primary education (UNESCO, and national sources), and, 5) natural resource management (Center for International Earth Science Information Network and Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy). The last criteria, encouraging economic

²⁵ USAID, *Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity*, July 8, 2003, http://www.usaid.gov/fani/Full_Report--Foreign_Aid_in_the_National_Interest.pdf (accessed November, 29, 2008), ii.

freedom, include objective measures for these areas: 1) business start-up (International Finance Corporation (IFC)), 2) land rights and access (International Fund for Agricultural Development and IFC), 3) trade policy (Heritage Foundation), 4) inflation (IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO)), and, 5) fiscal policy (IMF country reports, national sources, and IMF WEO).²⁶

The MCC develops a scorecard for eligible countries using the objective measures outlined above.²⁷ For obvious reasons, the metric for control of corruption is particularly important to the MCC. The willingness to suspend or terminate aid is an important element in ensuring that aid is effective. The MCC spells out the circumstances and the process that will be used to determine if aid should be suspended. When eligibility criteria scores fall below acceptable limits, the MCC generally requires countries to develop a plan to improve. Continued failure to improve will result in aid suspension or termination.²⁸

The MCC has developed and refined the criteria they use to determine eligibility using input from aid experts and stakeholders. The most recent revisions were made in 2007. According to a report published in 2007, they used the following to decide on new criteria:

[They] are developed by an independent third party; utilize objective and high quality data that rely upon an analytically rigorous methodology; are publicly available; have broad country coverage; are comparable across countries; have a clear theoretical or empirical link to economic growth and poverty reduction; are

²⁶ Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Selection Indicators Fact Sheet," <http://www.mcc.gov/selection/indicators/index.php> (accessed November 7, 2008).

²⁷ Millennium Challenge Corporation, "2008 Scorebook," <http://www.mcc.gov/documents/mcc-2008-scorebook.pdf> (accessed October 8, 2008).

²⁸ Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Selection Criteria," <http://www.mcc.gov/selection/index.php> [accessed March 29, 2009].

policy linked (i.e., measure factors that governments can influence within a two to three year horizon); and have broad consistency in results from year to year.²⁹

Eligible countries must have scores that are, “... above the median in relation to its peers on at least half the indicators in the ruling justly and economic freedom categories, above the median on at least three of the five indicators in the investing in people category, and above the median on the control of corruption indicator.”³⁰ The scoring for the inflation indicator is not relative; countries must have an inflation rate below 15 percent.³¹ For sound geopolitical reasons the MCC can make exceptions and sometimes does. For example, Liberia does not merit aid according to MCC criteria.³² However, MCC selected Liberia for threshold program assistance, the precursor for significant MCC aid.³³ The United States has been helping Liberia for years through support to the UN mission in Liberia. It makes sense to try to include Liberia in MCC assistance programs.

Approaching foreign aid in this new way runs counter to traditional ideas about which countries should receive aid. Targeting countries that have reasonably good governance, decent educational systems, and generally effective control of corruption rules out providing aid to many countries in the most need of help. Inherent in this approach is a cold calculus that is alien to many in the aid business. Many countries view the United States as essentially a bottomless well of resources for countries in need and have argued that applying conditional aid is unnecessary given the vast resources of the

²⁹ Millennium Challenge Corporation: “Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the eligibility of candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account in Fiscal Year 2008,” <http://www.mcc.gov/documents/mcc-report-fy08-criteria%20and%20methodology.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2009), 1-2.

³⁰ Ibid., 6.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Millennium Challenge Corporation Country Scorecards and Scorebook, <http://www.mcc.gov/selection/scorecards/index-2008.php> (accessed March 29, 2009).

³³ Millennium Challenge Corporation, Countries and Country Tools, <http://www.mcc.gov/countries/index.php> (accessed March 29, 2009).

United States. Nevertheless, the approach of the MCC is well thought out, meshes nicely with more and more studies concerning how to make foreign aid effective, and enhances and strengthens the idea that Africans are responsible and accountable for their own destinies.

As mentioned above, MCC rules out countries that have significant resources of their own. The cut-off for eligibility based on per capita GNI is \$3,705. This level parallels criteria that the international aid community uses for assistance eligibility. The MCC says a country must meet one of the following criteria:

Has a per capita income equal to or less than the historical ceiling of the International Development Association eligibility for the fiscal year involved (or \$1,785 gross national income (GNI) per capita for FY 2009) ...;

or

Is classified as a lower-middle income country in the then most recent edition of the World Development Report for Reconstruction and Development published by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and has an income greater than the historical ceiling for International Development Association eligibility for the fiscal year involved (or \$1,786 to \$3,705 GNI per capita for FY 2009) ...”³⁴

There are other limitations that the MCC imposes. The MCC will not work with countries that are ineligible to receive economic assistance according to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.³⁵ Therefore the selection of countries is a relatively simple, but intelligent, process of determining whether a country needs assistance and whether a country is likely to use the assistance well, based on objectively measurable criteria. An overarching filter is applied based on current legal prohibitions to ensure

³⁴ Millennium Challenge Corporation, Selection Criteria; <http://www.mcc.gov/selection/step01-identify.php> (accessed December 29, 2008).

³⁵ Ibid.

countries such as state sponsors of terrorism do not get foreign aid from the United States.

The United States Coast Guard International Port Security Program developed a much smaller plan to deliver foreign assistance using a similar approach. The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 (Public Law 107–295—NOV. 25, 2002) tasks the Coast Guard with assessing security in international seaports that have direct trade ties to U.S. ports.³⁶ Aspects of the MTSA call for the Coast Guard to assist countries with improving their port security capacity. With severely limited resources, the Coast Guard assesses seaport security in 150 countries. Recognizing the Coast Guard’s inability to deliver assistance in many countries, the program managers set out to prioritize countries for assistance based on their capacity to make best use of the aid along with several other planning factors. With help from Booz Allen Hamilton, the Coast Guard first identified the countries that presented the most threat potential to the United States. Then they developed a mechanism for identifying countries most in need of help. Once the Coast Guard completed this part of the effort, they developed what they call the “responsiveness model,” which identifies countries most likely to benefit from the help the Coast Guard or other entities can provide.³⁷ Like the MCC eligibility criteria, the Coast Guard responsiveness model assumes that some countries are so corrupt, or their governments are so inept or unstable, that those governments would waste whatever assistance the Coast Guard provided. The criteria the Coast Guard used in their responsiveness model are very similar to the MCC criteria, overlapping in some areas.

³⁶ Maritime transportation Security Act of 2002, (Public Law 107–295—NOV. 25, 2002) http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ295.107.pdf (accessed December 7, 2008).

³⁷ “Promoting Global Security & Development Through Foreign Port Security Capacity Building,” An Unpublished U.S. Coast Guard Briefing for Capacity Building Planners, December 8, 2008.

However, the Coast Guard opted to develop unique criteria because their program is narrowly focused on port security.

This approach to foreign aid is not without its critics. Moyo questions why countries that are functioning well need aid at all.³⁸ Her argument that African countries should access international bond markets for development is compelling. In order to tap capital markets, countries should first get international debt rating agencies to develop an objective measure of the risk involved. The quantified risk, or bond rating, would then determine the terms, or cost, of development financing.³⁹ Despite the logic of her point, it is not directly applicable to TSC because military aid is technical assistance, not development aid. The intended result is increased efficiency and professionalism of targeted African militaries, not economic growth. Furthermore, she is one voice. Most have not rejected this new approach, though it is clear the jury is still out because it is so new. Nevertheless, there is an important correlation between accessing international debt markets and using eligibility criteria as a precondition for assistance; both approaches attempt to objectively quantify risk.

Summary

There is increasing evidence and a growing consensus that foreign aid should be applied to countries that have reasonably stable and effective governments and that view foreign aid as a complement to existing programs or policies. The growth of democracy and the increase in freedom discussed in this chapter improve the environment for aid delivery. Democratic institutions and the freedom of African citizens contribute to improved capacity of some governments to effectively use assistance. Taking this into

³⁸ Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa.*, 40.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 78.

account, international donors, including the World Bank, are beginning to rely on objective measures of a country's capacity to use assistance effectively. This quantification of risk reduces the possibility that aid will be wasted. By including MCC eligibility criteria with other geopolitical factors when planning TSC, AFRICOM can potentially avoid some of the pitfalls discussed above.

VI. Proposed Taxonomy for Theater Security Cooperation in Africa

Security cooperation is the means by which Department of Defense (DOD) encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with us to achieve strategic objectives. Security cooperation consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve mutual interests and build defense partnerships.¹

Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning.

TSC is a complex mixture of programs with funding from various federal departments, including DOD, Department of State, and even the Department of Justice. There is a confusing array of legal authorities for TSC, in addition to statutory restrictions on where TSC can be delivered. Thus, as discussed in the introduction, AFRICOM only has discretion over some military assistance.

TSC can be understood as military foreign aid, no matter which federal entity funds it. According to the Joint Advanced Warfighting School Operational Art and Campaigning Primer, TSC can be broadly defined using eight categories of assistance.² One of the categories, international defense technology collaboration, is not applicable in Africa; no African country possesses the industrial or technological capacity to collaborate on military technology projects. Therefore, this will not be considered when discussing TSC in Africa. The other categories of TSC have relevance in Africa and will be considered here.

The general categories are as follows: 1) operational access and global freedom of action, 2) operational capacity and capability building, 3) interoperability with U.S. forces/support to U.S. capabilities, 4) intelligence and information sharing, 5) assurance and regional confidence building, 6) defense/security sector reform, and, 7) international

¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning, Washington, December 26, 2006, I-3.

² *Operational Art and Campaigning Primer AY 09-10; Joint Operation Planning Process* (Norfolk, VA: Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2009), 128.

suasion and cooperation.³ While any framework of tailoring and prioritizing discretionary TSC in Africa must be flexible and adaptable, AFRICOM planners, as part of the effort to plan TSC, should categorize African countries into five groups. The most straightforward and easy grouping consists of countries with which AFRICOM should not engage at all. Several clearly fit in this category, such as Sudan, which the State Department lists as a state sponsor of terrorism.⁴ Countries such as Somalia and Zimbabwe that are failed or failing can also be included. If any government, with which AFRICOM does have a relationship, is overthrown in a coup, it should be moved into this category and all engagement should cease. AFRICOM planners should divide the remaining countries into four groups and use this taxonomy to plan TSC.

The first group includes those countries that meet MCC eligibility requirements and are additionally a strategic priority for the United States for geopolitical or energy security reasons. These countries should be the top priority for AFRICOM planners. The full panoply of TSC activities described above should be focused in those countries, including: visits from AFRICOM and DOD flag officers and senior officials; U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard ship visits; joint exercises in the host countries and in the U.S; military resident and exportable training to enhance the capability and professionalism of the military in those countries; and education opportunities, such as service academy scholarships and attendance at the various staff colleges for mid-grade officers, and the various war colleges for senior officers. To the extent that funds are limited, these countries should receive assistance first.

³ Ibid., 128.

⁴ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counter terrorism, *State Sponsors of Terrorism*, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm> (accessed March 29, 2009).

The second group includes those countries that may not be a strategic priority for the U.S. but are eligible for MCC assistance. All categories of TSC should be applied in these countries, including the activities described above. However, the priority should be slightly lower than the category above when funding is limited.

The next general category includes those countries that fail to meet MCC eligibility requirements, but are vital to U.S. strategic interests or where the geopolitical ramifications of not engaging them are too costly. In most of these countries, engagement is mandated. Nevertheless, MCC eligibility should inform how AFRICOM engages these countries. TSC in this group of countries should be limited to defense/security sector reform and to activities that enhance access and global freedom of action. Reforming the defense and security establishment in these countries should be the primary focus of AFRICOM. The effort to reform the militaries in these countries should involve education. According to Guest, when governments are incompetent, aid should take the form of advice.⁵

The fourth category includes countries that do not meet MCC eligibility requirements and are not strategically important to the United States. If these countries receive any assistance, it should be limited to engagement that enables access and freedom of action in the event of a contingency operation. Militaries in those countries should not receive any assistance that improves or enhances their capabilities. Funding for TSC in these countries should be the lowest priority for AFRICOM's discretionary efforts.

The taxonomy suggested above does not fit for all countries in Africa. For example, there are several countries in Africa that have GNI that exceeds the MCC

⁵ Guest, *The Shackled Continent; Power Corruption, and African Lives*, 160.

maximum. These include South Africa, Namibia, Algeria, Tunisia, and Gabon.

However, nothing prevents AFRICOM from analyzing these more prosperous countries using the MCC eligibility criteria because the metrics that MCC uses are publicly available.

To illustrate how the MCC criteria could be used to plan TSC in Africa, some notional examples will be developed. Kenya, Benin, Nigeria and Guinea, which are representative of the four categories proposed here, will be examined. To further illustrate the point, Figure 1 graphically depicts the basic taxonomy for enhancing the effectiveness of African TSC.




Figure 1: Taxonomy for Prioritizing TSC

Kenya: Category I

Kenya has a long-standing security relationship with the West and with the United States that dates from a 1980 agreement that gave the U.S. permission to use two air

bases and the port facility in Mombasa for logistical purposes.⁶ Kenya is also a key partner in the U.S. War on Terror because it borders the Sudan and Somalia. There is tension between the Muslim and Christian communities in Kenya, and active Islamist cells exist there, as evidenced by two major terror attacks – the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi in 1998, and a bombing of an Israeli tourist site in Mombasa in 2002.⁷ Kenya's military has never ruled the country and the government has never been overthrown in a coup. However, there was one failed coup attempt in 1982.⁸

Kenya has had several democratic transfers of power since President Daniel Arap Moi stepped down from power in 2002. Unfortunately, recent elections were marred by terrible post-election violence.⁹ Opposition candidate Raila Odinga, claimed that the election results were rigged, which resulted in protracted negotiations about power sharing between Odinga and the winner in the polls, Mwai Kibaki. The final resolution of the dispute resulted in a coalition government with both parties splitting power.¹⁰ Nevertheless, Kenya is beginning to consolidate democratic institutions. This consolidation is important to the United States and bodes well for a strengthening military relationship between the United States and Kenya.

Kenya qualifies for MCC assistance, despite a score in the control of corruption metric that is below the median. The board of directors of MCC has latitude to consider countries even if they fall short of the stated score minimums. With the exception of the corruption score, Kenya, fares very well when compared to other African countries.

⁶ Jane's Sentinel: *Country Risk Assessments: Central Africa*, (Surrey, United Kingdom: Jane's Information Group, Limited, 2008), 409.

⁷ Ibid., 409.

⁸ Ibid., 409-410.

⁹ Stephanie McCrummen, Kenyan Rivals Sign Power Sharing Agreement, *The Washington Post*, February 29, 2008. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/28/AR2008022801040.html> (accessed February 16, 2009).

¹⁰ Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa*, 33.

Other shortcomings include rule of law, immunization rates and health expenditures, and fiscal policy.¹¹ The corruption problem bears close watching. According to Jane's, There is a "... legacy of corruption in Kenya" that has influenced donors over the years.¹² Recent political scandals involved corruption. One involved cabinet ministers that were forced to resign when they were implicated in a plot to bilk payments for invoices from a non-existent company called Anglo Leasing.¹³ Not surprisingly, the MCC compact with Kenya, which, like Liberia's, is a threshold program agreement, is focused on reducing the endemic corruption in Kenya. The compact agreement provides for approximately \$12 million in support for anti-corruption activities.¹⁴

Kenya's military is very capable, which is probably why Kenya is a major contributor to UN peacekeeping and also part of the AU stand-by force.¹⁵ Therefore, that capability should be a focus area for U.S. military assistance. The U.S. Army could teach military policing skills to enhance Kenya's ability to serve on peacekeeping missions. Unlike Benin, discussed below, Kenya probably needs a robust, overtly expeditionary armed force because of the threats they face, including a border dispute with Sudan in an oil-rich region.¹⁶ The Kenyan Navy "...is the best equipped force on the East African coast and benefits from regular training exercises with the UK, US, French Indian Ocean Navy, and the South African Navy."¹⁷ The air force is similarly well regarded, and

¹¹ Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Country Scorecards and Scorebook, Scorecards for Fiscal Year 2009 Candidate Countries," <http://www.mcc.gov/selection/scorecards/index-2009.php> (accessed February 16, 2009).

¹² Jane's Sentinel: *Country Risk Assessments: Central Africa*, 409.

¹³ Ibid., 409.

¹⁴ Millennium Challenge Corporation, Threshold Quarterly Status Report, Kenya Program Summary," <http://www.mcc.gov/documents/qsr-kenya.pdf> (accessed February 16, 2009).

¹⁵ Jane's Sentinel: *Country Risk Assessments: Central Africa*, 450.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 458.

consists of a conglomeration of American and European equipment.¹⁸ They have 10 F5E fighters; however, only 5 of them were operational in 2007.¹⁹ The Kenyan Navy is a potential ally in the current effort to control piracy off the Horn of Africa. Training available from the U.S. Coast Guard in Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) would enhance Kenya's ability to assist the U.S. with combating piracy. Efforts to help Kenya improve their maintenance capability for their ships and aircraft would be well-spent. Both the navy and air force, like other militaries in Africa, have suffered from maintenance problems.

The Kenyan military stands out from other African militaries for its adherence to the principle of military subordination to civilian control. In order to enhance this strength, the full suite of officer education that the U.S. can offer through the National Defense University system should be available to Kenyan officers. Likewise, exportable or resident courses in the U.S. should be available for Kenyan enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers. Because so much of the equipment maintenance skills, mentioned as a shortcoming above, are skills that reside in the enlisted and non-commissioned officer ranks, these sorts of courses should be a focus for this group of military personnel.

In summary, Kenya should be a top priority for discretionary TSC because of its acceptable MCC scores and because it is a key strategic partner in the region. However, Kenya's eligibility for MCC assistance is by exception because of the problem with corruption. Should Kenya fail to reduce corruption, AFRICOM should consider curtailing or redesigning the program of TSC to complement MCC's anti-corruption

¹⁸ Ibid., 455.

¹⁹ Ibid.

efforts. The program of assistance for Kenya should embrace the full range of TSC. However, the history of terrorism in Kenya, and its proximity to Sudan and Somalia make counterterrorism assistance paramount. Other countries that fit in this category include: Senegal, Mali, and Burkina Faso, which are important partners in Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara effort. This program is a Department of State led, interagency effort to defeat Islamist terrorism in the Maghreb and the Trans Sahara region.²⁰

Benin: Category II

Benin is a small West African country that does not have significant oil or mineral resources, and currently does not have any significant problems with terrorism. Nor does Benin possess vital raw materials or energy resources. However, Benin is important because it is just beginning to consolidate democratic institutions.

In 1990, the people of Benin peacefully deposed Mathieu Kerekou, the unelected president of Benin. Since then Benin has been democratic, with several peaceful transitions of power. Furthermore, Benin is situated on the Gulf of Guinea, which, because of all the oil reserves in the area, is very important to the United States for energy security. Having a stable, prosperous, democratic ally in the region will benefit the U.S. However, as mentioned above, the geopolitical reasons for engaging Benin are not why AFRICOM planners should make Benin a top priority for TSC. Rather, AFRICOM should embrace Benin to reinforce success, to help Benin develop mature democratic institutions that are secured by a dedicated, professional military.

²⁰ United States Africa Command, Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara, program overview, <http://www.africom.mil/oef-ts.asp> (accessed February 16, 2009).

Benin is eligible for Millennium Challenge grants and in fact has worked with the MCC to develop a plan for \$307 million in U.S. assistance. Benin's current eligibility scores are favorable in 10 of 17 specific areas, with most of the identified problems in the general category of Investing in People. Benin has positive scores in all of the categories related to ruling justly and three shortcomings in the economic freedom category. The most recent MCC report takes note of a decline in several scores. In fact, Benin would have been ineligible had they scored at that level in 2004, when the MCC first identified them as a candidate country. Nevertheless, the MCC has a process used to determine whether aid should be suspended when a country's performance declines. The MCC Board of Directors has determined that Benin is eligible to continue receiving aid, provided improvements to the low scores are forthcoming.²¹

The precarious nature of Benin's eligibility is instructive and demonstrates a particular strength of the MCC approach. The willingness to suspend aid, or end it outright, is a powerful motivational tool, when, as is the case in Benin, roughly \$300 million of assistance is at stake. AFRICOM should be prepared to follow suit and suspend or significantly alter the form of TSC if MCC finds that Benin does not make the necessary reforms to raise scores in the lagging categories.

The military forces in Benin are small, consisting of an army, air force and a navy totaling approximately 5,000 personnel.²² The army has a conglomeration of French, Russian, Belgian and American military equipment that is mostly outdated. The Navy has three small patrol craft, with "... no real offshore capability to patrol the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) against illegal fishing."²³ The air force, with approximately 180

²¹ Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Report on the Selection of Eligible Countries for Fiscal Year 2008," <http://www.mcc.gov/documents/cn-121307-eligiblecountries.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2009).

²² Jane's Sentinel; *Country Risk Assessments, West Africa*, 34.

²³ *Ibid.*, 39.

personnel is primarily used for “... tactical transport of personnel and equipment within Benin.”²⁴

Prior to what has been called the civilian coup of Kerekou in 1990, the military in Benin staged a number of *coups d'état*.²⁵ While it is reasonable to assume that the military is no longer in the habit of overthrowing elected governments because it has been so many years since the peaceful transition to civilian rule, it is nevertheless a concern in any fragile democracy in Africa. Under the rubric of reforming the defense and security sector, the United States should establish a regular program of military training and education for the officer corps in Benin that instills the benefits of the rule of law and that teaches the benefits of subordination of the military to civilian authority. Senior officers should be selected to attend seminars offered through the National Defense University's Africa Institute, and the war colleges. Furthermore, promising young men and women should be selected for U.S. service academy scholarships, including the Coast Guard Academy.

Benin is an excellent candidate for a partnership program with a state National Guard unit under the auspices of the National Guard State Partnership Program. Like many militaries in Africa, Benin's army is more like a National Guard than it is to an expeditionary force such as the U.S. Army or the U.S. Marine Corps. A designated National Guard partner unit could conduct regular training exercises and training exchanges to enhance Benin's military professionalism and effectiveness. The training and exercises should promote all of the remaining categories of TSC discussed in the introduction to this chapter.

²⁴ Ibid., 38.

²⁵ Edgerton, *Africa's Armies: From Honor to Infamy: A history from 1791 to the Present*, 141.

AFRICOM planners should consider developing peacekeeping skills with armies throughout Africa. Benin is no exception. Benin's armed forces are an outstanding potential resource for UN peacekeeping missions. Therefore, US training assistance could also focus on developing the skills necessary for effective peacekeeping. Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) could receive military police training from the U.S. Army.

The large scale theft of oil in Nigeria has ripple effects in West Africa. Benin, which borders Nigeria on the west, is not immune from the problems this has caused in West Africa. Smuggling oil and refined products from Nigeria into Benin has been a perennial problem that undermines legitimate businesses in Benin, feeds corruption, and deprives the government of revenue. Some of this smuggling almost certainly is conducted by sea and presents a problem for Benin's Navy, which is essentially a coast guard. Planners at AFRICOM should take this into account when arranging training and education for Benin's Navy. The U.S. Coast Guard has an exportable training capability resident in the International Training Branch of Training Center Yorktown located in Virginia. Some of the exportable courses are designed to address the problems identified here and they can be delivered almost anywhere in the world. There are also existing resident courses in these subjects that are open to international students.

Benin, like many African countries, has excellent fisheries resources, but very little capacity to protect their EEZ. First, they need assistance designing the legal regime that would enable them to protect their coastal waters. The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) can assist Benin in this area. The U.S. Coast Guard has developed a Model Maritime Code, which is a template for the legal framework needed for maritime law enforcement. A lawyer assigned to DIILS can help the

government of Benin design an appropriate legal framework using the Model Maritime Code. Next, they need the capability to patrol their coastal waters and conduct maritime law enforcement. The U.S. Coast Guard can train their Navy in Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) techniques and in the particular aspects of MLE that apply to offshore fisheries enforcement and counter smuggling operations. The U.S. Coast Guard also has well-developed courses based in Yorktown, and courses that can be exported internationally, that address this area.

In summary, TSC in Benin should be a priority because of Benin's MCC relatively high scores. However, AFRICOM should carefully follow Benin's efforts to improve their performance in the MCC performance indicators that are lagging. Should MCC suspend or terminate aid, AFRICOM should also consider doing the same. The nature of the assistance for Benin should cover all the general categories of TSC except defense technology collaboration. The specific areas of development should focus on building Benin's capability as a potential resource for UN peacekeeping and building Benin's capability to conduct maritime and fisheries law enforcement activities in their EEZ. Benin is representative of several other countries, which are eligible for MCC assistance, but are not strategically vital to the U.S. when examined through the lens of the Global War on Terror or energy security. These countries include Cape Verde, Mauritius, Madagascar, Ghana, Zambia, and Botswana.

Nigeria: Category III

Nigeria is vital to the US because it supplies significant crude oil to U.S. and world markets, it is a struggling democracy, and it is the most populous country in Africa with roughly 140 million citizens. Unfortunately, Nigeria, while qualifying for MCC assistance based on per capita income, fails to meet eligibility requirements in the three

broad categories the MCC examines to determine if a country has the capacity, or responsiveness to make good use of assistance. This paper will suggest a way forward for Nigeria that could be replicated in other countries that also fail to meet eligibility requirements, but logically should be assisted for geopolitical reasons.

Nigeria, already the source of 15% of U.S. crude oil supplies, is destined to grow in importance as a source of crude oil for the reasons discussed in the introduction of this paper: Nigerian oil is “light and sweet” and can be moved to markets in the West without moving through any strategic choke points. Nigeria is also a critical front in the War on Terror because of tense religious fault lines between the Muslim North of Nigeria and the predominantly Christian South. Nigerian military forces are frequently deployed within Africa as part of UN peacekeeping missions. In fact, Nigeria has been a focus of U.S. TSC activities for some years, obviously owing to concerns about resource security and the Global War on Terror. Yet Nigeria scores well in only five of 17 categories in the MCC scorecard for 2009, an indicator of the inherent risk in undertaking a program of effective TSC there.²⁶ Considering Moyo’s point from the previous chapter, Nigeria’s MCC scores, were they a bond rating, would not be investment grade.

The Nigerian Armed Forces are composed of approximately 85,000 personnel, of which 70,000 are in the army. The Nigerian Navy is composed of approximately 6000 personnel and operates several frigates and coastal patrol boats. The navy “... is still predominantly a brown water force and plays its most important role deterring oil smuggling [bunkering] and insurgency in the inland waterways of the Delta.”²⁷ The Nigerian Air Force has approximately 9,000 personnel. Most of the Nigerian aircraft are

²⁶ Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Country Scorecards and Scorebook,” <http://www.mcc.gov/selection/scorecards/index.php> (accessed December 19, 2008).

²⁷ Jane’s Sentinel, *Country Risk Assessments, West Africa*, 585.

currently not operational.²⁸ Despite these limitations, *Jane's Sentinel* asserts that the military in Nigeria, "... is by far the largest and most capable force in West Africa."²⁹

The Nigerian "... government has designated broad spectrum changes for the military, focusing on improving salaries, living and training conditions for military personnel and eliminating corrupt practices."³⁰ There should be no illusions that these reforms have taken root, however. An examination of Nigeria's MCC scores since 2004 show there has been little demonstrable improvement in their record in the three broad categories of eligibility.³¹ Because of this, a good case can be made to not engage Nigeria. However, the risks of national failure there are so high that it is inconceivable that the United States would pull back from its current commitment to assist Nigeria's transition to a stable, functioning democracy. In order to succeed, they need a professional military that is subordinate to legitimate civilian authority. Nevertheless, MCC eligibility scores can and should inform decision making about how to tailor TSC in Nigeria.

TSC broadly focused on reforming Nigeria's defense and security establishment should be the dominant feature of AFRICOM's engagement there. Military leaders should participate in educational courses that focus on rule of law, control of corruption and military subordination to civilian authority. Senior officers should attend seminars at the National Defense University Africa Institute and the various war colleges to reinforce the important values mentioned above. Furthermore, promising young men and women in Nigeria should attend the various service academies in the United States. AFRICOM

²⁸ U.S. Department of State Background Notes for Nigeria, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm> (accessed February 9, 2009).

²⁹ *Jane's Sentinel*, *Country Risk Assessments, West Africa*, 545.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 585.

³¹ Millennium Challenge Corporation, "Country Scorecards and Scorebook," <http://www.mcc.gov/selection/scorecards/index.php> (accessed February 15, 2009).

should carefully avoid training that does not emphasize the vital importance of militaries defending constitutional governments. Unfortunately, this includes most of the training available for enlisted men and women and non-commissioned officers. Values education is best when tailored for officers and senior leaders of the military; the officer corps is almost always the source of coup leaders across Africa.

Other engagement should be limited, but should enable U.S. access in the event of a crisis contingency, such as a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). One final area of engagement should focus on developing the professionalism of the Nigerian military, in order to improve Nigerian usefulness in future peacekeeping operations. Nigeria is "... the third largest contributor of troops to U.N. operations."³² Planners should have no illusions about Nigerians as peacekeepers, though. Nigerian peacekeepers have a terrible track record. Their performance while serving as peacekeepers in Liberia was atrocious according to Kenneth L. Cain:

In practice, however--not surprisingly, given the abusive nature of the sponsoring Nigerian regime--the seven-year ECOMOG intervention actually prolonged the war, exacerbated the carnage, and manifested myriad indicia of absence of good-faith humanitarian bona fides: ECOMOG used rival Liberian factions as surrogates, with murderous consequences; violated the laws of war; participated in the transshipment of narcotics; engaged in corruption so endemic and systematic as to impugn the motives for intervention; and avoided accountability and transparency.³³

In summary, TSC with Nigeria is necessary for compelling geopolitical reasons. In fact, Nigeria is one of the most strategically important countries in Africa. Unfortunately, Nigeria has not significantly improved in MCC eligibility scores since

³² Ibid., 545.

³³ Kenneth L. Cain, "The Rape of Dinah: Human Rights, Civil War in Liberia, and Evil Triumphant," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 21, no 2. (1999): 300
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/human_rights_quarterly/v021/21.2cain.html (accessed November 10, 2008).

they were first collated in 2004. The Nigerian military's propensity to take power through unconstitutional means further complicates the picture. Therefore, TSC in Nigeria should be very limited. The primary focus of AFRICOM should involve efforts that contribute to strengthening Nigerian military subordination to legitimate civilian authority. Additional TSC should be designed to ensure U.S. access in the event of a contingency. Because Nigeria contributes to UN peacekeeping, improving their professionalism in that arena is probably worthwhile. However, because of the problems with Nigerian peacekeepers in Liberia, this should be considered carefully. An appropriate place to start that effort would be improving the leadership and professionalism of the field grade and senior officers who would command peacekeeping missions. There are other countries in Africa that, like Nigeria, have low MCC eligibility scores, but are strategically important. For example, Angola and Cameroon are similar in their strategic importance to the U.S. These countries merit limited engagement with AFRICOM. Some of the countries that are a focus of the Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans Sahara effort could also be considered in this category, such as Chad. Some level of TSC focused on reforming their defense and security sectors and ensuring freedom of access may be appropriate.

Guinea: Category IV

Guinea is strategically located in West Africa, has extraordinarily rich mineral resources that are important to the United States, and is ripe for exploitation by trans-national terrorists. Important U.S. economic and strategic interests converge in Guinea. Nevertheless, Guinea is a country that should be excluded from most, perhaps all, TSC because it is an example of a country that would, in all likelihood, waste any received help. And unlike Nigeria, Guinea is not democratically ruled. Furthermore, the

geopolitical reasons for engaging Guinea do not rise to the same level as those in Nigeria. Guinea clearly needs help. It is among the poorest countries in the world. Yet the government is corrupt and unstable. MCC eligibility scores make this abundantly clear. Guinea's scores for 2009 are below the minimum in all 17 criteria within the three broad categories.

In December 2009, the military in Guinea staged a coup upon the death of General Lansana Conte, who had ruled Guinea since he overthrew the government in a military coup in 1984.³⁴ This recent coup leader, Moussa Dadis Camara, promised elections in 2010, but long-time Africa observers are skeptical he is willing to cede power to an elected leader. According to Corinne Dufka of Human Rights watch, "We've seen this before in Africa -- the young guard wanting to have the trappings and power of the old guard. And then it's always the people who get left out ... If Camara is serious, he needs to hold elections quickly, well before 2010. Guineans are fed up; they want democracy and have been denied it for years."³⁵

The coup drives home the point that using the MCC eligibility criteria is an excellent way to screen countries for TSC. Guinea is not eligible for MCC, though it does qualify on the basis of GNI. Guinea contains important natural resources, including iron ore, bauxite, gold, diamonds, and uranium. In fact, Guinea is the second leading producer of bauxite in the world, behind Australia.³⁶ A case can be made for a military relationship, if only a limited one. Logically, Guinea is a potential sanctuary for trans-national terrorists. Unfortunately, Guinea is a classic case of a country where

³⁴ Saliou Samb, Reuters; "Analysis – Guinea's coup: a true break with the past, or déjà vu?", <http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLS300640> (accessed January 3, 2009).

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Stratfor, "Guinea: Anti-president Protests and a Scramble for Bauxite," January 24, 2007, http://www.stratfor.com/guinea_anti_president_protests_and_scramble_bauxite (accessed January 3, 2009).

any assistance, military or otherwise, would probably be wasted. To quote the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook:

Guinea has had only two presidents since gaining its independence from France in 1958. Lansana CONTE came to power in 1984 when the military seized the government after the death of the first president, Sekou TOURE. Guinea did not hold democratic elections until 1993 when Gen. CONTE (head of the military government) was elected president of the civilian government. He was reelected in 1998 and again in 2003, though all the polls have been marred by irregularities. Guinea has maintained its internal stability despite spillover effects from conflict in Sierra Leone and Liberia. As those countries have rebuilt, Guinea's own vulnerability to political and economic crisis has increased. Declining economic conditions and popular dissatisfaction with corruption and bad governance prompted two massive strikes in 2006; a third nationwide strike in early 2007 sparked violent protests in many Guinean cities and prompted two weeks of martial law.³⁷

Military engagement with Guinea should be limited to enabling U.S. access in the event of a contingency operation. A more extensive effort to assist their military risks wasting the effort - or worse. Guinea's military could improve their already well-rehearsed skill at repressing the long-suffering citizens of Guinea. Guinea is representative of several other countries in Africa that may be strategically important to the U.S, but the geopolitical concerns do not rise to the level of a country like Nigeria. Their MCC eligibility scores should serve as warnings to AFRICOM planners to avoid significant TSC engagement. Other similar examples include Equatorial Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Republic of Congo.

Summary

Examining all potential military partners in Africa through the lens of the eligibility criteria is a useful, even critical, element of determining where and how to

³⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gv.html> (accessed January 3, 2009).

deliver discretionary TSC. The basic approach recommended here is a first step for deciding the competing priorities for TSC within Africa and for tailoring TSC to fit the circumstances in particular African countries.

VII. Conclusion

...[S]hrinking the gap as a strategic vision is not about making amends for the past. Instead, it is a practical strategy for dealing with the present danger that will – on regular occasions...reach into our good life and cause us much pain.¹

Thomas P. M. Barnett

Engagement with countries in Africa is fraught with potential and difficulty.

Africa holds incredibly vast energy resources. This tends to blur the fact that only very small areas of Africa have been explored for oil and gas. Far more than anyone now imagines may exist. Consequently, current forecasts may understate the importance of Africa to world energy markets. Additionally, Africa may well become the next important front in the War on Terror. Islamic terrorists already operate there and there are large essentially ungoverned areas that terrorists may exploit. Clearly, vital U.S. national interests converge in Africa. Unfortunately, many countries in the region that produce energy or host trans-national terrorists are poor candidates for military assistance from the U.S.

Africa is mired in poverty, disease and conflict. To be sure, Africa seems to lead the world in all three categories. There are enduring conflicts in Somalia, the Sahel, and Liberia, both the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo, and Cote D'Ivoire. Zimbabwe, once the "bread-basket" of Africa, is on the verge of collapse, and currently suffering what can only be described as hyper-inflation. HIV/AIDS infection rates in some parts of Africa are so high that some experts are concerned that no matter what happens politically in Africa, the economies of the region will buckle under the pressure of AIDS.

¹ Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty First Century*, 161.

Terrible tribal and ethnic tensions are exacerbated by artificially drawn national boundaries that do not take tribal or linguistic bonds into account. For example, Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, is essentially at least two countries, with a major religious fault line running between the Muslim North and the Christian South. This fault line overlays countless other tribal and linguistic divisions. Similar divisions throughout Africa are often deliberately inflamed for political purposes.

Many African governments are inept, or thoroughly corrupt, or both. Cruel dictators still rule several countries in Africa, including Guinea Bissau, Zimbabwe, and Equatorial Guinea. Objective measures of governance and corruption put many African countries at or near the bottom of all the countries in the world. Roads are impassable or are dotted with police shakedowns of travelers, such as Robert Guest described in his book on Africa. This failure of governance is exacerbated by terrible leadership which this paper discussed at some length.

Militaries in Africa have often destabilized the region. Reflecting an historic contempt for democracy, they lack subordination to civilian rule and have staged countless *coups d'état* throughout Africa. This propensity has been a major impediment to stable democratic rule across much of the continent, which in turn has stunted African human development.

The production of oil and gas plays a role in the terrible state of affairs in Africa. Energy revenues often serve as a means to exert authoritarian control over populations in Africa. The nexus of oil and gas development and corruption discussed in this paper is one that must concern AFRICOM planners involved in enhancing and building U.S. military partnerships in the region. Nevertheless, as has been explored here, there are hopeful signs that Africa may have turned a corner. Most notably, the number of

Africans living in free or partly free countries has risen dramatically in recent years. Over 100 million Africans are no longer citizens of dictatorships. Increasingly, Africans are demanding responsive governments, democratic institutions, and civil institutions that support democracy, such as militaries that are subordinate to civilian authority. Most importantly, delicate, nascent democracies appear on the verge of consolidating their political improvements. Some of this is occurring in very unlikely places.

Coincident with developments cataloged in this paper, there has been a significant change in the expectations of donor institutions regarding accountability of foreign aid. Assistance is now often targeted at countries that most deserve aid as opposed to countries that simply need assistance. Objective measures or quantitative analyses of country performance inform decisions about aid delivery. There are numerous studies suggesting that assistance targeted in this manner will produce improved results. This paper demonstrated the usefulness of using this approach for prioritizing and targeting TSC. AFRICOM will achieve more if planners factor a country's capacity to absorb assistance into decisions about where and how to deliver discretionary military aid. The MCC criteria identify these countries.

AFRICOM does not currently plan foreign aid using the MCC eligibility criteria. Not surprisingly, they have approached the problem with a different lens than the MCC. However, informing important planning decisions with information gleaned about the policy environment in potential partner countries will enable planners to reinforce success. This may seem counterintuitive, but it will help ensure that the limited resources AFRICOM can bring to bear will not be wasted.

The Obama Administration is looking for budget savings in DOD to enable significant increases in spending in other areas. The decision to apply deficit spending to

help the U.S. recover from the current severe economic downturn will further restrain defense spending. Coupled with the costs associated with fighting two simultaneous wars in Southwest Asia, AFRICOM's efforts to fund assistance for militaries in Africa will not compete well against other spending priorities. Therefore, it is imperative that AFRICOM prioritize TSC. Utilizing MCC eligibility criteria as one of several factors will provide planners with a useful component for prioritizing and targeting military aid. Approaching discretionary TSC in this new way will help ensure the United States not only carries out effective TSC by reinforcing success, but also will help reduce the risk the assistance will be wasted or misused. The United States cannot afford to waste defense funding. Moreover, the ideas outlined here suggest a way to avoid repeating past mistakes.

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