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# Colloquium Brief

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## A NEW CHAPTER IN TRANS-AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT

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### KEY INSIGHTS:

- The need to advance regional understanding of the contemporary security partnership situation in the Hemisphere: An educational and conceptual requirement;
- The need to foster a broader partnership focus on the disaster relief issue: An educational, conceptual, and organizational requirement; and
- The need to build multilateral mechanisms and processes to address the contemporary security partnership situation: An educational and organizational requirement.
- Recommendation: USSOUTHCOM take the lead in developing a multilateral regional security action plan to begin a viable long-term regional partnership effort in the Hemisphere.

### INTRODUCTION

General Fraser and the conference dialogue stressed the critical need to develop a serious hemispheric partnership for opening "A new Chapter in Trans-American Engagement." In that connection, over 20 major issues and recommendations were put forward (some of which were redundant) at the 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium, held on May 25-26, 2010, in Miami, Florida. In one way or another, virtually every issue and recommendation stresses that building a viable regional security partnership in the Hemisphere is not a strictly short-term, or unilateral, or even bilateral defense effort. Regional security will result only from long-term, multilateral, civil-military partnering efforts. Thus, the generalized results of the colloquium emphasize three highly interrelated needs and an associated recommendation.

### ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**Issue A: The Need to Advance Regional Understanding of the Contemporary Security Partnership Situation in the Hemisphere.**

This is primarily an educational and conceptual requirement that centers on the major unconventional contemporary transnational threats to effective sovereignty, peace, democracy, socio-economic development, and individual

and collective security. Recommendations include, but are not necessarily limited to the following:

1. Western Hemisphere countries should reevaluate traditional understandings of state sovereignty and defense. The purpose is to reconceptualize concepts of sovereignty, defense, and security to meet 21st century requirements, and to generate truly transnational responses to transnational problems.

2. Western Hemisphere countries need to develop whole-of-society solutions to achieve individual and collective security, and to achieve effective sovereignty.

3. There is a corresponding need to improve education, training, knowledge transfer, and support to public security administrative officials (civilian, military, and police). As one example, the intent is to better use police, military, and civilian capabilities in a cohesive manner—fusing information into actionable intelligence—and helping them to work together operationally.

4. Civil-military relationships need public debate, and new Rules of Engagement (ROE) must be developed.

5. U.S. policymakers and their Latin American partners need to better coordinate their separate, subregional counternarcotics and security programs (e.g., Plan Colombia, Merida Initiative, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and the Central American Regional Security Initiative) in order to be more effective in meeting the transnational challenges posed by organized criminal networks, and avoid simply perpetuating “the balloon effect.”

6. As a corollary, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM must work together in a more cooperative manner in the Southern Triangle areas of Mexico, Belize, and Guatemala to combat illicit activities such as drug, arms, and human trafficking.

7. U.S. policymakers should readjust their metrics of success. U.S. assistance programs should no longer be gauged on the amount of money or military equipment doled out, or illegal drugs seized, hectares eradicated, or on domestic consumption rates. Instead the focus should be on qualitative measures such as provision of citizen security and political stability. Most importantly, the focus needs to be pragmatic, with the more reasonable goal of management of the situation, not complete victory in a so-called “war on drugs.”

8. Government-to-Government collaboration is best enabled through people-to-people diplomacy. For example, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence personnel should work on cultivating personal relationships with their counterparts in Latin America to build trust and to facilitate better sharing of information. The U.S. Government should also support measures that employ partner national level special and vetted units that work with U.S. agencies and a program that encourages U.S.

law enforcement agents to work with their partner nation equivalents. This is a “force multiplier.”

9. The U.S. Government should promote people-to-people diplomacy in collaboration with NGOs and PVOs through such initiatives as the medical missions of the USNS *Comfort* in partnership with Project Hope. The U.S. Government should also work to engage the private sector and civil society through “intersections of interest” to mobilize volunteers and obtain funding for socioeconomic development projects in the region.

10. Finally, Western Hemisphere countries must be encouraged to be proactive in providing their own security in partnership with their neighbors. This will require meaningful participation in decisionmaking and meaningful roles in implementation.

## Discussion.

In the context outlined above, it is helpful to understand how sovereignty, security, stability and defense issues have changed over the past several years. The traditional legal concept of threats to national security and sovereignty involve the protection of national territory and the population against recognizable external military aggression. Thus, the traditional level of security analysis tends to define national security and sovereignty in narrow nation-state and military terms. The main current in the Latin American threat environment is not a traditional security (i.e., defense against external nation-state aggression) problem. Rather, a dynamic and complex mix of nonstate actors (e.g., populists and neopopulists, new socialists, political insurgents, transnational criminal organizations, drug cartels, small private military organizations, enforcer gangs, mercenaries, other paramilitary “self defense” organizations, etc.) are actively involved in internal disruption and destabilization efforts that violate the effective sovereignty and stability of virtually every nation-state in the region, every day of the year. The primary objective of these “new” players in the hemispheric security arena is to attain a level of freedom of movement and action that allows their achievement of radical political, commercial, and/or other motives. Additionally, other potentially destabilizing issues have emerged or reemerged in the hemisphere, such as energy resources, missile defense, nuclear power, demarcation of boundaries, and informal economics.

The objectives of the players, nonstate and state-supported, define insurgency as: coercing fundamental change of a given political-economic-social system to neutralize, control, or depose it. These objectives also define war: compelling an adversary to accede to an aggressor’s policy objectives. All this requires more than law enforcement or military solutions. The ability to effectively deal with contemporary insurgency or war

threats engendered by nonstate actors is multilevel and multilateral, and requires political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, and social efforts—as well as police and military efforts. Thus, the full human and physical resources of a nation-state, its society, and its international partners are required to achieve the individual and collective well-being that leads to effective sovereignty, stability, and societal peace with justice. Finally, it must be emphasized that the concept of security now includes—first and foremost—the imperative of addressing the root causes (i.e., poverty, inequality, and the lack of law and order) of instability and violence.

#### **Issue B: The Need to Foster a Broader Partnership Focus on the Disaster Relief Issue.**

This is a conceptual, educational, and organizational requirement that focuses on the need for strategic clarity. Strategic clarity is derived primarily from conceptual, educational, and organizational mechanisms for achieving unity of effort. Recommendations include, but are not necessarily limited to the following:

1. Disaster response and relief should focus on partnerships and relationships that look beyond traditional command and control boundaries and instead allow for coordination, collaboration, communication, and flexibility.

2. The UN Security Council should be encouraged to reexamine its MINUSTAH mission to allow for the expansion of its mandate to include combating drug trafficking around Hispanola, and trans-national criminal organizations and gangs on the island.

3. It is time to investigate why JIATF South is such a successful model of inter-agency cooperation and how it can best be optimized in other arenas of whole-of government and multi-lateral cooperation.

4. There is a need to work on building trust, confidence, transparency, and accountability in disaster relief and related activities.

5. Same as recommendations 1 and 10 from Issue A outlined above.

#### **Discussion.**

In the past, small-scale peace enforcement and stability operations tended to be unrealistically viewed as providing military solutions for civil violence and instability problems. Presently, the complex realities of these types of missions must be understood as a holistic process that relies on various civilian and military agencies and contingents working together in an integrated fashion. The intent is to establish and achieve a common political end.

A former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe

and former SOUTHCOM Commander, General John R. Galvin, USA (Ret.), argues that continuous and cooperative planning among and between national and international civilian and military organizations, beginning with a strategic assessment of a given situation, can establish a mechanism for developing a common vision for ultimate political success (i.e., strategic clarity). Then, shared goals and objectives, a broad understanding of what must be done, or not done or changed, and a common understanding of possibilities and constraints will generate an overarching campaign plan that becomes the basis for developing subordinate plans making direct contributions to the achievement of the desired end state. Thus, the roles and missions of the various national and international civilian and military elements evolve deliberately—rather than as an ad hoc response to the crisis of the moment. All these integrative efforts ultimately ensure the conditions that will allow a host nation to develop or renew its political solvency and legitimacy—and that a given mandate for peace and stability will, in fact, be achieved.

#### **Issue C: The Need to Build Multilateral Mechanisms and Processes to Address the Contemporary Partnership Security Situation in Latin America.**

Logically, Issues A and B take us to this issue. Before rushing to create an architecture that will deal with security and stability threats that have an impact on us all, the primary parties must be in general agreement regarding a strategic end state. Although an agreement on the end state is a necessary condition for effective partnership, it is not sufficient. The agreement must be supported by an organizational structure that can identify, plan, and implement a plan of action. Recommendations include all those listed above, and more. First, there are educational/conceptual requirements necessary to develop leader judgment that is needed to effectively deal with complex, politically dominated, multi-dimensional, multi-organization, multi-national, and multi-cultural contingencies. In these terms, there is a need to:

1. Facilitate ways and means to help civil-military leaders cope with the many ways that political and psychological considerations affect the use and the nonuse of force.

2. Facilitate ways and means to help leaders to understand that the number of battlefield victories, the number of enemies arrested or killed, or the number of hectares or kilos destroyed has meaning only to the extent that such actions directly contribute to the legitimate strengthening of the state.

3. Teach leaders at all levels how to communicate with a diversity of national and external civil-military cultures.

4. Teach leaders how to cooperatively and to collegially plan and implement an operation employing a full universe of diverse organizations – internal government agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and coalition/partnership civil-military organizations.

5. Teach leaders a thinking process (i.e., logic path) and an understanding of grand strategy that will allow them to be clear on what the situation is and what it is not.

6. Since in a conflict situation, nonstate actors are likely to have at their disposal an awesome array of conventional and unconventional weaponry, there is a need to teach leaders, soldiers, and police involved in peace enforcement and stability operations to be effective warfighters.

7. Revitalization of the Inter-American Defense Board might be a step in the right direction to work toward achieving the ends outlined above, to enhance civilian oversight of the armed forces in the region, to become a school of public administration instead of just a training school for officers, and to help restore trust and confidence in the armed forces and Ministries of Defense in the region.

#### **Organizationally, there is a need to:**

1. Develop an executive-level management structure which can and will ensure continuous cooperative planning and execution of policy among and between the primary internal players. The Organization of American States (OAS) could provide such a structure.

2. That structure must also be capable of continuous cooperative planning and execution of policy among and between primary external actors (i.e., primary external ally, other coalition partners, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations).

3. That same structure must also ensure that all political-economic-military action at the operational and tactical levels directly contributes to the achievement of the mutually agreed strategic political end state. This requirement reflects a need to develop an effective end state planning mechanism within the executive-level management structure.

#### **Discussion.**

The United States shares with its hemispheric neighbors an increasingly and vitally important financial, commercial, and security/stability stake in the political and socio-economic growth of the region. Any kind of political-economic-social-security deterioration in the area will profoundly degrade the health of the U.S. economy – and therefore, the concomitant power to act in the

global security arena. Thus, the continuing U.S. responsibility to the region goes well beyond the narrow purview of unilateral military training and equipping to that of a broader multilateral strategy and civil-military leader development effort.

**FINAL ISSUE: The Need to Continue the Momentum from the Colloquium and to Build on the Range of Partnership-related Issues Outlined in this Conference Brief.**

**Sub-Issue:** None of the requirements and recommendations outlined above allow for quick and easy solutions. They demand a carefully staffed and phased multilateral security action plan, with short and long-term milestones and metrics to validate planning and implementation.

**Recommendation:** That the U.S. Southern Command takes the lead in establishing a multi-organizational and multilateral “Tiger Team” to develop a phased regional action plan that will begin a viable long-term regional partnership effort in the Hemisphere.

#### **ENDNOTE**

1. Manwaring interview with General John R. Galvin, USA (Ret.), on August 6, 1997, in Boston, MA.

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