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14. ABSTRACT
Since the findings of the 9/11 Commission were released in July of 2004, U.S. counterterrorism policy proffered a strategy to preemptively "attack terrorists and their organizations." Al Qaida (AQ) is responsible for the devastating attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC). Driven from the sanctuary provided by the Taliban in Afghanistan in October of 2001, several AQ senior leaders fled to the sanctuary of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. Denying sanctuary in the FATA is a national priority critical to regional stability and global security. Sanctuary provides terrorist, insurgent and criminal elements the time, space and opportunity to carry out their essential organizational functions, and history reveals that any successful counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign has denied sanctuary. The United States Government (USG) and the Government of Pakistan (GOP) COIN approaches are not sufficiently addressing the operational elements of sanctuary in the FATA. In fact, their methods may actually be perpetuating the insurgencies as evidenced by their growing disruptive activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This thesis recommends a "whole-of-international-community" effort focused on reducing the operational elements of the FATA's sanctuary to deny sanctuary and defeat the insurgencies that reside there.

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“Denying Sanctuary”

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The content of this paper reflect my own personal view and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of the Defense.

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X April 2009

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Keith Dickson, General Chuck Cunningham, Dr. Gail Nicula

Abstract

Since the findings of the 9/11 Commission were released in July of 2004, and even before, U.S. counterterrorism policy proffered a strategy to preemptively “attack terrorists and their organizations.” Al Qaida (AQ), a violent extremist organization (VEO), is responsible for the devastating attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC). Due to U.S. military operations to oust AQ from the sanctuary provided by the Taliban in Afghanistan in October of 2001, several of its senior leaders fled and remain at large in the sanctuary of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan. Denying sanctuary in the FATA is a national priority critical to regional stability and global security. During this same period of time, however, the U.S. national strategy for combating terrorism and the U.S.’s zeal to capture or kill the high-profile personalities responsible for the devastating attack on the WTC led to well-intended, but misappropriated, resources and separate agency plans. These plans focused on targeting individuals as the way to defeat the “global insurgency” rather than targeting the strategic pillars of terrorist organizations and transnational insurgencies.

Counterterrorism (CT) strategists and intelligence professionals have characterized AQ and its loose network of like-minded terrorist groups a “global insurgency.” Insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, and criminal elements all require the time, space, and opportunity to carry out their essential organizational functions. Sanctuary provides those requirements, and analysis of insurgencies in history reveals that the centerpiece of any successful counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign is denying sanctuary. Therefore, three case studies were analyzed to determine a framework of the common operational elements and critical factors of sanctuary and what COIN methods were used to deny sanctuary. The framework was then applied to the FATA to examine the role sanctuary provides to the many insurgencies that reside there and to determine the efficacy of the COIN forces ability to deny it.

It was determined that both the United States Government (USG) and the Government of Pakistan (GOP) approaches are not sufficiently addressing the operational elements of sanctuary. Moreover, USG/GOP COIN methods may actually be perpetuating the insurgencies as evidenced by their growing disruptive activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan and their intentions for greater instability in the region. Further, it was determined that “whole-of-international-community” effort focused on reducing the operational elements of the FATA’s sanctuary is the best approach to deny sanctuary and defeat the insurgencies that reside there. The U.S. must work with its allies to disrupt AQ attacks on the Homeland and U.S. interests abroad while simultaneously providing Pakistan, a critical U.S. partner, the time, space, capabilities, and capacities to defeat its own insurgencies in the region, which if left unattended, could emerge into a regional or global crisis.

The thesis also advocated that insurgencies are defeated by holistically addressing their strategic pillars of ideology, external support, and sanctuary and that the framework for sanctuary has broader application for VEOs seeking sanctuary in non-physical space such as cyberspace.

Dedication

To the families of our bravest fighting men of special operations who "loved so greatly that they laid their life for their brothers" while ruthlessly pursuing our Nation's most despicable enemies.

May they find strength and solace in the memory of their Husbands', Fathers', Sons', and Friends' ultimate sacrifice.

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To all of the Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen and Civilians forward deployed in harm's way: Your country is grateful for your selfless service even though they cannot completely understand the depth of your personal sacrifices. I am humbled in your presence and inspired by your commitment. Thank You and Stay in the Fight!

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Thesis Introduction

The *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* created by Congress and the President (Public Law 107-306, November 27, 2002) was directed to “investigate the facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.”¹ Since the establishment of the National Commission in November of 2002 and the publishing of its report in July of 2004, U.S. counterterrorism policy has proffered a strategy to preemptively “attack terrorists and their organizations.”² By design, a key objective of this preemptive strategy is denying terrorists the sanctuaries or safe havens they need to thrive and flourish. This tenet of sanctuary denial can be traced from the *National Security Strategy* (NSS) down through the *National Military Strategic Plan for the War On Terror* (NMSP-WOT), illustrating the understanding U.S. policymakers and strategists have regarding the role sanctuary provides to insurgent, terrorist and criminal elements. It is clear that denying or eliminating sanctuary is a critical component to defeating insurgencies, whether regional, transnational, or global.

While the concept of denying sanctuary is clearly outlined in strategic documents, it is far less clear in other publications used by warfighters. For example, The Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Field Manual has an oversimplified concept of sanctuary, and makes no distinction between sanctuary and safe haven nor does the methodology for denying sanctuary specifically address the operational elements of sanctuary as a means for eliminating or denying it.

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), xv.

² *Ibid.*, 365.

Until just recently, both U.S. COIN strategy and the approach for denying sanctuary in Afghanistan and Iraq have been military-centric. The military, consisting mainly of General David Petraeus and a small group of subject matter experts on insurgency warfare, analyzed historical insurgencies in an effort to improve how to conduct COIN. Revisiting some of the original tenets of counterinsurgency, such as intensive application of manpower, a whole of government (WOG) approach, orchestrating all of the instruments of national power, and securing the populace, the Petraeus group, quickly identified areas for improvements and justified the modification of the U.S. post-hostilities strategy for Iraq.

U.S. national strategy for combating terrorism has evolved over the last eight years. During this period of time, the name of the struggle against global terrorism and other transnational threats in which the United States is engaged evolved from the Global War on Terrorism to the Long War under the Bush administration. The Obama administration is discouraging the use of the term Long War and has even considered changing the name again but has not yet directed a change in its first hundred days. The U.S. and its international partners' categorization of the enemy during this same period of time has expanded from al Qaida (AQ) to violent extremist organizations (VEOs), a loose franchise or network of like-minded terrorist groups. Strategists, intelligence and CT professionals and experts agree that the enemy center of gravity (COG) is extremist ideology and not its senior leaders as initially assumed. This is evidenced by a shift in CT policy focus from man-hunting to defeating VEO

networks. The nature of the threat has been characterized as a “global insurgency” rather than transnational terrorism. The terms sanctuary and safe haven have become almost synonymous, and the definitions of sanctuary has evolved from physical domain to a connotation which includes the nonphysical domain.

Initially, the tenet of “no sanctuary”³ detailed under the “Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations” section in the 9/11 Commission Report and woven throughout national strategy directives and separate interagency plans, led to an unintended misappropriation of resources focused on targeting individuals as the way to defeat the “global insurgency” rather than targeting the strategic pillars of terrorist organizations and transnational insurgencies. In the U.S.’s zeal to capture or kill the high-profile personalities responsible for the devastating attack on the World Trade Center, who still pose a threat to the U.S. way of life, national strategy and counterterrorism policy, plans, and execution have been slow in moving from a terrorist-centric strategy to a VEO-strategy focused on defeating VEO’s by denying them the requirements they need to survive.

Currently, U.S. strategy is piecemeal – separate regional pieces are addressed without a global perspective. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the U.S. have known for some time that they are fighting against an insurgency in Afghanistan. As the case studies in this paper will disclose, and analyses of insurgencies in

³ National Commission, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 365.

history, such as the RAND study *Money in the Bank*⁴ reveal, the centerpiece of any successful COIN operation is denying sanctuary. However, the aforementioned organizations have been unable to deny sanctuary due to limits in resources, restrictions by separate national caveats of coalition members, and lack of interagency and coalition unified action. Furthermore, it is well known that the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in Pakistan offers sanctuary to both the Taliban and Al Qaida (AQ). The existence of this sanctuary has led to the re-emergence of the Taliban, AQ, and other insurgent elements that are intent on destabilizing the government of Afghanistan.

The ISAF COIN effort has been further complicated by distinct U.S. combating terrorism (CbT)⁵ goals to capture or kill Usama bin Laden, Ayman al Zarwahiri, and other AQ senior leaders, by the diversion of U.S. strategic priorities and resources to Iraq in March of 2003, along with U.S. regional security and stability goals for Afghanistan. The U.S. global CbT goal presently relies on kinetic method of drone strikes into the regional sanctuary to kill high-value individuals (HVIs). The newly elected government of Pakistan has to deal with the local, regional, and global results of these strikes. Among these are local (tribal) strife and disruptive regional tension with its Afghani and Indian neighbors, and international distaste when media sources accuse Americans of the indiscriminate killing of noncombatants. If the U.S. is going to achieve both its

⁴ A Rand study which examines the political and military capabilities for fighting a spectrum of current and future insurgency threats through analysis of their common characteristics.

⁵ **combating terrorism** — Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called **CbT**. See also **antiterrorism; counterterrorism**. (JP 3-07.2)

global CbT objectives as an individual nation at war and its regional COIN objectives as a member of NATO, it is going to have to think globally and act regionally by gaining a better understanding of sanctuary and adopting a more holistic approach of addressing the operational elements of sanctuary to eliminate a regional and global threat.

A similar analysis of historical insurgencies must examine sanctuary in COIN in order to develop and coordinate more effective regional and global methods for denying sanctuary. The thesis of this paper is that *by better understanding the causal conditions of sanctuary, U.S. counterinsurgent and combating terrorism strategists can develop a more integrated, enduring and comprehensive whole of international community (WOIC)⁶ approach to denying or eliminating sanctuary, or safe haven, in both a regional COIN context and in a global CbT context.*

This paper will look at the concept of sanctuary and its value to insurgency. The analytical method will be a three-fold process. First, examples of historical regional insurgencies will be analyzed to determine the operational elements and the critical factors of sanctuary (whether the sanctuary is state sponsored or in ungoverned space, or whether the sanctuary is domestic or external) and the COIN approach or methods used to deny that sanctuary. This analysis will assess the effectiveness of the COIN methods to deny sanctuary and its effect on the ultimate outcome of the insurgency and provide a framework for examining contemporary sanctuaries.

⁶ A non-doctrinal term to mean a community of interest (COI) consisting of government, non-government, private, multinational and international organizations working together towards a common end.

Second, the framework will be applied against the current AQ and Taliban sanctuary in the FATA. Denying this sanctuary is a national priority and is critical to regional stability for Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as global security for the world community. The operational elements and critical factors that define FATA as a sanctuary to the Taliban and Al Qaeda will be examined. Each element and factor of the historical insurgency analysis will be compared to apply COIN methods and their effectiveness. Finally, the framework will examine and assess sanctuaries in a global or strategic context.

Chapter One – Sanctuary as a Concept in Insurgency

Introduction

Before any COIN practitioner can begin to address insurgency, one must understand sanctuary as a concept by establishing what role or value sanctuary provides to an insurgency. Foundationally, insurgencies need three key strategic pillars to function. Common dream, external support, and sanctuary best describe these pillars.⁷ A common dream is the cause that inspires the insurgents and allows them to endure hardship, suffering, and even death. External support is the secure movement of resources (money, supplies, and people) that other nations, insurgents, or terrorist groups provide that allows the insurgency to sustain itself. Sanctuary provides the all-important secure physical space, or safe haven, and the freedom of movement to rest, re-fit, re-supply, train, and potentially serve as a base of support from which the insurgents can assemble, plan, organize, train, and launch attacks. As the term implies, sanctuary requires little or no active security. Insurgents move freely without fear of attack. Sanctuary is classified as either internal (within the country where the insurgency is taking place), or external (outside of the country involved in the insurgency). Most often, external sanctuary (sometimes termed “active sanctuary”) borders the country where the insurgency is occurring, but can exist away from a contiguous border. During the second half of the twentieth-century, insurgency and counterinsurgency were part of the Cold War. The U.S. or the Soviet Union provided support to either insurgents or COIN forces. Sanctuary for the insurgency was internal, external or

⁷ Paul Melshen, Professor of History, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College, NDU, interviewed by author, Norfolk, VA, 3 October, 2008.

a combination of both. Internal sanctuaries were most often the insurgents' secure base of operation, providing the same critical factors of security and freedom of movement. They also served as the rally point for fighters pressed by counterguerilla operations, or they became the launch point for guerilla infiltration and offensive action. External sanctuaries were normally across a contiguous border, facilitating support from the insurgents' client state. As a core COIN strategy, denying sanctuary in a physical terrain context usually equates with resorting to employment of military forces to seize, secure or occupy a location.

The Critical Factors – Security and Freedom of Movement

The 9/11 National Commission listed seven requirements needed to conduct a “complex international terrorist operation aimed at launching a catastrophic attack.”⁸ Two of those seven requirements deal directly with sanctuary:

- Time, space and ability to perform competent planning and staff work;
- Opportunity and space needed to recruit, man and train operatives with the needed skills and dedication providing the time and structure required to socialize them into the terrorist cause, judge their trustworthiness and hone their skills;⁹

Sanctuary is a capability vital to the survival of terrorist organizations and insurgencies alike. Security and freedom of movement are the two critical factors of sanctuary that provide the *time, space, and opportunity* essential to an insurgent group or terrorist element carrying out their organizational functions. The security factor of sanctuary prevents COIN forces from effectively penetrating

⁸ National Commission, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 365-366.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 365.

their space or governmental authorities from influencing the insurgents thereby protecting the time, space and physical well-being necessary for the insurgents to accomplish their essential functions. Sanctuary degrades COIN forces' capabilities to "find, fix and finish" insurgents which enhances their organizational, operational and physical security.

The freedom of movement factor of sanctuary provides the insurgents with the requisite time and space to assemble, train, plan, rehearse, prepare, move to conduct attacks, and return, if need be, to the safety of their sanctuary. Thus in conjunction the security and freedom of movement critical factors ensure terrorist or insurgent organization survival and mission accomplishment.

Terms – Sanctuary and Safe Haven

U.S. policy and strategy documents currently use the terms sanctuary and safe haven interchangeably. In the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (NS-CT), safe havens have a connotation of relatively secure territory or non-physical (cyber, financial, legal) space that allows freedom of movement or protection "to indoctrinate, recruit, coalesce, train, and regroup, as well as prepare and support...operations."¹⁰ Most of the reference material on insurgencies over the past 50 years uses sanctuary in the same context as physical safe haven. Since sanctuary and physical safe haven provide insurgent groups the same vital benefits - security and freedom of movement, this study will continue to use sanctuary and physical safe haven interchangeably. Nonphysical safe havens, such as cyberspace imply a similar notion of security and freedom of movement.

¹⁰ Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "2006 Country Report," Terrorist Safe Havens, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82728.htm> (accessed October 5, 2008).

Although the domains are different, the concepts of security and freedom of movement essential to sanctuary are the same and are subject to the same analytical framework outlined in this paper.

Concept of Sanctuary and its Physical and Human Operational Elements

A recent Rand study, *Money in the Bank*, details lessons learned from several past COIN operations and underscores the relationship between ideology (common dream or insurgency goals), external support, and sanctuary.¹¹ The report, however, does not examine the important role of sanctuary in contributing to security and freedom of movement. The Rand report and current U.S. and NATO strategies fail to identify and address the physical and human elements of sanctuary, which enhance the critical factors of security and freedom of movement.

In contrast to the RAND study, this research examines several twentieth-century insurgencies to reveal that the insurgents' access to sanctuary usually determines whether an insurgency succeeds or fails. Those COIN campaigns that were effective in denying sanctuary were able to defeat insurgencies. Conversely, where COIN forces were unable to deny either sanctuary alone, or deny sanctuary and external support, the counterinsurgent forces were unsuccessful. Thus, it is important to understand the role of the two operational elements that support sanctuary in order to deny sanctuary to an insurgent group. The two operational elements of sanctuary are the physical and human. These operational elements

¹¹ Angela Rabasa et al., *Money in the Bank; Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), ix-xv.

determine the degree of security and freedom of movement that are essential to sanctuary.

The physical element of sanctuary is usually characterized by its physical accessibility. Remote areas, particularly areas where indomitable terrain encompasses the local and surrounding area and the avenues of approach, providing a natural level of protection, make ideal physical sanctuaries. Triple canopy jungles of Indonesia and South America and the rugged, inhospitable mountain areas of central Asia are examples of territories that, by their nature, provide the security of sanctuary. The Sahara desert, while another inhospitable area, does not necessarily provide the same levels of security and freedom of movement that the jungles and mountains provide, not to mention the hardships the insurgents would have to endure to live there. Cities and heavily-populated urban areas can provide man-made sanctuary similar to that which naturally exists in extreme geographies. The densely populated warrens of poorly-designed or poorly-constructed urban centers provide insurgents the security of the masses and space, similar to natural sanctuaries, necessary to conduct essential functions of insurgency. Warsaw and Paris in 1944, Algiers over a decade later, and, more recently, Mogadishu in Somalia and Sadr City and Fallujah in Iraq, are good examples of urban areas which provided physical safe havens to insurgents. In both the indomitable terrain and urban safe haven vignettes, natural challenges and man-made infrastructure restricted access to COIN forces. The insurgents enjoyed a level of security and freedom of movement that allowed them to survive, sustain their insurgency, and attack and fight COIN interests.

The second and equally vital operational element is the human element. In areas of weak social space – isolated rural areas, remote tribal areas, places where people are separated by space, ethnicity, culture, wealth or social status – and where people share a common identity or affiliation, conditions enhance insurgents' security and freedom of movement. Weak social space offers insurgents prime opportunities to secure local or popular support. Local populace support boosts security and freedom of movement by providing food, protection, shelter, intelligence, transportation, medical and several other support functions that sustain the insurgents. In remote, rugged or isolated areas, tribalism is the dominant anthropological condition. In areas such as those in Africa and the FATA, tribal culture takes precedence over other state government and municipal social orders. Insurgents can exploit the tribal culture for both subsistence support and protection from civil society and the legitimate rule of law.

In overly-crowded, under-supported, and poorly-governed urban areas, the disenfranchised populace share common grievances and sympathize with insurgents, providing them support and security. Again, Sadr City and Mogadishu are classic contemporary examples. There are several large disenfranchised populations characterized by low-income, high unemployment, low-quality housing and high-crime areas in most modern European cities such as London, Paris, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. These areas can provide the necessary support to insurgents as well as restrict COIN forces and government penetration into their safe havens. The catalytic combination of anthropological identity and poor socio-economic status is a recipe for a weak local security

architecture (both military and law enforcement security forces) and governance marked by lawlessness and corruption. Somalia and the FATA are two areas that typify this dangerous combination of human conditions, both characterized by inadequate and weak local security, poor governance and absence of the rule of law.

As a result of the physical and human operational elements of sanctuary, insurgents can cajole, persuade, and intimidate support of the local populace for providing food, shelter, or manpower, and exploit the black and gray economies to provide other illicit resources. The combination of the operational elements provide insurgent, terrorist or criminal elements with the critical factors of sanctuary – security and freedom of movement - the benefits of which are the time, space and ability to recruit, radicalize, resource, refit, recuperate, plan, train and rehearse terrorist attacks.

This chapter discussed the concept of sanctuary in an insurgency. First, it highlighted the three strategic pillars of sanctuary – ideology, external support, and sanctuary. Second, insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, and criminal elements for that matter, all require the time, space, and opportunity to carry out their essential organizational functions. Security and freedom of movement are the critical factors that provide those requirements. Third, sanctuary and safe haven, for the purpose of this paper, are synonymous and provide the critical factors of sanctuary. Fourth, the chapter established the vital interplay between the critical factors of sanctuary and its two operational elements, describing how the physical and human operational elements enhance security and freedom of

movement. Finally, it determined the relationship of the COIN forces success in denying sanctuary and the outcome of the insurgency.

The next chapter analyzes sanctuary in historical case studies, examining the operational elements (physical and human) supporting the critical factors (security and freedom of movement), and examines the COIN forces effectiveness to deny sanctuary through its operational elements and the ultimate outcome of the insurgency.

Chapter Two - Case Studies Analysis of Twentieth-Century Insurgencies

Introduction and Case Study Analysis Construct

The previous chapter established the framework through which the twentieth-century case studies will be examined.

This chapter will look at three case studies to analyze the presence of the two critical factors and the two operational elements of sanctuary. First, the analysis will review the types of sanctuaries available to the insurgents in each case study. Next, the analysis will examine the extent to which the operational elements contributed to the critical factors of sanctuary and gauge their contributions to the outcome for each insurgency. Three case studies were selected specifically to validate, or contest the counterinsurgents' methods for addressing the physical and human operational elements of sanctuary as an approach to denying sanctuary and evaluate their effectiveness on the outcome.

In the first case study, the Malayan Emergency 1948-1960, the physical and human operational elements supported the critical factors of security and freedom of movement for both internal and external sanctuaries. The COIN forces sufficiently addressed the rudimentary physical and human elements through a whole of government approach and eventually defeated the insurgency. The COIN approach in the Malayan Emergency is one of the best examples of countering the operational elements to deny sanctuary leading to the defeat of the insurgency.

The second case study, the Algerian Revolution 1954-1962, also had internal and external sanctuaries, possessing the critical factors of security and

freedom of movement. In this case, the counterinsurgents addressed the physical operational element of sanctuary and denied the critical factors of security and freedom of movement. However, they mishandled the human operational element. The Algerian Revolution case study highlights the interdependence of the physical and human operational elements. This case study demonstrates that as a COIN approach both elements must be concurrently and suitably addressed in order to effectively deny the benefits of sanctuary.

The final case study analyzed though the operational elements of sanctuary framework is the Hukbalahap (Huk) Insurrection in the Philippines 1946-1955. In this case, the insurgents had neither external sanctuary nor support. Yet they had internal sanctuary where the physical and human elements provided the critical factors of security and freedom of movement. The COIN forces orchestrated an approach that sufficiently addressed both the physical and human operational elements of sanctuary simultaneously, and defeated the Huk insurgency. The Huk Insurrection case study supports addressing both operational elements of sanctuary, it also emphasizes the importance of integrating other elements of national power and reveals the effective and legitimate use of indigenous, or host nation forces, to deny sanctuary.

The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960)

Introduction

Although this thesis is specifically focused on the operational elements of sanctuary, this case study underscores a COIN approach that systemically and concurrently attacked the three strategic pillars of an insurgency (ideology, external support, and sanctuary) discussed in chapter one, ensuring its defeat. The following analysis focuses strictly on the strategic component of sanctuary and its denial. More specifically, the analysis applies the physical and human operational element framework to the internal and external sanctuaries, their impact on sanctuary, the COIN efforts to counter or address the elemental conditions, their effectiveness to deny sanctuary, and the ultimate outcome of the insurgency.

Physical element

The insurgents had internal sanctuary in the jungles of Malaya and external sanctuary in Thailand. In Malaya, the arduous mountain-jungle terrain and limited mobility infrastructure offered natural protection and security from COIN Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection assets and pursuit forces. However, neither the insurgents nor the COIN forces enjoyed a distinct advantage in freedom of movement. At best, this element was a force-neutral factor, until the COIN forces developed innovative rotary wing, or helicopter, techniques and tactics to reduce the physical element and gain the support of the high-mountain, indigenous people to aid in fighting the insurgents. The formidable triple-canopy jungle of Malay is the most challenging physical condition in all of Southeast Asia, with Malaya, a peninsula country, covering

50,690 square miles, of which “four-fifths is jungle and swamp.”¹² Although Malaya had a reasonably good, country-wide transportation network, internal access and over-ground mobility was severely limited by the vast and indomitable jungle.¹³ The indomitable terrain and harsh, wet jungle climate, up to 259 inches of annual rainfall,¹⁴ significantly impacted the two critical factors. The terrain naturally restricted movement and dictated internal mobility network design, and the climate affected the GOM capability to build, maintain, and modernize mobility infrastructure into the remote jungle areas. Both the physical conditions of terrain and climate restricted access to COIN forces thereby contributing to the factor of security for the insurgents. The lack of interior mobility between bases of support and remote villages did not significantly contribute to the insurgent’s freedom of movement.

Human element

As prevalent as the physical conditions of sanctuary were at the start of the Malayan Emergency, the combination of the physical and human elements provided the real security of the internal sanctuary. Two primary human conditions contributed to the insurgents obtaining the support of the local populace. First, the poor socio-economic conditions and lack of political representation disenfranchised the general populace, particularly the Chinese. Malaya was suffering socially, economically and developmentally from Japanese occupation during World War II and postwar recovery. Severe wartime and

¹² Paul A. Jureidini et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23 Summary Account* (Washington: The American University, 1962), 66.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 67-68.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 66

postwar economic dislocation, especially unemployment and food shortages (Malay had long been a food deficit area), had led about half a million Chinese to become “squatters” on fallow land along the jungle fringe in the countryside.¹⁵ These “squatters,” growing their own food, lived largely outside the influence of authorities and the slowly reviving GOM administration and became the *Min Yuen*, “a civilian mass organization set up to assist the guerillas in the jungle,”¹⁶ providing resources, intelligence and popular support to the insurgents, the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). The *Min Yuen* thrived in the “squatter” areas due to the lack of UK/GOM penetration of under-strength security forces, governance and development.

The second human condition was the anthropological likeness or common identity that existed between the MRLA, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the *Min Yuen*. The MRLA, MCP and *Min Yuen* were predominately Chinese (38 percent) and never really gained the ideological or moral support of the Malay or Indian populace (49 and 12 percent respectively), not because of “Chinese disloyalty to Malaya, but rather their extended loyalty to...China.”¹⁷ In addition, the fact that Malays never really considered themselves disenfranchised by the British, due to the long-standing British approach of “not subservienting the Oriental population” and their “persuasion and negotiation” of local indigenous

¹⁵ R.W. Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of A Successful Counterinsurgency Effort* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1972), 7.

¹⁶ Jureidini, *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, 75.

¹⁷ Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 13.

governance through semi-sovereign Malay States, also contributed to the Malays lack of popular support to the MRLA.¹⁸

COIN approach

Overcoming the physical elements and reducing the human elements, the UK/GOM counterinsurgents implemented a multifaceted WOG approach to deny internal and external sanctuary and defeat the insurgency. More specifically, they developed a strategy to build indigenous security force capacity systematically, extend and promote governance, and provide assistance and development to extend the GOM's reach and separate the insurgents from their popular base. In this case, the popular base actually resided in the remote "squatter" population on the jungle fringes. The internal safe havens existed initially in these squatter areas and later in the deeper jungle areas. The main methods of denying internal sanctuary were "chiefly registration, resettlement, and food control to deny men and resources to the guerillas."¹⁹ Although resettlement, and to some extent, food control, would be considered archaic and oppressive in today's COIN campaigns, the UK/GOM "made every effort to see that the communities did not degenerate into mere detention camps."²⁰ The resettlement camps provided many basic services such as schools, dispensaries, power and water.²¹

The 150-mile common northern border of the Malayan peninsula with Thailand provided an external, jungle sanctuary. Although reference materials are scant on sanctuary in Thailand, a border agreement with the friendly government

¹⁸ Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 12.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 55.

²¹ *Ibid.*

of Thailand allowing Malayan police forces to operate and pursue insurgents across the border denied external sanctuary.²² Furthermore, there was neither popular nor external support for the insurgents in Thailand.

Prior to the resettlement efforts, the first order of business for the UK/GOM was to build up the security forces, with initial emphasis on rapid expansion of the police and paramilitary forces. In doing so, this eventually allowed the military to move from static security missions to offensive jungle probes,²³ effectively extending the reach of security and impeding on the insurgents' physical security and freedom of movement.

The final two major lines of operations (LOOs) for addressing the human conditions of sanctuary were development and assistance, and extending the base of government. In development, the resettled "new villages" provided a means for local development and integration of much of the rural population into Malayan society.²⁴ In addition to socio-economic development of the "new villages," the GOM, with UK assistance, strove for general development:

In this category fall the rapid postwar expansion of the educational system, greatly improved health services, social legislation limiting hours of work and regulatory interest rates to prevent usury, public housing and the like.²⁵

Extending the base of government was essential to countering the human conditions of sanctuary.

The British strategic communication on Malayan independence was extremely effective in both word and deed. General Sir Gerald Templar,

²² Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency; Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (London: Chatto and Windus Ltd, 1966), 19.

²³ Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 46.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 62.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 63.

assigned by Churchill to unify civil-military control in Malaya by putting it under one head,²⁶ emphasized “developing an electoral process, and enfranchising the Indians and Chinese.”²⁷ The British were able to assist Malaya develop a diverse, representative electoral process from the local “new village” level up through the national level that is still in place today. Since the ethnic Chinese insurgents never gained the support of either the Malay or Indian populace, this electoral and political reform significantly reduced grievances and mitigated the human condition of anthropological identity.

Conclusion

The MRLA insurgents enjoyed security and limited freedom of movement from the physical conditions of the jungle and the under-reaching mobility infrastructure. Also, from the human element, the insurgents benefited from the assistance of the disenfranchised and ethnically-common squatters, the *Min Yuen*. The COIN forces developed an offensive capability to penetrate ruthlessly and pursue insurgent elements deep into the jungle reducing the natural security advantages of the jungle. Separating the populace from the insurgents through resettlement and food control reduced the human element of internal sanctuary. Furthermore, the grievances or poor socio-economic conditions of the disenfranchised were sufficiently addressed by the COIN forces. Finally, governmental reform by the UK/GOM included representation of all citizens, regardless of their nationality, further mitigating the human element. After twelve

²⁶ Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect*, 30.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 65.

years, the UK/GOM effectively denied internal and external sanctuary and ultimately defeated the insurgency.

The Algerian Revolution (1954-1962)

Introduction

In Algeria, at the time of the revolution, many of the physical and human conditions of sanctuary were evident and the insurgents benefited from the security of the urban as well as the human terrain. However, the French approach in Algeria differed from that of the UK/GOM in Malaya in that it was largely military-centric and heavy-handed in the methods²⁸ it used to pacify the populace and, in essence, only countered the physical conditions of sanctuary. Although France diminished the benefits of internal safe havens, denied external sanctuaries, and severed external materiel and manpower support, it failed to adequately address the human conditions of sanctuary. Along with its failure to improve the socio-economic status of the indigenous population and to recognize and appeal to the common anthropological identities of Algerian Nationalism and pan-Islamism, the heavy-handed tactics of pacification fueled the insurgency's ideology and bolstered their will to continue the insurrection. The insurgents' external political support, the National Liberation Front (FLN), was very effective in their strategic communications and provided an ideological sanctuary for the insurgents in the international arena as well as in the French homeland. This case study clearly illustrates that counterinsurgents can use extremely effective methods to deny the benefits of physical sanctuaries, but failing to "win the hearts and minds" of a population by not reasonably addressing the human conditions and creating alienation can lead to strategic failure.

²⁸ Paul Jureidini, *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Algeria 1954-1962* (Washington DC: American University, 1963), 13.

Physical element

The ideal scenario for rural or remote sanctuary is a combination of indomitable terrain, poor mobility access infrastructure, and insurgent control of the access infrastructure. In Algeria, the geography was rugged and the climates extreme in the compartmentalized interior. Despite the harsh geography and climate, the insurgents preferred conditions for restricting access to COIN forces did not exist. By 1954, the French had developed a modern and interconnected mobility infrastructure including well-developed ports, modern roads and railways, and a network of usable airfields.²⁹ The Algerian secondary road network was not well-developed into Tellian and the Saharan Atlas or in the Sahara, and the difficult terrain, extreme seasonal weather, and desert conditions in the Sahara made construction and maintenance difficult.³⁰ The Algerian rebels frequently sabotaged the mobility infrastructure and attacked convoys, but the French effectively controlled the Algerian mobility infrastructure, maintaining access and counterinsurgent freedom of movement throughout the Algerian war.³¹ The French overcame the physical limitations more advantageously than the insurgents due to their access to both resources and technology. The benefits of sanctuary in the remote areas were thus eliminated. “Seldom do” the conditions of sanctuary “affect both sides equally, in part due to inevitable differences in resources and technology available to the opposing forces.”³²

²⁹ Charles Shrader, *The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 18 .

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 21.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 19.

³² *Ibid.*, 5.

Without remote sanctuaries, the insurgents sought refuge in the city or urban terrain. As mentioned in the last chapter, and although characteristically different than the natural security provided by hostile terrain, restricted access and tyranny of distance, urban centers provide security by a combination of man-made physical element and human elements. Not only do insurgents depend on the city-dwellers for popular support, their sheer mass, lack of adequate policing and potential for high collateral damage during COIN operations provide the same critical factors of sanctuary that remote sanctuary provides. In Algeria, the insurgents benefitted from the security in the cities but had limited freedom of movement within the city. In summary, the FLN and the *Armée de Libération Nationale*³³ (ALN) relied primarily on popular support and internal safe havens in the cities and external sanctuaries and support in Tunisia and Morocco, respectively.

Human element

The human conditions of sanctuary benefited the insurgency's cause as well as its sanctuary. First, the socio-economic conditions, the most debilitating of which was "economic maladjustment,"³⁴ were pathetic. The Algerian economy was primarily and predominantly agricultural where the *Colons*, the European settlers, controlled 90 percent of industry and commerce and owned 40 percent of the most arable Algerian land.³⁵ Basically, "10 percent of the population accumulated and controlled most of the wealth, while a growing

³³ The military wing of the National Liberation Front (FLN).

³⁴ Jureidini, *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, 19-24.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 24.

community of Muslims lived on a subsistence level.”³⁶ The large and growing Muslim population was landless, underemployed in the rural areas and unemployed in the urban areas. Public health, literacy and education rates were poor by all measures. There was stark contrast between the European and Muslim populations. For the Muslims, health and sanitation conditions were substandard in both the rural and urban areas for a multitude of reasons: malnutrition, insufficient water supply, overcrowded living conditions, inadequate health education and hygiene, indigenous custom and superstitions.³⁷ In 1954, most of the European settler population was literate compared to 9 and 2.1 percent of the male and female Muslim population, respectively.³⁸ The political situation marked by the “lack of Muslim representation and participation at the local and metropolitan levels”³⁹ and acute discrimination by the ruling elite, reflected the same inequities of this two-class society – the Colon upper class and the indigenous lower class. French policies and socio-economic inequities disenfranchised the Algerian indigenous population which created the human conditions necessary for internal sanctuary and local support for the ALN-FLN insurgency.

The ALN-FLN insurgency was devoid of the other human element, Algerian common identity, for about 130 years, whereas Algeria’s bordering neighbors, Tunisia and Morocco, developed a common identity of anti-colonial

³⁶ Jureidini, *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, 24.

³⁷ Shrader, *The First Helicopter War*, 15.

³⁸ Jureidini, *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, 241.

³⁹ Jureidini, *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, 40.

and revolutionary nationalism in just a quarter of that time.⁴⁰ The rampant socio-economic, political and social inequality during this period further fueled Algerian nationalism. Furthermore, Messali Hadj⁴¹ was successful in linking “the movement with the greater Arab and Islamic struggle against colonialism.”⁴² The pan-Islamic identity was the pivotal ethos that assimilated the insurgents not only with their Algerian brethren but the larger Islamic world. The war cry and national slogan being taught in the *madrassas*, religious schools, was “Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my country.”⁴³ The human element of sanctuary, abundantly available, was vital to the security and support of the insurgents. In the end, the human condition of cultural identity proved an insurmountable condition for the French counterinsurgents.

COIN approach

The French counterinsurgents implemented several measures to counter the physical conditions of sanctuary without much concern for their human consequences. Like many imperial powers, the French were more prepared for a conventional war than they were an unconventional war. For the first fifteen months of the insurgency, “the French conducted small-scale combing operations which yielded almost nothing and served to alienate more and more Muslims.”⁴⁴

The COIN forces successfully denied internal sanctuary in remote areas by

⁴⁰ Alf Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 4.

⁴¹ Messali Hadj was central in the nationalist buildup towards the Algerian War (1954-1962), but came to have little influence over the development leading to Muslim independence and the founding of new political and state structures since 1962. Hadj proved to be mainly successful among Algerians living in France, which was important for the financial support of the war. His politics were moderate and pragmatic, yet founded on Marxist principles.

⁴² Jureidini, *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, 80.

⁴³ Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, 12.

⁴⁴ Jureidini, *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, 257.

controlling access and road networks through superior resources and technology, forcing the insurgents to seek refuge in the urban centers. In 1956, “the French Army adopted new countermeasures” aimed at “obtaining the support of the local population and starving the FLN of vital external support and internal territorial control.”⁴⁵ The French instituted *quadrillage*: “a grid operation garrisoning in strength all major cities, towns and villages;”⁴⁶ and resettlement of areas of large concentrations of ALN⁴⁷ forces to pacify the population in order to deny internal safe havens and diminish ALN’s security and freedom of movement. The French denied external sanctuary by controlling Algeria’s land borders with Morocco and Tunisia through an intricate physical and human infrastructure of “electrified barbed wire fence complex with minefields, radars, and patrol zones for armed elements.”⁴⁸ The French counterinsurgents overcame the physical conditions of sanctuary and maintained a distinct advantage over the insurgency with regard to technology and resources.

The French Army failed to implement measures to counter or address the human conditions of sanctuary until it was too late and the FLN had already secured international “ideological sanctuary” for their cause. In order to win over the population in 1958, “the French Army began a large-scale reform movement in the rural areas.”⁴⁹ They formed elements called Specialized Administration Sections (SAS) to integrate with the *quadrillage* to develop social infrastructure,

⁴⁵ Rabasa, *Money in the Bank*, 23.

⁴⁶ Jureidini, *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, 257-258.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 258.

⁴⁸ Rabasa, *Money in the Bank*, 23.

⁴⁹ Jureidini, *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, 258.

provide basic public services and build indigenous self-defense units.⁵⁰ Although the SAS program was a sound “human terrain” COIN initiative and addressed many of the socio-economic and security conditions, it was too little, too late, to counter the cultural identity element. By that time, Algerian nationalism and pan-Islamic identity had already secured Algeria’s independent future.

Conclusion

The Algerian Revolution case study underpins the power of the human condition in both insurgency and sanctuary. The French Army was militarily successful at nullifying the physical conditions of internal sanctuary through heavy-handed, military methods and effectively denied remote internal safe havens and external sanctuary through advantages in technology and resources. Where they failed, however, was in adequately addressing the human conditions of sanctuary. Even though there might not have been much the French could have done to counter the Algerian nationalist and pan-Islamic identity, they failed at employing all of their instruments of power in an integrated approach to improve the socio-economic and political conditions of the Algerian population. The Algerian Revolution is a classic example of a sole-agency approach misapplying a specific instrument of power in multiple LOOs creating a recipe for strategic failure. The counterinsurgents denied external sanctuary, but failed to address the human condition of sanctuary in an internationally-acceptable manner. Their heavy-handed, military-centric methods to deny domestic and external sanctuary

⁵⁰ Jureidini, *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, 259.

actually proved counter-productive in that they bolstered “ideological sanctuary” and international support.

Through the operational elements of sanctuary analysis, the former case studies – The Malayan Emergency and The Algerian Revolution – are two cases that emphasize the role of sanctuary and the effects of denying sanctuary by focusing elements of power on the human and physical elements of sanctuary in order to deny it. In the Malayan Emergency, the COIN strategy masterfully targets the elements of power in a WOG approach against the two operational elements of sanctuary, diminishing their benefits to the insurgents, ultimately defeating the insurgency. Conversely, in the Algerian Revolution, the French strategy directed the military instrument of power against the physical and human conditions, effectively reducing internal safe havens in the cities and denying external sanctuary, but ultimately failing to defeat the insurgency.

The Hukbalahap Insurrection (1946-1955)

Introduction

The Malayan and Algerian case studies involved two insurgencies that denied sanctuary through similar ways but different means, methods and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), resulting in opposite outcomes. The Hukbalahap (Huk) insurrection case study highlights three major points. First, when the combination of sanctuary and external support are denied to the insurgents, the outcome is inevitable – the insurgency will fail! Second, the methods to deal with internal sanctuaries and bases of support must remain focused on ameliorating the root conditions of sanctuary in order to deny local support. Third, an indigenous-led and combined WOG approach to security, development and assistance is very effective at defeating an insurgency. The Huk Insurrection vignette is a classic example, much like today's successes in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM - Philippines (OEF-PI), of using smart power and indirect approaches to defeat an insurgency. The *Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan* (People's Liberation Army) never generated external support or found external sanctuaries. Nonetheless, the Huks certainly attained physical safe haven, finding protection in the mountainous-jungle and hard-to-access, underdeveloped villages and barrios.

Physical element

Although the Philippine Islands were easy to isolate, essentially preventing external sanctuary, the mountainous-jungle and remote, hard-to-access barrios sufficiently sheltered the insurgents, providing them the much-needed

internal safe havens required for security and freedom of movement. As a result of the fighting between the Allies and the Japanese on the Philippine islands during World War II, the road networks had been heavily damaged and the Americans had only repaired the networks required to retake the islands. This left poor mobility infrastructure to the remote areas, which limited vehicular travel and favored the Huk who were on foot,⁵¹ further adding to the inaccessibility of security forces and governmental authoritative reach. The combination of the rugged jungle terrain and deficient or unrepaired mobility infrastructure increased the security and freedom of movement of the insurgents' safe havens.

Human element

The post-World War II socio-economic conditions, political corruption, and the Government of Philippines' (GOP) initial heavy-handed policy for dealing with the insurgents disenfranchised the Philippine population as a whole, and the Huk insurgents more specifically. As far as socio-economic conditions, "essential services were in chaos... food production was at a standstill and the health system was horribly overtaxed."⁵² The dominant socio-economic system was the land tenancy system, the most compelling reason for social unrest.⁵³ Two U.S. policies at the beginning of the Philippine Insurrection only exacerbated the situation. First, the USG denied Filipino veterans their benefits for serving in the U.S. Armed Forces in the war against Japan. Second, U.S. Congress passed the

⁵¹ James Weber, "Philippine Engineers in Nation Assistance: The Huk Campaign," *Engineer* 23, no 1 (February 1993), under "EBSCOhost,"

<http://connection.ebscohost.com/content/article/1025878912.html> (accessed 23 November, 2008).

⁵² Major Lawrence Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines 1946-1955* (Historical Analysis Series, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987), 29.

⁵³ Eduardo Lachica, *The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 40.

Philippine Trade Act of 1946,⁵⁴ which essentially formalized the pre-war economic system, further disenfranchising the populace and providing the Huk legitimate grievance of political corruption while providing no real efforts to bring about socio-economic reform.⁵⁵

The other human condition, common identity, was intrinsic in Filipino culture. As noted by Lachica, the Filipino population:

derive their strongest support from their own kin, neighbors and barriomates. This system of mutual dependency is a traditional function of the Philippine social structure.⁵⁶

The Huk benefited from this relationship with the populace. This relationship manifested itself in the development of the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC), basically an “underground government” responsible for the guerilla warfare support systems.⁵⁷ Similar to the support *Min Yuen* provided to the MRLA during the Malayan Emergency, the BUDC aided or assisted in a number of essential functions: transportation, recruiting, intelligence, communications, and the public works (sanitation, agriculture, etc...) of the Barrio. The popular support from the human terrain advanced the critical factors of security and freedom of movement for the Huk insurgents. The combination of the physical elements of hard-to-access, rugged territory and the human element of disenfranchisement and common ethnic and cultural identity significantly contributed to the critical factors of internal sanctuary in the way of resources, support, security and internal freedom of movement. Despite this internal support, however, the insurgents

⁵⁴ The Philippine trade Act of 1946 passed by the U.S. Congress specifying the economic conditions governing the emergence of the Republic of the Philippines from U.S. rule; the act included controversial provisions that tied the Philippine economy to that of the United States.

⁵⁵ Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection*, 35.

⁵⁶ Lachica, *The Huks*, 29.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 109-110.

were never able to generate or acquire the necessary external support or sanctuary required for insurgency survival.

COIN approach

Even though the Filipino counterinsurgents started off with a counterproductive, heavy-handed approach, they eventually succeeded in developing LOOs effectively targeting the physical and human elements of internal sanctuary. Through strength of personal character and conviction, Secretary of Defense Ramon Magsaysay took action to gain public confidence by focusing on the populace's legitimate grievances and policing up the Huk leadership. There are several COIN measures worth mentioning that highlight the WOG approach across multiple LOOs, addressing everything from public diplomacy; governmental and economic reform; penetration of indigenous security forces into the safe havens; to U.S. monetary and technical assistance in building partner nation capabilities and capacities. Following World War II with the start of President Quirino's administration, the Huk insurgency raged due to lack of confidence in the government, characterized by poor policies and socio-economic conditions, and exacerbated by poor COIN practices.

A pivotal turning point for the Filipino counterinsurgents was when President Quirino appointed former World War II guerilla leader, Ramon Magsaysay, Secretary of Defense.⁵⁸ He quickly made "sweeping reforms and reorganization" in the Philippine Armed Forces.⁵⁹ He increased the size and professionalized the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Among the many

⁵⁸ Robert Smith, *The Hukbalahap Insurgency; Economic, Political and Military Factors* (Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1963), 100.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 101.

changes in the Armed Forces, they were directed to “protect the populace.” By first restoring public confidence in the AFP, he was able to restore public confidence in the government as a whole. Along with military reform, he formed the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) to conduct civil affairs. They built farm settlements, wells, transportation infrastructure and schools, thereby improving the standard of living which diminished the social unrest.⁶⁰ The indigenous EDCOR battalions were vital in reducing both the physical and human elements of sanctuary in that they opened up access to remote areas and their civil affairs projects gained the confidence of the local populace.

The U.S. played a significant role in financing the Filipino counter-guerrilla campaign, training and assisting AFP soldiers and civilians to undertake a “peoples war”⁶¹ and introducing “dirty tricks”⁶² such as contaminating Huk war material illicitly acquired from corrupt government suppliers; conducting psychological warfare that played on local superstitions and cultural fears; infiltrating the Huks with Filipino volunteer agents; and significantly improving interrogation and interview techniques, stealing a page out of the Huk’s play book by gaining the sympathies of the barrios through public outreach and delivering basic necessities in food, medicine and clothing.⁶³ Later, in his new role as President, Ramon Magsaysay, “orchestrated all government agencies to address each element of counterinsurgency,”⁶⁴ ultimately defeating the Huk movement. As successful as the AFP were at killing Huk leadership, the EDCORs were the

⁶⁰ Weber, “Philippine Engineers in Nation Assistance.”

⁶¹ John Tierney Jr., “Can a Popular Insurgency Be Defeated,” *Military History* (March 2007) : 57.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Tierney Jr., “Can a Popular Insurgency Be Defeated,” 57.

⁶⁴ Weber, “Philippine Engineers in Nation Assistance: The Huk Campaign.”

key effort in the development and assistance LOOs which severed popular support and, in the end, defeated the insurgency.

Conclusion

In summarizing the Huk insurrection case study, the Huks lost the insurrection primarily because they had no external support or sanctuary. Domestically, however, the remote areas and villages of the Philippines had the necessary physical and human conditions for sanctuary. The symbiotic combination of the physical and human conditions provided the Huks several beneficial factors. The Huks found physical safe haven and freedom of movement in the remote barrios which were outside the reach of the undermanned, ill-equipped and poorly trained AFP. They acquired resources, intelligence, transportation and other support from the BUDC or shadow government. They shared common identity with the local populace due to cultural kinship. With the appointment of Ramon Magsaysay, the Filipino counterinsurgents turned the tide of the insurgency with sweeping political, social, military, and economic reforms. Finally, and most significantly, a WOG approach which conspicuously directed all of its instruments of national power on the physical and human elements of sanctuary and support defeated the insurgency. The U.S. played a critical role in funding and assisting the GOP in their struggle to defeat the insurgency.

Chapter Conclusion – Summary of Findings from Historical Insurgencies Analysis

This chapter examined three twentieth-century insurgencies to explore the cause and effect of countering the physical and human conditions of sanctuary as a means to denying sanctuary and defeating an insurgency. Although there is not a single critical vulnerability to insurgency, the chapter demonstrated that sanctuary is a strategic pillar of insurgency and eliminating that pillar directly contributes to the outcome of the insurgency. There are several common findings that highlight the commonalities of sanctuaries, their operational elements, their critical factors and how counterinsurgents addressed them.

First, in all three cases COIN forces denied external sanctuary. The Huk, in the Philippine Insurrection, never really had external sanctuaries or acquired external support. In the Malayan Emergency and Algerian Revolution, the COIN forces denied external sanctuary by physically isolating the insurgents to the internal areas of the country through border control and COIN pursuit forces. Furthermore, neither the Huk in the Philippines nor the MRLA in Malay had any substantial external support. However, the ALN had tremendous external support in its neighboring countries as well as in France, the US and the international community at large. Although French COIN forces denied the physical aspects of support in the way of people, materiel, weapons and supplies, they never denied external ideological support.

Second, internal safe havens are absolutely critical to the insurgents' ability to conduct their essential functions: rest and refit; recruit and train; organize, plan and rehearse; and initiate offensive operations. In all three cases,

the insurgents either had in place, or established, internal sanctuaries. The insurgents benefited from the physical and human elements of these internal sanctuaries which provided the security and freedom of movement for the insurgents to perform their essential functions.

Third, all three insurgencies benefitted from the physical element of sanctuary. Whether it was due to the natural protection of indomitable terrain or man-made protection of urban centers, the physical safe havens provided insurgents cover and shelter from collection and intelligence assets. Additionally, many of these safe havens were beyond the authoritative reach of the government and either indigenous security forces or COIN forces. The restricted access of the safe haven combined with the human element of effective governance added to this “beyond-the-reach” protective factor. In both the Malayan Emergency and the Philippine Insurrection, the insurgents enjoyed security and freedom of movement in their remote safe havens created by the harsh jungle terrain and the limited or poor road and mobility infrastructure. However, in the Algerian Revolution, the COIN forces controlled the access to the harsh remote areas. The ALN insurgents were forced to find asylum in the cities, which provided the same benefits of security and freedom of movement but in a different form that had limited but effective utility.

Fourth, in either the remote or urban internal sanctuaries, insurgents’ security and freedom of movement depended on human support, the human operational element of sanctuary. Through the examination of the three case studies, the author determined that there are two over-riding human factors

required for sanctuary. The first is the common identity that the populace shares with the insurgents. National, religious, tribal, ethnic and cultural affiliations are social orders that the insurgents exploit to identify with the populace. The second factor is weak social space that the insurgents can exploit, which is borne out of poor socio-economic conditions that create a disenfranchised populace.

All three insurgencies to varying degrees benefitted from the human factor of common identity, with Algeria benefitting the most. In the Malayan emergency, the common identity factor was confined to the Chinese MRLA insurgents and their local support, the *Min Yuen*, who were also Chinese. This trend remained isolated to the Chinese who never really assimilated to Malay national identity. The Huks, in the Philippine Insurrection, shared the cultural kinship of the larger Philippine population and were initially supported by a shadow government organization, the BUDC. When the Philippine government provided outreach to address the grievances of the populace, a backlash was set in motion when the Huk insurgency attacked the indigenous efforts, a disingenuous rejection of a solution to the insurgency's own grievances. Finally, in the Algerian Revolution, common identity was pervasive among the native Algerians. The ALN insurgents affiliated completely with the Algerian populace through the nationalism and pan-Islamic movement prevalent throughout the country. Common identity enhanced all three insurgencies' security and freedom of movement.

In addition, all three of the examined insurgencies had in common the human element of weak social space. The immediate post-war policies in both

Malaya and the Philippines hindered socio-economic opportunities through slow reconstruction and outreach, poor national reconciliation and the likely continuation of pre-war, colonial policies that agitated the grievances of the disenfranchised populace. Similarly in Algeria, the colonial, ethnically-divided, two-class society created a vastly weaker social space. Political alienation and under-representation, economic maladjustment and poor standards of living caused by lack of essential services disenfranchised the native Algerian populace. In all three cases, this weak social space enhanced the security and freedom of movement of the insurgents.

Fifth, in all three cases, the counterinsurgents who understood that sanctuary is a critical capability of insurgency developed strategies and methods to deny sanctuary. In all three insurgencies, the counterinsurgents directly addressed both the physical and human operational elements of sanctuary. Some methods were more effective than others. Nonetheless, the COIN forces focused on both elements as ways to deny the insurgents the benefits of sanctuary, security and freedom of movement.

In the Malayan Emergency, the COIN forces mitigated the physical elements present by improving their access to the remote jungle areas through innovative helicopter tactics and improved road infrastructure. The UK/GOM counterinsurgents separated the insurgents from their popular support through resettlement and food denial. Although the COIN forces resettled the “squatter” areas, they were empathetic to their poor socio-economic conditions and provided essential services and other opportunities in the resettled camps to ameliorate the

resettled “squatters” grievances. Hence, due to efforts to eliminate or diminish physical and human elements of sanctuary, the COIN forces denied internal sanctuary and defeated the insurgency in Malaya.

In the Algerian Revolution, the COIN forces also focused on denying sanctuary by addressing the physical and human elements. The COIN forces effectively reduced the physical element of sanctuary in the remote areas through advantages in technology and resources. They diminished both the physical and human aspects of urban areas through resettlement, establishment of security zones, and *quadrillage*. They were temporarily effective at reducing the grievances of the local populace through the SAS. Although the COIN forces effectively denied sanctuary, the insurgents never lost their common identity with the populace or popular support from the international community and accomplished their political objective - independence.

The COIN forces in the Philippine Insurrection effectively addressed the physical and human elements of sanctuary. They improved their access to the remote areas by improving the road networks. They reduced the human element through civil affairs projects that enhanced or restored essential services, improved the standards of living for villagers, and provided a means for governmental outreach. Other national reforms and policy changes gained the confidence of the populace and diminished popular support for the Huks. The counterinsurgents effectively denied internal sanctuary by addressing its physical and human elements and eventually defeated the Huk insurgency.

Finally, scrutiny of the outcome of the insurgency, dependant on the COIN forces' ability to deny sanctuary, was necessary to determine the linkage between denying, or eliminating, sanctuary and defeating an insurgency. In all three cases, external and internal sanctuaries were denied. The insurgencies in Malaya and the Philippines were ultimately defeated. However, the insurgency in Algeria was not defeated. Therefore, a direct correlation between denial of sanctuary and defeat of an insurgency cannot be assured. This monograph does not elaborate on other strategic pillars of insurgencies, but recognizes that there is not a single dominant pillar to insurgency. Rather, there is a symbiotic relationship between the pillars that demands a holistic approach in order to defeat an insurgency. Despite the ultimate outcome of the insurgency, the argument put forward is that elimination of sanctuary without simultaneously addressing both of its operational elements – physical and human – cannot be achieved.

The Malayan Emergency case study illustrated that a COIN campaign focused on addressing the physical and human conditions of sanctuary is an effective method of denying sanctuary as an integral part of a holistic strategy to defeat an insurgency. It also highlighted a comprehensive, WOG approach integrating multiple agencies in order to provide security, assistance, and development. The Algerian Revolution case study examined an insurgency where successful denial of sanctuary, by targeting the operational elements of sanctuary, did not prevent the insurgency from achieving its political aims. The Hukbalahap Insurrection case study detailed the efficacy of defeating an insurgency by

addressing the operational elements of sanctuary, with added emphasis on how the COIN forces ameliorate the human conditions through soft and smart power.

The next chapter will examine the operational elements of sanctuary in a contemporary context. Comparative application of the historical analysis to the FATA will evaluate the operational elements, the critical factors of sanctuary, and COIN methods and their effectiveness, and proscribe possible future strategies.

Chapter Three – FATA (A Tale of Three Insurgencies in a Land of Eternal Sanctuary)

Introduction

Having defined sanctuary and applied a conceptual framework to understanding its importance to an insurgency, we can now use this approach to examine a contemporary insurgency with the goal of analyzing how to deny sanctuary as a way to assist counterinsurgency practitioners, strategists, and policymakers. According to a 2009 U.S. GAO report, “Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing terrorist safe havens along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan have been key national security goals.”⁶⁵ Clearly the USG has noted the importance of one of the most forbidden physical spaces on earth to the American effort to stabilize Afghanistan. In order to achieve regional and global stability, COIN forces must contain, isolate, and defeat the numerous insurgent forces in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and deny the FATA as a sanctuary (see map 1). The FATA provides sanctuary to three distinct but interrelated insurgencies in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) region. It is the sole common sanctuary to insurgencies in which Taliban, Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) and AQ loom large. Left undone or uncontested, the insurgencies in the FATA threaten: the stability of the Karzai government in Afghanistan; disrupting U.S./NATO objectives for transition and reconstruction; the stability of the fledgling democratic Zardari government in Pakistan; and regional stability, particularly with India. While arguable, of greater concern is

⁶⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with Afghanistan*, February 2009 (Washington, DC), 1.

that the longer FATA remains a sanctuary the more likely it is that it can become a staging base for attacks against America and the West.

Map 1 – Pakistan & Surrounding Region – Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt CSR36



The Regional Situation

There are several complex and interrelated challenges that make this situation tenuous and uncertain. First, after almost seventy years of an autocratic government, Pakistan held elections in 2008 and Asif Ali Zardari became the new president. Zardari’s administration is struggling to govern Pakistan and has several competing national security issues to contend with at the same time. Pakistan’s economy, marked by high inflation rates, low income, corruption and a large budget deficit, was faltering prior to the global financial crisis and depends heavily on loans from the World Bank and IMF.⁶⁶

Pakistan is fighting an internal insurgency as well as external insurgents that have sanctuaries in the FATA. Pakistan’s authoritative reach is more

⁶⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, 9.

restricted now than it was before the ousting of the Taliban from Afghanistan. With increased attacks on NATO convoy routes in Bajur and Swat, the insurgents are showing a capability to operate in the North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP), an area once firmly under Pakistan's control. This expansion of capabilities has been traced to tribal militants, such as TTP, that use the same methods the Taliban used in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, and more recently in the FATA, to secure their influence and control. The pro-government tribal constabulary, the Pakistani Frontier Corps, ill-equipped and inadequately trained for COIN, is understandably not motivated to fight their own people, nor are they capable of challenging the heavily-armed and combat-experienced tribal militias.

Manned, trained and equipped for conventional war and defending the country against India, the Pakistani army has very little experience in COIN. In fact, the Pakistani army has never really been suited for COIN. Since gaining their independence from Britain in 1947, the Pakistani army, modeled after the British army, has been organized, equipped and trained to fight mechanized and armored conflicts much like the ones they observed in the Arab-Israeli Wars and like the one in which they participated in the first Gulf War.

Ironically, for an Army that has effectively used irregular and tribal surrogates to fight against conventional Indian forces in the Kashmir and former Soviet Union Armed Forces in Afghanistan, the Pakistani army is inadequately prepared to combat irregular forces in Pakistan. Their current doctrine of "offensive-defense" relies heavily on launching a large force into enemy territory in order to seize it. As shown in the case studies, applying this mindset and

doctrine in COIN has had the opposite effect in twentieth-century insurgencies. Large, conventional, and indiscriminate sweeps have a way of missing their intended high-value individuals, leaders and insurgents with significant collateral effects to noncombatants and their infrastructure which alienates the local populace. Not to mention, the Pakistani army, composed predominantly of Punjabis, has no ethnic ties to either the Mahsud or Wazir Pashtu tribes in the FATA.

The FATA, populated by roughly 3.5 million people out of a total Pakistani population of nearly 170 million, is a tribal belt administered by the Pakistani government consisting of seven tribal agencies (Kyber, Kurram, North and South Waziristan, Mohmand, Bajaur, and Orakzai – see Map 2).⁶⁷ Its area is approximately 10,500 square miles, roughly the same size as the state of Maryland.⁶⁸ It shares a 373-mile border with Afghanistan.⁶⁹ The entire Pakistani-Afghani border runs 1,640 miles of difficult, very different terrain, from the southern deserts of Baluchistan to the northern mountain peaks of the NWFP.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office, 6.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Daniel Markey, “Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt,” *The Council on Foreign Relations*, CSR no. 36 (July 2008): 18.

Map 2 – NWFP & FATA – Source: Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt CSR36



Finally, there is the almost non-existent control of the Af-Pak border area where the FATA is located. The Af-Pak border area, demarcated by Britain in 1893, and called the Durrand Line,⁷¹ remains under dispute. The rugged border area is extremely porous and neither the Pakistanis nor the Afghans are able to control the movement of people. This area has never been truly controlled and the tribes have never been conquered by a foreign invader or subordinated to central government control. The Durrand Line arbitrarily divides an ethnically common people, a proud egalitarian and warrior society of Pashtuns, that claim a territory historically and culturally their own. Untouched by modernity, beyond

⁷¹ Rubin, Barnett R, and Abubakar Siddique, "Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate," *United States Institute of Peace* (October 2006), under "usip," <http://www.usip.org> (accessed January 12, 2009), 4-5.

the reach of central authority, and governed by their own ancient and varied tribal traditions, the FATA and its people are a world unto themselves.

The Enemy – the Insurgencies that Dwell, Survive, and Flourish in the FATA

Currently, the FATA provides sanctuary to several fragmented and factionalized insurgencies that aggregate due to tribal custom, religious edict or other binding common purposes. There are three of specific interests to this chapter's analysis. The first and most threatening to U.S. national interests at home and abroad is Al Qaeda (AQ); an organization still headed and led by Usama bin Laden (UBL) and Ayman al-Zawahiri. AQ uses FATA as a sanctuary to plan attacks - the example of the 2006 trans-Atlantic aircraft with direct connections to Rashid Rauf, a member of Jaish-e Mohammed (JM), an AQ-associated group in Pakistan,⁷² clearly indicates that AQ, given a level of protection from attack, still has the transnational reach and depth to plan and coordinate an attack on U.S. interests. Rashid Rauf, a British militant of Pakistani descent, had been a key suspect in the plot to blow up trans-Atlantic airlines in 2006.⁷³ In August of 2006, Rashid Rauf's detention in Pakistan led to 25 arrests in Britain. Later in 2007, while awaiting a hearing on a separate case and facing extradition to Britain,⁷⁴ he escaped from Pakistani authorities. He was killed in a missile strike in the North Waziristan portion of the FATA in Pakistan on 23

⁷² Associated Press, "Pakistan: Suspected London Plane Terrorists Have Al Qaeda Connection" *FOX News*, August 11, 2006, under <http://www.foxnews.com/> (accessed October 26, 2008).

⁷³ Andrew Testa, "Trans-Atlantic Aircraft Plot (2006)," *New York Times*, February 18, 2009, under "Times Topics," http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/t/terrorism/2006_transatlantic_aircraft_plot/index.html (accessed March 27, 2009).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

November of 2008. The 2006 plot disrupted normal flights schedules for days, had significant economic impact on multiple airlines in the U.S., U.K. and Canada, led to the implementation of drastic security measures that are still in place today, and is believed to be the most severe AQ terror plot since September 11, 2001.

The second and third insurgencies are the product of a split of the original Taliban into the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban due to some, or all, of the following: an ideological fracture in their goals and aims, sub-tribe disputes, a cultural of fragmenting and factionalizing. In its simplest form, the original Taliban, sometimes termed the old Taliban or Afghan Taliban, is led by Mullah Omar. He has stated that the Afghan Taliban is no longer aligned with AQ's goals to establish a Pan-Islamic caliphate in Afghanistan. However, it desires to re-establish the Taliban-controlled government in Afghanistan as it existed prior to UBLs arrival.

The Taliban has re-emerged in Afghanistan as an insurgency seeking to destabilize the Karzai government by disrupting U.S./NATO efforts to establish a secure and stable pro-Western government. Since 2006, the insurgents have gained momentum and their attacks are bolder, more lethal, and more frequent. The overall number of attacks, number of attacks targeting non-combatants, and the number of suicide bomber attacks in Afghanistan has nearly tripled since 2005.⁷⁵ Mullah Omar's Taliban fighters enjoy the critical factors of security and freedom of movement in the external sanctuary of the FATA. They have used

⁷⁵ Anthony H. Cordesman, "Losing the Afghan-Pakistan War? The Rising Threat," *Center for Strategic & International Studies* (September 18, 2008), under "publications," <http://www.csis.org/burke/reports> (accessed October 23, 2008).

time and sanctuary to rearm, refit, train, add new recruits from the madrassas in Pakistan, and gained knowledge from other fighters in Iraq. As a result, the Taliban insurgents have become more effective and now employ tactics learned from Iraq. External sanctuary has been critical to the Taliban's resurgence and resiliency. Also, warfare is seasonal in Afghanistan. Winter is a time for return to sanctuary to rest and prepare for the new season of fighting.

Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), the new Taliban or Pakistani Taliban, is an internal insurgency headed by Baitullah Mehsud who intends to Taliban-ize Pakistan by waging jihad against the Pakistani government. TTP resorts to terror, assassinations and suicide bombings and has no regrets targeting Muslims, women, or children. A clear example of Baitullah Mehsud's methods, and one for which he has claimed responsibility, is the spectacular attack and assassination of Benazir Bhutto, former president of Pakistan, on 28 December 2007.⁷⁶

Baitullah Mehsud's TTP is not necessarily tribal-based, but rather "a transregional movement aligned with different disaffected local groups and even some criminal elements to produce a network of militants across the NWFP and FATA."⁷⁷ The Taliban movement of the 1990s was seen as positive by many people in the FATA and NWFP because they saw it as bringing stability to

⁷⁶ Rahimullah Yusufzai, "The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Taliban," *The Jamestown Foundation: Global Terrorism Analysis* 6, no. 3 (February 8, 2008): under "terrorism," http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?issue_id=4379 (accessed October 26, 2008).

⁷⁷ Shuja Nawaz, "FATA – A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenges of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan," *Center for Strategic & International Studies* (January 2009): 18.

Afghanistan after years of civil war.⁷⁸ But for many Pashtuns in both the tribal and settled areas of the frontier, there is great concern about the Pakistani Taliban for two reasons.⁷⁹ First, “their criminality and willingness to resort to suicide attacks against other Muslims belie their Islamic message”⁸⁰ and, second, “their violent resistance against the Pakistani state is unsettling.”⁸¹ Baitullah Mehsud’s Pakistani Taliban fighters enjoy the same benefits of sanctuary that the Afghani Taliban enjoys - security and freedom of movement in the FATA.

Conditions of Sanctuary

The FATA, for centuries, has been the ideal sanctuary for insurgents. Like no other place in the world, the FATA has the most potent blend of physical and human conditions creating a complex challenge for strategists and counterinsurgents.

The FATA bears all of the physical and human conditions of sanctuary. Tribalism and the human spirit are as indomitable as the geographical terrain, which is undoubtedly some of the most rugged and austere terrain on the planet. Invaders, occupiers and empires from Genghis Khan to Alexander the Great to Arab conquerors, ten centuries later, to the empires of Britain and the Soviet Union, most recently, failed to conquer its lands and control its people.⁸² The combination and interrelationship of these physical and human elements provide

⁷⁸ Nawaz, “FATA – A Most Dangerous Place,” 18.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, *The Soviet-Afghan War; How A Superpower Fought and Lost* (Kansas City: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 4-7.

several beneficial factors to the many insurgencies that seek refuge there: freedom of movement, resources, support of the populace, security, poor governance, rest and refit, recruit and training of personnel, operational planning and rehearsing, neutralization and degrading of advanced intelligence technologies as well as the denial of foreign human intelligence networks penetrating the space.

Physical element

Much like the mountainous-jungle terrain in the Malayan and Philippine case studies, the harsh, indomitable terrain of the mountains in the Afghanistan – Pakistan border area of the FATA provide the same beneficial factors – security and freedom of movement - to the insurgents it harbors there as did those jungle safe havens in the historical case studies. The harsh terrain of the FATA provides distance and cover, and denies, or limits, the advantages that COIN forces usually have over insurgents in resources and technology. The FATA, located in Pakistan around the Af-Pak “disputed” border area, is predominantly populated by Pashtun tribes, sub-tribes and clans. In *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, Akbar Ahmed’s description of South Waziristan, one of the seven agencies in the FATA, eloquently depicts the indomitability of the territory:

The South Waziristan agency is about 4,000 square miles with mountains as high as 11,500 feet. Temperatures go up to 120 degrees F in summer and below freezing in the winter. The terrain is harsh and mountainous and ... desolate valleys and barren mountains distinguish the agency...The climate is one of extremes. The heat is unbearable in the lower regions in the summer....120 degrees by day...and a minimum of 90 degrees at night...Dozakh Tangi, ‘the gorge of hell’ ...is appropriately named for the heat in the summer months...In winter the cold, sharp winds are equally unbearable...Waziristan groups ...tend to migrate to kin groups in search of more congenial climate for ... the two extreme seasons. Names like...Kiddar Ghula, ‘the mouth of the jackal’ suggest the nature of the geographical terrain...⁸³

⁸³ Akbar S. Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan* (Cambridge: Routledge, 2004), xxii.

Additionally, the harsh, rugged terrain and the underdeveloped, underfunded, and poorly-developed and poorly-maintained road infrastructure inhibit access to the FATA (see Picture 1). Due either to poorly-trained, tribally-ethnic security forces, or heavily armed and better trained insurgent forces, the insurgents control these roads, denying access, attacking mounted movements and convoys, and establishing illicit checkpoints to fund and resource activities. The extreme geography and control of the roads that provide access to these insurgent safe havens has other effects on the local populace. First, it hinders other infrastructure development like sewage, water, electricity and telecommunications (SWEAT). Second, it limits the amount, reach and efficacy of other essential services to the area such as schools, medical and public safety services. Finally, it isolates “tribal communities from markets, health and education services and many outside influences.”⁸⁴ These naturally-induced effects further bind the local populace into supporting the insurgents, whether directly or indirectly.



Picture 1 – example of terrain challenges to road infrastructure – Khowst Province – Afghanistan;
Source: <http://farm4.static.flickr.com>

⁸⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office, 9.

The physical elements of the FATA significantly impacts the security and freedom of movement of the insurgents by preventing access to security forces and their intelligence systems and disrupting or degrading government outreach and infrastructure development efforts. As formidable as the physical conditions are, the human element of sanctuary in the FATA is just as daunting, if not; more daunting.

Human element

According to the framework, two human conditions enhance the beneficial factors of sanctuary: cultural, or anthropological, common identity, and poor socio-economic conditions. Cultural identity is the most dominant human condition in the FATA and might be the most dominant of the operational elements (see Pictures 2 & 3). Tribalism is a pervasive way of life that has existed for centuries in the Af-Pak border region and is the principal governing factor that directs cultural behavior. COIN forces should never underestimate or discount the power of tribalism in insurgencies.⁸⁵ As the principal governing factor, tribalism takes precedence over Islamic fascism or Pakistani nationalism influences. AQ and Taliban share the same Sunni-based theocratic convictions and adherence to Sharia law, but tribalism and Pushtanwali code forge their alliance more than either nationalism or religious extremism.⁸⁶ The tribal structure in the FATA is best described in *A Most Dangerous Place: FATA Explained* by Shuja Nawaz:

⁸⁵ Doctor Paul Melshen, Professor of History, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College, NDU, interviewed by author, Norfolk, VA, on 23 October, 2008.

⁸⁶ Ahmed, *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*, 24.

The Pashtun belt ... is inhabited by people who have preferred to be guided by a tribal code of behavior (Pashtunwali) rather than by laws made by modern states for modern times. To this code that has existed even before Islam entered the area, they have added some aspects of the Islamic law, Sharia. The combination of these two codes has produced a way of life that has been practiced for centuries. Among its many features the strongest are an abhorrence to accept outside interference in internal affairs, an equal amount of reluctance to be governed by a central authority that operates from a distant place. And confidence in the ability of local leaders to provide protection to their communities and to provide an environment in which they can live according to their own laws and practices.⁸⁷

Most noteworthy of all of the Pashtun tribal customs and traditions in the Af-Pak border region is its abhorrence for outsiders and their interference. The resolute spirit of the tribes blended with the Pushtunwali code is a powerful catalyst for popular human support for the insurgents seeking sanctuary. Both indigenous and foreign insurgents alike exploit the Pashtun's concept of hospitality to strangers called *melamatia*. The support provided to the insurgents in the FATA by the local populace is more powerful than that provided by the Chinese *Min Yeun* and the Filipino BUDC to the MRLA and Huk insurgents in Malaya and the Philippines because it is honor-bound by a warrior code and cultural norm as compared to the others' mere cultural kinship. Local support in the FATA to any insurgent group need not be sought nor coerced by the insurgents; the Pashtun clans' norms dictate it and they offer it freely. This type of local populace support greatly facilitates the insurgents the security and freedom of movement to conduct their essential functions.

Another complicating factor is the shift of power and influence from the malik, or tribal elder, to the mullah, a spiritual advisor, a phenomenon referred to as "Talibanization."⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Nawaz, "FATA- A Most Dangerous Place," 6.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.



Picture 2 – Taliban fighters in the snow
Source: <http://cache.daylife.com>



Picture 3 – Pakistani pro-Taliban militant fighters
Source: <http://www.malagent.com>

As an egalitarian society, the tribes' governing construct was the *jirga*; an official community gathering of the tribal males where each has equal rights to speak and vote; with the tribal elder as its representative to the government of Pakistan through the Political Agent (PA). The mullah, however, was not a member of the *jirga*. In fact, he was an impoverished and illiterate spiritual adviser who was heavily dependent on the malik for income and security and did not have an independent political voice.⁸⁹ The situation changed in 1979 when Pakistan financed and armed a large variety of mujahedeen movements through the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) to check radicalized movements⁹⁰ inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini's religious revolution in neighboring Iran. Another contributor to this change was the large presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan who might rekindle the idea of a separate Pashtunistan in the Af-Pak border area. Pakistan wrongly assumed it could control these movements through the official hereditary malik, but "the

⁸⁹ Nawaz, "FATA- A Most Dangerous Place," 14.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

movements mutated out of state control” and into radical madrassas or religious schools control, with the mullah at the head of the militias.⁹¹

Whatever motivation the tribes in the FATA have for supporting and harboring AQ and other Taliban or splinter groups, be it *melmastia*, financial gain, or mullah-coerced, the intact human societal bond that has not been defeated and enhances security and freedom of movement.

Poor socio-economic conditions, the second human condition of sanctuary, are just as systemic and facilitative to sanctuary as are tribal traditions and culture. “North and South Waziristan agency areas are geographically, economically, and socially at the extreme periphery of Pakistani society, and have been historically independent of any central authority due to its inaccessibility.”⁹² The FATA region, by the 9/11 Commission standards, remains ungoverned or, at a minimum, under-governed.

For instance, the FATA is governed by an administration and a judicial system different from the rest of Pakistan – namely, the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) of 1901, codified under British rule.⁹³ This system, under the direct authority of the president of Pakistan, not the National Assembly of Pakistan,⁹⁴ characterizes FATA populations as being unequal to other Pakistani citizens and denies access and representation by national political parties. Obviously, this political alienation and discriminatory policy creates weak social space that the insurgents can exploit.

⁹¹ Nawaz, “FATA- A Most Dangerous Place,” 14.

⁹² U.S. Government Accountability Office, 22.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

Another disenfranchising element is the standard of living conditions. After decades of regional instability and poor governance in the FATA, the tribal economies have evolved from subsistence farming and raising of livestock to unregulated, cross-border trading of goods in gray and black markets.⁹⁵ Further, “the FATA is the poorest, least developed part of Pakistan...about 60 percent of households live beneath the poverty line.”⁹⁶ The terrain and tribal conditions make access, availability, and development of municipal infrastructure (SWEAT) and basic government services (such as health, education and safety services including medical, fire, and police) nearly impossible. Barnett Rubin and Abubakar Siddique paint a very illuminating, though grim, portrait of the human condition in the FATA in their special report, *Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate*:

Poverty levels are as high as 60 percent, twice those in the rest of Pakistan. Official statistics estimate the literacy rate at 17.4 percent...Only 102 high schools...on the other hand, madrassahs have mushroomed... up to 300...only 542 medical doctors practice in FATA, one for every 6,307 people and there is no healthcare infrastructure in some remote regions...FATA receives only about 1 percent of the national budget...the Per capita development allocation is one-third of the national average...the per capita income...is half that of Pakistan’s national average...the unemployment rate is 60-80 percent, or even close to 100 percent seasonally.⁹⁷

The political alienation, discriminatory policies and poor socio-economic conditions have disenfranchised the populace. Many Pakistanis, particularly in the FATA, believe the Pakistan government is fighting America’s war and therefore maintain allegiances to the once accepted Taliban practices as a way to check regional actors and control of borders without the cost of troops. The volatile combination of enmity for the U.S./West, tribal code or “primary group

⁹⁵ Rubin, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” 13.

⁹⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, 9.

⁹⁷ Rubin, “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” 13.

cohesion,” and the disenfranchising conditions, allow the local populace to provide essential support functions to AQ and the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban, as well as other fragmented splinter groups. Another byproduct of this situation is that young tribal males, much as in the formation of inner-city gangs by disenfranchised and radicalized youth, are easily enticed to join the radicalized militias like the TTP.

The Bifurcated, Insurgent-centric COIN Approach to Date

The U.S. /GOP strategy to deny the FATA as a sanctuary has been a series of uncoordinated efforts between the U.S. and GOP. This is due primarily to the fact that each country has had different objectives rather than a combined collective security understanding or agreement. The U.S. has had predominantly an insurgent-centric or leadership-centric strategy focused on capturing and killing AQ senior leadership as the method to prevent spectacular terror attacks on the Homeland. Meanwhile, the GOP has been more concerned with the changing geopolitical situation in the region. Specifically, the Pakistani army, which was in control of the Pakistan government for seven of the last eight years, has chiefly been concerned with countering regional actors with the utmost focus on India’s growing influence in the area, particularly in Afghanistan. The U.S.’s combating global terrorism goals and the GOP’s regional security goals have not always been mutually supportive. In either case, neither the U.S. nor the GOP had developed COIN strategies for the FATA which targeted the physical and human elements of sanctuary, and as the historical case studies have shown, sanctuaries

cannot be eliminated or denied without addressing these two operational elements of sanctuary.

Although the U.S. strategy to kill and capture AQ leaders in Pakistan over the last eight years has been marginally effective, the strategy to deny the FATA as a sanctuary has been largely ineffective. Over that same period of time, the GOP, a critical partner to the U.S. in destroying AQ organization, with assistance from U.S. intelligence agencies, has apprehended a number of key AQ leaders in the urban and other non-sanctuary areas of Pakistan, but its efforts to deny the FATA as a sanctuary have been sporadic, half-hearted and completely ineffective. The Pakistan army has deployed several times, often under U.S. pressure or insistence, to root out AQ and Taliban militants in the NWFP and in close proximity to the FATA. Their military ranks have suffered significant personnel losses during the course of these operations and have gained very little militarily. In fact, many times these operations have ended in stalemate with peace deals or agreements being brokered between the Pakistan army and the militants or tribes. More distressing for Pakistan, the FATA's boundaries are creeping further into other Pakistan provinces. The insurgent groups in the FATA have not only benefited from the operational elements of the FATA but their security and freedom of movement have, actually, been strengthened by the lack of combined U.S. /GOP effort to deny the FATA as a sanctuary. The re-emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan's southern and eastern provinces, the TTP's attacks on NATO re-supply convoys in Pakistan, the recent attacks in Mumbai, India and

into other eastern provinces of Pakistan, and AQ's continued operational planning for attacks on the West confirm this trend.

Through the context of the framework established from the historical case studies, it is evident that both the U.S. and Pakistan have taken unilateral and combined actions to target the insurgents and militants in the FATA, but have failed to develop strategies to address the operational elements of sanctuary. The GOP and U.S. have taken a route similar to that observed in the case studies where the COIN forces initially pursued insurgents in heavy-handed military operations that proved ineffective at denying sanctuary and alienated the populace. The U.S. has conducted kinetic air strikes on insurgent leadership located in the FATA and NWFP and the Pakistan Army has conducted large conventional military sweeping operations on pockets of assembled militants in adjacent areas. Although there has been some attrition of leadership and militants, the FATA remains a safe haven and the insurgent groups seeking refuge there are benefitting from both the physical and human elements of sanctuary.

Despite their slow start, the COIN forces in the historical case studies eventually developed methods and strategies to address the operational elements. The U.S. and GOP, on the other hand, have been slow to develop and implement strategies focused on the operational elements, for a number of reasons. First, the U.S. has lacked a comprehensive plan for the FATA since the beginning of OEF.⁹⁸ From March 2003 until just recently, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) diverted critical resources and attention from Afghanistan to Iraq, further complicating the strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most of the U.S.

⁹⁸ U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2.

assistance and support to Pakistan thus far has been funding of conventional military equipment as well as payment for services rendered in support of U.S. combating terrorism efforts inside of Pakistan. There has not been a U.S.-orchestrated plan that integrates all of the elements of national power in providing defense, diplomacy and development to Pakistan.

Second, Pakistan has always lacked the capacity in their security forces to conduct COIN and has been slow to transform its military from a conventional war focus to a COIN focus due to regional tension with India. Also until recently, Pakistan has lacked the will or desire to crack down on the insurgent groups as the ISID once were and still are, to some lesser extent, inextricably linked to sponsoring these surrogate groups as a cheaper resource (manpower, money, equipment) option of maintaining border control, regional stability and sovereignty. Additionally, for the first 5-6 years of OEF in Afghanistan, Pakistan remained skeptical of U.S. commitment due to the historical trend of inconsistent U.S. policies on Pakistan. The reasons notwithstanding, the GOP and U.S. have failed to develop a sufficient COIN strategy focused on the operational elements of sanctuary as a way to deny it. The way ahead for denying sanctuary must be a “whole-of-international-community” effort focused on reducing the operational elements of the FATA’s sanctuary in order to defeat the insurgencies that reside there.

Chapter Four – Conclusion & Epilogue

Conclusion

The challenge facing the United States in accomplishing its overall global objectives through regional execution is the need to build multilateral alliances. Working through indigenous intelligence agencies, security forces, and governmental agencies to disrupt AQ attacks both on the U.S. Homeland and interests abroad is a starting point. Simultaneously, the U.S. must provide Pakistan, a critical U.S. partner, the time, space, capabilities, and capacities to defeat its own internal insurgencies. The U.S. and its allies cannot afford to strategically and unilaterally focus on short-term, terrorist-centric or insurgent-centric goals at the risk of long-term regional instability in Pakistan. An unstable Pakistan, if left unattended or poorly managed, could eventually emerge as a global crisis through insurgency expansion into Pakistani-controlled areas. If Pakistan becomes a failed state with radical elements controlling the country and, potentially, its nuclear arsenal, they would become a threat to their regional neighbors and the broader global community.

The Pakistan plan for the FATA has been as inconsistent, incoherent and incomplete as the U.S. plan, which bodes poorly for U.S. strategic interests both regionally and globally. Pakistan must **within their writ** deny sanctuary in the FATA and defeat the insurgencies. Surely the U.S. and other international partners can assist, but only if Pakistan has the will and commitment to a long fight with its former associates. Overall, both the USG and GOP approaches are

falling short and are not adequately using a WOIC approach targeted at countering the operational elements of sanctuary.

There are three strategic courses of action (COA) that USG and GOP can undertake in order to defeat the insurgencies in the FATA, all of which have different costs and risks associated with their implementation. The first possible COA, which until recently had been the U.S. strategy and is still a large component of current U.S. strategy, is an approach targeting terrorists in the FATA. This terrorist-focused strategy seizes fleeting opportunity to capture or kill HVIs and AQSL without much consideration for subsequently reducing the operational elements of sanctuary or the collateral effects of their strikes.

Although this approach has been successful in reducing the insurgent leadership, it has limited value in diminishing the strategic pillars of insurgency, particularly sanctuary. As the case studies and model demonstrate, this approach has very little chance of being successful. This strategy will not deny sanctuary. Security and freedom of movement can be temporarily disrupted, but the accomplishment of long term denial of sanctuary will fail as HVIs and AQSL will move to other safe havens in the FATA. This strategy cannot sever or terminate the insurgencies' essential organizational functions, only interrupt them.

Furthermore, this COA risks the development of a WOIC-backed, indigenous-led approach as USG unilateral actions can alienate the government and people of Pakistan, not to mention the broader Islamic and international communities.

This strategy addresses neither the physical nor the human element of sanctuary in FATA. In fact, it actually allows the insurgents to further exploit the

operational elements to their advantage, particularly the human element. The collateral damage caused by USG kinetic drone strikes intended to kill AQSL in the FATA, or fabricated by the enemy, is not winning the support of the populace. The insurgents are using the human element of common identity to play to the local populace and foster mistrust in the GOP thereby bolstering support to the insurgents and to a larger, globally-connected insurgency. The greater risk to this strategy, as evidenced by the current situation in Pakistan where the insurgencies' boundaries are expanding eastward and the insurgent threat appears to be growing, is jeopardizing the long term stability of Pakistan.

The second possible COA is a strategy led by the GOP and focused on countering or defeating insurgent forces with military intervention as a last resort. The Pakistani army has a longer-term vision regarding Pakistani civil institutions' responsibilities in denying sanctuary. Currently, these institutions lack the capabilities and capacities to provide political, social, and economic reform to insurgent-controlled areas. The army brokers peace deals with the militants believing it to be "fruitless to pulverize the Taliban, and in the process kill many civilians"⁹⁹ without a means to address the physical and human operational elements of sanctuary. Unfortunately, a significant outcome of this strategy is that it allows the insurgents to co-exist with the populace in tribal areas and in their sanctuaries, conceding them the space and time to carry out their essential organizational functions. With this opportunity, the insurgents revitalize their goals and threaten Af-Pak security and stability. The GOP and the Pakistani army

⁹⁹"A real offensive, or a phoney war?" *Economist.com*, April 30, 2009, under "The Economist print edition: May 2, 2009, Briefings," <http://www.economist.com/printedition/index.cfm?d=20090502> (accessed May 29, 2009).

only intervene when insurgent forces attempt to gain more territory outside their sanctuaries. Similar to the U.S. strategy, attacking insurgents embedded within the populace, in areas where the insurgents have taken local control and intend to expand their territory and influence, does not sufficiently address either the strategic pillars of insurgency or the operational elements of sanctuary. In this scenario the Pakistani army, unskilled and unprepared to fight insurgent forces embedded within the populace, conducts conventional military operations to clear local areas of insurgent forces embedded with the populace, often displacing large portions of the civilian populace and forcing the insurgents to withdraw to their more isolated safe havens. Although the insurgents fail to expand their territories, they are still able to conduct their essential organizational functions in the refuge of their sanctuary. Insurgents' security and freedom of movement in their sanctuary remain unaffected but limited. This strategy, much like the previous, has a slight chance of success in defeating the insurgency over the long term. By isolating the insurgents in more remote portions of the FATA they become less effective. However, this approach takes a decade-long involvement of clear and bold military operations and significant commitment of non-military actions to isolate insurgents from the population.

This strategy does not completely address either the physical or human operational elements of sanctuary and presents potential prolonged risks to Pakistan's stability. As the case studies highlight, when government security forces which are inadequately prepared and equipped to conduct COIN fight insurgent forces embedded within the populace, they often resort to large,

conventional military sweeps. Large military sweeps to dislodge and defeat insurgent forces mixed with civilians can have detrimental effects on the human element. First, there is a higher potential for non-combatant casualties as a result of indiscriminate or imprecise kinetic operations. Second, collateral damage to infrastructure and disruption of essential services further worsen the populace's standards of living. Both effects are counterproductive to COIN forces' ability to secure the populace and to gain their confidence. Additionally, there is a greater risk of displacing significant portions of the populace, as evidenced by recent Pakistani army operations in the Swat, Buner, and Dir areas, where according to Amnesty International reports "700,000 civilians remain stranded amid the fighting in Swat."¹⁰⁰ Greater populations of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees require more humanitarian assistance and become targeted by insurgent groups to recruit fighters, both of which present greater risks to the long-term internal stability of Pakistan.

Finally, the last possible COA is a hybrid strategy of both the aforementioned COAs involving a WOIC-supported, Pakistani-led, comprehensive and integrated approach addressing both the operational elements of sanctuary as well as the other two strategic pillars of insurgency – external support and ideology. It has taken almost eight years to realize that other strategies are not defeating the insurgencies that exist in the FATA. This strategy calls for greater cooperation between the USG, GOP and its neighbors including India, Afghanistan and other regional actors, as well as other international

¹⁰⁰ Salman Masood, "New Exodus Fuels Concerns in Pakistan," *New York Times*, 16 May 2009, under "Asia Pacific," <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/16/world/asia/16pstan.html> (accessed 18 May 2009).

partners who can provide money, resources and other support in order to build Pakistani capabilities and capacities to overcome the operational elements of sanctuary. As compared to the separate USG and GOP strategies above, this collective WOIC approach would focus more directly on the human and physical elements of sanctuary in order to reduce the effectiveness of the critical factors. As all three case studies illustrated, there are several methods of reducing or degrading the insurgents' security and freedom of movement. For instance, the EDCOR battalions in the Philippine Insurrection gained access to remote areas by building roads, secured the populace and reduced government-directed grievances through civil affairs projects designed to provide essential services and improve the quality of life for locals. In so doing, the AFP reduced insurgent security and freedom of movement by addressing the operational elements of sanctuary. Although temporally effective and considered acceptable, some of the methods used by the British in Malaya and the French in Algeria are unacceptable by today's standards of human rights, but there are many creative and acceptable ways in which the GOP could extend their reach into the FATA.

There are three necessary steps to degrading the insurgents' critical factors: improving the capabilities and capacities of Pakistani security forces; improving physical access; and coupling security force and road infrastructure improvements with projects that focus on addressing the grievances of the populace through political, social and economic reform. First, the WOIC must assist in manning, equipping and training Pakistani security forces, to include, the Pakistani army, the Frontier Corps (FC), and regular police units, to conduct

COIN. Diplomacy in the region must focus on reducing Pakistan and Indian tensions allowing the Pakistani army to allocate more forces to assist in securing the FATA. As the Malayan Emergency case study illustrated, indigenous security forces, specifically police units, play a crucial role in COIN. At the local and tribal level, the populace trusts local police units more often than outside units, including the national army, and can turn the human operational element to their advantage. United States Special Operations Command's (SOCOM) security development plan (SDP)¹⁰¹ for Pakistan, which targets improving the FC COIN capabilities and capacities, has the potential to extend Pakistan's authoritative reach into the FATA, reducing the insurgents' security and freedom of movement. USG and GOP should encourage other regional and international partners to assist in funding and training to professionalize and improve Pakistan's security forces to conduct both COIN in the FATA as well as negotiations on mutual or collective security initiatives. USG must persuade GOP to adopt other non-military interagency efforts that complement improvements to Pakistan security forces and GOP's ability to conduct COIN, including improving intelligence-sharing between USG, GOP and GOA; improving civilian control of the army; restructuring ISID under civilian national security architecture rather than the Pakistani army; and ceasing completely the former ISID and Pakistani army practices of providing support to militant groups as a tool of Pakistan foreign policy.

¹⁰¹ SOCOM's plan to assist in building the capacity of Pakistani military and Frontier Corps forces. Currently, special operations forces are helping train Pakistani trainers in the North-West Frontier Province in order to enhance their counter-insurgency operations.

Second, improving GOP access into denied areas and sanctuaries is critically important for extending GOP's reach and reducing the insurgents' critical factors. There are two ways to improve the physical access to these denied areas. The first is improving the road and mobility infrastructure into the sanctuaries. As highlighted in the Algerian Revolution case study, it is important that the government security forces maintain control of the roads and mobility infrastructure. Advantages in resources, technology and security can help accomplish control of the roads. The second way to improve access is to have ground and air mobility assets that can maneuver quickly, protect themselves and deliver needed capabilities to the scene, particularly when the need for security force capabilities are paramount. Pakistan's critical partners can provide assistance in both these areas. WOIC partners can provide funding, equipment and technical assistance for infrastructure improvements, and helicopters, trucks, ambulances, and security and safety vehicles to improve GOP's ability to access remote areas. Improving mobility infrastructure and assets not only reduces the physical operational element of sanctuary but aids government, non-government, international and private volunteer organizations to reach the human operational element. When these collective organizations effectively improve basic necessities and essential services to the populace, the insurgents' security and support from the populace degrade significantly.

The third essential component of a WOIC strategy to reduce the operational elements of sanctuary is coupling Pakistan's political, social and economic reform efforts with improved security and physical access efforts. The

Malaya Emergency and Philippine Insurrection case studies demonstrated the effectiveness of this method of combining reform measures and civil affairs projects with security and access measures. The Philippine EDCOR battalions were extremely effective at not only gaining access to remote areas, but securing their legitimacy with the populace by improving SWEAT services to the populace. As the indigenous security forces' COIN capabilities and access to the remote areas in Malaya improved, the UK/GOM effectively delivered economic, political and social reform through socio-economic improvements and political representation of the disenfranchised populace. The GOP's Sustainable Development Plan (SDP)¹⁰² for the FATA has significant goals and objectives for social, economic, and ecological reform in the FATA. The GOP lacks the security to project these efforts consistently into the remote areas. The security and access improvements coupled with the SDP objectives could extend the GOP's authoritative reach into the FATA, gain legitimacy with the populace, and reduce the critical factors of sanctuary. The international community's contributions to GOP's SDP will be crucial to addressing the human operational element of sanctuary. The GOP should explore other areas of reform. For instance, GOP should seek opportunities to re-empower the tribal elders and de-emphasize the mullahs' influence on governing tribal affairs. In addition, GOP should look at methods to allow political representation into the FATA and repeal or reform the FCRs which have contributed to the disenfranchisement of the tribes from the nationalism of Pakistan. The U.S. must continue to support a democratically elected government

¹⁰²Government of Pakistan, "Sustainable Development Plan for FATA," under "New Initiatives: SDP," <http://www.fata.gov.pk/subpages/sdp.php> (accessed May 29, 2009).

in Pakistan thereby demonstrating to the global community its commitment to the long-term security and stability of Pakistan.

The risk to this strategy is the investment of political will, time and resources to see it through to fruition. As proven in the case studies, defeating insurgencies can take decades. Even after counterinsurgents committed to dealing with the operational elements denied sanctuary, it still took several years to defeat the insurgencies. The U.S. and GOP have just recently come to terms with the more relevant benefits of a WOIC approach targeted at the operational elements of sanctuary, but have been unable to abandon their previous methods due to competing policy objectives. The greatest detractor to this strategy is the history of the FATA and its people and the commitment of Pakistan. In the past, outside interference in the affairs of indigenous tribes of the FATA has only been tolerated for a short period of time and is akin to committing an act of war. The USG cannot realistically deny sanctuary in the FATA unilaterally. Success will take time and patience working through Pakistan. Denial of sanctuary in the short term is impossible. Management of sanctuary, on the other hand, by targeting the operational elements that will degrade its critical factors, effectively diminishing the insurgents' ability to conduct their organizational functions and plan and carry out attacks, is possible. The current methods of unilaterally targeting terrorists or tolerating insurgents without addressing the physical and human operational elements will not deny sanctuary. These COAs do not address or overcome the operational elements of sanctuary which provide security and freedom of movement, factors critical to insurgents' ability to carry out their essential

organizational functions. Although they have been somewhat effective at containing the insurgent threat to a regional level and prevented another AQ attack on the Homeland, the insurgencies are growing stronger and threatening to expand from a regional to a global level. The third strategic COA, a WOIC-supported, Pakistani-led, integrated plan, has a much more likely chance of success in denying sanctuary for two reasons. First, applying WOIC instruments of power (money, resources, and technical support) and building Pakistani indigenous security forces' capabilities to enhance their counterinsurgency operations, will allow the GOP to overcome the physical element of sanctuary by gaining access and providing security with indigenous security forces, innovative tactics and advantages in intelligence and technology. Second, securing the populace with indigenous forces of common identity and creating the opportunity, space and time for the GOP to project development and political, social, and economic reform into the area will allow the GOP to overcome the human element. This COA, although time- and resource-intensive, has proven effective in past insurgencies in reducing the operational elements, thereby denying sanctuary. Denying sanctuary in the FATA might not defeat the insurgencies that exist there, but not denying sanctuary will certainly ensure the insurgencies' survival.

Epilogue

This thesis established a model for denying sanctuary by addressing its operational elements in order to degrade the critical factors of sanctuary. The thesis also advocated defeat of insurgencies by holistically addressing their strategic pillars of ideology, external support, and sanctuary. Today's VEOs understand the globalization of the world and are seeking the *time, space and opportunity* to carry out their organizational functions in 21st century fashion. Although supported and conducted in more technologically advanced methods in multiple domains, many of the organizational functions remain the same. These illicit groups can find sanctuary in non-traditional, non-physical space, for example cyberspace, particularly by way of the internet. For instance, functions that can be accomplished almost instantaneously on the internet include conducting financial transactions to re-arm, refit, and resupply; recruiting personnel; communicating plans, intentions and orders to subordinates or affiliates; proliferating terror TTPs; perpetuating extremist ideology; and planning and organizing spectacular attacks.

As the twentieth-century insurgency case studies and the ongoing insurgency in the FATA have established, if COIN forces, military and non-military, can reduce or turn the operational elements in their favor, or at least render them neutral, they can deny sanctuary. Counterinsurgent man-hunting methods are very effective in treating the symptoms of terrorist or insurgent organizations and are a required capability in defeating VEOs and insurgent organizations, but as proven herein, often fail to deny sanctuary or defeat

insurgency and in some cases actually further the insurgencies' goals. For example, USG drone strikes have killed several HVIs and AQSLs, and the Pakistani army has killed many militants in several military operations, but the sanctuary of the FATA remains and insurgents continue to thrive and conduct their essential functions from their sanctuary there. Similarly, counterinsurgents can attack internet systems and service providers, temporarily disrupting the illicit activity, but that will not deny sanctuary in that space.

Although the operational elements will not be exactly the same in non-physical space, the critical factors of security and freedom of movement are relatively similar. Therefore, the model for denying sanctuary has broad application to non-physical spaces. The key is identifying the operational elements. The WOIC must decide if collective security in cyberspace is in their best interests and act accordingly.

U.S. national security architecture must decide how to proceed in our struggle to defeat a global insurgency such as AQ. As opposed to the traditional example that comes to mind when envisioning strategic pillars of any theory, usually legs supporting a barstool, perhaps a better analogy is to picture a child's disc swing, supported by a braided, multi-strand, nylon rope that can still function as a swing even if one of the strands is damaged. The only way to render the swing inoperative is to sever all the strands of the rope. If AQ's COG is its extremist ideology, then the U.S. must integrate all of its elements of national power and solicit its global partners to mobilize their elements of power in order

to holistically and systematically attack AQ's strategic pillars in combination in order to render its proverbial swing inoperative.

Glossary of Acronyms

Af	Afghanistan
AFP	Armed Forces of Philippines
ALN	<i>Armée de Libération Nationale</i> (National Liberation Army)
AQ	al Qaeda
BUDC	Barrio United Defense Corps
CbT	Combating Terrorism
COG	Center of Gravity
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CT	Counterterrorism
EDCOR	Economic Development Corps
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCR	Frontier Crimes Regulation
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GOA	Government of Algeria
GOA	Government of Afghanistan
GOM	Government of Malaya
GOP	Government of Pakistan
GOP	Government of Philippines
Huk	Hukbalahap
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Afghanistan Force
ISID	Inter Services Intelligence Department
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
LOO	Line(s) of Operation
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MRLA	Malayan Races Liberation Army

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLF	National Liberation Front
NWFP	North Western Frontier Provinces
OEF	Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
Pak	Pakistan
SAS	Special Administration Section
SWEAT	Sewage, Water, Electricity, and Telecommunications
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, Procedures
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States of America
USG	United States Government
VEO	Violent Extremist Organizations
WOG	Whole of Government
WOIC	Whole of International Community

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