
I believe joint doctrine development is proceeding in the right direction. However. . . we must continue to improve it so that it educates our joint force commanders in ways which allow them to best extend the battlefield in time, space, and purpose by leveraging the synergy of all available attack means.

— George A. Joulwan

Deep Operations, Command and Control, and Joint Doctrine:



AV-8B hovers above USS Constellation.

U.S. Navy (Mario P. DeAngelis)

TIME FOR A CHANGE?

By GORDON M. WELLS

Command and control (C²) of deep operations has become an area of intense debate among the services. The responses to the *Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces* and a subsequent study on the deep attack/weapons mix are just two examples of how fiscal needs for efficiency are being addressed across services vis-à-vis the conduct of deep operations. This debate is taking place not only inside the Beltway but in discussions where unified command and service representatives seek to develop doctrinal guideposts for how joint force commanders (JFCs) will conduct deep operations in the future.

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For instance, during a joint doctrine working group meeting on Joint Pub 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support*, the only agreed definition for joint fire support (not yet approved) was:

Joint fire support can include the lethal or destructive operations of close air support (by fixed or rotary wing aircraft), naval surface fire support, artillery, mortars, rockets, missiles, as well as non-lethal or disruptive operations such as [electronic warfare]. Joint fire support does not include air interdiction, counter air, or strategic attack.

This is a narrow definition intended, in part, to instruct us on what joint fire support is not: “air interdiction, counter air, or strategic attack.” These are areas covered elsewhere, for example in Joint Pub 3-56.1, *C² for Joint Air Operations*, 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations*, and Joint Pub 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats*. Unfortunately, these and other volumes on joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTPs) are extremely contentious. Such issues are being tackled by both the joint doctrine working party and the joint working group processes. Nonetheless it is a slow undertaking.

Other contentious issues regarded as deep operations matters include a possible joint force fires coordinator position, the organization and function of the Joint Target Coordination Board, and questions on dividing battlespace—with some airmen suggesting that the commander in chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), model should be applied to joint doctrine to make it less land centric. The common thread running through these issues is joint force command and control. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear that existing joint doctrine does not adequately address joint C². We need an overarching, universally understood model for how JFCs exercise the vital C² function. However, two issues must be addressed.

First, the decibel level of this interservice debate is drowning out the most important voice: the joint commander tasked with conducting the next Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Provide Hope, or Joint Endeavor. Service views, though critical to debate, often are based more on programmatic perspectives than on working together to meet JFC needs. Second, we must address the changing nature and use of combat power. In contingencies across the operational spectrum, battlespace is becoming less linear and combat power is employed with less symmetry. Moreover, information age technologies add another factor in developing a viable joint force C² framework.

Where are JFCs?

In the post-Desert Storm era, there are many doctrinal advocates firmly convinced of their views. As with any believers, they hold many opinions based on seemingly undeniable elements of truth.

Army. Convinced that the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) joint force air component commander (JFACC) during Desert Storm and the Air Force as a whole reneged on prior agreements on battlefield air interdiction sortie allocation, the Army position has typically oriented on greater control of air sorties to shape the battlefield.

Navy. Traditionally the most independent service, given its autonomous role of sea control going back to Corbett and Mahan, the Navy holds firmly to its prerogative of maintaining control of adequate air assets for fleet protection.

Marine Corps. Believing they have been historically left in the lurch by the Navy regarding naval gunfire support, the Marine Corps has long codified the air-ground task force concept which guarantees aerial artillery support independent of naval assets.


Air Force. Convinced that there is a need to centralize airpower planning, the Air Force position has been to develop the JFACC concept to ensure that the use of available airpower does not revert to a Vietnam-Tactical Air Command view when it was seen as little more than aerial artillery in support of the Army.

Who is correct? Everyone. Few will argue the doctrinal basis for shaping the battlefield to attack an enemy in depth so that victory, almost always ultimately ratified in conventional combat operations by land forces, is achieved at least cost. Likewise, history has proven that piecemeal application of airpower is nothing less than a violation of the principle of mass. Further, JFACC came into its own during Desert Storm as the previously distinct worlds of Strategic Air Command and Tactical Air Command were merged and air planners developed and executed viable theater air operations. Similarly the Navy, particularly as it transitions from its traditional blue water focus to working the brown littorals, has a very real and perhaps increasing need to ensure fleet protection. As for the Marine Corps, one need only read the history of the Pacific Theater and the *Mayaguez* incident to understand the reluctance to give up its air assets. Thus there are multiple pragmatic and emotional bases for various positions across all services.

A central problem with the planning/execution of deep operations debate is that, whereas each service enjoys powerful representation via

it is becoming increasingly clear that existing doctrine does not adequately address joint C²

Launching Tomahawk
at Iraqi target.



U.S. Navy (Wayne W. Edwards)

its doctrine development agencies and staffs, future JFCs have no formal advocate. Individual service positions on acquisition and budgets and service views on doctrinal issues are often closely identified. Though it is probably unrealistic to expect otherwise, doctrine development should be kept as intellectually pure as possible.

We must move beyond the histrionics of today and think in terms of the doctrine that JFCs will really need in the future. Budget battles generally affect each service in the mid to short term. But how joint doctrine is designed has consequences for conducting operations, directly translating into indeterminate costs of time, resources, and lives.

Battlespace and Combat Power

The burden on doctrine writers is staying sufficiently rooted in the present while gauging the future. As Michael Howard noted, "What matters is to prevent . . . being too badly wrong . . . to get it right quickly when the moment arrives." Therefore we must be able to read the tea leaves to discover the trends that will impact on future warfare. Three trends likely to affect the future of

operations are increasingly asymmetric applications of combat power, growing nonlinearity of the battlefield, and the additional element of so-called "third wave" or information age warfare.

Throughout history warfare was largely symmetrical. Similar forces confronted each other: armies against armies and navies against navies. With the advent of airpower and the global reach of seapower, this changed. For example, there was a forward leap in the asymmetrical application of military power during World War II in the southwest Pacific. General MacArthur's renowned island hopping would not have been possible without Admiral Halsey's amphibious landings and General Kenney's vertical envelopments. Naval and air arms supported ground forces to take key land areas while simultaneously gaining and maintaining air and sea control.

During the Cold War in the central region of Europe, geography and land force technology limited the Alliance to a largely linear layer cake defense of NATO. Nevertheless, we refined the asymmetric application of airpower with follow-on forces attack and joint precision interdiction. The subsequent development of airpower and smart weapons as force multipliers was validated in the Persian Gulf so that now the application of military power is largely asymmetric. Each service plays both direct and indirect roles in achieving control of the land, sea, and air.

Moreover, as combat power is applied with added asymmetry and reach, the battlespace in which it is employed has become increasingly nonlinear. The air attacks on Iraq during and after Desert Storm and NATO air operations in support of the U.N. Protection Force in the Balkans are more recent examples. This trend is likely to increase as information age technologies enable us to disperse forces and mass them from across a distributed battlespace.

Nevertheless, we must be careful of jumping on the information age bandwagon. As stated above, so-called "third wave warfare" is a trend, but it is an additive. In U.S. European Command (EUCOM), for example, current and near term threats are primarily "second wave" industrial age threats in Europe and the Middle East. In Africa, we still face many "first wave" agricultural age threats. Thus, we must be able to combat all three types as strategic interests dictate.

Accordingly, the way deep attack is defined also is evolving. As battlespace becomes more nonlinear, attacking an enemy in depth has less to do with physical reach than with attacking key functions simultaneously from the tactical to strategic level. This requires a range of capabilities to detect

and deliver ordnance and electrons accurately on target in a timely manner. The objective is functional paralysis, placing an enemy in tactical, operational, and ultimately strategic dilemmas.

Operations are Operations

Applying combat power asymmetrically demands increased flexibility by warfighters. We must abandon all vestiges of traditional set-piece, von Schlieffen-like thinking and lean toward more dynamic cycles in which various combat and support functions occur and are linked and

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synchronized both horizontally and vertically. As demonstrated at the Army National Training Center, battle and play books unnecessarily limit the sort of thinking needed in a tactical environment. The same principle applies on the operational and strategic levels of war.

This is why General George Joulwan, the commander in chief, U.S. European Command, frequently reminds his staff and component commanders that “operations are operations.” His concern goes well beyond the way in which war and operations other than war are separated doctrinally. All operations should be approached in an institutionally similar manner. Just as we err in distinguishing how to conduct various types of war and peace support operations, we are mistaken in separating the planning and the conduct of close and deep operations. Whereas once battlespace could be chopped up and the pieces delegated to various components, we can no longer afford the luxury of this practice as battlespace becomes less linear and combat power is applied less symmetrically.

Moreover, as JFCs engage in more peace operations it appears that the differences among close, deep, and rear operations are fading. Thus the tendency among EUCOM planners is to view operations more as a function of the asymmetric application of power, generally unconstrained by traditional battlespace frameworks. In part this is because the asymmetric application of power is not necessarily limited to the military, particularly as we engage in more interagency operations such as the 1994 relief efforts in Rwanda.

An obstacle to clear-headed discussion lies in a lack of agreement and understanding about joint planning and execution. Who plans and executes what? Are there links between campaign planning/execution and service/functional component planning/execution? JFACC purists may

feel that anything that flies in theater should be controlled by a JFACC. Yet the land component school may object since it is their blood which ultimately will be shed on the final objective and thus argue that the only JFACC role is that of administrative sortie provider. Neither position is correct, and unfortunately JFCs lack clear guidelines for reconciling them. The joint community needs a model for planning and executing campaigns and subordinate operations.

Planning and Execution

Although some work has been done to fill this void, it has tended to flow from bottom up rather than from top down. Doctrine writers have expanded the scope of some extant pubs to plug the holes in otherwise missing doctrine. This usually results in protests from the services which suspect that lead agents are codifying parochial service positions in joint doctrine. Moreover, in no area has this been more true than deep operations and the operational employment of fires.

Joint Pub 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats*, and Joint Pub 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*, are cases in point. In 1995 the Army nonconcurred in Joint Pub 3-01—which was being developed by the Air Force—before its release for staffing. Likewise, the Air Force nonconcurred in Joint Pub 3-09—which was being developed by the Army—since its inception six years ago. This sort of reaction will continue until overarching doctrine is developed that defines the planning/execution processes and the functions which occur on the joint force level. Moreover, it must define how they are linked on both the JFC and the service/functional component levels.

As a point of departure, it is useful to examine the cycles, functions, and linkages common to campaign planning and execution.

Cycles. JFCs will largely focus on two cycles in campaign planning and execution: current and future operations (plans). In peacetime one could argue that there is another cycle, training or exercise planning and execution. Nevertheless, these processes tend to be cyclic and generally define the “rhythm” by which commanders and their staffs perform.

Functions. Within each cycle, JFCs and their staffs must plan, synchronize, and integrate various combat and support functions both vertically and horizontally. The universal joint task list is a starting point for defining operational-level functional areas or operating systems: conducting operational movement and maneuver, developing operational intelligence, providing operational support, employing operational firepower, exercising operational command and control, and providing operational protection.

F-15 loading munitions for NATO airstrike.



U.S. Air Force (Paul R. Caron)

Linkages. An equally important third element common to campaign planning and execution is the series of linkages between current and future operations across the six operational functions. Moreover, such processes also occur on the service/functional component levels, albeit with varied degrees of emphasis and application. Thus there will be horizontal as well as vertical linkages.

Battle rhythm. This concerns how JFCs and their staffs execute current and future operations cycles across operational functions and how these processes are linked both horizontally and vertically.

This does not mean current joint doctrine is inadequate. Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, clearly identifies the designated JFC as responsible for planning and executing deep operations. Further, it provides a flexible framework for JFCs to organize and execute deep operations, one which all combatant commands and services agreed upon two years ago. This doctrinal structure allows for operations to be designed in traditional, set-piece, linear battlefield frameworks such as CINCUNC employs in Korea and asymmetrical operations executed in a nonlinear battlespace such as we now see in Bosnia.

Nevertheless, there is room for further doctrinal refinement. Increasingly, the battlefield is becoming nonlinear and combat power is being used asymmetrically. Moreover, information age technologies will only accelerate such trends. Thus commanders and their staffs must ensure that their approach to planning and executing

operations becomes more dynamic. We must move away from battle and play books to a universally understood battle rhythm focused on cycles (current and future operations) and combat and support functions.

Equally important, we must develop a common understanding of how operations today are linked horizontally to operations of the future across various functions and vertically to both higher and service/functional component planning and execution cycles. Thereby JFCs and their staffs will learn to extend battlespace in time, space, and purpose by using all available means.

The model described above simply outlines those issues to be addressed in the evolution of joint force C² by all parties concerned. The ability to command and control joint operations in the future depends on it. More important, the well-being of our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen who are called upon to execute those operations demands attention to this key issue. **JFQ**