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**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**

**REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA; A VITAL INTEREST OF
THE UNITED STATES**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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18 March 2010

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, the Gulf of Guinea region of Africa has become a vital interest of the United States. The U.S. will import up to 25% of their oil from this region within the next ten years and may be willing to conduct a military intervention to protect resources there. Poor governance, corruption, poverty, international crime, Islamic Fundamentalism, and tribalism are some of the issues confronting different states in the region. This thesis will review U.S. policies toward the African countries in the Gulf of Guinea region since the late 1950's in an effort to determine what policies have improved U.S. influence and interests in the region and which have not. This will be accomplished by looking at some of the historical successes and failures in the context of the period with specific countries involved. After gaining an understanding of what policies have worked and which have not, recommendations to improve the influence of the U.S. in the region are provided.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Region

The twelve countries in the Gulf of Guinea region of Western Africa have become increasingly important to the United States in recent years largely due to the increasing amount of oil production in the region. The U.S. National Intelligence Council says the region will provide 25% of the oil imports for the U.S. by 2015, exceeding the 23% currently imported from the Persian Gulf States.¹ The United States has recently declared the Gulf of Guinea an area of strategic national interest and thereby one that could require military intervention to protect its resources. The increase in oil production has prompted large investments from multinational oil companies in an effort to secure future research, development and production rights.² It has also prompted a renewed effort to improve diplomatic relations in order to insure the U.S. maintains favorable standing with the oil producing nations. The United States does not have the best diplomatic record in the region. The lofty ideals espoused by the U.S. are often quickly forgotten when the realities of self-interest take over. Often the U.S. overlooks human rights issues, corruption, and poor governance in favor of good relations with bad governments. In the Gulf of Guinea region, the quality of governance is rated as

¹ David Lewis, "Analysis-Pirates, Gangs Fuel Gulf of Guinea Woes," Reuters, 15 April 2009, 1.

² Patrick J. Paterson, "Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea," JFQ Forum Issue 45, (2nd Quarter 2007): 2.

extremely poor; the standard of living is extremely low³, illiteracy rates soar and the gap between wealthy and poor is astronomical.⁴ In order to protect U.S. security and economic stability, the U.S. must proactively invest in regional security, quality of governance, education, and development to insure the region remains stable.

Thesis

The U.S. must invest greater assets toward regional security in the Gulf of Guinea or risk regional instability turning into total anarchy. Without a focused investment effort across the spectrum of needs, the region may implode, ultimately requiring large scale military intervention. One could easily argue that the combination of oil resources, global demand, poverty, illiteracy, and poor governance create the perfect climate for the spread of Islamic Extremist ideology.

Background

The United States has a history of ill-defined, limited, and poorly executed policy in Western Africa. The twelve countries that make up the Gulf of Guinea region are: The Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and the island nations of Sao Tome and

³Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, Massimo Mastruzzi, "Governance Matter IV; New Data, New Challenges," The World Bank, (May 2005): 2.

⁴ James J. F. Forest, Matthew V. Sousa, Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf, Framing U.S. Energy and Security Policies for the Gulf of Guinea. (Lanham, [Md.]: Lexington Books, a division of Rowman & Littlefield Pub. Inc, 2006), 10.

Principe.⁵ The governments of these countries range from pro-western to communist leaning, and from models of true democracy to extremely authoritative military dictatorships. The economies are as diverse and varied as are the populations. Vast oil reserves, iron ore, gold, copper, bauxite, and other natural resources abound in the region, yet the U.S. has made marginal, if any progress in advancing development and security in the region, which will be critical to its economic future. In addition, Western Africa is plagued by ineffective and corrupt governments incapable of addressing the illegal importing and exporting of a multitude of items harmful or contrary to U.S. national interests. Drugs and other illegal contraband transit the Gulf of Guinea as freely as legal commercial products.⁶

Islam has a strong following in many nations in the Gulf of Guinea region. With high unemployment, widespread poverty and low levels of education, many young Muslims are prime candidates for recruitment by the Islamic Extremists. The ineffective state and local governments only add to the disenchantment of the young Muslims and make extremist rhetoric more appealing.

In the Gulf of Guinea region the U.S. will find if it encourages and pursues the more idealistic values of good governance (democratization), education, improved quality of life, and diversified economic development, it will greatly enhance the physical and economic security of the United States. In order to insure regional stability, these idealistic values must be addressed with a regional approach and encouraged in both oil

⁵ Paterson, 27.

⁶ Antonio Maria Costa, "Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa," *United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*, (November 2008): 1.

producing and non-oil producing nations in the region.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a historical context of the United States involvement in the region, beginning in the latter half of the 20th century when many of the nations in the region gained their independence from their colonial mother countries. Vignettes from different eras and different countries illustrate the effects or shortcomings of U.S. policy regarding various situations affecting the West African nations. These examples will enable the reader to understand how the region evolved to its current state. This paper will look at the impact of the oil industry, or its revenue, on the situation, and will try to more effectively capture the role of the United States in the region, past and present. With the background established and the current situation defined, recommendations are made for improving and making U.S. efforts more effective in the region regarding security, development and good governance. The intent is to avoid a future scenario where the U.S. would be forced to employ a large scale military force and vast financial resources to protect U.S. economic and security interests.

CHAPTER 2

POST COLONIAL AFRICA

Background

“Prior to 1945, Africa was viewed by the U.S. as a mere territorial outpost of Europe because of the latter’s role as colonial master, and Europe’s economic interest in the continent.”¹ Upon gaining their independence in the middle of the 20th century, many of the West African nations eagerly pursued closer diplomatic relations with the United States. Although the U.S. often engaged with these nations, the default position of the U.S. Government was to follow the policies set by the former colonial authority of the state.² This meant the U.S. Government would consult with the European nation who had presided over the former colony prior to any diplomatic interaction with these fledgling nations. In addition, during the 1950s and 1960s, the overarching mindset - the single most important factor in determining U.S. policy worldwide - was limiting the influence of Communism and the Soviet Union. These two factors made it difficult for many of these young nations to have much confidence in the ideals espoused by the U.S. during this period.

Since gaining independence the nature of the problems in most of the West African nations have not changed. Poor governance, tribalism, corruption, widespread

¹ Karl P. Magyar, ed., *United States Interests and Policies in Africa* (New York, St Martin’s Press Inc.2000), 48.

² National Security Council, *U.S. Policy Towards Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960, NSC 5818*, (Washington: Reproduced at the National Archives, 26 August 1958), 11.

poverty, and serious economic issues have plagued most of the countries in the region.³

Foreign investment seldom reaches the projects for which it was intended.

U.S. Policy

The following excerpt is from the National Security Policy on Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960:

The United States is concerned that Africa South of the Sahara develop in an orderly manner toward self-government and independence in cooperation with the European powers now in control of large areas of the continent. We hope that this transition will take place in a manner which will preserve the essential ties which bind Europe and Africa –which are fundamentally complementary areas. Africa depends on Europe not only as a source of the normal imports of underdeveloped countries but also as the major supplier of investment, both public and private. Europe in turn needs the African market, as well as Africa's minerals and agricultural products. The United States, therefore, believes it to be generally desirable that close and mutually advantageous economic relationships between the European powers and Africa should continue after the colonial period has ended.⁴

This was published in 1958 when there were only five independent countries in Sub-Saharan Africa; The Union of South Africa, Ghana, Liberia, Ethiopia and Sudan. Ghana and Liberia were the only two independent countries in West Africa and Ghana the only one in the Gulf of Guinea Region. At this point, it was clear that several more countries were very close to gaining independence. The U.S. policy clearly protected the close alliances the West African nations shared with the European powers, which may have been appropriate for 1958. However, this policy did not mature over time with

³ Kaufman, 2.

⁴ National Security Council, *U.S. Policy Towards Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960*, NSC 5818, (Washington: Reproduced at the National Archives, 26 August 1958), 1.

ample concern for the under-developed countries as will be demonstrated later in this paper.

During this period, the United States contributed resources to promote development and education in many of the African protectorates and newly independent states. When investing in these former colonies and new states the U.S. would transfer funds to the European power with clear guidelines delineating the use of the funds. The European authority would then administer the funds.

Ghana

Ghana was the first European colony in West Africa to gain independence after World War II. Ghana had been a British colony with an economy which was considered very strong when it became independent in March of 1957. Unfortunately, Ghana fell victim to circumstances similar to many African nations in their early days of liberation, a pattern that continues even today. Ghana's government, led by President Nkrumah proved to be extremely corrupt and authoritarian, and ultimately drove the country's economy to a dilapidated state. This abuse of public funds and power led to the conditions that prompted a military coup in 1966 overthrowing Nkrumah.⁵

There were a number of factors besides greed and corruption, which contributed to the deterioration of Ghana in such a short period. Socialist influenced economic

⁵ Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, "Excerpt from Commanding Heights, Kwame Nkrumah," Public Broadcast System, 1998, [Journal on-line]; available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/prof_kwamenkrumah.html; Internet; Accessed 14 October 2009.

policies, financial mismanagement of public funds, repressive government, and widespread corruption were a few of the factors. Perhaps more forward U.S. involvement or support for some of Ghana's initiatives might have changed the course of development, but that would be conjecture. We know that shortly after Ghana gained independence, Prime Minister Nkrumah formally requested financial assistance from the United States to help fund two dam projects in a letter dated November 12, 1957. The dams would advance their bauxite production and improve the standard of living with the electricity produced. On 24 July 1958, Prime Minister Nkrumah met with President Eisenhower to discuss economic advances in Ghana and he brought up the dam projects at that time. The Prime Minister explained that, "All of these economic objectives require power, the possibilities of which have been investigated in connection with the Volta River Scheme." The Prime Minister continued with, "two possible dams were involved, one at Ajena, which would cost about 65 million pounds, and produce one million kilowatts; and the other is at Abouya and would produce 60,000 kilowatts at a cost of 20 million pounds."⁶

Over the next several years there were indications that Ghana desired more direct involvement from the United States. The following excerpt was captured in a telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State on 3 July 1960:

Deputy Under Secretary of State Hare was in Accra for the ceremony in which Ghana became a republic. Before departing Hare met with President Nkrumah, during the conversation President said "vacuums are being created throughout Africa which somebody will fill. He declared Metropolitan powers still want to

⁶ Harriet Daschell Schwar, ed., *Africa, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIV* (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1992), 648.

maintain their positions but are unacceptable to the Africans and are thus unable to fill these vacuums. He said other countries “with bad views” will try to fill the void. Therefore, it was urgent that USG move to fill the void, formulating its own policy without worrying about what the Metropolitan powers may think.⁷

In November 1961, President Kennedy agreed to sponsor the Volta Dam project together with the World Bank, the United Kingdom, and the aluminum firms Kaiser and Reynolds that agreed to build a smelter. The years that it took for the U.S. Government to support this request and implement the loan probably contributed to President Nkrumah’s willingness to initiate and expand a relationship with the Soviet Union. This relationship was certainly courted by the Soviet Union as well, since it provided the Soviets a foothold in Sub-Saharan Africa from which to expand their influence in this part of the world. Many of Nkrumah’s industrial development plans as well as his economic policies were inspired and encouraged by the Soviet Union. President Nkrumah clearly believed, “Capitalism is too complicated a system for a newly independent nation” Nkrumah argued, “Hence the need for a socialistic society.”⁸

The ultimate failure of the Nkrumah government in Ghana is certainly not attributable to only one cause. Like many situations in Africa, there was no shortage of causes that led to the current state. It is possible that more aggressive direct U.S. involvement in the economic development of Ghana may have encouraged Nkrumah to lean toward a more free market style economy thus avoiding the serious economic decline for the country. It is also possible that if the U.S. had acted more quickly and

⁷ Ibid., 648.

⁸ Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, “Excerpt from Commanding Heights, Kwame Nkrumah,” Public Broadcast System, 1998, [Journal on-line]; available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/prof_kwamenkrumah.html; Internet; Accessed 14 October 2009.

decisively on the Volta River Project maybe Nkrumah would not have become so close to the Soviet Union. But even lacking that relationship, it seems President Nkrumah had become less practical and more obsessed with power the longer he remained in office. In addition, President Nkrumah and many other Government officials, at all levels, were more than willing to improve their personal financial situation at the expense of the state. Corruption had become the norm across the spectrum of government.⁹

Department of Defense (DOD) Involvement

The National Security Council was very clear in outlining what made Sub-Saharan Africa important from a military or strategic viewpoint pre-1960: “The military and strategic value of the area arises from its strategic materials and geographic location, especially with reference to sea and air routes alternate to those through the Middle East.”¹⁰

...our primary strategic interest is to deny Africa south of the Sahara to Communist control.¹¹

Allowing that it was believed the Soviets had very little influence in Sub-Saharan Africa pre-1960, there was little or no reason for the Department of Defense to seek engagement in this part of the world. The military was not as actively involved in building partnerships and training with foreign militaries in this era, and especially not if clear and direct value to U.S. interests could not be ascertained.

⁹ Yergin.

¹⁰ National Security Council 5818.

¹¹ Ibid.

Although the U.S. Military was not active in the area, other military events were happening throughout the region. With the movements for independence, violence did break out on occasion, often brutally suppressed. The Portuguese were very aggressive in their counterinsurgency campaign in Angola beginning in 1961. The U.S. had been selling arms to Portugal with an agreement the arms would not be used in Portugal. In 1961, a British newspaper ran an article that reported the finding of a “made in America” mark on part of a bomb dropped on an Angolan village. President Kennedy sent a memo to the Secretaries of State and Defense concerning this issue in which he declared, “This is going to present problems for us both in Angola and Portugal.” He went on to express concern about trying to persuade the Portuguese to stop using U.S. made munitions in this fashion but was more concerned with losing use of the Portuguese military base in the Azores. The President concluded, “I wonder if we should perhaps content ourselves with a public statement in regard to the matter.”¹² This was just another example of America’s lofty ideals of self-determination and independence taking second place to economic and security concerns of the United States.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

USAID and the Peace Corps were established in 1961. Previous to this, the U.S. government engaged in economic aid and development projects but expanded their efforts greatly after the establishment of these two organizations. The U.S. policy

¹² John F. Kennedy, *National Security Action Memorandum No. 77*, (Washington, Reproduced at the National Archives, 20 August 1961), 1.

outlined efforts to contribute economic aid for Sub-Saharan Africa with financial and technical assistance. The U.S. policy was to, “encourage Africa South of the Sahara to make the maximum contribution to its own economic development; to take measures capable of attracting maximum amounts of external private capital, and to continue to look to the extent possible to Western Europe and the international institutions...”¹³ By encouraging other forms of capital investment in Sub-Saharan Africa the U.S. intended to avoid any perception that the U.S. was another colonial power. The U.S. was also willing to send the technical expertise for whatever type of project might be proposed. In addition, the U.S. policy called for emphasizing agricultural productivity, improved educational facilities and education, and combating disease and malnutrition. All of the actions identified in the U.S. policy on Sub-Saharan Africa dated August 26, 1958 are still relevant and applicable today. What seems to be missing from the U.S. plan and was beyond U.S. control, was the commitment on the part of the Africans. This will be discussed more in depth, later in the paper.

Islam

Islam has a rich and diverse history throughout its 1400 years. Islam in Africa was addressed in 1958, with the National Security Council’s Policy towards Africa South of the Sahara. In this early policy, Islam was not seen as a threat in this part of the world

¹³ National Security Council 5818.

but was recognized to be rapidly expanding. The manner or style of writing depicts an American arrogance or sense of superiority to the Arabs of North Africa and the Africans, and Muslims in general.

Islam is spreading rapidly in Africa, although there is resistance to it in those areas where all Moslems are considered Arabs and all Arabs slavers. Up to the present, it has been reasonably free of anti-western overtones, but its use by the Egyptians cannot be overlooked. Islam is more attractive to pagan Africans than Christianity since it is more adaptable to their traditional customs (e.g., polygamy) and way of life.¹⁴

Islam also has a long history of radical extremists fundamentalists, beginning in the 6th century. This was not much of a concern to the U.S in Africa during the 1950s and 1960s as was also noted in the Security Council Policy of the period:

No immediate action seems warranted. Islam is not necessarily hostile to the United States. On the contrary, in many areas it has proved to be a strong barrier to Communism. Unless its proselytizing forces are captured by hostile elements, no action by the United States would seem to be called for.¹⁵

The policy was probably correct at this point in time to have limited concern about Islam. Again, the preoccupation with limiting the influence of Communism was paramount. If it was deemed bad for Communism, it seemed to be at least tolerable for the United States. This “counter – Communist” policy approach to Africa as a whole would degrade U.S. credibility and accomplishments over the next forty years.

¹⁴ National Security Council 5818.

¹⁵ Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

Peace Corps

Established

The most significant U.S. Policy change toward West Africa in the early 1960s was brought in with the administration of President Kennedy in 1961. President Kennedy had previously served as the First Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committees Sub-committee on Africa. He understood the issues and challenges facing the newly independent states in Africa. He also believed that by encouraging development in a non-threatening way it would promote a pro-western attitude in the assisted countries.¹ With this in mind, the Peace Corps was established by Executive Order 10924 on March 1, 1961,² and authorized by Congress on September 22, 1961, with passage of the Peace Corps Act (Public Law 87-293). The Peace Corps shall make available to interested countries and areas, friendship through a Peace Corps. The Act declares the purpose of the Peace Corps: “To promote world peace and men and women of the United States qualified for service abroad and willing to serve, under conditions of hardship if necessary, to help the peoples of such countries and areas in meeting their needs for trained manpower.”³

¹ Magyar, 53.

² John F. Kennedy, *Executive Order 10924, Establishment and Administration of the Peace Corps in the Department of State* (Washington: Reproduced at the National Archives, 1 March 1961), 1.

³ Eighty-seventh Congress of the United States of America, *The Peace Corps* (Washington: Reproduced at the National Archives, 22 September 1961), 1.

This declared purpose gives no hint of another real purpose of the Peace Corps which was to deny an area to Communist influence by promoting a Pro-western attitude through personal interaction and good will. Peace Corps volunteers were often idealistic and selfless individuals who may not understand the critical role they played in providing a positive example of an American, and thus a good representation of the western way of life. It will be impossible to quantify how many individuals or countries changed their view of America due to interaction with, or observation of, Peace Corps volunteers. President Kennedy eloquently expressed their contribution: “Nothing carries the spirit of American idealism and expresses our hopes better and more effectively to the far corners of the earth than the Peace Corps.”⁴ West Africa became the second major focus of the Peace Corps after the Philippines. The Peace Corps involvement in West Africa effectively reduced anti-American rhetoric, which may have been developing in some of the newly independent states.⁵

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

In addition to creating the Peace Corps in 1961, on November 3rd President Kennedy established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to administer economic and development aid separate from the military. USAID became the first U.S. foreign assistance organization whose primary emphasis was on long-range economic and social development assistance efforts. Freed from political and military

⁴ The national Archives, *Teaching With Documents: Founding Documents of the Peace Corps* (Washington: National Archives) [database on-line]; available from www.archives.gov/education/lessons/peace-corps/ 1.

⁵ Magyar, 53.

functions that plagued its predecessor organizations, USAID was able to offer direct support to the developing nations of the world.⁶ Again, there were certainly U.S. ideals exported for the good of the recipient peoples, but there was also a political agenda of containing Communism, which was well supported by the efforts of the Peace Corp and USAID. In addition, it was often difficult for the U.S. to administer its economic or development aid in many countries. The mechanisms were tied with military or diplomatic efforts that could reduce the impact of the aid and marginalize its affect. The perception from the recipient was seldom as clean as when administered through strictly aid channels.

The National Security Council's Policy toward West Africa dated February 29, 1960 highlights the importance of the newly independent states, particularly as their political leanings would dictate how they would vote in the United Nations on key issues, which could have a profound impact on shaping the course of world events. The policy states; "African leaders seek the understanding and goodwill of the United States. Above all, they want to be accepted as equals and to be treated with dignity and respect."⁷

The Peace Corps and USAID were absolutely critical to implementing these aspects of U.S. policy in a manner which could be seen by the African leaders as assistance to their nation and not patronization by a world power.

⁶ USAID, *USAID History* (Washington: USAID) [database on-line]; available from http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidthist.html.

⁷ National Security Council, *U.S. Policy Towards Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960, NSC 5818*, (Washington: Reproduced at the National Archives, 26 August 1958), 1.

Angola

“Angola was famous as the scene of Africa’s longest conflict, a 27 year civil war that lasted until 2002 and left over 500,000 dead.”⁸ The prolonged war devastated Angola and brought unrelenting poverty and hardship to its people. Angola has one of the lowest Gross Domestic Products of the Gulf of Guinea nations, making it one of the lowest in the world.⁹ Angola shares many of the same problems that are prevalent throughout many nations in Africa; rampant poverty, poor governance, corruption, ethnic strife and tribalism. Each of these issues is a common theme to Africa but nuanced to each of the nations experiencing them.

Angola was a Portuguese colony which gained its independence in 1975, after 14 years of war for independence. The interesting thing about the independence efforts in Angola is the various movements leading the struggle acted unilaterally. During a weekly staff meeting with Secretary of State Kissinger in 1974, the Angolan situation was described as;

Angola...complete disunity on the part of the liberation groups...One group has already quit fighting, the second group can’t decide whether to continue fighting or not. But the third group, perhaps the strongest, is upping its military activity, ... headed by Holden Roberto, backed by Mobutu, and he has just now brought in 15 Chinese Communist trainers for his military forces, basing them out of Zaire.¹⁰

Had these disparate groups cooperated in some manner to fight the Portuguese they may have achieved their independence much sooner. This statement also reflects the

⁸ Paterson, 28.

⁹ Ibid., 29.

¹⁰ Henry Kissinger, *The Secretary’s Principals’ and Regionals’ Staff Meeting* (Washington: Reproduced at the National Archives, 10 July 1974), 17.

ever-present anti-Communism preoccupation. U.S. domestic issues and politics did not affect the anti-Communist policies. Republicans and Democrats alike were extremely concerned with denying Communist expansion. U.S Presidents from both parties attempted to deny the Communists from gaining any influence in Africa, especially in the newly independent nations. Recognizing the propensity for these newly independent nations to engage in civil war and border disputes, President Nixon proposed, “The major contribution we can make to the peace of the continent is to support the African effort to keep free of great power rivalries and conflicts.”¹¹ He surmised that, “Conflict and involvement in the cold war rivalries can only bring harm to Africa and tragic delay in its progress.”¹²

These comments from President Nixon in his annual Foreign Policy Statement certainly supported American idealism but at a closer look, may have been more intended as strategic communication to persuade the world audience that the U.S. was not the aggressor in the Cold War.

The U.S. policy regarding the various independence movements throughout Africa during the 1950s and 1960s was one of moral support of non-violent liberation movements to the extent which would not upset relations with the colonial powers in Europe. Most countries, however, had gained independence prior to 1970, with the exception of the Portuguese colonies. The U.S. policy towards these colonies changed as their independence movements progressed. The U.S. began more direct talks with

¹¹ Richard Nixon, *The President's Annual Foreign Policy Statement* (Washington: Reproduced at the National Archives, 25 January 1971), 3.

¹² Ibid.

liberation movement leaders and formal relations with Portugal became more strained. Unfortunately, the idealism of the U.S. policy calling for self determination of all peoples may have seemed somewhat hypocritical to many Africans, particularly in the Portuguese colonies, who experienced U.S. weapons being used against them by the Portuguese.

The United Nations

The U.S., to its credit, supported United Nations Security Council resolutions which supported U.S. ideals during the early 1960s and 1970s. The U.S. supported weapons embargos and economic sanctions against South Africa and was very outspoken in their denunciation of Apartheid. In 1961, the U.S. voted in favor of a United Nations Security Council resolution which seriously impacted U.S.-Portuguese relations and prompted anti-American demonstrations in Lisbon. The resolution was written to encourage Portugal to reevaluate their policies in Angola. According to the final text of the resolution, the Security Council, "taking note of the recent disturbances and conflicts in Angola resulting in loss of life of the inhabitants, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security," called upon Portugal to "consider urgently the introduction of measures and reforms in Angola."¹³ The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, went on to comment, the United States believed that, "the people of Angola are entitled to all of the rights guaranteed them by the charter" of the United Nations and, therefore, considered that Portugal had the "solemn obligation to undertake a systematic and rapid improvement of the

¹³ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* (Washington: Reproduced at the National Archives, 3 April 1961), 499.

conditions of the peoples of its territories."¹⁴ The resolution was voted down in the Security Council but, the U.S. position had been a significant departure from previous U.S. policy and gained favor throughout Africa.¹⁵

Along with the policy shift being more in line with the values of self-determination and equality championed by the U.S.; the U.S. was much more aggressively exporting development assistance through USAID and the Peace Corps. In Angola, USAID assistance began in 1977 in the form of food assistance through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to assist refugees and victims of fighting in and around Luanda. In 1978, USAID provided 2.5 million for extension services and agricultural support again through ICRC. However, after 1978 USAID was unable to continue their efforts in Angola until 1989 due to the security situation during the civil war.¹⁶ The lull in fighting and the promise of elections allowed USAID to continue their efforts only until 1992 when fighting escalated again. Returning to Angola in 1995, USAID has effectively influenced improvements in economic policies, agricultural practices and governance to the betterment of the Angolan people.

The key point concerning Angola and U.S. policy is that diplomacy and properly administered aid will have a longer lasting effect on the nation than military interventions have had elsewhere in the world. The African people need to determine their future and work with foreign investment and advisors to achieve the future they desire. President

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Luís Nuno Rodrigues, *About-Face: The United States and Portuguese Colonialism in 1961*, (Providence, R.I.: Brown University, 2004)[database on-line]; available from ISCTE-CEHCP, Lisbon, luisrodrigues@iscte.pt.

¹⁶ USAID.

Nixon stated this theme in his address to Congress in 1974: “We want the Africans to build a better life for themselves and their children...And we want the Africans to build this future as they think best, because in that way our help and their efforts will be most relevant to their needs.”¹⁷ The U.S. must continue to aggressively pursue the path of aid with self-determination to allow pro-American thought to flourish.

¹⁷ Richard Nixon, *The President's Report to Congress on Foreign Policy* (Washington: Reproduced at the National Archives, 18 February 1970) 4.

CHAPTER 3

NIGERIA

Introduction

This chapter will provide an overview of Nigeria since it gained independence in 1960. Nigeria's diverse post-independence history serves as a model for much of the good and much of the bad that has transpired in Africa over the last 50 years. Military coups and dictators, corruption, starvation, poverty, ethnic and religious strife and conflict, economic woes, oil revenue, and poor governance have all been prevalent in the 50 - year history of Nigeria. This chapter will not look in depth at all of these issues but will touch on them to lay the context for the following chapters and current situation. It will also be evident that the issue of oil revenue will keep resurfacing due to its effect, or lack thereof, on so many other aspects of Nigerian life and culture.

Independence

Nigeria's population of 133 Million is the largest on the continent. Prior to Nigeria gaining independence, the U.S. National Security Council's Policy Toward West Africa dated February 29, 1960 recommends as policy guidance for Nigeria to; "Encourage close and friendly relations with other independent African nations with a view to facilitating Nigeria's role as a potential moderating force for political moderation."¹ The U.S. had high hopes and expectations for Nigeria to become a solid stable force in the region. In addition, the same policy document states, "Nigeria will become fully

¹ National Security Council, *U.S. Policy Towards Africa South of the Sahara Prior to Calendar Year 1960, NSC 5818*, (Washington: Reproduced at the National Archives, 26 August 1958), 19.

independent on October 1, 1960. By far the most populous country in Africa, with energetic, ambitious leadership and valuable resources and development potential, Nigeria will become a potent force among the free countries of Africa.”² This was a very favorable tone toward Nigeria in this type of document. The same document also expressed great insight as to the political realities of the environment the Nigerian leadership would face upon gaining independence; “An independent Nigeria may be expected to follow a largely pro-western policy, although it is certain to be under great pressure from other independent African states ...to follow a neutralist course. All Nigerian leaders, however, are strongly anti-Communist and conservative in their political and economic policies.”³ As in all U.S. policies for the 1950s, countering Communism was a key theme, which would transcend the next three decades until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.

It is hard to comprehend what could have prompted the course of events as they unfolded in Nigeria for the forty years following their independence. The harsh realities of the country strongly divided along religious lines between the Muslims and the Christians proved to be too much for the new nation to deal with. The national elections of 1959 paved the way for independence in 1960, although the U.S. had clearly stated concerns for the future of Nigeria without British oversight and intervention. “The national election of December 12, 1959 returned to power a government dominated by

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

the Moslem traditionalists of the Northern Region. The election has not smoothed over the age-old ethnic and religious differences splitting the country....”⁴

Nigeria was governed as a federation of three states until 1963 when Nnamdi Azikiwe became president. He served in that capacity until 1965 when the military assumed control through a coup. This coup was followed shortly thereafter by a counter-coup. This gave warning to the future of Nigeria.

The Military

When the military took over, the only trusted supporters for the various military leaders of the country were usually tied by clan or familial relations. This critical weakness certainly contributed to the religious tensions between Christians and Muslims, as well as tribal rivalries. The idea of a cross party coalition government would prove too dangerous a thought for this period in Nigeria. The various military regimes brutally suppressed political opposition and uprisings. Nigeria had a civil war break out in 1965 which lasted until 1970. This paper will not discuss this in detail but will mention that as many as three million people died in this war and it did nothing to ease ethnic or religious tensions.⁵

By 1970 extensive oil reserves had been identified in Nigeria and large amounts of revenue began to pour into the country. The military remained in control during the 1970s and in 1975, then Lieutenant General Obasanjo took over as Head of State. As

4 Ibid.

5 Jon Brunberg, *Nigerian Civil War* (Stockholm: The Polynational War Memorial, 2010), [database on-line]; available from http://www.war-memorial.net/info_events.asp.

Head of State, Obasanjo was open about his views on the Policies of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. toward Africa. At the fifteenth Annual Organization of African Unity summit in 1978, Obasanjo stated:

To the Soviets and their friends I should like to say that, having been invited to Africa in order to assist in the liberation struggle and the consolidation of national independence, they should not overstay their welcome. Africa is not about to throw off one colonial yoke for another....to the western powers, I say that they should act in such a way that we are not led to believe they have different concepts of independence and sovereignty for Africa and Europe.⁶

Obasanjo declared he would return Nigeria to civilian rule and followed through on that promise in 1979. Civilian rule did not last long, and by 1982 the military had resumed the position as Head of State.

The sad truth of Nigeria's first forty years as an independent nation was captured in the following statement:

Nigeria has many problems however, corruption is endemic and institutionalized. From its independence from Britain in 1960 until its first democratic election in 1998, it was ruled nearly continuously by military autocrats. During this time, the country's leadersstole an estimated \$400 Billion of the country's funds and secreted it away in overseas accounts.⁷

The Arrival of Democracy

In 1998 following the death of military dictator General Abacha, General Abubaker took control of Nigeria and outlined a timeline through which Nigeria would transfer to a civilian democratically elected government. Nigeria adopted a new

⁶ Helen Kitchen, *The Washington Papers/98, U.S. Interests in Africa* (New York: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Praeger Publishers, 1983), 20.

⁷ Paterson, 28.

constitution and the military peacefully transferred to a civilian government in 1999. Olusegun Obasanjo, the former Lieutenant General and Head of State was the new democratically elected president.

Obasanjo had recently been released from prison where he had been held for opposing General Abacha's dictatorship. Obasanjo was revered for having returned Nigeria to civilian rule in 1979, and campaigned as the candidate who would represent all Nigerians regardless of religion.⁸ With an economy in shambles, widespread corruption linked to large sums of oil revenue, and ethnic and religious tensions elevated, President Obasanjo faced significant challenges as he took office.

"Obasanjo succeeded in establishing civilian rule based on a multiparty democracy and launched a campaign against corruption."⁹ In 2000, 12 states in Northern Nigeria with a majority of Muslims adopted Islamic law. This increased religious violence in these states considerably which echoed throughout the country. Even with the increase in oil revenues, the Nigerian economy was unstable at best. President Obasanjo worked with the World Bank and IMF to improve the economic situation in Nigeria with limited results. The 2003 elections kept Obasanjo in office for another term during which he continued to push economic reforms, and his anticorruption campaign. In 2007 he turned over the presidency to Umaru Yar'Adua. This presidential transition is the first time in Nigerian history that a civilian president hands over power through

⁸ Library of Congress Federal Research Division, *Country Profile: Nigeria* (Washington: Library of Congress, July 2008) [database on-line]; available from <http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/>.

⁹ Ibid.

democratic elections. President Obasanjo was also Africa's first modern military leader to successfully guide a country's transition from military to civilian rule.¹⁰

Unfortunately, improvements to Nigeria's economy, development situation, and health reform issues have been slow in coming. The following was published in Joint Forces Quarterly in 2007 and indicates the magnitude of the problems President Yar'Adua was facing when he took office:

Despite enormous oil wealth, Nigeria has one of the lowest gross domestic products per capita in the area, just above Angola among the Gulf of Guinea nations, and one of the worst income distributions in the world: 80% of the generated oil revenue wealth accrues to only 1% of the population. Transparency International ranks Nigeria as one of the five most corrupt countries in the world, and the Economist Intelligence Unit listed the country's quality of Life index as the fourth worst.¹¹

In addition, there does not seem to be any reduction in ethnic tensions and violent clashes among religious groups are on the increase. President Yar'Adua is a Muslim from the North of the country and many hoped he might be able to address the religious tensions but this has not happened.¹² Time will tell how Yar'Adua will perform in the long run on the critical issues. We know that Nigeria's succession of military dictators has not improved any aspects of life in Nigeria; we can only hope the democratically elected civilian leadership can make the changes needed to revive Nigeria's economy and improve the overall quality of life for Nigerians.

¹⁰ George W. Bush, *President Commends Nigeria on Call for 2007 Elections* (Washington: Office of the Press Secretary, 26 May 2006) [database on-line]; available from <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/AF/WH/20060526-2.pdf>

¹¹ Paterson, 29.

¹² Dr. Theodore Karasik, Matthew Hedges, *Nigeria: Transnational Ties That Unbind* (Dubai: Inegma, MAR 2010) [database on-line]; available from <http://www.inegma.com/?navigation=reports#>.

OIL

Nigeria realized its oil reserves and the potential revenue they would bring in the middle of the twentieth century; however, the extent of her reserves and the importance of those reserves continue to grow even today. In 1971, Nigeria joined the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The Mission of OPEC “is to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of Member Countries and ensure the stabilization of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return on capital to those investing in the petroleum industry.”¹³ Nigeria’s current estimated oil reserves are more than threefold what was estimated in 1970.

Nigeria is the largest U.S. trade partner in Africa, supplying 10% of America’s imported oil.¹⁴ Nigeria is predicted to supply the United States with up to 18% of its imported oil by 2020. The Gulf of Guinea region as a whole is expected to supply as much as 25% of the U.S. imported oil by 2020. The dollar amounts tied to these quantities of oil exports are extremely large sums annually. In the Western mindset, it is difficult to imagine how corruption and mismanagement can account for so little of this revenue filtering into the domestic economy. The Western way of thinking imagines larger percentages of the funds filtering into society and making a difference in the quality of life for the masses.

¹³ Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, *Our Mission* (Vienna: OPEC, 2010) [database on-line]; available from <http://www.opec.org/home/>.

¹⁴ Paterson, 29.

In the late 1990s oil conglomerates such as Royal Dutch Shell started expanding their operations in the area. By 2000, nearly \$50 billion had been invested in oil infrastructure and 40,000 people were employed by western oil companies on rigs and refineries.¹⁵ This would seem a tremendous amount of investment and provide some valuable employment opportunities which are desperately needed. However, as described above, the people who gain from these tremendous investments are very few, largely through corruption, with no regard for the population as a whole or the benefits it could create.

Corruption does not dissuade development or remove the necessity of oil in today's world. "Heavy development is expected to continue, especially in light of the export challenges in Iraq, Iran and Venezuela. Additionally, China's and India's economies continue to grow in leaps and bounds, demanding reliable energy sources to feed their industrial machines. In January 2006, China purchased a \$2.3 Billion share of a Nigerian oil field, its largest investment on the continent to date."¹⁶

An article published in April of 2009 indicates that violent crime does not seem to slow the oil production either; "Attacks by gunmen operating in Nigeria's Niger Delta have slashed Nigeria's oil output by 20% and according to executives, driven the annual cost of oil services related security there to \$3.5 Billion annually."¹⁷ Even with the

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ David Lewis, *Analysis-Pirates, Gangs Fuel Gulf of Guinea woes* (London: Reuters, 15 April 2009) [database on-line]; available from <http://www.reuters.com/>.

additional costs of security Nigeria was able to maintain a stable and adequate flow of export oil to meet the demands of their customers.

The staggering investment figures force the realization that there is plenty of money in certain countries within the region to significantly upgrade the quality of life for their populations. Nigeria and Angola are the two largest exporters of oil on the continent yet their overall quality of life indicators are terrible. Rampant corruption has exacted a high toll in human suffering and loss of life. In Nigeria between 1997 and 2004, the infant mortality rate increased from 97 per 1,000 to 110 per 1,000. This was during the same period that democracy was established in Nigeria. Angola's children have a one in five chance they will not reach five years of age, and the life expectancy is 50 years old.¹⁸

There are several other countries in Africa with similar economic themes, some of them have some oil revenues and some do not. The issues of poor governance, corruption, inadequate education, substandard health care programs, rampant poverty, lack of economic diversity and similar child health statistics are not limited to, nor absent in, oil producing nations. These traits are widespread in developing countries in Africa and must be viewed as unacceptable in the African nations by the African people, before there can be any significant or lasting changes. The Africans must address the poor

¹⁸ Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, Massimo Mastruzzi, "Governance Matter IV; New Data, New Challenges," The World Bank, (May 2005): 5. And USAID, USAID History (Washington: USAID) [database on-line]; available from http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidthist.html.

governance and corruption or the best intentions of the rest of the world cannot have a lasting impact.

SUCSESSES AND FAILURES

Democratic Republic of Congo

In 1971, President Nixon commended the leadership in the Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R.C.):

I should also like to mention the striking progress which has been made in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Five years of peace have brought about a transformation in that country from perhaps the most tortured of African states to one of the most stable. Strong leadership, the restoration of unity, and enlightened economic policies have created a Congo bright with promise.¹

This is an interesting period to look back on in the history of the D.R.C. because the President elected without opposition in 1970, was Joseph Desire Mobutu. Mobutu had previously served as Commander-in-Chief of the National Army and seized control of the country and declared himself President for five years in 1965. It is somewhat surprising that the President of the United States would compliment a government which had seized control, oppressed opposition, and denied open elections. Perhaps this was more of an intended compliment of the lower levels of violence than had been seen from 1960 to 1965 in the D.R.C.

Under Mobutu's direction the name of the D.R.C. was changed to the Republic of Zaire and citizens were required to adopt African names in a surge of cultural

¹ Richard Nixon, *The President's Annual Foreign Policy Statement* (Washington: Reproduced at the National Archives, 25 January 1971) 8.

awareness.² Mobutu remained in power until 1997 through harsh suppression of any opposition. From 1977 to 1997, the internal and external conflicts involving Zaire grew progressively worse. The war and genocide in Rwanda had crossed into Zaire beginning in 1974, and would remain in the D.R.C. for nearly 30 years. In October of 1996, Rwandan troops crossed into Zaire, at the same time an armed coalition of opposition groups formed called the Alliance des Forces Democratiques for la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL). The AFDL was led by Laurent-Desire Kabila. Kabila ultimately declared himself President in May of 1997 after Mobutu left the country. Kabila quickly changed the name of the Republic of Zaire back to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (D.R.C.).³ Rwandan and Ugandan forces continued to operate throughout D.R.C. and in August of 1998 they planned to oust Kabila. Their plan was spoiled when foreign troops from Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe intervened for Kabila's government.

In July of 1999 a cease-fire agreement was signed, the Lusaka Accord, which called for a United Nations Peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The parties of the Lusaka Accord failed to meet the conditions of the accord until after the assassination of Kabila in January of 2001. All foreign troops were withdrawn from the D.R.C. by the summer of 2003 with the exception of the United Nations Peacekeepers.⁴

² Bureau of African Affairs, *Democratic Republic of Congo* (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 2010) [database on-line]; available at <http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/cg/facs/index.htm>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

USAID/DRC

In the midst of all the conflict, USAID was still diligently pursuing their objectives. USAID believed through economic development many of the issues in the D.R.C. could be minimized and significant improvements could be made across the country. “USAID/DRC lobbied for and obtained host government support for an open forum discussion on economic liberalization, privatization, and the creation of public private partnerships (PPPs) to rejuvenate Congo’s failing economy.”⁵ This may not seem like a huge item to be addressing but without significant economic reforms the D.R.C. would continue to deteriorate. “In October of 2000, President Laurent Kabila’s administration, after some highly effective behind-the-scenes encouragement from the [US] mission, agreed to sponsor the DRC’s first real public dialogue on economic liberalization through PPP forum.”⁶

Joseph Kabila succeeded his father, Laurent Kabila, after his assassination in January of 2001. Joseph reversed several of his father’s negative policies and supported talks to bring an end to the violence in the country. As president he issued a decree in June of 2003 announcing the transitional government lineup. During this period of transitional government, he supported liberalizing domestic political activity and serious economic reforms in cooperation with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)⁷.

⁵ USAID in Africa, USAID/DR Congo-Success Stories (Washington: USAID, 2010) [database online]; available from http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/success_stories/drcongo.htm

⁶ USAID in Africa.

⁷ Bureau of African Affairs.

In December 2005, the D.R.C. held a referendum which approved a new constitution that entered into force in February 2006. Roughly two-thirds of eligible voters participated paving the way for national elections in July. “On July 30, 2006 the D.R.C. held its first free, democratic, multi-party elections in more than 40 years....Voter turnout was over 70%...the elections were largely calm and orderly.”⁸ During the election no one candidate had the majority of votes for President, therefore a runoff vote was held on October 29th. Joseph Kabila won the election with 58% of the vote and was inaugurated December 6th, 2006 for a five year term.⁹

President Kabila has been a proponent of many of the aggressive reforms necessary to improve the overall situation in the D.R.C.. “The Kabila administration identified five areas requiring particular attention: education, health, infrastructure, water/electricity, and job creation.”¹⁰ He has been very supportive of USAID and their efforts and remains committed to improve his country. Many of the improvements he is seeking cannot take hold without security. “The Congo and The Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC)... are notoriously unstable. United Nations Humanitarian Relief Director Jan Egeland called the recent conflict in DROC, ‘the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.’”¹¹

⁸ Bureau of African Affairs.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Paterson, 28.

Regional Approach

In several regions throughout the D.R.C. there have been foreign and domestic rebel units reeking havoc on the population and infrastructure as well as any government entities they could affect. Many of these militias are renowned for their brutal assaults on civilian populations to include; murder, rape, impressments of male child soldiers and taking female children to be sex slaves. President Kabila has gained alliances with neighboring countries and aggressively pursued violent rebel and insurgent groups throughout the D.R.C. with a regional approach. Working with Sudan, Uganda and Rwanda they have conducted aggressive bilateral military campaigns in different regions throughout the D.R.C. for the improvement of security throughout the region.¹² More importantly is that at the end of each operation the military of the visiting nation withdrew their forces to within their own borders. This is exactly the type of regional cooperation and approach to problems that will be needed to advance the development and security of these young troubled nations. This is also an excellent example of how to get beyond the tribal and racial issues to work toward common goals for the betterment of all in the region.

Tribalism

The Democratic Republic of Congo has a population of 68 Million people representing 250 different ethnic groups. There are over 700 local languages and dialects, however, French and the native languages of Kikongo, Tshiluba, Swahili and

¹² Bureau of African Affairs.

Lingala are used as common linguistic bridges.¹³ About 70% of the population are Christian, 10% are Muslim with the remainder practicing various traditional religions. The harsh reality of their internal political struggles and subsequent oppression is that the parties normally fall along some sort of tribal lines. Human nature provides that people will look for or develop targets for their anger when they are frustrated or angry. In addition, when times are tough people try to take care of their own first. With widespread poverty and starvation throughout the D.R.C. and many other parts of Africa; it is normal that tribal loyalties would become stronger. Tribes would unite and look to find an outside source for their troubles, which could often be the simple beginning of tribal tensions. When all are eating well, are employed, and the economy is healthy and medical necessities are being met, tribal and ethnic issues subside.

President Nixon spoke of tribal issues in Africa and expressed the U.S. could not fix this issue, the Africans would have to resolve it, with little to no outside assistance; “We can make only a very marginal contribution to the assimilation of tribal diversity into national unity. These problems having to do with the forging of stable national institutions which are neither appropriate for nor amenable to much of a contribution from us. Only Africans themselves can do such work.”¹⁴

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Richard Nixon, The President’s Annual Foreign Policy Statement (Washington: The White House, 25 January 1971), 3.

Tribalism will be revisited in Chapter Seven, with recommendation on how to minimize its negative effects in the future.

THE WAY AHEAD

Is There Hope

President Nixon may have been wrong about the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1974, but he was right when summing up Africa as a whole; “The potential of Africa is great, but so are her problems...We must look to wise African leadership to build the framework into which other nations, including the United States, can fully contribute to a bright African future.”¹

Many of the issues facing Africa today are the same ones faced upon gaining independence: poor governance, corruption, lack of economic diversity and tribalism. But many of the serious issues facing Africa and the Gulf of Guinea states were not major issues when these nations gained independence or their situations deteriorated since independence. Their problems include: corruption, education, health care, poverty, wealth distribution, narcotics trafficking, and in some countries Islamic extremists. The key to resolving many of the issues facing Africa will be for Africans to take the lead in defining the solutions. For many leaders in the Gulf of Guinea states over the last fifty years, the challenges have proved too complex and broad in scope to be resolved or even addressed. In fact, many leaders, civilian and military, focused much of their efforts on retaining power which was often done through suppression of any opposition. This often required vast financial resources whether to maintain loyalties through financial means or

¹ Nixon, 9.

to pay the military to ensure they supported the leader. Corruption became normal practice in many of these countries as a way of insuring political loyalty. But now, there are signs that some African leaders in the Gulf of Guinea nations are willing to make the tough economic decisions and implement policies needed to reform their economies. Most people in Africa and abroad now realize the complexity of the problems in Africa offer no quick solution. Most of the issues will take years if not generations to address and fully rectify.

As we search for solutions to these problems we will find many approaches are already underway. Some of these efforts are proving to be very effective and others promise to be. A critical factor on all improvement efforts is whether or not the governments involved can maintain stability in their country when going through reforms which might affect daily life. The Gulf of Guinea states do not have the best record of supporting their governments when things are not going well. For this reason, it is critical that development and security issues be addressed as regional in nature and resolved with multinational participation.

Regional Security cannot be achieved without addressing a myriad of other issues affecting governance and security. Therefore, in the interests of improving security in the Gulf of Guinea region, many other issues must also be considered.

Economic Improvement Efforts

In an earnest effort to improve their economies many of the regional governments have been working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Historically, the IMF and World Bank have been heavily influenced by the United States and Western Europe in encouraging Free Market economies. “In addition, most

governments are pursuing retrenchment policies to reduce government spending.”²

Retrenchment policies are efforts by governments to reduce the size of the government and thereby the cost of running it. “Faced with growing inflation, a deficit of 14% in GDP, growing debt, ... the new president of Ghana, John Atta Mills, has pruned the number of ministries (from 27 to 23) and is promoting a ‘modest state’ in an effort to reverse trends.”³

The Nigerian President Umaru Yar Adua had serious concerns, but ultimately signed the 2009 budget. The Budget had a major deficit and called for borrowing USD 300 million to cover this deficit and ensure payments for debt servicing. President Yar Adua went on to hold the government accountable to do their part in trimming the budget by “promulgating some restrictive measures: a 50% reduction in travel allowances for officials, suspension of foreign training for civil servants, a freeze on purchases of new office sites and vehicles and the creation of a presidential committee to monitor budget implementation.”⁴ These measures may seem marginal but by holding the government officials responsible it shows they are part of the solution and not just directing it. Former President Obasanjo had initiated a number of anti-corruption measures but it will take years to undo the practices resulting from decades of corruption. It is promising to see the current administration continuing efforts to improve the government. These

² West Africa Observer, 7.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

tough economic policy decisions reflect a serious commitment to reform on the part of the president.

The Economic Council of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional group of 15 countries that was founded in 1975. ECOWAS includes the following Gulf of Guinea states: Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast. The ECOWAS countries have been increasing their efforts at regional economic improvements and even discussed having a regional currency. “According to World Bank December 2008, the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Mr Chukwuma Soludo , stated, ‘The second currency of ECOWAS, the eco, could come into circulation by 1 December 2009.’⁵ At this point, there have been no indications of this being implemented but the movement toward addressing economies in a regional context is promising.

Along with the regional cooperation, the economic diversification and recovery will require foreign investment. Many foreign governments contribute generously to the region but there must be an increase in private investment. This is not a new revelation, in the 1970s this was stated as a priority for the United States by President Nixon. “My administration will actively encourage private investment in Africa. Private investment is the easiest and fastest way to transfer both resources and human skills from a developed to a developing society.”⁶ Unfortunately, often times the instability of governments in the region created unacceptable risk for many potential investors. Some private investment

⁵ West Africa Observer, 8.

⁶ Nixon, 5.

has transpired in several countries, however, often with large multinational corporations pursuing mining operations. Oil and gas are certainly prominent currently, but uranium, bauxite, diamonds, gold, iron-ore and other minerals have provided investment opportunities in the region since independence. “In 2006, China purchased a \$2.3 billion share of a Nigerian oil field, its largest investment on the continent to date.”⁷ Although Liberia is not one of our focus countries for this paper, it is a member of ECOWAS and therefore closely aligned with most of the Gulf of Guinea countries. For this reason, the recent example of investment in Liberia by China Union, a Chinese company, is included. China Union signed a contract to exploit the Bong iron mines in Liberia (up to USD 2.6 billion, the largest investment in Liberian history),”⁸ again setting a new record for Chinese investment in Africa.

Another promising recent indicator of investment during 2008 were the bank estimates of “worldwide flows of direct investments (FDIs) which decreased by more than 20% in 2008. Contrary to this trend, FDI inflows into Africa increased and reached more than USD 60 billion in 2008 which is due to the continuation of many mining projects.”⁹ At least part of this increase must be attributed to some level of government stability in the region.

Piracy

⁷ Paterson, 29.

⁸ West Africa Observer, 7.

⁹ Ibid.

Government stability is not the only factor to be considered when risk is determined by foreign investors. A second major concern is crime. “According to the International Maritime Bureau, the waters off Nigeria are already the second most dangerous in the world after Somalia.”¹⁰ Piracy and kidnapping throughout the Gulf Of Guinea are a serious problem for countries in the area as well as for corporations or countries with interests there. In Nigeria, many of the attacks on shipping and oil infrastructure in the gulf are carried out by the local groups, who are conducting an armed opposition to the Nigerian Government. Many of the pirates are members of the tribes living in the Niger River Delta area of Nigeria. They have been frustrated by the corruption and uneven distribution of wealth in Nigeria. Kidnapping American citizens and other western oil company employees and holding them for ransom has been a way to make money, but it has also been an effective method of raising international awareness of their cause. They are demanding “the liberation of the delta from its tyrannical rulers.”¹¹

Nigerian pirates routinely have a large selection of targets from significant shipping traffic due to a large concentration of oil reserves off Nigeria’s southern coast. Ransom payments occur in Nigeria as they do off Somalia, although the amounts are not nearly so high. The attacks in the Gulf of Guinea are typically much more violent than the attacks off Somalia. Reports indicate the West Coast pirates seem better trained and equipped than their East Coast counterparts. “It’s a different dynamic in West Africa.

¹⁰ Lewis.

¹¹ Paterson, 29.

The real object is the commercial goods -- critically oil," J. Peter Pham, an African security advisor to U.S. and European governments and private companies, said. He added, "There is no compelling logic to keep a crew alive when what you are really after is the contents of a tanker."¹²

The piracy attacks have harmed the oil industry in the area, which is in keeping with the goals of the local militants who perpetrate many of the attacks.¹³ As identified in an earlier chapter, it was estimated that the attacks off Nigeria caused a 20% reduction in oil output in 2008. Although, the wide array of demands from the various piracy attacks leads to much doubt that all the pirates are from the local tribes fighting for liberation. Some ransoms are demanded, but often the cargo is the desired object which is stolen and then sold on the black market. As one diplomat said, "They may call themselves freedom fighters, but it is hogwash, it's about money."¹⁴

The pirates do not limit themselves to the Nigerian coastal waters; Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Benin have also experienced piracy at sea and attacks on land based facilities as well. In October of 2009, forces from the Cameroon military repelled a pirate attack on a fishing vessel off the Bakassi Peninsula near Nigeria. During the encounter four gunmen were killed and three were captured by the military. In Equatorial Guinea a group of seaborne gunmen attacked the capital, "shooting their way into the presidential palace before they were repelled by security forces, backed by

¹² Jonathan Saul, ANALYSIS-Pirates pose deadly threat in Gulf of Guinea (London: Reuters, Dec 2, 2009) [database on-line]; available from <http://www.reuters.com>.

¹³ ASI Global, Maritime Trends(Houston: ASI GLOBAL, 2009)[database on-line] available from http://www.asiglobalresponse.com/downloads/Final_piracy.

¹⁴ Lewis.

helicopter gunships.”¹⁵ Another example was in Benin where pirates killed a Ukrainian sailor during an attack on an oil tanker where they stole the contents of the ship’s safe.¹⁶

The nations of the Gulf of Guinea do not have much in the way of naval forces. Even Nigeria, the regional hegemon, is limited in its ability to combat the pirates and other illegal activities on the water. Military spokesman Colonel Mohammed Yerima said for now Nigeria did not have troops in the Gulf of Guinea. "The government decides whether or not to deploy troops and we obey those orders," he said. "The Nigerian army has the capability to defend the country's territorial waters."¹⁷

The primary necessity in combating piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is to have a regional multinational approach. In recent years there have been increasing regional cooperative efforts aimed at this problem. This is an extremely positive indicator of progress in the region where border disputes have prompted many armed conflicts in the post independence era.

In 2009, “Angola, current chair of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, called for a regional security mechanism to tackle shared threats. Nigerian and Cameroonian officials now often talk about cooperation on joint strategies.”¹⁸ Also in 2009, “A senior Cameroon military official said the country had deployed an Israeli-trained elite battalion in its maritime zone in the Gulf of Guinea.” He accredited this unit’s success in foiling

¹⁵ Reuters, Timeline-Attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, (London: Reuters, Dec 2, 2009) [database online]; available from <http://www.reuters.com>.

¹⁶ Saul.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Lewis.

another attempted piracy to their training.¹⁹ “Cameroon's Defense Minister, Rene Ze Meka, said his country together with Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe would launch joint sea operations to combat crime along the coastline.” This is the type of African led effort that is encouraging for the international community. With programs in place demonstrating regional cooperation to resolve or attack issues such as piracy, it will be much easier for the International community to contribute to these efforts.

Agriculture

In July of 2001, the 37th Summit of the Organization for African Unity established the New Partnership for Agricultural Development (NEPAD) as a program of the OAU.

NEPAD's Primary Objectives are to eradicate poverty; to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development; to halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process and enhance its full and beneficial integration into the global economy; to accelerate the empowerment of women.²⁰

NEPAD went on to develop the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) in 2003, with the goal of eliminating hunger and reducing poverty through agriculture. “CAADP is entirely African-led and African-owned and represents African leaders' collective vision for agriculture in Africa.”²¹ This is exactly the type of effort that Africa needs: African led, African owned, with African leadership support to

¹⁹ Saul.

²⁰ The New Partnership for Agricultural Development, About NEPAD (Johannesburg: The New Partnership for Agricultural Development, 2010) [database on-line]; available from <http://www.nepad.org/AboutNepad>.

²¹ Ibid.

make it a reality. “African governments have agreed to increase public investment in agriculture by a minimum of 10 per cent of their national budgets and to raise agricultural productivity by at least 6 per cent.”²² With this type of effort it is much more likely that regional problems can be addressed in a manner where solutions might be attainable and lasting effects might be realized. In addition, with Africans taking the lead on solutions, international aid and investment can be more focused and supportive of the African solutions.

CAADP is framed on four pillars to achieve their objectives.

Pillar 1 aims to extend the area under sustainable land management and reliable water control systems. Pillar 2 aims to increase market access through improved rural infrastructure and other trade-related interventions. Pillar 3 aims to increase food supply and reduce hunger across the region by raising smallholder productivity and improving responses to food emergencies. Pillar 4 aims to improve agricultural research and systems in order to disseminate appropriate new technologies.²³

Under each of these pillars are several programs and initiatives aimed at creating and enacting solutions to the agricultural issues and problems. CAADP is regional in its approach and thereby maintains a broad base of support for its initiatives, dramatically increasing the likelihood of lasting significant contributions to problem resolution. With the political and economic backing and their widespread effort, CAADP may be able to implement serious and aggressive initiatives which may significantly impact the future for agriculture in the region.

²² Ibid.

²³ The New Partnership for Agriculture Development, The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (Johannasburg: The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program , 2010) [database on-line]; available from <http://www.nepad-caadp.net>.

International efforts will prove to be the most beneficial to the region; however, national initiatives may compliment regional efforts as long as they are not in opposition with one another. In Benin, for example, there is a new initiative to diversify the crops grown and break away from the traditional one crop economy. Benin has focused on cotton over the last thirty years and previous to that, the primary crop was palm oil. With the recent downturn in cotton prices, serious efforts are underway to diversify. Working with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization; they are “launching a US\$500,000 rice initiative to produce and distribute New Rice for Africa (NERICA) seeds. A cross between African and Asian rice seeds, they have a shorter growing cycle and have helped boost production in the region.”²⁴ Not only will this help to provide food to the population but, it will help decrease the necessity to import rice from abroad. It is estimated that Benin could save up to \$55 million annually and supply 70 percent of domestic demand if they increase investment in rice.²⁵

Benin is not the only country in the region that has great potential to grow rice as a major crop for domestic consumption and export. Rice has become a dietary staple in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2007, sub-Saharan Africa purchased approximately one third of the world’s rice crop. Since then prices have nearly tripled. This has made it very difficult for many in Africa to afford. Papa Abdoulaye Seck, Director General, Africa Rice Center (AfricaRice) stated, “I am convinced that Africa holds the future for rice

²⁴ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, BENIN: Life after cotton (IRIN, humanitarian news and analysis, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2010) [database on-line]; available from <http://www.irinnews.org/Report>.

²⁵ Ibid.

farming. Because this continent, unlike Asia, has a great untapped potential, which is benchmarked by its large land distribution and its barely used water resources.”²⁶

AfricaRice was previously known as West African Rice Development Association (WARDA), which was established in 1971 with 11 African member states. In 2009 the name was changed to better reflect the expanded focus of 23 member countries which represent all of Africa. The Africa Rice Center’s mission is to contribute to poverty alleviation food security in Africa. “It is an autonomous intergovernmental research association of African member countries.”²⁷ The following Gulf of Guinea region countries are member; Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, and Togo.²⁸

The Africa Rice Center is another promising sign of Africans working together in an international effort to develop solutions to the complex issues causing poverty and food shortages in Africa.

Bio-fuels

In other efforts to diversify agriculture, many African nations are looking at the increasing bio-fuel market as a potentially lucrative investment. In 2008 the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), forecasted the “2008/09 year would include further increases in the use of cereals for bio-fuels production; a 22 percent

²⁶ West Africa Observer, West Africa is Responding to the Crisis (SWAC/OECD, January – March 2009, P10).

²⁷ Africa Rice Center, AfricaRice wins two prestigious international science awards (Cotonou, Benin: Africa Rice Center, 2010) [database on-line]; available from <http://www.warda.org/warda>.

²⁸ Ibid.

increase from the 2007/08 estimated level, representing 4.6 percent of world cereal production.”²⁹ Even though production in West Africa may be fairly limited at this time, many there are committed to pursue this expanding market. “In almost all West African countries, large bio-fuel production schemes are being negotiated with multi-national companies.”³⁰

There are numerous other international organizations that share the goals of eradicating hunger and reducing poverty in Africa. In 1984, the Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) of Sahel and West Africa was created. “It brings together each year the main food security actors in the Sahel and West Africa where participants are mainly experts and representatives of bi-lateral and multi-lateral aid agencies including USAID.”³¹ Each year, following their annual meeting, several measures are recommended to states and regional economic organizations. For the purposes of this paper we will not delve into the details of these recommendations but merely point out that there are many multinational, regional, and unilateral efforts acting on these issues. The resolution to the issues in the Gulf of Guinea region as in Africa at large, will be realized on a much shorter timeline as coordination of efforts increases. Governments

²⁹ Food and Agricultural Organizations of the United Nations, Early indications hint at smaller 2009 cereal crop (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organizations of the United Nations, 2010)[database on-line]; available from <http://www.fao.org/news>.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Réseau de Prévention des Crises Alimentaire (RPCA), Main conclusions of the 23rd annual meeting of the Food Crisis Prevention Network in the Sahel and West Africa (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, November 2007) [database on-line]; available from <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd>.

and organizations must work to ensure programs and development schemes are complementary and supporting in nature to produce the greatest achievement possible.

U.S. SOCIAL POLICIES AND STRATEGIC MILITARY ENDSTATES

Secretary Of State Rice said it well on June 6th, 2006, “Our policy toward Africa is rooted in partnership not paternalism, in doing things with the peoples of Africa not for the peoples of Africa.”¹ Over the years the United States has relentlessly stated the right themes in its policy toward Africa but never seemed to enact policy quite right. The memo directing a review of U.S. policy Toward Africa in June of 1992 clearly recognized the limitations of foreign aid in Africa. “There is greater realization, both among donors and recipients, of the limited role outside, assistance can play, and a more realistic assessment of the difficulty in modernizing African societies.”² The United States has always acknowledged through policy that Africans need to lead the way in developing Africa. Yet well-intentioned Americans get off course from written policy and relearn this lesson over and over.

In 1958, Vice-President Richard Nixon realized the African countries were going to gain independence and have a vote in the United Nations in the near future. He predicted that Africa ‘Could well prove to be the decisive factor in conflict between the

¹ Department of State, *Department of State Strategic Plan FY 2007-2012, Regional Priorities; Africa* (Washington:Department of State, 2007), 2.

² George Bush, *National Security Review 30, American Policy Toward Africa in the 1990s* (Washington: White House, 15 June 1992), 2.

forces of freedom and international Communism’.³ The Berlin Wall has been down over twenty years and the United States has had some trouble in formulating new policies on Africa. In 1971, the U.S President stated, “Africa seeks peace, economic development and justice; and ... seeks our assistance in reaching these goals.”⁴ This was true then and is equally true now. The key point is that African countries seek our assistance. They do not request that the U.S. tell them how to reach these goals.

When outlining democracy and good governance for Africa, the 1992 National Security Strategy states: “We will seek greater African acceptance of human rights, worker rights, the rule of law, government accountability, and democratic political pluralism.”⁵ Perhaps the United States should be a little less concerned with spreading democracy and let the actions of democratic nations spread the idea. If a government is making an earnest effort to respond to the needs of their people, not overly oppressive and economically developing, perhaps the U.S. should support these governments openly as acceptable partners. In time they may become more democratic.

Department of State

On February 9th 2009, Phil Carter, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs provided an outline of the U.S. policy on Africa during which he said,

³ Magyar, 47.

⁴ Richard Nixon, The President’s Annual Foreign Policy Statement (Washington: The White House, 25 January 1971), 3.

⁵ George Bush, 2.

“We want to support African leadership and African solutions to African problems.”⁶

This is not a new revelation, it is a lesson being relearned. That aspect aside, the current U.S policy is on track with four priorities for Africa. The first is security assistance programs which are broken into three levels, national or individual states, sub-regional, and continental at the level of the African Union. These programs have shown significant successes in recent years and must be increased to spread the positive influence.

The second priority is promoting democratic systems and practices. This aspect includes “working with African societies on the critical issues of governance, transparency and accountability as a means of helping establish pluralistic communities where open political dialogue is a channel for reform and progress.”⁷ Encouraging transparency and accountability in government and promoting democratic institutions is a critical requirement for any significant development or foreign investment.

The third priority is promoting economic growth which will be critical for the other priorities to succeed. People need to be able to feed their families or nothing else matters.

The fourth priority is promoting health and social development. The United States has been very successful in promoting this agenda but the tragic conditions in many parts of Africa will demand continued vigilance in this effort. AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria

⁶ Phil Carter, *U.S. Policy in Africa in the 21st Century* (Washington: The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 9 February 2009), 2.

⁷ Ibid.

and many other diseases are still prevalent and other (curable) diseases are still the leading cause of death in Africa.⁸

Department of Defense Policy

The 1992 National Security Directive 75 also stated, “We will promote smaller, defensive military force structures with missions and leaders, responsive to civilian authority and democratic values.”⁹ This is the right perception for the U.S. role in Africa and the U.S. must be willing to commit U.S. forces to conduct training with the militaries of friendly nations. By doing so, the U.S. uses the training as an effective tool for diplomacy and a demonstration of U.S. commitment to support these same governments. In addition, and perhaps more importantly for the U.S., training military of friendly nations is imperative to ensure they make effective and efficient use of their limited resources. The same policy also identified that “disciplined apolitical militaries are key to political progress and economic development in Africa.”¹⁰ The U.S. military is the most professional military in the world and their training programs should include lessons in professionalism, human rights, and the role of the military in a democracy with any bilateral training. These lessons can go a long way to discouraging military coups in an area where they seem to be a seasonal event.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ George Bush, *National Security Directive 75, American Policy Toward Africa in the 1990s* (Washington: The White House, 23 December 1992), 2.

¹⁰ Ibid.

The U.S. Department of Defense Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) directs three strategic endstates for U.S. Africa Command's activities. The first is "African countries and organizations are able to provide for their own security and contribute to security on the continent."¹¹ This is a good endstate but in reality the forces that have been sent to assist in peacekeeping efforts in other countries have often been accused of serious crimes that often exacerbated the ongoing conflict instead of abating it. Professionalism needs to be instilled before they can be used in an expeditionary manner away from their own country.

The second endstate is "African governments and regional security establishments have the capability to mitigate the threat from [internal and external] organizations committed to violent extremism."¹² Again, well written but will require significant enhancement of current capabilities for most African states to achieve this.

The third endstate is "African countries and organizations maintain professional militaries that respond to civilian authorities, respect the rule of law, and abide by international human rights norms."¹³ Well intentioned and thought out these endstates may be, but the U.S. Africa Command will need significantly more assets to make progress towards achieving these endstates. U.S. Africa Command was established three years ago, and during this time the U.S. military has been heavily engaged in two major

¹¹ United States Africa Command, *Africa Command Strategy, 2009* (Stuttgart, Germany: United States Africa Command, 2009), 11.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unfortunately, these major wars have left few forces available for commitment to U.S. Africa Command's requirements.

"Africa Command's strategy of sustained security engagement focuses our military-to-military programs on conflict and crisis prevention rather than reaction."¹⁴ This strategy is exactly what is needed to work toward the strategic endstates. The U.S. must prioritize our military's efforts and allocate sufficient forces to move forward with the U.S. Africa Command strategy. There are few regions of the world where the U.S. would be required to commit significant military forces to intervene in a regional crisis; the Gulf of Guinea is one of these locations and it is one of the most politically tenuous in the world. In 1992, U.S. policy Toward Africa stated, "The United States has no vital (war fighting) interests in Africa, although, protection of U.S. citizens could require the use of force."¹⁵ This is absolutely incorrect in today's environment. In an area where many countries have fragile governments, the overthrow or collapse of one state could quickly spillover borders creating regional instability. With the U.S. expecting to import 25 percent of their oil from this region within the next five years; a major regional crisis or conflict would absolutely necessitate large scale deployment of U.S. forces for intervention to protect U.S. interests and economy.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ George Bush, National Security Directive 75, American Policy Toward Africa in the 1990s, The White House, Washington D. C., 23 December 1992, 7.

CONCLUSION

In proceeding through the different periods of history in the post-independence era of this region of Africa, it becomes apparent that the myriad of complex issues facing the Gulf of Guinea region can only be addressed using a regional approach across the spectrum of issues. The intertwining issues require a broad approach and time to resolve.

America symbolizes freedom and hope to the world. Our policies are often drafted with these ideals and values of democracy, with free market economies as a mainstay. Still, the realities of interests to the U.S. often permit support in various forms to governments that are far from democratic.

Signs of Success

In the Gulf of Guinea region today, it would be very easy to cite the repetitive failures of the various countries and presume that peace and development may never come to many countries in the region. However, by closely examining the current situation with an optimistic lense, promising signs can be found and do seem to indicate some positive trends.

Democratic elections have been held in many more countries in the last ten years than ever before in this part of Africa. More importantly, peaceful transitions of power from one democratically elected government to their successors have occurred in several countries. This is new ground for many of these countries. “One U.S think tank that has studied Africa, Freedom House, has determined that three quarters of African countries

are now 'free or partly free,' as opposed to less than half the states in 1990.”¹⁶

It is not difficult to find examples of the improvements toward democratic governments. Nigeria's recent successful peaceful transition of one democratically elected government to another marked ten years of civilian rule and three national elections. Another prominent success story is “Ghana, which only 20 years ago seemed lost in the intrigues of military rule, successfully held its fourth national election since 1992, to the well deserved praise of local and international observers alike.”¹⁷

The United States has invested heavily in the Gulf of Guinea region, though, not always smartly. The support to the various military regimes in Nigeria as well as other states in the region is completely contrary to the stated policies and values of the United States. It is imperative that the United States continue to promote good governance, health and education, rule of law, and economic reform for the future of the region. It is equally important that private investment is encouraged and bilateral military training is a priority. Large scale private investment is going to be difficult to encourage without significant increases in the security situation. Political stability, economic stability, security and public welfare, all contribute to a complex symbiotic relationship. All of these must be addressed comprehensively or none will experience significant improvement.

¹⁶ Carter, 3.

¹⁷ Darren Kew, “Building Democracy in Twenty First Century Africa: Two Africas, One Solution,” *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* (Winter/Spring 2005): 149.

Social Programs

Ongoing aid and development programs through international governmental and non-governmental organizations are showing great improvements in some sectors such as disease control, and education in some areas. Improvements must be realized in public health, food security, poverty reduction, and educational opportunities, to reduce instability from the public sector.

The current policy and practice are beneficial and moving in the right direction but, the US Department of State and USAID are underfunded and undermanned. This seems the ideal time in U.S. history to increase efforts for government funded jobs to promote U.S. international objectives. With over ten percent unemployment in the United States from across the career spectrum, now might be the ideal time to expand employment opportunities. For example, the U.S. could create contractual positions for six to twelve months and send the seasoned newly hired consultants overseas. They could consult on any number of foreign needs, including but not limited to infrastructure development, business management, banking, education, construction, and other similar endeavors. Right now, there are a substantial number of American seasoned professionals that are unemployed or under-employed who might be particularly well suited to train interested parties in the Gulf of Guinea region.

Improving Governance

Continuing efforts toward greater transparency in government, reduction of corruption, increased accountability of officials, and greater adherence to the rule of law will enhance public trust and effectively decrease internal racial, ethnic, and religious

tensions prevalent in many countries in the region. Improving government institutions will bolster public confidence and increase foreign investment opportunities.

Economic Opportunities

Tough economic policy decisions are required to correct the courses of development for many nations in the region. Several leaders have made the tough decisions and are following through to enact programs developed in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to reduce debt and open markets to outside investment. Foreign investment is necessary to support progress and development. With economic reform underway in many countries, it is much more appealing to foreign investors who previously did not have confidence in the region's governmental stability. Unstable governments means higher risk to investors.

Security

The U.S. must increase investment and commitment to improve regional security. As discussed in an earlier chapter, the complex challenges to security infrastructure require a collaborative regional approach. In turn, this will require international support to enact and persistent engagement on the part of the U.S. Military. Training events with militaries across the Gulf of Guinea states must be increased immediately to negate the possibility of government collapse requiring large U.S. Military intervention to secure our vital interests. Separatist movements, Narco-traffickers, human and contraband smugglers, pirates, and Islamic extremists all pose threats of varying degrees to the region and the world. Each of these threats has implications to the U.S., European and global security. Bilateral training events can increase capability of the partner forces and

acts as a strong political indicator that the U.S. is committed to assisting the improvement of security in the region.

There are many great Americans dedicating their lives to improve the world through their efforts and actions working in some of the underdeveloped countries of Africa. Many of them work for non-governmental organizations to address one or more of the issue areas cited above. These efforts should be encouraged, and wherever possible, coordinated to maximize the effects with other efforts. USAID has made great strides in orchestrating development and aid. However, USAID is seriously under staffed and needs huge infusions of qualified personnel and large increases in budget. Together with the Peace Corps and other governmental and non-governmental organizations they are making a difference. It is incumbent upon the United States to maximize this effort and those of the Department of State in order to decrease the recurring requirement for what should be the last resort, the military intervention.

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