Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement
Abstract
A trend is reemerging that, if continued, could be a catastrophe for the profession of arms. It is nothing new. In fact, it has numerous historical antecedents which raise red flags of caution. At present it takes the form of a search for technological "silver bullets" that will make wars in the future swift, precise, low cost, and bloodless -- at least in terms of American lives. Unfortunately, it is being pursued at the expense of proven, balanced battlefield capabilities. This has implications on the tactical and operational levels and also limits the options available to the National Command Authorities (NCA). Faith in the unproven potential of technology is not a solid basis for strategy. Many believe that precision strike weapons can win all future wars. Yet history has shown that the human dimension of warfare cannot be countered by technology alone. War is essentially an expression of hostile attitudes. Technology cannot overcome the greed, fear, hate, revenge, or other emotions that cause wars. The United States has relied on technological silver bullets in the past, sometimes with disastrous effects. Precision engagement and dominant maneuver are two of four operational concepts addressed in "Joint Vision 2010." However, there is a certain danger in placing too much emphasis on precision engagement and unproven "silver bullets." The consequences of such reliance came home to roost in Korea and Vietnam. These concepts must be balanced to provide both CINCs and the NCA with the best options. Moreover, dominant maneuver accomplishes tasks that precision engagement cannot, as proven in Kuwait, the Sinai, Macedonia, Haiti, and Bosnia. A genuine balance between precision engagement and dominant maneuver serves national security.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1997
- Accession Number
- ADA530762
Entities
People
- Dennis J. Reimer