



THE GUARDIAN

THE SOURCE FOR ANTITERRORISM INFORMATION



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SUBMITTING NEWS & ARTICLES

The editors invite articles and other contributions on antiterrorism and force protection of interest to the Armed Forces. Local reproduction of our newsletter is authorized and encouraged. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Staff, DOD, or any other agency of the Federal Government.

***Guardian* feedback and contributions**

The Guardian is soliciting input for the Winter 2009 edition. Please direct your comments, feedback, and articles to: guardian@js.pentagon.mil

It should now be clear—the United States and our partners have sent an unmistakable message: We will target al Qaeda wherever they take root; we will not yield in our pursuit; and we are developing the capacity and the cooperation to deny a safe haven to any who threaten America and its allies.

— President Barack Obama

6 October 2009

I believe the decisions that the president will make for the next stage of the Afghanistan campaign will be among the most important of his presidency, so it is important that we take our time to do all we can to get this right.

— Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

5 October 2009

A successful counterinsurgency strategy does, of course, have traditional offensive and defensive kinetic military components, including a subset that is the kind of operations associated with counter-terrorist forces. Conventional military operations obviously enable you to clear areas of extremist and insurgent elements, and, together with special operations forces, to stop them from putting themselves back together. The core of any counterinsurgency strategy, though, is that it must focus on the fact that the decisive terrain is the human terrain, not the high ground or river crossing.

— Commander, U.S. Central Command Gen. David H. Petraeus

17 September 2009

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THE
GUARDIAN

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Articles should be approximately 2,000 words. Subject matter should relate to antiterrorism and force protection and relevant to current and future warfighters. Topics may include:

- Policy issues & strategic approaches
- Single incident analysis & lessons learned
- Law enforcement & counterintelligence
- Identity management & privacy issues
- Domestic & international legal issues
- Cyber security & emerging technologies
- Force protection for troops in transit/in theater
- Interagency cooperation
- Regional challenges & comparative AT/FP policies
- Emerging threats/opportunities & trends
- Disaster response/consequence management
- Piracy/maritime security issues

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The Guardian

The Source for Antiterrorism Information | 2009 | Vol 11, Issue 2



Guardian readers,

It is my pleasure to introduce the Fall 2009 edition of *The Guardian*. In order to meet the ever-present threat of an intelligent, adaptive enemy, J-34 is committed to bringing you the latest Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) theories, concepts, best practices and lessons learned.

In this edition you will find four articles with excellent insights, information and food for thought on a wide range of subjects spanning the entire tactical-operational-strategic spectrum:

- Rehabilitation Programs for Detainees – A comparison of US and foreign programs, examining their differences, limitations and relative levels of effectiveness.
- Vehicle Barrier Standards – A review of vehicle barrier effectiveness, new standards, testing, certification, and how they relate to Entry Control Point (ECP) design.
- Terrorism Deterrence – An approach to counter-terrorism by changing the focus from the “physical” to the “moral” and leveraging a deterrence strategy.
- Piracy – New solutions for an age-old problem. Commercial shipping reacts to the increase in piracy along key shipping routes off the Horn of Africa.

I am also pleased to announce a couple new additions to *The Guardian*. As part of our effort to assist all AT/FP professionals with continuing education, we have compiled an AT-focused reading list that should keep our aperture wide open. The readings include in-depth treatments of terrorists’ ideology, organization, capabilities, past operations and emerging threats. Accompanying the AT reading list we have incorporated a book review highlighting AT-related themes drawn from recommended readings. In this edition we have included a review of *The Age of Sacred Terror* by David Benjamin and Steven Simon. It is an outstanding overview of radical Islamist terrorism and the events leading up to 9/11. The authors outline Al Qaeda’s ideological roots, initial founding, and declaration of war against the US, then culminates with the 9/11 plot, and closes with an analysis of the initial U.S. response to the attack.

To help you develop a robust AT/FP program, I would like to direct your attention to additional AT-related resources at your disposal. Of particular interest are the AT education programs showcased in this issue. The upcoming 26-28 January 2010 Level IV Antiterrorism Executive Seminar covers AT issues from the senior leaders’ perspective and the updated Level I AT Training Program has the latest on lessons learned from current operations, terrorist TTPs, and modules tailored to regional threats. For additional resources on AT policy, training, education, and assessment tools, please visit the Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal (ATEP) at Army Knowledge Online (AKO).

As always, you have an open invitation to support *The Guardian* and the AT/FP community by providing us with your comments, suggestions, and/or article submissions via ATEP on AKO/DKO or at the guardian@js.pentagon.mil. I sincerely look forward to hearing from you. Thank you for all you do!

Check Six!

Jonathan “Tracer” Treacy
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director for Antiterrorism/Homeland Defense



TERROR REHAB

US Rehabilitation Programs for Iraqi Detainees

By Stephen Kersting

Successful rehabilitation plays a critical role in ensuring those who must be released do not pose a security threat to US forces in the region.

Introduction

As the United States withdraws forces from Iraq and turns over increasing responsibility to Iraqi security forces, tens of thousands of potentially dangerous detainees hang in the balance. At issue is how best to prevent such detainees becoming a threat to US forces in the region if they are released by the United States or by an Iraqi government lacking the capacity to jail or prosecute them.

According to the Associated Press, the United States held 10,429 detainees in Iraq as of July 2009. This number was down from 19,000 in September 2008 and 26,000

in November 2007. Under the terms of the Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Iraq, US detainees currently in custody will be released or transferred to an Iraqi prison system that already holds more than 30,000 prisoners.

With a view toward making released detainees less of a threat, Multinational Force Iraq currently offers a rehabilitation program for some detainees. Beyond making more detainees eligible for safe release, another rationale for rehabilitation of those at the fringes of terrorism is avoiding the radicalization that seems to be a permanent fixture of prison systems around the world. It is in prison that many people with only sympathy

for radical organizations become hardened radicals determined to attack US military assets and personnel.

The US rehabilitation program in Iraq began as one of education and release for those Iraqi detainees no longer considered a threat and willing to forswear violence before an Iraqi judge. By October 2007, more than 1,000 such detainees had been released, and none had subsequently threatened coalition or Iraqi forces.¹ Since 2007, more robust rehabilitation programs, based on similar Saudi programs, were implemented to deal with potentially more dangerous detainees.

Rehabilitation 101

Rehabilitation aims to change both the “hearts” and “minds” of prisoners.

Changing “hearts” implies convincing subjects that although they may have legitimate grievances, the use of violence is at odds with being a good Muslim. In terms of changing “minds,” prisoners are provided with incentives not to engage in support for terrorist organizations. Ideally, rehabilitated prisoners are no longer a violent threat. At issue is what can be learned not only from the successes but also from the failures of the Saudi program and what will become of “rehabilitated” detainees as the United States withdraws from Iraq.

The Saudi “Counseling Program”

The model for current coalition rehabilitation programs is Saudi Arabia’s “Counseling Program” for Saudis convicted of supporting terrorism. It is important to note that the Saudi program is only open to those prisoners who were tangentially involved in terrorism. Participants include those convicted for possession of terrorist propaganda, support for terrorism, and lesser offenses, not those who actually have blood on their hands. Eligible candidates participate in the program as part of their prison sentence and often receive a royal pardon on successful completion of the program.

The program was started in 2004, partly in response to a series of suicide bombings in Riyadh, Saudi



Today, Saudi Arabia champions the Counseling Program as a valuable tool in the “War of Ideas” within the kingdom. The counseling is designed to reform the prisoners’ notions of how they relate to society and to their faith and the appropriate role of jihad in their lives.

Arabia, during May 2003. The fact that those bombings targeted the Saudi government rather than foreign nationals exclusively caught the attention of senior Saudi leaders. Today, Saudi Arabia champions the Counseling Program as a valuable tool in the “War of Ideas” within the kingdom. The counseling is designed to reform the prisoners’ notions of how they relate to society and to their faith and the appropriate role of jihad in their lives.

Changing Beliefs

Following initial one-on-one counseling sessions, participants join others in 2-hour sessions before moving onto more in-depth classes. These 6-hour courses, in groups of about 20, are led cooperatively by

clerics and social scientists who try to reorient prisoners’ notions of important concepts within Islam. The mere presence of Westerners on “holy land” in Iraq or Saudi Arabia is often perceived by jihadists as justifying, or even necessitating, a violent response in “self-defense.” Similarly, the idea that the Dar al-Islam (House of Islam) is in constant and irreconcilable conflict with the Dar al-Hab (House of War) is a concept that is redefined in spiritual and moral terms. Counselors attempt to disabuse prisoners of their radical notions of loyalty, jihad, and takfir, a declaration stating other Muslims to be apostate—in essence, religious traitors worthy of death. Particular concepts like *takfir*, taken to their radical extremes, form the justification of those who participate in terrorist violence, especially against the authority of established Islamic political and religious authorities.

If a single point is driven home during this phase of the program, it is that political activism, even Islamist activism, is acceptable as long as it does not include violence.² In this way, some of the primary Islamic justifications for the use of violence that drives many of the current jihadist actions are redefined from physical military confrontation to spiritual and moral struggles. Rehabilitation counseling recasts such grievances as requiring a nonviolent response and prohibits resorting to violence for political or moral grievances that can be resolved via legal, political, and religious authorities.

Buying Compliance

Transforming the theological justifications and thought processes of terrorist suspects is admirable, but perhaps the more important aspects of the program are those that affect incentives. The program provides positive and negative incentives to discourage participants from violence, regardless of whether their theological beliefs are fundamentally changed. Graduates of the program receive housing, jobs, automobiles, stipends, and even wedding dowries as positive inducements to refrain from supporting political violence. Family members of prisoners are also typically provided for while the patriarch of the family is imprisoned and even immediately after his release. All such incentives depend on continued good behavior. Therefore, although

A May 2009 Pentagon report concluded that 1 in 7 of the 534 Guantanamo detainees who had been transferred abroad is engaged in terrorism.

graduates of the program are likely to continue to sympathize privately with terrorist organizations, they are often compelled to refrain from any overt support for such organizations in any way, whether it be in the form of propagandizing or making monetary contributions or in the actual planning of or training for attacks.

Disincentives include conviction and incarceration that would obviously accompany any repeat offences. Beyond these disincentives, the Saudi Interior Ministry can be quite creative in discouraging repeat offenders. In the case of Guantanamo Bay detainees who were returned to Saudi Arabia for rehabilitation, prisoners were not only integrated back into their own family networks but were introduced to families of other Saudi detainees still held in Guantanamo. These counseling candidates were made to understand that unless they took the program seriously and withheld overt support for terrorism, their compatriots could remain in US custody indefinitely. Such connections with other families also form a wider net of people with an interest in monitoring graduates of the program to ensure they behave.³ These connections, however, are tenuous at best. Many jihadists likely feel a stronger devotion to the cause than to their imprisoned brethren or their families. And as the idea of indefinite detention becomes untenable and other imprisoned terrorists in Guantanamo Bay or Iraq are expected to be released in the near future, this motivational tool becomes increasingly irrelevant.

This two-track approach of changing beliefs as well as buying compliance is reflected in the administrative organization of the program. The corps of religious and social counselors comprises religious, psychological, and social subcommittees; a “security” subcommittee is responsible for monitoring program graduates. Determining whether radicalism, defined as the use or advocacy of violence toward a political end, has really abated on release is as important as ensuring that the graduate does not return to radicalism. Recidivists risk long-term imprisonment, with no second chance at rehabilitation, and separation from their families, including marriages, which may have been facilitated by the government in the first place.

Jihadi Recidivism Rates: Are Saudis Getting Less “Bang” for Their Buck?

Results of the Saudi Counseling Program vary. Christopher Boucek, a leading American expert on the Saudi rehabilitation and reintegration programs, reported in January 2009 that Saudi Arabia claims an 80–90% success rate.⁴ Boucek estimates that about 2,000 prisoners have entered the program and approximately 700 have been released, with a recidivism rate estimated at 10%. But to the degree that most Americans are familiar with the Saudi terrorist rehabilitation program, it is thanks to the case of Said Ali al-Shihri.

Shihri, a graduate of urban warfare training in Kabul, Afghanistan, returned to Afghanistan in the weeks following the 9/11 attacks and wound up in US custody in December 2001 after being hospitalized in Pakistan as the victim of a US air strike. Although Shihri claimed he was in Afghanistan to do relief work, US investigators believed that he specialized in the smuggling of foreign fighters for al Qaeda, specifically from Mashhad, Iran, to Afghanistan.

On November 9, 2007, Shihri was transferred from US custody in Guantanamo to Saudi Arabia to participate in the kingdom’s Counseling Program. After completing the program, Shihri fled to Yemen and by January 2009 had risen to second in command of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Among his exploits, he is suspected of playing a role in the September 2008 suicide car bombings outside the US Embassy in Sana, Yemen’s capital, that killed 16.⁵

Shihri may be the highest profile case of recidivism, but he is not the only one. Of 85 individuals on Saudi Arabia’s al Qaeda “Most Wanted” list in February 2009, 11 were former Guantanamo detainees transferred to Saudi custody for rehabilitation and who subsequently escaped.⁶ Beyond just Saudi Arabia, a May 2009 Pentagon report concluded that 1 in 7 of the 534 Guantanamo detainees who had been transferred abroad is engaged in terrorism.⁷



Security Overwatch. As Iraqi soldiers battle armed militia men a 10th Mountain Division soldier provides overwatch in the Sadr City District of Baghdad. The release of thousands of detainees held by US forces in Iraq poses a great challenge to stability in the region.

US Army Photo 17 April 2008

Other Rehabilitation Programs

Many countries plagued by domestic terrorism, including Egypt, Morocco, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, use rehabilitation programs of one kind or another for certain segments of terrorist prisoners. Other countries, including the United Kingdom, Spain, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, and the Philippines, are considering the incorporation of rehabilitation elements into their penitentiary systems.

As of 2007, 41% of Indonesia's approximately 400 terrorist convicts were undergoing rehabilitation in a program run by Satgas, Indonesia's antiterror police division. One advantage of having such a small number of prisoners in such programs is that Indonesian authorities can take a holistic approach, identifying the individual circumstances of each candidate. Nevertheless,

even with a small program, the recidivism rate is unknown. Indonesian authorities acknowledge that they lack the resources to adequately monitor released prisoners.⁸

Singapore has an even greater advantage in being able to focus on the individual prisoner. Authorities include families and social networks in counseling sessions and are able to closely monitor released prisoners' activities via an "Aftercare" program. Malaysia couples intensive religious reeducation of detainees with counseling sessions for spouses.

Egypt's rehabilitation efforts are much more ad hoc and focused on delegitimizing domestic jihadist activity. Egyptian authorities will often compel religious authorities who were formerly affiliated with terrorist organizations to speak out against violence and to issue corresponding religious prohibitions.⁹



Containment. Preventing foreign jihadis currently detained in Iraq from flooding into Afghanistan and Pakistan is critical.

US Rehabilitation Programs for Iraqi Detainees

US rehabilitation programs for Iraqi detainees developed in earnest during 2007 and 2008, as part of then LTG David Petraeus' new counterinsurgency strategy. Although US experts drew on several programs, the Saudi rehabilitation experience was the primary model.

New Iraqi detainees are first brought to Camp Cropper for a short interview with Iraqi clerics or social workers who are under contract with the US military. The interviewers develop a report for each detainee, assessing the extremity of his political and religious views. Detainees are sorted and imprisoned according to how serious a threat they are presumed to be, with the least threatening eligible for rehabilitation.

The main element of the program adapted from Saudi Arabia is the *tanweer*, or enlightenment course. Iraqi contractors teach detainees a moderate version of Islam, focusing on Koranic verses that emphasize tolerance and prohibition against bloodshed.¹⁰ US rehabilitation of detainees in Iraq also focuses on vocational and literacy training, with the belief that the ability to earn a living will discourage detainees from returning to violence against coalition or Iraqi forces. Cash payments to the

Sons of Iraq program represented "buying a man a fish," in the form of direct cash payments from the military. Increasingly, US-led education programs attempt to "teach a man to fish" because payments cannot be made indefinitely and the Iraqi government may withhold payments in the future as a political tool. Other elements of rehabilitation include regular psychological assessments, observation of social interaction, basic civics education, and medical treatment. The new rehabilitation programs have been implemented, and more than 25,000 cases have been reviewed for release, with few being recaptured for terrorist or insurgent activity.

Given that many of the tens of thousands of detainees held by US forces in Iraq are "casual" jihadists, propagandists, "mules," and others involved only peripherally in the violence, the proportion of "rehabilitatable" prisoners is significant relative to the number of foreign fighters and hardened Iraqis with blood on their hands. Indeed, early iterations of the program during 2007 were directed at young Iraqi detainees, some as young as 11, who were held at the "House of Wisdom." At the time, about 820 of the 25,000 US detainees in Iraq were juveniles, and many were used by insurgents as messengers, guards, and even explosives planters.¹¹

Conclusions

One difference between US rehabilitation programs in Iraq and the Saudi model is the lack of legitimate religious authority in the US counseling process. Whereas the Saudi state has religious authority of its own and uses clerics as counselors, the US rehabilitation program is relegated to hiring moderate Iraqi contractors to conduct counseling. The Saudi Counseling Program emphasizes religious reeducation, whereas US programs prioritize vocational training. US programs substitute training in job skills and literacy for the Saudi method of direct payment with housing, vehicles, and jobs.

Coalition forces also lack the long-term monitoring capability of the Saudi Interior Ministry. The Saudi program makes use of family and social networks to monitor rehabilitation graduates; the United States lacks accessibility to such networks in Iraq. Saudi graduates also know that security-service presence is indefinite; Iraqis who are released can expect coalition forces to gradually vanish from the political landscape. As the US departure progresses, Iraqi security forces are replacing the original US captors. It will be important for the US and Iraqi governments to coordinate the transition of

US rehabilitation of detainees in Iraq also focuses on vocational and literacy training, with the belief that the ability to earn a living will discourage detainees from returning to violence. Other elements include regular psychological assessments, observation of social interaction, basic civics education, and medical treatment.

the rehabilitation programs themselves as well as the monitoring of released detainees.


As the US military readily acknowledges, we do not currently know the degree to which the rehabilitation programs are successful in the long run. US efforts to compile a database of biometric data, such as fingerprints, for known or suspected terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere will be valuable in determining the rate of recidivism, the triggers for return to violence, and the rehabilitation methods that work.¹² In the meantime, what is known is that US withdrawal makes the

continued detention of tens of thousands of prisoners impossible. Going forward, rehabilitation may be the best option for ensuring those who must be released do not pose a security threat to US forces in the region.

- 1 Wood, Sgt. Sara (USA). "Iraq Detention Operations Focus on Education, Rehabilitation." American Forces Press Service, October 10, 2007. Available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47746>
- 2 Kasupski, Anna. "The Saudi Counseling Program: New Questions about Terrorist Rehabilitation." Analysis Corporation, February 16, 2009. Available at: <http://www.theanalysiscorp.com/Saudi%20De-Radicalization.pdf>
- 3 Boucek, Christopher. "The Saudi Process of Repatriating and Reintegrating Guantanamo Returnees," CTC Sentinel, December 2007. Available at: <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss1.pdf>
- 4 Boucek, Christopher. "Clearing a Path for Guantanamo Returnees: Rehabilitation and Risk-Assessment." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 29, 2009. Available at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22678&prog=zgp&proj=zme>
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- 10 Dreazen, Yochi J. "Iraq's Counterinsurgency College." *Wall Street Journal*, September 18, 2008. Available at: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122169821303850455.html>
- 11 Pincus, Walter. "US Working to Reshape Iraqi Detainees." *Washington Post*, September 19, 2007. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/18/AR2007091802203.html>
- 12 Nakashima, Ellen. "Post-9/11 Dragnet Turns Up Surprises." *Washington Post*, July 6, 2008. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/05/AR2008070501831.html>

Recommended Reading

Book Review: *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America* by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon



The Age of Sacred Terror, written by former National Security Council members Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, outlines the roots of Islamist terrorism, including the Islamist's hatred of the West, their sense of divine mandate, and the strategic goals behind their use of violence. The authors present the authoritative history of the radical Islamic movement, tracing the emergence of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden from their ideological roots to the current struggle against the US. Myths, like the popular notion that poverty can explain terrorism, are rebutted. Al Qaeda's strength derives in large part from its ideology which has been selectively built on widely accepted fundamental Islamic ideas and principles. This makes terrorists' radical views on religion, politics and society very similar to the positions of moderate Islamists, differing largely on the use of violence to further their goals.

The effect of an all encompassing Islamist theology together with economic and political realities of life in the Middle East to explain why Islamist thought has shaped the minds and actions of many young Muslims.

Beyond the ideological/cultural underpinnings of Islam, dogged persistence of AQ and strategic operational goals of AQ, the authors identify ways the organization adapted to an increasingly hostile international environment. The importance of historical experience and social structures—families, tribes, and nations—in shaping, driving and enabling radical Islamist terror is emphasized. The historical lessons are drawn from insider accounts of the successes and failures of the East Africa embassy bombings and numerous near misses by both sides leading up to 9/11. In short, this book explains why the terrorists succeeded on 9/11 in carrying out the most extraordinary terrorist attack in history, why America was unprepared, and why the US government's pre-9/11 effort to stop bin Laden failed.

J-34 Antiterrorism Reading List

To assist in the professional military education and development of the AT/FP community, J-34 has compiled a reading list on topics related to antiterrorism.

1. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America*
2. Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*
3. Michael Scheuer, *Through Our Enemies Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*
4. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962*
5. LTC John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*
6. Bernard Lewis, *Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*
7. Anthony J. Joes, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency*
8. Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*
9. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism (2nd edition)*
10. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*

Guardian readers are encouraged to submit articles with analysis that expands on or critiques AT-related topics covered in these books. Send submissions to guardian@js.pentagon.mil.

Joint ECP/EOF Procedures (JEEP) Handbook



The *JEEP Handbook* provides operational standards, CONOPS, and TTPs for escalation of force at ECP, and recommends conceptual designs for emplacement of proposed ECP FP systems. This handbook is a training tool for service members on ECP/EOF CONOPS and TTPs, and is a model for use in establishing or updating ECPs, including a detailed discussion of ECP planning and design principles, selection of appropriate

force protection technologies, and recommendations on ECP/EOF training. The handbook also addresses the design, establishment, and enhancement of ECPs at FOBs in COIN environment.

For more information or to obtain a copy of the JEEP Handbook, please contact:

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NEW DIRECTIONS

IN VEHICLE BARRIER STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION



Tightening standards to improve security

By Doug Cavileer and John Wojtowicz, Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office

As of 31 January 2009, vehicle barrier performance is certified in accordance with the ASTM industry standard using four vehicles types.

Introduction

The Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO), a program office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities, works closely with more than 100 government agencies including with state and local government, law enforcement organizations, and national first responders. In 1999, the CTTSO was assigned program management oversight of the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG). CTTSO added irregular warfare support, explosive ordnance disposal/low-intensity conflict, and the Human Social Cultural and

Behavior Modeling Program as needs became apparent. This cooperative approach to resource and information sharing positions the CTTSO to gather front-line requirements that support multiple users, a distinct advantage in the combating terrorism community. The purpose of this article is to inform security officers concerned with force protection about the new American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) international industry standard, formally entitled, *ASTM F2656-07: Standard Test Method for Vehicle Crash Testing of Perimeter Barriers*.



VBIED aftermath. Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices are one of the weapons of choice for terrorists.

Vehicle Barrier Effectiveness

Vehicle barriers prevent vehicles from penetrating a facility's perimeter and are classified as either active or passive. Active barriers are used at entry control points (ECPs), while passive or fixed barriers are generally found along the perimeter of a facility. Active barriers, like a steel wedge or a retractable bollard, retract into the ground, allowing vehicles to pass into the protected area. Passive barriers, like fixed bollards, cable barriers, concrete planters, jersey barriers, berms, and ditches, are fixed in place, preventing traffic from crossing

The right vehicle barrier, properly certified to meet industry standards, will substantially mitigate the potential damage inflicted by these improvised threats.

the perimeter. Some designs also delay intrusion by adversaries on foot and protect the facility from direct observation or weapons fire.

As vehicles approach a facility, the first physical security measure generally encountered is the facility's ECP. A traffic-calming system, consisting of a chicane of fixed barriers in an "S"-curve configuration or other techniques to slow traffic, generally leads up to an ECP. The goal of vehicle barriers is to fully obstruct any breaching attempts by vehicles.

Changes in terrorist operations and techniques mean threats facing warfighters today often revolve around vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). The correct vehicle barrier, properly certified to meet industry standards, will substantially mitigate the

potential damage inflicted by a VBIED. Additionally, research has shown that specific site conditions can significantly impact performance. Therefore, crash barriers selection should be part of the planning stage of a new construction project, especially when to achieve a maximum possible blast stand-off distance from the facility.

The effectiveness of vehicle barriers in stopping ramming vehicles, VBIEDs, and hand-placed charges has been a concern for the United States since the early 1980s. At that time, the US Department of State (DOS) began standardizing vehicle barrier selection; terrorist events in Beirut, Lebanon, led to the first DOS standard, published in 1985.

Modern-day security officers and those concerned with force protection need to understand the role of vehicle barrier standards, how barriers are tested and certified, and how to locate this testing and certification information.

Vehicle Barrier Certification History

From 1985 through 31 January 2009, the US Government relied on the DOS to conduct standardized certification, testing the impact-resistance performance for vehicle barriers. In 2003, the DOS revised the original standard for measuring the effectiveness of stopping a vehicle, which became the standard for both the US Government and the vehicle barrier industry around the world.



Vehicle Testing. Dual-axel K12 truck making an impact with a dump truck.

New Era

January 31, 2009 saw the end of the DOS certification process for vehicle barriers and gates. Because of factors including new vehicle models and evolving terrorist techniques, the vehicle barrier industry developed a broader standard, supported by the US Army Corps of Engineers, Protective Design Center (USACE-PDC), the DOS Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and academia. Certification standards are now an industry owned process that addresses a wider range of vehicles,

penetration levels, and attack speeds and includes barriers for use in low-risk markets.

The new ASTM standard revives penetration levels which had been eliminated from the original 1985 DOS standards, which had the penetration designations L1, L2, or L3. The 2003 DOS standard used only medium-duty US manufactured trucks in all tests, and the new ASTM standard uses the same medium-duty trucks but also addresses passenger vehicles, pickup trucks, and heavy goods vehicles in the criteria. Force protection officers and those responsible for designing ECPs need to understand this new standard to differentiate between types of certified vehicle barriers and claims of certification stated by industry representatives.

The USACE-PDC maintains a list of vehicle barriers that are certified under the new ASTM standard as well as the older DOS standard. USACE-PDC also maintains the Unified Facility Criteria (UFC) and the Unified Facilities Guide Specification for all of DOD, including UFCs addressing facility security.

After the DOS 1985 standard was published, interest in vehicle barrier protection grew and methods for addressing VBIEDs and testing barriers evolved. In 2002, concerns about complex attack scenarios involving multiple vehicles and explosive charges led CTTSO to establish a bilateral project with an international partner. The purpose was to test vehicle barriers against evolving terrorist techniques and to share the information. CTTSO also worked with interagency and international partners in a vehicle barrier working group. CTTSO conducted a series of tests and scenarios involving multiple vehicles and blast testing; the resulting reports influenced new

requirements for the ASTM standard. The findings of this test series were shared with the working group at CTTSO facilities in January 2009.

The New Standard: ASTM F2656-07

ASTM F2656-07 details how to conduct vehicle barrier certification tests and establishes the certification rating of the barriers. The ASTM standard has four vehicle categories and three permissible ranges of vehicle-impact speeds for each vehicle type. The ASTM establishes general criteria for the structural condition of the four vehicle classes during testing, including the structural soundness of the vehicle and the restriction of vehicle modification to enhance performance. The four vehicle classifications, in order of increasing vehicle weight and general characteristics, are: small passenger car (C), 0.75-ton pickup truck (P), medium-duty truck (M), and heavy-goods vehicle (H). The requirement for the medium-duty truck is the same as for the 2003 DOS standard test vehicle: a diesel engine-equipped truck with a nominal weight of 15,000 pounds.

The ASTM standard also specifies the truck's wheel base, requires specific installation procedures for fixing the flatbed to the trucks chassis, and requires a set of 55-gallon metal drums to be filled and used as ballast in the cargo bed. The standard also has strict requirements for heavy-goods vehicles: The vehicle must be dual axle or dual axle with a drop axle; be a dump truck (or cement mixer), and have a mass of concrete placed in its bed as ballast (bringing the weight up to 65,000 pounds). For additional specific details on vehicle types and weights,



“T” wall testing. A heavy-goods vehicle, H50, drives at high speed into a barrier made up of a concrete “T” wall and earth at high speed. The resulting crash not only damaged the barrier but also caused some penetration.



Determining impact resistance. A dump truck crashed into a Metalith barrier during testing.

please review ASTM F2656-07. The H50 designation is the highest threat addressed by the standard.

The allowable test speed is specified based on the vehicle classification. The combination of the vehicle weight with its speed at impact determines the amount of kinetic energy that a barrier must be able to withstand. The speed is used in the test condition designation. For example, a heavy-goods vehicle test conducted at 50 miles per hour will have an H50 designation.

Table 1 summarizes the standard. The barrier ratings obtained under the ASTM certification process are based on a single successful test under controlled conditions at an ASTM-accredited, independent test facility.

TABLE 2.
The Four Penetration Levels in ASTM F2656-07

DESIGNATION	DYNAMIC PENETRATION RATING, M (FT)
P1	≤1 (≤3.3)
P2	1.01–7 (3.31–23.0)
P3	7.01–30 (23.1–98.4)
P4	≥30 (≥98)

Penetration Levels

The ASTM standard has four distinct penetration levels (Table 2): P1, P2, P3, and P4. The penetration measurement rates the maximum dynamic distance, or the total distance of the traveled by the front edge of the cargo bed beyond the pre-impact, inside edge of the barrier.

A P1 designator, for example, is assigned to a barrier if the maximum dynamic penetration is 1 meter or less, whereas the P4 designator is assigned if the dynamic penetration of a vehicle’s cargo bed is 30 meters or more.

TABLE 3.
DOS versus ASTM Designations

DOS 2003 Revised Standard Designation	New ASTM F2656-07 Equivalent Designation
K4	M30/P1
K8	M40/P1
K12	M50/P1
— ¹	H50/P11



The consequences of insufficient barriers. Iraqi police examine the damage caused by a VBIED to a police station hit in Salam, Iraq.

TABLE 1.

Summary of Standards in ASTM F2656-07

TEST VEHICLE	MEDIAN WEIGHT, KG/LB	IMPACT SPEED, KPH (MPH)	BALLAST	CERTIFICATION DESIGNATOR
Small Passenger Car (C)	1,100/2,430	65 (40), 80 (50), 100 (60)	Water in fuel tank or secured to passenger- compartment floor	C40, C50, C60
0.75-ton Pickup Truck (P)	2,300/5,070	65 (40), 80 (50), 100 (60)	Not specified other than to be uniformly distributed	PU40, PU50, PU60
Medium-Duty Truck (M)	6,800/15,000	50 (30), 65 (40), 80 (50)	Steel 55-gal drums secured to cargo bed	M30, M40, M50
Heavy-Goods Vehicle (H)	29,500/65,000	50 (30), 65 (40), 80 (50)	Mass of concrete	H30, H40, H50

Conclusion

Recently, some new energy-dissipation concepts used in crash barriers more effectively control impact forces by transferring them to the base, thereby significantly reducing barrier strength and foundation requirements. As of January 31, 2009, vehicle barrier performance is certified in accordance with the ASTM industry standard using four vehicles types rather than with the previous government standard addressing vehicle barrier performance against a single vehicle type (medium-duty US diesel truck; see Table 3). To receive this certification, the barrier must be physically tested in accordance with the ASTM F2656-07 standard at an independent, accredited test facility. USACE-PDC² maintains a list of barriers that have been tested in accordance with the ASTM standards and of those tested previously in accordance with the DOS standard. The needs of each individual site and associated end users will determine the acceptable penetration rating. For DOD users, consult with your supporting engineer or with the USACE-PDC if you have questions.

- 1 The DOS did not have K50 criteria. Industry and end users coined this term before the ASTM standard was published. The DOS standard recognized only K4, K8, and K12.
- 2 USACE-PDC maintains the Unified Facility Criteria (UFC) and Unified Facilities Guide Specification for all of DOD, including UFCs for facility security. MIL-STD 3007 established procedures and directs all Services, agencies, and field activities to use UFCs per DOD Directive 4270.5 dated 12 February 2005.

Further Information

It is strongly recommended that a site-specific survey be conducted prior to specifying the type of barrier. Considerations to be taken into account should include the operating environment, (including extreme temperature variations, austere environments, water table depth, soil conditions for the barrier foundation, and topography near the ECP), maximum approach speed, vehicle types, hourly and/or daily maximum throughput requirements, and potential inclusion of a sally port. The Department of Defense: Selection and Application of Vehicle Barriers (UFC 4-022-02) is one source that provides site-survey guidance.

- For additional information regarding vehicle barrier certification, testing, and related projects, contact Project Lead John J. Wojtowicz, Program Manager, US Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Technology Administration, Volpe Center. E-mail: John.Wojtowicz@dot.gov
- For more information on the listing of certified vehicle barriers, contact Curt Betts, Chief, Security Engineering Section at the USACE-PDC. E-mail: Curt.P.Betts@usace.army.mil
- For more information on the CTTSO and the Physical Security Subgroup, please visit <http://www.tswg.gov/subgroups/ps/ps.html> or e-mail at psgroup@tswg.gov



DETECTING TERROR

A Strategic Approach

By LTC James K. Morningstar, US Army (Ret.)

A counter-terrorist strategy of deterrence has inherent credible and ethical advantages.

Introduction

A counterterrorist strategy of deterrence has inherent credible and ethical advantages. It abandons the definitions of terrorism that give rise to claims of Western double standards. A deterrence strategy does not rely primarily on regional governments that are popularly perceived as unjust to “finish the task.” The current strategy relying solely on physical destruction lacks credibility when terrorists find sanctuary in many countries where the United States will not use military power and when US military strikes elsewhere cause inevitable collateral damage that terrorists use to portray Americans as unethical and anti-Islamic. In contrast, a deterrence strategy emphasizes the moral operations to undermine confidence in terrorist organizations and their methods.

Redefining Our Strategic Approach

For the United States to credibly and ethically deter adherents of extremist religious ideology from engaging in terrorist activity, policymakers must reexamine the problem of terrorism. What policies ensure credibility and ethical acceptance? Do adherents of extremist religious ideologies view terrorism in a unique way? How are terrorists deterred? How is “terrorist activity” defined? This last question provides the starting point because even subtly divergent definitions of this term can result irreconcilable positions when crafting and implementing deterrence policies.

Defining Terrorism

Surprisingly, semantic disagreements among academics, diplomats, and policymakers mean that, in the words of the US Department of State, “No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance.”¹ The lack of a common definition limits attempts to devise effective counterterrorist strategies. This failure has left the term “terrorism” open to a wide range of interpretations that undermine the credibility of counterterrorist efforts.

Western definitions that limit terrorism to substate actors, political objectives, or illegitimate violence only produce stubborn rejection from many parties. In his book, *Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial*

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Bombardment, Beau Grosscup explained: “Historically, the North American and European nations have generally offered a narrow definition that excludes the actions of nation states from being labeled ‘terrorism.’ This position is largely based on Max Weber’s framework in which states use ‘legitimate’ violence and condemn the violence of others as ‘terrorism’ or ‘barbarism.’”²

Critics see in this approach a double standard that justifies Menachem Begin, the Contras, and Syria (during the Gulf War) but condemns Yasir Arafat, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Iran. Former Algerian guerilla Equid Ahman argued that Western definitions are derived from “the need for the moral revulsion we feel against terror to be selective.”³ More simply, as terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins noted, “Terrorism is what the bad guys do.” Policies based on such definitions of terrorism are often rejected as biased and discriminatory.

Failure to define terrorism allows some to interpret a “war on terror” as a “war on Islam.” Some see Western denunciations of terrorists as code for denouncing defenders of Islam. This view holds Western counterterrorist policies to be less than credible and unethical.

A New Definition

Ethical and credible counterterrorist policies begin by redefining terrorism more broadly to gain greater universal acceptance while retaining enough precision to target terrorism’s pernicious characteristics. I offer this definition: Terrorism is the creation and use of fear through credible threat to coerce a desired response from a targeted audience.

The word “violence” is absent from this definition because violence has never been essential to terrorism except as a means of establishing credible threat. If a terrorist group could show that it had a nuclear weapon and was prepared to use it, it could instill coercive fear without any demonstration of violence. Cyberterrorism, for example, threatens many communities in uniquely nonviolent ways.⁵

The proposed definition also omits any reference to legitimacy. Condemnation of the terrorists’ acts too often becomes confused with condemnation of the terrorists’ cause. This confusion leads to semantic gymnastics that condemn “bad guys” and excuse “good guys,” which undermines credibility.⁶

Analysts like John Horgan argue that terrorists are defined by “the political dimension to the terrorist’s behavior.”⁷ I disagree: Not all terrorism is political.⁸ The dictionary definition of “political” is “exercising or seeking power in the governmental or public affairs of a state, municipality, etc.”⁹ “Political” also implies some give and take: Aristotle defined politics as the “art of the possible,” a definition that has since been embraced as “the art of compromise.” Yet many terrorists are rarely motivated by possibilities and even less by compromise; consequently, far different counterstrategies are required.

Some terrorists are criminals. Between 1979 and 1983, the Sicilian Mafia made such “extensive use of terrorist attacks to intimidate jurists that it made the actions of the Red Brigade pale into insignificance ... each of the most senior political, institutional and judicial representatives of state power in Sicily was assassinated.”¹⁰ “Political” does not describe these acts of terrorism. Although these actors leveraged fear, they were not “seeking power in the governmental or public affairs of a state”; they were simply criminal terrorists.

Terrorism defined as the creation and use of fear through credible threat to coerce a desired response from a targeted audience addresses

Ethical and credible counterterrorist policies redefine terrorism more broadly, while retaining enough precision to target terrorism’s pernicious characteristics:

Terrorism is the creation and use of fear through credible threat to coerce a desired response from a targeted audience.

This new definition addresses political, criminal, and ideological terrorists, and eliminates perceptions of double standards.

political, criminal, and ideological terrorists. It may be possible to negotiate with political terrorists and to bargain with criminal terrorists, but ideological terrorists must be dealt with very differently. This new definition also eliminates perceptions of double standards and serves as a starting point for gaining an international imprimatur for counterterrorism policies.

Ideological Terrorists

Ideological terrorists are poles apart from political terrorists. For radical Islamist Osama Bin Laden, the late white supremacist Robert Mathews, or antiabortionist Eric Rudolph, for example, there can be no compromise. They are fanatical absolutists. They find validation in scripture that cannot be modified. Beyond prohibiting compromise, fidelity to scripture serves as an absolutist's sword and shield. Author Lawrence Wright noted in *The Looming Tower*, "Al Qaeda was conceived in the marriage of these assumptions: Faith is stronger than weapons or nations, and the ticket to enter the sacred zone where such miracles occur is the willingness to die."¹¹ Al Qaeda's vision is total and totalitarian; therefore, any deviation from the group's ideology is an existential threat.

Appeals for moderation reinforce the absolutist's fanaticism. Walter Laqueur observed in *The New Terrorism*, "The Taliban in Afghanistan and many militants are not impressed by the speeches and writings of more moderate exegetists about the 'poverty of fanaticism' and the 'spiritual mission of Islam,' and this fact is what matters in the present discussion."¹² Such calls validate extremists' threat perceptions and motivate them toward further terrorism. An al Qaeda leader told an interviewer that "terrorizing oppressors and criminals and thieves and robbers is necessary for the safety of people and for the protection of their property. ... The terrorism we practice is of the commendable kind."¹³ Political negotiation and compromise are not possible with ideological terrorists.

Strategy and Tactics

Only in the narrowest sense can terrorism be considered a tactic.¹⁴ Terrorism is a strategy, and the distinction between tactics and strategy is an important one.


Strategy is the purpose or direction of effort to gain advantage, whereas tactics are the methods used at the point of attack.¹⁵ Terrorism is a strategy with a specific purpose: to coerce through fear and intimidation.¹⁶ Suicide bombings, assassinations, sabotage, and hostage taking are the tactics of terrorism.

Critics have called the transition from a war on

terrorists to a war on terrorism a major error. If al Qaeda now gave up terrorism and instead embraced guerilla or conventional warfare, would our war be over? No. Bin Laden would no doubt change strategy if a more effective one were available. The enemy is not terrorism; the enemy uses terrorism.

Failure to see terrorism as a strategy clouds our perception of the enemy. Consider President George W.

Ideological terrorists are poles apart from political terrorists.



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Political negotiation and compromise are not possible with ideological terrorists.

Bush's words shortly after 9/11: "Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."¹⁷ Compare those words with statements in the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* published in February 2003: "The enemy is not one person. It is not a single political regime. Certainly it is not a religion. The

enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”¹⁸ What began as a focus on perpetrators has morphed into an unhelpful targeting of their strategy.

Al Qaeda’s Strategic Purpose

Al Qaeda’s strategic purpose is no secret: Its constitution calls for the establishment of a Muslim caliphate. Al Qaeda intends to overthrow regional secular governments (the near target) and Israel and to unite Muslim lands under clerical rule. As a precursor operation, it intends to drive the United States (the far target) out of the region. Bin Laden explained, “If we cut off the head of America, the kingdoms in the Arab world will cease to exist.”¹⁹

President Bush was correct when he told Congress following 9/11: “[Al Qaeda wants] to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out

political beings. Their adherence to divine inspiration as their source of legitimacy precludes such interaction. O’Neill recognized this attribute when he classified al Qaeda and other religious extremists as “reactionary-traditionalist insurgents.” O’Neill explained, “Whatever their religious affiliation, reactionary traditionalists believe they are repositories of truth; their rhetoric is self-righteous, and they feel contempt (usually hatred) for those who do not share their views.”²³

Strategies to counter these fanatics must incorporate the insurgent nature of the fight. One usually does not defeat an insurgency, one outlasts it.

Strategy Misapplied

Unfortunately, counterinsurgency policies often become confused with counter-guerilla warfare. Although al Qaeda uses guerilla warfare, it relies on a global strategy of terrorism. A counterstrategy for the former is not adequate for the latter. Counterguerilla operations, for example, aim to deny local popular

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of the Middle East. ... With every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us because we stand in their way.”²⁰ Unfortunately, his phrase, “This is civilization’s fight,” has mutated into the official view that the 9/11 attacks “were acts ... against the very idea of civilized society.”²¹ Only with the broadest strokes can al Qaeda be painted as seeking to destroy civilization. Because deterrence requires denying objectives, overstating objectives confuses deterrence efforts and erodes the credibility of operations.

The stated intention of overthrowing governments defines al Qaeda’s war as an insurgency, which author Bard O’Neill defines as “a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.”²²

Using political resources and targeting of political systems does not mean that ideological terrorists are

support from guerillas.²⁴ Terrorists, however, require little popular support. Terrorists, for example, have long operated among British Muslims, although only 7% view groups like al Qaeda favorably.²⁵ Large investments to win the hearts and minds of regional populations are likely to yield disappointing returns as a counterterrorism policy.

America’s traditional military doctrines are also misapplied against terrorists. US commanders have followed a simple and traditional formula: Find the enemy and pile on firepower until he is destroyed. Yet al Qaeda, opting for asymmetrical war, has proven hard to kill.²⁶ Joseph Nye Jr., former assistant secretary of defense and dean of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, observed: “The war [in Afghanistan] destroyed only a quarter or so of al Qaeda, which is a network organization with cells in 60 countries. Precision bombing is not an option for countering cells in Hamburg, Singapore or Detroit.”²⁷ Al Qaeda’s use of cyberspace magnifies its ability to maintain a worldwide presence that is immune from American military might.²⁸

Ideological terrorists wage moral, not kinetic, wars. In

this type of war, al Qaeda believes it enjoys tremendous advantages in conviction and faith. Bin Laden told al-Jazeera, “Based on the reports we received from our brothers who participated in the jihad in Somalia, we learned that they saw the weakness, frailty, and cowardice of US troops.”²⁹ This perception encouraged al Qaeda to use a classic application of terrorism to bring the United States into conflict on their terms in Afghanistan. When attacks on embassies and naval vessels failed to provoke the desired response, al Qaeda executed 9/11. Unfortunately, US policymakers did not seem to understand al Qaeda’s strategy.

Fatal Lunges

The strategic potential of a single terrorist act to cause cataclysmic events was demonstrated by Gavrilo Princip’s assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. Princip fell in with agitators known as Crna Ruka (“the Black Hand”) who opposed Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia and who wished to destroy the Hapsburg Empire but lacked the strength to do so.³⁰ The group understood that, as David C. Rapoport noted in the December 2001 issue of *Current History*, “Terror would command the masses’ attention, arouse latent political tensions, and provoke government to respond indiscriminately, undermining in the process its own credibility.”³¹ The Black Hand provided Princip with training and equipment and

An effective counterterrorism strategy will seek to:

1. undermine confidence in the terrorists and separate them from their cause;
2. avert threats and undercut the terrorists’ credibility;
3. provide only undesirable responses;
4. inoculate the targeted audience from fear.

infiltrated him into Sarajevo.³² The group hoped that Austria-Hungary would respond to the assassination of the crown prince with repression in Bosnia that would arouse opposition from the South Slavs and their protector, Russia.

There is a tremendous lesson in the way terrorists



triggered these events. The Black Hand turned the empire’s power against itself by tempting it to react in ways that inspired the opposition that destroyed it. This lesson seems especially hard for Americans to comprehend. Americans see war in football terms: huddles to plan the next move; rapid, violent action; and measurable progress within a determined time frame. The terrorists’ paradigm is more like an ancient wrestling match: Without a clock, they grapple to obtain positional advantage and leverage, and then, with sudden movement, they try to get their opponent to lunge into a fall. Theirs is a contest that requires continual exertion, balance, and careful steps.

Whether from imitation or convenience, Osama Bin Laden has followed this course.³³ He announced, “One of the most important positive effects of our attacks on New York and Washington was to expose the reality of the struggle between the Crusaders and the Muslims, and to demonstrate the enormous hostility that the Crusaders feel towards us. The attacks revealed the American wolf in its true ugliness.”³⁴ Al Qaeda baited the Americans into lunging into Afghanistan and then

Ideological terrorists wage moral, not kinetic, wars. In this type of war, al Qaeda believes it enjoys tremendous advantages in conviction and faith. Bin Laden told al-Jazeera, "Based on the reports we received from our brothers who participated in the jihad in Somalia, we learned that they saw the weakness, frailty, and cowardice of U.S. troops." This perception encouraged al Qaeda to use a classic application of terrorism to bring the US into conflict on their terms in Afghanistan. When attacks on embassies and naval vessels failed to provoke the desired response, al Qaeda executed 9/11.

into Iraq. Al Qaeda lieutenant Ayman Zawahiri, noted "The Americans are facing a delicate situation in both countries. If they withdraw, they will lose everything, and if they stay, they will continue to bleed to death."⁵¹ Had US policymakers examined precedent, they might have taken their response to al Qaeda and developed a more comprehensive and successful strategy at a much earlier stage. A successful counterterrorism strategy must create and manipulate conditions designed to cause the terrorists to make their own fatal lunge.

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

US counterterrorism strategy is built on four "Ds": defeat, deny, diminish, and defend.³⁵ It defeats "terrorist organizations of global reach" by attacking "their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances." It denies state sponsorship and sanctuary and forces terrorists "to disperse and then attempt to reconsolidate

along regional lines to improve their communications and cooperation." US policies diminish the threats by working "with regional partners to implement a coordinated effort to squeeze, tighten, and isolate the terrorists." As outlined in the strategy document, "Once the regional campaign has localized the threat, we will help states develop the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary to finish the task." Finally, the strategy is designed to defend the United States and its interests. This strategy, however, omits one critical D: deterrence.

A Deterrence Strategy

The "4D" strategy focused on destroying "the lifeblood of terrorist groups" has "run aground."³⁶ Al Qaeda's protean nature enables it to absorb tremendous punishment and still grow back to functional size.³⁷ A counterterrorist strategy must change focus from the physical to the moral. Only a moral strategy can convince ideological terrorists that their efforts to meet their objectives are futile.

Deterrence begins in the temporal dimension of operations. By crafting steps to disrupt and deny all of the steps that terrorists must take to execute their attacks, a strategy can communicate the inevitability of failure and, thus, can undermine the terrorists' will to attack. The proposed new definition of terrorism includes four essential components: (1) the terrorists, (2) the communicated threat, (3) the desired response, and (4) the targeted audience.³⁸ An effective counterstrategy will seek (1) to undermine confidence in the terrorists and separate them from their cause, (2) to avert threats and undercut the terrorists' credibility, (3) to provide only undesirable responses, and (4) to inoculate the targeted audience from fear.

Undermine Confidence

It is essential that deterrent strategy portray terrorists as ineffective. Instead, the US Government frequently trumpets the dangers posed by al Qaeda: The July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) called them "the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland."³⁹ Such reports lack scale. Al Qaeda, on its best day, cannot mortally wound the United States.

What is needed is a portrait of al Qaeda's ineffectiveness. A report presented with all the solemnity of an NIE should be issued outlining al Qaeda's botched attempts, from the shoe bombers of 2002 to the 2007 airport attack in Glasgow, Scotland. Al Qaeda has been reduced to grasping blindly at the lowest hanging fruit. Like the PLO, al Qaeda gained support because it seemed to be effective in opposing the West. If al Qaeda is thought of as inept, that support will wane.

Revealing al Qaeda's ineffectiveness will likely revive latent rivalries challenging that organization. More importantly, al Qaeda's extremist ideology is at odds with the Shia denomination of Islam. Zawahiri was quoted in 2006 as saying, "Their [Shi'ites'] prior history in cooperating with the enemies of Islam is consistent with their current reality of connivance with the Crusaders."⁴⁰ Abu Sarhan, the leader of the Sunni Omar Brigade in Iraq, was quoted in 2007 as saying, "I have no hatred of Americans ... [but Shia] should be eliminated, to clear the society of them, because they are simply trash."⁴¹ Advertising such statements helps to isolate al Qaeda and prompt current supporters to question the organization's concept of a new caliphate.

Ideological terrorists are also vulnerable to hypocrisy.

threats, claims of success, and demands. By the law of compounding probabilities, decreasing the chance of successfully conducting two or more steps will exponentially decrease the chance of completing the entire process.

An effective deterrence strategy will undertake concurrent diplomatic efforts designed to reinforce antiterrorist attitudes and actions among the regional populations and governments. The United States has done well in tactically countering terrorist acts, but it has not combined these results with a full-spectrum, tailored, and coordinated information operations campaign that sends the message to the terrorists and their supporters that their operations are futile, counterproductive, and costly. A deterrence strategy must advertise the undesired

Bin Laden has repeatedly ignored respected interpretations of Islam and has even issued his own fatwahs. Such actions present opportunities to discredit him and his terrorism. A recent poll found that 75% of Muslims in Egypt, Pakistan, Morocco, and Indonesia now say attacks against civilians are un-Islamic.

Bin Laden's appeal among Muslims rests largely on his reputation for piety. He disavowed Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) terrorist acts against Muslim civilians.⁴² Later, he sponsored similar operations in Iraq, while lamenting: "Sometimes, alas, the death of innocents is unavoidable. Islam allows that."⁴³ He anointed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as "al Qaeda's Prince in Iraq," even as Zawahiri cautioned Zarqawi against "slaughtering" Muslims.⁴⁴

Bin Laden has repeatedly ignored respected interpretations of Islam and has even issued his own fatwahs, despite lacking the authority to do so. Such actions present opportunities to discredit him and his terrorism. A recent poll found that 75% of Muslims in Egypt, Pakistan, Morocco, and Indonesia now say attacks against civilians are un-Islamic.⁴⁵ Pew Research Center polls in Muslim countries have tracked a precipitous drop in respondents who have confidence that Bin Laden would "do the right thing regarding world affairs."⁴⁶

Disrupt the Terrorist Operational Cycle

To frustrate credible threats, a deterrence strategy requires tactics to disrupt and defeat each step in the terrorist operational cycle. Consider that terrorists must conduct reconnaissance, target selection, weapon acquisition, deployment, stationing, attack, and postoperations actions. They must also maintain their base; recruit and train agents; ensure command and control; and communicate the organization's ideology,

results of terrorism and publicize counterattacks on terrorists as the cost of association with extremists.

"Fear is the currency of terrorism," wrote Ian M. Cuthbertson in the Spring 2007 issue of the *World Policy Journal*.⁴⁷ Effort is needed not only to reassure allies but also to bolster the American public. National decisionmakers need to speak with one voice to create a popular immunity to coercive fear. Given the partisan nature of domestic politics, this might be the single most challenging dimension of a deterrent counterterrorism strategy.

Effective Deterrence Strategy in Action

An example of an effective counterterrorism deterrent strategy can be seen in the history of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Like al Qaeda, the PFLP was formed by a well-educated professional, Dr. George Habash, with a fanatical second-in-command, Dr. Wadi Haddad. Under the umbrella of the PLO, the PFLP competed for headlines and support. Habash and Haddad adopted a strategy of global terrorism guided by their adage, "To kill a Jew far from the battlefield has more effect than killing hundreds of Jews in battle."⁴⁸

In the late 1960s, the PFLP moved quickly from firebombing a Jewish-owned retail store in London to hijacking an Israeli passenger jet to force Israel to exchange 16 Palestinian prisoners for 12 hostages. When Israel increased security on El Al flights, the PFLP machine-gunned planes on runways in Athens, Greece, and Zurich, Switzerland. These acts only infuriated

European governments that were formerly sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. The PFLP changed tactics and hijacked an American flight from New York to Tel Aviv, Israel, and compelled Israel to free two captured Syrian pilots.⁴⁹ These acts established the PFLP's reputation as the most effective of the Palestinian resistance groups.

That reputation began to decline in 1970, when an Israeli agent foiled a PFLP hijacking of an El Al jetliner en

1972, the hijackers were met by one of many newly created special counterterrorist teams. Three months later, Israeli commandos disguised as mechanics stormed a PFLP-hijacked airliner, killing the hijackers and rescuing the passengers.⁵² In June 1976, the PFLP hijacked an Air France Airbus to Entebbe, Uganda, where a special Israeli force conducted an incredible long-distance, lightning assault that killed several hijackers (and 20 Ugandan troops) and freed the 103 hostages and crew.⁵³ These new countertactics encouraged normally supportive governments to shy away from the PFLP.


Although the PFLP was not a religious extremist organization, its example offers many lessons on deterrence. Effective countertactics undermined the publicized effectiveness of the organization and inspired the terrorists to make fatal lunges that, in turn, led to costly reprisals from local governments. This cycle diminished the status of the terrorists and created opportunities for other groups to assume leadership in their cause.

Conclusion

Nye wrote, "If a country can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes."⁵⁴ Only by erasing such resistance can US counterterrorist policies be effective.

A deterrence counter-terrorist strategy has inherent credible and ethical advantages. It abandons the definitions of "terrorism" that give rise to claims of Western double-standards. It does not rely primarily on popularly perceived unjust regional governments to "finish the task." Current strategy relying solely on physical destruction lacks credibility when terrorists find sanctuary in many countries where the United States will not employ military power and US military strikes elsewhere causes inevitable collateral damage that terrorists use to portray Americans as unethical and anti-Islamic. A deterrence strategy, on the other hand, emphasizes the moral operations to undermine confidence in terrorist organizations and their methods.

A deterrent counterterrorist strategy will take time to implement. In the *Art of War*, Sun Tzu warned, "All men can see the individual tactics necessary to conquer, but almost no one can see the strategy out of which total victory is evolved." Central coordination is needed to ensure that all operations contribute to convincing the terrorists that their efforts are in vain. Terrorists can be expected to adjust, so counterterrorist operations will require persistence in managing events to create conditions that encourage terrorists to make a fatal plunge that brings disastrous consequences. This approach is the next campaign in this war. Until it is begun, there can be no evolution toward total victory.



Flag of the PFLP

In June 1976, the PFLP hijacked an Air France Airbus to Entebbe, Uganda, where a special Israeli force conducted an incredible long-distance, lightning assault that killed several hijackers (and 20 Ugandan troops) and freed the 103 hostages and crew. These new countertactics encouraged normally supportive governments to shy away from the PFLP.

route from Tel Aviv to New York.⁵⁰ The PFLP responded with dramatic—but now eerily familiar—simultaneous hijackings of American, Swiss, and British passenger jets, which they took to Dawson Field in Jordan and blew up before the world's news cameras. This act proved to be the PFLP's fatal lunge. In what became known as "Black September," an irate King Hussein of Jordan unleashed his armored Bedouin brigades against refugee camps to drive the Palestinians out of Jordan.⁵¹ This undesired response rebounded badly for the PFLP. Arafat's followers immediately grabbed the spotlight by pointedly using Black September as their motivation for attacking the 1972 Munich Olympics.

When the PFLP hijacked a Lufthansa flight in February

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- 1 Gold-Biss, Michael. *The Discourse on Terrorism: Political Violence and the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, 1981–1986*. New York: Peter Lang, 1994. p. 11.
- 2 Grosscup, Beau. *Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment*. New York: Zed Books, 2006. p. 154.
- 3 Ahmad, Eqbal. *Terrorism: Theirs and Ours*. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001. p. 15.
- 4 Arnold, Terrell E. *The Violence Formula: Why People Lend Sympathy and Support to Terrorism*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988. p. 1.
- 5 Pillar, Paul R. *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. p. 23–24. See Pillar's argument for raising the profile of the cyberterrorist threat.
- 6 Gold-Biss, supra 1, p. 11. Gold-Biss explained the Western view that "Contemporary violence and legitimacy do not exist outside of the cognition of 'state' and 'society.' They also provide the foundation of the realist's understanding of the 'political,' or that which pertains to the modern state and its institutions."
- 7 Horgan, John. *The Psychology of Terrorism*. London: Routledge, 2005. p. 18. Horgan notes, "The violence committed by groups labeled terrorist is distinguished from 'ordinary' violence because of the political context to the activities and ideology of the perpetrators and (often) to the nature of the victims and the specific victimizing process."
- 8 Poland, James M. *Understanding Terrorism: Groups, Strategies, and Responses*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988. p. 10. Some attempt to define terrorism with the elastic concept of "political" or what Poland called "some vague political objective."
- 9 Webster's *Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language*. New York: Gramercy Books, 1996. p. 1,497.
- 10 Jamieson, Alison. "The Modern Mafia: Its Role and Record." In: *Terrorism and Drug Trafficking in the 1990s*. Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 1994. p. 47.
- 11 Wright, Lawrence. *The Looming Tower*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006. p. 120.
- 12 Laqueur, Walter. *The New Terrorism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. p. 130.
- 13 Wright, supra 11, p. 263.
- 14 Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare*. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1964. p. 39. Galula most effectively captured the qualification of terrorist activities as a tactic to raise awareness for a particular cause. The use of what he calls "blind terrorism," however, contrasts with my definition of terrorism in that such activities are not used to coerce a response through the creation of fear.
- 15 Scott, Winfield. *Infantry Tactics*. 1835. p. 1. Scott prefaced this manual with a much more useful definition taken from Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr von Bülow: "I call Strategy, the hostile movements of two armies, made beyond the view of each other, or—if it be preferred—beyond the effect of cannon. Tactics, I call, the science of movements which are made in the presence of the enemy, that is, within his view, and within the reach of his artillery."
- 16 O'Neill, Bard E. *Insurgency and Terrorism*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005. p. 33. In this it is distinguished from other strategies like guerilla warfare (to coerce by attrition) or conventional warfare (to coerce by destructive firepower and maneuver). O'Neill came closest to understanding terrorism as a strategy when he defined it as one of "three forms of warfare" associated with insurgent warfare.
- 17 "Transcript of President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Thursday Night, September 20, 2001." CNN, September 21, 2001. Available at: <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>
- 18 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003. p. 1.
- 19 Scheuer, Michael. *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006. p. xxiii.
- 20 CNN, supra 17.
- 21 US Government, supra 18.
- 22 O'Neill, supra 16, p. 15.
- 23 O'Neill, supra 16, p. 23.
- 24 See Galula, supra 14, p. 54.
- 25 "British Muslims Poll: Key Points," BBC News, January 29, 2007. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6309983.stm
- 26 Barnett, Robert W. *Asymmetrical Warfare*. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2003. p. 15. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff defines asymmetrical warfare as "Attempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent's strengths while exploiting his weakness using methods that differ significantly from the opponent's usual mode of operations."
- 27 Nye, Joseph S., Jr. "A North American Perspective." In: *Addressing the New International Terrorism, Report to the Trilateral Commission, 2003 Annual Meeting*. Washington, DC: Trilateral Commission, 2003. p. 10.
- 28 Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. p. 214. As Hoffman noted, "Al Qaeda, in fact, is unique among all terrorist groups in this respect: from the start its leadership seems to have intuitively grasped the enormous communicative power of the Internet and sought to harness this power both to further the movement's strategic aims and to facilitate its tactical operations."
- 29 Wright, supra 11, p. 189. He added, "Only eighteen U.S. troops were killed. Nonetheless, they fled in the heart of darkness, frustrated after they had caused great commotion about the New World Order."
- 30 MacKenzie, David. *The Black Hand on Trial*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995. p. 39–44. MacKenzie is clearly an expert on the Black Hand and paints a complex picture of the organization and its activities; however, his 1998 book, *The Exoneration of the Black Hand*, seems to indicate his sympathies for the Serbs.
- 31 Rapoport, David C. "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism." *Current History*, December 2001, p. 419–424.
- 32 Fromkin, David. *Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?* New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2005. p. 122. Some like MacKenzie (supra 20, p. 44) continue to debate the extent of the role of the Black Hand in the assassination, yet there is little doubt the revolutionaries of the Young Bosnians were influenced by the Black Hand through its members like Vladimir Gacinovic and Ljubomir Jovanovic-Cupa.
- 33 Shay, Shaul. *Islamic Terror and the Balkans*. London: Transaction Publishers, 2007. p. 45. We cannot be certain if Bin Laden observed the lesson of Princip, but he has no doubt studied Bosnian history. Shay notes, "The Muslim struggle for independence in Bosnia raised a considerable degree of interest among Muslims worldwide and stimulated the mobilization of countries, organizations, and individual volunteers."
- 34 Lawrence, Bruce, ed. *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*. London: Verso, 2005. p. 194.
- 35 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, supra 18, p. 11–12.
- 36 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, supra 18, p. 17.
- 37 Stern, Jessica. "The Protean Enemy." *Foreign Affairs*, July / August 2003.
- 38 Drake, C.J.M. *Terrorists' Target Selection*. London: Macmillan Press, 1998. p. 8. The targeted audience is not necessarily the same as the victims of the terrorists attack; Drake makes the distinction that

the victim is the physical target and the targeted audience is the “psychological” target.

39 National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to U.S. Homeland. National Intelligence Council, July 2007.

40 “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi.” GlobalSecurity.org, 2005. Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm

41 Partlow, Joshua. “Sunni Insurgent Leader Paints Iran as ‘Real Enemy.’” *Washington Post*, July 14, 2007, A13. He added, “The real enemy for the resistance is Iran and those working for Iran. Because Iran has a feud which goes back thousands of years with the people of Iraq and the government of Iraq.”

42 Chandler, Michael, and Rohan Gunaratna. *Countering Terrorism*. London: Reaktion Books, 2007. p. 61.

43 Scheuer, supra 19, p. 207.

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say they oppose Al Qaeda’s attacks on America; in Pakistan, 68 percent declined to answer this question, rendering it difficult to gauge attitudes there.”

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47 Cuthbertson, Ian M. “A Rose by Any Other Name.” *World Policy Journal*, Spring 2007, p. 51.

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49 Taillon, J. Paul de B. *Hijacking and Hostages: Government Responses to Terrorism*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 2002. p. 22.

50 Katz, Samuel M. *Israel vs. Jabril: The Thirty Year War Against a Master Terrorist*. New York: Paragon House, 1993. p. 24.

51 O’Neill, supra 16, p. 127.

52 Katz, supra 50, p. 23.

53 Stevenson, William. *Ninety Minutes at Entebbe*. New York: Bantam Books, 1976.

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MARITIME SECURITY: PIRACY

Lawlessness in Somalia revives an age-old problem

Interview with Captain Gordan E. Van Hook, USN (Ret.), lead up article by J-34 staff

The fundamental issues and problems surrounding maritime security make piracy as difficult to stamp out today as it was in the 1780s.

Piracy is back in the headlines. Although piracy has not been a problem for the United States in modern times, it is by no means a new problem. The infamous Barbary pirates of North Africa plagued international shipping in the Mediterranean in the late 1700s and early 1800s, and conflicts with them were among the first that America fought overseas. North Africa is back in the headlines today with pirates infesting the waters off the Horn of Africa. A US Navy SEAL team on the USS BAINBRIDGE rescued the MAERSK ALABAMA's captain, who had been held hostage by pirates for 5 days. The fundamental issues and problems surrounding maritime security have changed little in some respects, and piracy remains as difficult to stamp out today as it was in the 1780s.

"To the Shores of Tripoli"

During the 1700s Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli were the largest of the corsair states along the Barbary Coast of northern Africa and were nominally under the control of the Ottoman Empire. Thomas Jefferson argued for a military solution, whereas John Adams felt accommodation would be a less costly course of action, stating, "We ought not fight them at all, unless we intend to fight them forever."¹ As it turned out, both paths were pursued. For more than 30 years, from the 1780s through 1815, the United States and the various Ottoman corsairs of the Barbary Coast would find themselves in a series of conflicts.

Accommodation had generally been the European approach, paying off the pirate lords with tribute and buying “passes” for their maritime vessels to transit nearby waters safely. The pirate states were powerful enough to deter any serious invasion, and they managed to take billions in revenue and nearly 1 million Europeans as slaves during the heyday of piracy from 1500 to 1800.² Accommodation had its price, a cost which constantly increased, according to the whims of the pirate lords in the “Wild West” of the Ottoman Empire. Agreements with the Barbary pirates were constantly modified, terms were changed constantly, treaties were routinely broken, and hoped-for stability was fleeting.

Ultimately, the humiliations and economic costs proved to be too high. The constant increase in demands for tribute, the seizure of US merchant vessels, and the enslavement of American crews resulted in both skyrocketing insurance rates, which affected international trade, and political outrage among Americans. The United States began a series of engagements with the Barbary pirates, and both the Americans and, eventually, the Europeans confronted the Ottoman corsairs militarily, at sea and on the ground. As the French and other Mediterranean powers began to expand their sphere of influence and to settle North Africa, the threat of piracy from the Barbary Coast receded.

International Trade and Piracy

For centuries, the sea has provided the fastest, most secure way to transport large quantities of goods. Today, containerized transport is the core global supply chain for international trade and the increasingly interconnected global economy. This makes security along the high-traffic choke points of the global supply chain high on the list of US strategic interests. It is along the modern day “Silk Road” of the sea, where these shipping lanes begin to narrow and where political stability is absent,

A note on the history of the US military’s struggle with piracy

Algiers, 1800. Captain William Bainbridge sailed the small sloop the USS *GEORGE WASHINGTON* into the harbor in Algiers. Captain Bainbridge was bringing tribute to the Barbary pirates, but after delivering his tribute, the dey (ruler) of Algiers informed Bainbridge that the terms had changed. He ordered the US captain to ferry the Algerian envoy to Istanbul along with the Ottoman sultan’s annual tribute. The tribute included \$800,000 in gold; 100 slaves; 60 concubines for the royal harem; and numerous lions, elephants, ostriches, and other exotic animals. Even worse, Bainbridge was ordered to sail under the Algerian flag. Bainbridge reluctantly acquiesced to keep the dey from seizing his ship and enslaving his crew. This incident convinced the US Congress of the need for a standing Navy and turned public opinion in favor of fighting the Barbary States.

that pirates thrive. Piracy is still commonplace in many parts of the world and becomes strategically significant when it occurs along major choke points. The Horn of Africa and the Straits of Malacca represent two areas where piracy has been a significant and enduring problem. Piracy, driven by economic considerations, is not the only threat to maritime security. Some recent incidents labeled as “piracy” are largely political in nature (rather than economic), like the recent seizure of oil tankers off the coast of Nigeria. Terrorists also target maritime shipping, primarily for political and ideological reasons rather than economic ones. Understanding the root cause of maritime security events is critical to finding effective long-term solutions, whether the cause is economic instability, ethnic conflict,

or religious extremism.

US strategic interests lie in upholding the principle of freedom of navigation, but it is not a responsibility that should lie solely on the shoulders of the United States. Just as the benefits of secure shipping lines are shared, so should the responsibility be shared for maintaining that security. The United States cannot police the entire globe with less than 300 vessels, and having a billion-dollar destroyer escort is not the most cost-effective strategy. Over 20,000 vessels transit the Gulf of Aden annually, some of which must pay “war risk insurance” costing an estimated \$10,000–\$20,000 per trip. Nevertheless, piracy is not the primary threat to the health of international shipping. Indeed, most larger container ships are generally quite safe from hijacking at sea because their sheer size prevents smaller vessels from being able to board them. It is the medium- to small-sized vessels that make the most tempting targets. Properly assessing the threat and managing risk within a resource-constrained environment is always critical to avoid making the solution more costly than the problem.



Gulf of Aden

The most dangerous route. 20,000 oil tankers, freighters, and merchant vessels transit these waters each year, including 11% of the world's seaborne petroleum. The area off the Horn of Africa is over 2.5 million nautical square miles, and is patrolled by just 25 international naval vessels: approximately one ship for every 100,000 square miles.

Horn of Africa: Epicenter of Piracy

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous neighborhood where piracy thrives on the combination of lawlessness and extreme poverty. The aptly named Bab al-Mandab or "Gate of Tears" is the choke point separating the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean from the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The sheer volume of lucrative international trade concentrated within striking distance of impoverished Somalis is too tempting a target for many. Weak or failing

Yet, there is a lack of international consensus on how to deal effectively with development and a lack of will to move forward in areas of agreement. Vast amounts of money, resources, and effort have not had any lasting impact.

Other security threats also thrive in this ungoverned space. The region is home to two major strongholds of radical Islamists with strong al Qaeda-affiliated groups active in Yemen and Somalia. Seaborne improvised explosive device attacks have also been used against Western targets by terrorists in the past, including the failed attack on the USS SULLIVANS (the raft was overloaded with explosives and capsized and sank before reaching its target) and the successful attacks on the USS COLE in the port of Aden and the French supertanker M/V LIMBURG off the coast of Yemen.

MAERSK ALABAMA

Although piracy is generally economic and, thus, is not classified as terrorism, the attack on the M/V MAERSK ALABAMA illustrates several important maritime security principles and hostage survival strategies. Additionally, the attack demonstrates the current volatility in a region that DOD personnel commonly transit or deploy. According to Maersk Senior Vice President Steven Carmel in a recent speech, there was a model in which "no one gets hurt, nothing gets damaged, pirates get a ransom, and the ship and crew get returned. That model has recently been subject to extensive criticism, but in the end, given the circumstances, it is the model the industry got pushed in to. ALABAMA

More aircraft, both ship- and shore-based, would expand the reach of naval patrols. The USS BAINBRIDGE relied on a ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles and a shore-based P-3C Orion to maintain target intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance during the hostage crisis.

states that are unable to control large swaths of their territory, both on land and at sea, make the pirates' risk of being caught slim. Thousands of merchant vessels carry billions in cargo each month just a few miles off the coast, and impoverished Somalis living on less than \$2 per day find the risk of piracy well worth it.³ Piracy off the Horn of Africa is almost exclusively related to the failure of Somalia as a state, with chronic instability and lack of governance allowing for few economic opportunities.

changed all that, not just for the United States, but also for the international community."⁴

The Tipping Point

Much like the incident with Captain William Bainbridge in 1800, the current impact of piracy has galvanized national and international opinion on the need for action off the Horn of Africa. The Bahrain-based Combined

Task Force (CTF) 151 was established to prevent and deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden. CTF 151 assembles and deploys aboard amphibious transport ships like the USS SAN ANTONIO (LPD 17) in support of counterpiracy operations. Capabilities include a helicopter squadron, a fleet surgical team, boarding teams, and several elements from the US Marine Corps and the US Coast Guard (USCG). Internationally, US efforts focus on bringing in more navies to help solve this pressing security problem. The establishment of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) with vessels from more than 20 different countries is part of the multinational US approach.

Solutions

Numerous solutions to mitigate the risk of piracy are being pursued and include both offensive and defensive perspectives. Short-term measures to counter piracy include increasing the number of “cops on the beat” with increased naval presence, convoys, and establishment of counterpiracy reaction forces. Crafting an effective legal framework that allows suspected pirates to be tried and held accountable for their actions will also serve as a deterrent.

The shipping industry has responded quickly to the increased threat and is sharing best practices. Commercial shipping vessels operating in high-risk areas are utilizing more effective training and intelligence; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); convoys; nonlethal defensive weapons; and larger, faster ships. The commercial shipping industry develops and shares best practices that prevent pirates from successfully boarding vessels. Effective TTPs include increasing speed, making sharp changes in direction, heading for rougher seas, sealing up the ship, and using water hoses to making boarding difficult.

Seapower, New Tactics, or Weather?

The response to the spike in piracy has apparently had some impact in lowering the number of successfully pirated vessels. The USS GETTYSBURG, for example, has participated in counter-piracy operations as part of CTF 151 since early April 2009. The USS GETTYSBURG deployed with a visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) team along with members of the USCG’s legal detachment and captured the first and only pirate mothership taken by coalition forces. In less than 3 months, the crew conducted several boardings, captured 17 suspected pirates, and confiscated more than a dozen assault rifles and a number of rocket-propelled grenades, ladders, and grappling hooks used to attack merchant vessels. Additionally, speed, maneuvers, and nonkinetic defensive measures that increase the difficulty pirates have in boarding a vessel have been quite effective.



Collecting evidence. The Maersk Alabama life raft is hoisted aboard the USS BAINBRIDGE to be used as evidence in the trial of the lone surviving pirate. Abdel Abukadir Muse is the first suspect tried for piracy in the United States since the Civil War in 1861. In that case, the jury declared itself deadlocked and the Union government held the men as prisoners of war.

According to Carmel, in a 6-week period at the height of the pirate attacks during the spring of 2009, there were only four successful piracy attacks—a significant drop of between 60% and 80%.

Others attribute the decrease in pirate activity not so much to the more aggressive posture being taken by the US Navy and other naval forces but rather to the monsoon season, which makes seas too rough for the smaller pirate/fishing vessels to operate successfully.

Nevertheless, the drop in the number of pirate attacks is expected to change. Pirates will adapt, weather will improve, and the economic conditions driving piracy remain unchanged. Hard numbers are difficult to come by, and it remains unclear how much piracy has actually affected shipping costs and how effective the counter-piracy effort has been. The costs of rerouting shipping to longer routes, ransom payoffs, higher insurance premiums, and more training and security are not necessarily available. The lawlessness emanating from the shore has been partially contained, but until the situation in Somalia is improved, there will be no permanent solution to the problem of piracy. Seapower can contain but not solve this land-based problem.

INTERVIEW:

Captain Gordan Van Hook, US Navy (Ret.)

The following are excerpts from a *Guardian* interview with retired US Navy Captain Gordan E. Van Hook, the Senior Director for Innovation & Concept Development of Maersk, Line Limited (MLL). Captain Van Hook's background gives him a unique perspective on the current state of maritime security and the rise in piracy off the coast of Somalia. MLL is the American subsidiary of the Danish A.P. Moller-Maersk Group. MLL is based in Norfolk, Virginia, and provides US-flagged transportation, ship management, and technical services to US government and commercial customers.

Q. How has the recent rise in piracy affected the operations of commercial shipping companies?

A: Contrary to popular perception, piracy is not a recent phenomenon and has stubbornly persisted in unstable regions with high levels of shipping traffic, like the Straits of Malacca and the Horn of Africa. Although piracy has

been portrayed as a crisis that just erupted, piracy is and remains a long-term challenge with long-term solutions. Maersk continues to operate along these routes in the Gulf of Aden, which is sandwiched between the largely ungoverned back country of Yemen to the north and the Somali pirate havens to the south. Cargo carried by US-flagged vessels off East Africa is primarily food aid and development supplies for the US Department of State. MLL has adapted to the changing threat environment and has taken steps to increase the awareness of US-flagged vessels. US-flagged vessels could be higher profile targets, and briefing crews on the local threat environment and effective TTPs when faced with a pirate attack is now a standard practice. Convoys were previously arranged by the French naval commander in Djibouti (ALINDIEN), but are now largely coordinated by the European Union's Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) located in Northwood, UK, and they leave at regular intervals from Djibouti, escorted by naval vessels. Even so, it is here that the highest concentration of pirate attacks and successful hijackings has occurred.

Q: Are there certain types or classes of vessels that are more vulnerable to piracy?

A: Higher-risk vessels tend to be older, smaller vessels termed "low and slow." Maersk requires any vessels operating in the "threat window" to be able to maintain a minimum sustained speed of 15 knots or no less than 8 meters of freeboard (the distance between the main deck and sea level). Vessels usually speed up in high-risk areas, especially between Salalah, Oman and Djibouti. For example, the MAERSK ALABAMA usually averages 15–17 knots when transiting to Mombasa, Kenya. MLL now relies entirely on their "G-Class" vessels to transit the Gulf of Aden. These are newer ships that are larger and faster, most averaging 24 knots and having 10–15 meters of freeboard.

Typical pirate skiff vs. average bulk carrier traveling around the Horn of Africa⁵





While size and speed do not preclude attacks by pirates, they greatly increase the difficulty of a successful seizure. A number of larger Maersk vessels have been attacked, but none has ever been successfully taken. They are simply too big for small bands of pirates in small fishing vessels to successfully assault.

Q: So piracy is primarily limited to “low and slow” vessels?

A: Size and speed do not necessarily deter pirates from attacking or preclude them from successfully seizing a vessel. MAERSK ALABAMA, for example, was successfully boarded at 18 knots with 8 meters of freeboard and was 200 nautical miles out to sea. Size and speed do make the odds of a successful seizure smaller though.

Prior to the upturn in piracy, one of the primary security issues plaguing cargo vessels operating on the coast of Africa was stowaways. Most of these people are desperate, and some can be dangerous. Stowaways are costly in both time and resources because they must be cared for when found, and then guarded. If not found, they could damage the ship or its cargo. Insurance companies use the number of stowaway incidents as an indicator of weak security plans and standards, which result in higher insurance rates. It should be noted that the only reason that US-flagged vessels are operating in these high-risk waters, is to carry US preference cargo. US government cargo by law requires a US-flagged vessel to carry it (with crews of American citizens). Other than

US government contracts, which require the use of US-flagged vessels, most US-flagged vessels are priced out of the international market due to high labor costs and stringent regulatory standards.

Q: Over the past year, there has been a public debate about the merits of arming merchant vessels in response to the piracy off the coast of Somalia, due in part to significant resistance in international legal circles to the idea of arming merchant vessels or to allowing security teams in foreign ports. At the same time, the US government is considering requiring all US-flagged vessels transiting the Horn of Africa area to have armed security teams on board. What is your view of this debate?

A: Maritime security laws allow vessels to take all reasonable measures in self-defense, and nonlethal defensive security technologies are generally well accepted in the commercial maritime industry. Vessels leased to the US government to carry US government cargo could fall under the Cummings Amendment, which has passed the House, and if passed by the Senate could mandate that US military embarked security teams (ESTs) be present on US flagged vessels carrying US government cargo. MLL currently operates and manages a number of Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels known as “gray hulls” that routinely embark ESTs, but these teams do not routinely embark MLL vessels

that are independently chartered by the Department of State to carry USAID and other nongovernmental charitable organizations' cargo. From the perspective of maritime industry, the debate on arming merchant vessels is a complex issue involving the legality, liability, and effectiveness of who should or could be armed. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United

as low as four per EST, the numbers would likely prove to be very small and far more cost-effective. However, in the end, while such measures would protect US-flagged vessels, they are mere band-aids and are not really addressing the root of the problem, which is the failure of Somalia as a state.

For any long-term solution, the international community must understand the geopolitical environment in this region that enables piracy to flourish. Until the economy and the rule of law in Somalia improves, there will be no long-term fix to piracy off the Horn of Africa.


Nations body for overseeing safety and security at sea, opposes arming merchant vessels. Most commercial maritime companies oppose arming merchant crews, but there is a division within the industry on the utility of contracted armed security teams. If a company is to use a private security team, there are questions as to who will train and certify such teams and what the rules of engagement (ROE) are under which they will operate. Do they have autonomy or do they answer to the master, and who bears the responsibility, accountability, and ultimately the legal liability? Add to this uncertainty the extreme variability of the quality of many of these teams. Some companies have resorted to employing armed gangs, not far removed from the pirates. A uniformly high end group with a special forces pedigree can offer a full spectrum risk assessment and crew training in addition to highly capable and disciplined armed response, but then it is less a potential legal problem, but more of a cost issue. With labor being the primary cost for a US-flagged vessel, hiring heavily armed, professional maritime security teams for each vessel, similar to a US government air marshal program, could be extremely expensive. Applying risk management principles is therefore very important: Does the risk warrant the drastic increase in operational costs? The total number of US-flagged vessels in the high-risk area at any one time is usually only between six and seven. If US military ESTs were embarked on only the high-risk vessels, in numbers

Q: Given the current security situation, are there any additional actions that could be taken by major powers and/or the international community to mitigate this problem?

A: A number of steps have already been taken by the United States and other naval powers as well as by the commercial maritime industry in response to the instability off the Horn of Africa. Among the short-term measures to address piracy, two basic approaches have been taken: (1) increasing the number of "cops on the beat," with naval forces from the European Union, India, Russia, Japan, the United States, and many others to patrol the area, and (2) increasing security measures for commercial vessels.

However, it must be remembered that the cost of stationing several US naval destroyers off the Horn of Africa is not insignificant. Chasing pirates in small fishing skiffs is not the most efficient use of a billion-dollar destroyer. Given the shrinking size of the US Navy and other global responsibilities and the indefinite and expanding nature of this shore-based problem, other options should be considered. One suggestion to increase the effectiveness of maritime patrols is to increase the use of helicopters and smaller "brown-water" and coastal patrol boats operating from persistent sea bases off

Attempted and actual attacks, 2003–2007 vs. 2008⁷



***An estimated \$25 million to \$30 million was paid in ransom to Somali pirates in 2008.**

known pirate havens such as Eyl. Already, there have been efforts to examine establishing and strengthening a more effective Somali coast guard aimed at fighting piracy. The EU and NATO have already conducted combined operations with such forces. Persistent sea bases operating off the coast could aid in containing piracy while building the capacity of indigent forces to secure their own coastline. Many of the principles of irregular warfare that we have learned in Afghanistan and Iraq apply in the maritime environment off of Somalia. It would also do well to study our success in the Philippines, using USNS Stockham as a seabase for Special Operating Forces (SOF) as an example of irregular warfare in the maritime environment.

The maritime industry has adopted the use of anti-piracy TTPs (convoys, speed, and maneuvers), known as best management procedures (BMPs) in the industry, that include additional training, better sensors, operating larger ships through high-risk areas, nonlethal/defensive weaponry, and situational awareness briefings for crews. This approach has probably had an effect on the drop in the rates of successful pirate seizures.

The bottom line remains the same. For any long-term solution, the international community and the

US government must understand the geopolitical environment in this region that enables piracy to flourish. Until the economy and the rule of law in Somalia improves, there will be no long-term fix to piracy off the Horn of Africa.

- 1 Boot, Max. *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars And The Rise Of American Power*. New York, NY: Basic Books; 2002. p. 9–14.
- 2 Davies, Rees. "British Slaves on the Barbary Coast." BBC, July 1, 2003. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/white_slaves_02.shtml
- 3 Annual gross domestic product per capita is \$600 (2008 estimate). *CIA World Factbook*. Somalia: Economy. Updated September 22, 2009. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html>
- 4 Remarks by Stephen M. Carmel, Senior Vice President, Maritime Services, Maersk Line Limited, at the USNI/AFCEA Joint War Fighting Conference, Virginia Beach, Virginia, May 14, 2009.
- 5 Information from a report entitled "Piracy: An Ancient Risk with Modern Faces," 2009 by Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty AG.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Ibid.

LEVEL I ANTITERRORISM TRAINING UPDATE



OCTOBER 2010
CURRENTLY 1.3 MILLION USERS A YEAR
OVER 8 MILLION TRAINED SINCE 2001

The Joint Staff, J-34, in coordination with the Services and Combatant Commands, is updating the online Antiterrorism (AT) Level I training application located at <https://atlevel1.dtic.mil/at/>.

The new content ready for release includes:

- terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures
- evolving antiterrorism best practices
- content tailored to operating environment
- exportable versions capable of being hosted by DOD organizations within in their own Learning Management Systems

EVENT: Somalia – Struggle for Mogadishu

Al-Shabaab Transitional Federal Government (TFG)

200,000 Internally Displaced

\$137 million emergency food and non-food assistance to date in FY10

500,000 Somalis refugees

43% Somali population of Somalia reliant on humanitarian assistance

\$135 million Training Supplies Burundian and Ugandan forces

Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State | Senate Testimony | 20 May 2009

Per capita income in Somalia (2008): \$600

Total GDP 2008: \$5.575 billion

According to the World Bank, as much as 73% of the Somali population lives on a daily income below \$2.

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE:

MOGADISHU, SOMALIA—In May 2009, al-Shabaab, the Somali al Qaeda-affiliated radical Islamist group—along with allied group Hizbul Islam—launched a major offensive attempting to reestablish control over the capital Mogadishu. Hundreds were left killed and and wounded with upwards of 200,000 internally displaced in Mogadishu during this campaign. More recently, the Transitional Federal Government claims the recent success over al-Shabaab Islamist rebels during the latest round of fighting.

Despite the success in 2008 in crushing the Islamist Union of Islamic Courts and presence of nearly 4,000 African Union peacekeepers, regional instability continued. Somalia continues to be a breeding ground for jihadist training camps, piracy, and chronic corruption. Al-Shabaab is part of a new front in global jihad, controlling much of southern Somalia and parts of Mogadishu. Nearly 35% of the population is dependent on foreign food aid in 2008 (World Bank) with famine regularly used as a weapon by rival clans.

Al-Shabaab's strength has been augmented with foreign jihadis adding to the Somali group's strength. Pakistani and Arab jihadis have been assisting local Islamist warlords and militias. A small number of senior Al-Qaeda operatives work closely with al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia, where they enjoy safe haven. Evidence of an al-Qaeda presence in Somali includes a video distributed in 2008 by East Africa Al-Qaeda operative Saleh Al-Nabhan showing training camp activity in Somalia and inviting foreigners to travel there for training. Advanced training for Somali Islamists has also been provided by Hezbollah in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Eritrea is also supporting these extremist elements, supplying weapons and munitions to extremists and terrorist elements hoping to destabilize Ethiopia's Eastern border.

QUOTES:

"We want to inform Bush and our rivals about our real intentions. We will establish Islamic rule from Alaska and Chile to South Africa, and from Japan to Russia. Beware, we are coming."

—Ibrahim Al-Maqdasi, Al-Shabaab
Al-Jazeera TV Broadcast
20 December 2008

"I say to my brothers, the Lions of Islam in Somalia: Rejoice in your victory! As America licks its wounds in Iraq, and Ethiopia is looking for a way out, do not lay down your weapons before the mujahideen state of Islam and monotheism is established in Somalia!"

—Ayman Zawahiri, Al Qaeda
Al-Jazeera TV Broadcast
20 December 2008

"We are happy to terrorize the enemy of God. Ensuring that the Ethiopians and Ugandans get no sleep in Somalia is an act of worship for us. We are happy whenever we attack them. It takes us closer to our Lord. America is the terrorist. We were attacked in our own country. America is encouraging aggression in our own country."

—Sheikh Muqtar Robow, Al-Shabaab Spokesman
Al-Jazeera TV International (Qatar)
4 January 2009

EVENT: India – Mumbai Attacks

Mumbai Attacks from 26–29 November 2008:

10 Islamist terrorists: 9 killed, 1 captured

164 dead

240 wounded

60 hours of gun battles, bombings, and hostage crisis

Lashkar-e-Taiba | *Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)*

Mumbai Targets:

Taj Mahal Hotel

Oberoi Trident Hotel

CST Rail Terminal

Mumbai Harbor

Metro Cinema

Leopold Café

Nariman Jewish Center

Cama, Albess Hostipal

St. Xavier College

Times of India

"Lessons of Mumbai" | *RAND* | 2009

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE:

MUMBAI, INDIA—After killing the crew of the hijacked Indian fishing vessel the evening of 26 November 2008, ten terrorists made their way ashore in two rafts and began a series of terror attacks over the next 60 hours. The terrorists were well-armed and had detailed maps and information about each of the targets they hit. The attack was sequential and highly mobile with four teams coordinating their attacks at several locations simultaneously. The jihadis combined armed assaults, carjackings, drive-by shootings, prefabricated IEDs, targeted killings including policemen and foreigners, building takeovers, and barricade and hostage situations, leaving 164 dead and 240 wounded.

Mumbai demonstrated the ability of small teams of gunmen to effectively terrorize soft targets. The attacks exposed key weaknesses in India's counterterrorism and threat-mitigation training crisis response structure, including gaps in coastal surveillance, inadequate "target hardening," incomplete execution of response protocols, response timing problems, inadequate counterterrorism training and equipment for the local police, limitations of municipal fire and emergency services, flawed hostage-rescue plans, and poor strategic communications and information management. Radicalized local nationals also likely had an important role in facilitating this successful mass casualty attack.

Mumbai has a high level of international visibility as the financial and entertainment center of India. Targets here were all "soft" targets carefully chosen for their religious, political, and cultural value in order to maximize the psychological impact of the attacks. Mumbai underscored the need to address transnational sources of Islamist terrorism. The Mumbai terrorists received training and support from the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, an officially banned Islamist terrorist group with connections to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. The brutal Mumbai killings, along with the assassinations of Benazir Butto and the Sri Lankan Cricket Team, were part of a chain of incidents that prompted Pakistan to crack down on Islamic militancy.

QUOTES:

"In the CST [Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus rail station], Abu Ismail and I started firing at the public there with our AK-47 rifles. Ismail was throwing grenades also... The police caught up with us at the time and started firing at us. We retaliated. ...I fired at the police.... I would rather be judged here on earth than in heaven by Allah."

— Mohammad Ajmal Amir Qasab
Mumbai Trial Testimony
24 July 2009

"India will continue to face a serious jihadist threat from Pakistan-based terrorist groups, and neither Indian nor U.S. policy is likely to reduce that threat in the near future. Other extremist groups in Pakistan likely will find inspiration in the Mumbai attacks, and we can expect more attacks with high body counts and symbolic targets."

— Angel Rabasa, Senior Analyst, RAND
June 2009

"The Mumbai attack reflected precise planning, detailed reconnaissance, and thorough preparation, both physical and mental. It relied on surprise, creating confusion and overwhelming the ability of the authorities to respond."

— Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Vice President, RAND
16 January 2009

Additional Resources

Websites

If you have a Website you would like posted, please contact guardian@js.pentagon.mil

NAVY AT/FP PROGRAM

https://portal.navfac.navy.mil/portal/page?_pageid=181,5560913,181_5560927&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL

ASD (SO/LIC&IC)

ASD (HD&ASA)

http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/hd/index.html

USMC AT/FP PROGRAM

<http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/pp&o/PS/psfp/psfpHome.asp>

US ARMY AT/FP PROGRAM

<http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regs/r525-13.htm>

USAF AT/FP PROGRAM

<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI10-245.pdf>

WEST POINT COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER

<http://www.ctc.usma.edu/>

ARMY KNOWLEDGE ONLINE (AKO)

<https://www.us.army.mil>

FPED

<http://www.fped7.org>

TECHNICAL SUPPORT WORKING GROUPS (TSWG)

<http://www.tswg.gov>

LEVEL I AT TRAINING

<https://atlevel1.dtic.mil/at>

FEMA

<http://www.fema.gov>

DHS

<http://www.dhs.gov>

RAND CORP

http://www.rand.org/research_areas/terrorism/

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE/PUBLICATIONS

<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/index.html>

DOD DIRECTIVES/INSTRUCTIONS

<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives>

PSEAG (CAC REQUIRED)

<https://fppscop.spawar.navy.mil/forum/zone1/dispatch.cgi>

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)

<http://www.gao.gov>



The Joint Staff DDAT/HD Deputy Directorate for Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense will host the next Level IV Antiterrorism (AT) Executive Seminar from 26–28 January 2010, in the Washington, DC area.

The Level IV AT Seminar provides senior military and civilian leaders focused updates, detailed briefings, and AT war games. The training is designed to accommodate the perspective and decisionmaking considerations of senior leaders—O–6 to O–8—and civilian equivalent. It targets senior leaders, commanders, and staff personnel responsible for AT program policy, planning, and implementation, including those who have operational responsibilities for Force Protection.

This two-and-a-half day seminar features speakers who are renowned as subject matter experts. The agenda includes:

- CJCS address and Joint Staff J-3 address
- Intelligence integration
- Service AT program updates
- Interagency AT coordination
- The terrorist profile, tactics, targets, training, and equipment
- Biological and chemical weapons
- International AT perspective
- AT and terrorism consequence management table top exercises
- AT policy and technology updates

Individuals wishing to attend should contact their Service, Combatant Command, or DOD Agency Level IV representatives. The assigned Combatant Command, Service, and NGB representatives will submit nominations for allocated slots to DDAT/HD. DOD Agency individuals interested in attending should contact DDAT/HD directly.

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