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JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

FOLLOW THE LEADER: A PROPOSAL TO MAKE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT
GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT WORK


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Signature.  _____

12 June 2009

Thesis Adviser: William Eliason, Colonel, United States Air Force

Abstract

National security professionals in the government and in supporting institutions such as think tanks and universities agree that the U.S. must bring to bear all elements of national power in its global engagement strategy. Coherent whole of government approaches will enable the U.S. to use those power sources properly and effectively to cope with the challenges of the 21st century, especially in this era of rapidly emerging economic constraints. The U.S. must do so using 21st century mindset and organizational behaviors. The 21st century's multi-polar world presents the U.S. with networked, complex, "wicked" problems.

In the words of the Project on National Security Reform's nineteen members of its guiding coalition, representing hundreds of years of senior executive experience across the spectrum of national security affairs: "It is our unshakable conviction that the United States simply cannot afford the failure rate that the current national security system is not only prone but virtually guaranteed to cause." Resource allocations, DoD preeminence, bureaucratic nature, culture, prerogatives, power structures and human nature all contribute to this failure. Further, the system as currently organized and operating militates against and actively forestalls change. Compounding the difficulty, the billowing economic crisis makes change now much harder as it saps attention and resources from the nation's leaders and coffers.

Fortunately, the nature of both the causes of the system's deficiencies and the barriers to change is amenable to remediation through rejuvenated leadership and management. Leadership can promote cultural and mindset change, while management

can implement effective controls and processes, both by leveraging bureaucratic and human nature within the existing system.

Leadership is the key, since superficial changes that do not touch the underlying cultures and mindsets will be transitory and illusory. The President needs to bring true leadership to the fore through a top-level national security summit to set the establishment on the path to “think globally and act locally,” with the specific agenda to:

- Develop and commit to a national and national security strategic framework;
- Shape and commit to fulfilling agency and department whole of government task responsibility allocations and core missions;
- Empower execution through teams practicing collaboration, coordination and cooperation, and imbued with unity of purpose.

True leadership and management will begin to change the establishment’s core values and make the improvements needed to be effective in the 21st century. The establishment will move to realign resources, establish core missions across the NSE through the budget process, implement controls to ensure accountability, and develop national security professionals through training and cross-assignment.

The envisioned National Security Council will epitomize these changes in the national security establishment’s *modus operandi* and *milieu*. It will become more the President’s principal mechanism for strategy than policy and more for oversight than implementation. It will manage the national security processes for the President but not the establishment. Taking a less formalistic but feasible path, leaders and managers, using 21st century mindsets and practices, can and will achieve the real change the country needs and can realize now.

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“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change.”

Charles Darwin

I. Introduction

The inability to deal successfully with the instability in Iraq after the end of major combat operations in mid-2003 was the latest stimulus to prompt the United States to move toward a whole of government (WOG) approach. While increasing the military presence to establish security, the U.S. also brought to bear a broad range of government resources. The U.S. achieved its surge to a WOG response without government restructuring or major formal changes.

The United States national security structure does not now optimally leverage all elements of national power to achieve its strategic ends - the national security establishment needs to function more effectively. Many senior leaders implementing initial steps and Washington think tanks agree the nation needs to take a whole of government approach in pursuit of its objectives. Analyses have identified many impediments encountered in efforts to date. Advocates for the whole of government approach often propose major changes through legislation or executive order, but accompanied by significant structural changes in the legislative or executive branches to overcome those impediments.

Unfortunately, comprehensive formal change comes only slowly and is slow to produce real change. Legislation or executive fiat often effects change only marginally, since such measures attempt to produce change without taking into account the underlying functions of leadership and management and the effects they have on culture, behaviors, oversight and execution processes and resource allocation. Inadequate or

misdirected leadership and management produce and perpetuate the current conditions. Thus, leadership and management are also the ways and means for progress.

Thesis: Furthering the United States national interests and succeeding in whole of government global engagement requires effective leadership and management to bring about changes in behaviors, processes, culture, and resource allocation.

This paper makes specific recommendations to move forward in implementing the thesis. It founds those recommendations on an analysis of the case for change, an exploration of the forcing factors prompting the current clamor for change, and factors that retard progress. From this exploration, the paper develops the bounds of achievable change within which the recommendations lie.

The United States may benefit from restructuring its national security establishment. However, whole of government effectiveness can progress without it. Indeed, leveraging the leadership, behaviors, processes, culture, management and resource allocation factors has the potential to build relationships and processes supportive of whole of government success. This success can be achieved under any structure, can create and sustain a milieu necessary for evolving the current parochial culture, and ultimately guide the restructuring itself.

II. Introductory Notes.

“Whole of Government” vice “Interagency”

Regardless of the terminology in source documents, the author chooses to use the term “whole of government” throughout to focus on the desired outcome: responding as a nation vice as agencies or departments. The objective is that the government’s agencies, however structured, behave as a whole rather than as the parts, regardless of how well synchronized. Although U.S. literature on this engagement style uses “interagency” more often and usually treats it as synonymous with “whole of government,” “interagency” has the unfortunate side effects of concentrating on the seams and tacitly accepting that the disability of the agencies of government to work together is congenital.

“Whole of government” also better reflects reality. As of 2007, all the cabinet departments and many of the agencies within them, OMB, the Council of Economic Advisors and various other commissions, high level advisors and advisory bodies in fact play significant roles in national security affairs.¹ The issue is not whether the whole of government is engaged; only how effective that engagement is and how to improve it.

Limits on Scope to International Security Matters

9/11 brought home to Americans that national security matters can have consequences within our borders and that the nation needed to call for concentrated attention on homeland security. Recommendations from other analyses that the United States should integrate its international and homeland security functions may be valid. However, this thesis focuses on the traditional international engagement bounds of “national security.” The recommendations may be applicable in homeland security as

¹ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, (Project on National Security Reform: Arlington, VA), 453.

well, but addressing that realm here would introduce additional complexity that would detract from the thesis' primary focus without useful benefit to the analysis.

Research

The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) published its capstone work (*Forging a New Shield*) on November 26, 2008 as a report to the President. That work and the studies and analyses leading to it used greater than 500 sources, compiling and synthesizing the recommendations from the building consensus and integrating the current discussion. As shown in the bibliography, the author has reviewed much of that work in preparing this thesis. As *Forging a New Shield* is now the preeminent work in this area of study,² the positions, recommendations, case studies and citations used in this thesis frequently come from the PNSR work.

This thesis cites original sources where available and uses other sources to provide additional perspectives to the focus of the PNSR. The author's forty years of military, contractor and civil service experience in the national security field and bureaucracy, coupled with more than fifteen years in joint assignments and his current intelligence community joint qualifications, shape the thesis recommendations.

This monograph is not a précis or critique of the PNSR work. It does not attempt to evaluate the PNSR report, either *in toto* or in the particulars. *Forging a New Shield* includes many specific detailed recommendations besides the major reforms it proposed. This paper does not attempt to address each or any of them, and passes judgment on neither any specific recommendation nor the thrust of the PNSR report. It does, however, offer some alternative analyses, conclusions and recommendations. The thesis attempts to

² House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, *Project on National Security Reform: Commentary and Alternative Views*, 111th Cong. 1st sess., March 19, 2009.

prepare for the potential that the government will respond to such extensive change as PNSR proposes with slow evolution rather than revolution, and that the evolutionary path will not follow precisely the course PNSR had laid out.

Regardless of the path taken, it is critical to have a bright, clear and consistent vision of the ultimate end state of a functional, effective and efficient national security establishment leveraging all our nation's capabilities.

“If the only tool you have is a hammer, it is tempting to treat everything as if it were a nail.”

Abraham Maslow¹

III. The Case for Change

Key assumptions

1. The U.S. will continue to choose global engagement. This assumption had been sacrosanct in recent international affairs, but the recent global economic troubles have stirred the forces of isolationism in the United States and elsewhere.

2. The need for change will continue, albeit with urgency weakened by impeding factors in section VI below.

Basis for the Need for Whole of Government Engagement

The conclusion of major combat operations does not end a war. As Clausewitz pointed out, “War is only a branch of political activity; ...it is in no sense autonomous.”² “Politics,” in Clausewitz’ sense, has many branches. The whole of government form the branches, the trunk and the root system of a nation’s political “tree.” Just as the tree survives as a living organism, a nation’s global engagement must operate as an integrated whole to achieve optimal results.

As with Clausewitz’ famous dictum that war is the continuation of politics by other means,³ stabilizing and enabling civil authority to one more aligned to the winner’s

¹ Abraham Maslow, *The Psychology of Science* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), <http://www.quoteland.com> (accessed November 23, 2008); also “If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” attributed to Bernard Baruch as “Baruch’s Law,” <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/b/bernardbar181387.html> (accessed November 23, 2008).

² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), 731.

³ *Ibid.*, 99.

norms are the continuation of war by political means. As the Rand report on prewar planning for the occupation of Iraq pointed out, “Military planners must start with a view of the desired outcome of the war—not the outcome of major conflict, but the creation of the desired political circumstances that signal the real end of the war.”⁴

The experience in Iraq proves once again that wars do not end tidily, with strategic objectives met solely through decisive combat action. The administration had set one of Operation Iraqi Freedom’s (OIF’s) strategic objectives as regime change. However, without post-combat reconstruction and stabilization, all that resulted was regime removal. Planners across the government recognized the importance of planning for the post-combat phase, but the Department of Defense was preeminent in planning for all phases of the war and emphasized combat. Planning for different end and intermediate states in Iraq certainly would have produced a different U.S. engagement posture after major combat operations ceased.⁵

The Geneva Conventions establish occupying power obligations for hygiene, public health, legal systems, and security upon conclusion of hostilities.⁶ An occupying power cannot comply with the conventions without engaging the talent and skills of its judicial, law enforcement, health and human services, education, economic and agriculture agencies. Fully complying with the specifics and intent of the conventions

⁴ Nora Bensahel et al., *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), xxix.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 15-19.

⁶ International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), *Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*. (Geneva: ICRC, 1949), <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView> (accessed November 24, 2008).

demands nation building, and building (or rebuilding) a whole nation requires engaging the whole of government.

Conduct of Foreign Policy

21st century western world statecraft aspires to avoiding conflict, and thus a foreign policy emphasizing preemptive strike raises concern in many quarters around the world. A preemptive strike policy leads to militarizing foreign and global engagement in general, since it ends the use of other means to resolve the brewing conflict. Public opinion polls and reporting of global sentiment in the last few years indicate the world skeptically views this use of military forces to shape the strategic environment.⁷ Thus, the U.S. Department of Defense finds acceptance difficult to obtain when it engages outside the military arena, whether in shaping, deterring or reconstruction and stabilization activities. Defense Secretary Robert Gates noted “what’s seen as a creeping “militarization” of some aspects of America’s foreign policy” in his speech to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign in Washington, D.C. in July 2008.⁸ Nonetheless, he supported military involvement in collaborative responses to crisis:

“In recent years the lines separating war, peace, diplomacy, and development have become more blurred, and no longer fit the neat organizational charts of the 20th century. All the various elements and stakeholders working in the international arena – military and civilian, government and private – have learned to stretch outside their comfort zone to work together and achieve results.”⁹

While increased aid and security assistance can coexist, those who distrust U.S. power find the military aspects the center of their focus. Susan Rice, President Obama’s

⁷ See various PewResearchCenter reports such as the “Pew Global Attitudes Project” and “Bush and Public Opinion,” accessed via Pew web sites such as <http://people-press.org/> and <http://pewglobal.org>.

⁸ Robert Gates, address to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign (Washington, DC, July 15, 2008), <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262> (accessed December 5, 2008).

⁹ Ibid.

pick to be the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, noted on National Public Radio that “Africa has been divided up and been the poor stepchild in each of these different commands and not gotten the full attention it deserves.”¹⁰ Nonetheless, when the U.S. stood up a new regional combatant commander (AFRICOM) to elevate the visibility of Africa in U.S. foreign policy, it encountered skepticism in attempting to find a location for the headquarters,¹¹ and efforts came to naught after almost two years of searching. Thus, although the U.S. has increased aid to Africa several-fold through initiatives such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, AIDS assistance and USAID efforts, the “militarization” filter emphasizes efforts such as the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (now Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Sahara) and extension of the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program. Just as the world’s reaction to AFRICOM’s establishment has been ambivalent,¹² the perception that U.S. global engagement is predominantly military impedes the country’s ability to wield all elements of national power effectively.

The Nature of Current Challenges

Open warfare emphasizes the military component of national power. WWII and postwar adjustments shaped U.S. national security posture in the last half of the 20th century. The National Security Act of 1947 made extensive revisions to the defense establishment to reflect the *de facto* changes in World War II and to position the nation

¹⁰ *News & Notes*, NPR, February 13, 2007.

¹¹ As a result, USAFRICOM notes that it will be “headquartered at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany, for the foreseeable future.” <http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.aspweb> (accessed May 5, 2009).

¹² Stephanie Hanson “U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM),” Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/13255/>, (accessed December 5, 2008).

for the security challenges it faced as the Cold War began. Following several smaller intervening changes and prompted by failures (e.g., Operation Eagle Claw/Desert One), with urgency underscored by the continuing Cold War, in 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Act considerably refined the 1947 construct to integrate the defense establishment more fully through increasing the department authority and strengthening the joint aspects of defense.¹³ Suboptimal responses in the 1990s, the rise of the insurgency in Iraq and the ongoing engagement in Afghanistan may fuel the current conversation and the urgency. This section concentrates on the nature of the global security environment, which creates the need.

Stimulus: Complex Problems

The world has become wicked¹⁴: the destabilizing problem sets around the world are ill-structured and increasingly nodally and interactively complex. Amorphous, loosely coupled but broadly dispersed networks of terrorists or violent extremists and abstract, situational and systemic vice actor-driven problems (e.g., economic mechanisms, pandemics) confront the United States and its allies.

The national security establishment (as with much of the rest of the world) does not deal well with complex, mutating problems. This phenomenon is not new to the 21st century, as some imply. The U.S. dealt (and deals well) with linear problems or linear phases in problems. The Cold War era was largely bipolar and the threat to national

¹³ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Washington, DC: GPO, 1986. Public Law 99-433.

¹⁴ The concept of “wicked problems was introduced by Horst W. J. Rittel in “On the Planning Crisis: Systems Analysis of the ‘First and Second Generations,’” *Bedriftsøkonomien* 8 (1972), and (with Melvin M. Webber) “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” *Policy Sciences* 4 (1973). The discussion here draws on U.S. Department of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, “THE U.S. ARMY COMMANDER’S APPRECIATION AND CAMPAIGN DESIGN (*TRADOC Pam 525-5-500*),” (Fort Monroe: 2008), 4-10 for treatment of the concept of “wicked problems” in the national security/military context.

security was linear; the U.S. response was effective. In contrast, whether in the Vietnam conflict or operations in Iraq after the conclusion of major combat, the U.S. did not cope well when the problem became extremely multi-dimensional and non-linear. The issue is not whether the U.S. can be effective, but whether the nation can deal with the preponderance of the problems it faces now and increasingly will in the future. The national security establishment (NSE), both in what it is and how it deals with the challenges facing the U.S., needs to adapt as the globe becomes more interdependent and security issues take on other dimensions than just military.

Stimulus: Non-traditional Problems

“The primary near-term security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications”¹⁵ “that will impact on our national security in ways that we quite haven't figured out yet.”¹⁶ The specter of protectionism called forth by the current economic and financial instability, a globalized world still evincing uneven development, the economic insecurity of large swaths of the world, and increasingly divergent – but successful - economic models threaten the very control mechanisms the Western financial and market system has at its core for global engagement, and U.S. stewardship of that system.¹⁷ The “financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging market nations over the next year” and that “roughly a quarter of the countries in the world have already

¹⁵ Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” (Washington, DC, February 2009), 2.

¹⁶ Interview with ADM Michael Mullen; *European Stars and Stripes*, January 31, 2009.

¹⁷ Blair, 3.

experienced low-level instability such as government changes because of the current slowdown.”¹⁸

Major demographic shifts and migrations from the growing undeveloped world to the more prosperous but shrinking western societies threaten the established body politic both in Europe and in countries only just entering the democratic community.

Information technology has networked the world – information islands no longer exist.

That network has fragmented control over global information across all topics - social, economic and political, shattering one of the central unifying factors in the nation-state model. As GEN Petraeus noted in the counterinsurgency guidance he led in developing, and as the U.S. found in Iraq, one salient feature of insurgencies is the dominance of the network, especially as characterized by its adaptability and multiplicity of connections.¹⁹ Similarly, the theme running through the aspects of counterinsurgency and best practices is networking resources, bringing to bear all the elements of power, with your partners, with the population and by destroying or disabling the insurgents’ networks.²⁰

Insurgencies are but microcosms of the wicked problems bedeviling the world. Just as a successful counterinsurgency employs an adaptive network and the full set of capabilities to defeat the insurgents, so actors on the global security stage must do the same.

Stimulus: Balanced Response Across the Conflict Cycle

¹⁸ Blair, 2.

¹⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency (FM3-24)*, (Washington, DC: 2006), 1-2 to 1-18.

²⁰ Ibid., 1-19 to 1-28.

Effective counterinsurgencies are much less about traditional military dominance than about actions before, leading to and after achieving victory on the battlefield. The military captures this in its operational six-phase model.²¹ As Figure III-1 shows, use of uniquely military forces peaks in phase III. Other elements of national power, alone or in substantial partnership with the military, can and preferably should take many of the actions in phases 0, I, II, IV and V. Indeed, wicked problems and the challenges and failures noted by the Project on National Security Reform will most likely present themselves in phases 0, 1, 4 and 5.²²




Figure III-1: Military Operations Phases (Joint Publication 5-0)

Further, all Cabinet departments and at least sixteen other agencies, advisory groups or collections of organizations (e.g., the intelligence community) need to engage to deal

²¹U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), *Joint Operation Planning (Joint Publication 5-0)*, (2006) IV-32 to 38.

²² Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, iii-iv, 105-134.

with national security issues successfully, adding a complexity multiplier on the U.S. side.²³

Stimulus: Problems of a 20th Century National Security Establishment

The PNSR identified five core problems in the way that whole of government community comes together to meet the nation's security challenges:

1. The system is grossly imbalanced, supporting strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms.
2. Departments and agencies use resources allocated for capabilities required by their core mandates rather than those required for national missions.
3. Presidential intervention to compensate for the system's inability to integrate or resource missions well centralizes issue management and burdens the White House.
4. A burdened White House cannot manage the national security system as a whole, so it is not agile, collaborative, or able to perform well.
5. The legislative branch provides resources and conducts oversight in ways that reinforce all of these problems and make improving performance difficult.²⁴

○ ***Behavioral/Procedural:***

“New institutions are needed for the 21st century, new organizations with a 21st century mind-set.”²⁵ Many interpret this to mean that the structure is incorrect for the 21st century. More importantly, however, the system functions incorrectly in large measure because national security professionals still use 20th century competencies:²⁶

- Success = Scale + Scope
- Top Down - Centralized
- Vertical Integration
- Information Hoarding
- Local Awareness
- Arms Length Relationships

²³ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 453.

²⁴ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 137.

²⁵ Robert Gates, Landon Lecture (Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, November 26, 2007), <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199>, (accessed February 2, 2009).

²⁶ John Stull, “Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Planning” (lecture, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, February 2009), chart 79.

- Make and Sell
- Inwardly Focused

21st Century competencies, however, are the coordinating and collaborative ones of the networked age.²⁷

- Success = Adaptability + Agility
- Empowering the “Edges”
- Virtual Integration
- Information Sharing
- Increased Transparency
- Collaboration & Synchronization
- Sense and Respond
- Externally Oriented
- Accelerated Innovation & Experimentation

Long-standing officials view these competencies as anti-bureaucratic. However, the current NSE is bureaucratic (some may say in the extreme) because of the need for public accountability and because it is very large as individual components and taken together. Bureaucracy is the key organizational building block of the state.²⁸

The NSE’s bureaucratic nature makes it even more difficult to solve the greatest challenge as we move into the 21st century: the NSE’s domination “by its powerful functional organizations dedicated to building, maintaining, and employing functional expertise (diplomacy, military force, intelligence, development assistance, etc.).”²⁹ Internecine competition springs from the bureaucratic nature and, often, the bureaucratic mechanisms are the ways organizations exercise their power in that competition:

“Of all the faults cited in the major cases, interagency competition is the most prominent. From this one dynamic, a host of negative consequences emerge, including poor long-range planning, policy stagnation, redundancy of efforts, the

²⁷ Stull, chart 79.

²⁸ Brian Martin, *Uprooting War* (London: Freedom Press, 1984; revised 1990), chapter 8; <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw08.html> (accessed February 22, 2009).

²⁹ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 214.

tendency to centralize policy decision authority in the White House, lack of information sharing, and senior leader frustration resulting in the use of informal communications and decision-making channels in lieu of formal mechanisms.”³⁰

This functional preeminence “does a better of job of dividing labor than coordinating it. It thus encourages specialization rather than integration,”³¹ producing exceptional but narrow competence in the functional areas. Unfortunately, functional emphasis, attention and resource allocation overwhelm exceptional performance directed toward WOG issues since the participants’ core missions do not include WOG efforts.

The NSE community generally acknowledges that the Department of Defense (DoD) plans exceptionally well. At times, this causes push-back from agencies and departments with which the DoD collaborates, since the DoD planning approach is so detailed and methodical, thereby difficult and resource-intensive. Differences in current core mission planning needs and funding postures for the various agencies lie at the root of this problem: most USG agencies and departments do not execute major long-range investment programs but maintain and operate existing systems and provide services related to their core missions. They do not need the long-range planning prevalent in DoD.

Both DoD and State have attempted to become better at planning together, but their different processes and the cultural gulf remain significant impediments to collaboration and creating WOG plans. DoD has been exporting its planning expertise, through support of the Joint Forces Command to the State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), through assigning personnel fully integrated into S/CRS, and during the increasing number of civil-military exercises. Nonetheless,

³⁰ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 118.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 214.

prospects for a quick revolution are dim: these measures must overcome the longstanding DoD “practice of excluding non-military organizations from the DoD planning process,”³² and other forms of cultural resistance. The Goldwater Nichols Act directed the DoD to be and operate as a joint organism, but DoD’s joint planning culture and mechanisms are still evolving, hobbled by often well-meaning inter-service cultural differences over twenty years later.

○ ***Cultural:***

The functional stovepipes produce professionals who are narrowly qualified rather than developing a broad proficiency across national security affairs. The functional bureaucracy does not reward and almost actively discourages individuals from seeking or taking broadening assignments. Absence of broadening experiences early in careers has created a cadre of senior professionals who do not understand nor appreciate the need or value for WOG efforts. They are thus ill equipped to manage or lead WOG efforts within their organizations or as the focal point among multiple departments and agencies.

Just as the stovepipes limit on-the-job development opportunities for broadening the senior executive’s NSE-wide foundations, few formal development opportunities exist. DoD, State (particularly S/CRS), DHS and other agencies in the NSE are moving toward implementing the National Security Professional Development Executive Order,³³ primarily leveraging ongoing programs at the Foreign Service Institute and the National Defense University. Limited numbers of personnel from across the NSE have participated in these programs for some time, but often only later in their careers.

³² Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 345.

³³ Executive Order no. 13434, “National Security Professional Development,” *Federal Register* 72, no. 98 (May 22, 2007): 28583.

There are *de facto* vice legal limitations on developing WOG professionals. An analysis of the “current human resource management system governing the civilian population of the national security community does not reveal legislative or systemic barriers to assigning employees to other agencies. The barriers arise from the departments and agencies.”³⁴ When coupled with the 20th century mindset of many leaders with long NSE governmental experience, the prospects for displaying the competencies a networked NSE needs are faint.

Organizational cultures are also isolationist and the current processes encourage them to remain so: Congressional appropriations and executive branch allocations distribute resources into stovepipes, with little opportunity to merge them when needed; performance of core, intra-agency missions determines organizational success; and a variety of impediments, both technological and cultural, prevent information sharing. In short, just as NSE leaders do not possess or display the networking competencies required for success in the exploding complexity of the 21st century, nor do the organizations they lead. Organizational or personal cultures, already made exclusive by the absence of routine interaction and systemic collaboration disincentives, in the end increasingly turn inward.

Leadership:

The NSE’s current leadership model is “conflictual and emphasizes top down direction,” even though tightly centralized leadership is inadequate and the need for distributed initiative more acute in an increasingly complex and dynamic security

³⁴ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 312.

environment.³⁵ However, that very description disguises the real problem: NSE senior executives too often eschew leadership in favor of the narrower roles as managers, organizers and wielders of bureaucratic power. Successful leadership and management practices differ markedly in an organization displaying or requiring 21st century competencies rather than the 20th century emphasis on scale and scope (the root of “turf” battles), top-down direction, inward focus and arms-length relationships. 20th century practices by senior executives do not constitute effective leadership or management in a 21st century organization.

Although competent 21st century leaders exercise authority differently from 20th century ones, a successful establishment still requires effective authority and control, not chaos. For the NSE, “the root cause of the interagency dysfunction is, in a word, *authority*.”³⁶ Dysfunctional authority and control relationships now characterize WOG activities, whether in the field or among agencies at the policy level. Authorities are weak and poorly mandated. Agencies vie to be lead agencies of desired missions (or those which will impact them significantly), while shunning resource investment and accountability for those presenting significant risk.

The concept of C2 as “collaboration and coordination” has replaced “command and control” in the WOG lexicon. Recent DoD doctrine concedes that the WOG environment will not accept exercising normal military command functions. In eight pages establishing doctrine for working with other USG entities, IGOs (intergovernmental organizations), and NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), the

³⁵ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 330.

³⁶ Jeffrey V. Gardner, “Fight the Away Game as a Team,” *The American Intelligence Journal*, (Autumn/Winter 2005): 55.

capstone publication for joint doctrine uses the concept of “command” only in the context of NGOs and IGOs, and then only to say it does not apply. In the context of USG entities, it uses only the words coordination, collaboration and cooperation as means to achieve unity of effort.³⁷ This does not imply such means are wrong for the 21st century, only that the military is the premier example of an organization structured and acculturated for a top-down and command *modus operandi*. WOG activities involving the military must grapple with the cultural stresses of alien authority mechanisms and the resistance those stresses produce.

Resource Allocation:

A strong resource position is natural and expected in DoD as the WOG authority mechanisms are alien to DoD and the military. Although numbers vary and there is considerable current pressure to increase the State Department budget, the DoD budget historically has dwarfed the State budget by a factor of over 25:1, often more. Personnel resources are similarly lopsided. Since “(l)eft unattended, resources will determine policy more than policy will determine resources,”³⁸ resource allocations are determining the national policy for WOG engagement.

Congress appropriates lower funding and personnel end-strength based on the current core missions of non-DoD members of the “nuclear” and “extended family” national security establishment. Minimal resources are available in those agencies since

³⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Joint Publication 1), (2007), VII-1 - 8.

³⁸ Robert F. Turner, “The Power of the Purse,” *The Constitution and National Security*, ed. Howard E. Shuman and Walter R. Thomas (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 73–93. Quoted in *Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield*, 373.

their core missions normally do not include WOG international responsibilities.³⁹ In consequence, “When crisis situations demand the deployment of U.S. national security capabilities, the default response is often the deployment of military forces as the only readily available ... capabilities.”⁴⁰

DoD can respond because of two practices central to their six-year budgeting processes: large annual allocations to sustain capacity for current operations and to keep forces in reserve for crisis response; and separate large programs to execute long-term acquisitions. Both practices provide for substantial resources on hand and in development for the future, and the flexibility to support short-term surge responses to security threats. That is, DoD plans for disruptions to the *status quo*.

In contrast, non-DoD budgets assume indefinite extension of the *status quo*. Budget requests are mostly for single year appropriations for operations or for new and tightly defined programs vice for enduring capabilities. Non-DoD agencies allocate only a small portion of the budget requests, if any, to building capacity or for contingencies. Although these agencies receive supplemental funding for crises (e.g., Katrina), such appropriations are only after the fact and rarely span multiple years. DoD has received a major portion of its budget since 2001 as supplemental funding for the war on terror and the war in Iraq,⁴¹ while State normally does not even request supplemental funding for its substantial support to those national efforts.⁴² These budgetary *modi operandi* outside of

³⁹ For example, see the Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2009* at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100326.pdf> (accessed May 5, 2009).

⁴⁰ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 241.

⁴¹ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 387-9.

⁴² Department of State FY2009 Congressional Budget Justification.

DoD create little surge or even diversion capacity for crises, and little opportunity to make tradeoffs through program reductions or deferrals. The budgets become much more a reflection of what the agencies had before than what they will need for an uncertain future. The default condition often continues for a considerable period. In Afghanistan, DoD and the military predominantly staff the Provincial Reconstruction Teams even seven years after the fall of the Taliban.⁴³

The inability to transition smoothly and quickly to a more balanced WOG posture results from the absence of an engagement strategy linked to resource allocations and tradeoffs. Strategy and budget formulation are normally decoupled.⁴⁴ There is no overarching national strategy or budget planning guidance spanning all the NSE WOG players, and the mechanisms to control budget and strategy alignment are inadequate in both the executive and legislative branches even if there were.⁴⁵ Neither the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) nor the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has sufficient staff to verify or compel alignment methodically or thoroughly. Cross-agency planning guidance does not exist, so there is no agreed assignment of WOG tasks against which OMB and GAO can assess budget proposals or appropriating legislation.⁴⁶

⁴³ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq* GAO-09-86R, October 1 (Washington, DC: 2008), and conversations with recent Commander of PRT Farah, Afghanistan, CAPT Frank Hughlett, July 2008-February 2009. Note, however, that PRTs in Iraq, which began three years after they did in Afghanistan, were organized, staffed and operated significantly differently: Composition was nearly all civilians, with military providing security through collocated or nearby forces rather than integrated into the PRT. The PRTs in Afghanistan had only three nonmilitary members – one each from State, USAID and U.S. Department of Agriculture, while those in Iraq averaged forty-five per PRT, including members from other relevant agencies.

⁴⁴ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 372.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 377-380.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 381, 398, 410.

Legislation also does not drive strategic resource alignment, nor provide the flexibility needed to realign as crises develop or occur. Authorizing legislation would align or shape the policies that would drive strategy development in the executive branch, but Congress routinely provides authorizing legislation only for the DoD and the intelligence community. Even with a strategic framework for the budget, Congressional rules limit flexibility in identifying WOG resource needs as a separate funding line or collectively from the involved agencies' budgets, or of adjusting Appropriations Committee allocations to subcommittees made by the Budget Resolution.⁴⁷ Once a crisis looms, Congress permits the executive branch only very limited authority to move base funding after appropriation,⁴⁸ although supplemental funding flows (whether for war or natural disasters) have greater latitude to adapt in support of current exigencies.

Per the initial Obama administration budget submission, the U.S. will continue to fund overseas contingencies through supplemental funding in the DoD budget rather than in the base budget or across multiple agencies, and it makes no specific allocations to WOG missions.⁴⁹ This will perpetuate through at least fiscal year 2011 the extraordinary difficulty in properly resourcing WOG missions and the perception of “militarization” of foreign policy.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ *Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974*, (Public Law 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, 2 U.S.C. § 601–688, as amended,), section 302.

⁴⁸ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 423.

⁴⁹ Lori Montgomery, “In \$3.6 Trillion Budget, Obama Signals Broad Shift in Priorities,” *Washington Post*, 26 February 2009; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/26/AR2009022600783_pf.html (accessed May 5, 2009).

⁵⁰ For example, see Robert Gates' address to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign (Washington, DC, July 15, 2008).

Finally, WOG missions require huge resources, especially for nation-building (or rebuilding) after a conflict or in the event of a failed state. Analysis of cost estimates from 1990-2004 shows that monthly incremental costs of reconstruction and peacekeeping operations have been approximately the same as monthly costs associated with major combat operations, but that reconstruction and peacekeeping operations continue for far longer periods. As a result, the costs of reconstruction and peacekeeping *in toto* were nearly four times the cost of major combat operations.⁵¹ By 2008, the costs of reconstruction and peacekeeping have risen to over ten times the cost of major combat operations since 1990. The bottom line is that the opportunities for reducing NSE costs lie in doing the international WOG missions more efficiently.

Management:

Efficiency, effectiveness and the controls over performance in those areas are the relevant categories for characterizing management problems experienced in NSE WOG missions. As shown above regarding resources, total costs for WOG missions far exceed those of major combat.

Disjointed execution across multiple agencies, often with missions performed outside of the agency's functional area of expertise (e.g., nation-building by DoD), points to the likelihood of inefficient resource utilization. Well-documented and publicized issues with spending controls in Iraq and Afghanistan over recent years point to probable inefficiency as well. The current controls appear to have been inadequate, both before and after creating a Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction in DoD in 2004. Whether a better WOG approach would have instituted better controls by aligning

⁵¹ U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, (Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, 2004), 194-5.

mission (and thus controls) with related missions in other U.S. agencies and department is indeterminate.

Other evidence also points to ineffectiveness. Although results have changed in Iraq over the last several years, the U.S. did not achieve its nation-building outcomes adequately for an extended period prior to closely coupled State and DoD mission execution. Performance measured by nation-building outcomes in Afghanistan remains lower than expectations. This is not to oversimplify the challenges or the U.S. responses in either Iraq or Afghanistan. However, implementing a better WOG approach in Iraq did produce better outcomes there.

The President took a forceful step to improve WOG response in the Washington arena by creating a “czar” within the NSC - the deputy national security adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan policy and implementation. The current system was not meeting the management challenges for Iraq and Afghanistan; that failure called for extraordinary measures. The President gave the “czar” a portfolio to manage the entire national security system’s efforts in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁵²

Legislatively and by executive order, the NSC is the logical place to control WOG efforts, but issue management has consumed it. The NSC has been unable to generate the vehicles necessary to control the whole of government and its resources. Although the National Security Strategy addresses a broad range of national security goals for the U.S. to strive for, neither the NSC nor any other encompassing entity (e.g., OMB) has the resources to transform that into actionable guidance or direction for the dispersed NSE. Each agency or department is left to interpret the strategy and align its budget (or not)

⁵² Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 38.

without meaningful oversight or verification of conformity.⁵³ Without clear goals or effective oversight of progress toward them, the NSC cannot determine if the U.S. NSE management has optimally used its whole of government powers to achieve national security objectives.

⁵³ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism* GAO-04-408T, 3 February (Washington: GAO, 2004).

“Change We Need”

*President Barack Obama’s
2008 Campaign Slogan*

IV. Consensus Development for the Whole of Government Approach

Has the U.S. NSE management been optimal in using its whole of government powers to achieve national security objectives? The consensus is “No.” National security leaders put this consensus on view both in their public statements and in the early actions taken and policy issued. Although the U.S. has long acknowledged the need for whole of government engagement to achieve international objectives, that need has become a central theme rather than an afterthought in the national security establishment.

Public Statements

“The President (Barack Obama) has made clear that to succeed against 21st century challenges, the United States must use, balance, and integrate all elements of national influence: our military and our diplomacy, our economy and our intelligence, and law enforcement capacity, our cultural outreach, and the power of our moral example.”¹

Prior to becoming Secretary of State in January 2006, Condoleezza Rice announced her objective for transformational diplomacy, to bring that element of national power out of the shadows of military action in Iraq.² During confirmation hearings, the new Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, has continued this theme with her emphasis: “We must use what has been called “smart power:” the full range of tools at our disposal -- diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural -- picking the right tool, or

¹ James L. Jones, (45th Munich Conference On Security Policy, February 9, 2009) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/RemarksByNationalSecurityAdviserJonesAt45thMunichConferenceOnSecurityPolicy/ (accessed February 28, 2009).

² Condoleezza Rice, "Transformational Diplomacy: Meeting the Challenge of the 21st Century" (address to students, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, January 18, 2006); <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm>, (accessed November 23, 2008).

combination of tools, for each situation.”³ Whole of government engagement is pivotal for either transformational diplomacy or “smart power.” President Obama has retained Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense and Mr. Gates’ message on the need for WOG has continued under the new administration.⁴

USAID recognizes that “the factors that lead to the initial outbreak of violence do not disappear once a peace-agreement has been signed and the risk of renewed violence in post-conflict countries is extremely high.”⁵ Thus, USAID does not consider the national security mission accomplished until the U.S. has brought the other elements of national power to bear on the root causes of conflict.

Newspapers, books, colleges, universities, government analysis offices (e.g., GAO, CRS) and many prominent Washington area think tanks have focused on national security reform to bring a broader range of U.S. strength to bear more effectively.⁶ Based on this author’s research and *Forging a New Shield’s* bibliography, major published works for the national security community to consider in planning for its future number in hundreds in just the last eight years.

Early Actions and Policies

³ U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *Hillary Rodham Clinton Nomination Hearing*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., January 13, 2009.

⁴ For example: U.S. Congress, Senate, Appropriations Committee, *Opening Statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee by Robert M. Gates*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., April 30, 2009; <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1347>, (accessed May 10, 2009).

⁵ U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A strategy for Strategy and Program Development*, (Washington, D.C., 17 Aug 2004), 2.

⁶ For examples, see Project on National Security Reform, Center for a New American Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and RAND Corporation analyses included in the bibliography.

President Bush signed a new National Security Strategy in 2006. As in the 2002 version, it emphasized security concerns but placed greater emphasis on shaping and influence - achievable only through leveraging the whole of government:

- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
- Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power;
- Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century; and
- Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.⁷

Although stating that the “place of preemption in our national security strategy remains the same,”⁸ a full reading shows the militaristic language softened considerably - the strategy also explicitly stated the “preference that nonmilitary actions succeed.”⁹

Other national security documentation and parlance join with the National Security Strategy to imbed the interagency approach in U.S. global engagement. A recent Department of Defense Directive places reconstruction and stabilization on a par with major combat operations,¹⁰ and the 2008 National Defense Strategy points out the key role of partners from other agencies in national security missions.¹¹ The capstone military doctrine document has incorporated collaborating and coordinating with other agencies to achieve national security objectives as an important element of joint

⁷ President, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, March 2006), 1.

⁸ Ibid., 22.

⁹ Ibid., 18.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operation (Washington, DC, 2005), 2.

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC, 2008), xx.

doctrine.¹² In the spring of 2006, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released the new Joint Publication 3-08 (Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination). The new Joint Publication 3-0 (Joint Operations) followed in the fall. Both publications provide “the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination,”¹³ increase the prominence of interagency operations in joint planning, and establish the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) as an element of the combatant commander’s staff.¹⁴ An analysis of operational phasing illustrated in Figure III-1 shows that the level of uniquely military effort should be low or declining in four of the six phases. Interagency partners would carry the load in those phases.

Evolution to a whole of government approach is appearing in DoD command structures, not just in doctrine. Secretary Gates noted a shift “towards new capabilities to shape the security environment in ways that obviate the need for military intervention,” and that this shift “informed the creation of Africa Command, with its unique interagency structure, a deputy commander who is an ambassador not a general, as well as Southern Command’s new orientation and priorities in Latin America.”¹⁵

The U.S. created AFRICOM using the interagency paradigm. The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has evolved to that construct, particularly since its headquarters moved from the Panama Canal Zone to Miami, Florida. Without significant military threats in the Caribbean, Central and South America, SOUTHCOM has focused on humanitarian and development activities and intends to evolve into “an interagency

¹² DoD, *Joint Publication 1*, Chapter VII.

¹³ DoD, *Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0)*, (2008), i.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, xiv.

¹⁵ Gates, address to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign.

oriented organization seeking to support security and stability in the Americas.”¹⁶

SOUTHCOM strives to fulfill nontraditional responsibilities and to take a major, if not lead, role in them. In doing so, it has reorganized away from the traditional joint structure using J-codes.

Were it not for the uniforms and military ranks, SOUTHCOM would hardly be recognizable as a combatant command. USSOUTHCOM established directorates for Partnering, Policy and Strategy, Resources and Assessments, Security and Intelligence, and Stability to be more in tune with its focus on partnership. Nonetheless, its formal mission statement is “to conduct military operations and promote security cooperation to achieve U.S. strategic objectives,”¹⁷ its reporting structure is to the Department of Defense, and its personnel and funding resources come from DoD. Although developing close relationships with the whole of government, relationships remain informal.

The WOG approach means enhancing non-DoD involvement. Initiatives regarding the State Department and its role are moving the U.S. along the path to better WOG response. Following Congressional funds reprogramming in July 2004, Secretary of State Powell created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to enhance our nation's institutional capacity to respond to crises involving failing, failed, and post-conflict states and complex emergencies.¹⁸ On December 7, 2006, President Bush elevated executive branch policy relating to S/CRS when he signed National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) to establish a new approach to

¹⁶ U.S. Southern Command, *Command Strategy 2018*, (Miami, FL, 2008), 10.

¹⁷ U.S. Southern Command, Mission Statement, (Miami, FL, 2009), <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/ourMission.php> (accessed 28 February 2009).

¹⁸ See S/CRS website <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/index.htm> for a fuller treatment of S/CRS, its missions, partners and objectives.

managing interagency efforts concerning reconstruction and stabilization. While the NSPD entrusted the Department of Defense with the conduct of OIF in the build-up, combat and stabilization phases, NSPD-44 directed the Secretary of State to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”¹⁹

NSPD-44 included an obligation for the U.S. to “respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law...across the spectrum of conflict.”²⁰ The added emphasis highlights the awakening concern, largely absent in OIF planning, for the shaping, deterring, stabilizing and enabling civil authority phases, all of which place great demands on the whole of government, and the need to place coordinating responsibility for those phases outside the Department of Defense. However, Congress did not provide either full funding or authorizing legislation for S/CRS before the end of the last administration.

The new administration, while focusing mostly on the severe economic crisis, has taken several steps to continue on the path to a better WOG. President Obama appointed two members of the Guiding Coalition of the Project on National Security Reform to key national security positions, one as his National Security Advisor and another as Director of National Intelligence. The President’s first national security directive (now called “Presidential Policy Directives”), establishing the core structures of the National Security

¹⁹ President, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*. National Security Presidential Directive no. 44. (Washington, DC, 2005), 2.

²⁰ Ibid.

Council, greatly expanded the membership of the NSC to include a much broader cross-section of the whole of government.²¹

The President set some foundations in setting up the NSC, but the budget submission to Congress for Fiscal Year 2010 did not call out specific funding or initiatives to improve whole of government performance. Instead, that submission emphasized one of the key impediments to providing the resources and attention necessary for swift, decisive and resourced WOG improvements: the severe global economic situation.

²¹ President, *Organization of the National Security Council System*, Presidential Policy Directive 1 (Washington, DC, 2009). Note, however, it did not significantly strengthen the NSC's role, but used essentially the same language as used since at least 1989.

“A crisis is a horrible thing to waste.”

Paul Romer¹

V. Impediments to Change

“The problem of interagency coordination is well recognized, and has been for at least the better part of a century, but it has not been resolved.”²

Resource Impediments to Implementing a Whole of Government Approach

Economic Crisis

Although *Forging a New Shield* identified many systemic impediments, recent events clearly show that the economic situation, in the U.S. and globally, is now the most momentous obstacle. The economic crisis voraciously consumes government energy and financial resources. With every estimate of past or projection of future economic performance being worse than the last, the crisis sucks resources every more forcefully. Congress appropriated \$700 billion for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the fall of 2008, and \$789 billion in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in February 2009. None of the appropriations in either act will improve WOG performance (the only funds designated for the traditional global engagement entities were for State information technology and to repair and modernize DoD facilities). The fact of deficit funding clearly signals insufficient revenues are available. The government can run a deficit, but any increase in the deficit reduces flexibility and makes additional deficit funding less likely for WOG reform. On top of the \$1.489 trillion designated for

¹ Paul Romer, quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat*, (New York, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005), 305.

² Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 48.

economic crisis response so far, the President's speech to Congress on 24 February 2009 acknowledged the potential need for additional government investments in the economy.³

Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 and 2010 Budgets

TARP and ARRA are effectively "off-budget" and, as noted, focus on domestic needs. The full budget deals with all aspects of U.S. policy – domestic and international. Inspecting the initial submission for FY2010 budget reveals that new WOG reform initiatives did not make the cut in the full budget either, even though the overall budget increases almost \$1 trillion from the previous administration's submission for FY2009 and \$500B over the Bush administration's estimate for FY2010.⁴ The new budget's theme is "Jumpstarting the Economy and Investing for the Future," a marked departure from significant emphasis on national security and counterterrorism in previous years; the budget's cover document addresses only the economic situation and does not surface WOG issues or overseas contingencies.

The State Department budget increases by approximately 16%, but the increases only fund the continuing core State activities.⁵ The House-approved FY2009 budget for State provides only \$140 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (within which

³ President, *Remarks of President Barack Obama – As Prepared for Delivery Address to Joint Session of Congress*, (Washington, DC, February 24, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress/ (accessed February 28, 2009).

⁴ U.S. Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 2010*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009. <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/browse.html> (accessed May 10, 2009).

⁵ The budget does call for an increase in the Foreign Service (FS). The Bush submission called for 300 additional USAID FS officers. Separate studies also have proposed that some of the increases for a personnel "float" for increased training relevant to WOG; see American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center, *A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness*, (Washington, DC, 2008), 11, 23, 29; http://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/FAB_report_2008.pdf, (accessed February 3, 2009).

S/CRS activities and proposals fall), down from the requested \$249 million. The mark concentrates appropriations on capacity building (vice direct S/CRS expenses) and limits funding transfer authority to the capacity vice S/CRS operations portion of the program.⁶ The FY 2010 budget highlights do not specifically call out S/CRS funding (although there is a State increase in funding and personnel), and provides supplemental funding for Iraq and Afghanistan contingencies only to DoD.

Thus, the FY 2009 budget continues the ponderous pace of funding WOG capacity in State. Congressional actions prior to 2008 only permitted (but did not codify) the establishment of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the State Department and authorized the transfer of \$100M from the Department of Defense budget to the State Department for initial S/CRS efforts under the administration's Civilian Stabilization Initiative.⁷

The Secretary of Defense has consistently championed “a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security – diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development.”⁸ He and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have also acknowledged that

⁶ House Appropriations Committee, majority opinion mark to Department Of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2009; http://appropriations.house.gov/pdf/2009_Con_Statement_DivH.pdf, (accessed February 28, 2009).

⁷ Nina M. Serafino and Martin M. Weiss, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*; (Congressional Research Service RL32862, Washington, DC, 2008), 11-13, 24.

⁸ Robert M. Gates, Landon Lecture and speech to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign.

DoD budget increases are less likely in the future, although the FY 2010 budget submission is actually higher than they had anticipated.⁹

Fading Urgency and Shift of Focus

The quote from Paul Romer at the head of this chapter acknowledges that crises permit greater change than does equilibrium. The current national security crises are receding. 9/11 is becoming distant in the national memory. Plans for troop withdrawals from Iraq bring the end of that conflict into view. While recognizing that “our greatest military challenge right now is Afghanistan,” the U.S. is also scrutinizing its strategy and goals to reduce the scope of its commitment to and expectations for solving Afghanistan’s national challenges.¹⁰

The budgetary actions above indicate that new crises are supplanting the war on terror and the Iraq conflict as national priorities. Great energy is going into changes to modify the economic and financial systems to give them greater stability and resiliency. The new administration’s agenda differs from the previous in other significant ways: increased emphasis and resources for development of alternative energy and energy efficiency, transportation alternatives and improvements, health care and education reform and deficit reduction.¹¹ All of this drains off impetus for change that will no longer be available for dealing with the systemic challenges of performing the WOG mission.

⁹ Robert M. Gates, *Submitted Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee*, (Washington, DC, January 27, 2009) <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337> (accessed February 3, 2009); also U.S. Department of Defense, “[DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen.](#)” February 26, 2009. <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4361> (accessed May 18, 2009).

¹⁰ Gates, *Submitted Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee*.

¹¹ Obama, *Remarks of President Barack Obama – As Prepared for Delivery Address to Joint Session of Congress*.

Control of U.S. government has changed hands: the Republican party controlled both branches of government through 2006, government was split until 2009, and the Democrats are now in control of both branches since the inauguration of President Obama on January 20th. The Democrats have been unambiguous in words and deed, in the budget submission, in early actions by the 111th Congress, and their public pronouncements, that they intend a clear break from the policies of the Republican period since 2001. Whether that extends to the national security establishment reforms that began during the Bush administration remains to be seen.

Systemic and Inherent Impediments to Change

Inertia:

Inertia is the strongest impediment to change. So long as the current system operates the way it does, it will generate friction and hinder change. Strong departmental capabilities operate at the expense of integrating mechanisms. Core mandates rather than those required by national missions drive resource allocations to and within departments and agencies. Issue management and crisis response burden the White House (and NSC) so that it is not able to integrate or resource missions well. The current system is unmanageable but lacks the control mechanisms to improve management.¹² All of these serve to perpetuate the current *modus operandi*.

Current Structure, Prerogatives, Power and Resources:

Treatments of whole of government often present it as a departure from the *modus operandi* - something outside of the existing power structures, and therefore a threat to those structures. When departments and agencies see tasks as “interagency” or “whole of

¹² All characteristics are drawn from Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 444-446.

government,” vice as their core tasks executed within a WOG construct, they see the tasks threatening to bleed off department or agency resources and undermine their prerogatives. This perception understandably generates resistance. The perceived nature of the change is central to this element of resistance: if the changes propose significant authority centralization, the affected agencies see a competing power center developing

The Intelligence Community (IC) dealt with this after passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in 2004. The IC Management Staff preceded the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).¹³ Many in the community saw creating the ODNI as a positive sign, reducing ambiguity since it moved the staff out of the CIA and created a new director independent of the CIA. However, as the staff grew, it threatened the existing power structures. With a new potentially powerful central authority, the previous *loci* of power will fear neutering. Central authorities also tend in the opposite direction – to neuter – as they assert their authority in order to satisfy their mandates. Echoing the *sotto voce* concerns in the intelligence community, Congressional language expressed concern about the growth in staffing the office. An overly robust ODNI would threaten relationships the Congressional committees had established with community agencies over many years and thereby those committees’ prerogatives.

Prerogatives also permeate the current system, as they would any system imbued with so much power and resources. Both the legislative and executive branches exercise these prerogatives and do so in mutually reinforcing ways. Beneficiaries of the organizational *status quo* exist and wield real power now, while change agents can only call on speculative projections of future value. As one of the benefits of power is control

¹³ The DNI was created by the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, Public Law 108-458, 108th Congress, (December 17, 2004).

of the agenda to define the future, those in power now will tend to shape prospects to preserve their power. They do so through budget submissions, appropriations, authorizing legislation, executive orders, the questions for the record that are posited and the responses to those queries.

Budget rules in Congress, both in the Senate and the House, perpetuate the powers of committees and subcommittees over their areas of historical dominion.¹⁴ Restrictions on funding transfers within the executive branch make dynamic adjustments difficult and require permission from the appropriators and (often) authorizers, thus reinforcing their continuing power. It is difficult to see how legislators, having been so conscientious in establishing and enforcing rules and processes to buttress their power, will be cavalier in permanently redistributing that power.

Legislators are naturally inclined to select only those organizational solutions that achieve national ends while preserving their power in their district and the legislature. In the process, legislative marks diverge from formal administration requests in specifying how to spend appropriated funds. These marks are not necessarily earmarks, but do reflect the legislative perceptions of the national good as seen through the lenses of the members' district or their roles in the legislature. In doing so, the marks also often align the appropriations with recommendations of those who did not succeed in incorporating their recommendations in the formal President's budget, but which were articulated to Congress directly by lobbyists representing affected interests. As a case in point, while the *Washington Post* has many articles discussing the potential for major changes in the

¹⁴ *Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.*

Defense Department and its planned spending, it is also replete with advertisements extolling the virtues of weapons systems that appear to be in jeopardy.

Presidential budgets differ only slightly from previous submissions, even after a change in administration; the U.S. ship of state is massive and takes long to turn. In spite of an agenda that differed considerably from the Bush administration, President Obama's budget submission for FY2010 continued funding for overseas contingencies only within DoD and actually increased the DoD top line by four percent.¹⁵ While passionately supporting the need for greater funding for diplomatic and other elements of national power to accompany fundamental changes in how the U.S. manages its global engagement, Defense Secretary Gates has carefully avoided offering defense spending to enable those changes or to reduce unilaterally DoD funding requests to create overall federal budget slack.¹⁶ President Obama's FY2010 budget also made no changes that significantly increased funding for whole of government activities outside of DoD that were not already in the Bush submission. The bottom line is that major resource allocation changes will come only slowly.

The current mechanism to integrate national security affairs also is changing slowly. Mr. Obama's Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) setting the organization of the National Security Council brought new council members in or increased the roles of those who previously were only invited when necessary (e.g., Secretary of Commerce).¹⁷ Yet the FY2010 budget did not increase or identify funds for whole of government activities that those more prominent roles should bring.

¹⁵ Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 2010.

¹⁶ Gates, Landon Lecture.

¹⁷ *Presidential Policy Directive 1*, all paragraphs.

The NSC directive also continued limiting the NSC role to “advise and assist in integrating” and in “development and implementation of national security policy,”¹⁸ rather than more encompassing and influential roles in national security practices across the government. Although signed some time after a member of the Project on National Security Reform guiding coalition became the National Security Advisor, the directive did not assert an explicitly more influential role for the NSC in line with the recommendations of *Forging a New Shield*.

The tenor of the last sixty years continues. As Senator Henry Jackson had noted for the NSC in the Eisenhower administration, “When the policy stakes are high and departmental differences deep, agency heads are loath to submit problems to the scrutiny of coordinating committees or councils (and) aim ... to bypass the committees while keeping them occupied with less important matters.”¹⁹ Almost fifty years later, the 2009 directive chose a posture for the NSC that would not preclude the recurrence of these practices, rather than to direct dramatic change. The current directive’s verbiage specifies policy vice strategy development and does not emphasize analysis, assessment and appraisal or other functions that would enable the NSC to fulfill a complementary role to and provide oversight of the departments and agencies.

Some Things Are Really Hard to Do - Culture, Technology and Human Nature

Although avoiding direct confrontation or threats now, PPD-1 increases the likelihood that the NSC role will remain issue management. Departments and agencies normally resolve issues. Thus, continuing NSC responsibility for managing issues

¹⁸ Presidential Policy Directive 1, paragraph A.

¹⁹ Senator Henry M. Jackson, ed. *The National Security Council: Jackson Subcommittee Papers on Policy-Making at the Presidential Level*, (New York: Praeger, 1965), 39; as referenced in Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 69.

without the means to resolve them assures future resistance from the agencies. Their resistance stems from the powerful prevailing organizational cultures that result from functional segregation and longstanding department and agency prerogatives. The functional elements display the essence of organizational culture: accumulated shared group learning of what works.²⁰ What has worked to date is power distributed among the functional components and behaviors to minimize central influence. The current National Security Advisor (NSA) has chosen to confront this directly, issuing a memorandum setting high expectations for department and agency behaviors in supporting the NSC and, by doing so, the President.²¹ However, accumulation and collective understanding naturally occur through shared group and individual experience, adaptation and evolution, and thus take time. Cultures do not change rapidly or by fiat. Presidential Policy Directive 1 consciously recognizes that and sets only an evolutionary path to change.²² However, the recent NSA memorandum dictates behavior expectations. The memorandum's approach will require significantly increased NSC leadership and management resources to enforce expectations.

Bureaucracies are the archetypes of institutionalized shared learning and processes. However, the very institutionalization generates impediments to change through establishing formal procedures and their underlying mechanisms. Bureaucracies deem these necessary to accomplish the mission and fully integrate them into the work flow. This integration means it will cost money to change, and the pervasiveness means it

²⁰ Schein, Edgar H. *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, (Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 2004), 10.

²¹ National Security Council memorandum, "The 21st Century Interagency Process," (White House, Washington, DC, March 18, 2009).

²² However, PPD-1 does change the venue and participants so that more shared learning can occur.

often will cost a lot of money. The benefits of change in facilitating whole of government activities, however, are often speculative or opaque to the functional bureaucratic stovepipe. The current security system serves as an excellent example:²³ in the intelligence community, it took years for agencies to accept the badges of other agencies, then even more years before one agency's access control system could read the badges of another, and yet more years again before the access control systems used common badges. Delays occurred repeatedly in spite of the explicit agreement of all to the goal of commonality and enormous bureaucratic energy and financial resources devoted to solving the issues. Even now, however, the underlying security vetting processes are not fully integrated nor are security access approvals accepted across all agencies without additional scrutiny. Slow progress to the seemingly simple goal of badge reciprocity can be attributed to the facts that everyone has a badge, every agency has a security vetting system, every agency had an extensive and expensive unique access control system, and every agency was unwilling to take the risk that reciprocity would undermine satisfying its "unique" security requirements. The whole of government issues facing the NSE agencies present them with similar challenges in attempting to change.

The intelligence community also offers an illustrative example in attempting to integrate its information systems. "The tragic events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated that the United States needed greater integration across the Intelligence

²³ The author draws the examples from his experience over the last twenty years across several agencies in the intelligence community. See also Edward Maguire, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Office of the Inspector General, "(U) *CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES*," (Washington, DC, 2008).

Community and improved information sharing.”²⁴ 9/11, however, was not the beginning of efforts to share, it only provided renewed impetus and increased resources. The IC’s sharing strategy’s first goal deals with the policy barriers to sharing. However, the bulk of the strategy focuses on other barriers: universal information discovery and retrieval, pervasive connectivity, a common trust environment (identity management, information security standards, user authorization, and access control) and tools and incentives to collaborate and share.²⁵ Efforts toward these objectives had been underway since at least 1994, when the community’s classified and highly secure intranet called Intelink first became operational. Fifteen years and many dollars later, full implementation of the information sharing strategy is still in the future.

Human nature played a large role as the intelligence community proceeded to change its access control and information sharing systems. Agreements were explicit, often documented. However, slow responses often greet such plans. People do not do the things they agreed to do (or think they are doing them but others see it differently). Agreements at high levels are not accompanied by follow-through at the organizations’ lower levels, because the commitment was ill advised (e.g., legal limitations), because of institutional inertia, from resource limitations or priorities, or since those at lower levels disagree on the commitment or how to meet it. Often, all of the above combine to thwart or stall change. When these human factors come into play, another often empowers them

²⁴ Director of National Intelligence, *United States Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy*, (Washington, DC, February 22, 2008), 5; http://dni.gov/ICIS/index_public.html, (accessed March 2, 2009).

²⁵ Director of National Intelligence, *Information Sharing at-A-Glance*, http://dni.gov/ICIS/index_public.html (accessed March 2, 2009).

to carry the day: the desire – and need - for comity among the seniors overwhelms rigorous follow-through and accountability.

The current economic situation has reduced the likelihood of major change to the NSE because of resource and the distractions of the crisis. Overcoming the systemic impediments to change will be harder in the world as it today than it would have been when the Project on National Security Reform started its work about two and a half years ago. Human nature, technology and culture will always resist change, no matter how necessary. The question becomes not what we need to do, but what can we do, while not losing sight of the outcomes we seek. As Alfred North Whitehead noted, “(t)he art of progress is to preserve order amid change and to preserve change amid order.”²⁶

²⁶ Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, ed. David Ray Griffin, Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 339.

“Perfection is the (mortal) enemy of good enough.”

*Voltaire*¹

VI. Achievable Change

In spite of these forbidding impediments, national security establishment leaders, beginning with the President, can nurture and preserve change in how the NSE operates. However, due to these impediments, achievable change will be less formal and systematic; less legislative and prescriptive. It must occur absent major investments to enable retraining, redundancy and overlap as the cultures adjust. Within these bounds, changes will occur in the realms of leadership, behaviors and processes, culture, resource allocation, and management. Of these, leadership and management are paramount.

Focus and Goals for Change

This monograph’s recommendations focus on leadership and management, and the performance effects and receptivity for change that excellence in those areas will have on behaviors, organizational and professional culture and resource allocation. Leveraging human and organizational behaviors and cultures will be a key strategy, rather than demanding or directing that they change. Progress is the goal, not motion or effort. This goal makes change assessment more difficult, but necessarily so. Avoiding prescriptive, formal and organizational changes provides fewer measurable actions to complete. Change proposals also should avoid confronting entrenched bureaucracies and their resistance stemming from threat to budgets, existing core missions, and cultures. The more extensive or intensive the change, the more threatening it tends to be.

¹ Author’s extension of “Le mieux est l’ennemi du bien.” (Literally translated as “The best is the enemy of good.”); Voltaire, *Dictionnaire Philosophique* (1764).

Nonetheless, the recommendations in section VII align closely with PNSR constructs for areas needing change and will

1. Move the NSE toward key goals to:

- Mobilize and marshal the full panoply of the instruments of national power;
- Create and sustain an environment conducive to effective leadership, optimal decision-making, and capable management;
- Devise a more constructive relationship between the executive branch and Congress; and
- Generate a sustainable capacity to nurture the underlying assets of American power in human capital, social trust and institutional coherence—throughout American national security.²

2. Make improvements in *Forging a New Shield*'s four core reform areas:

- Department and agency capacity for whole of government solutions;
- Strategic direction and processes;
- Development of whole of government professionals; and
- Congressional changes.³

Regarding strategic direction and processes, the recommended changes especially target improvement in the national security establishment assessment, strategy-making, planning, implementation and evaluation in the short, mid and long-term.⁴

3. Encompass achievable change in three dimensions of NSE challenges: core national security institutions (e.g., NSC), mission-specific national security roles (e.g.,

² Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, x. Note that this reference and succeeding ones do not imply identity with the recommendations of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). PNSR has done an excellent job of capturing valuable changes and the contexts and outcomes for them. However, the thesis of this paper results in recommending both a narrower subset of the PNSR recommendations and introducing others outside the more formalistic construct PNSR uses.

³ *Ibid.*, 440-1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 254.

diplomatic, military, economic), and for contingency planning and planning for exceptional cases.⁵

4. Promote improving performance in areas imperative for the future national security establishment: leadership, strategic management, investment strategy, workforce and culture, structural flexibility and agility, information and knowledge management (minimally, since progress in this area requires a technological solution), and oversight and accountability.⁶

5. Support the attributes the successful national security establishment of the future must embody: learning, self-organizing, fast, informed, effectual decision-making, cohesion, innovation/creativity and distributed empowerment.⁷

By focusing on achievable change, the recommendations seek to “operationalize” the national security processes through empowerment and accountability, vice retaining all authority centrally and at high levels with a “top-down” *modus operandi*. Senior leaders and managers thus will be able to engage appropriately at all levels, vice becoming mired in the details or resorting to operating outside normal processes. The recommendations also assign clear and appropriate authority to the issue management level, to fix reasonable accountability there for both success and failure, bringing improvements in both results and lessons learned.

The proposals seek to use effective leadership and management take advantage of the strengths of the functionally oriented departments and agencies, rather than to isolate

⁵ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 440.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 447.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 573-6.

or marginalize them; to leverage stovepipe behaviors for integrated success.

“Departments and agencies interpret policy, strategy, and plans through their organizational perspectives when conducting implementation.”⁸

Finally, this thesis proposes using empowered teams as its principal achievable change to the NSE organizational construct.

Change for the Future (If Ever)

The focus on leadership and management drove the author’s decisions on which change options to include, rather than an assessment of whether or not a potential change would produce valuable national security enhancements. Excluded changes fell into two categories: changes that required substantial resources or political capital to implement, and those driven by factors outside the focus of this monograph. Excluded changes were not invalid or inappropriate now nor over the long term; they merely did not fit current circumstances or the emphasis here. For example, the probability of a substantial top-line increase in national security professionals of 10-20% across the entire NSE outside DoD is not sufficiently high in the near term to warrant inclusion. Included recommendations likewise do not address reducing government dependence on contractor support, both because of the implications conversion has for capped government personnel end strengths and because of the powerful political forces in play in this area. Similarly, in the current crisis, it is unlikely that sufficient political capital is available (and it may be unwise) to conduct a major Congressional power restructuring. The next chapter also excludes recommendations that are more hope than reality. Although striving for cultural change, there is no attempt to change fundamental human or organizational natures.

⁸ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 285. PNSR presented the words in quotes as a cause for poor implementation integration and resourcing.

Information technology and knowledge management changes are both too costly if implemented uniformly across the government. Stated goals in these areas also will likely take too much time to reach (if ever, since the goals change as the state of the art changes).

This study disagrees with *Forging a New Shield*'s conclusions that leaders:

- Cannot and will not routinely integrate the insights of all relevant departments and agencies into alternative courses of action;
- Do not understand how decisions are made and what information is required to make those decisions; and
- Will not act in the best interests of the system once decisions are made.⁹

Forging a New Shield uses these conclusions to justify changes in structure and formal processes, implying that promoting the above assumptions is an effort to protect the *status quo*. However, this analysis differs: people can change how they lead and manage, thereby changing culture and organizations, and that lasting change can only come if they do.

⁹ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 435-9.

“Start by doing what is necessary, then do what is possible, and suddenly you are doing the impossible.”

St. Francis of Assisi

VII. Recommendations

If leaders and managers cannot change themselves and the organizations they lead and manage, no lasting improvement is possible, no matter the degree of structural or superficial process change. The 9/11 Commission said, “Good people can overcome bad structures. They should not have to.”¹ A likely corollary is that “Good structures (formalized processes, prescriptive change, etc.) can overcome bad people and organizations.” However, that corollary is not sound. Effective leaders inspire the organization to new paradigms and efficient managers move them to those better designs. The structures themselves are not the agents of change. This analysis offers for consideration the unabashedly positive assumption that national security professionals and the departments and agencies making up the NSE can progress within fundamental human and organizational nature so that whole of government performance improves.

Key Assumptions²

1. There is enough talent within the national security system to make the recommendations work.
2. Accountability is impossible without empowerment.
3. The kinds of changes necessary are not amenable to implementation by fiat.

¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, New York: Norton, 2004, 399.

² The first two assumptions appear in Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 597-8. Although not explicitly stated elsewhere in the study, analysis of the solutions proposed reveals that those solutions also require many of the rest of the assumptions presented here.

4. When focused on mutually beneficial goals and with a sense of common purpose, people and organizations can and will evolve to achieve those goals.
5. Effective leadership can move the NSE toward a successful cultural paradigm.
6. Competent management can implement controls and management paradigms necessary for improved WOG performance without fundamental change.
7. Inspiring leaders and motivated national security professionals can convert many of the problems noted in analysis into opportunities.
8. Sufficient progress requires some formal changes (e.g., executive orders, budget reallocations).
9. Progress will incur some additional costs, primarily in areas already needing improvement. However, the bulk of the proposed changes can occur through reallocating resources currently extant in the national security establishment and in Presidential Policy Directive 1, which established the current NSC.

Leadership and Management: A Critical Distinction

Leadership and management are different and complementary. In short, you lead people, but you manage things. Leaders create and change cultures, while managers and administrators operate within them.³ This distinction makes a difference. When used in this monograph, “leader” does not mean just being in charge or at the top of an organization. Leading is about motivating, creating aspirations and unity of purpose while instilling dedication to mission success, setting the vision, helping to create shared goals, and shepherding. Experience and mentoring, among other techniques, can develop leadership. Because of the enormous potential impact for good or bad, leadership is an

³ Schein, 5.

exceptionally valuable commodity. Thus, people in positions of responsibility ardently seek the title “leader” because of the honor it brings.

Carelessly applying the title “leader” to anyone in charge misplaces attributes and disappoints when the individual only administers or manages. Leaders can overcome organizational design deficiencies, but we misplace confidence if we conclude that managers in the right places also will do so.⁴ If culture implies structural stability,⁵ then managers cannot remake those structures – they live within them.

Effective managers are also a valuable commodity. Managers deliver their value through developing and managing processes, allocating resources, administering projects to successful outcomes, improving efficiency and effectiveness, providing suitable working conditions, and other vital functions in an organization. Accountability and effective controls are impossible without good management. Organizational success depends on effective management.

Developing professionals with the whole of government breadth and experience populates a corps from which to select national security leadership and management executives. As discussed above, leadership is critical to many of the difficult whole of government organizational and individual cultural and behavioral issues. Effective managers grounded in the whole of government are equally necessary for success. These managers will help resolve many of the issues where leadership plays a role.

The above leadership/management distinction is essential to a discussion of actionable recommendations for the national security establishment given the

⁴ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, i.

⁵ Schein, 10.

impediments to change. Strong leaders will produce change through being accountable for setting the vision, inspiration, cultural stimulation, guiding behaviors, nurturing unity of purpose and instilling dedication to mission success. The leader thus will lay the foundation for the structures of the future. Effective managers will improve performance within the existing or emerging structures, establish effective processes, drive efficiency, institute controls and implement accountability mechanisms. “Good leaders and structure are interrelated and both are important to a well-functioning organization.”⁶ The following recommendations’ guiding principle is that the NSE must not look to management to fix leadership shortfalls, or leadership to overcome ineffective management.

Leadership from the Start: Operationalizing Consensus

As noted in chapter IV, consensus for change exists; it just has no actionable context. The President and National Security Advisor should lead the Cabinet and other key leaders across the government by gaining their commitment to an energetic U.S. whole of government posture. This effort is critical; its failure will fatally undermine the follow-through actions.

The President should call and chair a summit of all agency/department heads and the National Security Advisor, to agree on and commit to:⁷

- A national strategy for the United States;
- The need for acting as a whole of government;
- The principles for acting as a whole of government;
- The shape of whole of government task responsibility allocations;⁸

⁶ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 451.

⁷ To start building a whole of government mindset across the executive and legislative branches, the President should invite senior Congressional leaders to observe the summit’s deliberations.

⁸ At a high level, agency core missions can align with existing contingency task matrices. Recommendations below address how to determine and organize tasks and responsibilities in detail.

- Satisfying their agency's allocated responsibilities;
- Making adjustments in the interest of whole of government effectiveness in concert with other agencies to satisfy *their* allocated responsibilities;
- A whole of government executive order; and
- Setting goals and plan for follow-up.

Consonant with the leadership expected from and the breadth of those attending the summit, it may be useful to consider that body a "National Council." This is in contrast to the security focus of the NSC. This council collectively supports the President as he leads the nation.

At this stage, no leader will commit specific resources, but will commit to do so in the future if there is a net benefit to WOG performance. The leaders, however, will recognize the roles their agencies and departments can play to support whole of government effectiveness, rather than just their traditional core missions. Follow-up actions may require the leaders to commit resources either to accomplish WOG missions not now under their purview, or to assist with resources where others need them. As these are contentious issues, the Vice President should chair follow-up meetings to preserve independent action by the President to resolve disputes. These investments of the President's and Vice President's scarce time will pay large dividends in establishing WOG authorities and responsibilities, and set the tone and priorities to limit their future involvement.

Carrying through the summit's outcomes will be the first objective for the leaders: start to build consensus in their people and organizations for a new vision of who they are, what they do and where they bring value to the United States. The leader probably will need to follow up the executive order by using their strategic communications programs to generate support. Secretaries must gain commitment when they encounter

resistance in their organizations. They must be assiduous in building a commitment to an organizational motto expanded to include “What have you done for the nation today?”

Strategic Leadership

Involvement by the President, the Cabinet and other key officials is the first act in a new atmosphere of leadership rather than being in charge or managing. The leaders lift up their focus to the national vision and their part in realizing it, rather than direct it down toward the details their organizations work every day.⁹ One of the first obligations of leaders is to set the vision so those they lead, whether people or organizations, know where they are trying to go. That demands solid and relevant strategic guidance.

National Strategy:¹⁰

The United States is missing its capstone strategy: a national strategy. The current top-level strategy – The National Security Strategy of 2006 - states “we will employ the full array of political, economic, diplomatic, and other tools at our disposal.”¹¹ Five of its nine top-level national security tasks require engaging the whole of government to accomplish them.¹² Its cover letter addresses all Americans (and thus the whole of government). However, as a national security strategy its effective applicability is only to the national security establishment as represented by the regular NSC attendees: State, Defense, Treasury, the military and the intelligence community.

⁹ The Project on National Security Reform identifies those in charge being beholden and creatures of their organizations rather than national leaders as a critical shortcoming in the current system. See Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, xxx.

¹⁰ Note use of the term “national” vice “grand.” In many respects, they are synonymous in this situation. The intent here is to focus on a strategy covering all the nation’s needs and actions. It is unnecessary to become embroiled here in discussions surrounding the definition of the concept of “grand strategy.”

¹¹ President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 6.

¹² President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 1.

While security is the *sine qua non* of continued national existence, it is not the only national imperative.

A national strategy would seek to employ “the art of using all elements of power...to accomplish a politically agreed aim, and the objectives of a nation ... in peace and war.”¹³ National strategy embodies national purpose, “essentially a summary of our enduring values, beliefs and ethics.”¹⁴ In today’s parlance, developing and implementing such a national strategy is the art of using the whole of government (and nongovernmental national assets) to achieve the broad range of national aims (or ends).

While developing and agreeing on national ends will be difficult, reaching consensus on the ways and means will be more so. “Were there no limitations on resources, there would be no need for strategy.”¹⁵ Current processes actually encourage ignoring these limitations, as the common practice is to submit requests for far more than an agency expects to get.¹⁶ Therefore, analysis independent of departments and agencies must first determine the needed methods and resources and link those causally to achieving the ends, at a correspondingly national level. This presents a thorny leadership challenge, but also one with analytic bounds. The means will need to be conceptual, on the order of diplomacy, development, information, military and economic, but not limited to those traditionally associated with security activities. To avoid premature turf battles,

¹³ Noaber Foundation, *Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership*, AK Lunteren, Netherlands: Noaber Foundation, 2007, 91.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/080110_grand_strategy.pdf (accessed May 18, 2009).

¹⁴ Harry R. Yarger, “The Strategic Appraisal: The Key to Effective Strategy,” *USAWC Guide to National Security Issues, Vol I: Theory of War and Strategy* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2008), 53.

¹⁵ House Armed Services Committee, *Project on National Security Reform* (Krepinevich testimony, 11).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

the effort should not assign responsibilities to specific agencies, but rather only determine the functions. Similarly, resources should be intangible to prevent a “fight or flight” response by the participants. At this stage, the summit should limit decisions to relative priorities of the ends and an assessment of the scale of means needed.

The leaders’ first goal at the summit is to develop such an all-encompassing vision of the nation and its prioritized desired end states, our highest level global objectives, linkages to the appropriate ways to achieve those ends, and the scale of national treasure needed. This strategy will frame its security and other strategies and provide measures against which to assess those strategies. The strategy development and assessment fall to a redirected NSC.

NSC role:

Issue management consumes the NSC and has since the council’s establishment in 1947, save when strong executives marginalized the NSC to irrelevance. The NSC needs to evolve to make it the strategic agent of the President. It must remain the President’s principal national security advisory body, but it also must complement that with greater oversight responsibility on behalf of the President and focus on the development of whole of government national security strategy.¹⁷ In both capacities, unless it leverages the departments, agencies and empowered teams rather than supplanting them it will devolve once more into minutiae. The NSC must remain unencumbered to support the President in holding those departments, agencies and teams accountable and cannot exercise operational control or make operational decisions if it is to do so.

¹⁷ Clark A. Murdoch, et al. *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2005), 50.

Likewise, departments and agencies cannot oversee other agencies. Even though they may lead a WOG operation, these entities are members of the WOG community that do not and should not have authority over other agencies (except for the Chief of Mission in country).

To oversee and develop strategy successfully, the NSC must refocus and possibly expand its resources, since both activities require substantial analytic support for success.¹⁸ Whether increased staffing comes from government employees or contractors is not as important as the staff's independence from the agencies and departments the NSC oversees.

The NSC assumes the following tasks with this new role:

- Strategy development and confirmation of derivative strategy alignment
- Issue identification and assignment (not management)
- Process management and progress oversight
- WOG issue management performance and outcome assessment
- Analytic support (some at the national level, some in support of the empowered regional and functional teams)
- Clearinghouse for reprogramming actions
- Monitor compliance on national security professional personnel matters (e.g., to key positions in the agencies, promotion)

The first tasks for the remodeled NSC will be to develop an overarching national security strategy derived from the national strategy, and to begin the process of refining the task allocations made at the summit.

National Security Strategy:

¹⁸ For proposals for a National Assessment and Visioning Center and an Office of Decision Support, see Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 472.

Along with creating a national strategy, the definition of national security must evolve to derive and focus its associated strategy properly.¹⁹ The national security strategy must focus on security while serving four purposes:

1. Enable strategic interdependencies with peer national needs (e.g., economics, spreading democracy);
2. Incorporate relevant whole of government actions.
3. Guide the actions of the national security establishment; and
4. Set objectives and priorities to facilitate resource estimation and allocation.

Defining national security as “the capacity of the U.S. to define, defend, and advance its interests and principles in the world”²⁰ will enable creating a strategy serving those purposes, although doing so creates the risk that the strategy will also create problems in establishing necessary limits to bound national security matters.²¹ While many of the agencies that will sit on the expanded NSC have strategies, few of those strategies address any security issues; when they do, they only deal with homeland security. Only the defense, intelligence, justice and foreign affairs strategies directly address national security issues in the international arena. A broadened definition will encourage incorporating national security in strategies of other agencies, ultimately enabling the U.S. “to define, defend, and advance its position in a world that is being continuously reshaped by turbulent forces of change.”²² The interconnected and

¹⁹ For an extensive treatment of the history of the definition of national security, see Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 199-202.

²⁰ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, v.

²¹ House Armed Services Committee, *Project on National Security Reform* (Oleszek testimony, 6).

²² Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 440.

interdependent nature of national security emerges clearly in the DoD definition of national security interests and its relationship with national goals and purpose:

The foundation for the development of valid national objectives that define U.S. goals or purposes. National security interests include preserving US political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic well-being; and bolstering international order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its allies.²³

The new national security strategy must establish relationships with other strategies, but not overlap them – doing so would make it tantamount to the U.S. National Strategy. The strategy also must address all the elements of national power that bear on security, avoiding the historical pattern of defining national security ways and means in almost purely military and foreign relations terms; it cannot be merely be an amalgam of the National Defense Strategy and the Department of State and USAID Strategic Plans. Finally, while it will serve as strategic guidance for developing plans to execute the strategy, it should not assign specific tasks or allocate resources to accomplish them.

Whole of Government Task and Resource Allocation:

The next stage deals with those contentious activities. They are included here because strong leadership is the vital precondition for them, not because they are leadership functions in their essence.

Translating the national security strategy into resource and task guidance requires two documents: a national security task baseline and national security resources guidance.²⁴ The summit should direct that these documents flow from the national

²³ U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02), (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2008), 371.

²⁴ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 459-460 calls for the resource guidance (a National Security Resource Document (NSRD) that flows from a National Security Planning Guidance (NSPG) document and a national security review. The proposal above, however, identifies the task and responsibility allocation as a precondition to developing either the NSPG or NSRD.

strategy and the shape of allocating whole of government task responsibilities and that the NSC oversee and guide their creation. Developing and maintaining these documents will require investing the NSC with a sizeable strategic analysis capability and the use of that in close collaboration with the strategic planning elements of the departments and agencies of the NSE. This effort, and especially the collaboration, will test the leadership and commitment of heads of departments and agencies, and the effect they have had on their organizations in instilling a whole of government mindset. These documents will be more valuable if created through collaboration. Creating them unilaterally by the NSC destines them for irrelevance and makes them vulnerable to debilitating charges of inaccuracy. Departments and agencies must take ownership and have a stake in determining how their involvement in accomplishing the mission benefits them, while the NSC must retain control of the documents so they do not become recapitulations of the departments' and agencies' parochial agendas.

Informed by crises, a model exists that may assist accurate whole of government task allocation in this endeavor.²⁵ The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), in partnership with the U.S. Joint Forces Command, has developed a USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation.²⁶ The framework lays out the process to identify essential tasks, assign agency responsibility for tasks and then to orchestrate the application and integration of all USG “tools” to accomplish those tasks.

²⁵ The Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency has also developed its National Incident Management System listing emergency support functions, although they have not compiled those into a task matrix. See http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf

²⁶ U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), *USG Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation*, (Norfolk, VA: 2005).

That process begins with dividing a task matrix into five broad technical areas:

- Security
- Justice and Reconciliation
- Economic Stability and Infrastructure
- Humanitarian and Social Well-being
- Governance and Participation²⁷

The process would flesh out this template with the S/CRS matrix of the major mission elements and essential tasks involved in post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building²⁸ and correlate that matrix to the mission responsibilities of the departments and agencies involved in national security to develop proposed allocations to those departments and agencies. Those proposed allocations would become the basis for strategy refinement in those agencies and then flow into future budget submissions.

The new analytic capability and oversight roles for the NSC are crucial to producing a useable outcome from this effort. Drawing on the leadership imbuing the summit deliberations, department and agency leaders should cultivate participation in the allocations to serve the nation's greater interests without shielding their organizational equities inappropriately.²⁹ Managers will direct searches to obtain the necessary information to support allocation decisions. Without leadership and management attention, the still-existing cultural biases and resistance will influence the product.

This should not be a sterile exercise; there is ample recent experience on which to draw. The NSC's analytic capability and a supportive posture by the participants will

²⁷ USJFCOM, USG Draft Planning Framework, 10.

²⁸ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks* (Washington, DC, 2005). <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/53464.pdf> (accessed May 18, 2009).

²⁹ This is consonant with the role the National Security Advisor sees department and agency representatives having in such NSC activities. National Security Council memorandum, "The 21st Century Interagency Process," 2.

ensure allocation of all tasks. In its oversight role, the NSC must ferret out what agencies perform those tasks now. The NSC/department/agency team will be unable to create a resource allocation without this information.

To prevent invoking the tendency to protect resources, the process initially should map resource allocations to task, not to agency (although it will identify the agency currently performing the task). The process next will map those tasks to the agencies that will perform them. These two steps will create a baseline correlation matrix of task-to-resources-to-agency, which will play a central role in budget development and alignment.

Leadership and Management Development:

“There is, of course, no substitute for good leadership, and without it no system will be adequate. But a good leader alone is not enough, and we do not need to choose between the two. We need both”³⁰ (a good system and good leadership). The role of leadership in the success of the foundational activities above demands increased attention to both development and assignment to key roles. As noted earlier, leadership is about people, cultures, vision, inspiration and showing the way to new and better futures. Superb managers may be excellent leaders as well, but management skills are not a sufficient qualification for leadership roles. Current leaders and managers first must determine which positions require leadership, which require management, and which require both. Rewards in leadership and management positions should be comparable, although the paucity of superb performers in both capacities will demand higher rewards for those able to do both. The development tracks should be separate but interactive –

³⁰ James R. Locher III, “The Most Important Thing: Legislative Reform of the National Security System,” *Military Review*, (May-June 2008): 21. This thesis posits the additional requirement for good management.

good leaders require knowledge and some skill in control mechanisms, supervision, resource management, mechanics of administering a bureaucracy, and managers require similar familiarity with leadership skills.

Current senior leaders and managers can apply the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) government-wide methodology to discriminate between good leaders and good managers. The Executive Core Qualifications address performance in critical leadership and management areas:

- Leading Change
- Leading people
- Business acumen
- Driving to results
- Building coalitions³¹

Of OMB's core qualifications, leading change and leading people are critical leadership traits, while the core qualifications for driving to results and business acumen relate most closely to management skills. Building coalitions is pertinent to both leadership and management. The NSE can improve both senior leadership and senior management by conscientiously using these to assess individuals for leadership vs. management roles, rather than only for selection to senior level positions in general.

Culture and Behaviors

The objective of improving leadership is to create cultures so that people and organizations share basic assumptions from solving problems requiring external adaption and internal integration. Those solutions must work well enough for people to think them to be valid and worthy to teach to new members as the correct ways to perceive, think,

³¹ U.S. Office of Personnel Management, *Executive Core Qualifications*, provides an in-depth treatment of the ECQs and indicators of qualification against them; <http://www.opm.gov/ses/recruitment/ecq.asp> (accessed March 4, 2009).

and feel in relation to those problems.³² The challenge facing the NSE is to create cultures that share basic assumptions about how to solve problems stemming from demands for whole of government responses. From doing so, the NSE will create a whole of government mindset.

Creating a WOG mindset:

Forging a New Shield acknowledges “modern organizations are typically more malleable, with less hierarchy, less structure, and less formality.”³³ “Whereas earlier organizational theorists focused on how to best divide tasks among labor, organizations now place more emphasis on how to coordinate labor across numerous dimensions—geographic, cultural, legal, institutional, political, religious, ethnic, gender, technological, and economic (markets, industries, logistical, financial).”³⁴ Management training and organizational thinking now emphasize how to deal with and get best value from generations emerging in the workplace, their work ethic and value systems and interpersonal behaviors. Thus, the important lesson is that organizations adapt their processes and structures to the 21st century mindsets of their employees individually or collectively as a workforce, not the other way around. The national security establishment needs to do likewise and merge it with a whole of government approach. The National Strategy and a more appropriate national security strategy will set the environment to take advantage of the mindset. NSE leadership and management also should use a broad panoply of mechanisms to cultivate the mindset: encouraging 21st century competencies,

³² Schein, 12.

³³ Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker, *The Management of Innovation* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1961) quoted in Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 573.

³⁴ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 573.

fostering multi-agency interdependencies, training, rotational and development assignments outside home agencies, teaming across the NSE and practice working together.

21st century competencies:

Earlier discussion offered one version of 21st century competencies. A similar but more mnemonic version is The 6 C's for 21st Century Citizenship:³⁵

- Connect
- Create
- Collaborate
- Communicate
- Compute
- Think Critically

These are the competencies that a very large, complex, diversified and heterogeneous organization needs for success when faced with complex, ill-defined problems. However, they are also the very traits that 20th century organizations and cultures suppress.³⁶ If leaders create and change cultures, then NSE leaders will need to be in the forefront of developing, practicing and rewarding these competencies in whole of government endeavors.

Collaborate, Cooperate, Coordinate:

The military uses “C2” to mean command and control. However, those confronting the need to deal closely and extensively with other agencies have found it means “collaborate and cooperate” in those circumstances. The military recognizes, and

³⁵ Cynthia Drew Barnes, Ph.D., “The 6C's for 21st Century Competency,” <http://shifthappens.wikispaces.com/The+6C%27s+for+21st+Century+Competency> (accessed February 22, 2009).

³⁶ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 95-439 alludes to this practice in numerous contexts and forms in its sections dealing with assessment of system performance and problem analysis.

has now codified in formal doctrine, that it cannot command or control its whole of government partners in the same sense that it does its troops. 20th century managers, used to similar leadership or management styles but encountering “Gen Xers” and “Millennials” in the workplace, quickly come to the same conclusion.³⁷ The NSE must as well. If open collaboration does not become the norm for whole of government activities, none of the formalized procedural or structural changes will produce the desired effects. Those changes must occur within an atmosphere of collaboration, where routine cooperation and coordination are the norm. Commercial organizations use C5 (collaborate, cooperate and coordinate, plus communicate and connect) to produce better outcomes using a synergistic network.

Observing whole of government interworking reveals levels of C5: disunity (no C5), de-confliction (plan separately and then avoid clashes), coordination (stitch plans together at the seams), integration (plan together under top-down direction with common objectives), and coherence (plan in concert, weaving actions together under a common strategy with unity of purpose).³⁸ To succeed in the whole of government arena, national security establishment leaders must dedicate their greatest talents and skills to instill and cultivate an atmosphere achieving coherence.

Cross-assignment:

Breaking down the functional barriers to achieve coherence requires greater understanding of how the elements of national power support achieving our national

³⁷ Diane Thielholdt and Devon Scheef, “Generation X and The Millennials: What You Need to Know About Mentoring the New Generations,” Law Practice Today, <http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/mgt08044.html> (accessed March 5, 2009).

³⁸ Leonard Hawley, “Interagency Processes for Crisis Response” (seminar, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Norfolk, VA, February 4, 2009).

security ends. This is best done through broad direct experience. Therefore, the NSE must also encourage assignments that provide broad development for national security professionals across the whole of government. There are two basic steps: (1) Identify billets strongly associated with whole of government missions and activities in the various departments and agencies,³⁹ and (2) provide incumbents in these billets with rewards commensurate with the value to the whole of government mission, not just to the home agency. Leaders and managers must follow up these basic steps with enabling actions and control mechanisms to ensure the desired outcomes result.

To date, as noted by numerous students of the whole of government, cross-agency assignments often have been detrimental to professional advancement. Two steps to reverse that outcome are bureaucratic: make prior cross-agency assignments a prerequisite for assignment to key internal positions that routinely support WOG responses; and a prerequisite for elevation to senior executive ranks.⁴⁰ This is nearly identical to processes the military has put in place since Goldwater-Nichols in 1986 to develop joint proficiency in its officer corps.

Leaders will need to take additional steps to ensure compliance, such as assigning promotion board monitors from external agencies and requiring reporting WOG-relevant demographics on promotion results and senior executive selections. Leaders will need to

³⁹ Identifying the positions is also a small first step in improved WOG responsiveness and cultural valuation, since the department or agency implicitly will invest itself in the WOG approach by doing so.

⁴⁰ The National Security Professional (NSP) Development Implementation Plan requires Departments and Agencies to require NSP experience for selection or promotion into a national security SES positions. DoD and DNI are implementing such programs, and OPM has issued guidance on technical qualifications. See <http://www.nspd.gov/>, http://www.nspd.gov/rawmedia_repository/ca05b9e5f849a76f125eccae4eb80e65?/document.pdf, and http://www.nspd.gov/rawmedia_repository/607d577d4e612874fe8e1b3b7d77c756 (Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness memorandum, 31 December 2008, 2).

vet closely those jobs designated for filling through cross-assignment to ensure they are substantial, truly whole of government, and not superfluous.⁴¹ Incentives should include such things as extra credit (in promotion consideration, retirement credit, etc.) for time spent in cross-assignments, pay incentives for commuting differential, and preferential assignments upon return. Some agencies have used such incentives for a variety of difficult assignments, but the NSE should take care to document the incentives formally at the community level to ensure equity.

Even with all these measures, formidable challenges remain. This approach relies on the premise that better national security professionals and WOG performance will develop if proven professionals in a functional competency assume positions with whole of government scope. However, if careers remain the same length, tours outside the home agency may not allow enough time for core competency development. Policies must accommodate this in formulating a national security career path. However, growing such professionals from entry into service independent of the core functionalities will result in a shallow and bureaucratic cadre vice the professionals that success demands.

Other impediments: Selection officials must overcome the real effects of the individuals being out of sight and not involved in mainstream agency activities. Agencies will be reluctant to report on their internal processes. The normal practice of permitting agency and department autonomy will slow down implementation and increase the probability of non-compliance. Implementation will be slow under current practices. DoD

⁴¹ In his experience in the intelligence community, the author has noted that cross-assignment positions are uneven, from key positions to ones that the agency has been unable to fill since they are poor opportunities.

issued its direction more than one and a half years after the executive order.⁴² The DoD directive grants another three full years before DoD starts requiring that selectees demonstrate national security competency. It also does not require competency prior to assignment, only that designees begin receiving the appropriate qualifying education, experiences and opportunities within thirty days after designation. As a sign of the plan's infancy, DoD is yet to establish clearly assessable competency criteria. One result of great leadership is that people and organizations focus on how to overcome challenges rather than how daunting the challenges are. There may be excellent reasons for this incremental implementation, but great leadership seems lacking in this situation.

Professional development:

Executive Order 13434 directed improving National Security Professional Development (NSPD) through creating a National Strategy for Professional Development, establishing an Executive Steering Committee to facilitate implementing the strategy, an implementation plan and annual implementation status reports.⁴³ Under this order, the Executive Steering Committee has established the NSPD Integration Office, the National Security Education Training Consortium, and a council of human capital officers. The strategy calls for leveraging existing programs (e.g., the Foreign Service Institute, the National Defense University, and the Department of Homeland Security University).

Nonetheless, limited formal whole of government education is taking place through dedicated curricula at the Joint Forces Staff College, the National Defense

⁴² U.S. Department of Defense, *The Career Lifecycle Management of the Senior Executive Service Leaders Within the Department of Defense*, DoD Directive 1403.03 (Washington, DC, 2007).

⁴³ Executive Order 13434, 17 May 2007; implementing agreements and annual reports have not been discoverable through extensive research.

University and the Foreign Service Institute, and through an on-line course from the DHS University.⁴⁴ The hiatus typical of a major administration change now marks the national security professional development program. However, consortium participants must reenergize continuing and further integrating these programs if this aspect of whole of government professional development is to improve.

These programs need to continue, but are hampered by resources – both for the educational programs and in availability of national security professionals to attend. Most agencies in the NSE do not have adequate personnel “float” to permit many to participate in significant educational opportunities outside their core competencies. The FY2009 budget for the State Department includes billets for additional Foreign Service officers. Some of those billets were justified for whole of government development as cross-training or educational tours (e.g., the Joint Advanced Warfighting School already allocates two seats per year to State Department students).

The National Security Education Training Consortium should move immediately to coordinate DoD and WOG training in operational-level contingency planning. The training course would not be the one-week variants now found, such as the Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Planner's Course at the Joint Forces Staff College; those really only provide an orientation to the challenge. The envisioned arrangement would be a course such as the ten-week Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) offered at JFSC, paired with a parallel and collocated operational-level planning course for mid-grade personnel from non-DoD agencies. JCWS and the non-DoD course would share

⁴⁴ For examples, see: the NDU Catalog at <http://www.ndu.edu/AA/catalog.cfm> and the interagency programs in the Reconstruction Stabilization and Conflict Transformation curriculum in the FSI catalog at http://fsitraining.state.gov/catalog/2008_SchCoursesCatalog.pdf. DHS uses partnerships with universities for its programs, rather than an in-house institute; see <http://www.dhs.gov/universityprograms>.

early lessons, focusing on generic contingency planning fundamentals while avoiding the temptation to present the DoD model as the solution. As the courses moved into the scenario-driven planning exercises, the DoD and non-DoD students would work separately on planning specific to their contingency missions and tasks, with frequent crosswalks to share progress, perspectives to synchronize planning up to the crosswalk and align for the next stage of planning. Such a training arrangement would satisfy needs across the NSE for professional education in planning and would start bringing DoD and other agencies together in planning activities before a crisis forces them to do so.

Exercises and Teaming:

Teaming builds competency as measured in several indicators of the OPM's Executive Core Qualifications: team building, building coalitions, dealing with uncertainty, flexibility, etc.⁴⁵ On-the-job training will develop teaming skills, although that usually results in suboptimal mission performance while developing competency.

Exercises offer less stressful circumstances without the consequences of operational failure. The U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center planned at least eighteen exercises involving whole of government issues for FY2008.⁴⁶ However, the military leads these exercises that are primarily for military training requirements. Participation by other agencies is generally sparse, partly due to the same limited resources for training noted above, but partly because the exercises take place in the military context. However, the exercises are realistic in that the military is frequently on the ground when crises erupt and, if security is an issue, is normally in the lead.

⁴⁵ U.S. Office of Personnel Management, *Executive Core Qualifications*.

⁴⁶ USJFCOM, *Civilian Partnership and Training Opportunities Catalog* (Norfolk, VA, 2007)

Modest changes can improve the utility of and whole of government participation in these exercises:

- Sponsorship of theater exercises by the theater or functional empowered teams addressed below;
- Co-sponsorship (and development) of specific exercises by other agencies;
- General co-sponsorship by a coordinating body such as the NSC; and
- Nomination of exercises where other NSE agencies are in the lead.

Since other agencies may not conduct exercises frequently, USJFCOM technical support in creating and running the exercise would be of benefit.

Management

Whereas leadership is essential to wanting to do something, management makes it work. Excellent managers are expert in making accountability effective, delivering quality customer service, decisiveness, entrepreneurship, problem solving, technical credibility, and efficiently managing and effectively using human, financial, information and technology resources.⁴⁷ The first job most managers take on is putting the house in order.

Senior NSE managers wielding influence over the extended whole of government enterprise will need to establish a common, agreed, open framework and guiding principles with limited formality and rigidity. These attributes are necessary preconditions for coherent NSE management: all must agree (or at least consent), the framework must be common among all to deliver unity of purpose and effort, but not so prescriptive that it cannot accommodate unique characteristics and missions of the NSE members, and it must be flexible to adapt through self-learning. If the framework is too formal, it likely will be too prescriptive.

⁴⁷ U.S. Office of Personnel Management, *Executive Core Qualifications*, <http://www.opm.gov/ses/recruitment/ecq.asp> downloaded 11 Feb 2009. See appendix A for a full rendition of the Executive Core Qualifications.

The framework's guiding principles must be clear but simple. Professionalism will demand integrity, but ends to strive for and overarching principles will provide the yardsticks against which evaluate choices and actions. The national strategy and national security strategy set the highest level of this guidance, but the following principles need to supplement them:

- The nation demands effective and efficient government, which requires acting as a whole of government with unity of purpose.
- The nation's elected leaders and their appointees have primacy; besides the Constitutional issues, the nation's choices as expressed through elections drive unity of effort.
- Departments and agencies are responsible for budgeting to fulfill their core missions, and will adjust their core missions in response to elected leaders and appointees.
- Leverage the strengths of the line/functional organizations and their core competencies; align and nest their tasks within the strategic task allocations.
- Cultivate and enable unity of purpose to gain unity of effort rather than weakening autonomy to enhance supervisory authority.
- Accomplishing WOG missions will benefit the nation and the agency or department

Not just as a matter of administrative perfection, the senior managers must also establish the baseline for national security implementation guidance: "One clear requirement for unity of effort in executive branch departments and agencies is an authoritative, consistently updated, and easily accessible register of all statutes, executive orders, and presidential directives currently in force."⁴⁸ Unambiguous and known responsibilities are compulsory to ensure and enforce accountability. Without them, the NSE cannot achieve unity of purpose, effort and action, essential attributes of whole of government mission performance.

Unity of Purpose, Effort and Action:

⁴⁸ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 456.

Managers must control coalitions to achieve unity of purpose, effort and action, whether planning and setting conditions at high levels remote from operations or in the midst of whole of government mission execution. Depending on circumstances, the manager will play a role as a unified manager or as a collaborating component manager, or both. Unity of purpose creates an incentive to cooperate, avoiding the threat to autonomy that cooperation brings,⁴⁹ while reducing the effects of complexity by focusing multiple autonomous perspectives to the same problem. Leaders create unity of purpose through providing strategic guidance and developing culture, but managers operationalize it in the form of unity of effort and action by bringing together the appropriate agents, conveying the mission, and managing the team to create mutual benefit, effectiveness and efficiency.

By orchestrating the elements of the whole of government to strive in concert to a common goal, the managers will obviate much of the need for serendipitous cooperative relationships, exceptional policy entrepreneurship, or other uncomfortably random conditions.⁵⁰ Effective whole of government managers will create the opportunities and mechanisms for the close, continuous whole of government coordination and cooperation necessary to overcome discord, inadequate structure and procedures, incompatible communications, cultural differences, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations.⁵¹ They will also be key players in achieving unity of effort by synchronizing, coordinating, and

⁴⁹ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 220, claims that cooperation threatens agency autonomy.

⁵⁰ This contrasts with Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 116, which claims the obviated conditions must obtain to achieve cooperation.

⁵¹ DoD, Joint Publication 1, xxi.

integrating whole of government operations and with the operations of nongovernmental and international governmental organizations and the private sector.⁵²

Establish Standing Empowered Teams:⁵³

The concept of empowered teams applies the characteristics of 21st century mindset in NSE issue management. “Hierarchy and top-down direction was an efficient way to direct a workforce with a larger portion of unskilled workers. Today, such a structure does not get the maximum advantage from the current workforce.”⁵⁴ Teaming is the primary method to achieve unity of effort and action. Although there be unity of purpose, without a team unity of effort and action are only happenstances. Here, the value of teaming is that it works to accomplish the whole of government mission, if the teams have clear mandates and the power to fulfill them.

For the NSE, empowered teams would be cross-agency entities tasked and staffed to manage national security issues, coordinate and oversee the response by the NSE as a whole, and bring multidisciplinary perspectives to the issues. The NSE (through the NSC) would establish standing teams for regions and a small number of standing functional teams for continuing issues that typically impact the U.S. globally. They would be quite different from the existing interdepartmental coordination committees of the NSC, in that they would be responsible for managing the issue, not just coordinating

⁵² DoD, Joint Publication 1, xii.

⁵³ See Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 492-507, for that study’s concept of integrated regional centers and 507-526 for the option for a hierarchy of empowered teams. This analysis draws from both but is identical to neither.

⁵⁴ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 308.

the policy that addresses it.⁵⁵ They would be empowered to make decisions regarding the issues they manage. However, they would have resources only to manage the issues, not to implement the WOG response. The functional components from DoD, USAID, State, Treasury, etc. would implement the decisions for how to cope with the issue. The teams would formulate the courses of action, determine the WOG resources needed to accomplish the mission and the sourcing for those resources. Upon plan approval by the President or his empowered representative, the team would task the functional components to execute their tasks. The team would then oversee plan execution. The teams' success and ability to empower them depends on completing the national security resource guidance and task allocations to the agencies. These teams will fail if they must resolve these knotty issues as they also deal with the national security issues at hand.

Case studies of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam, of the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska in 1964, and of the ongoing Joint Interagency Task Force-South reveal that empowered teams can and do achieve superior results.⁵⁶ However, the case studies also teach that gaining and sustaining the NSE commitment to set up and sustain such teams are difficult. Without that, teams are powerless and fail

Characteristics of Empowered Teams:

Forging a New Shield proposes some characteristics of empowered teams: they break down parochialism, fix accountability, and are bureaucratically flexible enough to operate in functional, regional and issue management domains and at high, middle or low

⁵⁵ The core NSC Interagency Policy Committees would function to create strategy and policy and to perform oversight. They would not have large staffs charged with managing issues.

⁵⁶ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 73, 111, 512.

levels in the hierarchy. The nature of empowered teams also endows them with five attributes that underpin achieving and sustaining unity of effort where many players must pull together: respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination.⁵⁷

Such teams potentially present a few disadvantages: independence, narrow and detailed focus, and tendencies to slowness and for greater management attention. However, the teams themselves and the NSE can manage even those to make them advantages. The teams' independence resulting from empowerment can make them unwieldy to manage from afar, but this encourages initiative. Being closer to the problem enables them to recognize emerging troubles sooner. This, combined with distributing issue management, offsets their tendencies to slowness and demands for management attention. They can focus on accomplishing narrow missions and tasks unhindered by the distractions of competing national concerns and bureaucratic competition, although the narrow focus does not allow the team to trade off across the broader NSE.

By definition, teams amalgamated from disparate agencies work outside the existing formal structures of the sourcing agencies. In the context of such teams, "working around the system" is a virtue, rather than a counterproductive sin.⁵⁸ However, their effectiveness in working outside the structures of the functional components depends on them having clear and authoritative mandates, adequate resources and control over them, and the authority to execute their tasks.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ DoD, *Joint Publication 1*, p. xix. The doctrine applies these characteristics in the context of multinational operations, but they are just as applicable to WOG efforts.

⁵⁸ See Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 126 on the negative effects working around the system can have if not accommodated. Pages 55, 233, 283 and 417 provide additional examples.

⁵⁹ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 508.

To function effectively in support of the NSE, teams must network closely with other teams lest they lose their effectiveness and the central NSC moves back into the active issue management role. “We need a well-functioning networking organization that overlays the functional national security construct.”⁶⁰

Empowered National Security Issue Management Teams:

Empowered National Security Issue Management Teams would replace the Interagency Planning Cells (IPCs) in the case of global issues.⁶¹ For regional issue management, the teams replace the Advance Civilian Team, some aspects of the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) called for the Interagency Management System established by State under NSPD-44,⁶² and the military’s Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs).⁶³ Figure VII-1 shows the JIACG notional composition and relationships.⁶⁴ Such teams are similar to an Interagency Task Force, but are standing vice situational.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 213.

⁶¹ *Presidential Policy Directive 1*. IPCs need segregation from the NSC. If imbedded, their issue resolution immediacy would be deleterious to both the team and the NSC.

⁶² U.S. Department of State, *S/CRS: Overview of The Interagency Management System*, SECSTATE WASHDC 222242Z JAN 08 (Washington, DC, 2008).

⁶³ To facilitate collaboration, regional teams would remain collocated with the combatant command staffs, in a supporting vice liaison role and would need frequent working-level engagement with country teams.

⁶⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I (Joint Publication 3-08)*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006), II-21.

⁶⁵ Murdoch, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Phase 2 Report*, 8 and 52




Figure VII-1: Notional JIACG Structure


geographic combatant commanders and with the country teams in U.S. embassies through the region.

Ongoing collaboration as both the empowered teams, the regional military commands and the country teams execute their ongoing, non-crisis engagement in theater or in country will make transition to crisis response quicker and smoother. Planning in tandem and away from the competing demands in the home agencies will help the teams

Some issues are always present and new ones emerge or escalate to crisis quickly. The best WOG posture is active engagement in the region and the U.S. will realize that only through standing teams, not ones constituted only in response to a crisis. Standing teams would work and plan in tandem with the existing planning teams in the

break down cultural barriers and create beneficial opportunities to participate in cross-agency planning.⁶⁶ “The goal must be truly horizontal planning...tied together by each agency’s clear policy directives derived from the National Security Strategy.”⁶⁷

Figure VII-2: Notional Country Team and Joint Force Planning Team Organizations



o ⁶⁸ *Regional Team Source and Composition*

Current agency representatives or liaison officers and COCOM staff assigned to the JIACGs would form the core of the regional teams, but the team’s members would have new mandates and reporting responsibilities.⁶⁹ Additional staffing would become

⁶⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps*, GAO Report to Congress (Washington: GAO, 2007).

⁶⁷ Matthew F. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 37, (2005): 16.

⁶⁸ Country Team organization: USJFCOM, *Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group*, (Norfolk, VA, 2007), III-11. Joint force planning team organization: CJCS, *Baseline Organization And Functions for a Standing Joint Force Headquarters - Core Element*, (CJCSM 5125.01A), (Washington, DC 2008), A-23.

⁶⁹ JIACG staffing varies from region to region. See also USJFCOM, *Commander’s Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group*, III-9.

available as the NSC policy committees shrink with their narrowing responsibilities, and from permanent staff or on detail resources now destined for S/CRS. All personnel would be members, not representatives, and on permanent assignment.

○ *Relationships: Authorities*

The NSC, as the national-level WOG agent, is the principal overseer for the regional teams, rather than the CRSG, a State Department office. The NSC would hold teams to account for mission accomplishment, but home agencies would exercise professional and technical oversight and would coordinate with teams in planning, resourcing and executing their allocated tasks. Teams would assign allocated tasks to the agencies as needed for the plan and consonant with WOG task allocations, and issue the implementation order for the approved plan. Although they task the functional agencies, teams and their members must gear relationships with them to demonstrate the benefit to them. Optimally, the contributing agencies will know that using the teams, vice working around them, best serves their interests.

The concept for empowered teams overcomes the shortfall in the JIACGs as now constituted where they do not make policy or task interagency elements nor alter existing lines of authority or reporting.⁷⁰ As regional teams, the NSC and their home agencies (at NSC behest) would empower them to act in their stead and within the team's mandate in managing issues; they would not be only consultative with no authority or mission responsibility. The stake gained by multi-polar oversight by the functional agencies assures bringing the other elements of national power to bear in the field; oversight

⁷⁰ DoD, *Joint Publication 3-08 Vol I*, II-20: "each JIACG is a multi-functional, **advisory** element that **represents** the civilian departments and agencies and **facilitates information sharing** across the interagency community." (emphasis added).

provides a mechanism for the home agencies to influence outcomes relevant to their missions and protect their stakes in the results.

The empowered team concept also deals with the duet of contention most commonly encountered in the field: Chief of Mission/Ambassador - Joint Task Force Commander (or geographic combatant commander absent a crisis). It does so by treating both as supported commanders;⁷¹ the teams retain their autonomy and responsibility for accomplishing assigned missions.

The regional teams are primarily planning organizations, but must touch WOG operations. An arrangement such as the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) would bring together the operational elements and their operational supervision.⁷² CMOC command authority would transition as the situation evolves, but would provide unity of command.⁷³ For the teams, the charter would specify rotating the chief position, as mutually agreed by the individual team's stakeholders.

Empowered teams would:

1. Vest actual authority to execute policy in a region;
2. Fully integrate multiple USG agencies in a region instead of the current vertical alignment;
3. Provide agency balance so strengths of different agencies operating in the region can be leveraged; and

⁷¹ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 525-6.

⁷² For additional information on the CMOC, refer to U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations (Joint Publication JP 3-57)*, and U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs (Joint Publication 3-57.1)*, (Washington, DC).

⁷³ U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations (FM 3-07)*, (Washington, DC, 2003), chapter IV for a discussion of authority transition in peacekeeping operations. Also Bensahel, *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq*, 21, regarding the Executive Steering Group established by GEN Casey for Iraq.

4. Provide stability and balance in the region that permanence brings, not through ad hoc and temporary teams.⁷⁴

○ *Planning*

The rest of government has little hope of replicating the intensive and extensive planning complex characteristic of the Department of Defense without massive infusions of planning resources. Even then, developing competency would take a great deal of time. Most departments and agencies do not have tasks of such scope and complexity to require such planning capabilities. However, whole of government success requires a truly cross-agency planning process in which agency planners can be brought together to develop integrated plans to meet common objectives. The teams provide the *locus* for this cross-agency planning while moving beyond the current process of “interagency-izing” military campaign plans.⁷⁵

Agencies still must plan to complete their tasks and provide their contributions to WOG missions. The inability to integrate or even correlate those plans introduces significant challenges to achieving whole of government unity of effort. As much of the value of planning is in the process, not the resultant plan,⁷⁶ the NSE requires a common framework to enable collaborative planning and in which to relate the disparate plans as they develop. Rather than moving all agencies to the upper end of the spectrum (the DoD norm), the model needs to find common ground reachable by all if they plan sufficiently to accomplish their own missions. To ensure effective and efficient use of whole of government resources, the framework must include steps for mission analysis, strategic

⁷⁴ Gardner, *Fight the Away Game as a Team*, 55.

⁷⁵ Murdoch, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 Report*, 21

⁷⁶ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 155.

approach, operational option identification, formulating and evaluating implementation plans, approval and rehearsal.⁷⁷

Resources:

The U.S. does not need new resources to accomplish whole of government missions so much as it needs existing resources in the right places and performing the right functions. With strategy and task allocations in place and OMB and GAO empowered to ensure congruence, the current budget processes can realign the existing resources to perform whole of government engagement more effectively and efficiently.

However, some increase is necessary. Congress should continue with the planned increase of 300 Foreign Service Officers in USAID and the State Department increase of \$140 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative.⁷⁸ Both are clearly for whole of government engagement and will start providing some of the capacity now lacking. Legislative approval would increase USAID end strength by 30%, including seventy-five programming and planning officers in addition to people in various reconstruction and stabilization areas, fund the core of S/CRS and begin funding a whole of government Civilian Reserve Corps. These increases will help bridge while better task-based end strength estimates develop through strategy and task allocations.⁷⁹ These increases are small, however and will only minimally offset the huge staffing advantage DoD has now.

⁷⁷ For sample alternatives, see Leonard Hawley, *Interagency Planning for Crisis Intervention*, (Washington, DC, 2003), prepared for discussion by Working Group 4 (Interagency and Coalition Operations) of the CSIS study *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*; and DoD, *Joint Operation Planning (Joint Publication 5-0)*.

⁷⁸ Department of State FY2009 Congressional Budget Justification, 1-4 and Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 2010.

⁷⁹ Ibid. and Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 373.

As a result, DoD will continue to shoulder most of the burden in large-scale reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

A key outcome of the “National Council” summit – if not the key outcome – is the formulation of overarching national strategy and preliminary task allocations for whole of government missions. These are the foundations of rational whole of government budgeting. They enable assessing budget proposals against agreed roles and missions and their contributions to achieving the national strategy. However, they are not enough taken alone and strategy-driven budgets will not materialize without contention. Simply, senior executives cannot dictate purposeful budgeting successfully. Even when successful, the process requires follow-through to ensure conformity. Once checked several times and if the agencies benefit from compliance, it can become the norm. The recommendations that follow serve two purposes: to realign resources to conform to whole of government mission responsibilities; and to use the budget process and appropriations acts to validate legislatively the core mission changes, rather than to do so with independent legislation.

Substantial reallocations are too politically charged to occur in one step. “Detailing” people and applying resources to missions, regardless of which agency or department is using them, can facilitate transition while budgets realign. Consensus on the strategy and task allocation will be crucial but not unambiguous: tasks and responsibilities allocations must not only assign tasks to departments and agencies, they must eliminate them from organizations now doing the tasks they should not (e.g., DoD). Even then, a key problem will be to determine how much a task should cost. Departments and agencies will tend to underestimate the costs of missions moving to another agency,

thereby preserving their resources. Budget development oversight will need independent costing capability to offset this tendency.

○ *Budgeting to Strategy and Tasks – Executive Branch*⁸⁰

DoD's budget horizon is six years. Something approaching six years must also become the budget development norm for the rest of the national security establishment. Consistent horizons support attaining WOG resource coherence and give permanence to the needed whole of government capacity.⁸¹ Developing budgets against a common strategic framework and agreed task allocations also assists achieving coherence.⁸² Budgeting in this manner results in resourcing missions, not capabilities.⁸³

The strategic framework also is a key enabler for incorporating whole of government missions in agencies and departments. Cabinet heads and key leaders developing national and national security strategies and shaping whole of government task allocations to them will ensure those products are relevant to their agencies and aligned with their existing core missions. As the WOG dimension becomes part of an agency's routine, agency heads will become less conflicted between serving the President and being a champion of their departments.⁸⁴ Since the WOG mission is now core, department and agency budget submissions will allocate resources to it naturally.

Eventually, with appropriated resources to execute the WOG mission, departments and

⁸⁰ See Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 374-403, for a comprehensive discussion of the current national security budget processes and the problems in them. Inability to budget to strategy is one of them.

⁸¹ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 402.

⁸² *Ibid.*, xiii.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 150.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 222.

agencies can use temporary diversions while supplemental funding is obtained from Congress for WOG mission crises, much the way DoD does it now.⁸⁵ Leaders will be able to achieve better WOG solutions in crisis by improving their organization's responsiveness to WOG demands.⁸⁶

○ *Budgeting to Strategy and Tasks - Congress*⁸⁷

The U.S. must achieve budget coherence across both the executive and legislative branches. The methods readily available and these recommendations require both leadership and management from those in key power positions in the House and Senate.

The first prerequisite for a WOG look at the budget in Congress is the ability to do so. "Committees fundamentally contribute to policy fragmentation."⁸⁸ Initially, Congressional leaders of both parties, as the principal policymaking coordinators in Congress, should take an active integrative role by weakening jurisdictional rigidities and encouraging policy development from a broader perspective. Given the collegial nature of Congress, this leadership commitment is the necessary precondition for further steps to collaboratively deal with WOG issues.

Following such initial leadership intervention, they can use legislative management options to craft, tailor and adjust a menu of approaches to achieve the desired integration. The following are already within existing procedures: multiple

⁸⁵ See Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 152, re Congressional resistance to appropriating contingency funds.

⁸⁶ Note that this is the reverse formulation of Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 323, that "senior leaders need to further the interests of their organizations even at the expense of better interagency solutions."

⁸⁷ See Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 374-403, for a comprehensive discussion of the current national security budget processes and the problems in them. Inability to budget to strategy is one of them.

⁸⁸ House Armed Services Committee, *Project on National Security Reform* (Oleszek testimony, 10

referrals, task forces, working groups, assigning members to multiple related committees, establishing specialized subcommittees under cognizance of multiple committees.⁸⁹

These steps would lower the threat to current power centers in the legislature.

Following the leadership example, the committee power brokers (the House and Senate Appropriations Committees – HAC and SAC) should provide for and obtain the analytic support they require from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the GAO and the Congressional Research Service. Resourced and under HAC and SAC direction, these supporting organizations can conduct focused whole of government analyses of the budget which will facilitate the necessary crosswalks without wholesale reorganization of the Congressional committees.⁹⁰

Congressional legislation has required national security and defense strategies for some time. Congress must do so for the national strategy and a revitalized national security strategy as well. It must also do more: whether Congress agrees with the executive branch's strategies *in toto*, it must respond legislatively to them so the government can move toward national consensus. Once settling on an acceptable strategic framework, strategy and NSE task allocation should drive Congress' budget resolution and align legislative priorities, equities and power structures to the framework. Objective analysis of the merits of budget proposals will improve since there will be an independent strategic framework against which to judge them. The result will be appropriations that more closely conform to a commonly held view vice perpetuating budget decisions from previous years.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 9-11

⁹⁰ See Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 478, for an alternative approach to dealing with the whole of government in committee. The approach proposed above contrasts with that proposal in that it takes authority and prerogatives away from no existing committee.

Budgeting to strategy and task allocation will have two additional benefits in coping with the legislative workload.⁹¹ Congress can appropriate to implement the strategy and conform to the task allocation rather than deciding them piecemeal. Authorizing committees can influence the strategic decisions absent the battles over dollars. The strategic framework and task allocation also will allow greater flexibility for moving funds where needed. The executive branch will have a legislatively approved strategy within which to realign resources in response to changing circumstances, although Congress should still require at least “fact of” reporting. This serves both the executive branch need for flexibility and Congressional oversight and funding prerogatives.

○ ***Budget Oversight and Analytic Support***

Both executive and legislative branch oversight of the budget and analytic support to budget development and oversight are inadequate.⁹² Some of the inadequacies result from the tendency for these external auditors of mission efficiency and effectiveness to mirror the organizations they oversee and support. For example, proportional allocation of auditors and analysts will match the size of the organization they oversee or support, making an independent holistic assessment difficult. Others result from the want of sufficient resources to analyze a multi-trillion dollar budget thoroughly, as noted for the OMB regarding the process to develop the President’s budget submission. While not a panacea, creating a national strategy and task allocation will assist this analysis enormously and make better use of limited resources.

⁹¹ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 426-7.

⁹² Executive branch: Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 380. Legislative branch: Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 410-1.

As with OMB in the executive branch, Congress needs to improve its legislative oversight capabilities to support appropriating to strategy. The General Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget Office and the Congressional Research Service need staffing and funding augmentation to analyze the budget as submitted by the President for its ability to execute the strategy successfully and conformity with task allocations.⁹³ In turn, that assessment will drive Congress' budget resolutions.

For both branches, the assessment and analytic functions also would enable focused, systematic oversight of specific agency performance against the budget and comprehensive NSE assessment after appropriation and execution. To date, OMB and others really assess only execution rates, a rudimentary measure of performance. OMB needs to use measures of effectiveness against strategies, their objectives and the tasks and missions to achieve them. Such assessments are not trivial exercises. They will require substantially more capabilities than now exist within the oversight organizations.

○ *Personnel*

The departments and agencies are and will be the primary repository of and source for WOG and operational resources. Personnel are among the resources that NSE agencies should identify and associate with WOG missions in the task allocation process.

The overall personnel end strength increase should be modest. Many of the resources identified in the departments and agencies will continue to perform WOG functions there, but allocations must direct moves to offset net resource shortfalls elsewhere. The NSC will require far fewer people for issue management; it must increase the staff performing oversight, strategy development and analysis. OMB and

⁹³ See Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 411-4, for current roles of GAO, CBO and CRS in the legislative budget process.

Congressional budget support staffs (e.g., GAO) should increase to assess, verify and make recommendations for the budget's strategic alignment.

The preponderance of resources will come from current WOG support (e.g., the JIACG or IPCs). As directed initially by executive orders and as adjusted later in the agency budgets, some current resources will need to shift between agencies to align WOG mission accomplishment and resources. For extremely near-term needs or in response to short-fused demand signals, agencies would detail personnel to WOG operations or activities under corresponding agency missions. The President should call up military civil affairs reservists for longer term but impermanent operational WOG demands, whether in military crisis or outside hostilities.⁹⁴

Once personnel resources become better aligned, the NSE should plan to meet short-term surge demands through the "float" for training (the "float" should move with the associated billets) and redirecting resources internally to an agency. Once the WOG missions become part of the NSE agencies' core missions, meeting short-term surge demand becomes largely a matter of responding to new priorities driven by crisis. Personnel levels do not need to grow to match the worst case or short-term peak demands.

⁹⁴ Legal hurdles will likely require that establishing an effective permanent reserve WOG cadre be a long-term goal.

“On the pragmatic view the only thing that matters is that the theory 'works' and that the necessary preliminaries and side issues do not cost too much in time and effort.”¹

Bertram Neville Brockhouse

VIII. Concept of Operations

The following concept of operations portrays and describes the principal components of the envisioned national security establishment, how those components relate to each other and operate collaboratively to create unity of purpose and effort. In some respects, the operational concept is notional: leaders and managers could modify proposed cells within the empowered teams as necessary; the President and National Security Advisor could grow or shrink the list of functional teams; the President could classify membership on the national council into tiers.

National Council

The leadership, strategy and task/mission allocations emanating from the national council are the pillars of progress in successful whole of government operations; strategy underpins unity of purpose and allocations enable unity of effort. Many of the impediments to whole of government effectiveness center on parochial behaviors and cultures. The nation requires strong leadership to create the cultural norms and create a collaborative environment, and effective management will implement processes to achieve cooperation and coordination. Together, leadership and management can achieve coherent WOG engagement. The process of doing so must start at the highest level of government or the bureaucratic millstone slowly will grind efforts to work across agencies to a very fine dust.

¹ Bertram Neville Brockhouse, “Slow Neutron Spectroscopy and the Grand Atlas of the Physical World,” Nobel Lecture 8 December 1994, *Nobel Lectures: Physics, 1991-1995* (1997): 111




Figure VIII-1: National Council

Heads of departments and agencies must sit at the table and must represent the nation with respect to their functional areas of responsibility, rather than representing the interests of their agencies. They must focus on national goals and explore how their agencies can contribute to achieving them. In council deliberations, the principals will create the national strategy, identify and prioritize the top level ends in that strategy, bound acceptable ways to achieve them, make initial resource allocation judgments

against those ends, taking into account the risks of forgoing ends due to resource conflict, and commit to the shape of their agency's role in executing the strategy.

The council will have three other groups present, participating to varying degrees. The key security, economic, management and global engagement players in the Executive Office of the President will sit at the table as advisors, future overseers or executive agents for the council's outcomes. In the room will be a small group of key advisors in areas of specialized interest: the military, intelligence, law enforcement, law, the environment and emergency response. Last, the President should invite the Congressional leadership to observe, since the outcomes from the council will shape the executive branch submissions to and interaction with the legislative branch. Congress needs to engage early so that they can effectively perform their oversight, lawmaking and appropriating functions and prepare to engage the executive branch in refining the national strategy in representation of their constituents.

The commitment and values to change agency and department cultures must come from the council. Under the leadership of the President and in concert with their peers, they can formulate the way forward for the executive branch and the nation, making the necessary trades and developing the cross-agency mutual support and an agreed division of effort. Given the magnitude of the effort, the national council may meet only once an administration. However, if the council keeps its focus high and concentrates on getting the principles, general allocations and strategy right, its outcomes will endure.

Executive Branch




Figure VIII-2: Executive Branch Concept of Operations

The executive branch's implementation operations commence with the creation of the national strategy, whole of government principles and whole of government task allocations by the National Council. From that start, the concept of operations envisions the President developing and executing the national security strategy through two limbs: the existing departments and agencies and a reoriented National Security Council. The President stimulates operations through issuing the national strategy, accompanied by the national security strategy derived from it by the National Security Council, amplifying executive policy, and the consensus task allocation matrix from the National Council deliberations.

The graphical representation's complexity highlights one of the concept's key attributes: interconnectedness. Other key attributes include a process that is strategy-driven, collective responsibility with decentralized authority, and unity of purpose to promote C³ (collaboration, cooperation and coordination) to achieve unity of effort and reach national security coherence.

The first limb centers on the national security establishment as it has been constituted since 1947, with the extended composition to the whole of government that can contribute to national security success. The traditional country teams under the leadership of Chiefs of Mission in the many individual countries with which the U.S. engages, and the regional military commanders in the Defense Department's regional construct support the extended NSE. The other limb is comprised of a National Security Council reoriented to focus on strategy, oversight and analysis, supported by functional teams and regional empowered teams.

In their roles as agency or department heads, the whole of government leaders both transform their organizational cultures and missions to grow whole of government mission and unity of purpose, and provide the functional resources for the whole of government national security response as a part of their expanded core missions. The agencies provide those resources at four levels: to the National Security Council; to the standing functional and regional teams; and to contingency teams in response to allocated tasks as refined and understood through C³ with the functional teams and regional empowered teams. Providing these resources is key to achieving the C³ vital to national security coherence, as comprising the NSC-directed teams from across the NSE brings extensive and divergent perspectives into developing strategy, managing issues and

executing plans to succeed in achieving U.S. objectives in contingencies. Additionally, these assignments will help develop national security professionals with a wide-ranging base of experience, benefiting both the parent organizations and the NSC organizations in future assignments.

The NSC becomes the focal point for national security strategy development and analysis and the overseer for implementation. The National Security Advisor should redirect issue management resources to the functional and regional empowered teams, while bringing in a smaller cadre with a different set of skills and talent to perform the core NSC's new strategy development, analysis and oversight functions. The NSA will draw much of the talent from the departments and agencies (to become temporary members of the NSC rather than representatives of the departments and agencies); the small portion of the NSC that is permanent staff should focus on the council's independence in perspective and equities required to perform its oversight and analytic functions properly.

The NSC has two initial tasks: deriving the National Security Strategy from the National Strategy, and tasking/assigning issues to the functional and empowered regional teams. The core NSC must complete the security strategy early. That strategy is essential to structure responses by the departments and agencies, will be the framework to guide the teams in managing issues and provides the ends, ways and means to shape unity of purpose and effort. Clear and effective leadership and management must guide the NSC policy development and tasking so that it remains at a level appropriate for the President and avoids usurping the roles of either the departments and agencies or the functional and empowered teams. The demands on leadership will be particularly tough, since the

natural tendency will be to build up power in the NSC under the crush of issue immediacy and as an effect of proximity to the President. NSC leaders will need to be vigilant in maintaining focus on the strategy development, oversight and analysis roles. Keeping the staff small and empowering the teams also will serve to reduce the tendency to manage issues and solve problems in the NSC. Departments, agencies and teams vibrantly engaged in WOG missions will produce ample demands on the core NSC to maintain the NSC's proper focus.

The organization of functional teams parallels some of the Policy Coordinating Committees in the Bush administration's NSC and similar working groups in prior administrations. The proposed list of teams is notional; the exact mix of teams needs to support the leadership and management preferences of the President and National Security Advisor. They must take care not to duplicate the functional efforts in the various departments and agencies, but only to establish teams where there are global issues that also cut across multiple departments and agencies. In most cases, the principal measure of the functional teams' success will lie in the independent, impartial, integrated and thorough policy recommendations and options to resolve the current issue or crisis. Actual issue management and resolution will be the province of the regional empowered teams and the departments and agencies. When performing optimally in their roles, the teams will be invaluable resources to the President, departments, agencies and the regional empowered teams.

The empowered regional teams are where the policy and action to implement it come together, they achieve unity of effort and affirm unity of purpose. The graphic shows them organized in the DIME-FIL model (Diplomatic, Information, Military,

Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement), but that model is also notional. The team's leader, selected from senior national security professionals using the "best athlete" principle, should adjust the team to fit the region, its issues and his or her leadership and management style. As with the NSC, departments and agencies will provide the bulk of the staffing. Many of the original members will come from the existing JIACGs, including those the regional commander will provide to fulfill the teams' needs for military expertise. The regional commanders will disestablish the JIACGs when the regional empowered teams stand up. However, the teams will require considerable augmentation; depending on the region, leaders may require staffs numbering the hundreds. If leaders do not require such capable staffs, they may find that the departments and agencies and the NSC assume greater responsibilities and thereby *de facto* limit the team's empowerment. On the teams, personnel assigned will be members of the team and conduits to their parent agencies but they will not be representatives of their agencies. The team will have the power to implement actions to manage and respond to issues, using resources provided by the departments and agencies in response to teams allocating tasks to them. Those resources will form teams to implement the issue management strategies the regional teams will oversee. The teams will develop the tasking and policy options in C³ with the departments and agencies, their field entities in the Chiefs of Mission country teams and regional military commander staffs and the functional teams. C³ is the *sine qua non* of empowered team success across the NSE. The departments and agencies, along with their field elements, must appreciate that:

- (1) Resource tasking aligns with the task allocation matrices from the President;

(2) Success of the empowered teams or their contingency teams is equally the success of the departments and agencies; and

(3) Assigning resources to the teams results in fewer tasks the departments and agencies must accomplish on their own.

The empowered teams' activities will create the empirical resource usage data needed to inform and continually update the national security-related budget proposals from the departments and agencies for strategic alignment by OMB and the President's submissions to Congress.

Legislative Branch




Figure VIII-3: Legislative Branch Concept of Operations

The legislative branch operates fundamentally differently from the executive. Respect for the elected status of all the key players and the need for harmony – at least in the majority party – replace the hierarchical authority of the executive branch. Thus,

nearly all the interconnecting lines are dotted to reflect their non-authoritative nature. Nevertheless, there are centers in Congress that exercise real power. The most powerful of those are the Speaker of the House, the Senate Majority Leader and the chairpersons of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Although significantly less powerful, minority party leaders often gain power and become critical factors in successful legislation because of the nature of House and Senate rules and the importance of strategic communications in the political arena. Successful progression to sound legislation depends on drawing together all those power centers to achieve coherent whole of government outcomes. As with leadership in any sphere, the leaders must unambiguously display commitment to the desired culture and outcomes through both demeanor and actions. In the case of Congress, that means cross-jurisdictional behaviors culminating in an integrated and coherent set of whole of government legislation.

The task for Congress becomes more manageable if the President provides Congress with the National Strategy, the National Security Strategy and an integrated budget aligned with those strategies. For all the strengths of the legislative branch and all it can contribute to adjusting, redirecting and refining these strategic documents, its distributed nature, political preeminence and absence of detailed executive knowledge prevent Congress from developing them as original documents.

Analytic support from enhanced organizations such as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) will be pivotal throughout the legislative process. That support will enable leadership to employ the tools already at their disposal to enhance integration in the legislative process. Congressional leadership can use integrating

techniques such as referring bills to multiple committees, with or without designating a lead committee, creating task forces for transitory but important issues or working groups for more enduring ones, and assigning members to multiple interrelated committees. They can implement any or all of these without change to rules or procedures. However, doing so requires both a major investment of the power of their offices and their time. The analyses of the executive branch strategic documents by the CBO, CRS and GAO will align those submissions with the Congressional committee model so that the leaders can employ their integrating techniques more easily and successfully. The leaders must apply these techniques pervasively through appropriations, authorizing and the existing select committees in each house and in collaboration with leaders of the other house.

CBO, CRS and GAO also provide critical analytic support to committee deliberations and legislation development. The Strategy-to-Budget Alignment, Budget vs. Strategy Performance Assessments and Integration Analyses will create both an information base from which the committees can assess legislation and windows into opportunities to integrate laterally.

Optimally, these analyses and integrated legislation will adjust to each other to come together into an effective monitoring and oversight regimen after the legislation is signed into law. With the executive branch's strategic documents and developing whole of government implementation culture, the nation will have gained the ability to resource and execute a coherent global engagement strategy appropriately using all elements of national power.

“If you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there.”

Lewis Carroll

IX. Conclusion:

National security professionals in the government and in supporting institutions such as think tanks and universities agree that the U.S. must bring to bear all elements of national power in its global engagement strategy. Many ongoing activities and actions carry this consensus forward. Coherent whole of government approaches will enable the U.S. to use those power sources properly and effectively to cope with the challenges of the 21st century, especially in this era of rapidly emerging economic constraints. The U.S. must do so using 21st century mindset and organizational behaviors. The 21st century's multi-polar and non-polar world presents the U.S. with networked, complex, “wicked” problems.

National security and foreign relations strategies since 2006 echo the whole of government approach. Presidential directives and Congressional appropriations have directed and funded supporting initiatives and created offices to concentrate on whole of government activities. Two separate Secretaries of State have made whole of government policies central to their objectives. Geographic combatant commands have reorganized and recast their missions to be both “softer” and more inclusive of non-DoD agencies. The Project on National Security Reform's 830-page report, funded by Congress in 2008, is now the seminal work in this field. The nineteen members of its guiding coalition represent hundreds of years of senior executive experience across the spectrum of national security affairs. They conclude that the U.S. national security system remains dysfunctional: “It is our unshakable conviction that the United States simply cannot afford the failure rate that the current national security system is not only prone but virtually

guaranteed to cause.”¹ The national security establishment’s resource allocations, DoD preeminence, its bureaucratic nature embodied in its functional organization, culture, prerogatives, power structures and human nature all contribute to this failure.

Change has not come easily or quickly thus far, but not for lack of knowing where we want to go. The system as currently organized and operating militates against and actively forestalls change. Compounding the difficulty, the billowing economic crisis makes change now much harder as it saps attention and resources from the nation’s leaders and coffers.

In this atmosphere, the nation needs to seek achievable change; those made with limited resources and avoiding power struggles to get the nation where it can go on the road to an optimal whole of government posture. Fortunately, the nature of both the causes of the system’s deficiencies and the barriers to change is amenable to remediation through rejuvenated leadership and management. Leadership can promote cultural and mindset change, while management can implement effective controls and processes, both by leveraging bureaucratic and human nature within the existing system.

Leadership is the key, since superficial changes that do not touch the underlying cultures and mindsets will be transitory and illusory. The President needs to bring true leadership to the fore through a top-level national security summit to set the establishment on the path to “think globally and act locally,” with the specific agenda to:

- Develop and commit to a national and national security strategic framework;
- Shape and commit to fulfilling agency and department whole of government task responsibility allocations and core missions;

¹ Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, iii.

- Endorse distributed authority executed through teams practicing collaboration, coordination and cooperation and imbued with unity of purpose.

Inspired and guided by the summit's leaders, the national security establishment can move the summit's vision forward with minimal structural change. True leadership and management will begin to change the establishment's core values and make the improvements needed to be effective in the 21st century. In addition to specific follow-through actions from the summit's outcomes, the establishment will move to realign resources, establish core missions across the NSE through the budget process, implement controls to ensure accountability, and develop national security professionals through training and cross-assignment.

The envisioned National Security Council will epitomize these changes in the national security establishment's *modus operandi* and *milieu*. It will become more the President's principal mechanism for strategy than policy and more for oversight than implementation. It will manage the national security processes for the President but not the establishment. Taking a less ambitious but feasible path, leaders, managers and their 21st century mindsets and practices can and will achieve the real change the country needs and can realize now.

Appendix

Executive Core Qualifications¹

| Leading Change | Leading People | Results Driven | Business Acumen | Building Coalitions |
|---|--|--|---|--|
| Definitions | | | | |
| This core qualification involves the ability to bring about strategic change, both within and outside the organization, to meet organizational goals. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to establish an organizational vision and to implement it in a continuously changing environment. | This core qualification involves the ability to lead people toward meeting the organization's vision, mission, and goals. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to provide an inclusive workplace that fosters the development of others, facilitates cooperation and teamwork, and supports constructive resolution of conflicts. | This core qualification involves the ability to meet organizational goals and customer expectations. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to make decisions that produce high-quality results by applying technical knowledge, analyzing problems, and calculating risks. | This core qualification involves the ability to manage human, financial, and information resources strategically. | This core qualification involves the ability to build coalitions internally and with other Federal agencies, State and local governments, nonprofit and private sector organizations, foreign governments, or international organizations to achieve common goals. |
| Competencies | | | | |
| Creativity and Innovation External Awareness Flexibility Resilience Strategic Thinking Vision | Conflict Management Leveraging Diversity Developing Others Team Building | Accountability Customer Service Decisiveness Entrepreneurship Problem Solving Technical Credibility | Financial Management Human Capital Management Technology Management | Partnering Political Savvy Influencing/Negotiating |

Fundamental Competencies: These competencies are the foundation for success in each of the Executive Core Qualifications.

- Interpersonal Skills
- Oral Communication
- Continual Learning
- Written Communication
- Integrity/Honesty
- Public Service Motivation

ECQ 1: Leading Change

Definition: This core qualification involves the ability to bring about strategic change, both within and outside the organization, to meet organizational goals. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to establish an organizational vision and to implement it in a continuously changing environment.

Creativity and Innovation

Develops new insights into situations; questions conventional approaches; encourages new ideas and innovations; designs and implements new or cutting edge programs/processes.

¹ U.S. Office of Personnel Management, *Executive Core Qualifications*.

External Awareness

Understands and keeps up-to-date on local, national, and international policies and trends that affect the organization and shape stakeholders' views; is aware of the organization's impact on the external environment.

Flexibility

Is open to change and new information; rapidly adapts to new information, changing conditions, or unexpected obstacles.

Resilience

Deals effectively with pressure; remains optimistic and persistent, even under adversity. Recovers quickly from setbacks.

Strategic Thinking

Formulates objectives and priorities, and implements plans consistent with the long-term interests of the organization in a global environment. Capitalizes on opportunities and manages risks.

Vision

Takes a long-term view and builds a shared vision with others; acts as a catalyst for organizational change. Influences others to translate vision into action.

ECQ 2: Leading People

Definition: This core qualification involves the ability to lead people toward meeting the organization's vision, mission, and goals. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to provide an inclusive workplace that fosters the development of others, facilitates cooperation and teamwork, and supports constructive resolution of conflicts.

Conflict Management

Encourages creative tension and differences of opinions. Anticipates and takes steps to prevent counter-productive confrontations. Manages and resolves conflicts and disagreements in a constructive manner.

Leveraging Diversity

Fosters an inclusive workplace where diversity and individual differences are valued and leveraged to achieve the vision and mission of the organization.

Developing Others

Develops the ability of others to perform and contribute to the organization by providing ongoing feedback and by providing opportunities to learn through formal and informal methods.

Team Building

Inspires and fosters team commitment, spirit, pride, and trust. Facilitates cooperation and motivates team members to accomplish group goals.

ECQ 3: Results Driven

Definition: This core qualification involves the ability to meet organizational goals and customer expectations. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to make decisions that produce high-quality results by applying technical knowledge, analyzing problems, and calculating risks.

Accountability

Holds self and others accountable for measurable high-quality, timely, and cost-effective results. Determines objectives, sets priorities, and delegates work. Accepts responsibility for mistakes. Complies with established control systems and rules.

Customer Service

Anticipates and meets the needs of both internal and external customers. Delivers high-quality products and services; is committed to continuous improvement.

Decisiveness

Makes well-informed, effective, and timely decisions, even when data are limited or solutions produce unpleasant consequences; perceives the impact and implications of decisions.

Entrepreneurship

Positions the organization for future success by identifying new opportunities; builds the organization by developing or improving products or services. Takes calculated risks to accomplish organizational objectives.

Problem Solving

Identifies and analyzes problems; weighs relevance and accuracy of information; generates and evaluates alternative solutions; makes recommendations.

Technical Credibility

Understands and appropriately applies principles, procedures, requirements, regulations, and policies related to specialized expertise.

ECQ 4: Business Acumen

Definition: This core qualification involves the ability to manage human, financial, and information resources strategically.

Financial Management

Understands the organization's financial processes. Prepares, justifies, and administers the program budget. Oversees procurement and contracting to achieve desired results. Monitors expenditures and uses cost-benefit thinking to set priorities.

Human Capital Management

Builds and manages workforce based on organizational goals, budget considerations, and staffing needs. Ensures that employees are appropriately recruited, selected, appraised, and rewarded; takes action to address performance problems. Manages a multi-sector workforce and a variety of work situations.

Technology Management

Keeps up-to-date on technological developments. Makes effective use of technology to achieve results. Ensures access to and security of technology systems.

ECQ 5: Building Coalitions

Definition: This core qualification involves the ability to build coalitions internally and with other Federal agencies, State and local governments, nonprofit and private sector organizations, foreign governments, or international organizations to achieve common goals.

Partnering

Develops networks and builds alliances; collaborates across boundaries to build strategic relationships and achieve common goals.

Political Savvy

Identifies the internal and external politics that impact the work of the organization. Perceives organizational and political reality and acts accordingly.

Influencing/Negotiating

Persuades others; builds consensus through give and take; gains cooperation from others to obtain information and accomplish goals.

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Mr. Ammons served as a U.S. Naval Officer for twenty-one years, five as a Surface Warfare Officer and sixteen as a naval cryptologist. After retiring in 1990, he supported the National Reconnaissance Office communications and signals intelligence programs for twelve years, three as a systems engineering and technical assistance contractor and ten as a Senior Project Engineer for the Aerospace Corporation, a federally funded research development corporation. After five years as a liaison to NSA's Spaceborne Planning Division, Mr. Ammons returned to government service as a civilian in the National Security Agency, serving in the Special Source Office, the Foreign Affairs Directorate and as the finance, budget and business manager for NSA's midpoint programs. In his last assignment, he managed major adjustments in collection programs as part of NSA's transformation and was promoted to GG15 in 2007.

Mr. Ammons holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Cincinnati, a Master of Science degree in Systems Technology from the Naval Postgraduate School and a Master of Science in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.