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14. ABSTRACT Somali Piracy continues unabated in the Horn of Africa to this day. The thesis offers a piracy prevention strategy involving bold capacity building and reintegration actions on land in limited access environments. It compares piracy to other successful small war experiences where combined action at the grass roots level leads to tactical and even operational successes. The thesis operationalizes phase zero ideas by harnesses the national strategic documents creating unlikely diplomatic and military partnerships, applying conflict prevention principles, and blending Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations along the maritime commons in Somalia. Budget limitations will require creative multifaceted solutions to complex problems, Somali maritime partnerships however untenable today, will be far more cost effective than prolonged intervention tomorrow.					
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**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**

**SOMALI PIRATES:
A NEW PHASE ZERO STABILITY OPERATIONAL APPROACH
A STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**



By

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18 June 2010

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND THOUGHTS

Dr. Keith Dickson, the thesis advisor, provided invaluable guidance and patience as

this project took shape, without his encouragement, I would not have completed this requirement. For the future JAWS student, I would pass along that your time is limited. When you begin a project of this size in parallel to your daily reading requirements, it is unadvisable to take on a thesis that has little connection to the JAWS curriculum. One technique in framing the thesis requirement is to harvest all the potential topics from the Combatant Commands for the sake of relevancy. As the JAWS curriculum is presented to you, make use of the reference material and incorporate it in your bibliography. I found that there is simply not enough time to do recreational research to build unrelated arguments. This methodology will not only meet the writing requirement, it may also prepare you for oral boards. The name of the game is efficiency. My recommendation is to bring together the JAWS curriculum references, including your Elective, against a potential Combatant Command thesis topic, and then let the thesis problem that interests you develop concurrent to JAWS. As someone who struggles with writing, I would also recommend taking advantage of the writing and library staff early and often. Your relationship with the Thesis Advisor is of utmost importance. Thesis confessional sessions are better than a thesis intervention. As daunting as this effort may sound, do not let yourself become discouraged, there are 40 others going through similar scenarios, and sharing your experiences with your shipmates is important. It will provide you a means of venting frustration, and could save some time in terms of sharing researching methods.

Semper Fidelis, LtCol D.J. Larson, American Marine

Biography

LtCol Dennis Larson hails from the Puget Sound region of the great Pacific Northwest, and is currently assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command J-9 Concepts Suffolk, VA. He enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve Whidbey Island, Washington in 1985 and served in the reserve component until receiving a commission on 1991. LtCol Larson received his B.A. Humanities from Washington State University Pullman, Washington that same year. Serving in 2nd Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, NC from 1991-1995, LtCol Larson commanded Platoons of Combat Engineers, Support personnel, and small boat coxswains in Small Craft Company. In 1995, Larson left active service and joined the Marine Corps Reserves' 4th Landing Support Battalion at Ft. Lewis, Washington. During this period, Larson found employment in the commercial fishing industry Bering Sea Alaska. Returning to active service in 1997, Larson returned to Jacksonville, NC to serve with the Reserve Support Unit, Marine Corps Base until 2002. In 2002 Larson transferred to 6th Engineer Support Battalion Portland, Oregon where he served until 2005. From 2005 to 2008 Larson served with Training and Education Command Quantico, Virginia followed by 6 month with HQMC Reserve Affairs Manpower. LtCol Larson has served in a mix of engineering, logistics, training, and education positions in both enlisted and commissioned ranks. He has served in active, reserve, and civilian status for a total of 24 years. He will be broadening this experience while on joint assignment as a Joint Force Planner U.S Joint Forces Command.

LtCol Larson is married to the former Wendy Glatiotis of Gunnison, Colorado. The Larson's have two children Andrew 12, and Ava 9. They reside in Virginia Beach where they enjoy water sports, soccer, and equine activities in the Hampton Roads region.

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INTRODUCTION

The beginning of the 19th century posed many strategic challenges to the United States; President Thomas Jefferson responded to these challenges by dispatching land and naval expeditions to North Africa, and the American Pacific Northwest to protect and enhance the interests, of an emerging nation. The operational design behind each expedition was very different, but the strategies were similar, the preservation and expansion of an unstable American economy. Today, the National Security Strategy (NSS) also reminds us of the nexus between national and economic security, protection of free trade, and access to global markets, a nexus as important to Jefferson's America as it is to modern America.

Somali piracy has been in the international spotlight for several months, and despite robust efforts by the United States and the international community, the illegal activity continues unencumbered and threatens to disrupt the flow of resources through the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden sea lane calling into question the efficacy of the current counter piracy strategy. Vice Admiral William Gortney, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command provides a succinct view. "Ultimately, piracy is a problem that starts ashore. We made this clear at the outset of our efforts. We cannot guarantee safety in this vast region."¹ Clearly, without a comprehensive multifaceted strategy, piracy in the Horn of Africa will continue indefinitely and could possibly become a dangerous form of asymmetric warfare. The oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is a very visible example of the vulnerability of the maritime domain. While the oil production platform explosion and

¹ United States Navy, CDR, Combined Maritime Forces Public Affairs, "*Combined Maritime Forces Issues New Alert to Mariners*," April 7, 2009.

fire was not labeled a terrorist attack but an industrial accident, what is certain is the magnitude of disaster. With very little imagination, one can imagine a super tanker full of crude oil in the Gulf of Aden being held for ransom by pirates threatening a repeat of the outcome of the American oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. Clearly time is not on our side with regard to this complex problem, and a comprehensive solution is needed.

However, as it is now organized, the United States military is ill-prepared to contend with 21st century problems represented by piracy off the Horn of Africa. Complex problems such as these demand effective operational concepts and designs, unity of effort, and whole of government strategies to address the long-term systemic problems that threaten U.S. security. To address complex security problems, the U.S. must engage in Phase Zero Stability Operations in limited access environments to support U.S. national interests. Somalia's piracy problem requires new strategic thinking that, by design, brings to bear all aspects of national power to protect the global commons now and into the future. The concept envisioned in this paper provides operating space for military and civilian leaders to work collaboratively in austere locations in the interest of America's defense, diplomacy, and development efforts. The purpose of this paper is to offer a campaign-based small war-like solution to address the complex security problem that piracy in the Horn of Africa represents.²

The analytic framework behind the paper follows a modified version of Richard H. Yarger's model for strategy conception. The Yarger model is a hierarchical arrangement

² Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation. U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual 1940.

producing military plans influenced by a stratified series of national documents beginning with the National Security Strategy, and ending with a campaign design plan for the eradication of piracy in the Horn of Africa. This paper's methodology follows Yarger's model assessing and appraising elements from theoretical national security and theater strategy documents, and selectively integrating them into a practical comprehensive piracy eradication plan. The exploration continues by comparing and contrasting Somali piracy with similar challenges in U.S. history, where national security challenges required multifaceted solutions involving firm and equal application of whole of government capabilities. Thus, the paper brings insights from historical small wars forward, using the lessons derived to apply to the contemporary operating environment in the Horn of Africa. A new proactive concept proposes addressing the root causes of piracy originating from Somalia. This new expeditionary Phase Zero Stability Operational construct blends counterinsurgency techniques and stability operations activities, alongside capacity building and reintegration programs, aimed at preventing piracy from occurring in the first place. The operational design also applies crosscutting principles and techniques emerging from current operations, emphasizing thinking and planning, problem framing and understanding that achieve long-term goals, rather than short-term military effects. It involves a proactive approach shaping and molding operational environments to forestall conflict and the formation of safe havens, thereby supporting U.S. national security objectives.³ The model not only offers a piracy prevention strategy

³ Randell L. Mackey, *The United States Army Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-500, Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia 28 January 2008.,P4. Approach reflected on pg.13. The design process begins with a broad understanding of the

but also an overarching approach to Phase Zero Stability Operation activities applied in areas of restricted access. It represents a redirection of thinking concerning how and when counterinsurgency (COIN) and Stability Operations are conducted, how best to organize for these operations, and even how to blend capabilities across U.S. government departmental lines. Lastly, the hybrid model places a strong emphasis on combined U.S. and Somali maritime capability in combating piracy. The piracy situation off the coast of Somalia is an excellent test case for the conceptual application of a whole of government preventative strategy, in a difficult and contested region where successful application of these concepts potentially yields the greatest results.

This study utilizes a wide range of sources, including national security and foreign policy documents, service and joint doctrinal publications, think tank articles, the works of classical and contemporary military theorists, and works on counterinsurgency. Also included are the congressional testimonies of U.S. Department of State officials, statements from the Commanders of both U.S. Africa Command, and the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. This paper intends to inform combatant command plans and designs, policy, doctrine, and organizational structures in better preparing for complex challenges involving the protection of U.S. national interests. Through a well-executed effort supported by an operational framework, the new Phase Zero Stability Operational design admittedly requires assuming additional operational risks, but the strategic rewards of achieving U.S. national security aims outweighs the risks.

nature of the problem. Planners compare elements by measuring the intensity between the constituent parts. For example, Somali youths are attracted to piracy due to the lure of easy money, a very strong connection considering their situation. Infrastructure improvement projects involving steady employment opportunities provide an attractive alternative for youths away from the risky pirate activity.

Annex A. displays several Joint Professional Military Education Special Areas of Emphasis (SAE) for academic year 2010. This paper is aimed at representing and even harnessing many of the ideas and concepts emphasized by the Joint Staff J-7 and AFRICOM's SAE submission, such as using capacity building activities as a conflict prevention tactic. The paper takes prevention a step further by using maritime capacity building as prevention means to eradicate piracy in the Horn of Africa.

CHAPTER ONE – A NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT

In this century, countries benefit from healthy, prosperous, confident partners. Weak and troubled nations export their ills – problems like economic instability and illegal immigration and crime and terrorism. America and others...understand that healthy and prosperous nations export and import goods and services that help to stabilize regions and add security to every nation.

President George W. Bush⁴

Disruptive criminal activity along the Suez Canal, Red Sea, and especially in the Gulf of Aden sea-lane challenges universal access to the global commons, one of the most vital interests people throughout the globe rely upon. The cargo passing through the Gulf of Aden choke point ranges from petroleum and agriculture products, to relief supplies and



Figure 1. Puntland, Somali source: Gov. of Puntland Website.

National Security Council's Counter report on piracy for example, stresses using hard power to repress this problem.

new motor vehicles. This broad array of products represents not only the life blood of industrialized countries, but also survival for drought stricken and impoverished regions. Piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa is indeed an international security problem, but there appears to be only one response: the employment of hard power in the form of maritime patrols and interdictions. The 2007

⁴ U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security. *The National Strategy for Maritime Security*, by President George W. Bush (Washington D.C., 2005) Introduction.

Somali pirates have attacked and harassed vessels as far as 800 miles off shore in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Somali based piracy against chemical and oil tankers, freighters, cruise ships, yachts, and fishing vessels poses a threat to global shipping...this combination of illicit activity and non-existent rule of law offers a breeding ground for higher levels of instability, organized crime, and other transnational threats.⁵

President Bush in June 2007 recognized that piracy was beginning to challenge the physical and economic security of the United States, and therefore issued a memorandum directly from his office augmenting the earlier National Security Council's Report emphasizing the need to focus on the growing piracy problem.⁶ The aim of the presidential emphasis was to repress piracy in high-risk areas by responding quickly promoting international solutions. The policy served to focus the effort to repress the illegal activity, and international involvement arrived in the form of volunteer navies to the Combined Maritime Task Forces.⁷ The policy insisted that piracy threatens U.S. national security interests and the freedom and safety of maritime navigation throughout the world, undermines economic security, and contributes to the destabilization of weak or failed state governance.⁸ The policy concluded with acknowledgment that a combination of illicit activity and violence at sea could also be associated with other maritime challenges, including illegal, unlawful and unregulated fishing, international

⁵ National Security Council of the United States of America, *Countering Piracy of the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan*. December 2008. Executive Summary.

⁶ Ibid. Executive Summary.

⁷ The Combined Maritime Task Force is composed of three primary Combined Task Forces (CTFs) and seven supporting CTFs and includes over three dozen ships from Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, the U.S. and U.K., as well as over 20 nation supporting with other naval forces and personnel. The task forces support Maritime Security Operations (MSO).

⁸ National Security Council of the United States of America, *Countering Piracy of the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan*. December 2008. Annex 1: United States Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy, June 14, 2007.

smuggling, and terrorism.⁹

The National Security Council's report, while accurate, paints an operational picture that sets the conditions for military planners to envision a forcible entry, rather than building a Somali U.S. partnership in the maritime domain for the long term. The National Security Council's report directs immediate operational measures to prevent, disrupt, and punish acts of the Somali pirate organization in response to the growing threat, and it mutually supports long-term initiatives aimed at establishing governance, rule of law, security, and economic development in Somalia.¹⁰ While marginally effective in the short term, the current policy and approach using maritime interdiction to repress and disrupt piracy is a losing strategy in the long term because it has no conclusive end state, and does little to alter the environment from which piracy emanates. The long-term piracy eradication initiatives have not been implemented to date largely due to an aversion toward the use of ground forces in Somalia based on previous experiences in the country, but clearly the current approach is not working as piracy is on the rise, and a comprehensive land inclusive approach is overdue. One significant advantage that U.S. forces did not have in nineteen ninety two through four, is capacity building experience on the continent, a Forward Operating Site (FOS) in Djibouti, Africa, and a Combatant Command focused on Africa specifically. Since 2002 the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTFFHOA) has been operational in Djibouti, Africa only 250 km from the center of the piracy activity. CJTFFHOA in fact has a long tradition

⁹ Ibid. Executive Summary.

¹⁰ National Security Council of the United States of America, *Countering Piracy of the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan*. December 2008. Annex 1: United States Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy, June 14, 2007. Executive Summary.

of building partner capacity in the benign environments among countries in the Horn of Africa. This paper proposes extending the operational reach of CJTF-HOA into the northern semi-autonomous states Somaliland and Puntland in an effort to eradicate piracy in the Horn of Africa, and to communicate AFRICOM's positive partnership message in the region. Piracy eradication is achievable through the advancement of capacity building lines of operation and creating enduring partnerships with the Somali's. A true anti-piracy campaign design begins by interpreting the illegal phenomenon as a long-term strategic opportunity more than a short-term tactical challenge. Building tangible maritime partner capacity in northern Somalia by with and through local authorities, however difficult and untenable it may seem today, would serve to open this critical sea-lane indefinitely, and provide the U.S a geostrategic partnership that would improve global economic security in one of the world's most vulnerable choke points. In the end, capacity building in the form of maritime training and material support is less expensive than a prolonged naval presence at best or a costly kinetic intervention at worst.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) recognizes the importance of addressing threats such as Somali piracy to secure U.S. strategic goals. One of the goals of the NSS is to "strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends."¹¹ The National Security Strategy also seeks to strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against the U.S. and its friends.¹² The National Security Strategy further states, "the goal of our statecraft is to help create a

¹¹ Bush, George, W., "*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*", (March 16, 2006):1.

¹² Secretary of Defense, "*The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*", (2008):6.

world of democratic, well governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system, this is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.”¹³ The National Security Strategy correlates the safety and security of American citizens to the safety and security of other governments and citizens in an international construct. Piracy off the Horn of Africa represents a potential perfect storm of national security challenges at the confluence of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. However daunting the task of piracy eradication may seem, the geostrategic importance of Somalia combined with the economic implications of criminal activity continuing unabated are too great to continue with the status quo, therefore counter-piracy is a strategic imperative in the Horn of Africa. Creative, long term partnerships which meet the needs of the indigenous people and fledgling host governments while allaying U.S. economic concerns would be the logical next course of action in Somalia.

Unfortunately, the current state of affairs in the region remains a complex foreign policy challenge. The U.S. has little contact with the governmental authorities and inhabitants in the northern region of Somalia, and piracy is on the rise in close proximity to the Bab al Mandab maritime choke point in the Gulf of Aden where 3.3 billion barrels of oil travel daily. Along with piracy at the chock point in the north, to the south threats have emanated from terrorist safe havens and training camps outside Mogadishu where African Union Forces under a United Nations mandate have been fighting for control of the capital from groups such as Al Shabbab.

¹³ Bush, George, W., “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, Washington: U.S. G.P.O. (March 16, 2006):1.

As the National Security Strategy indicates, one of the major challenges in a globalized world is open access to markets and trade. In fact, ninety percent of the physical commodities traded in the global market travel over the surface of the globe on the oceans.¹⁴ The Cooperative Strategy for 21st century Seapower (CS21) amplifies this nexus between access to global markets, national security, and the need to protect the maritime domain.

The oceans connect the nations of the world, even those countries that are landlocked. Because the maritime domain – the world’s oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, littorals and the airspace above them – supports 90% of the worlds’ trade, it carries the lifeblood of a global system that links every country on earth. Covering three quarters of the planet, the oceans make neighbors of people around the world. They enable us to help friends in need and to confront and defeat aggression far from our shores.¹⁵

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) informed by the National Security Strategy, echoes the relationship between national and economic security, identifying a U.S. interest as “including protection of the nation and our allies from attack and securing the global commons, and with them access to world markets and resources.”¹⁶ This emphasis toward economic security and access to the global commons specifically in the maritime domain, serves to elevate piracy from a criminal act, to a national security interest, requiring thoughtful long-term indeed comprehensive solutions. Capacity building and partnerships are integral aspects of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, and should be sought out in a larger national security context.

¹⁴ United States. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2009. <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/FDLP1722>>. Introduction.

¹⁵ Ibid. Introduction.

¹⁶ U.S Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, Secretary of Defense, [Washington D.C.]: Dept. of Defense, 2008.6. <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS103291>

The cooperative strategy indicates that the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard will employ the global reach, persistent presence, and operational flexibility inherent in U.S. sea power to accomplish key tasks, or strategic imperatives including: (1) Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international partners. (2) Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global system. The strategy further proposes that fostering international cooperation through a Global Maritime Partnerships initiative will serve as a catalyst for increased international interoperability in support of cooperative maritime security and help promote the rule of law.¹⁷

In support of the NSS goals, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) envisions long-term innovative approaches to deny extremists the opportunity to gain footholds, using approaches that include local partnerships in contested areas.¹⁸ The Secretary of Defense envisions a bold new concept, which suggests reaching out to new and even unlikely partners proposing,

a new approach to meet national security objectives broadening ideas to include partnerships for new situations or circumstances, and developing arrangements with other partners that are limited to specific objectives of goals, or limited duration while varying according to mutual interests stressing that these arrangements be built on respect, reciprocity, and transparency.¹⁹

The Secretary of Defense insists that although the Department of Defense is strong and capable in many areas of the spectrum of military operations, it will need to integrate with other U.S departments and agencies.²⁰ Similarly, the Department of State's strategic plan stresses creating engagement opportunities consisting of civil and military capacity building activities to counter regional threats by supporting efforts to strengthen partner

¹⁷ United States. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2009. Introduction. <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/FDLP1722>

¹⁸ U.S Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, Secretary of Defense, [Washington D.C.]: Dept. of Defense, 2008.3. <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS103291>

¹⁹ Ibid.15.

²⁰ Ibid.16.

nation capabilities in the area of border and maritime security.²¹ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, draws a direct connection between U.S. economic security, and piracy, “Maritime piracy”, Mullen states in his guidance to U.S. military forces, “represents a direct threat to freedom of movement and peaceful use of the global commons.”²² Simply said, a comprehensive counter-piracy plan necessitates the incorporation of skills and capacities of the Defense Department, the Department of State, and the international community rite large in order to eradicate the phenomenon through capacity building and development.

It is clear that to have these strategies succeed additional risks will need to be taken under a land based engagement approach. From the onset, in the Horn of Africa a comprehensive five-to-ten year capacity building approach is required preceded by an analysis of the many causal factors that contribute to the current form of piracy. An approach that correctly interprets piracy as a physical manifestation of the untenable environmental on land, requiring a counter-approach aimed at repairing the infrastructure, economy, and social well being of the coastal villages, and providing alternatives to crime at sea. Although a failed state, Somalia is not a failed society, nor does it lack for information, considering it has developed one of Africa’s fastest growing mobile communication markets. Northern Somalia requires an improvement in economic opportunity if the pirate seafarers are to end their depredations at sea. Piracy, therefore, reflects inequities and depravation on the land which could be met with improvements in

²¹ United States Department of State/U.S.AID, *Strategic Plan 2007-2012*, revised May 7,2007.14.

²² Michael Mullen, Admiral USN, Chairman for the Joints Chiefs, *Guidance for 2009-2010*.1.

the environment from which it originates thus stopping it before it starts. Opinions, perspectives, and potential approaches vary throughout the federal government. The disparate nature of the U.S. government understanding and interpretation of the environment adds to the confusion delaying engagement and focus.

The Africa Command *Posture Statement 2008* describes how increased pressure placed on the natural resources of African coastal regions will be the source of contention and conflict in the future. The Commanding General of Africa Command, General William Ward, provides a perspective regarding the over exploitation of marine resources in coastal Africa and one element of piracy's genesis.

Today, the waters off Africa's coast are being over-fished at an alarming rate by a variety of entities aware of Africa's inability to monitor and regulate this activity in their economic zone. If this continues, some forecasters predict that the ecological system that supports the fish population, the primary source of protein for many African states, could fail by 2045. Without the ability to secure their maritime spaces and regulate fishing, the nations of Africa will lose this important source of food and revenue for their people. The United States must adopt a long-term view towards creating programs that will help solve such problems. Failing to do so today mean our activities will only produce short-term effects.²³

Africa is a poor continent; livelihoods such as subsistence fishing are the source of life itself, AFRICOM clearly views these basic human activities as vulnerable to outside exploitation requiring enhanced indigenous security capacity and policing. Security capacity building is the core of AFRICOM's efforts on the continent.

Senator Richard G. Lugar outlines the correlation between piracy, safe havens, and terrorism in his opening statement in a hearing on piracy before the U.S. Senate

²³ General William E. Ward, USA, *Statement regarding United States Africa Command before the Senate Armed Service Committee*, Stuttgart: U.S. Africa Command, on March 17, 2009.4. <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/March/Ward%2003-17-09.pdf>

Committee on Foreign Relations. “While military means may be necessary, it is important to understand that the root cause of this problem is the breakdown of law and order in Somalia which is what allows the pirates to operate from shore with impunity.”²⁴ Senator Lugar continues by articulating that ungoverned spaces pose a direct risk to U.S. security,

The point that I and other members of this Committee have long made – the existence of failed states directly threatens the national security interests of the United States. Failed states exist as a potential safe haven for terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, and piracy. Failed states can destabilize surrounding nations, spawn tribal or sectarian conflict, and intensify refugee flows.²⁵

The Senator attributes failed states and their resultant safe havens to the emergence of piracy. He does not distinguish between piracy and terrorism. The Senator implies that one aspect of a solution to piracy in the Horn of Africa is a well governed state.

Continuing in the same meeting, Ambassador Stephen D. Mull testified on the subject of confronting piracy off the coast of Somalia. His perspective paints the pirates as profiteers just in it for the money, not to advance an ideology.

The World Food Program transport ships delivering aid to some of the world’s most vulnerable populations are in danger, fighting piracy is an important element of our strategic objectives in Somalia, which focus on helping regain political and economic stability, eliminating the threat of terrorism, and responding to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.²⁶

The foreign relations and diplomatic policy perspectives vary in description and how to

²⁴ Senator Richard G. Lugar providing an opening statement, *Confronting Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia*: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate on April 30, 2009, 111th Cong., 1st sess.

²⁵ Ibid.1.

²⁶ Ambassador Stephen D. Mull providing the Committee Chair a State Dept. perspective, *Confronting Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia*: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate on April 30, 2009, 111th Cong., 1st sess.

²⁶ Ibid.1.

address the problem, clearly defining the environment is an essential aspect of building an integrated campaign design to eradicate piracy in the Horn of Africa. The Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, stated before the same Committee,

The Somali Transitional Federal Government controls only a small portion of the territory the vast majority of Somalia is controlled by militias, clans, or terrorist organizations. The blight of piracy off the coast of Somalia is without question a symptom of the instability and insecurity within Somalia, without stability in Somalia, there can be no long-term resolution of the piracy problem.²⁷

Chatham House journalist Roy Love draws upon the importance of economics in his article on conflict in the Horn of Africa, “In the Horn of Africa, as elsewhere,” Love asserts, “economic drivers do not always manifest themselves directly but are often concealed in the politics of nationalism, of religious ideology, or of struggles between elites.”²⁸ In building a piracy prevention strategy this perspective is useful, as complex problems require a different type of thinking and analysis beyond superficial issues.

Chairman Mullen, Senator Lugar, Ambassador Mull, Assistant Secretary Carson, and Journalist Roy Love all recognize the strategic importance of securing the sea-lanes in the interest of the economic security of the United States; however, opinions differ on the approach going forward. Chairman Mullen, a career navy officer, characterizes piracy as a maritime threat to the global commons thus; a naval response has been the focus. Senator Lugar suggests multi-lateral cooperation and good governance. Ambassador Mull calls for economic, development, and humanitarian support as a

²⁷ Jonnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Statement at Confirmation Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2009.,the day before the official hearing regarding Somali piracy., United States Senate, 111th Cong., 1st sess., on Washington, D.C.

²⁸ Roy Love, *Economic Drivers of Conflict and Cooperation in the Horn of Africa*, Chatham House December 2009.2. http://www.org.uk/files/15571_bp1209hom.pdf

solution. Secretary Carson relates the piracy problem to the Somalia Transitional Federal Government's inability to control the entire country, and that stabilization through a centralized government in the southern capital city Mogadishu is the key to resolving the piracy problem in the north. The many perspectives on piracy seem to reflect and even endorse current strategies from the originator's department or sphere of influence, but they do not propose a holistic multifaceted, bilateral approach by with and through the Somali people, government, and military. The Phase Zero Stability Operational approach aimed at piracy eradication suggests that ALL of these perspectives are relevant, applicable, and even interrelated; however current operations lack unity of effort, a whole of government approach, and are risk adverse, therefore an operational design solution which incorporates not only the perspectives of the individuals departments, but the resources and capabilities as well would begin the process of piracy's eradication in the Horn of Africa.

The National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, along with the Department of State strategic documents all promote the need for building capacities that the National Security Strategy describes with a "broad spectrum of partners as the basis for long term stability."²⁹ In an era of globalization, these partnership engagement approaches can be applied through military, diplomatic, and economic lines of operation. Stabilizing volatile regions before large-scale interventions are required is clearly the most effective approach to addressing threats to the global commons. A comprehensive whole of government effort is essential in meeting the National Security Strategy goals.

²⁹ U.S Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, Secretary of Defense, [Washington D.C.]: Dept. of Defense, 2008. <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS103291>

A whole of government approach toward Somalia's piracy problem involves a wide portfolio of activities ranging from diplomatic and military engagements, security cooperation, humanitarian relief, infrastructure reconstruction, health, sports and education initiatives. In addition, an effective campaign design is required to synchronize national strategic goals and policy objectives with theater operational plans integrating and harnessing the capabilities and contributions of a number of government agencies within a tailored expeditionary organization.

In eradicating piracy in the Horn of Africa, the U.S. should adopt a plan that addresses the root causes of this systemic problem by extending local security partnerships to the semi-autonomous governments of Somaliland and Puntland, building on the well-established relationship between the Department of State and the Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Nairobi, the U.S. Embassy, and the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti. A mutually supporting security partnership would require extending the operational reach of CJTF-HOA positioned in Djibouti, and assuming additional operational risks on the ground. CJTF-HOA has a long history of building partnership capacity including a broad array of outreach capabilities including programs aimed at improving maritime law enforcement, health, sports, and education, agriculture and pastoral care, and police and military training programs.³⁰ A reciprocal maritime security and development relationship between the U.S., Somaliland, and Puntland would protect the flow of trade through the Gulf of Aden sea-lane, protect, manage and preserve local marine resources, and prevent

³⁰ United States Africa Command, "Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa," <http://www.hoa.africom.mil/> (assessed Jan 6, 2010).

the outgrowth of transnational terrorism in the region. In an era of limited U.S. defense resources, and little appetite for large-scale intervention, the remaining options available to address the piracy problem include the continued enforcement of maritime interdiction, complimented by diplomatic and military engagements at the local level.

Certainly, the establishment of an international naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding waters to repress piracy from the seaward side has served as a unifying action among the countries involved. However, the efficacy of this approach has come into question as piracy is on the rise, and the naval presence is becoming more costly over time. A landward strategy is the logical next step. This will involve a reciprocal security partnership between U.S and Somali maritime forces. This long term relationship begins with efforts to address the holistic needs of the indigenous people in order to establish trust through deeds and strategic communications, support to incipient state government ministries, and lastly building a Somali maritime capability to contend with a variety of unlawful seaborne crimes including piracy. This approach is aimed at piracy eradication; therefore a simple metric that would measure progress is a decrease in the number of attacks, attempts, and successful piracy occurrences. The shipping companies and insurers such as Lloyds of London have provided the navies operating in the area detailed documentation almost in real time with regard to pirate activity.

Of utmost importance to this effort is a detailed understanding of the history of the region, the context of the piracy situation, and the local socioeconomic conditions. The next chapter is aimed at understanding the environment in order to alter the current course of increased violence and terror on the high seas.

CHAPTER TWO – UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENT

An in-depth understanding of the political, military, geographical, and socioeconomic circumstances related to piracy in the Horn of Africa is essential in developing an effective operational counter-piracy concept to support a long-term U.S. national strategy. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) provided Congress a perspective that views Somalia as “war-torn,” incapable of governance and policing, with little economic viability,

Most experts believe that the reestablishment of government authority in Somalia is the only guarantee that piracy will not persist or reemerge as a threat. Congress may seek to influence U.S. policy through oversight of U.S. military operations and diplomacy and through foreign assistance appropriations and authorizations.³¹

The government ministries of the semiautonomous states Somaliland and Puntland in northern Somalia view the problem much differently than this report would portray. The local governments tout capturing, trying, and punishing pirates for as long as 15 years in local prisons with only limited maritime capacity. Broad country wide generalities such as the CRS report to Congress do not provide the details of what is truly occurring in these two northern Somali states. The war torn streets the report is referring to are 900 miles to the south in Mogadishu. An example of the local situation can be seen in Somaliland’s coast guard report. Although operating with limited capacity it is indeed contributing to the counter-piracy effort.

Somaliland Coast Guard Forces captured 11 suspected pirates and their equipment near the coastal water borders of Somaliland and Djibouti. The suspects will be presented to the regional court. Berbera Regional Court

³¹ Ploch, Lauren. *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa*. CRS report for Congress, R40528. [Washington, DC]: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2009. Summary.

sentenced 11 pirates 15 years of jail term each. The 11 pirates were caught in the territorial waters of Somaliland in December 2009.³²

Clearly the modern day form of piracy off the Horn of Africa represents a dangerous shift toward irregular and disruptive warfare on the open ocean; it involves advanced telecommunication networks, sophisticated marine tracking systems, financial and logistical support from state and non-state actors. In 2008, Somali pirates seized a record number of ships in larger tonnages than ever before and also set record for ransoms paid.³³ Although pirate attacks often include brandishing weapons and seizure of the vessels by force, most Somali pirate groups have not harmed their captures. They, themselves have publically said that they are only seeking ransom money. They hold ship, crew, and cargo for months in some cases, requiring contracted food vendors, lodging, and a host of other logistical requirements.³⁴ The ransom negotiations often involve third party intermediaries, satellite communications, and elaborate financial networks.

Piracy has become big business in a region rife with human suffering. The successful piracy business model is worthy of note and informs a counter piracy strategy including a pro-business and development counter-strategy aimed at the disaffected communities alongside the hard power maritime prosecutions. Indeed the Somali pirates have done well with very limited means, implying that there are forces larger than the armed men in skiffs at sea at play. This is not to say that reformed pirates or their organizers would

³² Government of Somaliland, Hargiesa, *Somaliland Coast Guard Forces Capture Pirates*, assessed December 19, 2009, *Pirates Given 15 Year Jail Term in Somaliland Regional Court*, (assessed February 17, 2010), <http://somalilandgov.com/>

³³ Mid-East Business Digest. *Somali Piracy 2008 Yearbook*. [United States]: Catocin Creek Consulting and the editors of Mid-East Business Digest, 2009.

³⁴ Ibid.

make legitimate businessman, but in terms of skills of negotiation, coastal seamanship and piloting, knowledge of small arms, and the responsible use of force, the pirates of Somalia have indeed displayed qualities and abilities that in time could be molded into a professional maritime security capability.

As untenable as it may seem today, in the long run, the Somalis will need to police their sea space; the question is how to properly build that capacity without the training and equipment unintentionally becoming a means for more efficient pirating. That answer is by training and equipping side by side with the Somali's using their language, cultural skills and knowledge of local waters, coupled to the discipline and professional mentoring skills of U.S. maritime forces. Combining U.S. and local paramilitary auxiliary forces is not a new technique, but it seems forgotten in the U.S. military lexicon. The next chapter discusses how these techniques were used successfully in other American small war experiences such as the U.S. Marine Corps Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam. Trust, confidence, and cooperation come to the fore through shared experiences and time together, said differently, counter-piracy in the Horn of Africa is a combined struggle, and the most important understanding of building indigenous capacity is building partnerships first.

Somalia, a country the size of Texas, has been without an effective government since 1991. In the years that followed, periodic conflict has erupted between rival clan factions, forcing massive displacements of people severely disrupting the economy. Contributing to this environment is the fact that 70 percent of the population is 20 to 23

years old, and unemployed.³⁵ Employment, and or national service related to development and security may be a means to reduce piracy; this approach meets both needs if the U.S. were to assist in building a maritime academy providing housing, subsistence, pay, uniforms, and mentoring to Somali recruits as a segment of a greater whole of government capacity building strategy. The understanding and complexity of the problem unfolds with the knowledge that previous security sector reform efforts in Somalia may have unintentionally contributed to advancement of the piracy phenomenon. Early in the piracy struggle in 2005, Somali commercial fisherman alleged their livelihoods taken from them by European and Asian fishing companies poaching the vast tuna and swordfish fish stocks at gun point in coastal waters, well within the Somali economic exclusion zone, this led to widespread unemployment, and resulted in many disaffected young men turning to piracy to survive. Many coastal fisherman calling themselves ‘coastguards’ and ‘Marines’ were previously trained by western firms to board and arrest ships, but without recognition, a legal frame work, mentoring, and supervision, the activity metastasized from a well meaning marine fisheries law enforcement activity, to piracy. This is not to suggest that the Somali’s should be relieved of crimes on the high seas, it simply is meant to illustrate that shortly after the maritime training took place, the fishing and shipping companies cried ‘piracy’ when their fishing and merchant ships were detained off Somali waters for plundering fishing stocks and pollution. Counter-piracy strategic planning must envision a long term


³⁵ General William E. Ward, USA, Statement regarding United States Africa Command before the Senate Armed Service Committee, Stuttgart: U.S. Africa Command, on March 17, 2009. <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/March/Ward%2003-17-09.pdf>

commitment rather than half measures such as these and all sides of the story must be presented in order for a forthright solution to be derived.

The success of the early pirates gave way to actors from outside Somalia looking for a piece of the fortunes the shipping companies were readily paying in ransom payments. The millions of dollars in ransom payments paid out have exacerbated the problem in one of the poorest parts of the world. The attraction to the pirate gold rush has simply been too strong to resist, and many towns' people are now providing active and passive support to the illegal operation similar to populace behavior in insurgent small wars. While a few religious leaders have spoken out against the illegal pirate activity as counter to their belief system, religion and other social anchors are no match against the strong attraction the ransoms pose. The only long term solution to the problem is for the Somali government to actively patrol its territorial waters to prevent poaching and piracy equally, then the fisherman could return to a productive life, but this is a significant challenge as it involves altering deeply held feelings among the disaffected.

It is important to remember that military equipment and training support has been granted to the government of Somalia previously. For example, the Somali navy supported with equipment by the Soviet Union and the U.S. patrolled their coastline maintaining the economic exclusion zones during the Cold War. In fact, the trouble in Somalia on land and now at sea can be traced back to the U.S. and Soviet withdraws from this strategic location as a legacy of the Cold War. BBC journalist Will Ross explains, "The collapse of the federal government in Mogadishu followed the end of the Cold War, and led to the diminishment of the Somali naval force leading to overfishing by outside actors putting many locals out of work, and increasing pressure on the natural

resources.”³⁶ Farah Ahmed Omar, former Somali navy chief, told the BBC recently that he was first put in charge of the Somali navy in 1982. His mission in his words “is to provide a Somali government response to piracy.” Omar continued, “Today there is a big piracy problem and we are ashamed.”³⁷ Omar revealed that 500 new recruits had joined the navy as a result of radio advertisements offering volunteers a salary of \$60.00 a month. The Somali navy chief’s resolve represents an element of pride that should be incorporated in future partnerships and capacity building activities between the Somali



naval forces and U.S and international maritime forces. Omar went on to claim that, “Somalia used to be among the best navies in Africa, having 10 battalions covering the whole coast, and that the international community should give us the resources and support in terms of

equipment and one year to take care of this problem”³⁸ The Somali Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke said in Nairobi: "If 5 percent of the money being spent on the warships guarding the Gulf of Aden could be spent on building a security force that deals with the piracy, this would be much more effective. The pirates have bases on the land

³⁶ Will Ross, BBC News, Nairobi, [Somali navy chief: Worlds worst job?](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8096137.stm), 16 June 2009. (Accessed on Dec 10, 2009).

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

and the best way to deal with them is to deny them a safe haven there.”³⁹ Both the Soviet Union and the U.S. supported the Somali government with equipment and training between 1960 and the end of the Cold War. Somalia was used as a staging base by both super powers, when this financial and material support diminished, so did the government’s ability to control the clans and the country.

Although the Somali Prime Minister and the navy chief have opened the door to support from outside governments; there is little doubt that foreigners are welcome in Somalia. BBC correspondent Will Ross observed that, “the Prime Minister appeared to be ignoring the fact that Somali government troops, let alone U.S. troops are far from welcome at the pirate’s bases, such as Harardhere, or the notorious lair, Eyl, in Puntland.”⁴⁰ Somali analyst Rashid Abdi of the International Crisis Group, paints a picture of corruption if funding and support are provided without oversight. “Previous efforts at security sector reform,” Abdi observes, “have seen money disappear into a black hole as there was no accountability.”⁴¹ It appears that both Somali officials and the U.S. foreign policy community recognize the threat of piracy, however, the Cold War model of handing money over to the Somalis, or their trainers, no longer works.

Both the Somali navy chief and the Prime Minister suggest the outside world should grant resources in order to eradicate the problem. Perhaps a better investment of

³⁹ Will Ross, BBC News, Nairobi, [Somali navy chief: Worlds worst job?](#), 16 June 2009. The Ross article provides a report card for previous capacity building efforts that lacked direct oversight citing cases where newly trained Somali Coastguardsman in Puntland ended up working as pirates themselves. (accessed on Dec 10, 2009).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Will Ross, BBC News, Nairobi, [Somali navy chief: Worlds worst job?](#), 16 June 2009.

resources would be in combining the efforts of fledging Somali maritime forces with professional U.S. forces synthesizing capacities for the long term. The “1000 ship navy” that Chairman Mullen has described could include indigenous partners in trouble spots such as the Gulf of Aden alongside the large and powerful navies.

In the case of Somalia’s maritime security problem, any proposal for a comprehensive partnership should include a detailed portfolio of support, including organizing, training and equipping, along with infrastructure and maintenance facilities located along the Somali coastline. The most important requirement in this proposal is a U.S. leadership commitment to a small but effective constabulary training force in the region, perhaps as an extension of CJTF-HOA in neighboring Djibouti under an Africa Partnership Station East construct. The construct could add the existing east Africa standby force that has been exercised on land. Only a concerted, comprehensive, and supervised maritime training and education program such as a ‘Horn of Africa Maritime Academy’ where African Marines, Sailors, and Coast Guardsman are trained will be effective in rebuilding sufficient Somali naval capability in contending with piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Puntland, a northern semi-autonomous state in Somalia, appears to be home to the most active and capable pirate networks. Puntland authorities have responded to the piracy by initiating reintegration programs, and some policing activities, but it is difficult to claim that these local efforts are working. Congressional researcher Lauren Ploch, describes Puntland’s efforts to suppress piracy,

In April 2009, Puntland security forces began to launch raids on pirate bases, and the region’s courts have tried and convicted suspected pirates. Local authorities have initiated *wa’yigelin*, a “sensitization campaign” (social reintegration) and

have offered general amnesty to those that renounce piracy. Puntland's regional authorities have developed a basic coast guard, but accounts suggest that the equipment and capabilities of this small force remain very limited.⁴²

The Puntland authorities have been criticized for not reigning in the pirates; there have been allegations of apathy and corruption. Puntland's President, however, responded viscerally to an article written by an Australian journalist regarding corruption,

The Puntland government neither directed nor condoned acts of piracy in Somali waters, the pirates are not members of any distinctive clan nor are they directed by any clan elder. They are adventurers from all the Somali regions, attracted by the millions, quickly paid by the owners of the hijacked ships. The Government has opposed ransom payments which only encourage more piracy. Puntland succeeded in liberating three ships, and arresting 140 pirates on land and at sea. Our Government uses funds received from the different foreign companies for the infrastructure, social development, and security in the region. Its struggles to overcome many problems like poverty, underdevelopment and lately piracy that threatens the trade our biggest source of revenue. The Government welcomes all assistance in securing the waters and land of Puntland. There are not enough navy ships to guard the long coast of Puntland and Somalia. The best defense against the pirates would be a strong police to apprehend the criminals before they venture to sea and manage to grab ships.⁴³

The Puntland President's reaction identifies differences in opinion as to the true



conditions in Puntland, but what is clear is the statement of receptivity to outside assistance.

Clearly, there is a political element relating to piracy in Somalia; this will require a multidisciplinary U.S. political-military team under a Phase Zero Stability Operational approach, to eradicate piracy in the Horn

⁴²Ploch, Lauren. *Piracy Off the Horn of Africa*. CRS report for Congress, R40528. [Washington, DC]: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2009.7.

⁴³ Bossaso, Puntland, State of Puntland Web Site. *Current News Section*.
http://www.puntlandgovt.com/en/currentissues/information/current_issues_more.php?id=878

of Africa.

From Puntland's pirate dens in the northeast, Somaliland, located to the west of Puntland, shares a border with the Republic of Djibouti, and is home to the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTFHOA).⁴⁴ Somaliland, another potential counter piracy partner, operates functioning ministries and is relatively stable in terms of commerce and public safety. The Somaliland government has voiced a desire to return to its autonomous state status since the fall of Somalia's President Said Barre regime in 1991, however the U.S. and much of the international community has not recognized this return to sovereignty following the central government collapse. There is a direct correlation between good governance and a counter-piracy strategy. Somaliland, working with limited remittances, and foreign aid has been able to show progress in this area. Somaliland has shown it has been making progress in the security sector and economically stemming from its livestock export sector.⁴⁵ In order to build a maritime capacity capable of contending with piracy in the Horn of Africa, the U.S. will need to readdress foreign aid to these northern Somali states. In building a plan to eradicate piracy in the Horn of Africa, a regional capacity building approach should be taken with the authorities in Puntland and Somaliland above and beyond the diplomatic support

⁴⁴ CJTF-HOA, established in 2002 in Djibouti, Africa, employs an indirect approach to counter extremism. Through a strategy of cooperative conflict prevention, the task force builds security capacity, promotes regional cooperation, and protects coalition interests.

⁴⁵ Somaliland Government Website, <http://somalilandgov.com/> According to the Somaliland news sources the largest number of livestock exported from Berbera Port was recently recorded. Somaliland port in Berbera handled more than quarter of a million heads of livestock, which were exported to Saudi Arabia and the gulf countries in the last few days for the upcoming Eid and Haj celebration. The livestock went through health screening process in the newly built livestock quarantine and processing facilities in Berbera, which provided export health certificates. This will be the first time that Somaliland could export livestock to Saudi Arabia since the Saudi government lifted the embargo of live livestock from Somaliland.

given to Somali government in Nairobi, Kenya. A regional diplomatic construct using economic, security, and infrastructure reconstruction lines of operations would be effective, similar to current U.S. partnerships with the Republic of Djibouti. Berbera, Somaliland, or Bossaso, Puntland are ideal port cities along the Gulf of Aden for building combined coastal patrol force bases in the short term, the establishment of another U.S. led Combined Joint Task Force in the midterm, or even the Africa Command Headquarters in the long-term. In building an eradication plan for piracy in the Horn of Africa, a long lasting solution to problem is required. A solution communicated through continuous diplomatic and military presence, security sector investment, leading to a mutually beneficial maritime partnership.

These northern Somali states are well positioned geographically to expand their economies. There are literally thousands of ships that transit through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden sea-lane every day. These commercial vessels travel directly in front of the coasts of these two northern states in Somalia, all of these ships require maintenance, fuel, and provisions, both Somaliland and Puntland could offer commercial maritime port services giving the local economy a boost. An example of socioeconomic advancement through port operations is Djibouti City, Republic of Djibouti. The Port of Djibouti is the single largest employer in the country, followed by the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa at Camp Lemonier next to Ambouli International Airport. Containerized cargo travels through Djibouti to inland cities such as Addis Abba, Ethiopia. Roy Love, a Chatham House journalist describes the potential for cooperation between the U.S and the two northern states in Somalia, “Somaliland is generally noted for its cooperation and political stability, and it is an important trade route and has potential as a regional role

model.”⁴⁶ Love continues, “Puntland is associated with the location of bases for piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean not arising from the general political situation but linked to what might be termed the economic drivers of diminishing livelihoods of seaboard communities, international fishing rights and licenses.”⁴⁷ In the northern Somali states, economic viability, infrastructure, and the availability of a viable workforce, all contribute to a greater understanding of the situation in which piracy has erupted. A counter-piracy plan is best addressed with a sustained and secure economic strategy.

Djibouti, Somaliland, Puntland, Somalia, Yemen, and the Seychelles all benefit economically through the use of the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean sea space, and would benefit by building additional security capacity in their maritime domains above and beyond infrastructure investments. The process might begin by simply offering assistance to national trade programs, such as marine resource management among other economically related initiatives such as the burgeoning livestock export sector. By offering to improve the economic capacity of the region, a willingness to engage in maritime domain security improvements may follow. In essence, the trust factor is of central importance when initiating capacity-building activities, thus before the U.S. works toward a piracy eradication goal, deference should be given to the human conditions in the region. For example, assistance aimed to improve the health and welfare of the local population, along with improvements in the economy, serve to shape

⁴⁶ Roy Love, *Economic Drivers of Conflict and Cooperation in the Horn of Africa*, Chatham House Briefing Paper, London England, December 2009.6.
<http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/africa/papers/view/-/id/816/>

⁴⁷ Ibid.

positive perceptions regarding U.S. intentions. These strategic deeds and acts serve to communicate a positive message in build partnerships which harmonize other operational activities.

Livestock exportation is the leading economic driver in northern Somalia followed by commercial fishing; however the manner in which the products are traded could be modernized. Currently live animals are sent by sea to markets in the Middle East. In the future, frozen meat and fish products transported to market via frozen air and sea shipments to Asia, Europe and the greater Middle East may become profitable. The Soviet Union built strategic bomber airfields in the region during the Cold War, these airfields could be refurbished, and air trade may be a way for the Somalis to compete by getting their quality products to the market place quickly. Counter-piracy may not only be fought at sea, it may be fought with business opportunities on land as well. A frozen processing plant for these foodstuffs would employ hundreds of Somali's, and provide the government the means to sustain a coast guard force capable of securing its coastal economic exclusion zones. Somaliland and Puntland in northern Somalia share a coast line along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, and a common land border. Due to its location, Puntland would benefit by following Somaliland's successful government and business model regarding livestock exportation to the Middle East. Truly, development is a central cure for the piracy manifestation.

Grievances are often expressed through radical ideologies, or crimes like piracy, but survival trumps all others in the Horn of Africa. There are many sociological reasons and justifications why pirates, and those that support them have chosen the life they lead. In developing an effective concept to counter the trend toward extremism and criminality,

one must remember that these individuals have left their economic and societal frameworks. The disaffected can indeed be brought back into this framework, by even stronger counter attractions such as better employment opportunities, family pressure, and religious persuasion.

There are many contributing social elements to the operating environment in Africa including wars, famine, and disease. These elements have changed the demographics of entire countries such as Somalia. AFRICOM's *Posture Statement* explains the shift,

Rapid population growth and a "youth bulge" exceed most governments' ability to provide basic services and the capacity of their growing economies to provide jobs. This pool of undereducated and unemployed youth presents a potential source of social and political instability.⁴⁸

An effective piracy eradication strategy should incorporate the youthful aspects of the problem by repairing or even recreating social fixtures, alongside economic opportunities as friendly centers of gravity drawing youths back into stable self policing social frameworks. The pirates of Somalia's coastal communities clearly suffer from disaffection, lack of opportunity, and general wellbeing. While it is difficult to calculate what would motivate a former fisherman to cast a grappling hook onto the stern of 600 foot merchant vessel traveling at 10-15 knots at night in a desperate attempt to make a living, it is clear that this risk taking describes desperate human behavior. Some Somali fishermen have clearly moved from protecting marine resource rights against exploitation by large production companies, to a perilous pirate existence, threatening international

⁴⁸ Ward, William E. *Statement of General ..., United States Africa Command, Before the ... Armed Services Committee*. Stuttgart: U.S. Africa Command, 2008. <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/March/Ward%2003-17-09.pdf>

maritime commerce. This dangerous transition has culminated with exchanges of gun fire, and a general increase of the level of violence in the region.

Randy Borum, the Director of Psychology of Terrorism Initiative, University of Florida, concludes that “violence is caused by a complex interaction of biological, social/contextual, cognitive, and emotional factors that occur over time – some causes more prominent than others for certain individuals and for certain types of violent aggression.”⁴⁹ Borum continued his observation stating that, “most terrorist violence can be usefully viewed as intentional, chosen as a strategy of action, purposeful (goal-directed) and intended to achieve some valued outcome for the actor, not the product of innate, instinctual drives, nor is it the inevitable consequence of predetermining psychological and social factors.”⁵⁰

Although the pirates of Somalia may differ in their cause, and mindset, they share a purposeful character, doing things for reasons good to them at the time. Said differently, they are rational thinkers not suffering from mental illness, or predetermined hatred. Terrorists, revolutionaries, guerrilla fighters, gang members, and Somali pirates all share one thing; they have left one society to join another. New operational concepts, such as a comprehensive Phase Zero Stability Operation incorporated into to a piracy eradication plan, need to be informed by how and why the social equilibriums become out of balance, in order to plan a reversal of these social trends. Some pirates make their criminal decisions based on passion and ideology, others for profit and greed, even more

⁴⁹ Randy, Borum, Director, Psychology of Terrorism Initiative, *Psychology of Terrorism*, University of South Florida, 2004. 10.

⁵⁰ Ibid.11.

due to desperate living conditions, and many, simply by accident.

Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen describes this societal transition process in his book, *The Accidental Guerrilla*. Kilcullen explains how the disaffected are drawn into a life of violence through coercion, he concludes that in fact this trend is reversible. The decision to become a terrorist or pirate is certainly an individual choice; however the environment in which pirates or terrorist live contributes to that decision. Those that recruit and coerce youths into a life of crime, hatred, or radical ideology thrive in impoverished and disaffected settings, altering the environment is the only way to ensure the complete eradication of the problem. The fact that piracy is occurring in close proximity to Yemen, the Sudan, and Mogadishu where humanitarian crisis are prevalent, adds to the complexity and interconnectedness of the problem. A comprehensive plan for the eradication of piracy in Somalia must include lines of operation aimed at improving the living conditions of average Somali as an aspect of the comprehensive campaign. These social dynamics color the environment, and relate to the desperation manifest as piracy.

The pirates in Somalia demonstrate a need for wealth, social acceptance, and are resentful that they have unfairly been denied their livelihood. These three psychological elements can be targeted in order to reign in the pirates, while preventing others from considering it. Combining economic capacity building programs against these negative psychological elements addresses the causal effects, and alters the environment, resulting in a return to responsible behavior. The Somali men and youths performing these illegal acts seem willing to operate aggressively at sea under austere conditions, perhaps supervised employment relating to maritime law enforcement, port operations, military

and police service, or infrastructure construction, would provide meaningful alternatives to piracy. Young men actively serving their community and country earning a fair wage are far less likely to fall victim to the temptation of piracy, further, a counter-piracy strategy centered on employment for young men serving in maritime and national police roles contributes to public order and safety.

A comprehensive plan to rid the Gulf of Aden of piracy, including securing access to the global commons for the long term, must include robust disincentives in the form of maritime interdiction at sea, combined with incentives, such as the development of a small but capable coastal patrol force, infrastructure improvements, labor related jobs, and police forces creating a safe environment for the population. Cooperative security relationships with the people that live in littoral choke points such Somalia would be indispensable in the future, and more cost effective than navies serving on station indefinitely. Transforming Somali pirates back to commercial fisherman or serving within an organized maritime patrol force is an achievable goal that could meet U.S. long term strategic objectives. In order to eradicate piracy in the Horn of Africa, a persistent presence involving equal measures and simultaneous actions related to diplomacy, defense, and development is required. The pirates themselves are only one aspect of the problem; moreover they could be considered a symptom of the problem. General Ward of AFRICOM earlier in the paper mentioned outside influences have exploited marine resources in coastal Africa knowing that local authorities have limited capacity to respond, and that when local citizens are trained and oppose outsiders, they are deemed pirates and sea bandits. This element of complexity may seem to cloud the issue, in fact it strengthens the argument that current U.S. policy, methods, and approaches should

change from treating symptoms to building partnership capacity solutions capable of piracy eradication.

The U.S.-led Combined Maritime Force supported by twenty different countries, operating under a number of U.N. resolutions has only slightly repressed piracy in the Gulf of Aden.⁵¹ Therefore, a whole of government operational concept involving a wide range of *security, engagement, relief and reconstruction* capabilities, is essential to transform conditions in northern Somalia tapping into potential economic opportunities such as commercial fishing, livestock export and port operations, while simultaneously building a Somali maritime security infrastructure.⁵² Combining capabilities of the U.S. government into teams tackling difficult national security problems, has for many years in American history served as a model for dealing with insurgencies and small wars. The next chapter examines some historical situations which required a comprehensive approach employing a wide range of security, engagement, relief and reconstruction capabilities as part of a counterinsurgency strategy. These combined models could be employed in a Phase Zero Stability Operation within a counter-piracy strategy as well.

⁵¹ United Nations Security Council Resolutions to facilitate international response to piracy, UNSCR 1816,1836,1846,1851.2008. <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>

⁵² Department of Defense. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0*. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2009.p14. The future Joint Force Commander will be involved in four general activities. They will involve security, engagement, relief, and reconstruction and combat operations. Washington, D.C.: USGPO.

CHAPTER THREE – PIRACY: JUST ANOTHER AMERICAN SMALL WAR EXPERIENCE

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy established Army Special Forces, and the United States Aid in Development (USAID) to address the growing threat of communist subversion and insurgency abroad. These two new entities, one military, one civilian, would join forces to promote U.S. interests. He summarized the reasoning and logic in a message to graduating midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy, telling them that they would need certain new skills in the coming years:

You must know something about strategy and tactics and logistics, but also economics and politics and diplomacy and history. You must know everything you can about military power, and you must also understand the limits of military power. You must understand that few of the problems of our time have been solved by military power alone.⁵³

On December 7, 2005, President Bush signed the National Security Directive 44, delegating to the Secretary of State the authority to lead U.S. government efforts in reconstruction and stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this led to the formation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (SCR/S). Over the past nine years, Department of Defense and the Department of State personnel have been actively engaged in a combination of counterinsurgency and stability operations both learned and refined. If these skills can be employed in earnest during periods of

⁵³ President John F. Kennedy, Graduation speech to Midshipmen on 7 June 1961, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. Audio on demand available on the JFK library website: <http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfk/modules/diary/default.aspx?y=1963&m=8&d=1>

engagement as a means of shaping, deterring, and preventing conflict to create new strategic partnerships, they will serve as a preventative means to minimize the likelihood of U.S. or coalition forces becoming involved in combat operations.

Terrorist, traffickers, and pirates alike have one thing in common, their setting enables their activity. A comprehensive plan to eradicate piracy in Somalia must alter the environment on land, along with pursuing the perpetrators at sea. Further, the contemporary challenge of piracy can be addressed using concepts that relate to fighting small wars and insurgencies. Cross-cultural and language communication ability is a multiplying skill in this setting. This central skill set that relates closest to success or failure drawn through many small wars among people, tribes, and clans, are the individual's ability to negotiate, understand, and exploit the human and cultural terrain. Interpersonal and cultural skills serve as a social catalyst in a small war environment; the ability to communicate cross-culturally is necessary to become proficient at counterinsurgency, one must also study the tactics and analyze the context of the fighting in better understanding the roots of the grievances, aspirations of the government, or passions of the guerilla fighters.⁵⁴ The mixing bowls of converging motivations, congruent and incongruent ideals, culture senses, historical contexts, and physical environment, has been called the "combat milieu" of small wars.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Melshen, Paul Dr., *Various lectures and conversations during JAWS 2010*. Joint Forces Staff College, National Defense University, Norfolk, Virginia, USA 2009/10. For more information on counterinsurgency operations, the Low Intensity Conflict Elective with Dr. Melshan is recommended. The small war campaign design for the eradication of piracy in the Horn of Africa was influenced by Dr. Melshan's articles and lectures. An example of this is in the application of the British method of 'brigading' allied forces inside indigenous force structures in a small war setting.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

Piracy off the coast of Somalia can be related to small wars of the past where asymmetric counterinsurgency techniques were successfully implemented alongside humanitarian and development efforts. Operating unconventionally with asymmetric tactics and methods inside the combat milieu is not a new American lexicon; the United States military has conducted small war operations since the earliest days of the American Revolutionary War.

The Vietnam War provides numerous examples of successful asymmetrical fighting; however, there were many different ideas of how to fight the Vietcong insurgents in the south of the country. Some advocated a direct approach attacking fielded forces, which proved to be illusive, others viewed the logistical lines as vulnerable, and still others viewed a population based war as the best approach. These disparate ideas and approaches occurred due to a lack of understanding, and general agreement of the nature of the insurgency itself. This is the first historic lesson applied in planning against the contemporary piracy problem in the Horn of Africa. There must be complete agreement as to the nature of the struggle, consensus regarding the nature of the operating environment, and a holistic belief in the approach to eradicate the problem. This belief should be understood among U.S. participants and more importantly endorsed by the host country government.

The population-based program known as pacification was directed at winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people, and was one of the most effective methods of rooting out the Vietcong insurgents in the village hamlets. The pacification program brought the skills of the interagency alongside military efforts in the agrarian Vietnamese societies through development projects and humanitarian aid, which served as a

partnership building catalysts. The Americans earned the trust of the villagers through these programs along with training and operating next to Vietnamese popular forces. These partner relationships eventually cut off the enemy from foodstuffs and the support from the villages. The Vietcong, like the pirates of Somalia, challenged the local government's authority, making use of impoverished villagers under their hard handed coercion. Pacification in Vietnam was an attempt to sever the relationship between the villagers, and the insurgents, thus a similar approach between the coastal villagers in Somalia and the pirates would be a general campaign design theme.

Two of the more effective pacification programs in Vietnam involved humanitarian aid, agricultural and veterinarian assistance, alongside military training, partnerships, and reintegration of combatants. They were Civil Operations Revolutionary (later changed to Rural) Development (CORDS), and the Combined Action Programs (CAP). CORDS merged civilian aid teams from USAID with military groups, to deliver assistance and foster stability in rural areas. Organizational structures such as CORDS promoted unity of effort among the interagency, and eventually between the military and the interagency, attacking the strategy of the enemy. Because there were then (and now) many cultural and philosophical differences between the Department of Defense and the State Department, programs in Vietnam required strict cooperation and unity of effort between all U.S. government departments and agencies. CORDS did not simply fall together in crisis; it required firm strategic leadership from the President of the United States, and strong leadership in the field.

During the month of March 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson convened a meeting on Guam with Robert Komer, head of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO), regarding

the interagency aspect of the pacification effort in Vietnam, as it was not performing to the President's satisfaction. The deliberations of this meeting resulted in the National Security Action Memorandum 362, establishing the Department of State responsible for unifying the interagency in the pacification effort in Vietnam manifest in the formation of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support under the single manager, Komer. Komer was promoted to Ambassador, and worked directly for General William Westmoreland Commander U.S. Military Advisor Command Viet Nam (COMUSMACV).

CORDS was a success story as it formalized disparate interagency organizations under a single leader, Ambassador Komer, who then rolled the unified interagency effort under the military through General Westmorland. Prior to this consolidation, the interagency effort in Vietnam was a disorganized grouping of Washington D.C. based organizations with little unity of effort and efficiency.⁵⁶ This innovative structure provided the pacification effort nearly unfettered access to the Department of Defense vast human, financial and organizational resources in implementing pacification at the provincial, district, hamlet, and village level.⁵⁷

The historic lesson provided by the formation of CORDS in Vietnam, is in how best to organize, align, lead, enable and empower the interagency through the resources available in the military, and that such organizations should be established early in the

⁵⁶ National Archives and Records Admin., RG 273, National Security Action (NSAM), NSAM 362. Confidential. Project on National Security Reform, <http://www.pnsr.org/web/page/652/sectionid/579/pagelevel/3/parentid/590/interior.asp><http://www.pnsr.org/web/page/652/sectionid/579/pagelevel/3/parentid/590/interior.asp>

⁵⁷ Ibid.

planning process, rather than in an improvised fashion during conflict. The requirement for presidential direction came to the fore during a period of intense dissension in the U.S. due to differences of opinion between the Department of Defense, Department of State, aid, and intelligence agencies over a Vietnam strategy. President Johnson clearly articulated the need for cooperation under CORDS in the 1967 National Security Action Memorandum: “This new organization arrangement represents an unprecedented melding of civil and military responsibilities to meet the overriding requirements of Vietnam. Therefore, I count on all concerned in Washington and in Viet Nam to pull together in the national interest to make this arrangement work.”⁵⁸ Although the departments and agencies differed in ideas, attitudes, and approaches, the historical facts outline more similarities between soldiers and aid workers, than differences. In Vietnam, members of USAID served in villages and hamlets alongside soldiers and Marines with little leave and liberty. Aid workers worked tirelessly in the villages some even captured by enemy forces, held as POWs for years, alongside military members in the infamous Hanoi Hilton.⁵⁹ Since Komer and CORDS in Vietnam, there have been few instances where a single manager has been appointed in theater to serve as the Joint Force interagency focal point where numerous elements of U.S. government influence and capability come together. In the case of a Horn of Africa counter-piracy strategy, elements of diplomacy, agriculture, justice, defense, agriculture and fisheries must be integrated into a comprehensive combined plan.

⁵⁸ National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, National Security Action (NSAM), NSAM 362. Confidential.

⁵⁹ Marc Leepson, *The Heart and Mind of USAID's Vietnam Mission*, American Foreign Service Association, Feb 9, 2010.3.

CORDS was an example of a theater level work force structure which increased the efficiency of the interagency at the operational level. The Combined Action Platoons (CAP) conducted preventative engagements at the tactical level in Vietnam. Although CAP and CORDS were not affiliated directly, the methods involved were similar in concept, and had far wider influence than the level in which they were conducted. CAP's, also known as Civic Action Programs, blended medical assistance, veterinarian, and agricultural outreach initiatives, alongside the training of local indigenous Popular Forces (RFPF), to oppose the Vietcong insurgents at the tactical level. These approaches were not conducted under the guise of altruism similar to the Peace Corps, the relationships built between Marines, auxiliary forces, and local villagers were a part of a greater operational and strategic framework. Although not termed 'building partner capacity' in Vietnam, the contemporary parity and nuance regarding relationship building as a strategy is certainly identifiable from past through present. U.S. Marines developed close personal bonds with members of villages gaining the trust of the population which came naturally under Marine culture. Whether this came naturally, or as a matter of personal survival, the Marines became part of the village landscape. The pastoral, veterinarian, and medical community support extended to the villagers served as a catalyst in building relationships which enabled CAP Marines to sever villager ties to insurgents. The Marines called them "county fairs" and "pill patrols", as villagers would travel long distances to receive assistance from the unit's corpsman and aid workers. The melding of humanitarian and economic aid with security and relationship building in the CAP program aids in modeling the counter-piracy strategy in the Horn of Africa.

The origin of the Combined Action Platoons is based on challenges faced by LtCol

William W. Taylor, an infantry commander in Phu Bai, Vietnam 1967. Taylor's unit was overextended geographically and was unable to control Vietcong activity in his tactical area of responsibility. On the recommendation from his executive officer, who spoke Vietnamese, and had studied the British model of "brigading" (serving side by side with local forces thus contriving a larger force), LtCol Taylor brought forth an innovative proposal involving the integration of Marine Platoons into local Vietnamese militias delivering it up the CINCPAC chain of command. The American and Vietnamese commanders fully supported the idea and it was immediately implemented. Although criticized by many for its so-called "hearts and minds" methodology, Civic Action Programs, and Combined Action Platoons, quickly became a success story and expanded into new areas. The protection of the population and control of the village food and land were an essential friendly center of gravity in the counterinsurgency plan. The local Vietnamese Popular Forces were fighting for the survival of their families, villages, and supplies. Marines came to appreciate this viewpoint as adopted members of the village communities. These human interactions were extraordinarily important in building trust; trust in turn begets human intelligence, which harmonized other operational activities.

The Combined Action Platoons succeeded in denying the Vietcong safe havens and logistic support, while gaining critical information related to enemy locations and patrol patterns. The CAP program targeted a critical vulnerability (rice harvests) via an indirect approach (building relationships) and directly affected the enemy's ability to sustain the insurgency. The human terrain in Vietnam became as important as the military high ground in fighting the insurgent Vietcong, and the successes of the Vietnamese Companies and their embedded American Marine Platoons were legendary

in Marine Corps history. General William C. Westmoreland long after the war wrote in his memoirs that “The Combined Action Programs was one of the most ingenious innovations developed in South Viet Nam.”⁶⁰

The establishment of CORDS and the emergence of the CAP program in Vietnam are not so distant historical examples of how the Department of Defense and the State Department organized and worked together successfully to address economic conditions that formed the breeding ground for the insurgency, and how human bonds between U.S. and indigenous forces are timeless tactical combat multipliers. Small wars and insurgency are not new phenomena to the U.S. military, many times in the 19th and 20th century the U.S. encountered this threat. General George Crook used small war tactics in the American West against Apache Tribes. Crook directed his officers to build close personal bonds with their Apache Scouts which multiplied Crook’s cavalry capability by infusing indigenous tracking, language, and culture ability alongside U.S. cavalry firepower, gunnery, and maneuver skills. This is an American example of building partner capacity in the 19th century, and is applicable today in building combined maritime strength with Somali’s in the Horn of Africa.

In the case of Vietnam, General Westmorland was contending with both a conventional and unconventional threat in the same theater of war, adding to the war’s complexity. The formation of CORDS in Vietnam was an organizational example of how five U.S. interagency partners unified under the single manager under the

⁶⁰ Westmoreland, William C., *A Soldier Reports*. Da Capo Press, (1989).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combined_Action_Program

pacification campaign in South Vietnam. CORDS successfully combined the expertise of the interagency with the security, transportation, and logistical strengths of the military, and further applied the greater capability against the Vietcong insurgency. The Combined Action Program took the same cross-cultural ideas down to the village hamlet level by interweaving U.S. Marine Platoons with Vietnamese popular force rifle companies. In both instances, the participants learned from another, and applied the cumulative synergistic strength toward the common goal of defending their villages from outsiders. These historical examples inform the Phase Zero Stability Operational approach relating to piracy prevention in the Horn of Africa. Chapter five describes this in practice.

Today, the U.S. is contending with insurgent small wars where interpersonal and cross-cultural capabilities are required at both operational and tactical levels. An example of this new concept is the multidisciplinary civilian military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) concept emerging out of Iraq, and ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The PRT's are composed of teams which include military service members, and civilians from Department of State, USAID, and technical experts from U.S. Department of Health, Agriculture, and Forestry.⁶¹ This program should be expanded and applied with other security capacity building efforts in limited access environments on the continent of Africa through U.S. Africa Command. At the operational level the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Iraq and Afghanistan are applying "clear,

⁶¹ International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan), and Stanley A. McChrystal. *Commander's Initial Assessment*. Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, 2009.16. http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 (Accessed May 1st 2010.)

hold, build” techniques, and by in large are meeting with success. The successful PRT organizational structures and techniques could be expanded across other Combatant Commands as a conflict prevention approach during Phase Zero Stability Operations.

The future global operating environment, with all its complexities, will clearly require the skills of the whole of government across the spectrum of conflict; however, currently the U.S. government does not operate in this fashion on a routine basis. This paper draws upon the lessons of history, such as the formation of CORDS and CAP in Vietnam, and the successes of the PRT teams in Central Command’s Area of Responsibility, into the contemporary challenge of piracy in the Horn of Africa. In creating winning strategies for complex problems abroad, there should be mechanisms that create CORDS, PRT, and CAP-like organizations prior to deployment. In building an effective counter-piracy strategy, the U.S. military, along with supporting interagency partners, need to combine and blend efforts and capabilities into a broad whole of government design capable of managing a spectrum of national security threats. Annex C. depicts the methods, approaches, and even lines of operation of several operational and national organizations, the capabilities are similar if not complimentary and could be incorporated into capacity building efforts in preventing conflict under theater campaigning.

In shaping a model for eradicating piracy in the Horn of Africa, the lessons of history show that when U.S. capabilities are operationalized by, with, and through the host country, the results are not just bilateral cooperation, or collaboration, but a new and even greater combined capability emerges. These twisted sinews of language, culture and customs, and knowledge of local geography, coupled to U.S. firepower, logistics, discipline and diplomacy, are the new counter-piracy operational design strategy. The

new Horn of Africa counter-piracy solution not only combines U.S. and Somali whole of government capabilities, but it is implemented during Phase Zero Stability peace-time operations in Somalia's limited access environment.

CHAPTER FOUR – A NEW LEXICON: “PHASE ZERO – STABILITY OPERATIONS”

Generally, in war, the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill, to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.⁶²

Phase Zero Stability Operations attempt to maintain a steady state condition where a peaceful existence between states persists, and routine diplomatic and military engagements take place, achieving U.S. national goals. Activities directed at shaping, dissuading, preventing, even forestalling armed conflict are the fundamental character of Phase Zero Stability Operations, and are in keeping with Sun Tzu's principles in the Art of War relating to out-witting adversaries. According to European Command, Phase Zero operations consist of proactive peacetime engagement activities that reassure allies and partners, promote stability, and mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict.⁶³ In Phase Zero, rule of law prevails and host nation authorities possess the capacity to provide both physical and economic security for its population. The significant differences in Phase Zero in benign environments and Phase Zero Stability Operations in Northern Somalia are the nature of the environment in which it is practiced, and the end state. Phase Zero in benign environments involves routine peace time military exercises in a diplomatic steady state construct. Phase Zero Stability Operations in Northern Somalia recognizes the environment is declining, and the situation is trending toward the

⁶² Sunzi, and Samuel B. Griffith. *The Art of War*. UNESCO collection of representative works. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

⁶³ The United States European Command, *Posture Statement*, 2006.

more aggressive Phase One (Deterrence) period. Phase Zero Stability Operations applies techniques and practices found in current counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as population security, infrastructure repair and enhancements, and humanitarian aid operations, as well as stabilization operations similar to Balkan peace operations involving diplomatic, economic, government and social improvements. Piracy in Somalia is a complex problem that will require contributions from the whole of the U.S. government; these contributions will be required in limited access environments where an increase in risk exists. This construct asserts that Phase Zero Stability Operations is not risk adverse, but it does attempt to influence the environment to return to steady state operations, however Somalia has not known a true phase zero period since the end of the Cold War in 1989.

The national security documents mentioned in chapter one clearly prefer conflict prevention as the desirable outcome to today's national security challenges; however, the world's ungoverned spaces, where direct and indirect attacks on U.S. interests are planned, pose the greatest risks. Terrorists and pirates prefer weak governments, lacking rule of law where they can obtain passive and active assistance from the population, while influencing disaffected youths. A dysfunctional social environment is part of the piracy business model. In framing a piracy prevention strategy, or a counter-piracy business model in the Horn of Africa, the U.S. military and the interagency will need to operate together through collaboration with local authorities and the population at large to return the society to an acceptable form. Phase Zero Stability Operations is a preventative model aimed at forestalling conflict and crime in part by mitigating the effects of civil strife in the effected environment. Piracy in the Horn of Africa is clearly a

manifestation of the situation on land in northern Somalia, and in order to eradicate this phenomenon, a comprehensive land based approach is required.

Traditional Phase Zero operations will continue – they are conducted for the most part in low-risk benign environments. Phase Zero Stability Operations however take place in less stable areas as mentioned and have additional risk associated to them. Piracy off the Somalia coastline and the weakly governed and ungoverned spaces where piracy thrives define the current operational environment and are most suited for the application of a Phase Zero Stability Operations prevention strategy. A collaborative operational concept, Phase Zero Stability Operations in the Horn of Africa, enables the robust skills of the U.S. Department of State diplomatic corps, through the powerful, security and logistics capability inherent to the Department of Defense, projected against contemporary challenges such as sea piracy. Essentially one Department provides secure operational space for the other to perform specific reconstruction and stability tasks and functions.

Piracy lives in limited access regions, inside the social milieu of the population. In order to alter the operating environment, the Department of Defense, Department of State, and local Somali authorities will need to act collaboratively in eradicating piracy by preventing it from forming. Establishing a common operational concept is the first step in building a Phase Zero Stability Operations design that incorporates the robust strengths of whole of government with host country capabilities. Both the Department of Defense and the Department of State have doctrine, mandates, and charters that describe counterinsurgency, as well as reconstruction and stabilization activities; however, little has been accomplished in developing operational concepts that create unity of effort to

address the roots causes of today's complex problems. It is in contested regions, where proactive counterinsurgency and stability operations combined reap the most benefit. Unlike conventional military operations, Phase Zero Stability Operations begin with training and education, infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief and recovery, rather than seizure, dominance, and other kinetic operations. In this operational design, Phase Zero Stability Operations succeeds in remaining at steady state operations (see Figure 1 Campaign Design page 57). This concept requires long-term engagements and a semi-permanent status of small but capable teams comprised of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Aid for International Development (USAID) personnel.

The Department of State and USAID have a long history of maintaining a constant U.S. presence overseas. Conversely, the Department of Defense prefers clear limited objectives, end states, and exit plans, due to its global commitments, potential for further tasking, and general aversion to national building. In Phase Zero Stability Operations, the U.S will need to engage in robust peacetime security cooperation and stability operations to achieve U.S. national security interests. This approach will require effective operational concepts involving persistent forward presence by with and through country teams and host country partners. Stability Operations should not be viewed as only applicable in a post conflict reconstruction phase, but also as preventative. Phase Zero Stability can serve as an antecedent to interventions, combat operations, and other crimes such as human trafficking, smuggling and piracy.

The piracy situation off the Horn of Africa illustrates a need for a Phase Zero Stability operation applied at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. When

surveying U.S. organizations capable of projecting this land and sea based counter-piracy plan, there is clearly a lack of unity of effort with regard to operationalizing the authorities and resources, needed. An illustration of the disparate and redundant efforts is recognizable within organizational strategies and a survey of key documents.

Within Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is building an expeditionary Civilian Response Corps (CRC) capable of, “surging into a degrading situation potentially avoiding crises requiring troop deployment.”⁶⁴ Indeed, there have been U.S. envoys visiting the regional authorities in Puntland and Somaliland where the pirates are most active, but there has been no meaningful engagement aimed at piracy prevention. Although there is an Ambassador for Somalia hosted in neighboring Nairobi, Kenya, as well as a functioning Department of State presence in nearby Djibouti, numerous geopolitical considerations, such as sovereignty and recognition of the northern Somali states, have stymied constructive U.S. Somali diplomacy, defense, and development progress.

The role of the diplomat is a key element of a whole of government strategy to alter the environment in which pirates and insurgents live.

The diplomat’s starting point is to craft a strategic narrative; that is, a compelling storyline that is the foundation of all actions taken in pursuit of the strategy...such a narrative will be short and culturally unassailable...it will explain the purpose of all government plans and programs, and will be used to

⁶⁴ Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, *Through the Complex Operations Prism, Vol.1, No1, December 12, 2009*.25. The Journal *PRISM*, a publication from the Center for Complex Operations (CCO), National Defense University (NDU), describes a strengthened regional role among Ambassadors in phase zero peacetime periods.

interpret events throughout a counterinsurgency...the narrative will appeal directly to the local population.⁶⁵

According to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), the role of the diplomat is to begin to build a new narrative, a counter-ideology even, which sees the U.S. as a positive partner in the stabilization context.

Experience shows that managing conflict, particularly internal conflict, is not a passing phenomenon. It has become a mainstream part of our foreign policy. Until now, the international community has undertaken stabilization and reconstruction operations in an ad hoc fashion, recreating the tools and relationships each time a crisis arises. S/CRS responding to new foreign policy and National Security Interests will deploy to failing and post-conflict states which pose one of the greatest national and international security challenges of our day, threatening vulnerable populations, their neighbors, our allies, and ourselves. Struggling states can provide breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, trafficking, and humanitarian catastrophes, and can destabilize an entire region.⁶⁶

The task of eradicating piracy in the Horn of Africa will require the S/CRS to surge the Civilian Relief Corps into the Horn of Africa as mentioned in the mission of the organization. Similar to the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05 *Stabilization Operations* states, “DOD has a lead role in stability operations activities, which include establishing civil security, and civil control, the restoration of essential services, repairing and protecting critical infrastructure, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.”⁶⁷ The

⁶⁵ Kurt Amed, *The Diplomat as Counterinsurgent*, Foreign Service Journal, September 2009.22.

⁶⁶ The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, S/CRS Website, *Mission Statement*. <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/>

⁶⁷ *Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05*, Washington, D.C.: USGPO published Sept 16, 2009.p.2. (accessed January 10, 2010). The publication of this document was a seminal shift in how the DoD will plan and execute Stabilization Operations. Three key excerpts:

(1) Conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments. The magnitude of stability operations missions may range from small scale, short-duration to large-scale, long-duration.

Department of Defense and S/CRS will need to combine these efforts in a cooperative manner in the Phase Zero Stability Operations construct.

Adding to the confusion, the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) portrays Ambassadors and their country teams as

permanent agents for the U.S. government’s diplomatic relationship with the host nation. Above all, by virtue of its routine political contacts with the host government and its familiarity with local conditions, the country team is uniquely placed to assess the partner nation’s ability and willingness to accept military engagement and, where those differ from the U.S. appraisal, to convince the host government to modify its views.⁶⁸

The Defense Department Instruction 3000.05, *Stabilization Operations* portrays multifaceted diplomatic, defense, and diplomacy activities across traditional boundaries, “envisioning these activities synergistically and to be adopted throughout all phases of conflict, and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments.”⁶⁹ The Department of Defense defines stability operations as,

an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.⁷⁰

The Phase Zero Stability Operations concept presents a new opportunity for U.S and

- (2) Support stability operations activities led by other Government departments or agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as “U.S. Government agencies”), foreign governments and security forces, international government organizations, or when otherwise directed.
- (3) Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such a time as it feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations. In such circumstances, the Department will operate within U.S. Government and, as appropriate, international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the deployment and utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities.

⁶⁸ The Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operation Version 3.0*, 15 January 2009. Washington, D.C.:USGPO.p.17.

⁶⁹ The Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05, *Stabilization Operations*, Sept 16, 2009. Washington, D.C.:USGPO.p.2

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Somali government partnership capacity, and counter ideological support to pirates and terrorists, through security cooperation, and civil action programs in limited access environments, such as Somaliland and Puntland. This progressive approach operationalizes all the preceding departmental references, deploying the cumulative abilities of the Civil Relief Corps and the Department of Defense, applying the concepts embodied in the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* in eradicating piracy in the Horn of Africa.

Planning small-scale government-to-government micro engagements, tactical military-to-military engagements, and humanitarian collaborations requires delicate diplomatic skills, and deference toward host countries perspectives. In many countries in Africa there is an aversion to outside control, due to human rights abuses during the colonial era. Therefore, techniques involving a wide portfolio of capacity building are more effective. The National Security Strategy states that “outsiders generally cannot impose solutions on parties that are not ready to embrace them, but outsiders can sometimes help create the conditions under which the parties themselves can take effective action.”⁷¹

The Department of State and Department of Defense increasingly describe similar methods, approaches, and operational concepts that envision teams reaching out to states that are moving into crisis. Under a preventative operational concept, a whole of government collaboration continues with persistent presence in troubled regions negating the need for robust and costly intervention. When comparing the Office for the

⁷¹Bush, George W., “*The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*”, Washington, D.C. USGPO, 2006, p.1.

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and Department of Defense operational concepts, it would appear that both departments recognize the strategic implications of failed states and resultant safe havens, and how assisting in stabilizing vulnerable regions would result in increased U.S. security. However, neither organization envisions continuous collaboration under steady state operations.

A winning strategy for the eradication of piracy in the Horn of Africa brings the full capacity of the U.S. government against the problem combining the enduring counter-insurgency principles, techniques, and methods, with 21st century diplomatically oriented stability operations. This approach is being developed through AFRICOM's operational arm, Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTFFHOA). General William Ward, Commanding General AFRICOM states that,

Development, diplomacy, and defense programs are integrally linked, and U.S. Africa Command is implementing the National Defense Strategy's vision of a new jointness by supporting and improving collaboration with other agencies and departments across our Government, as well as improving coordination with international, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations. We achieve the greatest effect for our nation when we coordinate and harmonize our collective efforts in support of our common objectives. Strengthening African security, both in individual nations and regionally, is necessary for its communities to flourish. I am convinced that building African security capability and capacity is the best path to assisting the people of Africa to achieve long-term stability and security.⁷²

The Phase Zero Stability Operational concept of preventing conflict and piracy with romantic ambitions and ideals in Africa, thrusts the whole of government into dangerous environments. Without quick reaction security support and an infrastructure mechanism, the counter piracy concept in the Horn of Africa would not be feasible. CJTF-HOA, a

⁷² Ward, William E. *Statement of General ..., United States Africa Command, Before the ... Armed Services Committee*. Stuttgart: U.S. Africa Command, 2008. <<http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/March/Ward%2003-17-09.pdf>>. (Accessed January 21, 2010).

Forward Operating Site in Djibouti Africa since 2002, is within the operational reach of the neighboring Somali states Somaliland and Puntland, and the pirate activity itself.

With AFRICOM's presence on the continent in the form of the Forward Operating Site at Camp Lemonnier Djibouti, and the diplomatic skills and support from the U.S. Embassy in Djibouti, the Phase Zero Stability Operations concept for eradicating piracy is attainable. With this support architecture in place, the operational concept represented in this paper is feasible with some additional risks.

Although, both the Department of Defense and the Department of State have built new organizations, visions, and concepts for contending with the future operating environment, the United States government remains ill-prepared to contend with complex 21st century problems, such as piracy in the Horn of Africa. Complex problems demand effective multifaceted operational concepts, transparent unity of effort, short and long-term views, and support infrastructure in order to be feasible. The U.S. must engage in peacetime expeditionary whole of government operations in limited access environments to support U.S. national security interests.

CHAPTER FIVE –PHASE ZERO STABILITY OPERATIONS, PIRACY PREVENTION THROUGH SOMALI PARTNERSHIPS

A counter-piracy strategy built around a Phase Zero Stability Operational model in Somalia, is informed by General Stanley McChrystal's operational assessment of Afghanistan. General McChrystal believes that although the operating environment will "be filled with complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity, there should be no ambiguity in how the U.S. government is organized, what concepts it employs, or the way it presents a unity of purpose"⁷³ As General McChrystal notes, complex problems need not become more daunting by a lack of strategic clarity or disparate U.S government efforts. Certainly the challenge presented by piracy in the Horn of Africa presents an element of complexity, however as the 5th century military theorist Sun Tzu reminds us to "Know your enemy and know yourself, find naught in fear for 100 battles. Know yourself but not your enemy, find level of loss and victory. Know thy enemy but not yourself, wallow in defeat every time."⁷⁴ The enemy in this situation is not pirates at sea, but the environment on land, which has contributed, shaped, and expanded the phenomenon of piracy in the Horn of Africa. The Phase Zero Stability Operational approach is aimed directly at altering the environment in which piracy manifests.

In knowing ourselves and relating the findings to contemporary foreign policy in east

⁷³ International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan), and Stanley A. McChrystal. *Commander's Initial Assessment*. Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, 2009. http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 (Accessed May1st 2010.)

⁷⁴ Sunzi, and Samuel B. Griffith. *The Art of War*. UNESCO collection of representative works. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Africa, an element of intellectual honesty must be present. Taking inventory of all the new U.S. and international organizations charged with providing a solution for piracy in the Horn of Africa shows that none of them require a long term presence or approach. While quick fix concepts and approaches promise immediate solutions, in truth, piracy in the Horn of Africa has taken 60 years to form, and can be traced through the colonial and neocolonial periods, the Cold War and the legacy thereafter, and previous U.S. operations in Somalia. Piracy is simply a reflection of life on the fringes of globalization ironically committed by some of the world's most impoverished people along one of the most lucrative sea lanes. (For a definition of sea piracy, see Annex B.) This understanding of long term conditions is intended to provide clarity and purpose to a vision that applies feasible concepts, sustained commitment, and physical presence. To paraphrase General McCrystal, the situation and environment in the Horn of Africa is certainly complex, but the U.S. government's approach should not be. The conceptual counter-piracy design combines the strength, dedication, and resolve resident in the U.S. whole of government, alongside the Somaliland and Puntland governmental ministries. Similar conflict prevention strategies can be found in existing Theater Security Cooperation (TCP) plans and security cooperation initiatives; however the physical risks in northern Somalia require enhanced security measures (See Annex C. for blended lines of operations that represent the whole of government approach.)

AFRICOM's posture statement to Congress illustrates how important cooperative security capacity is to the overall mission of the Command. The command's primary effort is, "building African security capacity so partners can prevent future conflict and


address current or emerging security and stability challenges.”⁷⁵ AFRICOM conducts Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) as a means for building partner capacity involving a wide variety of intersecting initiatives, the central condition from which the rest are built is security capacity. Coupled to Department of State and Aid in Development initiative, the solution for piracy prevention is formed.

The U.S. must engage in proactive peacetime expeditionary Phase Zero Stability Operations in limited access environments to support U.S. national security and economic interests. In order to eradicate piracy in the Horn of Africa a thorough understanding of the *Phase Zero Stability Continuum* is necessary among civil-military leadership in order for each organization to envision their specific contributions, while understanding the broader theater context. A counter-piracy model using a Phase Zero Stability Operations approach in northern Somalia involves changing the manner in which the U.S. military organizes and applies counterinsurgency techniques. The new approach requires combining proven counterinsurgency techniques alongside contemporary stabilization methods in limited access environments to forestall or prevent piracy from occurring in the first place.

⁷⁵ The United States Africa Command, *Posture Statement 2009*. Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs remain the cornerstone of our persistent, sustained engagement. These programs build lasting relationships, promote common interests, and enhance partner capabilities to provide safe and secure environments. Our mil-to-mil programs assist our allies and partners in maturing their capabilities to conduct operations with well-trained, disciplined forces that respect human rights and the rule of law. Our cooperative security efforts provide essential peacetime and contingency access and infrastructure, improve information sharing, and are vital to U.S. Africa Command’s support of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

The Phase Zero Stability Operations counter-piracy operational design consists of seven lines of operations with interrelated decisive points (DPs), events, or conditions linked together and aimed at a center of gravity (a Somali maritime capability), leading to the end state of the eradication of piracy in the Horn of Africa.⁷⁶ The progression of interrelated events (DPs) over time along a line operation is known as the ‘critical path.’ The critical path in the counter piracy scenario is aimed at the end state, piracy eradication. The counter-piracy operational design is intended to accommodate the fluid and unpredictable nature of the problem, combined with a learned approach capable of

Political and Military End State: The eradication of piracy in the Horn of Africa. Safe and secure passage through the Red Sea Gulf of Aden Sea Lane. Partnership capacity in the Region. Somalia capable of policing its waters of pirates and poachers.



⁷⁶ Similar design methodologies can be found in the science of Gantt charting commercial construction projects which complete milestones over parallel timelines, however this design is aimed at a friendly center of gravity, a Somali government maritime capability. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gantt_chart

improvisation and adaptation. The lines of operation are concurrent. These lines of operation, decisive points, and conditions serve to focus the whole of government effort by creating systematic progression with intermediary goals and a clear division of labor. The design also extends an element of operational art as each line of operation and the inherent decisive points interrelate to one another in a systemic manner, to alter the environment in which piracy grows.

The U.S. diplomatic line of operation is aimed at building a positive relationship between U.S., Somaliland and Puntland governmental authorities. Lt. Colonel Julian Paget, U.K. Army, emphasizes this element in his 1967 book, *Counter Insurgency Operations, Techniques of Guerilla Warfare*. Paget summarized British experiences in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus.

The political and military aim should be agreed by all concerned from the very start and should clearly state three points; firstly the purpose and scope of military operations; secondly. The short-term political and military aims governing the campaign, and finally, the long-term political aim which it is hoped to achieve when the military campaign is over.⁷⁷

Paget's call for a political-military plan is applicable in linking U.S. and Somali authorities to develop a plan for the eradication of Somalia's piracy problem.

Next, a Somali governance line of operation coupled to the U.S diplomatic line begins to establish responsibility and control at a ministry level. Events such as senior leader visitations, public pronouncements against piracy, and other unifying actions display solidarity within the U.S. and Somali piracy eradication policy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen articulated the need to communicate in this way,

⁷⁷ Paget, Julian. *Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerilla Warfare with Forewords by Virgil Ney and D.R. Lang*. New York: Walker, 1967.

“We must see our international partners and allies as indispensable actors and treat them accordingly, involving them in the planning and conduct of critical influence operations and campaigns.”⁷⁸

The next line of operation, strategic communication, depicts piracy as an impediment to social, economic, and security sector reform. The message is intended to isolate and even demonize the perpetrators. Positive communication can also enhance relationships, and move the process of social reconciliation along. Infrastructure improvement projects facilitated by the U.S are a visible and tangible means of communication, and provide immediate results in terms of employment alternatives to piracy. These projects can assist in generating trade and commerce, as well as a sense of pride and hope among the populace. Examples of infrastructure engineering projects are enhancements related to sea and air port facilities, all weather road networks, and sports facilities. These efforts can quickly enhance the viability of overland transport to landlocked countries such as Ethiopia, and have a direct impact on the national economy. Construction projects such as these provide ready labor jobs and an alternative to the desperate life of piracy.

The next line of operation relates to the general welfare of the population itself. Collaborative projects involving improvements in health, education, sports, and social development send a soft and meaningful message to the societies female, children and elderly population. These key societal enablers gain the most from this line of operation, and by supporting them, the passive support to pirates begins to erode. It has been demonstrated that nothing transcends language or cultural barriers better than

⁷⁸ Mullen, Michael, Joint Forces Quarterly, “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics”, 55(2009).p108.

humanitarian relief activities. Recent relief operations in Haiti in the wake of the devastating earthquake illustrate how displaced people can quickly become malnourished and sick becoming breeding grounds for dissention. Drought, famine, and poverty have been Somalia's steady seismic tremor inhibiting investment, aid and development for years. In Somalia today, 500,000 displaced refugees either have fled the country, or survive in refugee camps.⁷⁹ Humanitarian relief operations (HA) serve to preserve human life and are a way of communicating compassion to the general population. While it is ideally right and in keeping with our national core values to relay the U.S. message of compassion in this form, it is also good strategy as it drives a perception wedge between coalition forces and pirate recruiters. The aid messages presented are essential in gaining the trust of the people over the short term, and the local government over the long term. In the case of Somaliland and Puntland, educational exchanges among medical, veterinarian, engineering, and maritime educators serve the counter-piracy effort in directly aiding local economies. Practically speaking, aid in development is a form of asymmetric warfare, and can be applied in a whole of government piracy eradication strategy.

An example of Phase Zero activity is supporting immunization and inspection of livestock through veterinarian civic action programs (VETCAP). VETCAP, and similar medical support (MEDCAP), are two outreach approaches used by CORDS and CAP in Vietnam, and are an integral aspect of the new piracy prevention campaign design. These

⁷⁹Brett D. Schaefer, *Piracy: A Symptom of Somalia's Deeper Problems*, Heritage Foundation, www.heritage.org/Research/Africa/wm2398.cfm assessed Jan 2010.

activities are a means for shaping perceptions, and communicating positive intentions to the people in northern Somalia, and serve to sway the population away from supporting piracy or terrorism. MEDCAP, VETCAP, and sports events are proven trust primers, and are an integral aspect of the health and social development lines of operation in the Phase Zero Stability Operations design. These lines of operation are intended to improve the well being and livelihood of the people. These activities can be centralized through a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in populated areas, and projected out to remote locations.

In addressing the decline of marine resources in the coastal areas of northern Somalia due to over fishing, a “FISHCAP” activity is added to the economic line of operation. Marine resources have been over exploited in many locations throughout the world; international marine biologists use fish hatcheries, and establish marine sanctuaries as means to recover and repair lost resources. This line of operation is supported by education and infrastructure lines as it requires facilities to operate.

The security sector in northern Somalia is clearly in need of capacity building, and has the broadest emphasis in the campaign design. The optimal approach in this area is to initially combine the effort among and between Somali and U.S maritime forces in an educational setting such as a college or marine academy, and later at sea in practice against unlawful actors. This will ensure that universal naval, Marine and coast guard principles and practices are followed, and that the training, education, and equipment fielded is used for its intended purpose, once again displaying solidarity and visible resolve. U.S. Maritime forces are highly trained and equipped for missions; the summation of U.S. training, education and hardware complimented by the host nation

linguistic and cultural skills make for a highly effective combined U.S.- Somali team.

Somaliland has created a Maritime and Fisheries College in Berbera, Somaliland, perhaps CJTF-HOA could augment the staff with military and civilian education faculty members in order to enhance this capacity. In similar fashion, combined coast guard patrols along the contiguous Somali coastline would serve to improve interoperability and localize the policing effort against piracy and other illegal activities including piracy, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing. Somali culture places education second only in importance to Islamic beliefs and principles. Somalis' thirst for education, thus augmenting local educational initiatives with U.S. expertise, and equipment through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FMA) serves to advance many of the counter-piracy lines of operations. Security capacity building is central to stability at the urban, street, and coastal village level. The Marine Corps Small Wars Manual of 1940 emphasizes the host government's role in small wars, the manual points out the need for capable security forces to support the government's goals.

The United States forces seek to restore domestic tranquility as soon as possible and to return the normal functions of government to the country concerned. To accomplish this, the United States Government will usually insist upon the establishment of an efficient and well-trained armed native force, free from political influence and dictatorial control.⁸⁰

Assisting in the establishment of small, but capable, coast guard detachments along the Somaliland and Puntland coastlines would provide the state ministries of fishery a means to enforce local laws as well as providing employment opportunities to young men in coastal communities. CJTF-HOA has been supporting the expansion of the Republic of

⁸⁰ The United States Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual*. Publisher, Pavilion Press, 2005. Section I.p.12.

Djibouti's maritime capacity; the scope of this organizing, training, and equipping effort could expand into northern Somalia in keeping with AFRICOM and CJTF-HOA goals, "CJTF-HOA seeks to improve East Africa Maritime Security and Safety through the expansion of maritime domain awareness and implementation of an African Partnership Station East."⁸¹

The Phase Zero Stability operational design in the Horn of Africa employs Theater Security Cooperation as a piracy prevention line of operation in northern Somalia. Building local capacity endures longer than cash and material grants, a 'hands-on the wheel' 'side by side' approach is more effective in the long term. There is a growing consensus that inevitably a land based solution for the piracy problem will be required. James Kraska, of the U.S. Navy War College states that

"Effectively responding to the threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia will require attacking the root causes of piracy on the ground, by providing comprehensive support for operations, logistics, investigations, and prosecutions. This means outside maritime powers should begin the long-term task of provisioning regional states with numerous maritime patrol craft, training, modern communications systems, and a regional maritime security coordination center."⁸²

Piracy in the Horn of Africa is a growing problem that will not get better with time. The operational design of the Phase Zero Stability Operational concept consists of a broad portfolio of interrelated capacity building activities generally termed, lines of operations with interrelated points aimed at a single center of gravity and end state (piracy's eradication). When these activities are focused and centrally directed toward a

⁸¹ General William E. Ward, USA, Statement regarding United States Africa Command before the Senate Armed Service Committee, Stuttgart: U.S. Africa Command, on March 17, 2009. <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/March/Ward%2003-17-09.pdf>

⁸² James Kraska, Comparative Strategy, *Coalition Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea*, Vol.28 Number 3.2009.p.197.

center of gravity (Somali maritime capability) the mission is clear and concise and in time the Somali's become capable of policing their coastal zones in a five-ten-year timeframe. Efforts such as these serve to address piracy, and also provide the U.S. with an invaluable partnership in the maritime commons.

CONCLUSION

Piracy threatens the global commons and represents an example of a 21st century complex security problem for nations that depend on the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden passage, part of the global commons essential to modern commerce. Current efforts address symptoms, not the root causes of piracy off the Somali coast. Naval squadrons, while important and essential to securing the global commons, cannot be permanent and represent a one-dimensional hard power approach that ignores the conditions that create piracy in the first place.

A close examination of the north coast of Somalia reveals several important factors: a government entity is functioning in Somaliland and Puntland; an economy exists in fishing and livestock production. But economic conditions involving each resource have created the necessity for Somali's to turn to piracy. Some are criminals, but most are not. Therefore, the cause of piracy is within Somalia itself and must be addressed from within, rather than contested at sea between warships and fishing skiffs.

Addressing Somali piracy requires a small war approach involving engagement, capacity building, combined military actions, civic outreach, and education. There are historical precedents from Vietnam that offer an approach toward a solution. CORDS and CAP applied small-scale, whole of government efforts to address stability and build trust and capacity. Taking the historical small war principles and moving them into 21st century Somaliland and Puntland requires a new approach—the Phase Zero Stability Operations model employs and blends lines of operation including classic counterinsurgency operations, contemporary provincial reconstructions team approaches, and developing concepts from the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and

Stabilization. Annex C. displays the lines of operation in detail, their similarities, and how they might support one another. In preventative application, the civil and military capacity building lines of operation contribute toward the center of gravity, the establishment of a Somali maritime capability, and the end state of piracy's eradication, and perhaps even a beginning to the end of overall conditions in the country rite large.

Building partner capacity does not immediately begin with boats, guns, and coastal patrols. This effort is long term, and requires the establishment of trusting relationships between U.S. and Somali authorities, and more importantly between U.S. military personnel and the population. This is the rationale behind the health, societal, and education lines of operation as they prepare the environment for further investment, and serve to make the setting safe for more robust development efforts.

Contemporary national security imperatives require a new approach above and beyond hard power solutions. A new security environment requires new thinking; Phase Zero Stability Operations does this. As a way to reduce piracy in the Horn of Africa, building new maritime security partnerships off the coast of Somalia provides a wide range of littoral security options for the maritime community. In time, such a program reduces the large navy requirement, replacing it with a smaller local force.

The ability to transit goods through the maritime domain drives the economies of the world. It is in the vital interest of the United States and many other nations using the Gulf of Aden Red Sea sea-lane, that commercial vessels bringing goods through the global commons be granted open and innocent passage. In addition to the external international economic concerns, building maritime capacity along Somalia's coastline could also serve internally in the case of a natural or manmade disasters such as the

recent Indian Ocean Tsunami, or an environmental accident such as an oil tanker accident or terrorism.

Somali partners, properly equipped, trained and tempered with professional seamanship values, could begin to police and patrol their territory adding new layers of cooperative security in the Indian Ocean. Potential partners, such as the Somalis, may not possess material capacity or even seamanship skills, but they exude human will, pride, passion, and determination.

Piracy in the Horn of Africa in 2010 resembles the American small war experiences of the nineteen and twentieth century's, where a successful whole of government operational strategy emerged. An example of this was the interagency manpower consolidation effort that became CORDS created by President Johnson and directed under General Westmoreland and Ambassador Komer in Vietnam.⁸³ The development of CORDS in Vietnam illustrated how both the Department of State and Defense worked together to provide stability in the interior of Vietnam by building trust and cooperation with the Vietnamese. Another example from Vietnam illustrated the benefits of combined action between U.S. and native forces. The Marine Corps Combined Action Platoons sought to improve the security and well-being of the people the Marines lived and worked with.

⁸³ General Westmoreland and Ambassador Komer served in Southeast Asia during a period of rapid change in American foreign policy regarding the conduct of the war in Vietnam. One of the developments mentioned earlier in the paper was the interagency consolidation under Komer known as Civil Operations Revolutionary Development (CORDS). The whole of government policies, plans, and organizations today reflect these lessons, and the need to integrate the whole of the U.S. government in addressing complex problems overseas. Although there has been much growth and emphasis on the subject of whole of government, the practice of integrating the interagency within military structures, or vice versa is not commonplace thus the name 'revolutionary development' fit the thinking of the time.

Informed by these historic examples, a 21st century operational design is formed. The Phase Zero Stability Operational design uses a whole of government bilateral approach, involving U.S. and Somali maritime partnerships, in maintaining the safe access to the global maritime commons. The new preventative design is grounded in national ends and historic logic, further validated and polished by emerging doctrinal concepts. The new whole of government Phase Zero Stability Operational model is summarized as the application of a population based counterinsurgency approach, where military civic action programs and security capacity building are coupled to diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian assistance, applied in limited access environments.

The thesis project began by assessing and incorporating elements of the national security documents, relating piracy in the Horn of Africa to a dangerous form of asymmetric warfare, challenging U.S national interests requiring a more comprehensive approach. The argument established a tight nexus between the security of the U.S. and world economy, and open access to the maritime commons. It explored the operating environment of northern Somalia, highlighting the root causes of the criminal behavior at sea. It was found that the United States military can indeed contend with complex 21st century problems such as piracy off the Horn of Africa by building whole of government organizations similar to the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa in Djibouti, Africa. These forward deployed multidimensional commands provide persistent presence by engaging local governments and regional authorities in preventing conflict, and shaping the operational environment. In the long term, the U.S. must engage in peacetime expeditionary whole of government operations in limited access environments to support U.S. national security interests.

Annex A

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Area of Emphasis (SAE) JPME 2009

1. Building Partnership Capacity (BCP) is a preventative strategy to build the capacity of foreign partners to counter terrorism and promote regional stability. BCP includes Department of Defense (DOD) activities that support United States Government USG plans to train and equip, and operate with foreign militaries. These activities include providing humanitarian aid and leveraging international organizations and agreements in support of USG plans. BCP incorporates cross-cutting enablers such as culture understanding and awareness commensurate with social science research and analysis. It includes improving DOD communication mechanisms in domestic public affairs and influencing potential adversaries and non-state actors. Initial guidance is provided in Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) as contained in the Campaign Strategy planning construct and in the Guidance for Development (GDF). Additionally, the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes the need to work by, with, and through partners in achieving strategic success. JPME curricula should provide students with an understanding of the following:

- a. Indirect approaches to use of military power.
- b. Existing mechanisms for conduct of civilian military operations in Phase 0 operations.
- c. Contributions of other USG agencies in conduct of preventative strategies.
- d. Integration of security cooperation activities into campaign planning.
- e. Approaches to achieving cultural and sociological understanding of area of interest.
- f. Messaging to domestic and foreign partners through non-traditional media.

2. The concept of Countering Ideological Support to Terrorism (CIST) is integral to the USG and military strategy for the Global War on Terrorism (see NMSP-WOT). CIST erodes the appeal of extremist ideology, the enemy's strategic center of gravity. All military members should have an understanding of the principal framework of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) strategy to investigate the five elements of the Department of Defense's role in CIST (security, information, operations, humanitarian support, military-to-military contacts, and conduct of operations) and provide students with an awareness of the culture, customs, language, and philosophy of the enemy. This will allow future leaders to more effectively counter the extremist ideology driving terrorists and providing cover for them to operate within their society.

Security. The U.S. Armed Forces and indigenous forces provide security as a critical condition for countering extremist ideologies. A secure environment prevents a culture of violence from emerging that feeds the radicalization process. Security is

also a precondition for the humanitarian assistance and the counter ideology efforts of other government agencies, international organizations, non-government organizations, and the private sector.

Military Information Operations. The DOD can support efforts, consistent with its limited authorities, to facilitate introspection within Muslim society that rejects violent extremism. It can also support countering the radicalization message of extremist groups. These operations are coordinated with other department and agencies, principally the Department of State (DOS), where authorized and as a component of the DOD contribution to public diplomacy and strategic communications.

Humanitarian Assistance. The considerable capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces to alleviate suffering in times of hardship may provide opportunities to influence the way people perceive their situation and environment and how they perceive the USG. These efforts are often key to demonstrating goodwill abroad, reinforcing support for local governments, and mitigating problems that extremists exploit to gain support for their cause. These operations are coordinated with other departments and agencies, principally the DOS, and are conducted by the DOD pursuant to limited authorities and funds.

Military to Military Contacts. The military's extensive footprint and access to foreign military leaders influence the way they think about the GWOT and the actions they take to counter extremists and promote non-violence. The contacts include: International Military Education and Training; Offices of Military Cooperation and other train-and-equip efforts; foreign participation in regional centers; combined training activities and exercises; and senior military contacts.

Conduct of Operations. The way we conduct operations—choosing whether, when, where, and how—can affect ideological support for terrorism. Knowledge of the indigenous population's cultural and religious sensitivities and understanding how extremists portray the U.S. military's actions as attacking the indigenous population should inform the way the U.S. military operates. Where effects can be achieved by means other than direct U.S. military actions, the USG may seek to do so. Where U.S. military involvement is necessary, military planners should build efforts into the operation to reduce potential negative effects. At the same time we must, by our military actions, convey the sense that our power cannot be defeated and that, under the right circumstances, we are willing to use it. This will require careful balancing. The conduct of military operations should avoid undercutting the credibility and legitimacy of indigenous authorities opposed to the extremists while defeating the extremist's ability to spread their ideology.

JPME curricula should provide students with an understanding of the following:

- a. History and basic elements of militant Islamic ideology.
- b. Cultural features of the population the enemy seeks to radicalize.
- c. Social and political environments in which the ideology breeds.
- d. Effects of all instruments of national power on CIST.

ANNEX B

Piracy Defined

Article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy consists of the following:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act inciting of or intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).

ANNEX C

Phase Zero Stability Operations

There are many similar lines of operation used by the U.S. government, most of which are currently being used in post conflict settings. Phase Zero Stability Operations combines and blends COIN, PRT & S/CRS efforts providing the commander a wider range of options. All small wars are different therefore approaches should represent a broad portfolio of activities, and be implemented across the spectrum of operations during all phases of operations. Phase Zero Stability Operations are conducted in limited access environments such as northern Somalia. These operations are aimed at piracy prevention before costly interventions are required.

Counterinsurgency Lines of Operation (Source FM 5-34)

- Combat Operations/Civil Security Operations
- Host Nation Security Forces
- Essential Services
- Governance
- Economic Development
- Politics and Reconciliation

Provincial Reconstruction Teams Lines of Operation [Source: (ISAF PRT Website)]

- Governance
- Rule of Law (Justice, Police and Prisons)
- Security
- Economic and Social Development and Reconstruction
- Counter Narcotics
- Strategic Communications

Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Source: S/CRS Website)

- Strategic Communications
- Rule of Law/Police training/Legal/Justice/Corrections/Advising/Instruction
- Military Liaison/Local Field Engagements/Training Host Nation Maritime Forces
- Economic Recovery/Agriculture/Fisheries/Rural Development/Commerce/Taxes/Monetary Policy/Business and Financial Services
- Essential Services/Public Health/Public Infrastructure/Education and Labor
- Diplomacy and Governance
- Political Reporting/International Liaison/Civil Administration/Democracy and Governance, Protection/Human Rights/Rule of Law Policy/Civil Society/Media Development/Security Sector Reform

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