Traditional and Irregular Warfare: A Flawed Concept for Categorizing Conflict
Abstract
"Irregular warfare" and "traditional warfare" are poor terms for a fundamentally flawed concept of categorizing warfare that will limit the U.S. Government's ability to shape effectively the international environment without high costs militarily, economically, and politically. This artificial division of warfare adds no value and establishes an intellectual framework that may conceptually limit U.S. approaches to future national challenges. This paper reviews recent developments in terminology, concepts, and categorization of warfare focusing on "irregular warfare" and "traditional warfare" found in official U.S. documents published since 2001. Clausewitz, SunTzu, Thucydides, T.E. Lawrence, and Mao Tse-tung are used to investigate key constructs within the current "irregular warfare" concept and the recent categorization of warfare. An analysis of the major flaws in policy and concept development is offered for consideration. These flaws include attempting to categorize warfare into two main parts, poor terminology, the wrong focus of effort, and militarization of U.S. National Strategy. The paper concludes with the recommendation that the U.S. should discontinue the official use of "irregular warfare" and "traditional warfare" as they relate to actions taken by the U.S. Government and the Armed Forces of the U.S.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 18, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA530173
Entities
People
- James W. Purvis
Organizations
- National Defense University