

CSI REPORT


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LARGER UNITS:
THEATER ARMY--ARMY GROUP--FIELD ARMY

Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

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1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of the Army and publish the results in a variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve Components.
2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist other USACGSC departments in integrating military history into their instruction.
3. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's executive agent for the development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military history instruction in the TRADOC service school system.

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PREFACE

The current U.S. Army doctrine for larger unit operations predates the AirLand Battle doctrine. As a result, the Combined Arms Center's Concept Development Directorate and the Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint and Combined Operations are updating the older doctrine with a new field manual on larger unit operations. The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) was tasked to support this project by preparing a historical perspective on the echelons of field army, army group, and theater army organization during wartime. The following study is the result of CSI's efforts.

The military philosopher J. F. C. Fuller noted that "looking back is the best way of looking forward." CSI's task in looking back was to uncover common principles of command and organization in order to highlight past mistakes and successes. To do this, the study begins with World War II and moves forward to the Vietnam Conflict. The study focuses on the organization, command relationships, functions, and logistics of operational theaters.

The study uncovered unity of command as a guiding principle for larger unit organization, and many other lessons are developed as well in the individual chapters. It is hoped that this study will help provide the historical foundation for the revised larger unit manuals.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The American Civil War marked the beginning of the U.S. force structure's evolution toward larger units. Prior to the Civil War there were few occasions when Americans mobilized sufficient forces to constitute even one small army. During the Civil War, millions of men were mobilized and for the first time the United States possessed massive forces dispersed in multiple theaters of operation. The mobilization of large units produced the need for corresponding command and control elements. It was during the Civil War that we saw the evolution in the U.S. force structure of a single commander directly controlling more than one Army, a case in point being when U. S. Grant was placed in charge of all field forces in 1864. From that time, Grant exercised command over all U.S. land forces, and the Civil War became the U.S. Army's first experience in command, control, and support of corps and Army-size unit operations.¹

During World War I the French General Joffre directly commanded eight armies prior to the Battle of the Marne in September 1914, and Von Moltke directly commanded seven German armies. The Russian leader, Grand Duke Nicholas, commanded six armies but organized his command structure differently. His armies were widely dispersed, and he established an organization with two groups, thus placing an additional level of command and control between the armies and the general headquarters.² Gradually the idea of the army group as an intermediary headquarters developed, and by the end of World War I, all major powers had experimented with the army group echelon of command and control. General Pershing and the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) never actually used the army group extensively, preferring instead that the army commanders deal directly with the general headquarters.³

Pershing went to Europe in 1917 with a direct appointment from the Secretary of War as the Commanding General, AEF. Inherent in this appointment was the establishment of a general headquarters (GHQ) for the prosecution of the war. This status, according to some interpretations, placed Pershing as a coequal of the Army Chief of Staff and he reported directly to the Secretary of War.⁴ Pershing's independent and somewhat arrogant

*Written by Lieutenant Colonel Gary L. Bounds

nature contributed to this somewhat unique relationship. Upon arrival in Europe, Pershing estimated the nature and scope of the U.S. involvement in the war and promptly requested twenty divisions plus supporting troops. As the war progressed, Pershing periodically increased his requests, and by the time of the German collapse, the United States had forty-three of its sixty-two infantry divisions in France.⁵

Throughout this buildup, Pershing constantly resisted pressure by Britain and France to integrate American troops piecemeal into Allied units. Pershing's adamant resistance set a precedent repeated during World War II and in later conflicts that American forces must fight under American commanders. (Pershing actually consented to U.S. forces being committed to combat with Allied units, but these forces were usually of battalion size.)⁶

Logistically, the AEF was organized in much the same way as an army in a modern theater of war. Pershing established a Line of Communication HQ which was later designated the Service of Supply (SOS). This headquarters had several sections deployed at various places in the communications zone to facilitate supply and evacuation operations. By the summer of 1918, the War Department proposed that the supply function be made a separate operation, thus freeing Pershing to pursue operations. This would have further expanded the War Department's role in the supply operation, but Pershing insisted it was his prerogative as theater commander to control the support operations of his theater. In addition, Pershing quickly designated his chief of staff as commander of the SOS.⁷

The United States emerged from World War I with considerable experience on which to base future practices and procedures. By 1921, having been elevated to Army Chief of Staff, General Pershing became instrumental in a number of reforms that helped prepare America for the next major war. The reforms included an increased role for the general staff in operational planning. Pershing agreed to the findings of the Harbord Board which established the War Plans Board (later OPD), a development which paved the way for the general staff to play a major operational role in World War II.⁸

During the interwar period, the United States continued to borrow doctrinally from the French. In 1924, our first manual on larger unit operations, a direct translation from the post-World War I French publication,

was released. This manual outlined the command, organization and tactical employment of large units, but none larger than the field army.⁹

In 1930, the War Department published a Manual for Commanders of Larger Units (Provisional). Volume 1, Operations, was the first American effort to articulate a doctrine based on recent U.S. initiatives to guide larger units in the field. This early equivalent to later FM 100-15s described the philosophy of American participation in a mature theater of war. The regulation established the general headquarters (GHQ) to oversee the forces in the field and defined the various other echelons of command as required, i.e., army groups, field armies, corps, and divisions. At this time the division was considered to be a larger unit, and the army group was the largest tactical unit. Much of what is depicted in the 1930 manual directly reflects Pershing's influence as well as a number of his reforms. The GHQ established to direct field forces mirrored the AEF organization of World War I, and the larger units discussed reflected the echelons of command many World War I veterans felt were required for operations in a mature theater.¹⁰

Throughout the 1920s, and early 1930s, General Pershing and other reformers fought to enhance the Army's position by seeking increased resources for a skeletonized force. By 1930, when General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Chief of Staff, it was becoming evident that World War I was not "the war to end all wars." MacArthur, although under strict materiel and personnel constraints, continued the battle for a viable force structure. Organizationally, he was able to establish a framework for mobilization and force expansion in case of war. Although proposed in the 1920s, the establishment of Army areas in CONUS was not realized until 1932, when four field army headquarters were established to facilitate general mobilization. The headquarters were to be exercise and planning agencies providing staff and commanders with experience to take to the field. MacArthur also proposed a skeletonized Army group headquarters, but this idea did not materialize.¹¹

By the summer of 1939, the Regular Army was still scattered around 130 posts in mostly battalion-size units. Field armies existed for exercise purposes only, and the corps structures were primarily administrative headquarters. As the U.S. prepared to enter the war, it was evident to many military leaders that the conflict might become a multitheater war.¹²

Doctrinally, the 1930 manual called for a general headquarters to be established for expeditionary forces which would direct the various aspects of war fighting. However, by this time many Army leaders, to include Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, believed the current doctrinal organization to be insufficient to meet the challenges of a multi-theater war, a training mission, an operational mission, and the complications of a rapidly evolving air force. As a result, a reorganization study was effected, and on 9 March 1942, the findings were acted on by creating a division of responsibilities. The Army Ground Force was created to train the field forces while the general staff was to control operations. Thus, on the eve of active participation in the war, the United States Army had established a command center for worldwide combat operations.¹³

Changes brought about by the Army reorganization of March 1942 necessitated revision of the 1930 field manual on larger unit operations, and in June 1942, the new FM 100-15 appeared. Preparation for operations were already in progress in England, but this FM would provide the framework for larger unit operations throughout World War II.¹⁴

NOTES

1. U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, Tactical and Strategic Studies: A Group of Armies (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Command and General Staff School Press, 1923), 5.
2. Ibid., 5-6.
3. Ibid., 3.
4. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan Co., 1967), 377-78.
5. Ibid., 358-60.
6. Ibid., 381.
7. Ibid., 369-70, 381.
8. Ibid., 405.
9. France, Ministry of War, Provisional Instructions for the Tactical Employment of Large Units (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service School Press, 1924).
10. U.S. War Department, A Manual for Commanders of Large Units (Provisional), vol. 1, Operations (Washington, DC, 1930).
11. U.S. War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff to Commanding Generals of Corps Area and Departments, Letter, Subject: "Establishment of Field Armies," 9 August 1932.
12. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 419.
13. Ibid., 405, 440-44.
14. U.S. War Department, FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, (Washington, DC, 29 June 1942).

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CHAPTER 2

LARGE UNITS IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN*

Introduction

When the United States became a belligerent in World War II on 7 December 1941, U.S. Army large unit organization was still guided by A Manual for Commanders of Large Units (Provisional). This manual, which had been published by the chief of staff in 1930, was rooted in the experiences of the Army during World War I and was considered inadequate to meet the military challenges posed by World War II. Six months after U.S. entry into the war, on 29 June 1941, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall promulgated a new doctrinal statement on large units, FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units. This document, in addition to describing the functions and operations of army groups and armies as the 1930 manual did, also discussed joint land, sea, and air operations and placed much greater emphasis on large-scale, extensive "theaters of operations." Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, June 1942, did not, however, use the term "theater army," and there was no mention of combined operations with Allied forces. Such concepts and practices were soon to emerge, however, as the war against the Axis powers developed.

This chapter examines the beginning efforts of American and British military leaders to create large unit structures that could successfully plan, organize, and carry out the massive military operations that were required in World War II. It further examines the evolution of larger units brought about by the experiences gained in North Africa and the Mediterranean area. Starting with the first phases of Anglo-American military cooperation, this chapter discusses the establishment of the European Theater of Operations (ETO), the involvement of ETO in the invasion of North Africa, the establishment of the North African Theater of Operations (NATO), subsequent organizational changes within NATO, the establishment of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations

*Written by Dr. Gary J. Bjorge.

(MTO), and later organizational changes within MTO. What emerges is a picture that exemplifies how American and British military leaders successfully met the military challenge before them by creating effective large unit structures.

American-British Cooperation Before Pearl Harbor

United States-United Kingdom cooperation in military matters began well before U.S. entry into World War II. In October 1940, Major General James E. Chaney of the Army Air Corps was sent to England to observe the air war over Britain. He submitted his report to the War Department in December 1940 and predicted that Germany would be unable to defeat Britain. On 29 January 1941, representatives of the U.S. Army chief of staff and chief of naval operations met with representatives of the British chiefs of staff in a series of meetings known as ABC-1 (for American-British staff conversations). The purpose of these meetings was to establish principles and methods for acting together against the Axis powers in the eventuality of the U.S. entering the war. It was agreed at these meetings to exchange military missions and coordinate planning, and in May 1941, the U.S. mission, named Special Observer Group, or SPOBS, began operating in London with Major General Chaney in command. The entire group consisted of eighteen officers and eleven enlisted men.¹

The first task of SPOBS was to establish liaison with the British and begin learning about their equipment and methods of operation. SPOBS was also tasked to help coordinate the allocation of the equipment that was being shipped to Britain under provisions of the American Lend-Lease Act of 11 March 1941. In mid-1941, SPOBS became involved in the American occupation of Iceland. It was also given responsibility for preparing for the stationing of U.S. forces in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and elsewhere in the British Isles, in case the United States became an active participant in the war. At the time all of this work was being done, the United States remained officially neutral and SPOBS had to be careful not to overtly violate that neutrality.

United States Buildup in Great Britain

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and United States entry into the war dramatically altered the American-British relationship. The two nations were now

at war against common foes. In December 1941, Prime Minister Churchill traveled to Washington, D.C., and in a series of meetings known as the Arcadia Conference reached agreement with President Roosevelt on broad global strategy and a combined prosecution of the war. The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) organization was established to coordinate military operations and allocate resources, and the British Chiefs of Staff appointed a permanent party called the Joint Staff Mission to stay in Washington to work with the American Army-Navy Joint Board.² This established unity of command at the highest level and made it possible for the United States and Great Britain to proceed with a joint war effort.

In early 1941, the United States moved quickly to establish a military presence in Great Britain. On 8 January, the first step toward establishing a U.S. Army headquarters in England was taken with the activation of Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI).³ Major General Chaney was designated the commander. On 24 January, the first ground command was established when United States Army Northern Ireland Force (USANIF) was officially announced.⁴ On 26 January, four thousand American troops debarked at Belfast, Northern Ireland.

As the number of American forces in Great Britain grew during the next several months, so, too, did the debate over how to organize and command them. General Chaney and most members of his staff favored regional commands. The Operations Division (OPD) in the War Department and Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, favored functional commands. On 14 May, General Marshall sent a letter directive to General Chaney informing him that U.S. forces in the United Kingdom were to be organized along the same pattern as the new War Department structure with three coordinate functional commands, one each for air, ground, and services.⁵ OPD envisioned that General Chaney's headquarters would be organized like a command post, with Army Air Forces in Great Britain largely autonomous under an air command, and administrative and supply functions passing to a theater-wide services command. Establishing an air command was not such a difficult matter, but the establishment of a theater-wide services command created serious disagreements. Marshall's 14 May directive gave broad powers to Supply of Services (SOS) in the United Kingdom, and after SOS, USAFBI was established in London on 24 May, its commanding general, Major General John C. H. Lee, set out to take over virtually all supply and administrative functions in USAFBI. On 28 May, he submitted a draft general order which proposed that all supply arms and services except

for the minimum amount needed in the supply and administration of Headquarters, USAFBI, be placed under SOS. General Chaney and his staff felt that this proposal infringed too much on their areas of responsibility, but the broad powers given SOS in the 14 May directive made them uncertain of their position. On 29 May, Chaney's chief of staff, Brigadier General Charles L. Bolté, sent a memorandum to the visiting chief of OPD, Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower, asking him to help clarify the situation. What was needed, Bolté said, was a "basic directive to the Commanding General, USAFBI, concerning his authority, responsibility, and mission."⁶

The controversy over how best to organize U.S. forces in Great Britain had been of deep concern to General Marshall for some time. In April 1942, during his visit to London to argue for plan Bolero, a plan which envisaged a great American buildup in Great Britain and a cross-channel assault, he had sensed that the American officers on duty there "were not familiar with the broader problems and objectives of the War Department."⁷ After he returned to Washington, he directed the chief of OPD, General Eisenhower, to travel to London to see what could be done about correcting the situation. Marshall also told Eisenhower that he wanted him to "bring back recommendations involving future organization and development of our European forces."⁸

European Theater of Operations

General Eisenhower's visit to the United Kingdom left him convinced that General Chaney and his staff had to be replaced and that a European Theater of Operations with "absolute unity of command . . . exercised by the Theater Commander" should be established.⁹ On 8 June, he presented General Marshall with a draft directive entitled "Directive for the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations" that provided for unified command of all American forces in the European area.¹⁰ That very day, the directive was sent out establishing European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA), with General Chaney as commander. Three days later, on 11 June, Marshall told Eisenhower to prepare to leave OPD and relieve General Chaney as Commanding General, ETOUSA. On 24 June, Eisenhower arrived in London and assumed command.

The 8 June directive that established ETOUSA gave the Commanding General, ETO, the "tactical, strategical, territorial, and administrative duties of a theater

commander."¹¹ In keeping with the principle of unity of command, he was to exercise planning and operational control over all U.S. forces, including naval forces, assigned to the theater. U.S. forces were instructed by the directive to cooperate with British forces in operations against the Axis powers, but it was also specified that U.S. forces were to be maintained as distinct and separate components in such operations.

Before Eisenhower left Washington, he visited the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, and was told by King that he would do everything possible to make sure that Eisenhower was, in fact, the actual "commander" of naval forces assigned to ETO. King stressed the point that this would be the "first deliberate attempt by the American fighting services to set up a unified command in the field for a command of indefinite length."¹² He told Eisenhower that there should be no talk of the ETO commander's authority resting upon "cooperation" or "paramount interest," and that any violation of his authority by naval units should be reported to King personally.

Admiral King's position assured interservice unity of command in ETO. Shortly after Eisenhower assumed command of ETOUSA, he also worked to resolve the intraservice issue of how SOS fit into the theater command structure. On 20 July, General Order 19, which restated the responsibilities of SOS and its position in ETOUSA, was issued. The authority of commanding general, SOS, as a corps area commander was restricted so as not to apply to areas where another commander already had such authority. More staff sections (eight) were made residents of theater headquarters, and the remaining ten staff sections were to have senior representatives selected by the theater commander there. General Lee was assigned the additional responsibility of administrative and supply planning for theater operations. He was also given authority to communicate directly with British officials and the War Department on supply matters without going through theater headquarters. This was a compromise solution, and General Eisenhower apparently considered this arrangement to be temporary. However, other events intervened and General Order 19 governed ETOUSA organization for the next year.¹³

Allied Force Headquarters

When General Eisenhower became Commanding General, ETOUSA, Allied planning was still directed towards a

buildup of U.S. forces in the United Kingdom and a cross-channel assault. Then in late July, it was decided that an invasion of Northwest Africa, code named Operation Torch, would be undertaken. On 26 July, General Marshall informed Eisenhower that he would be appointed commander in chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force that would carry out Torch.¹⁴ Eisenhower began organizing a headquarters staff immediately, and by the time that he was officially notified of his appointment on 14 August, the organization of his headquarters was largely complete. When this headquarters, which was called Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), officially announced its existence on 12 September with the publication of General Order 1, it was actually already a month old.¹⁵

AFHQ was a headquarters without precedent in history. For several months General Eisenhower had been involved with the establishment of an efficient joint command structure for U.S. forces in Great Britain. Now he had the task of creating a combined headquarters that fused the different services of two nations into an effective fighting force. He accomplished this task by adhering to three principles: unity of command, a close balance of American and British personnel in staff sections, and the use of the best person for the job regardless of nationality. He firmly insisted on a unity of spirit that held no room for nationalistic sentiments. To enforce his position, Eisenhower had at least two American officers removed from their duties and sent back to the U.S. for making disrespectful remarks about the British.¹⁶

Unity of command was the firm foundation upon which AFHQ was constructed. As noted by Eisenhower:

Alliances in the past have often done no more than to name the common foe, and "unity of command" has been a pious aspiration thinly disguising the national jealousies, ambitions and recriminations of high ranking officers, unwilling to subordinate themselves or their forces to a command of different nationality or different service . . . I was determined, from the first, to do all in my power to make this a truly Allied Force, with real unity of command and centralization of administrative responsibility.¹⁷

General Eisenhower had to fight to obtain the unity of command that he sought. A draft directive from the British chiefs of staff to Lieutenant General Kenneth A. N. Anderson placing him and British First Army

under Eisenhower's command contained a clear limitation to Eisenhower's command authority. The draft directive stated that if the Allied Commander in Chief gave an order that imperiled any British troops in the Allied force, even those not under Anderson's command, Anderson would be "at liberty to appeal to the War Office before the order [was] executed."¹⁸ Eisenhower received a copy of this draft directive and quickly expressed his objections in a letter to General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Churchill's Chief of Staff:

I anticipate that as fighting develops in the new theater there will be many times that detachments of both United States and British forces are definitely imperiled. . . . But I have constantly endeavored to maintain in all my relationships with the British Government and Armed Services, with the American War Department, and with my staff and subordinate commanders, that we are undertaking a single, unified effort in pursuit of a common object stated by the two governments; and that for the attainment of this object our sole endeavor must be to use every resource and asset for the common good. I think this view is correct and that our best interests will be served if all concerned are imbued with a similar purpose. Consequently, departures from normal practices of command should be tolerated only in cases of urgent necessity.

In view of the above, I believe that this directive should be written in the form of a short statement of principles, emphasizing unity of the whole, and stressing the great desirability of keeping the integrity of national forces. I should give to General Anderson the right, in what he may consider to be grave and exceptional circumstances, to appeal to his home government, but he should be instructed first to notify the Allied Commander in Chief that he intends so to appeal, giving his reasons therefore.

As a final word, I should like to say that I do not present the above from any personal viewpoint whatsoever, since any order issued directly by the War Office to General Anderson could have no other effect than to relieve me of a portion of a very heavy burden of responsibility. I am speaking solely from

conviction, and, while I believe that the British Chiefs of Staff probably see this matter exactly as I do, I think the wording of their directive is such as to weaken rather than to support the spirit that should be developed and sustained among the ranks participating in this great enterprise.¹⁹

In response to General Eisenhower's comments, the British Chiefs of Staff changed their directive to General Anderson. It now included the following two paragraphs:

His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States have agreed that singleness of purpose and unified direction are essential to the speedy success of these operations. To this end, the First Army has been placed under the Supreme command of the Allied Commander in Chief, Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, United States Army. In the exercise of his command, the national forces at his disposal will be used towards the benefit of the United Nations and in pursuit of the common object. You will carry out any orders issued by him.

In the unlikely event of your receiving an order which, in your view, will give rise to a grave and exceptional situation, you have the right to appeal to the War Office, provided that by so doing an opportunity is not lost, nor any part of the Allied Force endangered. You will, however, first inform the Allied Commander in Chief that you intend so to appeal, and you will give him your reasons.²⁰

The revised directive completely satisfied Eisenhower. In an endorsement he wrote:

I consider its terms completely satisfactory. In fact it so definitely expresses the views I hold with respect to appropriate instructions to a National Commander under the conditions prevailing in this case, that I am forwarding a copy to the United States War Department in the hope that it will serve as a model in future cases of this kind.²¹

Personnel policies were used to strengthen the organizational unity established through unity of command. Operational staff sections were integrated as far as possible, and the principle of balanced personnel


was observed. Whenever an assistant chief of staff or chief of a section was of one nationality, an officer of the other nationality of near or equal rank was designated his deputy. This practice was almost general enough to be called the "principle of the opposite number" and often extended down to subsections within staff sections. Below this level, the rest of the personnel was recruited as equally as possible from American and British sources. None of these practices precluded finding the best person for the job.

Balanced personnel did not apply to most administrative and supply staff sections. In these cases, differences in organization, procedures, and channels of communication made it advisable not to have integrated sections. Instead, parallel and separate American and British staff sections were established, each with their own personnel. Eisenhower did not want these sections to have an "international facade . . . which would prejudice the administration and maintenance of the armies upon which the success of [his] operations would depend."²²

Coordination between the American and British administrative and supply sections was provided by establishing the position of Chief Administrative Office (CAO). This position, which General Eisenhower called "unique in the history of war,"²³ was filled by a British officer, Lieutenant General Sir Humfrey Gale. His responsibilities included the following:

- 1) Coordination of all operational logistical matters (British and American) in the theater.
- 2) Coordination of American and British Army, Navy, and Air Administrative staffs.
- 3) Convocation of CAO conferences to facilitate the exchange of information and expedite coordination.²⁴

The organizational structure of AFHQ on the eve of the invasion of North Africa is shown on chart 1. General Eisenhower was Allied Commander in Chief, and another American, Lieutenant Mark W. Clark, was Deputy Allied Commander in Chief. Originally, Clark's position had been designated a British position, but due to a desire to ensure that Torch would still have an American facade in case something happened to Eisenhower, Clark was given the appointment. It was assumed that in light of French bitterness toward the British because of Dunkirk, the



----- Line of General Supervision
 _____ Line of Command

Note: The letters in the lower right of each box indicate the nationality of the chief officer and not that of the personnel as a whole.

SOURCE: George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1978), 34.

Chart 1. AFHQ Organization, 1 November 1942


French in North Africa would resist a British-led invasion. The Chief of Staff, AFHQ, was also an American, and headquarters organization and staff procedures were along American lines.

Operation Torch

As finally agreed upon, Operation Torch consisted of amphibious landings by three task forces on 8 November 1942. The Western Task Force landed at Casablanca, Morocco. The Central Task Force landed at Oran, Algeria. The Eastern Task Force landed at Algiers, Algeria. The Western Task Force was composed entirely of American ground, naval, and air forces that came directly from the United States. The Center Task Force was also American, but it sailed from the United Kingdom with British naval support. The Eastern Task Force was predominantly British, but it carried an American assault force in order to project an American image to the French.

General Eisenhower, as Allied Commander in Chief, exercised direct control over the commanding generals of the task forces and indirect command over the senior naval commanders of both nationalities through a British Naval Commander in Chief, Expeditionary Force, Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham. Eisenhower exercised command over land aviation through British and American Air Force commanders.²⁵

Admiral Cunningham was responsible to the Allied Commander in Chief for the sea security of Torch and for naval support to the amphibious landings in the western Mediterranean. For operations other than Torch in the western Mediterranean and in the North Atlantic, however, Admiral Cunningham remained directly responsible to the British Admiralty. The American naval forces that came directly from the United States were under the command of Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, until they crossed the meridian of 40° west longitude. They then came under command of Commander in Chief, Allied Force. When the assault operations were finished and these naval forces were released by Commander in Chief, Allied Force, they reverted back to the command of Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. The Sea Frontier Forces of the U.S. Navy along the Atlantic Moroccan coast were under the command of the Commanding General, Western Task Force. The U.S. naval operating base at Oran was under the command of Commanding General, Center Task Force.²⁶ The chain of command for Operation Torch is shown in chart 2.



2-12

^aThese Air Commands were brought under one Air Commander, GEN Spaatz, (US), in December 1942 to form the "NORTHWEST AFRICAN AIR FORCES".

^bDuring lodgement, Commander, Eastern Assault Forces, commanded all air and ground forces involved. The Assault Force was absorbed by the Eastern Task Force upon the arrival of the British First Army in the follow-up.

^cLater, Fifth Army (U.S.).

SOURCE: Colonel William R. Wendt, et. al., "Organization and Command Relationships During World War II" (US Armed Forces Staff College, 17 December 1951), 73.

Chart 2. Chain of Command for Operation Torch

AFHQ exercised overall planning and logistical control for Torch as well as operational control. Officers were borrowed from ETOUSA and SOS for planning purposes, but there was still insufficient liaison and communication between AFHQ and these two headquarters. The result was that SOS was responsible for implementing a supply program that had been planned by another organization.²⁷ This was considered to be a distinct handicap, and General Lee, Commanding General, SOS, later said that one of the principal lessons of Torch was that supply planning and operations must be closely coordinated with tactical planning and operations.²⁸

Supply of the Torch task forces was initially carried out from their respective points of origin. Because Central Task Force was made up of American forces, its source of supply was shifted to the United States from the United Kingdom as soon as its position ashore was consolidated. The British ran the Port of Algiers. The ports of Oran and Casablanca were run by the Americans. AFHQ G4 had planned that at these two ports specially organized SOS units would come ashore after the area had been secured and would establish base sections. This occurred at Oran. The first echelon of the Mediterranean Base Section (MBS) came ashore on 11 November. On 6 December, MBS was established and was soon handling tremendous quantities of supplies. At Casablanca, however, the situation was much different. The Western Task Force commander deferred the transfer of the SOS unit that was supposed to establish the Atlantic Base Section (ABS), and the first echelon didn't arrive until 24 December. Supply troops of the Western Task Force were given the jobs of base section and port operation. Due to a lack of training, however, they couldn't handle these tasks properly. Many essential items were misplaced and lost before order was established.²⁹ This experience pointed out the necessity of having organized service forces included in an invasion force. On 30 December 1942, in order to better coordinate the activities of MBS, ABS, and the port of Algiers, the two base sections were removed from the jurisdiction of the Task Force commanders and were placed, as the port of Algiers had been from the start, directly under the command of AFHQ,³⁰ which since 25 November had been located in Algiers.

North African Theater of Operations

Operation Torch was planned and carried out as an operation within the ETO. On 18 August, to accommodate

this action, ETO boundaries were expanded to include the previously excluded European countries of Portugal, Spain, and Italy, and all of Northwest Africa. Even as that was being done, however, it was foreseen that the campaign in North Africa could not forever remain a part of ETO. General Eisenhower, who at the time was already both Commanding General, ETOUSA, and Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, suggested that as soon as the Torch force was firmly established, the North African area should be detached from ETOUSA and a new theater established. He predicted that this could be done approximately two months after the landings.³¹

AFHQ moved to Algiers on 25 November 1942, but it was not until February that the break with ETO was made. On 3 February 1943, the boundaries of ETO were redrawn to exclude Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Northwest Africa, and these areas were incorporated into a new theater called the North African Theater of Operations, under General Eisenhower. On 4 February, NATOUSA was established. General Eisenhower was relieved of his position as Commanding General, ETOUSA, and was appointed Commanding General, NATOUSA. This same day, ETO received a new commanding general.

NATOUSA was created to handle the administration of the ever-growing American forces in the area, matters that were not properly of Allied concern. At first, like General Eisenhower, many of its military personnel were working as both Allied force and theater officers. Later, some whole sections of AFHQ would be transferred to comparable sections in NATOUSA.³²

As Allied Commander in Chief and theater commander, General Eisenhower's time was in great demand. He required the assistance of another general officer who could tend to the details of the theater command. This need was filled by the appointment of Brigadier General Everett S. Hughes to be the deputy theater commander (DTC) of the new theater. General Hughes saw his responsibility as "relieving the theater commander of all possible details."³³ In many respects the American DTC was to become much like the British CAO, and when necessary Generals Hughes and Gale cooperated in problem solving.

An interesting point concerning the position of DTC is that American Army organization did not provide for such a position. General Hughes was sensitive to this fact and wished to have his position and duties clarified by being

designated also as Commanding General, Communications Zone (COMZ). The duties of a COMZ commander were defined in U.S. Army Field Service Regulations and coincided with those that would be undertaken by the DTC, namely, American territorial defense, administration, and supply in the rear of the combat zone. Designating General Hughes as Commanding General, COMZ, did not mean that a headquarters separate from HQ, NATOUSA, was being activated. It merely gave the DTC a more understandable definition of duties using traditional army terms. On 9 February, General Eisenhower designated General Hughes as CG, COMZ.³⁴

On 15 February, SOS, NATOUSA, was established. All supply activities and personnel from ABS, MBS, and the newly created Eastern Base Section (EBS) at Constantine were assigned to this new command. Brigadier General Thomas B. Larkin was designated Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, with headquarters at Oran. He reported to the DTC in all matters related to supply. The commanders of the base sections reported to the DTC in all matters related to the operation of their bases. This command was to relieve G4, AFHQ, of operational functions, but problems of communication and coordination between the two commands often arose. To correct this problem, a colonel from SOS was appointed as SOS representative at AFHQ "for conferences and for the transmission of information to the Commanding General, SOS."³⁵

While the changes in administrative and supply command structures discussed above were occurring, numerous changes in larger unit operational commands were also being implemented. On 1 January 1943, the Eastern Task Force was redesignated the British First Army. On 4 January, the U.S. Fifth Army under the command of General Mark Clark was activated at Ojuda, Morocco. The missions of this Army were to preserve the territorial integrity of French Morocco and Algeria, prepare a strike force for amphibious operations, prepare plans, and work with French civil and military authorities.³⁶

Organizational adjustments were also being made because of the employment of French forces in the Allied military effort. On 22 November, the French regime in North Africa signed agreements in which they pledged the aid of French forces to assist the U.S. and its Allies in the war against the Axis powers. As these agreements were implemented, however, complications quickly arose because the French refused to fight under British command. As a way to break the impasse, on 13 January, General Eisenhower assumed direct command over American,

British, and French units and established what amounted to an intermediate army group headquarters, AFHQ Command Post, Constantine, to exercise this command.³⁷ Eisenhower made frequent trips to this command post and the front after 13 January, but this was not a satisfactory solution to the French command problem. This problem was solved after several weeks by the large restructuring of Allied forces that was agreed to by the CCS at the Anfa Conference of 13-23 January.

The Anfa Conference, held outside Casablanca, Morocco, was an important series of meetings that involved not only the CCS but the political leaders of the U.S. and the United Kingdom. Progress to date was assessed and future plans were made. One of the major problems faced at the conference was that of creating a command structure that would permit the coordination of ground, air, and sea forces in North Africa with those in the Middle East. The approach of the British Eighth Army to the southern border of Tunisia made this decision imperative.

The solution for the ground forces was to establish an intermediate army group headquarters between AFHQ and the headquarters of the British First Army in northern Tunisia and the British Eighth Army that was about to enter southeastern Tunisia. General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, Commander in Chief, Middle East, was appointed Commander, 18th Army Group, and Deputy Commander in Chief, Allied Force.³⁸ The 18th Army Group assumed, to a large extent, the operational responsibilities of AFHQ. Among other tasks, it developed tactical plans and issued directives for operations in the Tunisian area. It commanded all ground forces in the Tunisian area and coordinated army operations with air and naval forces. It also was responsible for keeping itself informed on the logistical situation to and in Tunisia and for controlling the level of supplies made available to each army.³⁹ Although an Allied command, 18th Army Group was predominantly British and was organized along British staff lines. When 18th Army Group was activated at Constantine on 18 February, AFHQ Command Post, Constantine, was closed.

During the invasion of North Africa, the lack of a unified air command below the level of Allied Commander in Chief had proven to be a problem. Therefore, on 5 December 1942, Major General Carl Spaatz (American) was appointed Acting Deputy Commander in Chief for Air, Allied Force, in addition to his other duties, to unify the separate air forces. On 5 January, this organization was

officially constituted, and its name later became the Northwest African Air Command (NAAC). Its component elements were the American Twelfth Air Force, the Royal Air Force (RAF) Eastern Air Command, and such French units as might be attached.


When the Western Desert Air Force came into Tunisia with the British Eighth Army, it was necessary to coordinate its activities with those of the NAAC. The result was the activation on 17 February 1943 of the Mediterranean Air Command, with headquarters at AFHQ. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, GCB, RAF, was designated Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean. His command comprised the Middle East Air Command, RAF Malta Air Command, and Northwest African Air Forces. His area of responsibility extended beyond the boundaries of NATO, and for air operations outside NATO, he was independent of General Eisenhower.

Coordination of naval forces in the western Mediterranean, including Malta, was achieved when a new command structure went into effect on 20 February. Admiral Cunningham's designation was changed from Commander in Chief, Naval Expeditionary Force, to Commander in Chief, Mediterranean. He was responsible for all naval operations in NATO under the command of General Eisenhower as Allied Commander in Chief. Chart 3 shows the Allied command structure that resulted from all of the organizational changes described above.

Operation Husky

At the Anfa Conference, the CCS agreed that after defeating Axis forces in Tunisia, Allied forces would invade Sicily. The operation was set for the period of the favorable July moon and code named Husky. On 23 January 1943, General Eisenhower was given a CCS directive which designated him as Supreme Commander, General Alexander as deputy commander in chief, Admiral Cunningham as naval commander, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder as Air commander.⁴⁰ General Eisenhower was also directed to establish, in consultation with General Alexander, "a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the operation. . . ."41

The first meeting of the Husky planning staff was held on 10 February 1943 in room 141 of the St. George Hotel in Algiers. This meeting place suggested the name for the



SOURCE: George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West* (Washington, D.C.; Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1978), 486

Chart 3. Allied Command, Mediterranean, March 1943


staff, and on 12 February, they officially announced the existence of Headquarters, Force 141. At this time, Headquarters, Force 141, was not independent; it was a subsection of G3, AFHQ. However, it was free from all responsibilities for the Tunisian campaign. The welding together of elements from the different countries and services into the overall plan was accomplished through close liaison between Headquarters, Force 141, and the Joint Planning Staff of AFHQ.

The experience gained in creating AFHQ and Headquarters, 18th Army Group, helped solve the problems encountered in creating Headquarters, Force 141, and the operation developed on schedule. On 13 March, the first commander's meeting was held, and the appointments of Lieutenant General George S. Patton as Commanding General, Force 343 (American Task Force), and General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery as Commanding General, Force 545 (British Task Force), were announced. On 15 May, four days after the surrender of the last Axis forces in Tunisia, General Alexander's 18th Army Group was disbanded with most of the personnel being augmented into Headquarters, Force 141. On this same day, the headquarters became an independent operational headquarters. In June, Headquarters, Force 141, moved from Algiers to LaMarsa in Tunisia to have closer control of its units. In early July, Tactical Headquarters, Force 141, moved to Malta, and it was from there, on the morning of 10 July, that General Eisenhower, General Alexander, and Admiral Cunningham observed the successful landings on Sicily. They maintained contact from there with Air Marshal Tedder, who was at his Air Headquarters in Tunis.

On the day of the invasion of Sicily, the new command designations for the forces involved in Husky were announced. Headquarters, Force 141, became 15th Army Group with General Alexander in command. Force 343, formerly I Armored Corps, Reinforced, became U.S. Seventh Army under Patton. Force 545 became British Eighth Army under Montgomery.⁴² Command structure for Operation Husky is shown on chart 4.

There was close Army-Navy planning for Husky. To improve naval fire support, fire control parties from each artillery battalion received some training in observing and controlling naval gunfire. Arrangements were made for air observation and control of naval fire. Each infantry division had a naval gunfire liaison officer assigned.⁴³

The utilization of air assets in Husky was based on the principle that air strength should be kept under a



^a Command of all seaborne forces rested with Naval Commanders during amphibious phase.

^b General support missions were given all major subordinate units.

^c Mission - direct support of the assault of Sicily.

SOURCE: Wendt, et. al., 77.

Chart 4. Command Structure for Operation Husky

single command instead of being divided by sector. The objective was greater flexibility. The U.S. XII Air Support Command, which had the mission of providing air support for the Seventh Army, only had direct control of its one reconnaissance squadron. Its six squadrons of fighter bombers and ten squadrons of day fighters were all under the RAF's Malta Command and under NATAF itself.⁴⁴ Because of concern over neutralizing enemy air, strategic targets, armed reconnaissance, and cover over the beaches, little attention was given to providing close air support to the ground forces during the operation. During the critical first forty-eight hours of the campaign, not a single close air support mission was flown in support of the Seventh Army.⁴⁵

The logistics situation for Husky followed previously established practices. Each of the two armies was supplied and supported by its own logistical system. However, because the British were landing in an area with three major ports and the Americans were going to be dependent on beach maintenance, it was agreed that after the British had opened the port of Syracuse and the campaign was fourteen days old, the British would send one thousand tons of supply a day to Seventh Army.⁴⁶

The Sicilian campaign ended successfully on 17 August, only thirty-eight days after it began. All CCS objectives were achieved with less difficulty than had been expected. However, there were problem areas. There was a lack of close air support for ground forces. The direction of the campaign seemed to favor Montgomery over Patton, placing the Seventh Army in a subordinate and supporting mission to the British Eighth Army. In addition, the high level command structure, with three service commanders in widely separated headquarters, made it difficult to react quickly to major changes in the military situation: Alexander's ground headquarters was in Sicily; Tedder's air headquarters was in Tunis; Cunningham's naval headquarters was at Malta. Eisenhower's headquarters was in Algiers. No plan had been drawn up for joint action to prevent the Germans and Italians from evacuating Sicily. When it became evident during the last ten days of the campaign that Axis forces were evacuating the island, each service acted independently to prevent this from happening. General Eisenhower was not presented with the problem, and no joint operation was undertaken. As a result, the Germans and Italians were able to carry out one of the most successful evacuations ever conducted from a beleaguered shore.⁴⁷

Operation Avalanche

At the Trident Conference, held at Quebec in May 1943, the CCS decided to direct General Eisenhower to prepare plans for invading mainland Italy. Various options were prepared and presented to CCS. Finally, on 16 August, only one day before final victory in Sicily, it was decided to carry out two landings in Italy. The British Eighth Army was to carry out Operation Baytown, an attack across the Straits of Messina. The U.S. Fifth Army was to carry out Operation Avalanche, a landing on the beaches near Salerno, a city some 150 miles to the north. Fifth Army was selected because of the Seventh Army's involvement in the campaign to capture Sicily.

The command structure for the operations against mainland Italy was similar to that of Husky. The 15th Army Group was responsible for planning the operations allocated by AFHQ and for commanding the operations of Fifth and Eighth armies. Since plans for mainland Italy did not include the active participation of the Seventh Army, on 3 October it reverted to direct command of AFHQ from 15th Army Group. This was one day before General Alexander opened his headquarters in Italy at Santo Spirito.⁴⁸

The Baytown landings took place on 3 September. On 9 September, the Fifth Army landed at Salerno. By 1 October 1943, the combined ground, air, and naval forces of the Allies had established a secure foothold on the Italian mainland, and the need for better coordination of administration and supply was apparent. In response, on 15 October, a new combined organization known as AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO) was established. FLAMBO's relationship with 15th Army Group was described as being like that between "the operational and administrative portions of a single headquarters."⁴⁹ However, it was first of all an "administrative advanced AFHQ and not a rear HQ of Fifteenth Army Group."⁵⁰ FLAMBO was headed by Major General Sir Brian H. Robertson (British), whose official title was Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, FLAMBO. Among other responsibilities, FLAMBO coordinated logistics in forward areas for both American and British forces, supervised Italian ports, and controlled and directed all British general military administration on the mainland of Italy.


Mediterranean Theater of Operations

As the campaigns in Tunisia, Sicily, and mainland Italy brought the forces commanded by AFHQ and the forces commanded by General Headquarters (GHQ), Middle Eastern Forces (MEF), into ever closer contact, it became more and more obvious that a unified command for the entire Mediterranean should be created. In the situation which existed, command relationships were not clear-cut. The Allied air commander in chief, as the commander of air forces under both AFHQ and GHQ, MEF, had two different commanders to whom he was responsible. The Allied (naval) Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, had responsibility for the strategic disposition of naval forces in both the western and eastern Mediterranean, but he did not have executive command in the eastern Mediterranean. General Eisenhower reported to the CCS in Washington, while General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, commander of the British Middle East theater, reported to the British chiefs of staff.⁵¹ Coordination between the two theaters was largely on a liaison basis and was simply "unwieldy, improvised, and inadequate."⁵² Since the great preponderance of Allied forces in the Mediterranean was under the control of AFHQ, it didn't seem proper for GHQ, MEF, to possess half of the command authority in the region. Clearly, the combined operations in the Mediterranean required a unified command.

On 10 December 1943, the CCS acted to resolve the issue of unity of command in the Mediterranean by establishing the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO). MTO represented an expansion of NATO to include the Balkan countries, Hungary, all of Turkey, and the eastern Mediterranean. General Eisenhower was designated Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater. Below him, ground, air, and naval forces in the theater were unified under their respective service commanders in chief. Control over air forces, however, would soon not include strategic bomber forces based in MTO. On 1 January 1944, these forces came under control of a new headquarters called U.S. Strategic Air Forces Europe (USSAFE) that was located in the United Kingdom. The American theater retained its designation of NATOUSA, and General Eisenhower retained this command. Chart 5 shows the command system for the MTO as proposed by the CCS on 5 December 1943 and implemented on 10 December.

On the same day that MTO was established, General Eisenhower was informed by CCS that he was to be appointed Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force and would be

Appendix "A" to CCS
387/3 (Sextant)
5 Dec 43. Directive
for Unification of
Command in the
MEDITERRANEAN



SOURCE: Staff of MTOUSA Historical Section, et al., History of Allied Force Headquarters (Allied Force Headquarters, 1945), pt. 3, sect. 1, 626.

Chart 5. Proposed System of Command in the Mediterranean, 5 December 1943 (Implemented 10 December 1943)

leaving the MTO. Two weeks later General Wilson, Commander in Chief, MEF, was selected to be his replacement. General Eisenhower's departure set off a chain of command changes that resulted in MTO becoming a British theater reporting the CCS through the British chiefs of staff. During the next few months, there were also a number of refinements made to the larger unit command structure in MTO. Fundamentally, however, the command system depicted on chart 5 remained in effect in MTO up to the end of the war.

One of the more important organizational changes that occurred after the establishment of MTO and General Eisenhower's departure for the United Kingdom involved one of his former commands, NATOUSA. There had long been concern about the large number of personnel on the staffs at HQ, NATOUSA and at AFHQ. An inspector general's report in August 1943 had called the number excessive. General Eisenhower's successor as Commanding General, NATOUSA, Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers, acted quickly to consolidate staffs and economize personnel. In February 1944, directives were issued which distributed most of HQ, NATOUSA's functions, on the policy and operations side to AFHQ and on the territorial, supply, and administrative side to SOS, NATOUSA. The office of deputy theater commander was abolished and the Commanding General, SOS, NATOUSA, assumed command of the communications zone (COMZ), North African theater. HQ, SOS, NATOUSA, thus became HQ, COMZ, NATOUSA, but for the sake of convenience, it maintained its title of SOS, NATOUSA.⁵³

Another important organizational adjustment that took place in early 1944 was the change taking place in HQ, 15th Army Group. As the campaign in Italy progressed, this command took on functions that were beyond those of an army group and more akin to those of a force headquarters. The 15th Army Group continued to exercise operational control over all Allied ground troops within its geographical area. At the same time, it assumed a number of administrative functions as AFHQ decentralized its own administrative responsibilities. On 4 March 1944, FLAMBO was absorbed into General Alexander's headquarters. On the same day, General Alexander gained some control over the supply agency for American Fifth Army when the Commanding General Peninsular Base Section (PBS) was made responsible to him for the ground defense of the PBS area.⁵⁴ On 9 March 1944, General Alexander's headquarters was designated HQ, Allied Armies Italy (AAI).

Throughout the war, the titles assigned to headquarters and their commanders were important. Since

titles could, and sometimes did, cause confusion in establishing communication channels, and command authority changes were not uncommon. It is interesting to note, therefore, that on 9 March, not only did General Alexander's headquarters receive a new title, but the title of Allied Commander in Chief, MTO, was also changed to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.⁵⁵

Operational Anvil-Dragoon


In May 1944, the Allied armies broke the winter stalemate in Italy and moved rapidly northward to capture Rome on 4 June. Two days later, Operation Overlord was launched in Normandy. Originally, Allied plans had envisioned launching an amphibious assault code named Anvil against southern France on the same day as the Normandy invasion. The objective was to tie down German troops that might be used to defend against the cross-channel assault. German resistance in Italy had made it impossible to meet this schedule. Now, with Rome captured, it was possible to consider using MTO forces to attack southern France. Planning on the operation, now renamed Dragoon, proceeded rapidly, and on 15 August, MTO forces under the command of General Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, came ashore east of Toulon.

The command structure for Operation Anvil-Dragoon is shown on chart 6. It is of special interest because of the large French contingent. Two French corps were used in the operation, and after both were ashore, Headquarters, French Army B, was established. This army was still controlled, however, by U.S. Seventh Army, which in this case acted as an army group headquarters.

General Wilson and General Eisenhower had agreed beforehand that after the Anvil-Dragoon forces moved far enough north, they would be integrated into Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). This was to be accomplished by activating an army group headquarters (6th Army Group) under SHAEF command. The objective was to maintain U.S. control of the operation and provide a mechanism for coordinating civil affairs.⁵⁶

MTO forces made a junction with Overlord forces on 4 September. On 15 September, in accordance with a CCS order, 6th Army Group became operational under the command of General Devers, former Commanding General, NATOUSA. Sixth Army Group controlled the First French Army (formerly French Army B) and the U.S. Seventh Army.

2-27



SOURCE: Colonel William R. Wendt, et al., "Organization and Command Relationships During World War II" (Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff College, 1951), 78.

Chart 6. Command Structure for Operation Anvil-Dragon

SHAEF did not take over the maintenance of Sixth Army Group immediately, so as to take advantage of reserve stocks of supplies still located in the Mediterranean. The administration, logistical support, and maintenance of Anvil-Dragoon forces in southern France continued to be the responsibility of AFHQ. AFHQ was also in charge of civil affairs in southern France.⁵⁷

Operation Anvil-Dragoon was a great success. Within a month after landing, Allied forces had advanced over four hundred miles and were nearing the German border. This success, however, was purchased at the price of stagnation in the MTO and on the Italian front. Large numbers of troops, equipment, and supplies were removed from Italy and used in Operation Anvil-Dragoon. Thus weakened, the Italian campaign, in the words of the official Army history, "sank to the level of a great holding operation."⁵⁸ This holding operation was carried out during the remaining months of the war using fundamentally the same larger unit organizational structure and command system that has been described above.

Conclusion

Larger units at the echelons of theater army, group army, and army were created in the Mediterranean area to conduct military operations. The structure of these commands and their evolution during the course of World War II have been described above. This conclusion briefly discusses some of the most important organizational principles and practices involved in the deployment of these large units.

AFHQ, the theater headquarters for operations in the Mediterranean area, was a combined command headed by an Allied commander in chief. He was the supreme commander of the theater and exercised operational control over the ground, air, and naval forces through subordinate commanders in chief for the various services. The administrative and supply sections of AFHQ consisted of separate and parallel American and British groups that were coordinated by a British chief administrative officer. The CAO exercised control over British services. American administration and supply were accomplished through an American theater, NATOUSA.

At the heart of AFHQ was the principle of unity of command. The efficient operation of AFHQ and the subordinate headquarters was possible only because there was a supreme commander who exercised final command

authority in the theater. General Eisenhower had worked hard to obtain unity of command for AFHQ. His efforts were rewarded by the effective functioning of his command.

The important contribution that personnel policies made toward making AFHQ an effective combined headquarters cannot be understated. The integrated operational staffs, with their close balance of American and British personnel, helped create a common sense of purpose. They gave AFHQ a strength of organization that made it possible to change, for example, the MTO from an American theater to a British theater without difficulty.

The use of separate and parallel British and American staffs for administration and supply was decided upon because these two systems could not be integrated efficiently. The willingness not to force integration where it was impractical showed that those who created AFHQ were not doctrinaire. They used the unique position of the CAO to achieve the overall coordination and unity of action that was needed.

Combat experience in the NATO and the MTO demonstrated the importance of employing national forces together in the largest possible units. During the first phase of the North African campaign, troops from different nations were sometimes assigned piecemeal to larger units from other countries. This meant that troops were sometimes asked to do things that were contrary to their own training and tactical doctrine. The result was often lowered troop morale and reduced combat effectiveness.

As a rule, the NATO and the MTO ground, naval, air, and logistical headquarters sought to locate close to the forces under their control. This led to better communications between these headquarters and their subordinate units. However, the wide dispersion of headquarters often hampered communication and coordination between the force headquarters and between the force headquarters and the theater headquarters. Liaison officers were assigned to improve communications between headquarters, but this method of achieving coordination tended to be unwieldy.

Planning was a given a high priority in the NATO and the MTO and was generally very good. The planning for operation Husky was a model of how to plan for a future operation while still conducting a major campaign. Unity of command was most effectively exercised at the planning stage. Once operations were underway, it was not easy to

implement previously unplanned joint or combined operations. This was shown by the Allied failure to halt the successful Axis evacuation of Sicily in August 1945.

The principle of unity of command when translated into practice tended to concentrate authority. For example, MTO was established by expanding NATO and bringing more forces under its control. However, there were also factors at work which encouraged the dispersion of authority. One was the limit of time and energy possessed by one person, General Eisenhower. Eisenhower created the position of deputy theater commander in the American theater in order to free himself from as many administrative burdens as possible. Another problem was the inefficiency caused by the great distances between decision makers and the geographical areas of their responsibilities. AFHQ's decision to decentralize a number of tasks to AAI in 1944 was due in part to the distance between Algiers and central Italy.

The final point to be made about the large unit structures examined in this chapter is that these structures were ultimately successful. While they were created quickly in response to unprecedented military challenges and may not have represented the ideal solutions for organizing the Allied military forces, these structures did accomplish the mission assigned to them--the defeat of Axis forces in North Africa and the Mediterranean area.

NOTES

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CHAPTER 3

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS UNITED STATES ARMY, WORLD WAR II: ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS*

Introduction

On 6 June 1944, an Allied Expeditionary Force of five divisions, organized into four corps, two field armies, and one army group landed on the German-occupied coast of Normandy. Eleven months later on 7 May 1945, when that force completed its mission, it included eighty-seven divisions organized into twenty-three corps, nine field armies, and three army groups. From the invasion to victory in Europe, the organization of the Allied Expeditionary Force changed and developed to accommodate the increasing number of units and to confront operational demands. Personalities also played a significant part in changing organizational structure at echelons above corps. The creation, functions, and relationships of field armies, army groups, and the supreme headquarters in the World War II European Theater of Operations revolved around the search for organizational structures capable of controlling Allied forces and defeating the enemy in Western Europe.

The requirement for proper organization of an army was evident long before World War II: "From a strategic point of view one should never ask what the strength of a division or corps ought to be. The proper question is how many divisions or corps an army should have."¹ The question posed here by Karl von Clausewitz faces all large armies. Finding the optimum command structure and organization for a particular mission requires a careful effort. The development of a command structure for the decisive battle against Germany on the European Continent in World War II began for the United States Army three years prior to the Normandy invasion.

A study of the organization of echelons above the corps in the European Theater of Operations United States Army in World War II can be divided into four periods. The first begins with the establishment of a prewar

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observer group in Great Britain and ends with the founding of the European Theater of Operations United States Army (ETOUSA) in June 1942. The second period commences with the founding of ETOUSA and ends with the foundation of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in January 1944. The third period covers from the founding of SHAEF to 1 September 1944, when SHAEF assumed ground command on the Continent of Europe. Finally, the fourth period goes from 1 September 1944 to the end of the war in Europe in May 1945. For purposes of this study, the third and fourth periods are most important because they include the activation of new field armies and army groups. However, an understanding of command relationships in the theater prior to the invasion is vital to an appreciation of later developments.

Organization: May 1941-June 1942

After the beginning of the conflict in Europe in September 1939, the United States sent an increasing number of military observers to the embassies abroad. One of these observers was Major General James E. Chaney, an Air Corps officer who arrived in England in October 1940 to study the aerial battles then in progress. In May 1941, as a result of the American-British Staff Conversations held in Washington, Chaney was selected to head the U.S. military mission in Britain, known as Special Observer Group or SPOBS. The functions of SPOBS were more than observation. Chaney was ordered to coordinate the reception of American forces sent to Great Britain and to establish channels of cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries.² SPOBS was a small group with many tasks, including preparing for U.S. forces to occupy Ireland and establishing a base in Northern Ireland.

Following the Pearl Harbor attack and the declaration of war between the United States and Germany, the War Department took the first step to establish a U.S. Army headquarters in Great Britain in January 1942, by activating the United States Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI) with Chaney as commander. USAFBI initially commanded all American forces in the British Isles and eventually became the European Theater of Operations. In January 1942, Headquarters, V Corps, was sent to Northern Ireland. Also, the first ground force command was established in Great Britain, United States Army Northern Ireland Force (USANIF). The V Corps served under USANIF. USANIF, including V Corps, was initially both a tactical and administrative headquarters.³

The organization of both USAFBI and USANIF was a prelude to increased commitment of American forces to Europe. Before that commitment could expand, combined command arrangements had to be made. American and British military leaders organized an overall command agency, the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs ordered a study of options for offensive action on the European Continent. Out of this study and at the urging of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, came the first definite plans for a large-scale, cross-channel invasion. The code name Bolero was given to the invasion buildup preparation, and an assault in Northwest Europe for 1943 was code-named Roundup.⁴

The United States was committed to a strategic policy of making its major military effort in the European theater and defeating Germany first. The creation of the Bolero plan involved a great buildup of American forces in Britain and an eventual invasion of the Continent. These plans clearly indicated the need for an agency to administer logistic preparations and for the creation of a full-scale theater of war which would adhere to the concept of unity of command. In May 1942, the Services of Supply (SOS) was established under the command of Major General John C. H. Lee. SOS was authorized to coordinate all logistic arrangements, supply, and administrative services for the soon to be created theater of war. Following the new 1942 War Department organization of three coordinate commands--one each for air, ground, and services--SOS would free the theater headquarters to be organized along the general pattern of a command post with a minimum of supply and administrative services.⁵

By the close of May 1942, the United States Army agreed to send ground forces to Britain for the purpose of invading the Continent. An agency to supply these forces was established. However, the need for the creation of a theater of war to replace USAFBI became evident. USAFBI was not created to handle large numbers of troops and lacked a specific mission statement. The inadequacies of USAFBI were clear to both its commander, Major General Chaney, and to a visitor to London from Washington, the chief of the War Department's Operations Division, Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower.⁶

Major General Eisenhower and General Marshall had both returned from inspection trips to England dissatisfied with the organization, approach, and leadership of USAFBI. On 8 June 1942, Eisenhower asked Marshall to read a draft directive for the commander of the European

Theater of Operations United States Army (ETOUSA), a name originated by Eisenhower. Eisenhower, in his draft directive, urged that absolute unity of command should be exercised by the theater commander. When Eisenhower gave the document to Marshall, he asked the chief of staff to study it carefully because it could be an important document. Marshall responded that he did, indeed, want to read it, for Eisenhower might be the man who executed it!⁷

On 8 June 1942, the War Department established the European Theater of Operations United States Army (ETOUSA). ETOUSA followed from USAFBI whose commander, Major General Chaney, became the first commander of ETOUSA. The directive creating ETOUSA was based in part on the one given General Pershing in World War I. The directive emphasized unity of command and charged the ETOUSA commander with the responsibilities of theater command over all U.S. forces assigned to the theater. The mission of the Commanding General ETOUSA was "To prepare for and carry on military operations in the European Theater against the Axis powers and their Allies, under strategical directives of the combined U.S.-British Chiefs of Staff."⁸ On 17 June, Eisenhower was assigned as Commanding General ETOUSA, the boundaries of which included most of Western Europe.

A little more than a year after the Special Observers Group began work in London, the United States Army had organized a full-scale operational theater of war and began to develop a buildup for an invasion of the Continent. It was a lasting organizational achievement, but the critical substances of war--operational plans and the tactical forces to carry them out--were still lacking.

Planning: June 1942-January 1944

The preparation and conduct of Allied operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean during 1942 and 1943 shifted the development of U.S. armies away from Britain. The invasion of North Africa, Torch, diverted Allied resources from the Bolero buildup. Delay continued as campaigns developed in Sicily and Italy. In August 1942, Lieutenant General Eisenhower was designated Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Forces for Torch. While conducting operations in North Africa, Eisenhower remained in command of ETOUSA, exercising command through a deputy until February 1943, when the North African Theater of Operations United States Army (NTOUSA) was established.

At this time Eisenhower became commander of NTOUSA and other officers assumed command of ETOUSA.⁹ Eisenhower did not resume command of ETOUSA until 16 January 1944.

Despite the postponement of a cross-channel invasion, preparations for operations on the Continent continued. Decisions reached at the Casablanca Conference, a meeting of the U.S. and British government heads and the Combined Chiefs of Staff in January 1943, emphasized a commitment to operations on the Continent. The conferees decided to resume the Bolero buildup, to have a united command with a Supreme Allied Commander, and to create a Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) to conduct preliminary planning for the cross-channel invasion. A British officer, Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan, was chosen to head the COSSAC staff. The appointment of a Supreme Commander was postponed until closer to the invasion date.¹⁰

The COSSAC staff developed the invasion plan, code-named Overlord. COSSAC's initial Overlord plan called for a three-division assault led by a British army commander. When an American army was established in France, Allied field command would shift to a British army group, which would continue to have operational control until either the capture of the Brittany peninsula or the establishment of a U.S. army group in France. The COSSAC planners envisioned having a British supreme commander and a larger initial British participation in the operation. Thus, they recommended a British chain of command.¹¹ The buildup of U.S. forces in Britain during 1943 altered the plan, but the emergence of conflicting demands over the nationality of commanders remained a controversial subject.

By August 1943, the need for the United States to develop command and organizational arrangements for the cross-channel invasion was apparent. ETOUSA had three major subordinate commands: Eighth Air Force, Services of Supply, and V Corps. As the highest ground force headquarters in the theater, V Corps was incapable of commanding and controlling the large forces which were organizing for the invasion, nor could it develop actual tactical battle plans for the invasion.¹²

In September 1943, General Marshall wrote a letter describing his concept of what the eventual organization of the European Theater should be like. Marshall raised two major subjects: first, "that all U.S. Army forces in the theater should be administered by one supreme U.S.

Headquarters under one commander," and second, "that field force commanders should be relieved of as many administrative responsibilities as possible." Marshall declared that Army group commanders and the Supreme Allied Commander were field force commanders.¹³ This letter firmly established that there would be an overall U.S. headquarters for operations on the Continent.

Another impetus to the creation of U.S. ground force commands came in July 1943 when the British established a skeleton organization for their total Overlord ground force command. The British activated Second British Army, First Canadian Army, and the 21st Army Group. Lieutenant General Morgan of COSSAC urged the Americans to create reciprocal headquarters to carry on detailed invasion planning and eventually command U.S. forces in the invasion.¹⁴

After some delay, the War Department moved to create a headquarters for a field army and army group. Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley was selected to organize and lead these organizations. Bradley led II Corps to victory in North Africa and Sicily, and he was pleased with his new assignment.¹⁵ After attending conferences in Washington, Bradley arrived in Britain in early October 1943 to begin his new tasks.

First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) was activated on 16 October 1943. First U.S. Army Group's initial mission was operational planning under the direction of ETOUSA. First U.S. Army (FUSA) was also activated in October 1943. FUSA took over operational control of all U.S. ground forces in Britain from V Corps. All ground forces were assigned to First Army instead of V Corps for administration and training. Bradley commanded both units. The 1st Army Group's main concern was planning, mainly with the British 21st Army Group. First Army became the overall U.S. field force headquarters in Great Britain and soon controlled four corps.¹⁶ First U.S. Army became the nucleus of the U.S. invasion force for operation Overlord (chart 1).

By the close of October 1943, both the U.S. and Britain had established an army group and field armies to plan for, train for, and conduct the actual invasion operation. The question of coalition command arrangements still remained unanswered. Two decisions facilitated invasion preparations but did not completely resolve the issue of ground force command.

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Abbreviation</u> | <u>Date Formed</u> |
|---|---------------------|--------------------|
| Special Observers Group | SPCBS | May 1941 |
| U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles | USAFBI | January 1942 |
| U.S. Army Northern Ireland Force | USANIF | January 1942 |
| European Theater of Operations U.S. Army | ETOUSA | June 1942 |
| Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (designate) | COSSAC | April 1943 |
| First U.S. Army Group | FUSAG | October 1943 |
| First U.S. Army | FUSA | October 1943 |

Chart 1. Predecessor Organizations to SHAEF

First, in November 1943, Lieutenant General Morgan, head of COSSAC, after conversations with General Marshall, announced the organization of ground forces for the assault. Acting for the Supreme Allied Commander (still unnamed), Morgan directed the 21st Army Group Commander, then British General Bernard Paget, along with the naval and air force commanders to plan the actual assault. The 21st Army Group Commander was also ordered to be responsible for execution of the operation, "until such time as the Supreme Allied Commander allocates an area of responsibility to the Commanding General, First Army Group." The 21st Army Group would have overall ground command in the invasion. The Commander of 21st Army Group was "made de facto commander of the ground forces in the assault but was never given the title of ground commander."¹⁷

American historians of the preinvasion command arrangements agree that the 21st Army Group commander was to be the overall ground commander only in the initial phase of the operation. His tenure was definitely limited to the early stages of Overlord.¹⁸ Unfortunately, a specific time was not chosen for the transfer of ground command from Commander, 21st Army Group to the Supreme Allied Commander.

In December 1943, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the Chief, Imperial General Staff, selected General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery to command 21st Army Group, replacing General Paget. Montgomery was selected because of his considerable combat experience as head of the British Eighth Army in Africa, Sicily, and Italy and because Churchill highly regarded him.¹⁹ Montgomery was a vain and egotistical man. His efforts to be named permanent Allied ground commander were to cause considerable tension among other Allied commanders.

A second important decision shaping Allied command was the selection of a Supreme Commander. The question of whether the Supreme Commander would be British or American was resolved at the Allied heads of state conference at Cairo late in 1943, when Marshal Joseph Stalin asked who would lead the cross-channel attack. Although General Marshall's name was frequently suggested for the position, President Franklin Roosevelt stated that he could not sleep at night with the Chief of Staff out of the country. On 7 December 1943, General Eisenhower was notified of his selection as Supreme Commander by President Roosevelt. Eisenhower assumed command of Allied

forces in mid-January 1944. His headquarters in England was designated Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)²⁰ (chart 2).


SHAEF took over the duties and staff of COSSAC, and Eisenhower also assumed command of ETOUSA for the second time. Thus, the U.S. Theater Commander was also the Supreme Allied Commander. A reorganization took place whereby SOS and ETOUSA were consolidated and the Commanding General, SOS, was named Deputy Theater Commander. By this reorganization, SHAEF exercised control over all ground tactical planning and operations, supplanting ETOUSA, which functioned mainly in the administrative and logistic areas.²¹ By early 1944, the organizational structure to carry out Overlord was nearly complete. Field army and army group headquarters were activated. Supreme Headquarters was operating and a Supreme Commander oversaw operational planning.

Preparation and Invasion: January 1944-September 1944

The third period in this study begins with the creation of SHAEF in January 1944 and concludes with the assumption of ground command by the SHAEF Commander on 1 September 1944. During this period Allied forces landed in Normandy and liberated most of France. They conducted operations according to the mission directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in February 1944. General Eisenhower was directed as follows:

1. You are hereby directed as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operations for the liberation of Europe from the Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.
2. Task. You will enter the continent of Europe, and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May 1944. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed to securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.²²

This directive left the Supreme Commander considerable freedom to exercise command of operations against Germany.



(Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 54)


Chart 2. Chain of Command, Allied Expeditionary Force, 13 February 1944

Serving under his command was the greatest Allied military force in history. The three elements of General Eisenhower's command were: the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, whose mission was to take the invasion forces to France; the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, which controlled the British and American tactical air forces; and the invasion ground force units of the British and American armies.

In January 1944, the American ground force organization included only the 1st Army Group and the First Army. To complete the headquarters required for the invasion and to administer the new divisions arriving in England another U.S. field army headquarters was established. Third U.S. Army Headquarters under command of Lieutenant General George S. Patton was created in late January. Army troops for the headquarters and the bulk of staff officers came from Third Army Headquarters in Texas where it had served as a training army. Lieutenant General Patton also brought a nucleus of staff officers from his Seventh Army in North Africa. Third Army served under the 1st Army Group. Lieutenant General Patton's presence in England was used to deceive the Germans into the belief there would be a second landing. Using false communications the Allies sought to convince the Germans Patton actually led another U.S. army group in Britain. With the establishment of Third U.S. Army, the combat command organization for Overlord was finalized.²³

Several months prior to the invasion, General Montgomery was selected to command Allied ground forces. On 1 June 1944, Eisenhower declared that "until several armies were deployed on a secure beachhead and until developing operations indicated the desirability of a command reorganization, all ground forces on the Continent [would be] under the Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group."²⁴ While the area of operations in Normandy was restricted and it was necessary to keep Supreme Headquarters in Britain, Eisenhower believed he must place control of the land battle with Montgomery. However, Eisenhower retained responsibility for approving major operational plans (chart 3).

The command of ground forces for Overlord was from the Supreme Commander to the 21st Army Group Commander to the First U.S. Army Commander and to the Second British Army Commander to corps and divisions. While both military and political considerations required the participation of both American and British troops in Overlord, the different administrative and logistical organizations of



3-12

(Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 159)

Chart 3. Operational Chain of Command, AEF, 1 April 1944

the U.S. and British armies meant that armies of one nationality would not pass through the beachhead established and controlled by the other. Thus, the two invasion armies used five separate beaches for their successful simultaneous landings on 6 June 1944²⁵ (chart 4).


The initial operational command arrangement was clearly delineated and successful. Logistic arrangements also adapted to the invasion. SOS was redesignated Communications Zone (COMZ). The change signified a shift from operating an extension of the zone of interior in Britain to providing logistical support for combat operations in France.²⁶

As Allied forces moved from Britain to France, the command structure expanded. On 14 July 1944, the First U.S. Army Group became the 12th Army Group. The 12th Army Group's mission was the same as that of the First U.S. Army Group--to prepare and conduct operations in accordance with directives from SHAEF. First U.S. Army Group continued to exist for purposes of deception to act as a phantom army group, fooling the Germans into believing there would be a second invasion. First U.S. Army Group was maintained on paper until 18 October 1944, when it was officially disbanded.²⁷

By mid-July the number of U.S. divisions in combat favored the formation of two armies, but the congested state of supply and the limited area for maneuver caused one army headquarters to remain in control. The plan for operation Cobra, the breakout of late July, influenced organizational arrangements because the operation should have been controlled by a single army commander. Planners expected divisions and corps to become mixed up, and one army commander could best rearrange them. However, when U.S. forces reached the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, two army headquarters were required to control divergent lines of advance. Accordingly, 1 August was selected as the best time to change to an army group organization.²⁸ On that date, the U.S. 12th Army Group became operational in France commanded by Lieutenant General Bradley. Because the advance element of SHAEF was not ready to move to the Continent, 12th Army Group remained under the temporary overall command of the British 21st Army Group.²⁹

An important date in the history of the command and organization of echelons above corps of the U.S. Army is 1 August 1944. On that date, the U.S. Army proved its

3-14



ability to adjust and enlarge its command arrangements. With 12th Army Group being operational, Bradley was replaced at First Army by his assistant in command, Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges (chart 5).

Also on 1 August, Third U.S. Army under Lieutenant General Patton became operational. Patton was ordered to form the six divisions on First Army's right into two corps while they were on the move. This was accomplished, and Patton controlled these two corps and two new corps formed of divisions brought from Britain.³⁰

It is important to stress the vital role played by a U.S. field army as both a combat and an administrative agency in World War II. The corps was a combat organization only, while for purposes of administration and supply, the army was supposed to bypass the corps. The organization of armies and corps was flexible and proved adaptable to changing circumstances in the campaigns in Europe during World War II.³¹

Before World War II, the American Army had little experience with army group command. During the final four weeks of World War I, in 1918, General John J. Pershing commanded an army group controlling the First and Second U.S. armies.³² According to pre-World War II U.S. Army doctrine, the army group commander "assigns tasks to his armies, leaving the details of execution to the army commander."³³ Lieutenant General Bradley believed that he was free, in terms of tactics, to command 12th Army Group as he wished. Bradley gave broad missions to his field army commanders and closely controlled the execution of the mission.³⁴

To effectively command 12th Army Group, Bradley divided his headquarters into three sections. The 12th Army Group's code name was Eagle, so the three sections were named Eagle Tac, Eagle Main, and Eagle Rear. Eagle Tac was a highly mobile forward command headquarters outfitted in vans. Eagle Tac began with 200 officers and men and within three months grew to 400.³⁵ Eagle Tac was established because Bradley "intended to keep up a fast pace and stay close to the front whenever the tactical situation permitted."³⁶ Eagle Main and Eagle Rear were large staff and support headquarters which operated from buildings in the rear area. Eagle Tac closely followed its armies, making ten moves forward, while Main and Rear made four moves.³⁷ At its peak 12th Army Group numbered 1.3 million men and was the largest force ever commanded by an American field commander.




Chart 5. Chain of Command, Allied Expeditionary Force, 1 August 1944


The activation of 12th Army Group produced a curious command situation. While Bradley controlled the U.S. zone in France, including the COMZ, overall control of operations of the ground forces rested with General Montgomery, the commander of the British 21st Army Group. This situation brought a critical response from the American press and prompted General Marshall to urge General Eisenhower to promptly establish SHAEF Headquarters on the Continent and assume the ground command. While startled by this criticism, Eisenhower agreed SHAEF should move to the Continent as soon as the establishment of communication links would permit; this was planned for 1 September. On that date SHAEF became operational on the Continent and the Supreme Commander assumed direct operational command of both army groups.³⁸

The Advance to Victory: September 1944-May 1945

When SHAEF became operational, its forces consisted of two army groups, 21st and 12th, and four armies, First U.S., Third U.S., First Canadian, and Second British. Another army group and three armies soon were added to the SHAEF force structure. One of the additional armies was the Ninth, commanded by Lieutenant General William H. Simpson. It became operational on 5 September 1944 and was assigned to the 12th Army Group. The Ninth U.S. Army took over control of the forces in the Brittany peninsula which had been part of Third Army, even though General Patton and most of his forces were on the opposite side of France. The other two armies and the army group which joined SHAEF came from the Southern France invasion force³⁹ (chart 6).

On 15 August 1944, the Seventh U.S. Army invaded Southern France. Initially, Seventh Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch, controlled both U.S. and French invasion forces. Overall operational control of Seventh Army was with the Strategic Allied Command in the Mediterranean, and logistic support came from North African Theater of Operations U.S. Army (NATOUSA). As these forces advanced inland, they were to be transferred to Eisenhower's command. To facilitate this transfer and to eventually command the Seventh Army and a French Army, the 6th U.S. Army Group was activated on 1 August in Corsica under the command of Lieutenant General J. L. Devers. The invasion of Southern France was a success, and the forces made rapid progress. On 11 September, elements of French Army B met the French 2d Armored Division of the Third U.S. Army.⁴⁰ On

3-100



(Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 262)

Chart 6. Operational Chain of Command, AEF, 1 September 1944

15 September, Headquarters, 6th Army Group, assumed control of the Seventh U.S. Army and the First French Army, which was organized from French elements with the Seventh Army. Also on 15 September, command of the 6th Army Group passed to the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower.⁴¹

Logistic Arrangements

As the armies advanced across France and into Germany, the COMZ expanded behind them, controlling supply and administration. The COMZ was both a geographic area to the rear of army areas of responsibility and an organization subordinate to ETOUSA responsible for logistic support of American armies on the Continent. Throughout the campaigns in Europe during World War II, there was confusion and overlap between theater and COMZ organization.⁴²

The American section of SHAEF attempted to act as a theater staff, since Eisenhower was both theater commander and Allied commander. Field commanders faced poorly defined lines of authority on logistic issues because of the confusion between theater and communications zone staffs. Communications zones developed a massive infrastructure with immense support demands of its own. When COMZ moved its headquarters to Paris in September 1944, valuable truck and plane transports were diverted from supplying the field armies at a time when supplies were short. This restricted offensive actions. A Southern Line of Communications developed after the invasion of southern France and the organization of 6th Army Groups. It operated until February 1945 as a separate but subordinate headquarters of COMZ.⁴³

COMZ developed its organization as the armies advanced to Germany. COMZ established a territorial organization which ultimately included three base sections, two intermediate sections, and two advance sections. Advance sections were the first to be established on the Continent. They served as advance subcommands of COMZ in close support of the field armies. They provided an immediate supply source. Intermediate sections were established between advance and base sections to handle communications, transportation, and supplies. Base sections were established at Brittany, Normandy, and the Channel coast, where ports were located.⁴⁴ When COMZ sections were firmly established, they enabled the logisticians to fully support the drive into Germany.

Ground and Air Operations

A brief examination of air force support for ground operations in ETOUSA should evaluate command and control of tactical and strategic air elements and the use of air assets in tactical roles. The 1943 doctrine defined the principal tasks of air forces supporting ground operations. In order of priority these were (1) to establish and maintain control of the air in the critical area for the purpose of eliminating the enemy's capacity to interfere from the air; (2) to isolate the battlefield by interdicting enemy movements of troops and supplies; and (3) to render immediate support to the ground forces on the battlefield. To carry out these missions, air forces were doctrinally coequal to land forces, neither force being an auxiliary of the other.⁴⁵

To implement this doctrine in support of the SHAEF mission, new commands were established and command and control questions resolved. At British request, U.S. and British tactical air forces came under a single Allied command. With the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, COSSAC in November 1943 directed RAF Air Chief Marshall Leigh Mallory to establish the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF). AEAF served under the Supreme Allied Commander and gave him operational control over the British and American tactical air forces committed to the invasion. The Ninth U.S. Tactical Air Force came under the operational command of AEAF. However, due to the personality of the AEAF Commander and the resistance of the U.S. Air Force to accept his direction, the need arose for reorganization. Allied Expeditionary Air Force was dissolved on 15 October 1944, and its functions were assumed by SHAEF. AEAF was unsuccessful as a combined command, but the tactical air forces did develop effective means of cooperation with ground forces.⁴⁶

In 1944 the largest single advantage the Allies had over the Germans was command of the air. General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander sought to utilize air power to assure the success of the invasion, and he demanded that the strategic air forces be placed under this command. The British, particularly RAF Bomber Command, sought to remain independent to carry out their bombing offensive. Eventually, Eisenhower gained direction of all strategic air operations.⁴⁷ He utilized control of strategic air power to isolate the invasion area, destroy the German Air Force, and aid the ground forces to breakout. After the Allied forces were

established on the Continent, the Combined Chiefs of Staff in September 1944 removed the strategic air forces from direct command by SHAEF.⁴⁸

The tactical air forces remained under SHAEF command, and they developed means of cooperation with Army groups and U.S. field armies. To support the American ground forces, Ninth Air Force became the most powerful single tactical air force engaged in operations during World War II. The IX Tactical Command (TAC), led by Major General Elwood R. (Pete) Quesada, and the XIX Tactical Command, led by Brigadier General Otto P. Weyland, cooperated closely with ground forces from Normandy to Germany. Ninth Air Force maintained advanced headquarters alongside those of 12th Army Group. Each American field army had a tactical air command in direct support, and flexibility was maintained to support developing operations by transferring units between air commands.⁴⁹

The IX, XI, XIX, and XXIX Tactical Air commands supported, respectively, the First, Seventh, Third, and Ninth armies. Requests for air support went from an air support officer at division headquarters to the G3 Air Section at army headquarters for transmission to the tactical air command. The forward air headquarters, usually located at army headquarters, decided on the feasibility of a mission and assigned aircraft to conduct it.⁵⁰ If weather cooperated, the American armies could depend on powerful close air support facilitated by close air-ground cooperation.

Additional Armies and Command Changes

An important addition to the SHAEF forces came from the establishment of the First Allied Airborne Army in August 1944. The First Allied Airborne Army was formed as a major command operationally subordinate to SHAEF and not under an Army group. The Airborne Army was established to coordinate the air and ground forces required for airborne operations. To assist in the conduct of airborne operations and to simplify command difficulties, the Airborne Army was an integrated U.S.-British headquarters. The U.S. components of the First Allied Airborne Army were administered by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, and the British components by the 21st Army Group. Upon commitment of its airborne troops, the First Allied Airborne Army was habitually relieved of command of the troops, and they became components of the army in whose zone they were dropped. This command was


composed of the XVIII U.S. Airborne Corps with the 82d, 101st, 17th, and 13th U.S. Airborne divisions, the British Airborne Command with the 1st and 6th British Airborne divisions, the IX U.S. Troop Carrier Command, and two Royal Air Force groups⁵¹ (chart 7).

For administrative purposes, in September 1944, the 21st, 12th, and 6th Army groups were designated as the Northern, Central, and Southern groups of armies respectively. This had no effect on the operations of their headquarters or the numerical designations, and no new headquarters were established under these titles. The 21st Army Group consisted of the First Canadian and Second British armies. The 12th Army Group consisted of the First, Third, Ninth, and the new Fifteenth U.S. armies, and the 6th Army Group was made up of the Seventh U.S. and First French armies.⁵²

The Fifteenth Army, the final U.S. Army for ETOUSA, was activated in the United States in August 1944 and began operations in Britain in late November. The Fifteenth Army became operational on the Continent on 6 January 1945, and Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow became its commander.⁵³ Fifteenth Army became responsible for the coordination of all movement of field force units from the beaches to army areas. In March it took over control of containing forces in Brittany and in April the occupation of the Rhineland. Besides occupational duties, Fifteenth Army did not have operational responsibilities for the offensive in Germany. Fifteenth Army never had more than two corps assigned to it. The Army was used to prepare forces for occupational responsibilities following the defeat of Germany.⁵⁴

Prior to assuming operational control of his army groups on the Continent, the Supreme Commander declared that the Allied "command system has functioned exactly as planned and in accordance with the tactical and strategic situation." General Eisenhower asserted that "no hitches have occurred and no frictions that I know of have developed."⁵⁵ Eisenhower's optimism was merited after the successful Allied pursuit across France. However, as Eisenhower gathered his armies for the attack on Germany, his optimism was soon tarnished by forces within and without the Allied camp.

The force within was Field Marshal Montgomery, Commander of 21st Army Group.⁵⁶ Montgomery's conflict with Eisenhower involved a personality clash, strategic



(Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 270)


Chart 7. Operational Channels, First Allied Airborne Army, 28 November 1944

differences, and differing philosophies of command. Montgomery continually urged that he be made the sole ground force commander, leaving the Supreme Commander on a higher strategic level. This Eisenhower rejected, and the tension between the two men continued until the end of the war.⁵⁷

General Eisenhower, in December 1944, carried a large burden as the Theater Army Commander, SHAEF Commander, Supreme Allied Commander, and head of ETOUSA. Eisenhower realized that he had many more burdens than his field army and army group commanders. He informed General Marshall that his (Eisenhower's) visits to various lower headquarters had shown him that the corps, army, and army group commanders were standing up well because they had only to worry about tactics and local maintenance. According to Eisenhower, these commanders did not have "to burden themselves with politics, priorities, shipping, and Maquis" on the one hand, and they did not have to undergo the "more direct battle strains of a division commander on the other."⁵⁸

A major realignment of commands occurred in December 1944 as a result of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, known as the Battle of the Bulge. The German counteroffensive never came close to reaching its goal of Antwerp and the division of Allied forces. The counteroffensive did catch the Allies weak and unprepared in the Ardennes, and the Germans were able to achieve surprise and penetrate over fifty miles beyond the Allied front line. The bulge which formed separated Lieutenant General Bradley's 12th Army Group Headquarters on the southern flank of the salient from the major part of the First U.S. Army and the Ninth U.S. Army, which were located on the northern flank. Communications between group and army headquarters were cut. To remedy this situation, Eisenhower's staff recommended that the American Ninth and First armies be shifted to the command of Montgomery's 21st Army Group which was in the north. On 20 December 1944, Eisenhower ordered the shift of forces⁵⁹ (chart 8).

This change in command left Lieutenant General Bradley in control of only one army, the Third, while placing four armies under Field Marshal Montgomery's control. Bradley claims he made one of his biggest mistakes of the war by failing to resist the command change. "Giving Monty operational control of my First and Ninth armies," Bradley confided later, "was the worst possible mistake Ike could



(Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 379)

Chart 8. Operational Chain of Command, AEF, 18 December 1944

have made."⁶⁰ Indeed, while Montgomery continued to assert his strategic and command concepts, he failed to destroy the German forces in the Ardennes.


When contact between the First and Third armies was renewed after reduction of the German salient in the Ardennes, command of First Army reverted to Bradley. However, the Ninth Army remained under Montgomery until the reduction of the Ruhr pocket was completed in 1945 (chart 9).

The shift of armies in December 1944 reveals both strengths and weaknesses in the Allied command system. The flexibility of the system was clearly evident in the ease with which armies could be moved among army groups. The Allied Expeditionary Force chain of command was adaptable to changing circumstances. On the other hand, differing personalities and nationalities bred distrust among the Army group headquarters and between those headquarters and SHAEF.

By the end of March 1945, the Allied armies had crossed the Rhine River in force and were conducting offensive operations in Germany (chart 10). These offensives led to the end of the war in Germany. On 7 May 1945, Eisenhower submitted a terse but accurate message to the Combined Chiefs of Staff: "The mission of this Allied Force was fulfilled at 0241 local time."⁶¹ The role of Allied field army commanders now changed to that of occupational authorities and military governors. Their primary mission was complete. The three army groups and nine field armies were separated from the Allied Expeditionary Force and either dissolved or prepared for other duties.


Conclusion

The establishment and organization of echelons above corps in ETOUSA took place during four periods. A theater organization developed during the first period, which culminated in the creation of ETOUSA in June 1942. During the second period, the Allies established organizations to plan for the invasion of the Continent. The third period began with the founding of SHAEF in September 1944 and concluded with SHAEF's assumption of ground command. SHAEF governed preparation for the greatest successful military invasion in history. During the fourth period, which concluded with V-E Day, new armies joined the Allied command, advanced across France, and were victorious



(Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 428)

Chart 9. Operational Chain of Command, AEF, 27 March 1945



(Pogue, The Supreme Command, p. 455)

Chart 10. Operational Chain of Command, AEF, 1 May 1945

against Germany. There are several reasons which account for the successful organization and operation of echelons above corps in ETOUSA. First and foremost, the Allied civilian and military leaders accepted and adhered to the principle of unity of command. The Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, always supported unity of command. Second, ETOUSA became a mature theater of war. Logical progression of planning and preparation led to a successful 6 June 1944 invasion. The invasion armies had time prior to combat in France to organize, plan, and prepare for the test of combat. Many commanders gained experience in other theaters of war before facing the challenges on the Continent.

A third reason for success was the combined command of SHAEF. Despite personal jealousies and squabbles between commanders over issues both significant and otherwise, and in the face of rivalries and contentions based on nationality or branch of service, SHAEF was a successful combined command. SHAEF accomplished its mission because it united sea, air, and ground power. There were problems in maximizing air and logistic support, but these problems were either overcome or were not allowed to become crucial. SHAEF logically arranged its armies by nationality, yet maintained flexibility by allowing divisions of one nationality to serve in corps or armies of another when circumstances demanded it.

SHAEF was a combined operational command for ETOUSA. Logistics and administration were the responsibility of Britain, and the U.S. utilized ETOUSA and the COMZ for these purposes. This arrangement worked, although not without difficulties and some confusion in the logistics area.

During World War II, the United States created a theater of operations in Europe, participated in a unified combined command, and fielded and supported three army group headquarters and six field armies. The United States Army in Europe was America's largest and best organized fighting force.

NOTES

1. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 293.
2. Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol. 1 May 1941-September 1944, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953), 13-21.
3. Ibid., 23.
4. Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954), 100.
5. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 36. Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) John C. H. Lee had a high opinion of himself. Lee's critics gave him a nickname based on his initials, J.C.H.- "Jesus Christ Himself."
6. Ibid., 39.
7. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Vol. 1, Soldier, General of the Army, President Elect, 1890-1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 152-53.
8. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 39-40; Report of the General Board, United States Forces European Theater, Study of the Organization of the European Theater of Operations, Study No. 2: 39 (hereafter cited as Report of the General Board, 2).
9. Pogue, Supreme Command, 100-101. Col. William R. Wendt et al., "Organization and Command Relationships During World War II," A committee study done at the U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, 17 December 1951.
10. Pogue, Supreme Command, 25, 103.
11. Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951), 107.
12. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 190.
13. Gen G. C. Marshall to Lt. Gen. J. L. Devers, 24 September 1943. Extracts of the letter are in: Robert W. Coakley, The Administrative and Logistical

- History of the European Theater of Operations, Pt. 2, Organization and Command in the European Theater of Operations, unpublished manuscript prepared by the Historical Division, U.S. Army Forces, European Theater (hereafter cited as Coakley, "Organization and Command").
14. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 191.
 15. Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 207.
 16. Report of the General Board, 2: 47-48; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 191. The four corps were V, VII, VIII, and XV.
 17. Pogue, Supreme Command, 45.
 18. Ibid.; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 115-18; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 194.
 19. Nigel Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War Years, 1942-1944 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), chap. 6, "Who Will Command OVERLORD?" See also Pogue, Supreme Command, 49.
 20. Pogue, Supreme Command, 24-63. The SHAEF Deputy Supreme Commander was Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur W. Tedder. Gen. Eisenhower chose Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith as Chief of Staff of SHAEF. Eisenhower trusted and utilized both officers.
 21. Report of the General Board, 2: 50; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 201.
 22. Pogue, Supreme Command, 53. The directive was issued on 12 February 1944.
 23. Coakley, "Organization and Command," 40-44; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 203.
 24. Pogue, Supreme Command, 180.
 25. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, 106.
 26. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 206.
 27. Coakley, "Organization and Command," 154-55.
 28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 156.
30. Pogue, Supreme Command, 204.
31. Kent Roberts Greenfield et al., The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Historical Division, U.S. Army, 1947), 364-65.
32. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 385.
33. U.S. War Department, A Manual for Commanders of Large Units (Provisional), Vol. 1, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1930), 13-14.
34. Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 283-84.
35. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt, 1951), 362.
36. Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 284.
37. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, 362. Other codes names were: Lion for 21st Army Group, Master for First U.S. Army, Lucky for Third U.S. Army, and Conquer for Ninth Army.
38. Pogue, Supreme Command, 263-65.
39. Ibid., 265.
40. Coakley, "Organization and Command," 226-31.
41. Report of the General Board, 2: 26.
42. James A. Houston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775-1953 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), 530-31.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.; Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, 211-19.
45. FM 100-20, 21 July 1943, quoted in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 3: 186, 807.
46. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, 2: 739-40, 3: 620-23; Pogue, Supreme Command, 274-75.

47. Eisenhower threatened to resign as Supreme Commander unless the bombers came under his command. Ambrose, Eisenhower, 1890-1952, 287; Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, 3: 79-83.
48. Pogue, Supreme Command, 272-74.
49. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, 3: 107-13, 243-45, 597.
50. Charles P. MacDonald, The Last Offensive, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1973), 13-14.
51. Ibid., 26; Pogue, Supreme Command, 269-71. Originally named the Combined Airborne Headquarters, it was renamed the First Allied Airborne Army at the suggestion of its commander Lt. Gen. Lewis A. Brereton, former commander of the Ninth Air Force.
52. Report of the General Board, 2: 26.
53. Pogue, Supreme Command, 266-67.
54. Coakley, "Organization and Command," 264.
55. Gen. Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 23 August 1944, in Ibid., 162.
56. Montgomery was promoted to Field Marshall on 1 September 1944. His official biographer claims it was for having won "the greatest battle of the war in the west." Hamilton, Master, 833. Lt. Gen. Bradley believed Montgomery was promoted so that Eisenhower's assumption of ground command would not be perceived as a demotion for Montgomery. Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 321.
57. Stephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969, 1970), 561-76.
58. Pogue, Supreme Command, 315. On 16 December 1944, Eisenhower was promoted to the newly created five star rank General of the Army. This made him equal in rank to Marshall and Montgomery.
59. Ibid., 378.
60. Bradley and Blair, A General's Life, 363-68.
61. Ambrose, Eisenhower, 1890-1952, 407.

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CHAPTER 4

DIVIDED COMMAND IN THE PACIFIC: SWPA AND POA*


In 1942 the United States assumed primary responsibility for the war effort in the Pacific, yet interservice rivalry between the Army and the Navy prevented the creation of a unified command for the entire region. Instead, what resulted was the establishment of two separate and distinct theaters with each service in command of its own area. Divided command in the Pacific proved a constant problem, especially in major operations that involved combat forces from both theaters. Unity of command within each theater, however, allowed the theater commander to organize and use his land, naval, and air forces in ways that he thought would best prosecute the war against Japan. As a result of this arrangement, distinct differences in high command developed between the two theaters, and the purpose of this study is to examine those differences, while at the same time paying due regard to the similarities.

Creation of Two Theaters

The division of responsibility in existence in the Pacific before Pearl Harbor remained a salient feature of the U. S. war effort throughout the period 1941 to 1945. At the outbreak of the conflict, the United States possessed four major commands: the United States Army Forces in the Far East, the Asiatic Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, and the Hawaiian Department (the former two located in the Philippines and the latter two in Hawaii). In the face of the Japanese advance, Washington joined on 10 January 1942 with other concerned parties in establishing the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM), an Allied and joint command under British General Wavell, who in the capacity of Supreme Commander reported directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (see chart 1). ABDACOM lasted barely two months, however, crumbling under the pressure of Japanese victories as it attempted to muster sufficient forces to defeat the enemy. A new command emerged in the wake of its collapse

*Written by Dr. George W. Gawrych.

4-2



(Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 169)


Chart 1. Organization of ABDACOM, January-February 1942

prompted by Britain's decision to abandon its primary role in the Southwest Pacific so that it could concentrate its efforts in the Indian theater. The Pacific Ocean, thus, became an area of exclusive American responsibility under the direction of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).¹

Left with this mission, the JCS proved unsuccessful in establishing a unified command for the Pacific, as both the Army and the Navy wanted to be in charge, and neither side was willing to make a major concession. To solve this impasse in a diplomatic manner, the JCS on 30 March 1942 divided the Pacific into two separate and distinct theaters. General Douglas MacArthur, who recently had escaped from the Philippines, became the Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), whereas Admiral Chester Nimitz received the designation Commander in Chief of the Pacific Ocean Area (POA). JCS directives specified that MacArthur and Nimitz were to report to the JCS, who exercised jurisdiction over operational strategy for both theaters. Orders from JCS went through the head of each service, so that MacArthur received his instructions from General Marshall, the chief of staff, and Nimitz his orders from Admiral King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. Command in the Pacific was thus clearly divided according to geographic areas of responsibility.²


The JCS assigned MacArthur a joint and allied command with SWPA also comprising a U.S. Army theater. MacArthur thus came to occupy a dual position as commander of an Allied theater and as commander of U.S. Army forces in SWPA. The JCS directive creating SWPA enjoined MacArthur from directly commanding any national forces or interfering with their internal administration. This arrangement reflected the realization that at the onset sizable human resources in SWPA would come from the Australians, the British, and the Dutch. In POA, on the other hand, Nimitz received a different command structure. His area was divided into three subordinate regions: the North, Central, and South Pacific (see map). Nimitz was to exercise direct command of all forces in the first two areas, but in the South Pacific, he had to work through a regional (subtheater) commander, eventually Admiral Halsey³ (see chart 2). The composition of forces was overwhelmingly American, thus making POA more a U.S. joint theater rather than an Allied command.

The creation of SWPA and POA caused competition over resources and divided military effort. Serious problems arose when forces from both theaters joined together in



Louis Morton, Pacific Command: A Study in Interservice Relations, Boulder, Colorado: U.S. Air Force Academy, 1961)

Map 1. Pacific Areas of Operation



11-5

(Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 254)

Chart 2. Command Organization in the Pacific, July 1942

one operation. In the conflict over Leyte Gulf, two American fleets were under the separate commands of MacArthur and Nimitz, a situation that nearly produced disaster. In the engagement, Admiral Halsey, who remained under Nimitz's command, moved his naval forces to the north without informing Admiral Kinkaid, whose own task group was under MacArthur's control. This move exposed Kinkaid's flank and jeopardized the entire operation.

Sharing military forces between theaters presented another source of tension. MacArthur, for example, borrowed naval and army (XXIV Corps) units from POA, and his refusal to release ships on schedule weakened naval gunfire in support of the Marine landings on Iwo Jima. This may well have contributed to high casualties as claimed by the Marine Commander, General Holland Smith.⁴ The problem of unity of command plagued the American war effort in the Pacific up to and including the planning for the invasion of Japan.

Command and Organization within Each Theater


MacArthur and Nimitz organized command differently in their respective areas of responsibility. MacArthur established his headquarters--initially located in Melbourne and then moved to Brisbane--and created three separate commands: Allied Land, Air, and Naval Forces. Allied Land Forces went to General Thomas Blamey, an Australian, who exercised tactical control through task forces created for each campaign, whereas Americans commanded Allied Naval and Allied Air Forces. For purposes of operational control, MacArthur exercised command through these three commanders⁵ (see chart 2).

After the establishment of SWPA under his command, MacArthur moved to address the problems of administration and supply for American forces in the theater. On 20 July 1942, he redesignated U.S. Army Forces in Australia, originally formed to be an air and supply base for the Philippines, as U.S. Army Services of Supply (USASOS). Its mission was to serve as the administrative and service agency for all American units, with the exception of certain air elements. Operational control of all American ground troops remained with Blamey, the Commanding General of Allied Land Forces. As the American war effort grew in the theater, MacArthur's general staff faced increasing administrative and operational duties. To relieve his general staff of its heavy workload, MacArthur established on 27 February 1943, the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East

(USAFFE) as his administrative command. USAFFE, thus, became the highest American headquarters in SWPA, functioning as a theater army with a separate headquarters but with no tactical combat mission.⁶ As a result of this reorganization, MacArthur strengthened his direct control over U.S. ground and air units by assuming two hats. As Commanding General, SWPA, he exercised operational but not administrative control over ground, air, and sea forces of the United States, Australia, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. In his capacity of Commanding General, USAFFE, he possessed administrative command of all major American elements. By late 1944, this included the Sixth and Eighth Armies, the Far East Air Forces, and USASOS, the latter continuing to function as the support agency for U.S. ground troops⁷ (see chart 3).

In theory, SWPA constituted an Allied and a joint command, but MacArthur avoided forming a joint staff and instead staffed his headquarters with army officers. General Headquarters, SWPA, thus functioned as a U.S. Army staff, with liaison officers from the other services and nationals.⁸ Rear Admiral Raymond Tarbuch, who served in SWPA as chief naval advisor and naval liaison officer at GHQ from mid-1943 to late 1944, complained of the "Army mentality" prevalent among the MacArthur staff.⁹

As the war dragged on and the United States committed more forces to SWPA, air forces and naval forces remained under Allied commanders, whereas MacArthur slowly reorganized land forces so as to bypass Blamey. At first, the only combat units available to MacArthur were the 41st Division (U.S.) and two Australian divisions (less two brigades in Ceylon). In July 1942, JCS approved the formation of a corps headquarters under Major General Robert L. Eichelberger, who found himself under Blamey's command. At the beginning of 1943, the Sixth Army was constituted under Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, but in order to avoid placing such a large American force under the operational control of General Blamey, MacArthur conveniently transformed the Sixth Army into Alamo Force (April 1943), under his own direct command. This ensured that Sixth Army never came under Blamey's control. It also meant that the Australian general's task forces became increasingly Australian in composition. The hollowness of the title Allied Land Forces Commander in charge of all ground troops became even more apparent after the South Pacific Area was closed as a combat area and most of the army units, including XIV Corps, went to SWPA. The addition of forces to SWPA together with the planned invasion of the Philippines created the need for a



(Smith, Triumph, p. 660)

Chart 3. Generalized Organization of the Southwest Pacific Area, December 1944


reorganization of command. MacArthur dissolved Alamo Force on 25 September 1944 and from that time on issued orders directly from general headquarters to headquarters, with Sixth Army ignoring Blamey completely. MacArthur employed the same procedure for the Eighth Army when it went into the field under General Eichelberger. Americans, thus, were no longer to serve under Australian command.¹⁰

At Leyte, on the assault day of 20 October 1944, MacArthur was able for the first time to commit a field army into battle. Sixth Army began the operation and Eighth Army took control of the mopping up phase on 26 December, thus freeing Krueger to move on Luzon. Krueger invaded Leyte with two corps--X and XXIV with a strength of 53,000 and 51,500 respectively--supported by two reserve divisions (32d at 14,500 and the 77th at 14,000 soldiers). The total number of ground troops under his command was around 202,500. For the invasion of Luzon, MacArthur released the X and XXIV Corps to Eichelberger for the completion of the Leyte campaign and gave I and XIV Corps to Krueger as the main units for the reconquest of Luzon. At this time, Eichelberger gained three army corps under his command, though he relinquished operational control of XI Corps to Krueger for Luzon. Throughout the Philippines campaign, MacArthur chose not to form an army group headquarters, instead preferring to exercise direct operational control over both field armies (see chart 3).

Just as SWPA evolved into a U.S. Army operation, so the war in POA developed into a U.S. naval enterprise, with Admiral Nimitz as the theater commander. Naval commanders exercised operational control over Army forces throughout the war. The only employment of a field army in POA occurred in the Central Pacific when the Tenth Army took part in the Ryukyus campaign. Activated on 20 June 1944 at Ft. Houston, it passed to the command of Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., who had been in charge of the Alaska Defense Command. Among the major units involved in the Ryukyus operation were the XXIV Corps, released from action in the Philippines on 10 February 1945, and the III Amphibious Corps (Marine). The size of the total force numbered around 183,000 personnel for the assault phases, with approximately 154,000 men in seven combat divisions. The 81st Division was excluded as it remained in New Caledonia¹¹ (see chart 4).

The Tenth Army differed in several respects from field armies in other theaters, including those employed in

4-10



Source: Commander Task Force 51, Commander Amphibious Forces, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Report on Okinawa Gunto Operations from 17 February to 17 May 1945, Part I, pp. 2-4; Tenth Army Action Report Ryukyus, 26 March to 30 June 1945, Ch. 2; Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, April 1945.

(Appleman, Okinawa, p. 24)

Chart 4. Organization of Expeditionary Troops for the Ryukyus Campaign, January 1945

Europe and the Mediterranean. First of all, Tenth Army remained under the operational direction of a naval commander throughout its land campaign. Second, unlike the Sixth or Eighth armies, it constituted a joint task force containing Marine (III Amphibious Corps), Navy (Naval Forces, Ryukyus), and Air (Tactical Air Force, Ryukyus, under a Marine major general) elements under its direct command. Third, as a result of this mixture of forces from different services, Buckner organized his staff to include naval and marine officers.¹² (Other differences concerned responsibility for logistics and base development, which will be discussed below.)

A study of field armies in the Pacific during World War II thus presents a nice, comparative framework for analysis owing to the fact that the Army and the Navy assigned to their respective field armies different command structures and organizations. Sixth and Eighth armies were composed of army units, whereas Tenth Army was a joint command.

Command Relationships in Amphibious Operations

As noted by Eichelberger, "Every troop movement in the Pacific depended upon Navy and the Air for success."¹³ Over a forty-one day period, for example, the Eighth Army conducted fourteen major landings and twenty-four minor ones, all supported by ships.¹⁴ This island hopping warfare meant that naval forces had to be used in initial phases of operations and demanded the employment of naval amphibious doctrine. Here, again, differences existed between the two theaters.

In SWPA, Vice Admiral Kinkaid, who commanded Allied Naval Forces, doubled as the head of task forces. In the Leyte assault, he was in charge of Task Force 77 that contained combat, transport, and cargo ships of the Seventh Fleet. He divided Task Force 77 into two smaller attack forces: Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey, in charge of Task Force 78, transported and supported Major General I. P. Swift's I Corps; while Rear Admiral Theodore Wilkinson, with Task Force 79, carried the XIV Corps of Major General O. W. Griswold to shore. General Krueger, Commanding General, VI Army, assumed control of ground troops only upon his arrival on shore and after notifying Kinkaid.¹⁵ In practice, however, during the amphibious phase, Kinkaid refrained from issuing orders to land forces without prior consultation with Krueger.¹⁶ General George Kenney, who controlled Army Air Forces,


deployed American air elements in a manner similar to that of the Navy. On Luzon, for example, when both field armies were simultaneously in action, Kenney assigned General Wurtsmith's Thirteenth Air Force to work with Eichelberger and Whitehead's Fifth Air Force to work with Krueger.¹⁷ Liaison officers from the three services provided the cohesion necessary for the operations involving Army, Navy, and Air forces.

During landing operations in SWPA, control transferred from naval to ground commanders, starting from the bottom and moving upwards. When an infantry division commander assumed control ashore, he passed from the control of the task group commander to that of the next higher level of naval command, the task force. A commanding general of a corps, upon setting foot on land, moved from under the immediate authority of the amphibious task force commander to that of Admiral Kinkaid. Kinkaid kept command of both naval and land elements, reporting directly to MacArthur, until Krueger landed and established a functioning headquarters for the Sixth Army. At that point, Krueger directed land operations under MacArthur's authority.¹⁸ On Leyte, Krueger assumed command of Sixth Army on 24 October, four days after the initial landing of American troops.¹⁹

Matters worked somewhat differently in POA, indicating the Navy's own unique practice. For Operation Iceberg (Ryukyus), Nimitz placed Admiral Spruance, Commander in Chief of the Central Pacific Task Forces, in overall command of the amphibious operations, in addition to his responsibility for all naval forces in the subtheater. Admiral Turner, in turn, headed the Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 51) composed of Army, Navy, and Marine elements, whose mission was to capture and develop Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyus chain (see chart 5). SWPA did not employ such a system. If Kinkaid had done so for Luzon, this would have meant remaining in charge of the amphibious phase while another naval commander, using a separate headquarters and staff, would have been in charge of the land operations proper. Kinkaid declined to do this, instead choosing to follow SWPA practice.²⁰

In the battle of Okinawa, Task Force 55 and Task Force 53, both under rear admirals, handled the landings of XXIV Corps and III Amphibious Corps respectively. Lieutenant General Buckner, the highest ranking army officer, commanded Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56), which once ashore became Tenth Army. During the amphibious phases of the Ryukyus campaign, Buckner reported directly to Turner,

4-13



Source: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas, April 1945, Plates I and II, opp. p. 76 (with adaptations).

(Appleman, Okinawa, p. 22)

Chart 5. Organization of Central Pacific Task Forces for the Ryukyus Campaign, January 1945

the commander of the Joint Expeditionary Force, but when that part of the operations came to an end, the commanding general of the Tenth Army moved under Spruance's direct command (Central Pacific Task Forces) for the purposes of defending and developing captured positions. In time, Nimitz, as CINCPAC, would relieve Spruance of direct command, in the process making Buckner, the commander of Ryukyus Force (a joint task force of ground, air, and naval troops), responsible for the defense of the Ryukyus islands, base development, and the protection of sea lanes within twenty-five miles of shore.²¹ Here the chain of command and mission of Tenth Army differed considerably with those of the two field armies in SWPA.

Logistics

The war in the Pacific presented U.S. forces with gargantuan problems of communication and supply that both theater commanders solved by showing flexibility of command. The invasion of Okinawa, for instance, required the initial transportation of 183,000 troops and 747,000 tons of cargo, involving over 430 assault ships embarking from eleven different ports and stretching across the Pacific from Seattle to Leyte. Some 87,000 additional troops would come later. Meeting such formidable challenges in logistics demanded unorthodox methods, as Eichelberger once noted: "We threw logistical textbooks out the window and examined the facts."²² For the support of a field army, this meant the creation of two similar logistical commands.

To put an entire army in the field, both theater commanders formed special commands to handle logistics, for army commanders lacked sufficient personnel for the task. Island-hopping operations prevented the early and neat organization of a theater into the typical combat zone, army service area, and communications zone.²³ In SWPA, USASOS performed the functions of a communications zone. When the time came to employ a field army for the Leyte operation, GHQ, SWPA, created a new organization called the Army Service Command (ASCOM) whose mission was "to relieve the combat forces of the burden of detailed logistical planning and operations necessary to support the force and implement the required base development."²⁴ USASOS and Sixth Army both provided personnel for ASCOM, and a new ASCOM was formed for each major operation. Planning normally began three to six months in advance of a campaign, with priorities being set by the task force commander, in this case Krueger. On

23 July 1944 USASOS, for example, constituted an ASCOM as an Advance Section, Communications Zone, for the Leyte operation and placed it under the command of Sixth Army on 15 September. At that time, ASCOM was required to maintain close liaison with USASOS. A new ASCOM came into being to support Sixth Army in the Luzon campaign (see chart 3).

During the actual combat operations, (i.e. from their commencement to conclusion), logistical support of a field army went through three distinct phases. In the landing phase, corps and divisions became responsible for all aspects of supply and construction, a period normally lasting for the first five days. Then, ASCOM would relieve these commands of many responsibilities, in the process centralizing as much as possible into a base area. Finally, USASOS would take over everything from the Sixth Army, of which ASCOM had been a part. Among the ASCOM's main functions were construction and rehabilitation within the service area; discharge of troops and cargo ships; operation and maintenance of all supply points, service installations, and communications in the service area; hospitalization and evacuation; administration of civil affairs, including the recruitment and maintenance of civilian labor; handling of prisoners; and base development.²⁵

In POA the counterpart to an ASCOM was an Island Command (ISCOM), and its creation also awaited the formation of a field army. On 1 July 1944, to keep up with the accelerating pace of warfare in POA, Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., formed the Central Pacific Base Command (CPBC) as the first communications zone in the area with responsibilities for the defense of Hawaii and adjacent islands; it also handled logistics and planning for Army units stationed or staging in Hawaii. CPBC also maintained supply levels at advance bases as directed for an emergency. Here there was a significant difference with USASOS in SWPA, in that units and installations assigned to forward areas fell outside the concern of CPBC. On Okinawa, base development became the responsibility of Tenth Army, which, in turn, charged it to the care of ISCOM, which had been established at Oahu on 13 December 1944. Unlike an ASCOM, which was attached to Sixth Army just prior to an operation and in the third phase reverted to USASOS, the ISCOM was under Tenth Army and remained so, becoming the agent for executing Buckner's base development mission (see chart 4). In this role, ISCOM contained within its command Army, Navy, and Marine units for the defense of the Ryukyus Islands after

they were made secure.²⁶ It was in the early phases of an operation that the responsibilities of an ASCOM and an ISCOM were similar.

Fire Support

To achieve the most efficient success, joint operations called for coordination of artillery, naval gunfire, and air support. As a direct result of its experiences during the Ryukyus campaign, the Tenth Army suggested the development of "a standard army doctrine of the procedure for the employment of naval gunfire in support of landing operations."²⁷ It naturally recommended that its practice at Okinawa translate into official doctrine.

At Okinawa, the Commander of the Joint Expeditionary Force, Vice Admiral Turner, maintained overall responsibility for the coordination and actual bombardments, but decentralization governed the use of fire support throughout the area of conflict. The Navy allocated most of the fire support ships and aircraft to the two army corps and assigned zones of responsibility to both the army and two corps commanders based on the depth of operations. Once a corps commander assumed control ashore, the corps left its own representative on the flagship of the particular task force, and this army officer worked closely with the naval gunnery officer. The Tenth Army had its own sufficient number of vessels for deep support missions so that Buckner did not have to take fire support ships away from the two corps. His targets did not interfere with those of the two corps either, for there existed a clear boundary delineating zones of responsibility.²⁸

The Commanding General, Tenth Army, remained on the same flagship as of the Joint Expeditionary Force commander for eighteen days after the first assault, at which point he established his command post on land. At that time, the army naval gunfire officer, an army lieutenant colonel, stayed aboard the flagship to continue coordination and to maintain representation and liaison for the artillery section. The assistant naval gunfire officer and the naval liaison officer went ashore prior to the arrival of the remainder of the artillery section. Daily communication kept the shore units informed of available naval assets. A similar procedure worked for corps operations. Coordination between corps was not necessary until 7 May, at which time the front narrowed

and maneuver forces came in close proximity to one another. Then the Commanding General, Tenth Army, ordered lateral communication between the two corps, with the army artillery officer intervening to settle disagreements and allocate fire support when demand exceeded availability.²⁹ On Leyte, a similar situation occurred when the two corps became for the first time contiguous, and Krueger appointed a liaison officer for the two corps.³⁰

Buckner appointed the army artillery officer to be "responsible for the preparation of fire support plans and for the coordination of artillery, naval gunfire, and air support."³¹ In order to facilitate the preparation of fire support plans, he had the army, corps, and divisions establish within their respective echelons a Target Information Center (TIC). Representatives from the other support arms were present in this section. The rule of thumb in terms of priority of assignments of missions to the support arms was artillery first, followed by navy, and air last, unless the nature of the mission dictated otherwise. If the army artillery officer determined the need for fire support from the Navy, he then made his formal request through his own naval gunfire officer (NGO); a specially trained artillery officer to the naval commander. One such NGO worked on each of the staffs of the army, corps, and division, coordinating naval gunfire support.³² According to a self-evaluation report made by the Tenth Army, the above system worked well and needed to be incorporated in Army doctrine on the use of naval gunfire in support of amphibious operations.³³

Amphibious warfare in the Central Pacific led to the innovation in late 1943 of Joint Assault Signal Companies (JASCO). JASCO contained five hundred to six hundred communication specialists from the Army, Army Air Force, and Navy who received training in joint procedures in order to provide vital communication links among land, sea, and air elements.³⁴ This organization saw service on the Philippines, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and in the European theater. Based on its experiences on Okinawa, the Tenth Army recommended that JASCO "must be considered the primary factor in the control and delivery of naval gunfire in close support after troops have landed."³⁵

Although detailed information was unavailable, it appears that fire support for the Sixth and Eighth armies followed the broad outlines used by the Tenth Army. Corps commanders arranged naval gunfire support directly with the Navy and Air support elements when possible.³⁶ Both

MacArthur and Nimitz left it to army and corps commanders to coordinate fire support with naval and air elements through liaison officers from all services.

Command and Control

The personal philosophies and styles of the various commanding generals shaped the nature of command and control in the Pacific. MacArthur considered himself a grand strategist and therefore preferred to remain at GHQ so that he could keep in touch with the big picture. Egeberg, MacArthur's personal physician during most of the war, described the general's philosophy of high command thus:

...He (MacArthur) went on to tell me that a good division commanding general could still relate to his troops, knew many of them, both officers and men. He could lead in a personal way, belonging to a group that one could encompass. He could show concern, sadness.... A division commander was a good man, and in his work, usually a satisfied man; but to find a man who could command an army was an entirely different proposition. An army commander had to divorce himself from the men of his divisions, had to work with his staff, relate to them in an entirely different way. His work was more on an intellectual level; he couldn't think of individuals.³⁷

At his GHQ, MacArthur, in order to have time for contemplation and formulation of strategy, delegated a great deal of authority for staff matters to his Chief of Staff, General Sutherland, who, though very unpopular with many colleagues, fulfilled his mission of keeping people away from the general.³⁸ MacArthur's staff, with some exceptions, tended to follow the general's example and stayed close to headquarters, a practice that brought great distress to Eichelberger, who believed the GHQ was at times ill-informed about the true nature of combat conditions.³⁹

As a rule, MacArthur left the tactical, operational, and logistical aspects of his major plans to Krueger and Eichelberger. In this, according to Rear Admiral Barbey, MacArthur delegated far more authority to his commanders than most.⁴⁰ During the Leyte campaign, MacArthur, although he established his advance headquarters on the

island, met infrequently with Krueger, visiting his army commander only three times in a two month period. Krueger, in turn, visited MacArthur seven times during that same interval: six in the first month, but only once in the second. Neither corps commander saw MacArthur after the operation was a few days along.⁴¹ Yet MacArthur daily followed the progress of operations, and even encouraged Krueger to move faster.⁴² This practice of staying away from combat areas changed drastically on Luzon where MacArthur had a long, personal stake in retaking Manila. There he dashed from one sector to another, prodding commanders and even moving battalions around.⁴³ In one instance, MacArthur assessed that Krueger was moving his troops toward Manila too slowly, so he established his own advance General Headquarters some fifty to sixty miles ahead of Sixth Army's command post, thereby hoping to encourage Krueger to quicken his pace toward the capital of the Philippines.⁴⁴

Krueger and Eichelberger were competent generals in their own right. Like MacArthur, they tended to give a great deal of freedom to their corps commanders, keeping orders to a minimum, thereby allowing for independence of judgment.⁴⁵ Both men, however, believed that commanders needed to maintain daily communication with their subordinates, to visit their troops, and to inspect installations regularly. Krueger, for example, cautioned against a headquarters staff that was "command post bound."⁴⁶ Eichelberger was noted for his mobility. During a ninety-day period in the spring of 1945, he traveled in the air on seventy different days. He referred to his airplane--Miss Em--as "a magic carpet for me."⁴⁷ General Buckner also visited the front once ashore and was killed by enemy fire on one such occasion.


Krueger provides a good example of the flexibility necessary to command at the field army level and above. He willingly created ad hoc committees to handle pressing problems not directly related to combat. Throughout November on Leyte, for example, the assignment of areas to units presented difficulties. To solve this problem, Krueger established an Area Allocation Group whose task was to handle requests for space. This organization consisted of representatives from MacArthur's GHQ, the Sixth Army, the Air Forces, the Navy, and ASCOM.⁴⁸ Another example of Krueger's flexibility in command concerned shipping. To review the backlog for the unloading of cargo, Krueger formed a priorities committee.⁴⁹

Staff planning for both theaters followed a similar practice. When operations involved the employment of sizable elements from both the Navy and the Army, the practice was to formulate plans by temporarily assigning Army officers to permanent naval staffs and vice versa, rather than by relying on mutual cooperation between Army and Navy commanders and/or their staffs.⁵⁰ In summary, flexibility, mobility, and regular communication constituted important ingredients of effective command.

Command for the Invasion of Japan

Interservice rivalry plagued the war effort in the Pacific right up to the very end when the question of who would be commander in chief for the invasion of Japan surfaced as a pressing item for discussion. The final answer undermined, once again, the principle of unity of command. In the planning for the assault on the Japanese islands, the JCS redeployed forces from SWPA and POA, creating in the process an organization that resembled an army group.


On 3 April 1945, the JCS designated MacArthur, who had been promoted to General of the Army, to be Commander in Chief of the United States Army Forces in the Pacific (CINCUSAFPAC). They expanded his responsibilities to include both operational and administrative control over all army units in the Pacific except the Twentieth Air Force and certain troops in Alaska and the Southeast Pacific Area. This command involved the transfer by Nimitz to MacArthur of all army forces in the Ryukyus, including the Tenth Army. As commanding general, MacArthur was to have under his direct command the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth armies. Nimitz, in turn, received control from MacArthur of the Seventh Fleet under Kinkaid. This step placed all naval forces in the Pacific under Nimitz, who now served as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The Twentieth Air Force became a separate command under General Spaatz who was to receive his orders from General Arnold in Washington. In forming these three separate commands, each responsible for its own logistics, the JCS decided against a unified command. Interservice rivalry was again a problem (see chart 6). Although MacArthur exercised primary responsibility for Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu, he had to rely on cooperation from the Navy and Air in the execution of the operation⁵¹ (see chart 7). Realizing the need for some unity, JCS in May directed that MacArthur could exercise control of the actual amphibious assault through the



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(Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, Reports, 1:390)

Chart 6. Organization of U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific, 1 July 1945



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(Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Reports, 1:409)

Chart 7. Organization of Forces for Olympic

appropriate naval commander in case of exigencies, although these situations were not defined.⁵² In planning for the invasion of Honshu (Coronet) that would involve First and Eighth armies, MacArthur expected to establish the advance echelon of his general headquarters as the army group headquarters in the field.⁵³ This intention was consistent with MacArthur's practice in the Philippines, where he directly commanded both field armies.

Other organizational changes took place within the Army. USAFFE became a nominal agency for financial matters in the Philippines. On 1 June 1945, Lieutenant General Wilhelm Styer assumed command of the new U.S. Army Forces in the Western Pacific (AFWESPAC), a logistical organization for the theater directly under MacArthur. AFWESPAC thus took over the functions of USAFSOS, continuing the policy of having a separate ASCOM for each major operation involving field armies. Lieutenant General Richardson received control of U.S. Army Forces in the Middle Pacific (AFMIDPAC), which entailed command of army forces and installations in the POA and the Hawaiian Department, as Nimitz released these from his operational control. Because area boundaries remained in the Pacific, Richardson was under the control of both MacArthur and Nimitz. SWPA continued as an allied command under MacArthur. The Americans wanted the British to take authority for areas south of the Philippines, but Great Britain felt unready to do so until 1 January 1946.⁵⁴

On 15 August 1945, the day on which the United States received notification of Japan's capitulation, MacArthur became the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces for the invasion of Japan, and the question of unity of command in combat no longer constituted an issue with the signing of the peace treaty.

Conclusion

By dividing the Pacific into separate theaters, the JCS created a situation that gave rise to Army and Navy squabbling over resources for their respective areas of responsibility. The problem of divided command became most acute when sizable forces from both theaters participated in a single, major operation with each theater commander controlling his own units. Interservice rivalry prevented any resolution of this dilemma up to and including the planning for the invasion of Japan. Unity of command within each theater, however, permitted both MacArthur and Nimitz to use their forces effectively.

Field armies in the two theaters differed in command, organization, and mission. In SWPA, the Sixth and Eighth armies were composed of army elements supported by air and naval forces under the command of their respective service commanders, who reported to the theater commander. When both armies entered combat in the Philippines, MacArthur avoided forming an army group headquarters, and for the assault on Honshu, he wanted his own general headquarters to perform that function. The Tenth Army in POA formed a joint task force--including air and naval units--under the operational direction of a naval commander. It was also charged with base development and defense. One must note that the plans for the invasion of Japan gave large Marine assets to the Sixth and Eighth armies, making these field armies more closely resemble the composition of the Tenth Army in its assault on Okinawa.

Flexibility characterized command in the Pacific. Corps moved from one army command to another in order to facilitate operations. Both MacArthur and Nimitz created new logistical commands called ASCOM and ISCOM to handle the enormous problems of supply. Ad hoc committees tackled noncombat difficulties. Theater, army, and corps commanders exercised a great deal of freedom in planning, fire support, and maneuver, though in varying degrees and depending on circumstances.

The problem of divided command--where forces from two theaters joined together for major operations--was never solved during the war in the Pacific. But the conduct of the war does stand as an interesting and unique example of how the Army could fight for four years under navy command and do so successfully.

NOTES

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2. Ibid. 244-50.
3. Ibid. 249. For the two directives see Appendices C and D in Morton's study.
4. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. 2, 1941-1945 (Boston, Houghton and Mifflin, 1975), 631.
5. Morton, Strategy, 494.
6. Virgil Ney, Evolution of a Theater of Operations Headquarters, 1941-1967, CORG Memorandum CORG-M-318 (Fort Belvoir, VA: Prepared by Combat Operations Research Group, Technical Operations, Inc., for U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, December 1967), 48, 53.
7. Ibid., 48-53.
8. Morton, Strategy, 253-55; U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, "Organization and Command Relationships During World War II," a committee study submitted...[by] William R. Wendt, et al. (Norfolk, VA, 1951), 13 (hereafter cited as Wendt, et al., "Organization").
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10. D. M. Horner, High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy, 1939-1945 (New York: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 348. This work is an excellent study of the American-Australian problems during the War.
11. Roy Appleman, et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific (1948; reprint, Washington, DC: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1971), 21-26.
12. Lida Mayo, The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefield, United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1968), 448.

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16. Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific (1963; reprint, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1982), 34.
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18. Smith, Triumph, 33-34.
19. U.S. Army, 6th Army, Report of the Leyte Operations: 20 October-25 December 1944 (N.p., n.d.), 40.
20. Appleman, Okinawa, 23-25; Smith, Triumph, 34.
21. Appleman, Okinawa, 23.
22. Eichelberger, Jungle Road, 233.
23. Robert W. May, "The Army Service Command," Military Review 26 (December 1946):52.
24. Ibid., 56.
25. Ibid., 55. See also 6th Army, Leyte Operations, 123-25, 214; and Walter Krueger, From Down Under To Nippon (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1953), 152.
26. Mayo, Ordnance, 448; Appleman, Okinawa, 39.
27. U.S. Army, 10th Army, "Action Report: Ryukyus, 26 March-30 June 1945," chap. 11, sect. 5, p. 17.
28. Ibid., chap. 11, sect. 5, pp. 9, 13 and chap. 11, sect. 8, pp. 1-2.

29. Ibid., chap. 11, sect. 5, p. 14, and chap. 11, sect. 8, p. 3. See also U.S. Army, 10th Army, "Tentative Operations Plan 1-45," annex 5, pp. 1-9.
30. 6th Army, Leyte Operations, 226. Because of the difficult terrain, Krueger established a no-fire zone 1000 yards on either side of the boundary separating the two corps. Any fire in this area required the prior approval of Sixth Army Headquarters.
31. 10th Army, "Tentative Operations Plan 1-45," annex 8, p. 5.
32. Ibid., annex 5, pp. 2-4. See also 10th Army, "Action Report," chap. 11, sect. 5, pp. 13-15.
33. Ibid., chap. 11, sect. 5, p. 17.
34. George Raynor Thompson and Dixie R. Harris, The Signal Corps: The Outcome, United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services (1966; reprint, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1970), 231-33.
35. 10th Army, "Action Report," chap. 11, sect. 5, p. 17.
36. 6th Army, Leyte Operations, 198; Krueger, From Down Under, 213-14.
37. Roger Olaf Egeberg, The General: MacArthur and the Man He Called 'Doc' (New York, Hippocrene Books, 1983), 126-27.
38. Ibid., 37-41; Kenney, General Kenney Reports, 26.
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40. Daniel Barbey, MacArthur's Amphibious Navy (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1969), 24. For a similar statement see Eichelberger, Jungle Road, 189.
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42. Egeberg, The General, 76.
43. James, MacArthur, 629-30; Smith, Triumph, 364.

44. James, MacArthur, 623, 628-29; Egeberg, The General, 116.
45. Eichelberger, Dear Miss Em, 240, and Jungle Road, 224; Cannon, Leyte, 244.
46. 6th Army, Leyte Operations, 206, 208.
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48. Cannon, Leyte, 189.
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50. Wendt, et al., Organization, 11; Krueger, From Down Under, 136-37. In the later reference, Krueger provides a brief description of joint planning sessions.
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CHAPTER 5

ORGANIZATION OF LARGE UNITS DURING THE KOREAN WAR*

The Korean War is unique in the annals of U.S. military history in that it was America's first standing start war. Because of the total surprise and quick success achieved by the North Korean invasion, America was forced to go to war with the existing forces in the theater. As a result, several months were to pass before the military organizations committed to the Korean War by the U.S. and its UN Allies formed into mature, permanent structures. For this reason, this report on the organization of large units in the Korean War is divided into three main descriptive sections: the status at the outbreak of war, the buildup phase, and the organization of the mature theater. In addition, a section on logistics has been added because of the unique nature of the logistical system established in the theater to support the ground force. The report terminates with conclusions drawn from an analysis of the information in the preceding sections.

Status at the Outbreak of War

When the North Korean People's Army struck the Republic of Korea (ROK) in an unprovoked surprise attack on 25 June 1950, the U.S. theater command in that area of the world was the Far Eastern Command (FEC), located in Tokyo and commanded by General Douglas MacArthur. In addition to his role as Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), MacArthur held the post of Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) and Governor, Ryukyu Islands. With respect to the prosecution of the war in Korea, however, the key command was the FEC. Under its joint umbrella, MacArthur commanded all the U.S. armed forces in the Western Pacific. The Eighth Army, Far East Air Forces (FEAF), and U.S. Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE) comprised its three component arms.

In 1950, the Eighth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Walton Walker, comprised four understrength infantry divisions, scattered throughout Japan. The FEAF disposed 350 fighter aircraft organized into nine groups

*By Major Scott R. McMichael

of eighteen squadrons (of which only four were within effective range of Korea). In addition, the FEAF included a light bomber wing and a troop carrier wing in Japan. The only medium bomber wing (of the Strategic Air Command) in the Far East was on Guam. Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy commanded NAVFE. At the outbreak of the war, his command included one cruiser, four destroyers, and a number of amphibious and cargo vessels. Seventh Fleet, not initially under MacArthur's command, was ordered in late June to place itself under the operational control of NAVFE.¹

Prior to the war, MacArthur had no military responsibilities in Korea except to logistically support the U.S. Embassy and the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). The KMAG consisted of five hundred officers and men charged with advising Seoul on the development and training of the ROK Army. In this capacity, it placed advisors down to battalion level.²

In June of 1950, the ROK Army consisted of approximately one hundred thousand men organized into eight ill-trained and poorly equipped divisions, plus support units. The South Korean Air Force had twenty-two liaison aircraft and trainers. Finally, the South Korean Navy consisted of four patrol boats, one LST, fifteen former U.S. mine sweepers, ten former Japanese minelayers, and other smaller craft.³

The Buildup Phase

The rapid collapse of the South Korean defenses forced the U.S. and the UN to take prompt military action to secure South Korea against downfall. On 26 June, President Truman authorized MacArthur to send a survey team to Korea to assess the situation. Soon thereafter, the JCS directed MacArthur to assume operational control of all U.S. military activities in Korea. MacArthur designated the survey team as the FEC GHQ (general headquarters) Advance Command and Liaison Group (ADCOM) and instructed its head, Brigadier General John H. Church, to do all he could to help the ROK Army stop the enemy's drive. KMAG was subordinated to ADCOM.⁴

Pessimistic reports from ADCOM and from MacArthur's personal inspection of the battlefield led to Truman's decision to use American ground troops in Korea. On 30 June, MacArthur ordered the Eighth Army Commander to dispatch the 24th Infantry Division to Korea at once. The Division Commander, Major General William F. Dean, was directed to take command of all U.S. forces in Korea

(USAFIK), superseding ADCOM.⁵ Task Force Smith, formed around 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, arrived in Korea on 2 July as the first U.S. Army unit committed to action. Meanwhile, the rest of the 24th Infantry Division prepared to join TF Smith.

Although USAFIK was activated on 4 July, it was soon preempted by MacArthur's order to General Walker to take command of U.S. military operations in Korea. Accordingly, Lieutenant General Walker established HQ, Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), at Taegu on 13 July, and USAFIK dissolved. In the interim, the FEAF had established a Joint Operations Center (JOC) in Korea at Taejon on 5 July. On 14 July, the JOC moved to Taegu to collocate with HQ, EUSAK. Six days later the advance headquarters of the FEAF joined Walker's headquarters in Taegu.⁶ By this time the FEAF controlled aircraft from the Navy and Marines as well as its own.

Simultaneous with U.S. unilateral actions to support South Korea, the UN stepped into the conflict. Following several resolutions from the Security Council and the General Assembly, the UN asked President Truman to take control of the UN forces being sent to the theater. On 8 July, Truman designated General MacArthur as the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). MacArthur's FEC GHQ thereby also became the UNC GHQ.

On 14 July 1950, President Syngman Rhee of South Korea directed the ROK Army Chief of Staff, General Chung Il Kwon, to place himself and his forces under MacArthur as part of the UNC. MacArthur, in turn, ordered Walker to assume command of the ROK Army. No written document formalized this relationship, but the pattern established in July 1950 was followed throughout the war. Walker directed the operations of the ROK Army indirectly through the ROK Chief of Staff, who issued the formal orders to the ROK units. This unusual relationship is explained in more detail in the next section of this report, but it is worth noting at this point that it caused no problems on the battlefield. The ROK Army was eager to follow the lead of the U.S. commander and anxious to redeem itself.⁷

The growth of the UNC proceeded rapidly. By the 1st of August, four divisions of the Eighth Army--the 25th, 24th, and 2d Infantry divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division--plus the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) had closed in Korea. The 7th Infantry Division remained in Japan as the GHQ Reserve. The 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional), in advance of the arrival of the entire 1st Marine Division, came ashore on 2 August. The ROK Army at this time had reconstituted itself into five infantry


divisions--the 1st, 6th, 3d, 8th, and Capital divisions--organized into the I and II ROK Corps. The British 27th Brigade arrived in late August; it was the first UN ground force to arrive.

The bulk of the air and naval forces available to MacArthur were American. On 27 August, MacArthur designated the FEAF and NAVFE as part of the UN Command, setting the pattern for the assignment of other UN air and naval forces to the FEAF and NAVFE as they arrived.⁸ Similarly, as UN ground forces arrived in Korea, they were integrated into existing U.S. formations. All of the UN ground forces, aside from the U.S. forces, were brigade-size or smaller.

It was not until September 1950 that, by directive of the FEC (following DA approval), the Eighth Army organized its U.S. divisions into corps, the U.S. corps headquarters having been activated stateside and shipped over.⁹ The organizations of the FEC and Eighth Army at this time is shown in figure 1.

During the first four to five months of the war, both GHQ FEC and HQ Eighth Army conducted operational planning. Eighth Army was responsible for the day-by-day ground combat, while GHQ approved Eighth Army plans, planned for future operations, and maintained a GHQ Reserve. The first major operational plan of the GHQ was the Inchon amphibious operation. A product of MacArthur's fertile mind, the Inchon plan was undertaken initially by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG), headed by Brigadier General Wright, who was also the GHQ G3. Later, for reasons of secrecy, the operation was turned over to the headquarters group of the Special Planning Staff (SPS), GHQ.¹⁰ Simultaneously, a corps was being raised in Japan as the GHQ Reserve. On 26 August, with DA approval, MacArthur activated Headquarters, X Corps, from the SPS and assigned all units in the GHQ Reserve to it, thus forming the ground force for the Inchon invasion. Major General Edward Almond, Chief of Staff, FEC, assumed command of the X Corps on 26 August but retained his duties as Chief of Staff even after the X Corps was ashore--an unusual arrangement to say the least.¹¹

GHQ FEC also controlled the U.S.-UN air and naval forces and allocated these assets to close support of EUSAK, interdiction, long-range bombing, and for other support operations as it saw fit. EUSAK directly controlled no air or naval forces; it requested such support through the Fifth Air Force or GHQ. CINCNVFE



^aThe Army Chief of Staff was designated as the executive agent for the JCS.

^bThe CINCUNC/CINCFEC exercised operational control only over the FEAF and NAVFE.

^cThe X Corps actually was no longer in GHQ Reserve on 23 September. By this time it had been committed on the Inchon amphibious invasion.


Figure 1. UNC/FEC Organization, 23 September 1950

organized his vessels into task forces with specific territorial and functional missions.¹² For the Inchon and Wonsan amphibious operations, Joint Task Force 7 (JTF 7) was formed to carry out the landings. Admiral Struble, Commander, Seventh Fleet, also commanded JTF 7, which included seven subordinate task forces (see figure 2).


Surprisingly, after the Inchon landing, when the Eighth Army and the X Corps had linked up and had formed a contiguous defense, the X Corps was not assigned to the Eighth Army. Instead, MacArthur retained control of the X Corps, pulled it out of the line, and explained to General Walker that he was reconstituting the reserve for a coming GHQ-directed operation--the Wonsan amphibious operation.

MacArthur's controversial decision to keep the two commands separate had several unfortunate results. As the 7th Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division outloaded at Inchon and Pusan, the X Corps priority on logistical support and transport facilities severely disrupted supplies flowing to the Eighth Army. Depot stocks intended for EUSAK fell to low levels. Ultimately, the advance of the Eighth Army into North Korea was slowed by the emphasis placed on getting X Corps provisioned and outloaded for the Wonsan operation.¹³ Second, the delay of the UN drive into North Korea, as a result of the repositioning of the X Corps, permitted large numbers of the enemy force to escape. Finally, the Wonsan amphibious operation proved unnecessary. The ROK I Corps captured Wonsan overland on 10 October; the X Corps made an administrative landing into the port city from 25-28 October.¹⁴

Once the X Corps was ashore, MacArthur still refused to relinquish control of the corps to Walker. Ostensibly, he based this decision on tactical considerations. Operational plans at this time called for Eighth Army to advance into North Korea along the west coast, the X Corps (with ROK I Corp attached) to advance along the east coast. The two commands were separated by the rugged Taebaek range of mountains through which ran only a few east-west trails and no good roads. Physical liaison was impossible. MacArthur reasoned that as long as the two commands could maintain radio and teletype contact, with their flanks connected by daily reconnaissance flights, there was no reason to place X Corps under Eighth Army. Inexplicably, however, MacArthur charged Walker with logistical support of the X Corps while denying him tactical control. These confusing and non-doctrinal



INCHON OPERATION



WONSAN OPERATION

^a Admiral Struble was also the Seventh Fleet commander.

Source: Roy Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of Army, 1973), 497 and 620.

Figure 2. Joint Task Force 7


arrangements were opposed by senior members of MacArthur's own staff--the acting Chief of Staff, the G3, and the G4. Yet the CINC insisted on doing things his way.¹⁵

It was not until December 1950 that the X Corps was absorbed into the Eighth Army, forming one ground command in the theater. This development followed the shocking retreat of the Eighth Army to a line below Seoul and the evacuation of the X Corps through Wonsan, both events coming as a result of the massive Chinese intervention. By this time General Walker had been killed in a jeep accident. His replacement, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, obtained control of the X Corps when it was reintroduced into the line after refitting at Pusan following its evacuation from the north. Another significant change took place after Ridgway's elevation to command. From this time on, MacArthur was content to leave virtually all the ground operational planning to Ridgway's staff.¹⁶ Ridgway was careful to keep his boss informed on planned operations, but at no time was his authority abridged, as Walker's had been.¹⁷ Three events, therefore, combined in 1951 to permit the evolution of the mature theater: the combination of all ground forces into one field army, the stabilization of the lines, and the concentration of ground force operational planning at one HQ--EUSAK.

The Organization of the Mature Theater

By June 1951, the FEC-UNC, with subordinate commands, had taken the shape shown on figure 3. This organization remained without significant change through the end of the war. NAVFE continued to organize its forces into task forces and task groups with specific functional and territorial missions. Eventually, the FEAF evolved into three subordinate commands. The Bomber Command included B29 wings and reconnaissance elements; generally, it executed the strategic bombing plan and performed interdiction. The Fifth Air Force, augmented by Marine, South Korean, and UN air squadrons, conducted close air support, air-to-air operations, and interdiction. The 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) provided logistical airlift to the command.¹⁸

EUSAK remained the field force of the FEC. Its detailed organization is shown in figure 4. Figure 4 also depicts the maintenance of a GHQ Reserve, a force retained for several reasons. First, the principles of war mandate the existence of a reserve as a tool for the commander to influence the battlefield. Second, the reserve divisions



* The U.N. Security Council had no command authority, but did receive biweekly reports from the U.N. commander.

^b The Army Chief of Staff acted as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


^c The UNCEC exercised operational control only over the air and naval forces under its command.

^d Although Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, had not been inactivated, it did not become operational until 1 October 1952.

^e The Military Advisory Group for Korea was assigned to Eighth Army command. It continued to discharge its mission of assisting the ROK Army and provided liaison between the Eighth Army and the ROK Army.

Source: Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1973), 54.

Figure 3. Channels of Command, July 1951



Source: Hq Eighth Army, Command Report, ACoFS, G-3, bk. 4, pt. 1, 1 Jul 51.

NOTE: Chart reproduced from Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1973), 56.

Figure 4. UN Command/Far East Command, Major Ground Forces, 1 July 1951

were rotated with the EUSAK divisions to share the burden of combat. Third, because of the dual hats worn by Ridgway, who succeeded MacArthur as CINUNC and CINCFEC in April 1951, he needed to retain an uncommitted force for the defense of Japan and other territories. The perceived conflicting responsibilities of his dual roles, U.S. Theater Commander vice UN Commander, caused Ridgway to seek resolution of these conflicts through comprehensive dialogue with the JCS. The products of this dialogue were the prioritization of Ridgway's responsibilities and the clarification and reconciliation of past directives from the JCS to FEC.19

Returning to figure 4, it is evident that UN forces were integrated directly into U.S. divisions and corps. Also worthy of note is the EUSAK responsibility for the UN Reception Center. This function is one of many theater or communications zone (COMMZ) functions which were charged to the Eighth Army. In effect, Korea was a theater of operations, but no onshore COMMZ was ever established. Eighth Army was responsible for the logistic support of the entire UN force, to include the ROK Army. EUSAK HQ fulfilled a wide range of responsibilities far beyond those doctrinally required of an operational field army HQ. Thus, Eighth Army functioned as both a field army and a theater army or army group HQ. This issue is explored more fully in the next section--Logistics.

The relationship of Eighth Army to the FEAF and NAVFE conformed to doctrine. The FEAF placed TACPs (tactical air control parties) down to regimental level. Requests for air support were passed through G3 and Air Force channels. The Fifth Air Force continued to locate a CP (command post) element with the Eighth Army main and advance CPs, as did the FEAF regarding the JOC. Ultimately, GHQ resolved any disputes concerning the allocation of air assets. Similar procedures regulated the use of NAVFE forces in support of the Eighth Army.

The relationship of the Eighth Army to the ROK Army settled into an unusual but efficient pattern. Basically the relationship took three forms. The CG, Eighth Army, exercised operational command of ROK forces through the ROK Chief of Staff (for the ROK Corps and separate ROK units) and through the U.S. corps commanders having ROK divisions assigned (figure 5). The U.S. Commanding General, however, always exercised the policy of restricting operational command to tactical matters in order to respect the independence and integrity of the ROK government to control its own forces through the ROK Chief




Figure 5. Operational Command

of Staff. As noted earlier, this arrangement worked very well and had no adverse effects from a military point of view.²⁰

As shown in figure 6, no direct administrative command existed between EUSAK and the ROK Army. Administrative control was maintained separately in each army. Few problems resulted from this arrangement; those that did were resolved quickly through other channels.²¹

The third form of the EUSAK/ROK Army relationship concerned the KMAG. Throughout the war, the KMAG continued to place advisors in the ROK structure (figure 7). These advisors had no command responsibilities. They did, however, provide guidance, make suggestions, authenticate ROK requisitions of U.S. supplies, and assist their units in any way possible. The existence of the KMAG was vital to the smooth functioning of the U.S.-ROK relationship.²²

A study done at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) in 1952 compared the composition of EUSAK to the doctrinal type field army of 1952.²³ Significant differences were noted (see figure 8). For example, the type field army projected a twelve division structure--nine infantry divisions and three armored. In contrast, EUSAK disposed five infantry, no armored, one cavalry, and one Marine division (U.S. divisions only are considered here). The type field army forecasted a division strength of 217,854; in March 1952, EUSAK division strength totalled 137,264. The type field army also included strong armor, artillery, engineer, and chemical elements which far exceeded EUSAK's strength in these branches. Opposite imbalances existed in regard to service support elements; EUSAK CSS elements comprised 30 percent of the force compared to 20.5 percent in the type field army.

Generally, the nature of the theater and the manner in which it evolved caused these differences. ROK and UN forces, for example, made up the shortfall in U.S. divisions. The U.S. divisions which were committed in theater were those most available in June 1950, not those necessarily most desirable. UN air and naval supremacy reduced the need for armored cavalry and artillery in EUSAK. Moreover, Korean terrain generally did not favor the use of armor. The extra logistical requirements of EUSAK required a heavier CSS structure; as noted earlier, EUSAK supported the entire UN force in Korea. In addition, use of the Korean Service Corps to prepare and





Figure 6. Administrative Command



Source: U.S. Army, 8th Army (Korea), "Command and Administrative Relationships Between the Eighth U.S. Army and Republic of Korea Army," (24 March 1953), Encl 1-3.

Figure 7. Advisory Control

| UNIT OR BRANCH | COMBAT | | | | SERVICE SUPPORT | | | |
|---------------------|-----------|-------|------------|-------|-----------------|-------|-----------|-------|
| | 1 MAR 52 | | 6400/2 | | 1 MAR 52 | | 6400/2 | |
| | EUSAK | | TYPE ARMY | | EUSAK | | TYPE ARMY | |
| | STRENGTH | % | STRENGTH | % | STRENGTH | % | STRENGTH | % |
| HEADQUARTERS | 3,079 | 1.25 | 2,109 | 0.51 | 972 | 0.38 | | |
| DIVISIONS | 137,264 | 55.34 | 217,856 | 52.50 | | | | |
| ARMOR | 42 | 0.01 | 18,983 | 4.57 | | | | |
| ARTILLERY | 19,701 | 7.96 | 52,773 | 12.73 | | | | |
| CHEMICAL | 718 | 0.29 | 2,928 | 0.70 | 1,056 | 0.42 | 2,295 | 0.56 |
| ENGINEER | 8,009 | 3.24 | 27,591 | 6.67 | 16,570 | 6.69 | 10,450 | 2.52 |
| INFANTRY REGT (SEP) | 4,452 | 1.79 | 7,588 | 1.82 | | | | |
| MEDICAL | | | | | 6,832 | 2.76 | 14,100 | 3.40 |
| MILITARY POLICE | | | | | 4,982 | 2.00 | 4,500 | 1.08 |
| ORDNANCE | | | | | 11,147 | 4.60 | 17,512 | 4.23 |
| QUARTERMASTER | | | | | 9,732 | 3.93 | 13,004 | 3.13 |
| SIGNAL | | | | | 8,103 | 3.27 | 9,872 | 2.38 |
| TRANSPORTATION | | | | | 10,978 | 4.43 | 8,424 | 2.03 |
| MISCELLANEOUS | | | | | 4,070 | 1.64 | 4,796 | 1.17 |
| TOTAL | 173,265 | 69.88 | 329,826 | 79.50 | 74,442 | 30.12 | 84,953 | 20.50 |
| TOTAL STRENGTH | 247,707 | | 414,779 | | | | | |
| DIVISIONS | | | | | | | | |
| INFANTRY | 5-94275 | | 9-169695 | | | | | |
| ARMORED | 0 | | 3-48159 | | | | | |
| CAVALRY | 1-17851 | | | | | | | |
| MARINE | 1-25138 | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL | 7-137,264 | | 12-217,854 | | | | | |
| % TOTAL ARMY | 55.3 | | 52.5 | | | | | |
| ARMY HQ STRENGTH | 1843 | | 1062 | | | | | |

SOURCE: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, "Staff Study on Service Support for Eighth U.S. Army Korea," (15 April 1953).

Figure 8. Comparison of EUSAK to a 1952 Type Field Army

support the battlefield in Korea reduced the need for engineers. In short, EUSAK did not conform to a doctrinal, type field army structure. Its organization evolved in response to the peculiar strategic situation and tactical environment of the Korean theater. Thus, in this respect, it may be improper to regard the Eighth Army as a field army. In reality, it was a combined army under U.S. command, having in addition, administrative and logistic responsibilities normally performed by a theater army or COMMZ.

The Eighth Army HQ also differed significantly from a type field army HQ. This is not surprising given the caveats noted above. Figure 9 illustrates the manner in which the HQ was organized in order to fulfill its standard operational functions and its extra responsibilities previously noted. Although EUSAK was considerably smaller than a type field army, its headquarters was larger--1,843 versus 1,062.²⁴ The same was true of respective corps headquarters. This fact, of course, also reflects the added nondoctrinal responsibilities given the army headquarters.

Under Ridgway, the GHQ also resumed a greater role in operational planning. Most of the time this role was confined to the establishment of restrictions on Van Fleet's operations. The most common restriction was the imposition of a line limiting the advance of Eighth Army forces. Ridgway also limited the number of troops which Van Fleet could permit to become decisively engaged. At various times, Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to restrict his operations against the enemy almost entirely to aggressive patrolling, artillery bombardments, and air strikes; he refused to allow the commitment of forces larger than a division (to local offensives only) without his own approval. There were three main reasons for these restrictions. First, by the winter of 1951, the lines had stabilized to the point that both sides occupied heavily fortified defenses in depth that were somewhat invulnerable to artillery. Any major offensive would ultimately lead to heavy casualties. In fact, the U.S. offensives in the summer and fall of 1951 to take Bloody Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge, and the Punch Bowl had produced unacceptably high levels of casualties. Second, the UNC had no hope of achieving total victory without the injection of substantial additional forces to offset the huge manpower advantage of the Chinese. Ridgway knew that such reinforcements were unavailable, thus total victory was not within reach unless atomic bombs were used. Again, this option had been ruled out by Truman. Third,

Source: U.S. Army, 8th Army (Korea), "Staff Directory, Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army Korea (EUSAK)" (15 June 1951).




Figure 9. HQ, Eighth U.S. Army (Korea), 15 June 1951

as long as peace talks were being conducted, U.S. public opinion prohibited the expenditure of U.S. lives for terrain which might well turn out to be worthless in the long run. Under these conditions, Ridgway essentially enforced a strategy which aimed at maximizing Chinese losses through indirect fires and which minimized U.S. losses by reducing troop exposure. Thus, it was necessary to keep a close rein on the Eighth Army to accomplish these objectives.

On 1 October 1952, HQ, US Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE) was activated and

...assigned the responsibility for all Army operations in Japan. Headquarters FEC and UNC were then streamlined by transferring the majority of the special staff sections and their functions to HQ, USAFFE, leaving only the general staff sections and necessary special staff activities in the headquarters.²⁵

Thus, the activation of USAFFE relieved the GHQ of administrative functions which it had been performing for army troops in Japan. As such, USAFFE represented the closest organization to a theater army established within the FEC. However, the establishment of USAFFE in no way relieved EUSAK of the administrative functions which it was performing in Korea. USAFFE also exercised no operational control of field units. Its impact was limited to administrative support of army troops in Japan.²⁶

In January 1953, the GHQ, FEC/UNC reorganized into a joint staff in accordance with doctrine defined in FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units. The reorganization provided for more joint representation on the staff, reflecting the three component commands: USAFFE, NAVFE, AND FEAF.²⁷ The change served to make GHQ staff operations more efficient and representative. It was the last major change to the theater organization.

Logistics

The U.S. entered the Korean War on a logistical shoestring. The stocks initially on hand for provisioning the combat units were quite inadequate.²⁸ Furthermore, service units suffered from a dismal personnel situation. Already manned at a low level, these units were stripped of additional manpower to strengthen deploying combat units.²⁹ No infrastructure existed to push the Eighth

Army out of Japan or to receive it in Korea. Upon arrival in Pusan, the 24th Infantry Division had to unload its own equipment. All of these problems originated from one central deficiency mentioned at the beginning of this report: for the first time in history, U.S. troops were moving directly from peacetime barracks to the field of combat.³⁰ Already a matter of extreme urgency, the logistical situation worsened further on 1 July 1950 when MacArthur directed Walker to assume support of all UN forces in Korea, particularly the ROK Army, which had to be reequipped almost entirely following its devastating tactical reverses.

To meet these compelling requirements, Eighth Army organized itself into Eighth U.S. Army Korea (EUSAK) and Eighth Army Rear. Eighth Army Rear comprised the service units, headquarters, and installations in Japan which equipped and provisioned EUSAK. In the absence of clear procedures and precedents, expedient methods were established to accomplish the logistic mission. Automatic resupply of the deployed force was instituted because no central requisitioning agency existed in Korea to identify unit needs. Chartered Japanese vessels with Japanese crews and U.S. vessels carried supplies to Korea by water. Eighth Army Rear relied extensively on local procurement to obtain essential supplies. For example, contracts with Japanese firms in August 1950 called for the production of 68,000 vehicles to equip the ROK Army. Japanese firms also provided dynamite, flares, mines, oil drums, locomotives, railway cars, and many other vital items.³¹

The creation of the Japan Logistical Command (JLCOM) on 25 August 1950 as a major subordinate command of the FEC released Eighth Army from responsibility for logistical support activities and installations in Japan.³² The units and activities formerly assigned to Eighth Army Rear passed to JLCOM, and Eighth Army Rear dissolved. Logistical commands had only recently entered the U.S. doctrinal lexicon; the Korean War validated the concept. The JLCOM functioned as the support link between EUSAK and the Zone of the Interior. All EUSAK-originated requisitions were made on JLCOM.

Within Korea, an ad hoc organization called the Pusan Base Command was initially created to operate the port city of Pusan and to establish a logistical base in country.³³ This base command (a World War II concept) on 19 September 1950 was redesignated the 2d Logistical Command and assigned as a subordinate command to

EUSAK.³⁴ Eventually, it came to support EUSAK and the entire UN force, except for specially designated elements that remained responsible for their own support. Like the JLCOM, the 2d Logistical Command validated the then untested logistical doctrine developed after World War II. However, there were a number of twists in the manner in which the 2d Logistical Command operated.

Although the 2d Logistical Command had been intended to function as the principal requisitioning agency for EUSAK, it was slow to realize this objective because it took some time, given the fluid tactical situation, to establish time-based norms for requisition of certain supplies. EUSAK, for example, could not relinquish control to the 2d Logistical Command for the requisitioning of Class I (perishable), Class III, or Class V supplies because the need for these items fluctuated widely. The EUSAK G4 requisitioned these items directly from JLCOM.³⁵

Another twist to the operation of the 2d Logistical Command was its reliance on provisional units composed of unqualified personnel, instead of TOE structures.³⁶

As more of South Korea was liberated and other port cities opened for traffic, additional logistical commands were established. For example, the 3d Logistical Command assumed responsibility for unloading and provisioning through the port of Inchon, particularly to support the movement of X Corps for the Wonsan amphibious operation and to support EUSAK operations into North Korea. Assigned to EUSAK on 7 October 1950, the 3d Logistical Command was attached, in turn, by General Walker to the 2d Logistical Command.³⁷

As noted earlier in this chapter, the Eighth Army discharged many responsibilities not normally assigned to a field army. Among these, the logistical support of UN forces, the equipping of ROK divisions, the operation of the UN Reception Center, and the establishment and use of the 60,000 man Korean Service Corps have already been mentioned. These functions were shared between the EUSAK HQ and the 2d Logistical Command. Other COMMZ/theater responsibilities handled by EUSAK which bear iteration were: the construction and administration of POW camps, the operation and maintenance of the ground lines of communication (including ports, railroads, and pipelines), labor procurement, civilian relief, establishment and operation of the Civil Transport Corps, and rear area security. Apparently, neither Ridgway nor his successor

Lieutenant General Van Fleet gave serious thought to the establishment of a COMMZ HQ to perform these burdensome functions. From the start of the war, Ridgway had maintained that his responsibilities for operations in Korea began at the shoreline; Van Fleet never tried to change the situation.³⁸ Each commander obviously preferred to retain total control of all military activities, whether operational or logistical in nature, conducted within the territorial confines of the peninsula.

Conclusions

An analysis of the history of the organization and operations of the Eighth Army during the Korean War, as summarized in this study, leads to a number of important conclusions and observations. Certainly the most significant conclusion of this report is that the Eighth Army existed simultaneously as a (combined) field army and a theater army, owing to the unique geographical conditions of the Korean theater and the combined nature of the command. Although this arrangement had no basis in formal doctrine, it proved itself viable after the first year of the war--the time required for the command to evolve into a stable structure. In essence, the dual functions practiced by the Eighth Army established the principle of flexibility of organization at army level and higher. It seems both logical and likely that the same kinds of conditions which shaped the Eighth Army into a one-of-a-kind structure might well shape future armies in much the same manner. Thus, doctrinally based type armies must be considered at best as models only, which will be modified upon employment into specific theaters to meet specific conditions.

The Eighth Army succeeded in the accomplishment of its dual functions. In so doing, it demonstrated a feasible combined structure for the assimilation, integration, and employment of various national forces under one banner. From the point of view of interoperability, therefore, the experience of the Eighth Army has high historical value. In the same way, the successful and efficient relationships between EUSAK, FEAF, and NAVFE provides a positive example of interservice cooperation and coordination during joint operations and at the theater level.

From a negative point of view, MacArthur's refusal to unify the X Corps and Eighth Army under Walker's command and the continuing, deep involvement of the GHQ in operational planning after the Inchon invasion led more or

less directly to the fragmenting of the UN Command in the far reaches of North Korea just prior to the massive Chinese intervention. These unfortunate events point out the necessity for one unified ground command (in a theater the size of Korea) and a clear separation of responsibility for operational planning. It was a mistake for MacArthur's GHQ, 750 miles away in warm, secure facilities in Tokyo, to act as the primary planning HQ for operations in Korea. In contrast, the depth of involvement characterized by Ridgway and his staff was entirely appropriate to the tactical and political situation of the moment, there being a meaningful difference between the direction of operations (MacArthur) and the imposition of operational restrictions (Ridgway).

Finally, the undisputed success of the logistic support provided to the UNC and EUSAK by the JLCOM and the 2d Logistical Command validated the Army's post-WWII doctrine on logistical organizations. This doctrine remains in force today with relatively few changes in concept, although significant changes in force structure have taken place.

NOTES

1. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1973), 49-50.
2. Ibid., 13.
3. Ibid., 17.
4. Ibid., 43.
5. Lawton J. Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), 47.
6. Appleman, 95.
7. Collins, 89, and Appleman, 111.
8. Appleman, 639.
9. Ibid., 544.
10. Ibid., 489-90.
11. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), 169-170. It is not clear why MG Almond retained his position as FEC Chief of Staff. Perhaps MacArthur intended to return him to GHQ quickly. Whatever the reason, it was impossible for Almond to act as FEC Chief of Staff while commanding a corps in Korea.
12. Appleman, 497.
13. Collins, 158.
14. Ibid., 169.
15. Appleman, 610. See also Collins 162 and 170, and Ridgway, 48. MacArthur's decision to keep the two commands separate under overall GHQ control is a subject of controversy even today, although most military commentators criticize the decision because it violated the principle of unity of command. Interestingly, MacArthur consulted neither Walker nor Almond regarding post-Inchon operations nor about his

decision to keep the commands separate during the advance into North Korea. MacArthur stated in 1955 that his decision followed standard military practice for the handling and control of widely separated forces where lateral communications were difficult if not impossible. Of course, it was MacArthur's plan which created these conditions in the first place. The weight of criticism disputes the wisdom of these command arrangements.

16. Collins, 239.
17. General Ridgway praised MacArthur for the tactical latitude which he delegated to Ridgway. He also praised the air and naval components of the FEC for their sincere willingness to support the ground operations of Eighth Army in every way possible. See Ridgway, 83, 101-104. It is not clear why MacArthur kept such tight control of the Eighth Army when it was commanded by Walker. Some have suggested that he did not have full confidence in LTG Walker although there are no apparent reasons for such a lack of confidence. The tactical reverses of the Chinese intervention and the arrival of the highly respected Ridgway probably led to his decision after Walker's death to leave operations in the hands of the Army Commander.
18. United Nations Command, "G3 Operations Report, from 0001I 6 May 1952 to 2400I 6 May 1952," (No. 682, 6 May 1952), 7-8.
19. Collins, 298-302.
20. U.S. Army, 8th Army (Korea), "Command and Administrative Relationships Between the Eighth U.S. Army and Republic of Korea Army," (24 March 1953), 1.
21. Ibid., 2.
22. Ibid.
23. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, "Staff Study on Service Support for Eighth U.S. Army Korea," (15 April 1953).
24. Ibid., 6.
25. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: MacMillan Company, 1967), 36.

26. Virgil Ney, Evolution of a Theater of Operations Headquarters, 1941-1967, CORG Memorandum CORG-M-318 (Fort Belvoir, VA: Combat Operations Research Group, Technical Operations, Inc., for the Combat Developments Command, December 1967), 64.
27. Ibid.
28. U.S. Army, 8th Army (Korea), Logistical Problems and Their Solutions (1 July 1952), 5.
29. Ibid., 15.
30. Ibid., 3.
31. Ibid., 13-14.
32. Appleman, 114.
33. Logistical Problems, 24.
34. Appleman, 574. The assignment of the logistical command to the Eighth Army differed from World War II practice, when base commands normally were not subordinate commands of the armies that they supported.
35. Logistical Problems, 25.
36. Ibid., 26.
37. Appleman, 639.
38. Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1973), 70.

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Weigley, Russell F. The History of the United States Army.
New York: MacMillan Company, 1967.

CHAPTER 6

VIETNAM: COMMAND AND CONTROL*

Introduction

The final case study in this report covers the organizational composition of the United States force structure in the Vietnam theater during that conflict. The Vietnam theater was unusual because the forces there built upon an existing Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). Organizational doctrine in the 1960s was sufficiently flexible to allow for this evolutionary force buildup. But the doctrine did not allow for a fragmentation of command and effort, a fragmentation that developed from the three separate wars waged in Vietnam: the air war, the ground war, and the pacification effort. These wars will be discussed separately in this chapter, supporting the conclusion that sufficient unity of command was not achieved in Vietnam. Two organizational decisions contributed to this lack of unity: failure to form a separate, unified command and failure to form a combined command. While the U.S. military had existing doctrine to promote unity of command and effort, this doctrine was not assiduously followed. In sum, the organization of the Vietnam theater evolved from a MAAG, fragmented into separate wars, and developed into a disunified command.

In 1963, U.S. Army doctrine for theater operations called for a unified team of land, naval, and air forces "based upon the principle that effective utilization of the military power of the nation requires that the efforts of the separate military services be closely integrated."¹ In addition, the doctrine stated that unity of effort among the services began at the national level with the president and the secretary of defense and then moved through the secretaries of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS directed strategic planning, and the military departments provided joint commands to implement these plans.²

The U.S. Army forces to execute these plans were organized so that each echelon of command had a specific and essential role. No echelon was to usurp or duplicate

*By Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade.

the role of the next lower echelon.³ To accomplish that task, the army component (shown on chart 1) would have normally become the theater army, answerable to one unified commander. For a large-scale theater (chart 1A), the subordinate headquarters of the theater army would be an army group headquarters, followed by field army, then corps headquarters. All of these units were connected by operational command or command lines starting at the unified command and running straight down the chain of command through corps to the divisions. Naval and air components had similar command lines, also beginning with the unified commander.


A similar arrangement was to take place in the event of the formation of a combined command. National identities would have been maintained, but the command lines would all end at the same individual, a supreme allied commander.

Logistics was a service responsibility. Army logistics were centrally managed by a theater army logistical command and a support command assigned to each field army.

The purpose for this command and control doctrine and for the preparation of proposed chain of command charts was to promote and ensure unity of effort. According to FM 100-5, 19 February 1962, "the decisive application of full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command would obtain unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. While coordination may be attained by cooperation, it is best achieved by vesting a single commander with the requisite authority."⁴


U.S. army doctrine in the early 1960s, as written in various field manuals, called for and provided the structure for unity of command. Unfortunately, this doctrine was not followed in Vietnam.

The evolutionary process by which U.S. forces were committed to Vietnam influenced the organization of the command. The war did not begin with a massive, conventional force invasion of the south by North Vietnam. Nor did the United States begin the war with a massive influx of troops backed by wholehearted national support. The war evolved and the U.S. effort was built upon a Military Assistance Advisory Group.



(FM 100-15, December 1963)

Chart 1. Chain of Command for Typical Theater of Operations



(FM 100-15, December 1963)


Chart 1A. Theater Army Organization

The Beginnings

Following the defeat of France in Indochina, the 1954 Geneva Agreements established the boundary between North and South Vietnam at the 17th parallel on the coast, and inland along the Ben Hai River to Laos (see map 1). A Communist regime formally assumed control of North Vietnam on 10 October 1954, and on 23 October, the United States offered military aid to South Vietnam. South Vietnam accepted the offer, and in January 1955, the United States began direct military aid and advisory assistance to the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) through the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam.⁵


During the next five years, the Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed, national elections were held, and a constitution developed. But North Vietnam continued infiltration and began a military campaign to unite the two Vietnams by force. By 1960, the South was requesting increased military assistance. On 18 October 1961, the Republic of Vietnam declared a state of national emergency and asked the United States for combat troops. The United States provided combat support and combat service support units, plus additional material aid and more advisors.⁶

These units initially came under the control of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (chart 2). More U.S. Army units arrived, and on 6 February 1962, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), was



(Echartd, p. 2)

Map 1. South Vietnam, Its Provinces and Corps Tactical Zones



(Echardt, p. 17)

Chart 2. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1956

created.⁷ The chain of command for the assigned units is depicted on chart 3. USMACV would continue to be the building block for the remainder of the American commitment to Vietnam.

Also in 1962, logistical support in Vietnam that had been provided by an eleven-man logistical support team from Okinawa became the responsibility of the U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands Support Group. This group was soon redesignated U.S. Army Support Group, Vietnam, and by 1964 had become the U.S. Army Support Command, Vietnam (USASCV).⁸ As it became likely that the United States would commit ground combat units, the 1st Logistical Command, upon its activation on 1 April 1965, assumed the responsibility for logistics. USASCV converted into Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV).


In May 1965, the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), the first U.S. ground combat maneuver unit, began to arrive at Bien Hoa and Vung Tau air bases, and by 12 May, the brigade was conducting combat patrols.⁹

The Commitment of Larger Units

The 173d, as well as the combat support and service support units, fell under the operational control of USMACV. The national chain of command is shown on chart 4. This chart shows that the ambassador had policy control. President Johnson, however, made it clear in 1964 that the ambassador was the boss on all matters concerning support to South Vietnam. President Johnson stated that General Maxwell Taylor, the new ambassador to South Vietnam, was to "have and exercise full responsibility for the effort of the United States Government in South Vietnam...I wish it clearly understood that this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietnam."¹⁰


The ambassador's organization to accomplish this task was the United States Mission (called the country team), shown on chart 5. USMACV was only one component of the country team. General William C. Westmoreland, appointed Commander of USMACV in 1964, stated that "It [the mission organization] was [a] complex, awkward arrangement."¹¹

Fortunately, General Taylor delegated control of the war to military authorities, and subsequent ambassadors, for the most part, left the direction of the armed forces to the military chain of command. That chain of command



(Echardt, p. 32)


Chart 3. Chain of Command, Vietnam, 1962



_____ Command
 - - - - - Policy Control
 xxx Advice

(Sharp, p. 38)

Chart 4. U.S. Command Structure, 1964



¹ USOM--Agency for International Development, U.S. Operations Mission to Vietnam.

² JUSPAO--Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office.

³ USASCV--U.S. Army Support Command, Vietnam.

⁴ HSAS--Headquarters, Support Activity, Saigon.

⁵ NAG--Naval Advisory Group.

(BDM Study, p. 2-32)

Chart 5. United States Mission, Vietnam

at (chart 4) shows the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), as the theater commander, and USMACV as a subordinate, unified command. General Westmoreland, however, still had two immediate supervisors, the ambassador and CINCPAC.

The Headquarters, USMACV, is depicted on chart 6. This chart shows that USMACV was a joint command. However, it was not a separate, unified command, and its responsibility was confined to the borders of South Vietnam.


Prior to the formation of this organization for the Headquarters, USMACV, the JCS proposed forming a unified command of all U.S. forces in South Vietnam that would report directly to it. Admiral Harry D. Felt (at that time CINCPAC) objected to this proposal. He thought that the Communists were threatening all of Southeast Asia and that, therefore, CINCPAC should continue to direct a unified military effort in Vietnam. In addition, contingency plans for joint or combined operations in Southeast Asia called for a headquarters commanded by the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, under the control of CINCPAC.¹²

After the war the BDM Corporation studied the issue of a separate unified command for Southeast Asia. A summary of this study is at figure 1.

Viewed with the principles of war in mind, the arguments for a separate command far outweighed those against them. The arguments for a separate command were that it provided for greater unity of effort, flexibility, and mass, and that it would have been doctrinally sound. Unfortunately, discussions are not always based solely on the principles of war.

Nevertheless, the Department of State and the President agreed with Admiral Felt's view. Thus, the headquarters for U.S. military forces in Vietnam remained in Honolulu with CINCPAC in command.¹³

Chart 7 shows the Pacific Command relationships as they existed in 1967. Just due to organizational size and the diverse lines of operational control, weak operational control would have existed and coordination and cooperation would have been difficult to attain. Add the national level of command to this already confusing web of relationships and the loss of unity of command becomes even more readily apparent, as seen by chart 8.



(BDM Study, p. 2-35)

Chart 6. U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

FACTORS

POLITICAL

FOR

- CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS PRECEDENT
- VEHICLE FOR POSSIBLE SEATO PARTICIPATION.
- CLOSER REGIONAL COORDINATION OF US POLICIES
- REMOVAL OF CINCPAC AS "OBSTACLE AND IRRITANT."
- COULD HAVE PRODUCED PRESSURE FOR BETTER INTERAGENCY CO-ORDINATING IN USG.

AGAINST


- SENSITIVITY OF THAIS, LAOTIANS & CAMBODIANS.
- PROBABLE WORLDWIDE IMPACT.
- "WE SEEK NO WIDER WAR."
- REDUCTION OF US AMBASSADORS' INFLUENCE AND COUNTRY TEAM CONCEPT.
- SINGLE, POWERFUL "WAR LORD."

MILITARY


- UNITY OF EFFORT (FLEXIBILITY, MASS, ETC).
- DOCTRINALLY SOUND.
- COMMUNICATIONS/DATA CAPABILITIES.
- BETTER COODINATION OF US INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.
- US/SEATO CONTINGENCY PLANS.
- BETTER CONTROL OF US AIRPOWER MORE ECONIMICAL.
- ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP FOR POSSIBLE COMBINED COMMAND.
- COULD HAVE REDUCED INTERFERENCE BY PACOM COMPONENTS COMMANDS.
- SPAN OF CONTROL OF SEACOM.
- POSSIBLE THREATS IN OTHER PACOM AREAS.
- RESTRICTION ON SHIFTING FORCES WITHIN PACOM.
- PROBABLE CLOSER WASHINGTON CONTROL OF GROUND OPERATIONS.
- CINCPAC USUALLY SUPPORTED MACV VIEWS WITH JCS.
- POSSIBLE DIMINUTION OF PACOM SUPPORT OF SEACOM (LOGISTICS, ETC).

(BDM Study, p. 11-49)

Figure 1. Summary of the Case For and Against Unified SEACOM



1. Army Component Commander
2. Navy Component Commander
3. Air Force Component Commander
4. Also Deputy MACV Commander for Air
5. Assigned primary responsibility for orientation and co-operation with ROK Capital Division and 9th ROK Infantry Division
6. Assigned primary responsibility for orientation and co-operation with ROK Marine Brigade
7. Under command less operational control of U.S. Army Security Agency, Pacific
8. Under command less operational control of Commander, Airlift Force, Vietnam
9. Director of the Military Assistance Command, Transportation Directorate, exercises command and operational control
10. Elements under command less operational control of appropriate type commanders



(Echardt, pp. 66-67)

Chart 7. Pacific Command Relationships

6-15




Chart 8. Chain of Command, 1967


The fragmented, compartmentalized manner which characterized the prosecution of the war in Vietnam also affected unity of effort. The Under Secretary of the Air Force, Townsend Hoopes, noted in 1969 "that the United States was actually fighting 'three separate or only loosely related struggles. There was the large-scale, conventional war...there was the confused 'pacification' effort based on political-sociological prescriptions of astronomical proportions...and there was the curiously remote air war against North Vietnam.'"¹⁴ Three wars in Vietnam--ground, air, and the pacification effort--will be discussed in detail later in the chapter.

Along with these separate wars there were a number of commanders vying for control in Southeast Asia. General Westmoreland said there were five commanders: "CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and the American ambassadors to Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam."¹⁵ That does not include the prerogatives of the president and the secretary of defense to step in anywhere along the chain. These many commanders helped to fragment the war effort, particularly the air war.

The Air War



Brigadier General Dave Palmer rightly noted that the air war "remained a separate and distinct operation from the war in South Vietnam, directed from a different headquarters and subject to different policy considerations. Yet it obviously was a part of the Vietnam War, always related to and affected by events in the South."¹⁶ CINCPAC, the Strategic Air Command (SAC), and USMACV were all headquarters directing the air campaign, and Washington, through the JCS, was supposed to be the controlling authority. However, according to the military strategist Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., "with several minute exceptions 'not a senior level officer above the rank of office director or colonel in any U.S. agency dealt full-time with Vietnam before 1969.'"¹⁷ Washington's efforts helped to further divide the control of the war and complicate the theater commander's mission.

The theater commander, Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp (CINCPAC, 1964-1968), controlled a large portion of the air war. Chart 9, taken from his book, Strategy for Defeat, shows relatively straight command lines for the control of military operations in Vietnam. But a BDM Corporation study (chart 10) completed after the war shows a somewhat different story for the air war. Chart 10



(Sharp, p. 78)

Chart 9. Command and Control of Military Operations in Vietnam



(BDM Study, p. 11-53)

Chart 10. Command and Control of the AIRWAR

shows three command lines from JCS, then three from PACOM. Notice, also, the Republic of Vietnam's Air Force was not connected, although cooperation and coordination were expected.

According to doctrine, PACOM as theater headquarters, could have had three or more command lines running from it. The problem stems from the Vietnamese fighting their own air war, General Westmoreland fighting his air war south of the 17th parallel, Admiral Sharp fighting the air war in the north, SAC involved in all, and Washington providing directives to everyone. A coordinated effort was not achieved. Obviously, the reason for this was that there was no unity of command.


The Ground War

The Pacific Command was also the theater headquarters for the ground war (refer to chart 7), but Admiral Sharp left the direction of the ground war, within the borders of South Vietnam, to the COMUSMACV, General Westmoreland. This ground war eventually involved over half a million troops.

From the landing of the 173d Airborne Brigade in May 1965 to the end of that year, U.S. Army strength in Vietnam increased fivefold to more than one hundred thousand. To command administratively these increasing numbers, USASCV was designated Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV), in July 1965 and placed under the operational control of COMUSMACV.¹⁸ General Westmoreland as COMUSMACV was also designated CG, USARV. U.S. Army, Pacific, retained command, less operational control. A close look at chart 7 shows that General Westmoreland was a subordinate and an equal to U.S. Army, Pacific, and his own subordinate as CG, USARV. Senior commanders often wore several hats, and it was not unusual to have separate administrative and operational headquarters. But building on an advisory command had serious implications for the future.

Thus, two sizable headquarters for command of the war evolved: USMACV retained operational control of the maneuver units, and USARV, as the army component command, retained command, less operational control, of most U.S. Army units throughout the war. The organization of USARV headquarters is shown at chart 11.

6-20



- - - - - OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF SELECTED UNITS
- - - - - GENERAL STAFF SUPERVISION
- FUNCTIONAL SUPERVISION

(Functions Manual, p. v)

* Added by 1967, deleted by 1969


Chart 11. USARV Headquarters, 1966

The command and control of the ground war is depicted at chart 12. Unlike the air war, U.S. operational control of the ground forces within the borders of South Vietnam appeared on the surface to be clearly defined. But the relationship with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and other allied forces was based on cooperation and coordination. A combined command was not established. Colonel Summers commented, "within Vietnam itself the command structure was convoluted and confused with overlapping authority and responsibility diffused among Military Assistance Command Vietnam, the Army Republic of Vietnam Joint General Staff, United States Army Vietnam and the 'Free World Military Forces.'"¹⁹

In his memoir, General Westmoreland gave his reasons for not forming a combined command: "I consistently resisted suggestions that a single, combined command could more efficiently prosecute the war. I believed that subordinating the Vietnamese forces to U.S. control would stifle the growth of leadership and acceptance of responsibility essential to the development of Vietnamese Armed Forces capable eventually of defending their country. Moreover, such a step would be counter to our basic objective of assisting Vietnam in a time of emergency and of leaving a strong, independent country at the time of our withdrawal."²⁰

A BDM Corporation study summed up the arguments on a combined command at figure 2. Those arguments for a combined command are sound, can be proven by historical examples, and are based on time-honored principles of war. The arguments against a combined command are subjective evaluations, based on outdated situations. Perhaps more importantly, neither the Vietnamese nor the Koreans supported the idea of a combined command. As a consequence, General Westmoreland decided against this type of command. This decision had implications for the future, after U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam.

Ultimately, the U.S. did not leave a strong, independent Vietnam. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam collapsed in 1975. It did so to a large degree because of an ineffectual leadership which grew out of the Vietnamese system of officer procurement, shaky political appointments, and corruption. The U.S. command could only influence the Vietnamese by persuasion and by withholding support. This sort of control was not effective. We should have had a combined command situation where we would have had the authority to fire incompetent leaders--an authority that might have fostered growth of



(BDM Study, p. 11-29)

Chart 12. Command and Control of the Ground War

| <u>FACTORS</u> | <u>FOR</u> | <u>AGAINST</u> |
|-------------------------|--|--|
| <u>PRECEDENTS</u> | WWII AND KOREA | AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND WATERLOO |
| <u>POLITICAL</u> | | |
| o US | YES, BUT <u>NOT</u> WITH RVNAF CDR | VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT "PUPPET" AND "NEO COLONIAL" ISSUES. |
| o RVN | | |
| o ALLIES | MOST RECOGNIZED BENEFITS <u>BUT</u> | SENSITIVE, ESPECIALLY ROK'S EXCELLENT PROPAGANDA WEAPON |
| o ENEMY | | |
| o WORLD | | "PROOF" THAT IT WAS A US WAR |
| <u>MILITARY</u> | | |
| o UNITY | SOUNDEST APPROACH | |
| o MASS | MORE AND FASTER | |
| o MANEUVER | SPEEDIER AND BETTER | |
| o FLEXIBILITY | SEVERAL-FOLD INCREASE | |
| o SURPRISE | | JGS AND RVNAF INFILTRATED BY ENEMY |
| o CONTROL | TIGHTER | |
| o PLANNING | MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE | |
| o MORALE | GOOD FOR SOLDIERS <u>BUT</u> | OFFICERS LOSE "FACE" AND CONFIDENCE |
| o LEADERS | BETTER FOR SELECTION, TRAINING AND "FIRING" <u>BUT</u> | THEY BECOME US "BOYS" |
| o SUPPORT | CHEAPER, AND BETTER | |
| o TRAINING | MORE OJT FOR RVNAF | |
| <u>PSYCHOLOGICAL</u> | A PLUS FOR US <u>IF</u> SOLID <u>BUT</u> PROGRESS ACHIEVED AND US CASUALTIES REDUCED | PROBABLY MORE HARM THAN GOOD FOR RVN OVER LONG RUN |
| <u>ECONOMIC</u> | SOME SAVINGS PROBABLE | |
| <u>PACIFICATION</u> | MORE EFFICIENT <u>BUT</u> | TOO MUCH US AND TOO LITTLE RVN |
| <u>"VIETNAMIZATION"</u> | EARLIER AND SOUNDER <u>BUT</u> | RVNAF MORE "SPOILED" |
| <u>ON BALANCE</u> | MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE <u>BUT</u> WHILE US ACTIVELY INVOLVED | RVNAF EVEN MORE DEPENDENT ON EXPENSIVE AND SOMETIMES IRRELEVANT "WAY OF WAR" |
| <u>FEASIBILITY</u> | POSSIBLE WHEN RVN WEAKEST (1965) <u>BUT</u> | THE POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL COST WOULD HAVE BEEN TOO HEAVY |

6-23

(BDM Study, p. 11-39)


leadership and acceptance of responsibility better than leaving the Vietnamese forces under their own president.

The Republic of Korea forces also were not integrated into the command structure. Here, as with the Vietnamese, the command relationship rested on coordination and cooperation. With two allied forces outside the chain of command, it would have seemed that the U.S. organization would have been straightforward and according to doctrine. But the decision of General Westmoreland not to establish a combined command destroyed unity of effort at the tactical level.

Chart 13 shows the organization of the tactical ground forces. If this diagram had reflected doctrine, then USMACV would have been named the subordinate unified command. Its subordinate commands would have been called corps. As forces increased, a field army, then an army group headquarters, could have been superimposed on the corps. As it happened, the corps headquarters were III Marine Amphibious Force and the two Field Force headquarters. General Westmoreland in A Soldier Reports gave the reasons for this organization:

For several reasons I chose not to designate the American headquarters as corps. I wanted to avoid confusion with the four existing Vietnamese corps headquarters and also to emphasize that each American headquarters was supporting the Vietnamese--a force in the field supporting a corps, thus a 'field force.' Nor was the headquarters a corps in the usual tactical sense, since the commander had territorial responsibilities as well as tactical ones and eventually, I anticipated would also be in charge of pacification.

Because the III Marine Amphibious Force at Danang already constituted a corps-type headquarters, it served as the American headquarters in the northern provinces alongside the South Vietnamese I Corps. A U.S. Army headquarters, the I (Eye) Field Force, Vietnam, located at Nha Trang served with the Vietnamese II Corps, responsible for the central provinces; and another U.S. Army headquarters the II Field Force, Vietnam, at Bien Hoa served with the Vietnamese III Corps in the region around Saigon. Since I contemplated no major American deployment in the Mekong Delta, no comparable headquarters served with the Vietnamese IV Corps.



(Echardt, p. 83)

Chart 13. Tactical Ground Forces

This organizational concept provided a flexibility that was essential, for who could predict exactly how the battle would develop? If necessary, for example, a field force headquarters might assume the role of a field army headquarters with one or more tactical corps subordinate to it. In later months, after introducing U.S. Army troops into the northern provinces to help meet an enemy threat, I found it necessary to put a corps headquarters within the zone of III Marine Amphibious Force, to operate as a true tactical headquarters without advisory or territorial responsibilities, so that the flexibility paid off.²¹

In sum, the major subordinate headquarters were called field forces instead of corps for several reasons: to preserve the preeminence of the Vietnamese corps; to prevent problems in communications and coordination that would develop through the existence of a senior U.S. tactical headquarters, designated as a U.S. corps, but functioning in the same area as a Vietnamese corps; and to avoid the connotation of a unilateral U.S. effort.²² In such a situation, the methods and mentality of advisors predominated over doctrine because the subordinate unified command was a former military assistance advisory group. In addition, major commanders always had to balance command and advisory duties, as the operations of field forces demonstrated.

The operations of a field force also differed from the operations of a conventional U.S. corps. These differences included the close coordination required with ARVN and Free World Military Assistance (FWMA) armed forces, the civilian agencies of RVN, and other U.S. agencies located in the various corps tactical zones, (CTZs).²³

All corps-type headquarters coordinate, but in Vietnam military operations were planned by arbitration, as described in a 1966 USARV report:

Military operations are planned and controlled on the basis of cooperation and coordination between commanders of US/FWMAF and Vietnam commanders at all echelons.

For military operations involving both RVNAF [Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces] and US/FWMAF forces, planning is accomplished as far in advance as possible in which the responsible RVNAF and US/FWMAF commanders achieve agreement on the purpose, overall objectives, concept of

operations, forces to be committed, and general timing. Selected staff personnel designated by those commanders join together to plan the operations in detail. Before the initiation of hostilities the responsible RVNAF and US/FWMAF commanders establish collocated command posts to facilitate coordination, cooperation, mutual assistance and decision making.²⁴


Clearly, the U.S. field forces did not control all the military forces in their sectors.

This war by committee was not the most efficient means of applying force. Moreover, it did not leave the South Vietnamese leaders with a firm grasp of how to conduct military operations. The field force headquarters, however, did accomplish their missions vis-a-vis the U.S. forces. In the end, it did not matter whether they were called a field force or a corps. But they should have had one command, and they should have had that command over all the military forces in their geographical area.

As stated earlier, the organization in the Vietnamese I Corps area was somewhat different. Here a Marine headquarters functioned as the corps or field force headquarters. In 1968, this headquarters took on the role of a field army. The headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), was subordinate to USMACV and controlled a U.S. army corps (refer to chart 14). The problem with this organization, as with the field force headquarters, was the dependence on coordination and cooperation with the I Corps ARVN and 2d ROK Marine Brigade. There were also further difficulties involved in having Marine and Army units mixed. This created problems in air and logistic operations.

Before 1968, there were two managers for air assets in the I Corps zone. The deputy commander for air operations (USMACV) had operational control of 7th Air Force's men and equipment and the Navy air support from Task Force 77. The Commanding General of III Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF) had operational control of the resources of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). The 1st MAW supported the Marines, and the 7th Air Force, the Army. In 1968 General Westmoreland appointed his deputy for air operations as the manager for all air assets in the I Corps zone.²⁵

Logistics for the Marine-Army mix remained a problem. USARV was responsible for the supply of the three southern combat zones, while the Naval Supply Activity at Danang



(Echardt, p. 76)


Chart 14. Command Relationships, I Corps, 1968

served the I Corps area. The Commanding General, III MAF, was also responsible for supplying items needed exclusively by Marine units. As more Army units were assigned to I Corps, the Navy and Marine facilities could no longer meet the demand. As a result, USARV expanded its efforts into the area. An official history of the command and control in Vietnam commented: "While the logistic support operations in the I Corps area during this period were efficiently carried out, they were accomplished through a complicated control arrangement involving Army, Navy and Marine headquarters."²⁶

Besides the somewhat unusual Marine-Army structure in the I Corps area, the delta had an even more unorthodox organization comprised of Navy and Army elements. Although General Westmoreland originally foresaw no large scale deployment of U.S. forces in the Delta, a sizable force was in fact committed. The 2d Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division and the Mobile Riverine Force conducted operations in the Mekong Delta from 1 June 1967 until 25 August 1969.²⁷ Unlike Marine and Army forces in the north, the Riverine forces did not even have a semblance of a joint command structure. As seen in chart 15, these operations were primarily based on coordination and mutual support.

In preparing for the riverine operations, General Westmoreland had proposed a joint task force to be commanded by the assistant commander of the 9th Division, who would have a small joint staff for operations, logistics, and communications. Admiral Sharp, however, wanted Task Force CTF116, the naval river patrol force already conducting operations in the Delta, to have operational control. A compromise developed which placed U.S. Army units under the operational control of II Field Force, and Navy units under operational control of the Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam. Thus, riverine operations were conducted with Army and Navy units commanded separately, with the Navy providing close support based on coordination.²⁸

Again, the organizational structure did not support unity of command or effort. But in this case, the operations were deemed a success by the participants. After-action reports listed no unusual problems or lack of support.



* The Army will provide the base commander both ashore and afloat. The Navy will provide its appropriate share of personnel for local base defense and primary efforts directed toward provision of gunfire support and protection against waterborne threats.

(Echardt, p. 79)

Chart 15. Command and Control for Riverine Operations

Pacification


The third war was the pacification effort. General Westmoreland, prior to becoming COMUSMACV, realized that unity of command in the U.S. pacification effort in Vietnam was needed.²⁹ But little progress was made during 1964 and 1965.

The total U.S. pacification effort involved several independent civil agencies as well as the military, and U.S. actions were not well-coordinated. High-level meetings held among agencies of the U.S. Mission in Saigon and the Washington Vietnam Coordinating Committee recognized the problem, but little improvement was made except to change the name of the advisory effort.³⁰

General Westmoreland attempted his own improvements. He elevated the MACV Revolutionary Development Support Division (as the pacification effort was called in 1966) to directorate level and placed a major general in charge. He also appointed directors for each of the four regions. General Westmoreland further directed the commanding generals of the III MAF, I and II Field Forces, and the senior advisor to the IV Corps to give all necessary assistance to the regional directors.³¹ Yet effective civil and military actions in support of pacification remained an elusive goal.³²


In 1967, President Johnson decided to integrate the civilian and military U.S. pacification support efforts under General Westmoreland. The Military Assistance Command now assumed responsibility for pacification. There were two basic reasons for assigning the task to General Westmoreland. First, security, a prerequisite to pacification, was a primary responsibility of the Vietnamese armed forces, which were advised by the Military Assistance Command--Westmoreland's headquarters. Second, the greater part of U.S. advisory and logistic resources were under General Westmoreland's control.³³

Pacification came to be called Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), under an appointed deputy to General Westmoreland with a rank of ambassador. Chart 16 shows the CORDS organization. By 1967, the U.S. pacification effort had finally been centralized. But, again, the lack of a combined command hampered efforts. When the Vietnamese relationship is added, as in chart 17,



(Echardt, p. 72)

Chart 16. CORDS Field Organization



— Command

- - - Advise

XXXXX OPCCN

(BDM Study, p. 14-28)

Chart 17. Advisory Relationships

the haziness of the command and control relationships of the pacification effort can be seen. Author Guenter Lewy provided an astute summary of the pacification effort:

Americans in the field also pointed out the lack of coordination between the different elements of the pacification effort. ARVN commanders often refused to accept the authority of the district chief; American, Korean and South Vietnamese commanders failed to coordinate their military operations with those responsible for pacification or with each other.

The one proposal which might have gone a long way toward solving most of these difficulties--the idea of a combined command--was rejected by the military commanders of the American, South Vietnamese and Korean forces fighting in Vietnam.³⁴


Logistics

Logistic responsibilities were centralized for U.S. Army forces on 28 April 1965 with the reactivation in Vietnam of the 1st Logistical Command, from Fort Hood, Texas. This unit, a major subordinate command of USARV (chart 18), assumed a type B logistical command structure in May 1965.

The logistical command's headquarters of 329 personnel had a directorate staff that commanded subordinate area commands and separate units (see chart 19). The organization by 1969 had a strength of approximately 50,000 military and 30,000 civilian personnel, and it supported over 500,000 U.S. and Free World forces in Vietnam.³⁵

Map 2 shows the major tactical units supported by the 1st Logistical Command and map 3 the location of the four area commands. Although many problems were encountered in structuring the command, no battles were lost due to lack of support. Other problems surfaced concerning coordination with supported units (as in I Corps, as discussed earlier), but the static situation in Vietnam lent itself to successful support operations.


The logistic effort in Vietnam may be summed up by stating that the U.S. soldier was the best-equipped and cared for fighting man in the world.



NOTE: - - - - OPERATIONAL CONTROL
 * USASTRATCOM-PAC EXERCISES COMMAND


(USARV Logistics, vol. I, p. II-6)

Chart 18. U.S. Army, Vietnam, 1969




(USARV Logistics, vol. II, p. A61)

Chart 19. 1st Logistical Command, 1967



(USARV Logistics, vol I, p. II-5)

Map 2. Major Tactical Units Supported



(USARV Logistics, vol. I, p. II-9)

Map 3. Location of Area Commands

Conclusion

General Westmoreland provided the following conclusions in his memoir on the command and control of the Vietnam War:

Many of the errors could be traced to strong control of the conduct of the war from Washington, a policy born jointly of the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, which demonstrated the perils of decentralization, and of the successful outcome of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, which seemed to indicate that command from the White House was the only way to handle crisis and war in the nuclear age. Yet never was there created a central organization in Washington capable of exercising the necessary control; in the final analysis only the President could make a decision and then only after having listened to a host of sometimes conflicting voices.


Creating a unified command for all of Southeast Asia would have gone a long way toward mitigating the unprecedented centralization of authority in Washington and the preoccupation with minutia at the Washington level. A unified commander provided with broad policy guidance and a political adviser would have obviated the bureaucratic wrangles that raged in Washington and resulted in military decisions strongly influenced by civilian officials who, however well-intentioned, lacked military expertise either from experience or study. Instead of five 'commanders'--CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and the American ambassadors to Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam--there would have been one man directly answerable to the President on everything. Although that kind of organization might have created ripples within the service-conscious Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs traditionally fall in line when the Commander in Chief speaks. Such an arrangement would have eliminated the problem of coordination between the air and ground wars that was inevitable with CINCPAC managing one, COMUSMACV the other.³⁶

A unified command would have solved some of the problems, but a combined unified command would have been the best solution. In this case, a combined command would

not have been an innovative solution but one which would have followed existing doctrine. It would have also fulfilled the missing goal of unity of effort.

A Center of Military History monograph on the command and control of Vietnam proposed the command arrangement shown on chart 20 as a solution to future Vietnam type conflicts.

This was a combined unified command. In addition, the pacification (CORDS) and advisor groups are shown under the operational command of the component forces. The important point to note is that a supreme commander is in charge, not a military assistance commander. This proposal, if put in force, would ensure a vast improvement over the organization used in Vietnam, and it should serve as a model for the future.



(Echardt, p. 88)

Chart 20. Proposed Command and Control

NOTES

1. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations: Larger Units, (Washington, D.C., December 1963,) with change 1 March 1966), 5.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 11.
4. Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. (Carlisle Barrocks, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S Army War College, 23 March 1982), 87.
5. U.S. Army, Vietnam, Organization and Functions Manual (1 December 1967), (IV, hereafter cited as Functions Manual).
6. Ibid.
7. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, A History (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), 680.
8. Functions Manual, V.
9. Ibid.
10. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports. (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1980), 84.
11. Ibid., 94.
12. George S. Eckhardt, Command and Control, 1950-1969. Department of the Army, 1974, 26-27.
13. Ibid., 27.
14. Summers, On Strategy, 91.
15. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 543.
16. Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 122-23.
17. Summers, On Strategy, 91.
18. Functions Manual, V.
19. Summers, On Strategy, 98.

20. Ibid. 102-3.
21. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 201-2.
22. U.S. Army, Vietnam, Report Subject: "Questions by USAC & GSC on Military Operations in Vietnam," to Commandant, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 August 1966. Inclosure 1, 3.
23. Ibid., 2.
24. Ibid.
25. Eckhardt, Command, 75.
26. Ibid., 77.
27. Ibid., 80.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 65.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 68.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 69.
34. Guenter Lewy, America In Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 121.
35. U.S. Army, Vietnam, The Logistics Review, U.S. Army Vietnam, 1965 to 1969, vol. I, Systems Overviews, (n.p., n.d.), II-2.
36. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 543.

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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION*

General

The preceding chapters provide a frame of reference from which to study force structures over the past forty-five years of U.S. military involvement in various worldwide conflicts. Throughout the period, general similarities in theaters may be observed, but each theater army reflected its own geographic area, mission, and special requirements. The effects of various personalities also shaped high command and organization, as in the case of MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific Area. These five case studies provide the reader with a general picture of U.S. doctrinal philosophies for the periods under consideration.

The United States had doctrinal concepts for "type" force structures for the corps and field army prior to becoming involved in both World War II and the Korean War. These concepts provided guidance for determining the number of nondivisional units needed to support a given number of divisions. By determining the number of divisions to be supported, the number of corps and army headquarters could be calculated for a projected divisional force. However, the actual force structures did not always mirror planning but often developed as a result of such factors as mission, enemy forces, tactics, and terrain.

Organization

Organizationally, there were numerous similarities, as well as dissimilarities, among theaters. Theater commanders adapted to the conditions of their particular areas. Generally, each of the theaters began as a combined operation, with the commitment of an observer group to work with the host nation forces (ETO, North Africa, Korea, and Vietnam). Initially, U.S. forces worked closely with the host nation forces as a matter of

*Written by Lieutenant Colonel Gary L. Bounds

necessity because the U.S. lacked the personnel and logistical support for independent commands and operations.

Political considerations were another factor influencing early organizations. In SWPA, conditions warranted the creation of ABDA, a combined command with an Australian as the ground forces commander. In North Africa, the 18th Army Group was created under Eisenhower's control, with the political goal of inducing French forces to join the Allied effort. During the Vietnam War, political considerations surpassed most other considerations, with the U.S. ambassador during the early phases of the war having overall responsibility for military operations in the country. In this case, politics dictated a nonstandard organization, with splintered areas of responsibility and command, with U.S. Army, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and ROK forces pursuing separate ground wars without any pretense of a combined command.

Commands were evolutionary in nature, and organizations were developed and discontinued based on the needs created by specific operations. In the NATO, after the Allies achieved victory in Tunisia, 18th Army Group was disbanded and its staff integrated into Headquarters, Force 141, the planning staff for the invasion of Sicily. On the day that the invasion was launched, this headquarters became Headquarters, 15th Army Group. During the initial phases of the Korean conflict, assets for the corps echelon of command were not available and therefore not used. The nucleus for the corps headquarters had to be activated stateside and then shipped to the theater of operation. A mature theater did not emerge until 1951. A similar situation developed in the ETO during World War II. As the force structure expanded during Overlord, so did the number of army groups. In the case of Third Army, the headquarters was established stateside and shipped to England. In the ETO, span of control and the operational area affected the way larger unit headquarters were established. As the buildup continued, additional field armies became operational. The span of control increased, and two army groups were created, with SHAEF becoming the combined headquarters directing all phases of the battle. (Eisenhower assumed the role of ground forces commander after the lodgement on the Continent.)

Organization was also affected by operational factors. In the ETO, during the Ardennes counteroffensive, U.S. field armies were placed under the command of the British 21st Army Group until the bulge was

reduced and normal conditions prevailed. These changes reflected the flexible nature of ETO's organizational structure.

A number of features were unique to specific theaters. SWPA never employed the army group echelon of command. This was probably a theater-dependent decision by MacArthur and was also due to the geographic nature of the predominantly waterborne theater. Field armies in this theater were kept under MacArthur's direct control, thereby making them more responsive to his needs.

The evolution of the theater army as an administrative headquarters involved logistical responsibilities. ETOUSA, in this context, should be viewed as the father of the modern theater army, an organization which took its most characteristic form as USARV. Theater armies have more often been established after a theater of operations has been in action for some time, as demonstrated by the reorganization of ETOUSA in 1944, the late establishment of USAFE and USAWESPAC in SWPA and USAFFE in Japan. In these case studies, theater armies usually exercised only administrative command and not operational control, thereby making them responsive to his needs.

Command

One of the most significant conclusions of this study is that unity of command was necessary for the effective organization and operation of larger units in the field. This principle of war probably had the greatest influence on the successful command and control of forces. Examples indicate that when unity of command was not established (SWPA/POA cross-theater operations, the UNC advance into North Korea and Vietnam), serious problems developed in combat operations. In contrast, greater effectiveness was observed when the time-honored principle of unity of command was observed (as in ETO, MTO, and FEC under Ridgway) by large unit commanders.

Factors affecting the establishment of unity of command were political considerations, as in Vietnam, and interservice rivalries and geographic considerations, as in the Pacific. In the Pacific, the division of the area into two primary theaters, one under U.S. Army control and one under U.S. Navy control, resulted in different missions and organizations for field armies. In the case of the POA, the U.S. Army had to conform to the directives of senior naval commanders. For the Tenth Army, this

meant fighting as a joint task force consisting of Marine, Army, Navy, and tactical Air assets. Upon the conquest of Okinawa, the Tenth Army assumed the mission of base development but still remained under Navy control. In contrast, Sixth and Eighth armies (SWPA) fought under Army control throughout the war. This was a clear example of how geography and prewar commitments provided the basis for wartime command structures. But only in the case of the POA did the Navy command all theater assets for any period of time.

Another consideration influencing unity of command was the consistent effort by national forces under combined command to retain command of the largest organizations possible to avoid their being placed under nonnational commands. For example, in Korea, separate British brigades and other Commonwealth forces were eventually organized into a Commonwealth Division, and the Turkish Brigade always fought as a brigade and not as individual battalions. In the MTO and ETO, national lines of organization were always followed to the highest level of organization; the few exceptions to this rule were temporary expedients.

This study demonstrates that the U.S. established or maintained U.S. theater commands which were parallel and complementary to the combined or Allied command. In fact, staffs and commanders usually had dual roles, as in Korea, where the CINCFEC was also CINCUNC and his FEC, GHQ also functioned as the UNC, GHQ. Similarly, in addition to being Supreme Commanders of their theaters, Eisenhower and MacArthur were also U.S. theater commanders, and their U.S. theater staffs formed the backbone of the combined staffs.

Flexibility, in addition to unity of command, was a driving principle in the organization and command of theater forces. Field armies were sometimes combined commands; for example, British or French corps were attached to American armies in the MTO and the ETO, and the ROK Army was integrated into EUSAK in Korea. On the other hand, field armies rarely had joint structures, the Tenth Army in the POA being an exception. Army groups were usually not established, except in the case of North Africa and the ETO, where there was a large ground theater.

Under the generic heading of command, theater and army commands built on the foundation of existing MAAGs experienced problems. In Korea, the KMAG was quickly subordinated to EUSAK. In contrast, one of the reasons

for the ineffectiveness of MACV in Vietnam was its growth out of a prewar MAAG and its retention of MAAG attitudes and philosophies on fighting the war. Mid-intensity warfare demanded that the military assistance effort submit to the higher priority of conventional combat operations.

Another problem associated with unity of command was the tendency of a supreme commander to retain command of ground forces, while separate component commanders were appointed for the air and naval forces. MacArthur, for instance, commanded his own (American) ground component and even created Alamo Force in order to bypass a combined forces ground commander, in this instance an Australian. This action circumvented non-American control of U.S. ground forces. MacArthur continued this practice in Korea by retaining control of X Corps when it logically should have come under EUSAK control. In ETO, Eisenhower acted as his own ground force commander after 1 September 1944, as did Westmoreland for the Vietnam conflict. U.S. Army officers who became supreme commanders often retained command of ground forces.

In a case where there was a separation of the air and ground wars, as in Vietnam, it may have appeared that this constituted a deviation from standard practice. Such situations, however, were far from unique. A strategic bombing campaign, pursued independently from an associated ground war, has been the norm for U.S. theater operations. The Combined Chiefs of Staff controlled strategic bombing in the ETO rather than Eisenhower. CINCUNC controlled strategic bombing in Korea, with minimal input from Eighth Army. CINCPAC, rather than Westmoreland, controlled strategic bombing in Vietnam. Tactical air support in Vietnam was not separated from the ground command. It was either attached, controlled by, or extremely responsive to the ground force in the theater.

Logistics

Combat service support for larger unit operations generally followed national lines. In the first major combined operation of World War II, Operation Torch, Allied headquarters provided for separate and parallel combat service support systems. Three task forces (Western, Central, and Eastern) were established, and during the initial phase, the Western Task Force (U.S. forces) was supplied directly from the U.S., the Central Task Force (U.S. ground forces) was supplied by SOS,

ETOUSA, and the Eastern Task Force (predominantly British) was supplied by the British Supply Service. After the lodgement in North Africa was secure, a COMZ was established, and U.S. support was orchestrated by an American acting in the dual capacity of COMZ commander and deputy theater commander. The unique position of chief administrative officer (filled by a British general) was established in AFHQ to coordinate the work of the American and British supply systems.

The ETO was a logical outgrowth of lessons learned and procedures established in North Africa and the Mediterranean theaters. Logistics, in this context, followed national lines to the degree that the Allies used separate beach areas for Overlord to facilitate follow-on supply operations. Once the lodgement was established, SHAEF assumed command of ground forces. Subsequently, two Army groups were made operational, each primarily along national lines, and a COMZ established to support combat operations. A flexible organization was thereby established to ensure responsiveness to special situations, as in the establishment of the Southern Line of Communication which supported the southern invasion of France. This organization was a separate but subordinate headquarters of HQ, COMZ, ETO.

In SWPA and the POA, the waterborne theaters prevented neat boundaries and zones, but the theaters used similar methods to achieve desirable logistical support. In each case, when an operation was in the planning stages, a logistics cell would be designated consisting of personnel from SOS and the supported field army. This cell would do the logistical planning, receive additional support units for the operation, and execute the mission of sustaining the landing force. These agencies, called an Army Support Command (ASCOM) in SWPA and an Island Support Command (ISCOM) in the POA, were created for each operation and remained in support until the landing force moved away from the beaches, at which time the SOS would resume responsibility.

Korea presented a unique instance where a field army acted, for a period of time, as a theater army, taking on much of the responsibilities normally associated with that level of command. EUSAK was charged with logistical support for all United Nations forces in Korea. Although not exercising administrative control over the ROK forces, EUSAK still operated the UN Reception Center, processing all replacements. In country, EUSAK operated logistics base commands that were supported by the Japan Logistics Command, which, in essence, was the offshore communications zone.

During the Vietnam conflict, logistics mirrored the operational picture to some degree. A logistics command was established early to support combat operations for Army forces. However, clear lines of operational responsibility precluded the simplification of logistics support. Army logistics assets were used to support the Naval Supply Activity (Danang), which supported the Marines in I Corps. Moreover, Army units attached to Marine headquarters were sometimes forced to rely on Marine channels for logistics support. Although American soldiers in Vietnam were the best supplied soldiers in history, clear lines of responsibility for their support were often lacking.

The case studies presented demonstrate the need for clear doctrinal guidelines for the pursuit of combat operations. The United States entered each of the conflicts with general guidelines based on the mission, geographic area, enemy forces, and politics. The United States, however, developed organizations tailored to fit those needs. Larger unit operations invariably fared well when unity of command was observed but fared less well when this principle was not incorporated into the overall plan. The process was evolutionary, and policies changed as conditions warranted. Personalities often played major roles: for instance, MacArthur perpetuated policies in Korea that were begun in SWPA.

The conclusions and common historical characteristics of larger units described in the preceding pages will hold true for U.S. operations at least in the near future. Thus, this study has value for the U.S. Army in its current and future efforts to organize and field larger units for battle.



APPENDIX A

THE EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE: LARGER UNITS, 1924-1973

Introduction

This appendix contains a synopsis of existing doctrine pertinent to larger units (theater army, army group, field army) over the period from 1924-1973. FM 100-15 or its equivalent was used to collate the data. Information was selected and synopsized by functional areas for each year from separate manuals that were published to illustrate the evolution of doctrine for larger units over an approximate fifty year span. Manuals examined include those for the years 1924, 1930, 1942, 1950, 1963, 1968, and 1973. Functional areas considered were organization, command, strategic/tactical functions, air-ground operations, ground operations, and combat service support.

Theater Army 1930-73

Organization

1930

The headquarters of a field force in a theater of war is a general headquarters and will be established by order of the President of the United States. This headquarters will be small in personnel when operating in contiguous territory, whereas while operating beyond the sea, it is large so as to perform many of the duties performed by the War Department.

1942

FM 100-15, dated 20 June 1942, was the primary document governing large unit operations during World War II. This early war publication addresses in some detail a theater of operations, of which a number existed at the time. Of particular interest is the role of the War Department General Staff in the planning of long-range strategic operations. The Chief of Staff, as

*By Lieutenant Colonel Gary L. Bounds.

the immediate adviser of the Secretary of War, is charged with the planning, development, and execution of the military program. Subordinate commanders would assign missions according to the general plan. The theater of operations designates an area of land, sea, and air of a theater of war where military operations and the administration pursuant to such operations would be performed. The terms "theater of operation" and "base command," with minor differences, relate to that level of operation.

The term theater army was not specifically used as an echelon of command, although an echelon analogous to what is commonly termed "theater army headquarters" existed in each of the theaters of operation.

The largest unit specifically described was the group of armies, and it was to operate under the War Department or a theater commander. The group of armies was described as a tactical unit with no territorial jurisdiction and few supply and administrative functions unless assumed by the theater commander.

1950

The Chief of Staff, USA, designates the theater army commander. Theater army forces include all army units and personnel assigned to the theater and constitute the army component of the theater commander. Theater army forces are organized under a headquarters into army groups or armies and COMMZ forces. The army forces in a land mass theater are usually under the control of a theater army commander, while in an oceanic environment, they are usually under a theater joint force commander.

1963

The term "theater of operation" connotes a uni-service operation; area of operation connotes a joint operation. The theater army consists of headquarters elements necessary to provide command and a valuable number of field armies or army groups. The theater army is under the operational command of the theater commander. The theater army consists of a headquarters commanded by the army component commander of a unified command and of the individuals, units, detachments, and organizations placed under his command. It is organized to perform strategic, tactical, and administrative operations. The theater is divided into a combat zone and a COMMZ. The combat zone may be divided into army groups, army, corps, or division

zones. The combat zone's rear boundary is designated by the theater army commander and is charged to conform to movements of the field armies.

1968

The organization of a theater army includes a headquarters (TDA unit), Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM), and an attached theater USA Strategic Communications Command and may include an Air Defense Brigade/Command, a civil affairs command, an MI group, a special forces group, and a psyops group. The theater army is the army component of the unified command and is a component of the unified command and is a component command of the theater. In peacetime, the theater army may include training, administration and CSS with certain interzonal services, combat readiness, and effectiveness of assigned army forces. In wartime, the theater army will be involved primarily with CSS to army elements. Rarely is the theater army commander assigned an operational tactical mission but when he is, he issues strategic guidance through LOIs to assigned combat forces. The field army and the TASCOM are on the same command level, each having CSS means to perform their missions in combat zones and COMMZ respectively.

1973

The theater army will contain a headquarters, a variable number of field armies, army groups, a TASCOM, a Theater Army Communications Command (TACCOM) and based on the mission--air defense brigade, civil affairs brigade, an MI group, a special forces group, and a psyops group. The headquarters is a TDA unit. The mission may be tactical operations, training, administration, CSS, welfare and preparedness, combat readiness, and effectiveness of assigned army forces. When tactical missions are assigned, strategic plans are carried out by broad directives or LOIs. The field army and the TASCOM are on the same command level: both have CSS means to perform their missions in the combat zone and COMMZ, respectively.

Command

1930

A Commander in Chief (CINC) exercises command over a theater of war, which may consist of more than one mutually

dependent theater of operations. The CINC draws up and issues strategical plans in accordance with general policies prescribed by the President. The CINC acts as army commander when there is a single army, group commander (when there is a single group), or he may assign command to another officer. In any case, no officer will act as commander of a large unit and also command one of its component units. The CINC is responsible for the success or failure of the campaign and must plan in advance and allocate assets to accomplish designated tasks. The CINC specifies the personnel/supplies for his field forces and establishes policies/priorities for distribution. The CINC influences the battle by personal contact and must know the personalities of his subordinates as well as those of the enemy leaders.

1942

This manual was the first FM that moved away from a GHQ/CINC concept, but it did not specifically address the theater army. This level of control evolved as the force structure matured, and it was not until later in the war that specific duties were described.

1950

The theater army commander is in the direct chain of command under the theater commander and is responsible for planning the conduct of operations and the administration of army forces in the theater. He is responsible for tactical operations of all army forces not assigned to joint task forces or unified commands. Command is executed through commanders of army groups, armies, army reserve forces, the COMMZ, and the army replacement command. The theater commander assigns missions to army forces, administers them, and logistically supports them.

1963

Normally the senior U.S. Army officer assigned to a unified command (and qualified for command) is designated as the theater army commander. The theater army commander commands all U.S. Army forces assigned to the theater except those assigned to a subordinate unified command established by the theater command, a uniservice command reporting directly to the theater commander, a J.T.F., or a functional command attached or established by the theater commander. The theater army commander may be designated as the Combined Land Force Commander; however, in a combined arena, strategies and tactical direction for

units usually come under a headquarters other than the theater army. The theater army is then primarily an admin/log support headquarters for U.S. Army forces. In an independent unified command, the U.S. theater army commander may be designated to direct the tactical and CSS operations for all U.S. Army forces. Overall, the theater army commander must make recommendations to the theater commander for employment of the army component. The theater army commander communicates directly with the Army Chief of Staff on uniservice matters relative to admin, personnel, training, logistics, communications, doctrine, combat development, and intelligence. The TA staff is devoted to policy planning and the coordinating of operations. The staff prepares plans and estimates and maintains close liaison with the theater staff. The TA staff is not usually involved in operations.

1968

The theater army (TA) commander is appointed by the Army Chief of Staff. Normally the senior army officer (qualified for command), excluding the theater commander and the joint staff, is designated the TA commander. The TA commander is primarily a supervisor, planner, and coordinator, providing centralized direction and doctrine for the decentralized execution of assigned missions. In peacetime, the TA commander commands all army troops, activities, and installations assigned to the theater. In wartime, the TA commander normally relinquishes operational control of army combat forces, air defense forces, CS forces, and other units required to accomplish the theater operational mission (theater commander usually assumes control of operational units). The TA commander may be designated to retain control of operational units, but this is not normally the case. In wartime, the TA commander normally only maintains under his command the forces necessary to perform theater-wide specialized functions (technical intelligence and CSS). In a combined arena, the TA is primarily an administrative headquarters. If the TA commander is also the unified commander (in emergency), he uses separate and distinct staffs to exercise operational and component command. The TA commander communicates directly with the CofS USA on uniservice matters dealing with admin, logistics, personnel, training, doctrine, combat developments, and intelligence matters primarily of Army interest.

1973

The CofS, USA, appoints the TA commander, and it is usually the senior army officer (qualified for command),

with the exception of the unified commander and J.T.F. staff. Only in an emergency is the unified commander and the TA commander the same person, and if so, he has separate and distinct staffs for operational and component command. The TA commander coordinates his activities with other service component commanders and makes recommendations to the unified commander on employment of the army component. The TA commander communicates directly with CofS, USA, on uniservice matters relating to administration, personnel, training, logistics, communications, doctrine, combat intelligence, and on intelligence matters primarily of army interest. The TA has a general and special staff organized to permit decentralized operation. Similar functions are grouped for standardized operations. When special commands are formed, the commander may be a theater staff officer, i.e., ENCOM commander is the theater engineer.

Strategical/Tactical Functions

1930

The CINC is responsible for strategy, and he should take into consideration the personality of the enemy leaders. Planning must be one campaign ahead of current operations, and the general headquarters is responsible for preparing a plan of concentration for the field forces. The CINC is concerned with tactics after strategy. Subordinate elements make tactical plans and execute them. The army group and army commanders should provide input for the CINC's decision making process. The reserves for the GHQ consists of tanks, artillery, aviation, chemical troops, and engineers. Specifically, a general headquarters reserve is maintained along with such corps and divisions as may be held in strategic reserve. The strategic reserve influences the battle by maneuver, combat, or by reinforcing large units.

1942

The theater army is not specifically addressed.

1950

The TA commander receives missions from the theater commander, develops the army portion of a theater campaign plan, and conducts estimates of the situation to develop courses of action for the campaign. The TA commander issues broad directives to subordinate commanders

reflecting the overall scheme of maneuver, phasing of the action, forces and supplies available to each command, support from the theater navy, and air force assets available. Specific missions are allowed for each subordinate command. The TA develops an analysis of army force requirements for a campaign and forecasts future administrative and logistical requirements, projecting planning as far as possible into the future. The TA commander designates the rear boundary of the combat zone when established and changes it based on movement of the armies. The TA maintains close liaison with theater navy and air force commanders.

1963

The TA commander's operational mission is to carry out strategic plans and instructions of higher headquarters. Plans are issued to subordinate units in the form of broad directions or LOIs and indicate the overall plan of maneuver, phasing, forces, supplies available to each command, support available from other services, and the missions of each subordinate command. The TA commander conducts long-range CSS planning. The TA commander is responsible for internal administration and discipline (except where the theater commander is responsible), training, logistical functions normal to the army component forces, and the army intelligence matters.

1968

In a JTF environment, the TA commander provides CSS to other components as directed by the theater commander. Normally, echelons above field army do not have tactical operations centers because they engage in long-range planning and not day-to-day operations. The TA conducts stability operations in concert with the host country to prevent or defeat insurgency. Other missions of the TA include civil affairs, air defense as part of the theater air defense, special forces operations, special ammunition support, and training in army doctrine, techniques, and tactics.

1973

The TA is responsible for training in army doctrine, techniques, and tactics, and for providing CSS functions normal to the army component. The TA commander is responsible for the employment of forces assigned to his operational control by the theater commander. The TA commander recommends geographic organization of the area

into a combat zone and a COMMZ and assigns geographic areas of responsibility to the AG, FA, and TASCOC commanders. The TA commander provides overall direction and coordination of intelligence efforts of army forces. This involves collection and processing intelligence and counterintelligence (technical, scientific, and target). The TA will provide assistance to host countries to prevent or defeat insurgency movements. The TA commander may establish a Command and Control Operations Center (CCOC) to provide the commander with a high-speed communications link to the unified commander, higher authorities, and subordinate commands. The air force component commander and the TA commander integrate the theater air defense effort through a theater air defense organization. Other missions of the TA are army intelligence matters, psyops matters, enemy POWs, captured U.S. military personnel policy and planning, civil affairs, special forces operations, cover, deception, EW operations, and special ammunition support.

Combat Service Support

1930

The War Department will procure supplies at home, while the GHQ CINC normally will procure supplies abroad. Whether in friendly or enemy territory, the theater of operations must be exploited to the limit of its capacity for supply of the military forces. Utilization of local supplies will be carried out with due regard to the needs of the local population. Local supplies will be acquired with active cooperation of the inhabitants, and just payment will be rendered and continued production encouraged.

1942

Not addressed in FM 100-15.

1950

Normally each service force within a joint theater has its own organization for providing service support. The theater commander may designate one component to organize overall logistical support for the theater or a joint logistics force for common support of all components (with a joint staff). The TA commander is responsible for administrative and logistical support to Army forces of a

joint task force and other forces as directed by the theater commander. Army forces receive logistical support from the theater logistical command, if so organized.

1963

The TA will coordinate acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; movement and evacuation of personnel; facility construction, maintenance, operation and acquisition; and the furnishing of services. Normally the service forces of a theater are organized unilaterally; exceptions are by agreement or assignment. The administrative mission of the TA is to organize and operate supply, maintenance, and services for CSS of U.S. Army forces in the theater. The TA may supply common items and common services to the USAF and Navy elements per agreements. The TA allocates and regulates critical items of supply. The TA provides engineer construction support to Navy, USAF, and Allied Forces per agreements. The TA provides CSS to Army components of a JTF as directed. TA G4 and other TA staff members normally perform no operations functions. The TA Replacement System operates under the TA commander and is responsible for theater processing and training of replacements, including hospital returnees, isolated individuals, and units.

1968

Although the TA commander normally delegates authority and execution responsibility for CSS to TASCOM and field Army commanders, he retains overall control of CSS operations to ensure uniformity of effort. The TA commander issues policy, mission directives, broad planning, and priorities on CSS operations. The TA commander exercises technical supervision and is responsible for material readiness of Army equipment, the movement and evacuation of personnel, the acquisition or construction and maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities. The TASCOM and FASCOM maintain close liaison. The TASCOM is responsible for interzonal services and throughput shipments of supplies and personnel originating in the TASCOM area and for use of tactical airlift aircraft to support certain aspects of the CSS mission. The TASCOM provides GS to COMMZ and rear area security within the COMMZ.

1973

The TA commander retains overall control of CSS to ensure uniformity of effort. The TA commander exercises

control by issuing policies, mission directives, broad planning, program guidance, allocations, and priorities. In the JTF arena, the TA provides CSS to U.S., Army components as directed. The TA commander is responsible for the exercise of technical supervision (inspections and instructions) by CSS commander's to the force as a whole and is responsible for logistical readiness of Army equipment. The TA is charged with the acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; the movement and evacuation of personnel; the acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and the acquisition and furnishing of services. The TA commander discharges his responsibility for construction and real property maintenance activities (RPMA) through the Engineer Command (ENCOM), which may be under the TA commander or TASCOM commander. The TASCOM may have a PERSCOM, MATCOM, ENCOM, TRANSCOM, MEDCOM, and TAACOMS. The TASCOM is responsible for interzonal services and throughput shipments of supplies and personnel originating in the TASCOM area and for use of allocated tactical airlift assets.

Army Group 1930-73

Organization

1930

The Army Group (AG) is established to ensure unity of command when two or more armies are operating in the same area. Unity of command, decentralized operations, and coordination of effort are guiding principles. When the number of armies is small, the AG cdr acts as CINC, Field Forces. When too large to be controlled by a GHQ, two or more AGs will be formed. Armies engaged in the same operation should be assigned to the same group. The CINC may regroup armies under his direct control. There are no group troops, but large reserves may be designated. The AG staff consist of a small general staff, an adjutant general's section, and representatives of the service in such numbers as needed to operate the HQ.

1942

The group of armies (AG) consists of two or more armies with reinforcements under a designated commander for the accomplishment of a particular task, the execution of which requires coordination and control by one commander. Combat aviation and armored and motorized formations are allotted for the execution of assigned missions. Large armored formations are authorized in order to pursue powerful offensive operations (terrain dependent). The AG is a tactical unit. The AG will have general and special staff officers and utilize experienced LNOs to ensure mutual exchange of information.

1950

The Army Group (AG) is a tactical unit organized for strategic and tactical operations with a headquarters and required troops, a variable number of field armies, and separate divisions and corps. The AG may operate under a theater commander, theater army commander, or be organized as a unified command so directed by the theater commander. The mission, area of operation, and enemy forces will influence the composition of additional troops allotted to the AG commander. The general and specialized staffs will be occupied more with operational vice administrative matters. Liaison officers will be used to facilitate exchange of information. An LOI will set the organization (armies, units, etc.) of the AG.

1963

The army group (AG) has a headquarters and headquarters units necessary for command and communication of two or more field armies and sometimes independent corps and separate divisions. There is no TOE for an AG headquarters, but it is organized for strategic and tactical purposes to translate theater army directives into combat action.

It is primarily a tactical unit with limited CSS responsibilities, and actual composition is based on the campaign plan, mission, area of operation, and enemy forces. The headquarters is usually echeloned with a small rear echelon for administration concerning support of the main echelon and a tactical CP that can be established. The AG has a general staff to provide policy, control, coordination, and direction in the field of personnel and administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, and civil affairs; and it has a special staff for technical and administrative services. These functions approximate those of the field army or corps but are more concerned with control and allocation of means over a longer period of time and are less concerned with small unit actions.

1968

The AG HQ is a TDA unit organized for a specific operation or campaign. The AG consists of a HQ and two or more field armies and those units necessary for command, communication and admin support. Separate corps and divisions may be assigned. Composition is determined by the Army CBT Forces Commander based on campaign plans and missions. HQ is usually echeloned with a small rear echelon concerned primarily with admin support of main echelon. The AG may organize a tactical CP based on the tactical situation and adequacy of communication assets. Communications are provided by the Theater Army Comm System (TACS); internal comm is provided by a Signal Medium HQ Opn Company. The AG has an army general staff to assist the AG commander in planning and supervision.

1973

The AG may operate under the direction of a combined force HQ or have Allied units in it. The AG consists of an HQ; those units necessary for command, communication, operations, intelligence, and administrative support; and two or more field armies and sometimes

separate corps and divisions. The AG HQ is a TDA unit organized for a specific operation or campaign. HQ is echeloned with a small rear echelon that provides administrative support to the main echelon. The AG commander may organize a tactical CP based on need. The actual composition of the AG is based on campaign plans, mission, area of operation, enemy, and probable courses of action. The AG has a U.S. Army general staff organization that provides policy, control, coordination, and direction for personnel and administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, psychops, and civil affairs. The communications link for the AG is provided by TACS.

Command

1930

The commander of the AG will be the commander of the forces in the field when the number of armies is small. The AG commander exercises territorial responsibilities and has supply, administrative, and strategical functions only when the AG is the headquarters of a theater of operation. The AG is a tactical unit. No commander will act simultaneously as the commander of a large unit and as the commander of one of its component units. The commander should know his personnel well enough to predict their actions. Personal involvement is an attribute of command.

1942

The AG operates under the War Department or a theater commander, and its commander may be designated by the theater he is under or by the War Department. An LOI, or an order supplemented by an LOI, is usually issued to designate the composition of the AG and when an action is effective. The AG commander exercises no territorial jurisdiction and few supply and administrative functions except when he becomes the theater commander. The general staff deals primarily with operational matters rather than administrative ones.

1950

The AG commander will operate under either a theater or theater army commander and may be designated by the theater commander or Department of the Army, usually by an LOI or an order supplemented by an LOI.

1963

The AG commander is usually designated by DA or the theater army commander and orders are received through LOIs. The TA commander normally assigns territorial responsibility to the AG for the combat zone and this includes rear area security, area damage control, and traffic control. Territorial responsibility is usually further assigned down to the field army commander.

1968

The AG commander is designated by DA or Army component commander. The AG commander normally has territorial responsibility for the CBT zone to include RAP, highway management, traffic control, air defense, and civil affairs. The AG commander normally publishes directives in the form of an LOI. The AG commander normally assigns territorial responsibility to the field army commanders. The principles of the 1968 FM applies equally when operations are with Allied units or as part of a combined command.

1973

The AG commander is designated by DA or the Army component commander and normally has territorial responsibility for the CBT zone to include RAP, highway management, traffic control, air defense, and civil affairs. The AG is primarily a tactical echelon of command with few CSS responsibilities. The AG commander publishes guidance to the field armies via LOIs.

Strategical and Tactical Functions

1930

The AG commander assigns assets and missions to subordinate elements. The AG commander, in accordance with assigned missions, draws up tactical plans; issues orders to armies, special troops and reserves under his command; apportions forces; allocates zones of action or sectors; and coordinates movements and efforts. Detailed planning and execution is left to the army commanders. The AG HQ may directly control deep air reconnaissance or assign the mission to the armies. Deep cavalry reconnaissance by a number of cavalry divisions under one commander is conducted under the direct control of the AG. In the defense, the AG commander indicates the

general nature of the defense and establishes conditions under which to begin a withdrawal or counteroffensive. In the defense, the AG commander designates the limit of army responsibility for distant air reconnaissance. If the need exists to form a new army, a nucleus is designated and the army created by adding the necessary troops and services. The AG commander may retain large reserves to influence the action.

1942

The AG commander prepares plans (current and future), allots assets, and assigns clear and specific missions to subordinate units based on mission taskings. The AG commander assigns objectives, zones of action or sectors, and coordinates the movement/efforts of major elements. The AG commander monitors the operations, allocates additional assets, and makes recommendations for additional assets. The reserve will be constituted from assets allotted to the AG, from other subelements, or from both. The reserve is the major means to influence the battle, must be kept mobile and secure from air/ground attack. The reserve is committed in force and not piecemeal.

1950

The AG commander conducts offensive and defensive operations. He is charged with planning future operations; allocation of forces; assigning missions and objectives to field armies; assigning zones/sectors of action; and coordinating movements of major subelements. The AG is also charged with shifting major CBT forces, reallocation of field arty, control of log resources, and the employment of ABN forces (if allocated from TA). The AG commander may shift TACAIR allocations to influence the action in a desired sector. The AG commander is charged with employment of any guided missiles held under his control. The AG reserve will be mobile and concealed, be employed en masse vice piecemeal and constitute a major means to influence the action.

1963

The AG implements broad strategic plans of the theater army by translating them into operational plans. The AG conducts long-range planning and provides long-range operational direction while directing all land forces in the army group area. The AG allots assets, assigns broad missions and objectives, conducts long-range strategic and

short-range tactical planning, and assigns zones to the field armies. The retention of a reserve at AG depends on the tactical plan of the commander, missions assigned to the field armies, area of operation, availability of forces, and the enemy. Normally a maneuver element will not be retained due to a lack of forces; however, newly arrived or reconstituted forces may be used on a temporary basis. The AG may retain a reserve of special weapons received from TA, and some of these weapons may be delivered by USAF assets and may be integrated into the interdiction mission.

1968

The AG commander provides the field armies with a concept of operation, assigns missions and objectives, plans future operations, plans and conducts tactical operations, assigns zones of action or sectors of responsibility to field armies and other subordinate elements, and maintains liaison with higher, adjacent and subordinate units. Retention of a reserve at AG depends on the tactical plan, area of operation, availability of forces, enemy forces, and probable courses of actions. But normally the AG commander does not retain a maneuver element in reserve. As conditions warrant, new units or reconstituted units may be used as an AG reserve. The AG usually retains a reserve of nuclear weapons received by TA to be integrated into the tactical air interdiction plan. The AG commander normally retains a portion of the allocated tactical air support in reserve.

1973

The AG commander plans future operations, plans and conducts tactical operations, translates directives into tactical actions for execution, assigns missions to field armies, and assigns zones of action, sectors of responsibility, and objectives. The AG commander directs all ground operations within the AG boundaries and allots forces to those operations. The AG commander continually coordinates the movements of major units, analyzes AO, the enemy, probable courses of action, and determines the assets needed for such operations. The AG is responsible for cover and deception planning and may allocate and dispatch forces for RAP missions. The AG normally does not retain a maneuver element in reserve, due to availability of forces. However, newly arrived or reconstituting forces may temporarily constitute an AG reserve. The AG normally integrates its nuclear weapons into the tactical air interdiction plan.

Air/Ground Operations

1930

Air assets are not addressed in the 1930 Manual except as stated above.

1942

The 1942 Manual relates one mission of the Air Force is to conduct close support missions, but they should not prejudice success of air superiority missions. Combat aviation support may address the following missions: reconnaissance, bombardment, enemy defenses, enemy reserves, and reinforcements, hostile mechanized forces, support of friendly armor/motorized forces; and support of airborne forces in the air and on the ground. The primary mission of combat aviation is air superiority, but aircraft are vulnerable and not as easily replaced as artillery. CAS missions are affected by a number of factors, such as the distance from target, weather, target identification, and duration of attack.

1950

A separate section for AG reference air-ground ops is not included in the 1950 manual with the exception of pointing out the option of the AG commander to shift air resources allotted to the AG to other sectors to influence the action. A generic air-ground statement that applies to air ops in general includes the role of air forces to gain and maintain air superiority, isolate the battlefield, render close support to ground troops, and conduct reconnaissance missions. Close support and assistance will support operations to mobilize, disperse, or destroy hostile ground forces.

1963

The AG and tactical air force missions are complementary in the same general areas of operation and include counter-air, CAS, air interdiction, and tactical air reconnaissance. AG air/ground assets include G2/G3 air personnel, a photo interpretation team, communications personnel, and liaison teams. Planning is broad at AG level, detailed at lower echelons. The Tactical Air Commander determines the amount of air effort based on mission, assets available, and AG preplanned requirements, and these assets are allocated to the AG and, in turn, are usually allocated to the field army in terms of sorties

for a period of time. The tactical air commander may reallocate assets based on desires of the AG commander to consolidate assets in one field army area.

1968

The AG and supporting air force have complementary missions, but air assets extend deep into the AO. Air operations include air interdiction, CAS, and reconnaissance, and maybe naval or marine assets. The TA commander determines apportionment of air assets, and the AG commander ensures establishment of FSCL (usually) by corps and that it is coordinated with Tactical Air Commander. The TACC is collocated with the FATOC while the DASC is collocated with the CTOC. TACPS are provided from bn through field army.

1973

The AG chapter in FM 100-15 does not have a separate section on tactical air for the AG, but the chapter on Army planning does outline applicable guidance for the AG-tactical air operation. Air operations include USAF, Navy, and Marine support in the form of CAS, reconnaissance, and airlift. CAS missions are controlled by the tactical air control system, while reconnaissance and airlift provide direct support to army operations. Assets are allocated based on analyses of subcommands' requirements and consist of those that cannot be serviced by Army aviation or field artillery resources. The Air Force component commander bases his apportionment recommendations on his mission, enemy air threat, available resources, and requirements of subcommands. The army component commander suballocates most of his allocated air assets to subcommands. The AG commander may retain a part of his air assets as a reserve.

Combat Service Support

1930

The AG commander has administrative and logistical responsibilities only when acting as the theater commander, and in those instances, the AG commander will ensure that systematic and well-formulated plans are effected. Just payments will be made for locally procured supplies. This encourages active cooperation of the inhabitants and encourages continued production.

1942

The AG commander has few administrative and logistical functions except when he becomes the theater commander, however, he exercises control over supplies and credits for his forces and in some instances establishes supply installations. Strong signal assets are required for the successful operation of an AG.

1950

The AG usually has few supply or administrative functions and usually does not operate supply or admin installations. The AG does exercise control over supplies and credits for forces and allots to the field armies additional admin support that is provided by higher HQ. The AG maintains liaison with higher, lower, and adjacent units and sets movement priorities and exercises traffic control. Strong signal assets are required for both operational and other duties.

1963

The AG allocates available service troops to major subordinate commands, establishes priorities for movement, ensures adequate movements and traffic control, establishes priorities for allocation of replacements, and normally controls the allocation of ammunition. The AG commander recommends the locations of field army rear boundaries to theater army. The AG ensures conformity to supply and administrative procedures by the field armies, allocates special weapons and CSS assets provided by the theater army. The AG commander may dispatch troops to solve COMMZ security problems (command of these forces may pass to COMMZ local security force commander or to TA commander).

1968

The AG is primarily a tactical unit and does not normally operate CSS installations. It is not an automated system of CSS. The AG discharges its CSS functions either through the TACOM or transmits requirements to TA, who in turn directs the TACOM. The AG is involved in establishing priorities for movements, ensuring adequate movements and traffic control, establishing priorities for supplies and credits for assigned and attached units, establishing priorities for allocation of replacements to major subcommands, allots available CSS assets to subcommanders and ensures subunits

are supported. The AG also recommends the location of field army rear boundaries, normally controls allocation of ammunition, and may control allocation of other items. The AG assigns territorial responsibility to the field armies.

1973

The AG is primarily a tactical unit and normally does not operate CSS installations and has only limited CSS responsibilities. The AG HQ is not an automated CSS system. The AG discharges its CSS role by directing field armies to conform to AG established allocations and priorities, by recommending allocation priorities to TA HQ, establishing priorities and credits for subunits, establishing movement priorities and priorities for replacements to major subunits. The AG normally controls the allocation of ammo, allocates CSS troops to subcommands, and ensures adequate support for subunits. The AG also recommends field army rear boundaries.

The Field Army 1924-73

Organization

1924

The field army (FA) is a strategic unit whose orgn varies according to the mission but normally consists of several army corps, large cav units and air svc units. The FA is a unit of command with a general staff, special trps and svcs.

1930

The FA is the largest self-contained unit and consists of a cdr, stf, special army trps and svcs, and two or more army corps. It may have GHQ avn, reserve arty, cav divisions, and other auxiliary trps. The FA has a general and special stf that assist the cdr by providing basic info and technical advice for the preparation and execution of battle. The CofS translates the cdr's decisions into orders and the stf prepares estimates from the cdr's guidance. The FA has territorial, tactical, administrative, and support functions.

1942

The FA is the largest self-contained unit, consisting of an HQ, organic army trps, and a variable number of corps and divisions. It is the fundamental unit of strategic maneuver. A fixed orgn is not desirable but is determined by mission, enemy, terrain, and trps available. The orgn of the general and special stf is omitted.

1950

The FA is the largest self-contained unit and has both tactical and administrative functions. The FA consists of a HQ, organic army trps, and a variable number of corps and divisions. A fixed orgn is not desirable but is structured based on mission, terrain, weather, and probable enemy forces. The cbt forces may be armor or infantry heavy or structured to meet special needs. (Stf org and functions are not addressed in the 1950 FM.)

1963

The FA is a tactical and administrative orgn with an HQ, certain assigned army trps, and a variable numbers of

corps and divisions. The composition is not fixed but is organized under the TOE 51 Series. The actual composition of forces is based on mission, area of opn, availability of forces, and contemplated opns. Units are assigned to the FA by higher HQ on a relatively permanent basis and may be assigned down to corps. Nuclear weapons are allocated to the FA for specific periods of time or for a specific mission. The HQ and stf are organized under TOE 51-1 with the general and special stf under the control of the CofS. The staff prepares estimates for input to the cdr's concept and prepares detailed plans to support FA plans. A USASA Gp is attached to the FA for EW, intelligence, and security support. (The 1966 chap to FM 100-15 added an insurgency role for the FA).

1968

The FA is a tactical and administrative orgn with a HQ, assigned army trps, and a variable number of corps and divisions. TOE 51-1 prescribes the orgn of the FA HQ. The composition of the FA is prescribed by higher HQ and is based on mission, area of opn, availability of units, and contemplated opns. Support may be recommended from other army forces or other svcs. During cbt, the FA HQ has two echelons: the main and alternate CP, and the rear CP. The FA stf provides info based on thorough analysis.

1973

The composition of an FA is not fixed, the number and types of units assigned or attached depend on the mission, area of opn, availability of units, and the contemplated opns. Missions assigned to FA usually are broad in nature and permit latitude in their accomplishment. FA mission taskings are analyzed for implied missions. TOE 51-1 prescribed the orgn of the FA HQ. Units attached or assigned to the FA may be further assigned or attached to corps. The stf of an FA consists of a CofS, G1-G5 general stf, and special stf. The FA may operate directly under an army gp, theater army, unified command, a subordinate unified command, or a combined force HQ.

Command

1924

The FA cdr gives orders to cdrs of corps, arty, engrs, air svc, and tanks of the FA by issuing orienting and detailed instructions to ensure success. The army cdr bases his plans on guidance received from the CINC or the

cdr of an army gp. He ensures unity of action of the army corps by personal supervision, impressing his personality on both the concept and execution. He personally follows the action of the corps and influences the action by utilizing army arty and by modifying zones of action.

1930

The 1930 Larger Units Manual has extensive information on command. It stresses the philosophy of command and the role of the army cdr to direct corps and other large units under his control. It states his responsibility for mutual understanding among subordinates.

1942

The FA has territorial responsibility and is the basis for planning and executing strategic and tactical opns. Detailed planning is the responsibility of the FA cdr. Plans must be flexible to exploit favorable situations and correct unfavorable ones. During operations, this flexibility permits the transfer of major units and missions among corps. The information cycle must move up and down the chain of command to be effective.

1950

The FA cdr executes bold and daring plans based on careful analysis and sound planning. Planning must be flexible to exploit or react to enemy situations and must project well into the future. The FA cdr issues orders in concert with the general plan and allots divisions and supporting trps. He is charged with coordination of boundaries and actions between and among corps. The nature of FA opns is offensive, the defensive being but a preliminary to counteroffensive opns.

1963

The FA cdr's decision is based on the concept of the opn and is based on TA orders. Missions are assigned to the corps in phases to include be prepared missions. A FA Tactical Opn Center (FATOC) may be organized to assist the cdr in controlling the opn. The FA Support Command (FASCOM) cdr is responsible for rear security and area damage control in the FA svc area.

1968

The FA operates under an army gp, a unified command, a U.S. theater army cdr or a combined force HQ. A FA tactical opns center (FATOC) may be established to facilitate opns.

1973

The FA HQ, during cbt opns, has a main and rear echelon. The main echelon consists of a main and alternate CP. (Cdr has option of establishing a tactical opn CP--FATOC). The rear echelon is concerned with CSS. During opns, the FA cdr's concept of the opn is specifically directed in para 3a. of the cdr's tactical plan.

Strategical/Tactical Functions

1924

The FA cdr, is responsible for the conduct of opns to achieve the tasking of higher HQ, directs the cdrs of his arty, air svc, tanks, and engrs, and oversees the application of these assets in cbt. He gives guidance to his stf for planning and operational purposes.

1930

The FA is the fundamental unit of strategic maneuver, carrying out broad phases of tactical opns, while acting independently or as part of a group of armies. The FA produces tactical and administrative plans to coordinate the efforts of corps and army trps, designates zones of action, allocates divisions and special trps to corps, and influences the battle by use of army tanks, air forces, army arty, coordination of corps arty, and by use of the reserves. The army cdr, based on recommendations of the army chief of arty, allocates army and GHQ arty to the corps. The army cdr determines if and what kind of arty prep will be fired, controls H&I fires, length of counterpreps, and determines the time they will be fired. Heavier calibers of arty are usually held at army level while smaller ones are allocated to corps. The army cdr exercises direct control over engr, medical, and other support and administrative trps or allocates them to corps or divisions.

1942

The FA cdr coordinates the major efforts of the FA by issuing orders to subordinates, allocating divisions and support trps to corps, and by making provisions for special task forces. He is charged with the planning and execution of assigned missions. The FA cdr must project planning well into the future, covering considerable periods of time, while directing current opns.

1950

The FA cdr influences the action by personal leadership, and assigns missions and boundaries to the corps. Continuity of action is ensured by thorough coordination with tactical AF assets, employment of reserves, and the provision of adequate logistical support. The FA cdr is also charged with the movement of forces between and among corps and the rotation of reserve divisions to frontline corps.

1963

The FA receives missions from the army gp or theater army in the form of an LOI. The FA allocates cbt power and missions to corps and plans opns two or three phases in advance. The field arty develops fire plans to support the dominant element of maneuver (nonnuclear environment). The FA normally allocates all of its field arty to the corps for control or further allocation. The regional ADA cdr will normally delegate control of organic ADA systems within the FA area to the FA cdr (he may delegate a portion to the corps). The FA supervises and allocates FA cbt support assets.

1968

The FA receives LOIs from higher HQ and translates them into operational guidance. Plans are made beyond current opns, perhaps two or three phases ahead. Opns are usually phased based on a change in the form of maneuver or a major regrouping of forces. The FA publishes operation orders establishing the concept of opn for the initial phases and outlining succeeding phases. The FA allocates forces.

1973

The FA plan supports the plan of the next higher HQ. The FA projects its planning well beyond current opns.

While one opn progresses, the stf plan the next two or three opns. The FA interprets the LOI from higher HQ and ascertains missions. FA opns will normally be phased when there is a change in the nature of the opn or a major regrouping of forces. The FA allocates each corps assets commensurate with mission tasking. The FA planning includes integration of allocated tactical air support. The FA is responsible for rear area protection in the FA security area (FASA). The FA, although not normally deployed in support of stability opns, may be required to train, equip, and dispatch elements for such opns. Nuclear weapons are allocated/assigned to an FA for a specific period, mission, or phase of an opn by higher HQ. Communication support at the FA level is provided by a command communications system, an area communications system, and an air defense arty communication system. The FA cdr has operational considerations for maneuver units, fire support, nuclear weapons employment, chemical weapons, tactical air support, attack helicopter opns, naval support, and electronic warfare.

Air-Ground Operations

1924

The air division, employed en masse, fights as part of the FA by bombardment and machine-gun fire. With close coordination, avn assets are used for protection against hostile aircraft and for reconnaissance and may be used as an element of maneuver for instant intervention.

1930

The FA cdr contols avn assigned or attached to the FA but attaches it to the corps when required. The FA cdr has an army chief of avn to coordinate avn (attack and reconnaissance) among the army's assets. Attack avn assets should be used in the same manner as machine guns and arty.

1942

Combined air-ground opns must be closely coordinated by the supported ground cdr. Avn assets will be allocated on a need basis; standard allocations will seldom be made. Avn assets in close support of ground opns can be horizontal or dive-bomb attacks, with chemicals and machine guns, or entail recon and flank security opns. Dive-bombers will be used against precise targets, horizontal bombing against area targets. Sufficient avn

assets will seldom be available to suballocate to subordinate elements of the supported unit. Avn support is dependent on weapons, enemy air and antiaircraft fires, and discretion will be used in pitting aircraft against well-defended targets due to aircraft vulnerability.

1950

The USAF gains and maintains air superiority, isolates the battlefield, renders close support to ground trps and conducts recon missions. Close support and assistance will support opns to immobilize, disperse, or destroy hostile ground forces.

1963

The unified cdr will normally apportion air assets to support the tactical air mission based on recommendations of the air and land component cdrs. The TACC at FA provides broad guidance for planning and committing preplanned and immediate air support requests. Air assets within the FA HQ will normally be coordinated in the G2/G3 air section. Gnd and air opns are mutually supporting and the FA cdr may redirect allocated air assets based on greater priorities. Immediate air requests are forwarded through the TACP's to the DASC.

1968

FA ground opns and supporting air opns are integrated and complementary. FA G2, G3, and G4 are involved in the planning and integration of recon, close air, and air-land support for the FA. Air assets are allocated to the FA by army gp or higher HQ. Preplanned and immediate air support requests are forwarded to the TASE at FA level. TACPs are located at levels of command from bn to FA. If requests exceed FA allocated capabilities, the cdr may request army gp or higher HQ reapportion available air assets or make aircraft available by diverting it from another mission. MIBARS units produce and disseminate intelligence obtained by USAF recon efforts and serve as liaison between the FA and the tactical USAF recon units supporting the FA.

1973

FA ground opns and tactical air ops are complementary. Tactical air support includes CAS, tactical air recon, and tactical airlift. An Army GLO assists and advises tactical fighter units on matters pertaining to army opns.

The G2/G3 air personnel plan and coordinate CAS and recon activities for the FA. AF TACPs are collocated with the TASE and provide liaison and technical assistance with the AF Tac Air Control Center (TACC) (if TACC and TASE are collocated, no TACP is required at FA level). The G3/G4 jointly plan and coordinate tactical airlift opns (G3-Operational lifts/G4 admin lifts). Missions are preplanned or immediate, and when requests exceed allocations, the FA cdr can request additional allocations or divert allocated reserves to higher priority missions. A MIBARS element is assigned to the FA to support the air recon effort.

Ground Operations

1924

The FA conducts offensive and defensive ground opns in accordance with mission taskings. The FA, in the offense, develops a plan of maneuver based on its mission. Corps formations are wide and deep when the enemy is distant but contract in depth when approaching the enemy. Cav and avn work in concert to provide reconnaissance. The lead elements gain contact and drive in resistance. Massed arty fires start the attack, while tanks break down hostile works not destroyed by arty. Avn bomb and machine-gun fires support the attack. During the battle, the FA cdr reinforces corps, allots remaining arty, monitors the battle, and positions the reserve. In the defense, plans include general disposition of the FA, corps zones, arty, air, and cav missions. Defensive opns are echeloned in depth with a good system of fires, judicious orgn of the ground forces, and rapid handling of the reserves. Phases include reserve positions, rest positions, reliefs, and periods of stabilization. The FA plan fixes the priority of work. Rest positions include dense barrages, continuous observation, and switch positions to counter enemy threats. Interior orgn must plan for destruction of breakthrough forces. The arty covers forward up to 2,000 meters and fires counterpreps on order. Counterattacks are immediate, and withdrawals should be made in hrs of darkness. If possible, the FA cdr holds a complete corps in reserve and does not hesitate to throw in his last reserves to gain victory.

1930

In the offense, the FA moves corps abreast or in columns with cav and avn leading to establish contact. In the passive defense, corps are employed abreast; in the

active defense, a reserve (up to a corps) is held to counter enemy actions. Army arty fires include counterpreps, defensive fires, and interdiction fires. Large counterattacks are usually executed by an FA reserve, and narrow frontages are given to areas of greater effort. The defense is the basis of planning for a counterattack, and successful defensive opns depend on the offensive spirit. The army may hold one or more divisions in reserve, and reserve arty may be sent to reinforce a forward unit's arty.

1942

In the offense, the FA cdr assigns the corps tasks and objectives, directions or zones of advance or zones of action. Forces are organized to provide decisive mass in a decisive direction at the decisive time. METT-T determines the allocation of forces to main and secondary attacks, and the FA, when attacking as a part of a larger force, may have its main attack and objective designated by that higher HQ. Plans will provide contingencies for enemy counteractions. As part of a larger force, the FA may execute enveloping maneuvers in support of other FA frontal attacks. Appropriate weapons and trps should be made available to leading elements to destroy enemy antitank defenses. The FA in the defense will usually act as part of a larger force and be integrated into the general scheme of defense. A FA acting alone will have great latitude in selecting defensive positions. The frontage assigned to the corps depends on the type of defense (position or retrograde) and on METT-T. The cdr must anticipate enemy mobility and be organized in depth, stressing fixed and mobile antitank weapons and obstacles. The defensive is characterized by the offensive spirit, and this spirit is pronounced in the counterattack. Daring and boldness characterize counteroffensive opns but not at the expense of careful analysis. The FA cdr decisively employs combat avn, field arty, and reserves to influence the battle.

1950

The FA is the ground unit of maneuver. The cdr assigns corps missions, objectives, directions of advance, or zones of action. Main and secondary attacks will be designated and based on METT-T and will provide decisive mass at decisive times. The FA cdr must anticipate great depth in organized enemy defenses and should ensure leading elements have the capability to destroy or neutralize organized antitank defenses. The main attack

of the FA may be designated by a higher HQ. The FA, when it is part of interior lines, will usually make frontal attacks or penetrations, while if it is employed in a flank position and part of a larger force it may perform an enveloping maneuver. FA defensive forces are organized into covering forces, battle positions, and reserves. Covering forces are normally the responsibility of the corps, as supervised by the army. Detailed responsibility for the battle positions are the responsibility of division and corps cdrs and are supervised by the army cdr. Priority of effort for defensive orgn for the FA cdr is battle positions prepared in depth, disposition of reserve, and major counterattacks by the reserve. The defense is organized to stop frontal attacks and block and defeat armor/motorized attacks. Rapid moving penetrations must be anticipated, and the counterattack should manifest the offensive spirit of the defense.

1963

The FA conducts offensive, defensive, and retrograde opns; these are usually phased due to scope and duration. Enemy capabilities, courses of action, friendly force disposition, areas of opn and log support all affect phasing, but changes in maneuver and major regrouping are the major factors that dictate this. The FA uses all forms of maneuver, but the turning movement is used more often at FA and corps level than at lower levels. The FA cdr rarely directs the form of maneuver for the corps but does assign zones of action. FA defensive opns include a security echelon, forward defense echelon, and a reserve echelon. At FA level, an enemy avenue of approach is one that will facilitate the unrestricted maneuver of one (+) division-size force. A mobile strike force will be physically located in the rear area and directed by the FA to support rear area opns. ACRs and separate bdes may be allocated to corps to act as a mobile strike force for rear area opns, or they may be held as an FA reserve. Retrograde opns are usually ordered by a higher HQ. The FA reserve is established to the rear of the forward defense echelon, consists of maneuver units and fires, and may be used to exploit success or friendly counterattack penetrations or to provide rear or flank security. In the offense, the FA reserve can be released to the corps and committed by the corps or kept directly under the control of the FA cdr. A detailed plan is not developed by the FA to use the reserve as a counterattacking force due to time and space. In a nuclear environment, nuclear weapons may constitute a reserve. The FA retains no significant reserve during an exploitation. The FA will not usually

be involved in unconventional warfare opns. (The 1966 chap to FM 100-15 allocates one long-range recon company to each FA).

1968

The FA employs three basic forms of offensive maneuver: the frontal attack, the penetration, and the envelopment. Elements of an FA may use all of these forms in one opn. Normally the FA and corps use frontal attacks; the division uses frontal attacks as part of a corps or FA. The FA rarely specifies the form of maneuver but does assign zones of action. The FA may be involved in meeting engagements, exploitations, and pursuit ops. A nuclear saturated battlefield may drastically reduce maneuver capability. The FA cdr will ensure contaminated units are rapidly reconstituted and reequipped. The FA defends by employing corps in a mobile or area defense and by assigning a definite sector to each corps. Defense echelons consist of the security echelon, forward defense echelons, and the reserve echelon. The security echelon (forward of FEBA) is usually controlled by corps, but coordination points are designated by the FA cdr to ensure unity of action. The general trace of the FEBA is determined by the FA cdr by designating corps coordination points and boundaries. The FA cdr selects boundaries that allocate each major avenue of approach to a single corps. Force allocation is based on the FA cdr's visualization of how the corps will defend. Dispersion required by nuclear weapons invites defeat in detail. The FA reviews and analyzes corps counterattack plans to ensure they are in concert with the FA perceived threat. The FA may retain divisions, ACRs, or separate bdes in reserve and uncommitted assets of their forces may be used to supplement FASCOM rear area protection forces. Maneuver is dominant in the nonnuclear battlefield. In the nuclear battlefield, maneuver may be planned around fire support. Normally all tube arty is attached to corps. ADA units within the FA area carry out the assigned missions with the policies and procedures established by the theater cdr. Nuclear weapons are assigned to the FA for a specific period, mission, or phase of an opn. CS support for the FA is multifaceted. The FA may train, equip, and dispatch forces involved in stability opns. Armed helicopter and aerial arty units are normally placed in support of lower echelons. In a nuclear environment, nuclear weapons may form a major part of the reserve. Time and space are major factors in the placement of reserve. The reserve, on occasion, may be directly controlled by FA cdr but is almost always released to the

corps in the offense, who in turn assigns missions and releases it to action. In some instances, the FA may designate the reserve of a corps as the reserve of the FA and place special restrictions on its use. FA contingency plans normally designate the forces to constitute the reserve.

1973

The FA conducts offensive, defensive, and retrograde opns. During offensive opns, the FA concept of opn is so stated to enable the corps to plan one phase of the FA opn in detail and initiate planning for succeeding phases. The FA uses the penetration, envelopment, and frontal attacks as basic forms of maneuvers. In the defense, all corps of the FA are normally employed in the forward defense area. An avenue of approach into an FA defense area is one that permits the unrestricted maneuver of one or more division-size enemy units. Except for long-range ballistic missile delivery systems, the FA usually attaches all of its field arty and aerial field arty to corps. The FA cdr usually constitutes a reserve of maneuver and fire support elements (including nuclear weapons) that may consist of divisions, an ACR, or a separate bde. He may also designate the reserve of one or more corps as the FA reserve (special restraints will be placed on the corps' use of their reserve). The reserve will normally be released to the corps for combat. The FA reserve may be released before the engagement of major enemy units, before the penetration of the forward defense echelon, after the penetration of the forward defense echelon, or after the corps has committed all or part of its reserve.

Combat Service Support

1924

During the conduct of battle, the FA cdr manages the rear area, creates svcs as necessary, and arranges for the opn of his svcs. Svc agencies maintain depots and establish services to include light railways, workshops, storehouses, and hospitals. FA practice is to assist the flow of ammo as far forward as possible.

1930

The FA cdr has logistical responsibilities and exercises direct control over support trps or allots them

to corps and divisions as needed. Vol. 1, Operation FM 100-15 does not address CSS functions to any degree. CSS was covered in a separate volume.

1942

The FA has admin responsibilities to the elements of the army. Also it must perform long-range logistical planning, detailed estimates of support and evacuation routes, traffic control, and transportation activities.

1950

The FA cdr is responsible for the orgn and opn of an effective administration and highly flexible logistical system. The FA must do detailed personnel, supply, evacuation routes, and tank estimates to support the overall army plan. The FA has territorial responsibilities.

1963

The FA will exercise its log support functions through the establishment of FA support commands (FASCOM). The FASCOM is responsible for its own local security and mutual assistance with adjacent units. COMMZ transportation will deliver 75 percent of support requirements to the support bdes with a 25 percent bypass to the DISCOM (when feasible).

1968

The theater army or other appropriate HQ allocates CSS means to army gps or FAs. FA further allocates or employs assets to support the corps and divisions. FA stf plans include the allocation of CSS assets to support the tactical mission. The FA support command (FASCOM) is responsible to the FA cdr for providing CSS to the FA to include planning for long-range and immediate opns and day to day coordination with units of the TASCOM in the COMMZ. FA HQ employs management by exception techniques, while monitoring FASCOM opns. A typical FASCOM can support three corps of four divisions each. Tailoring is required to support larger forces. Civil affairs authority is normally delegated to the FASCOM cdr. Rear area protection is also the responsibility of the FASCOM cdr. Other FA (FASCOM) responsibilities include POW facilities and medical opns.

1973

CSS assets are allocated from the theater army or other appropriate HQ. The FA allocates or employs assets based on plans and recommendations to support the corps and divisions. The FA is organized with an FA support command (FASCOM) that develops detailed plans, policies, and directives for CSS. The FASCOM performs the stf functions of policy development, planning, guidance, priorities, and allocations. It also develops army-wide estimates and analyses of the overall requirements of the FA. FASCOMs are tailored based on the size of the FA and opns primarily through an MMC and an MCC. The Army Spt Bde provides DS and GS to all army units and other svc units located or passing through the FA svc area. The Corps Spt Bde provides GS support maintenance, transportation, personnel svcs, and financial support to divisions and separate bdes and DS and GS to nondivisional units within the corps area. Other FASCOM elements are the medical and transportation bdes, MP bde (when assigned) and a civil affairs bde.

