



NEWSLETTER



NO. 10-51

JUL 10



Multinational Integration

Observations, Insights, and Lessons

Approved for Public Release,
Distribution Unlimited

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE JUL 2010		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2010 to 00-00-2010	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Newsletter. No. 10-51, July 2010. Multinational Integration				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Center for Army Lessons Learned, 10 Meade Ave., Bldg. 50, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 66027-1350				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 190	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

Multinational Integration	
Table of Contents	
Introduction	1
Chapter 1 - Global Environment and Challenges	3
Future Strategic Environment in an Era of Persistent Conflict <i>MAJ Paul S. Oh, U.S. Army</i>	3
The Struggle Against Global Insurgency <i>Dr. Daniel G. Cox</i>	19
Eliminating High Seas Piracy: Legal and Policy Considerations <i>James P. Terry</i>	27
China's New Security Strategy for Africa <i>Jonathan Holslog</i>	33
Chapter 2 - USAFRICOM	45
Overview/Operations of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) <i>LTC Leda Rozier</i>	45
U.S. Army Africa: A Team Like No Other <i>MG William B. Garrett III</i>	53
Exercise in Africa Breaks Many Molds <i>Rita Boland</i>	57
The Battlefield Surveillance Brigade as a Joint and Multinational Task Force Headquarters: 560th BFSB Lessons from Exercise Natural Fire 10 in Uganda <i>COL Peter C. VanAmburgh</i>	61

Chapter 3 - USCENTCOM	67
Operational Design for ISAF in Afghanistan: A Primer <i>Julian D. Alford and Scott A. Cuomo</i>	67
The Use of Airpower in Combating Terrorism in Iraq <i>Staff Maj Gen Qaa'id K. M. Al-Khuzaa'i, Iraqi Air Force</i>	77
Predator Command and Control: An Italian Perspective <i>Colonel Ludovico Chianese, Italian Air Force</i>	85
Chapter 4 - USEUCOM	99
USAREUR: Building Partner Capacity for the Future <i>GEN Carter F. Ham, Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army</i>	99
Strengthening the Bridge: Building Partnership Capacity <i>ADM James G. Stavridis, U.S. Navy; and COL Bart Howard, U.S. Army</i>	103
Chapter 5 - USNORTHCOM	109
The Future of Warfare: Canadian Counterinsurgency Manual Reflects US-Canada "Synergy" <i>Anthony Fenton</i>	109
The Enduring Value of NORAD <i>Gen. Victor E. Renuart Jr. USAF</i>	113
Chapter 6 - USPACOM	121
U.S.-Vietnam Defense Relations: Deepening Ties, Adding Relevance <i>Lewis M. Stern</i>	121
Unlocking Russian Interests on the Korean Peninsula <i>Major John W. Bauer</i>	133

Fires in the Pacific's Theater Security Cooperation Plan <i>COL Jack K. Pritchard</i>	141
Chapter 7 - USSOUTHCOM	145
Time to Improve: U.S. Defense Structure for the Western Hemisphere <i>Dr. Craig A. Deare</i>	145
Islamic Terrorist Activities in Latin America: Why the Region and the US Should be Concerned <i>Renee Novakoff</i>	157
War Without Borders: The Ecuador-Colombia Crisis of 2008 and Inter-American Security <i>Dr. Gabriel Marcella</i>	167

Center for Army Lessons Learned	
Director	Colonel Thomas Joseph Murphy
Division Chief	Larry Hollars
CALL Analyst	Kevin Makel
Production Coordinator/Editor	Joey Studnicka
Graphic Artist	Dan Neal
Distribution Manager	Candice Miller

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.

Introduction

The following collection of articles and reports are focused on multinational training and operations. The articles are categorized in the following areas of interest: global environment and strategic challenges; and the geographic Combatant Commands: USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and USSOUTHCOM. In a complex and changing world with enduring and emerging challenges, this newsletter cover a range of issues relating multinational training and operations, the strategic environment, and challenges of each geographic area. The articles should not be considered as all-inclusive or as a complete guide to each region. In some instances, the information may be slightly dated, or opinions and conclusions of the author(s), but it is our determination that many of the thoughts, lessons, and insights are valid and enduring.

Each article, representing only a small diverse slice, was selected to highlight an aspect of a Combatant Command area of responsibility, and give a thought-provoking perspective to each region and an understanding of the activities and challenges taking place there. In many instances, the ideas presented in these articles are personal opinion, and in some cases, are not approved the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Army.

Any recommendations in these articles should always be validated with the latest approved U.S. government policies and U.S. Army and joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

This newsletter is an effort to capture relevant articles published in recent professional journals and, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) archives to provide a historical document for future reference. CALL acknowledges and thanks the professional journals and authors who permitted the reproduction of these articles and, in some instances, were personally involved in assisting CALL in the formatting process.

CALL editors note: Minor modifications to format were made by CALL editors to support the CALL newsletter format. In some instances, pictures that were not referenced in the narrative were deleted to save space. Every effort has been made to give appropriate credit to the author(s) and professional journals.

Chapter 1 - Global Environment and Challenges

Future Strategic Environment in an Era of Persistent Conflict

MAJ Paul S. Oh, U.S. Army

Reprinted with permission from the July-August 2009 issue of *Military Review*.

Framing the Future strategic environment in an era of persistent conflict is an immense challenge.¹ Unlike during the Cold War era, the United States no longer has an overarching paradigm through which it can view the world. Nonstate actors and irregular warfare dominate America's attention as it continues to fight insurgencies while coping with terrorist threats like Al-Qaeda. Traditional threats persist in places like the Korean peninsula, while the rise of China presents the prospect of a future strategic competitor. Increasingly global forces in economics, the environment, and health have greater impact on citizens worldwide. The U.S. is not sure how to structure, fund, and oversee its national security apparatus to meet these future challenges. No overarching paradigm suffices, and the United States faces the prospect of racing from one crisis to the next.

Several institutions have conducted studies to help policymakers plan for national challenges beyond the next 20 years. Among the most recent are Mapping the Global Future by the National Intelligence Council; Joint Operating Environment by United States Joint Forces Command; Forging a World of Liberty under Law by the Princeton Project on National Security; The New Global Puzzle by the European Union Institute for Security Studies; and Global Strategic Trends Programme by the British Ministry of Defense Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre.

These studies suggest the trends that will characterize and shape the future strategic environment: globalization, demographics, and the rise of emerging powers, the environment and competition for resources, non-state actors and challenge to governance, and advances in technology. These trends will present complex, multidimensional challenges that may require careful use of the military along with other instruments of national power. To respond to this future strategic environment, the United States will most likely be involved in three types of missions: expeditionary warfare to manage violence and peace, defense of the command of the commons, and homeland defense. The land forces will spearhead expeditionary missions to "contested zones" to protect American interests abroad.² Sea, air, and space forces will counter threats to the American command of the commons—air, sea, space, and cyberspace—where the American military currently has dominance. The military will also support the interagency effort in homeland defense as technological advances weaken traditional natural barriers to attack on U.S. soil.

Future Trends of the Next 20 Years

Globalization will force future trends that present both optimistic and pessimistic likelihoods.

The good - In Mapping the Global Future, the National Intelligence Council calls globalization the overarching "mega-trend" that will shape all other trends of the future.³ Globalization is an amorphous concept, but here it is meant in its broadest definition—the increasingly rapid exchange of capital, goods, and services, as well as information, technology, ideas, people, and culture.⁴ Markets for goods, finance, services, and labor will continue to become more internationalized and interdependent, bringing immense benefits to the world as a whole.⁵ Globalization will continue to be the engine for greater economic growth. The world will be

richer with many lifted out of poverty. It is unclear, however, whether a richer world where America has less relative economic power will be better for the United States in terms of its global influence.⁶

Studies before the recent economic shock had expected the global economy to be 80 percent larger in 2020 than in 2000, with average per capita income 50 percent higher.⁷ According to the European Union Institute for Security Studies, the world economy will grow at a sustained annual rate of 3.5 percent between 2006 and 2020.⁸ The United States, European Union, and Japan will likely continue to lead in many high-value markets, with the United States continuing to be the main driving force as the world's leading economic power. Emerging economies will continue to do well, with the Chinese and Indian gross domestic product tripling by 2025.⁹ The percentage of the world's population living in extreme poverty will likely continue to decline.¹⁰

The bad - The benefits of globalization will not be global. The harsh realities of competitive capitalism will produce definite winners and losers, and result in increased social and economic stratification both internationally and within countries.¹¹ Internationally, these losers will concentrate in certain areas of the “arc of instability,” a “swath of territory running from the Caribbean Basin through most of Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Southeast Asia.”¹² Here, the gap between countries who are benefiting economically, technologically, and socially and the countries that are left behind will continue to widen.¹³ And although absolute poverty will decline worldwide, this will not be the case for these regions. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the number of people living in absolute poverty—on less than one dollar a day—has increased from 160 million in 1981 to 303 million today.¹⁴ Poverty and aggravated income inequality will remain a monumental challenge in the next 20 years.

The Defense Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre notes, “Absolute poverty and the comparative disadvantage will fuel perceptions of injustice.”¹⁵ The disparities will be evident to all because of globalized telecommunications. Populations of “have-not” countries that perceive themselves to be losing ground may continue to be breeding grounds for extremist and criminal ideologies that lead to violence within and outside those countries.

Greater economic interdependence will lead to greater political interdependence. Although such a scenario diminishes the prospects of major industrialized war between two nations, it also means that what happens in one part of the globe will affect other parts of the globalized world. Economic shocks will reverberate throughout the globe. A drastic downturn in the U.S. economy, for example, has caused a global economic recession, perhaps requiring global or regional political solutions.¹⁶

And the ugly - The new era of globalization also means that the United States cannot depend on geography to shield it from the many problems of the developing world. This was clear on 9/11 when the hate espoused by the extremist ideology of radical Islam manifested itself in attacks on U.S. soil. The dangers of interdependence are manifest in other areas as well. Effects of climate change, disease, and pandemics originating from remote parts of the world will affect the United States. Infectious disease is already the number one killer of human beings.¹⁷ AIDS is a scourge in most of the world and poses an extreme societal threat in portions of sub-Saharan Africa. Even more frightening is the threat of a global avian influenza pandemic.¹⁸ The ever increasing connectivity of nations resulting from globalization means that a virus originating in a remote part of an undeveloped country can spread throughout the world at a frightening pace, as evidenced by the recent “swine flu” panic. A pandemic would also cause economic hardship, even if the disease were physically kept out of the United States.

Demographic Trends

Experts expect the world's population to increase by 23.4 percent from 2005 to 2025.¹⁹ The population growth in the developed world, however, will remain relatively stable. The United States will have 364 million citizens by 2030, while the population of the European Union will grow from 458 million to 470 million in 2025 before declining.²⁰ Japan and Russia will experience a decrease in population, with Japan's population falling from 128 million to 124.8 million and Russia's population falling from 143.2 million to 129.2 million within the next 20 years.²¹

Developed countries will also experience significant population aging. In the European Union, the ratio of employment age citizens (15-65) to the retired (over 65) will shift from about 4 to 1 in 2000 to 2 to 1 by 2050.²² Japan will approach 2 to 1 by 2025, and the median age in Japan will increase from 42.9 to 50 years.²³ This trend will fortunately not have as severe an impact on the United States due to higher fertility rates and greater immigration.²⁴ Europe and Japan could face societal upheaval as they try to assimilate large numbers of migrant workers from the developing world. These factors will soon challenge the social welfare structure of these countries, their productivity, and discretionary spending for defense and foreign assistance.

Developing countries

Ninety percent of global population growth by 2030 will occur in developing and poorer countries.²⁵ Population growth in these areas will be 43 to 48.4 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, 38 percent in the Middle East/North Africa region, 24 percent in Latin America, and 21 percent in Asia. Nine out of ten people will be living in the developing world in the next 20 years.²⁶

In contrast to the developed world, a significant portion of the population growth will be the "youth" of the region with a "youth bulge" occurring in Latin American, Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.²⁷ About 59 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa will be under 24 years by 2025.²⁸ In the Middle East, the working-age population will expand by 50 percent and in North Africa area by 40 percent, challenging governments to provide employment for a young and undereducated populace with little employment opportunities and setting up the potential for violent conflict. As a recent Economist article notes, these young men without "either jobs or prospects" will trade "urban for rural poverty, head for the slums, bringing their anger, and machetes, with them."²⁹ In the last two decades, 80 percent of all civil conflicts took place in countries where 60 percent or more of the population was under 30 years of age.³⁰

Migration

Significant portions of the global population will be on the move, mostly to the cities. By 2030, 61 percent of the global population will live in cities as compared to 47 percent in 2000.³¹ And while the urbanization ratio will be greater in developed countries compared to developing countries (81.7 percent versus 57 percent), the developing countries will struggle to control the transition to urban societies.³² Shantytowns will likely proliferate in "mega-cities" struggling with crime and disease. Migration to wealthier countries will also continue as workers search for better economic opportunities. The Defense Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre reports that the number of people living outside their country of origin will increase from 175 million in 2020 to 230 million by 2050.³³ Environmental degradation, natural disasters, or armed conflicts will also forcibly uproot populations. How both the developing and developed countries absorb the influx of migrants may determine the level of conflict associated with these movements.

Identity

How segments of the global population identify themselves may drastically change in the next 20 years. Individual loyalty to the state and state institutions will become increasingly conditional.³⁴ Identity will increasingly be based on religious convictions and ethnic affiliations.³⁵ Religious identity may become a greater factor in how people identify themselves. Although Europe will remain mostly secular, religion will have greater influence in areas as diverse as China, Africa, Latin American, and the United States. In some areas of the developing world, Islam will continue to increase as the overarching identity for large numbers of people. In other regions, ethnicity and tribal loyalties will continue to be the dominant form of identification.

Emerging Powers

The rise of powerful global players will reshape how we mentally map the globe in an increasingly multipolar world. *Mapping the Global Future* likens the emergence of China and India to the rise of a united Germany in the 19th century and the rise of the United States in the 20th.³⁶ The global center of gravity will shift steadily toward the Pacific.

China

China will become a powerful actor in the global system. The rise of China has been called “one of the seminal events of the early 21st century.”³⁷ China’s economic and diplomatic influence will continue to expand globally. Its gross national product is expected to surpass all economic powers except the United States within 20 years.³⁸ China’s demand for energy to fuel this growth will make it a global presence as it ventures out to secure sources of energy. In East Asia, China is likely to wield its growing influence to shape the region’s “political-institutional contours” to build a regional community that excludes the United States.³⁹ All this will likely be accompanied by a continued Chinese build-up of its military to reinforce its growing world power status.

Whether China continues to pursue a peaceful rise will have a profound impact on the course of international affairs in the next 30 years. The rise and fall of great powers has been one of the most important dynamics in the international system, a dynamic that is often accompanied by instability and conflict.⁴⁰ Defense Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre believes China will approach international affairs with a fair amount of pragmatism, but face daunting challenges as it develops. It may exert its growing hard and soft power to either protect its growth or ensure internal stability.⁴¹ When China does establish itself as a global power, it may be less restrained in its conduct of foreign affairs.⁴²

Other powers

Other nations may also play a greater role in the international arena. Among those mentioned in the studies are India, Russia, Indonesia, South Africa, and Brazil.⁴³ Depending on its ability to achieve greater political cohesion, a more united European Union could also play a greater role, especially as a model of global and regional governance.⁴⁴ Another possibility would be the rise of a rival alliance.⁴⁵

The rise of these powers may mean a decline of the relative power of the United States. Though the United States would continue to play the major role in international affairs, its overwhelming dominance may decline. In the next 20 years, a more multipolar world may develop with political, economic, and military power diffused throughout the globe and America’s ability to influence dialogue in key global issues relatively diminished.

Environment and Competition for Resources

Scientific consensus increasingly points to human activity as a main contributing factor in global warming. Although climate science is complex and the estimates of probable damages differ, the possibilities of catastrophic effects caused by global warming are real. Major consequences are likely because of “melting ice-caps, thermal expansion of the oceans, and changes to ocean currents and flows.”⁴⁶ Possible consequences on land include increased desertification, reduced land for habitation and agriculture, spread of diseases, and an increase of extreme weather events.

The worst-hit regions will likely face political, economic, and social instability.⁴⁷ These regions will be an arc of instability affecting the non-integrated areas of the globe and particularly worsening the already marginal living standards in many Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nations.⁴⁸ The likelihood of more failed states collapsing will increase as weak governments are unable to cope with decreases in food and water and increases in disease and violent uprisings.

Competition for resources

Exacerbating the environmental concerns is the ever-increasing competition for resources. As countries grow richer and modernize, the demand for resources will greatly increase in the next 20 years. According to the International Energy Agency, demand for energy will likely grow by more than 50 percent by 2035, with fossil fuels projected to meet 80 percent of this increase.⁴⁹ The world economy will remain heavily dependent on oil through 2025 at a minimum.⁵⁰ Similarly, global consumption of natural gas will increase by 87 percent.⁵¹ The United States has so far shown little inclination to seriously address its addiction to oil. Growing Asian powers’ consumption of oil will also skyrocket; China will have to increase consumption by 150 percent and India by 100 percent by 2020 to maintain current growth.⁵² Such explosive consumption will exacerbate global warming in the absence of a global framework to tackle the problem.

Because of global growth, competition for these resources will intensify as the United States and other major economies vie to secure access to energy supplies. The competition will bid up energy prices, making it even more difficult for developing nations to afford minimal energy for their populations. As Isaiah Wilson notes, resource security has persistently been the primary objective of advanced-nation security and military strategies. Quests for this security will continue to draw nations into military and economic engagement in the “arc of instability.”⁵³ The United States will continue its involvement in the Middle East for years to come. China will continue to build bilateral agreements with various nations in Africa to secure its oil supply.

The degradation of the environment and increased economic growth of nations will cause competition not only for traditional energy sources, but also for necessities like food and water. Major portions of the population will live in areas of “water stress,” and the amount of arable land may diminish.⁵⁴ The consumption of *blue water* (river, lake, and renewable groundwater) will continue to increase, depriving even more people of access to clean drinking water.⁵⁵ Concurrently, environmental degradation, intensification of agriculture, and a quickened pace of urbanization will all contribute to the reduced fertility of and access to arable land.⁵⁶ Increased reliance on biofuels for growing energy needs will reduce food supply crop yields. Competition for other food sources, including fish, will increase.⁵⁷ Even now, African fishermen bemoan the disappearance of their livelihoods while Europeans bemoan the increasing prices for fish in restaurants.⁵⁸

Nonstate Actors and Challenges to Governance

Scholars view the rise of nonstate actors as a fundamental challenge to the Treaty of Westphalia-based international system.⁵⁹ The United States, as the leader and architect of the Westphalian system, has been and will continue to be the primary focus of this challenge. Nonstate actors that do not see themselves bound by national borders are likely to continue to grow in strength and lethality. Small, empowered groups will be increasingly able to do greater things while states' near monopoly on information and destructive power continues to diminish.⁶⁰ Various factors have aided their cause. The National Intelligence Council sees a "perfect storm" in certain regions of the underdeveloped world as weak governments, lagging economies, religious extremism, and the unemployed youth fuel extremist movements.⁶¹

Al-Qaeda remains a formidable near-term threat. Recent testimony by American intelligence officials reported that Al-Qaeda is continuing to gain strength from its sanctuary in Pakistan and is "improving its ability to recruit, train, and position operatives capable of carrying out attacks inside the United States."⁶² Even if the West neutralized Al-Qaeda, the National Intelligence Council believes that the factors that gave rise to Al-Qaeda will not abate in the next 15 years and predicts that by 2020, "similarly inspired but more diffuse extremist groups" will supersede it.⁶³

Challenges to governance

Nonstate actors such as Al-Qaeda will play a major role in spreading extreme and violent ideologies. Fueled by the perceived injustices in a globalized world and by frustration with the oppressiveness of regional authoritarian regimes, major segments of the population in the arc of instability may rally to radical Islam and attack the institutions of traditional government through violent means. These forces may also cross national boundaries to form a transnational governing body dedicated to terrorism and jihad. The National Intelligence Council, for example, sees a possible scenario in which political Islam provides a context to form a Sunni Caliphate and draws on Islamic popular support to challenge traditional regimes.⁶⁴ The Princeton Project on National Security presents another scenario where a radical arc of Shi'ite governments rules areas from Iran to Palestine, sponsors terrorism in the West, and tries to destabilize the Middle East.⁶⁵

Governments in the arc of instability will face daunting challenges to stability. They will have to deal with the adverse effects of globalization, climate change, unemployment, and a new form of identity politics. To succeed, they will need to fight internal corruption and reform their inefficient, authoritative governments. They will need to do this as a radical ideology fiercely attacks their legitimacy and any connections to the Western world.

International crime will also challenge governance.⁶⁶ Criminal activities will continue to increase in sophistication and lethality as enhanced communication technologies and weapons continue to proliferate.⁶⁷ Such activities will be increasingly intertwined with civil conflict and terrorism as criminal groups leverage the benefits of increased globalization and their alliances with states and nonstate actors, to include terrorists.

Nonstate actors may also provide opportunities for increased cooperation to meet these future challenges. International, regional, and nongovernmental organizations will continue to grow in capacity. Although governance over international trade and crime has increased due to expanded transnational government networks, new collaborative institutions and mechanisms will be required to cope with increasingly complex global and regional problems.⁶⁸ These networks must continue to grow in strength to solve global problems.

Technology

Advances in technology elicit great hope as well as great fear, because major technological breakthroughs have an impact on every aspect of our lives. We can expect further progress in information technology and nanotechnology, innovations in biotechnology, and increased investments in research and development.⁶⁹ Faster computers combined with elements of nanotechnology and biotechnology may improve our ability to deal with daunting challenges such as human health, environmental issues, and malnutrition.

On the other hand, technology's availability and ease of transfer allow broader access to previously unavailable weapons. The ease of use of commercial technology has also exacerbated the problem of proliferation.⁷⁰ This is most dangerous in terms of weapons of mass destruction. The Princeton Project on National Security asserts that the "world is on the cusp of a new era of nuclear danger."⁷¹ North Korea does possess nuclear weapons. Despite the findings of the recent United States National Intelligence Estimate, it seems likely that Iran is still determined to acquire the ability to build nuclear weapons. If the international community cannot rein in these countries, other countries in the Middle East and East Asia will likely also attempt to join the nuclear club.⁷²

Countries will also continue to pursue chemical and biological weapons, as well as delivery capabilities for these weapons. Chemical and biological weapons can be integrated into legitimate commercial infrastructures to conceal a country's capabilities.⁷³ At the same time, more countries will be able to acquire ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. By 2020, the National Intelligence Council believes that both North Korea and Iran will have intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities, and several countries will develop space-launch vehicles.⁷⁴ A preview of such capabilities came on 5 February 2008 when Iran launched a Kavoshgar-1 rocket into space using technology similar to that needed for long-range ballistic missiles.⁷⁵

Concurrently, many in the United States fear the waning of American domination in research and development of new, emerging technology. The number of American Ph.D. engineering students is decreasing while the number of foreign students returning to their countries from U.S. universities is on the rise.⁷⁶ At the same time, the *Economist* notes that the domestic trends in American politics and immigration policy are keeping the world's best and brightest talents from "darkening America's doors."⁷⁷

Technology and terrorists

The potential nexus of terrorist groups and nuclear weapons is perhaps the most frightening scenario for national security experts. The increasing ease with which terrorists can acquire weapons to deliver a nuclear attack on the United States presents a nightmare scenario. Graham Allison notes that there are more than 200 addresses around the world from which terrorists can acquire nuclear weapons or fissile material.⁷⁸ Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea are among the likely sources. If terrorists cannot acquire a nuclear bomb, the technology and tools are now available for them to build their own.⁷⁹ The difficult part is acquiring the fissile material needed for a homemade bomb. There is evidence that Al-Qaeda attempted to acquire a nuclear weapon for an attack on the United States.⁸⁰ The prospect of Iran gaining nuclear capabilities is also of great concern because of the capabilities of its proxy force, Hezbollah.⁸¹

Operating Environment and Threat Evaluation

The second part of this paper explores the ramifications of these trends for each type of mission set by explaining the operating environments and the nature of the threat. There are obvious limitations to such framing. First, missions will likely be joint and interagency ventures with success not achieved purely through the application of military force. Second, labeling these challenges as “threats” inherently implies an adversarial relationship, which may not always be the case. The emergence of great powers, for example, may not necessarily lead to adverse conditions in international affairs. Third, some challenges do not fit neatly into these categories, so we may not always identify an emerging threat. The emerging radical Islamic community in Europe might be an example.

However, categorization does highlight the vastly different types of missions our military forces may perform during the next 20 years. With tighter budgets for discretionary spending, the U.S. must prioritize missions and use military forces efficiently and effectively. Examining and analyzing mission sets allows each service to plan accordingly and adapt to myriad possibilities the future strategic environment may hold.

So, what do these trends mean for our military forces? American expeditionary forces may need to enter what Posen labels “contested zones.” These zones correspond to areas the Pentagon has called the global “arc of insecurity.” Any mission in these zones will be both dangerous and difficult because political, physical, and technological realities negate many American military advantages. Although this will have to be a joint venture, land forces will likely spearhead such missions. The air, sea, and space forces, on the other hand, will lead the effort in countering threats to the “command of the commons.” With the rise of emerging powers and advances in technology, countries will venture into the commons where the U.S. military has traditionally maintained dominance. Finally, all forces will continue to support the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies in defending the homeland against nontraditional actors. For each mission type, the U.S. military will face increasingly capable threats seeking to take advantage of any vulnerabilities.

Expeditionary Warfare to Contested Zones

Although both the Navy and Air Force have begun structuring their forces for expeditionary warfare, the land force will likely spearhead the missions into the “contested zones” in the arc of insecurity. These areas, running from the Caribbean Basin through most of Africa, the Middle East, and Central and Southeast Asia, will disproportionately involve the losers from globalization.⁸² In fact, these zones are where the many trends of the next 20 years will converge. Increased poverty or at least relative poverty, large numbers of unemployed youth, environmental degradation, competition for resources, emergence of deadly nonstate actors, failed states, and proliferation of devastating technology will be the most evident and severe here.

The American expeditionary force may be drawn into these areas for a variety of reasons. First, these areas will continue to be breeding grounds and safe-havens for extremist ideologies and criminal elements. Second, increased global demand and competition for energy sources could require military intervention in these contested zones. Third, tribal wars or genocides may oblige the United States to join multilateral forces in stabilizing failed states or regions. Fourth, humanitarian interventions may increase if natural or man-made disasters cause mass suffering or death. In these zones, the American forces will be involved in both the management of violence and management of peace, forcing it to “fight” wars in a different fashion.

Political, physical, and technological facts will make the missions in these areas particularly difficult. Local actors have stronger interests in a war's outcome than the United States, and our adversaries will have a plentiful supply of males of fighting age.⁸³ They will also have the "home-court advantage." They have studied the way the U.S. military fights, and the weapons required for close combat are inexpensive and plentiful. In addition, conflicts that involve more than battles between traditional armies will also require nontraditional expertise in areas like cultural awareness, working with and training allied nations, interagency operations, and diplomacy.⁸⁴ Major General Robert Scales goes as far as to say that the next World War will be the social scientists' war, describing the wars to follow as "psycho-cultural wars" requiring officers with knowledge based on the discipline of social sciences.⁸⁵ These factors negate the traditional advantages of the American way of war built on technology and organization.

What will the operating environment look like for U.S. expeditionary forces in the contested zones? A survey of the literature suggests that U.S. forces will have to operate in an environment characterized by the following factors:

- **Highly urban environment / megacities.** Approximately 60 percent of the world's population will live in cities by 2030.⁸⁶ Some of these cities will grow into megacities containing huge shantytowns. They may have high crime rates, ineffective or corrupt police forces, and high levels of instability. Some megacities may collapse into chaos.⁸⁷
- **Extreme environments.** These regions may become increasingly inhospitable due to human activities and climate change. There may be less access to basic resources needed for survival, like food and water. These conditions could often obligate U.S. forces to provide such resources to populations in countries in which they operate.
- **Communicable disease.** Countries may also have high levels of communicable disease, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, hepatitis, and tuberculosis.⁸⁸
- **Endemic hostility.** There may be underlying hostility among the populace caused by transnational or intercommunal conflicts or virulent anti-American ideologies, such as militant Islam.⁸⁹
- **Collapse of functioning state.** U.S. forces may have to operate in regions where the government has failed and local warlords use extreme violence to control populations.⁹⁰
- **Nonmilitary partners.** U.S. forces will have to understand how to work with other government agencies and elements of society to combat adversaries.⁹¹ The management of peace will undoubtedly be an interagency affair as the integrated instruments of national power become increasingly crucial for success. The presence of media and internet coverage will also complicate missions. The military will need heightened awareness of legal implications and the rules of engagement.⁹²
- **Cheaper and deadlier weapons.** Adversaries will continue to benefit from wide availability of weapons, and they will continue to modify what is cheaply available to cause maximum damage on U.S. forces.
- **Weapons of mass destruction.** Advances in and the proliferation of technology may make the use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons on U.S. forces a real possibility.

- **Greater collaboration with developing country militaries.** Demographic declines and fiscal pressures will result in reduced military capabilities among developed-country allies. Future coalitions will increasingly rely on less well-trained and poorly equipped developing country forces that may not share the U.S. professional military ethic.⁹³
- **Media on the battlefield.** The media will likely cover the actions of the expeditionary force on the ground and communicate them in real time to a global audience.⁹⁴
- **Humanitarian disasters.** Increasingly devastating natural disasters caused by climate change could require more military humanitarian assistance.

Threats will come from multiple sources:

- **Terrorists.** Terrorists will continue to target U.S. interests abroad, seeking soft targets to send messages and inspire similar groups to action.
- **Paramilitary forces.** These forces will be intermingled with the local population and ally themselves with terrorist groups. The United States will face rebel groups, gangs, insurgents, and private military companies.
- **Tribal forces.** Armed tribal forces may be a big challenge because they have the potential to switch from being adversaries to allies depending on American strategy and tactics and on shifting local political calculations.
- **Criminal elements.** Weak governance will allow both transnational and local criminal elements to thrive. Drug cartels will continue to be an international presence and the most notorious criminal networks.⁹⁵
- **Traditional militaries.** Although hostilities with another state may be rare, increased competition for resources may cause state-to-state conflicts.

Maintaining the Command of the Commons

Posen describes the “commons” as those areas that no state owns but that provide access to much of the globe. It is analogous to the command of the seas, although Posen also includes command of the air and space.⁹⁶ The Joint operating environment includes the command of cyberspace as well. According to Posen, “command of the commons” means that the United States gets vastly more military use out of the commons than other states, that the United States can generally deny its use to others, and that others would lose access to the commons if they attempt to deny its use to the United States. The command of the commons has been “the key military enabler” of America’s global position and has allowed the United States to better exploit other sources of power.⁹⁷

The United States sea, air, and space forces will lead in responding to these challenges to the command of commons. Though the command of the commons will most likely remain uncontested in the near- and medium-term, the rise of emerging powers could lead to competition over time. Posen notes that the sources of U.S. command include American economic resources and military exploitation of information technology.⁹⁸ As American economic power begins to decline relatively, and as advanced technology becomes more diffused, other nations may exploit these factors to become viable contenders. Already, nations have launched missiles into space, started investing in blue water navies, and increased their cyber warfare capabilities.

The following are critical considerations for the operating environment:

- **Increased interest in space.** Emerging powers will continue to expand their space programs. Advances in technologies will enable more nations to launch rockets and satellites.⁹⁹ The United States will be increasingly concerned about capability of nations to convert this technology into intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as weapons threatening to U.S. space capabilities.
- **Nuclear proliferation.** As more countries acquire nuclear weapons, American ability or proclivity to intervene in various areas of the commons (or contested areas) may decline due to the threat of nuclear retaliation.
- **Missile technology proliferation.** Missile technology proliferation may deny certain areas of the commons to the United States. Examples include sea-lanes in the Straits of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Malacca.¹⁰⁰
- **Connectivity vulnerabilities.** Increased automation and reliance on information technology leave the United States more vulnerable to cyber-attacks as adversaries use techniques such as worms, viruses, Trojan horses, botnets, or electromagnetic pulse.¹⁰¹
- **The rise of great powers will feature nations with increased conventional military capabilities like that of the United States.** They will possess “information-enabled network” forces as well as naval forces with air and undersea capabilities.¹⁰² Nations may be able to challenge command of their regional sea-lanes, as well as U.S. dominance in space and cyberspace. Also, nonstate actors may be able to exploit technology to conduct cyber-warfare.

Military Support to Homeland Defense

With globalization and advances in technology shrinking the world, the homeland of the United States will be more vulnerable. 9/11 was a watershed moment in America as national policymakers began reexamining existing defenses and the balance between security and liberty. Many fear that terrorist and other criminal elements will continue to exploit the openness of American civil society to attack our financial, energy, or governmental infrastructure. The increasing availability of nuclear weapons may result in an attack that dwarfs the physical and psychological damages of 2001.

Despite the lack of terrorist attacks in the United States since 2001, it is still unclear if security measures implemented so far have made America safer. Many doubt the effectiveness of our changes and criticize the behemoth Department of Homeland Security and the restructuring that occurred with the creation of this agency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s performance during Hurricane Katrina heightened these concerns. Some scholars also doubt the wisdom of the creation of the Office of National Intelligence and the preservation of the Federal Bureau of Investigations as the lead law enforcement agency on domestic intelligence.¹⁰³ Still others call for reform of Congressional committee jurisdictions and oversight capabilities. How the U.S. military will best support this interagency effort is still unclear. The military has been viewed simultaneously as the last and greatest safety net for devastating events as well as a possible threat to civil liberties when operating within the U.S. borders. The demand for higher levels of security in the homeland leads to tension with many of the political and cultural traditions of America. Increased domestic surveillance conflicts with cherished civil liberties. Similarly, increased border protection affects immigration and even openness to foreign business

travelers, both of which can have negative economic and cultural impacts. The vigorous, often partisan, debates in Washington on wiretapping, torture, and immigration will likely continue well into the future. Following are the areas of major concern:

- Weapons of mass destruction - Proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical technology and material will leave the United States increasingly vulnerable to attacks with weapons of mass destruction.
- Natural disasters - Hurricane Katrina may have been a sign of things to come, with the nation looking more to the military as the most effective institution for dealing with devastating natural disasters.
- Economic shocks - Terrorist elements may target key financial nodes in the United States such as the New York Stock Exchange to attack the global financial system.
- Energy crisis - Shortages of supplies relative to increasing demand may leave the United States susceptible to energy shocks.
- Refugee flows - Economic and environmental factors may increase both legal and illegal migration from Latin America and elsewhere.
- Cyber-attacks - Increased automation of our financial systems, physical infrastructure, and government operations renders the homeland more vulnerable to attacks on our information systems by both state and nonstate actors.

There are multiple probable sources of threat. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups remain the biggest threat to U.S. homeland. Other Islamic terrorist groups may emerge not directly linked to Al-Qaeda, but inspired by similar extremist ideology. Elements of our society may become disposed to extremist Islamic ideology and independently plan attacks. Transnational criminals, including drug cartels, will continue to have a presence in the U.S. Although state attacks on U.S. homeland will be rare, hostile states may use proxy forces to attack vulnerable sites using difficult-to-trace methods, such as cyber-attack. States could also potentially use economic measures, such as energy embargos or financial measures as holders of U.S. debt, to damage the U.S. economy.

Facing the Challenges

The challenges of the next 20 years are immense and diverse. Some are immediate and others are long term or systemic. In this context, the U.S. military must be sufficiently flexible and multi-talented to play the various roles the nation may ask of it. Operations in the contested zones will be extremely complex and multidimensional, and perhaps more frequent; the military will have to redefine the concept of war and the nature and utility of military forces. Great-power politics will continue and may manifest itself in a challenge to American command of the commons. America may have to reexamine its hegemonic status and the role of U.S. forces in maintaining the international system. Threats to the U.S. homeland will continue and increase. The military will need to function effectively in the interagency process to aid in the defense of our homeland. Yet, our military must do this in an era of likely declining military funding. Forward-thinking analysis of likely trends on these various military missions will prove essential to preparing for the challenges ahead.

Endnotes

1. This article was originally written for the United States Military Academy's 2008 Senior Conference. The article reflects the views of the author, and not necessarily of West Point. Special thanks to Mr. Roland DeMarcellus, Colonel Mike Meese, and Colonel Cindy Jebb for their guidance and help in editing.
2. Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* 28, no.1 (Summer 2003): 5-46. Posen divides the world into two areas: the "commons" and the "contested zones." The United States currently enjoys the command of the commons, which he defines as composed of air, sea, and space. The contested zones, on the other hand, are "enemy held territory." The U.S. currently does not have dominance in these areas.
3. National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the Global World* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 10.
4. Ibid., 27.
5. Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), *The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036* (2007), 3.
6. West Point Mini-Conference, March 2008.
7. National Intelligence Council, 10.
8. European Union Institute of Security Studies (EUISS), *The New Global Puzzle: What World for the EU in 2025?* (EU Institute for Security Studies, 2006), 32.
9. Ibid., 32.
10. Ibid., 34.
11. DCDC, 3.
12. Joint Chief of Staff.
13. National Intelligence Council, 29.
14. EUISS, 34.
15. DCDC, 3.
16. United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Operating Environment (JOE): Trends and Challenges for the Future Joint Force Through 2030 (December 2007), 54.
17. The Princeton Project on National Security (PPNS), *Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security In the 21st Century* (The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2006), 51.
18. Ibid., 50-51.
19. EUISS, 15.
20. EUISS, 19, 20.
21. Ibid, 20, 21.
22. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division, "Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?" 21.
23. Ibid, 53; EUISS, 20.
24. Ibid., 20.
25. The United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2005 Revision.
26. EUISS, 15.
27. JOE, 10.
28. EUISS, 22.
29. "Young, alive but not very heaven," *The Economist*, 2-8 February 2008, 54.

30. JOE, 10.
31. Barney Cohen, "Urbanization in developing countries: Current trends, future projections, and key challenges for sustainability," *Technology in Society* 28 (2006), 68.
32. EUISS, 17.
33. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division, *International Migration Report 2002* (New York, 2002).
34. DCDC, 10.
35. National Intelligence Council, 79.
36. Ibid., 9.
37. PPNS, 47.
38. National Intelligence Council, 9.
39. PPNS, 46.
40. Ibid., 48.
41. DCDC, 45.
42. DCDC, 38, National Intelligence Council, 51.
43. National Intelligence Council, 57.
44. West Point Mini-Conference, March 2008.
45. DCDC, 2.
46. PPNS, 53.
47. JOE.
48. International Energy Agency: *World Energy Outlook 2005*.
49. JOE, 30.
50. EUISS, 54.
51. PPNS, 53.
52. Isaiah Wilson, "The Arc of Instability and Energy Predation."
53. DCDC, 8.
54. EUISS, 78.
55. DCDC, 8.
56. JOE, 25; DCDC, 78.
57. Elisabeth Rosenthal, "Europe's Appetite for Seafood Propels Illegal Trade," *New York Times*, 15 January 2008.
58. Isaiah Wilson, "Strength and Honor," 8.
59. West Point Mini-Conference, March 2008.
60. National Intelligence Council, 14.
61. Mark Mazzetti, "Intelligence Chief Cites Qaeda Threat to U.S.," *New York Times*, 6 February 2008.
62. National Intelligence Council, 94.
63. Ibid., 83.
64. PPNS, 39.
65. JOE, 12.
66. Ibid., 12.

67. Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); DCDC, 14.
68. EUISS, 91.
69. West Point Mini-Conference, March 2008.
70. PPNS, 43.
71. Ibid., 43.
72. National Intelligence Council, 100.
73. Ibid., 101.
74. Nazila Fathi, "Iran Launches Rocket to Commemorate New Space Center," *New York Times*, 5 February 2008, A10.
75. West Point Mini-Conference, March 2008.
76. "Help not wanted," *The Economist*, 12-18 April 2008, 38.
77. Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (New York: Times Books, 2005), 67.
78. Ibid., 92.
79. Ibid., 20.
80. Ibid., 36.
81. "Arc of Insecurity." labeled by the Joint Chief of Staff, provided in Wilson, "The Arc of Instability and Energy Predation," 3.
82. Posen, 24.
83. JOE, 59.
84. Robert H. Scales, "Clausewitz and World War IV."
85. JOE.
86. DCDC, 29.
87. DCDC, 7.
88. Ibid., 51.
89. JOE, 39.
90. Ibid., 59.
91. DCDC, 72.
92. West Point Mini-Conference, March 2008.
93. Ibid.
94. JOE, 42.
95. Posen, 8.
96. Ibid., 8-9.
97. Ibid., 10.
98. DCDC, 65.
99. Ibid., 54.
100. JOE, 35.
101. Ibid., 39.
102. Richard Posner, *Remaking Domestic Intelligence* (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press at Stanford, 2005).
103. Ibid., 47.

The Struggle Against Global Insurgency

Dr. Daniel G. Cox

Reprinted with permission from the 1st Quarter 2010 issue of *Joint Force Quarterly*.

Since 9/11, it has become commonplace for scholars, politicians, and military thinkers to refer to current U.S. military and diplomatic actions as being part of a larger “war on terror.” This is an extremely imprecise characterization of the current conflict. What the United States and, in fact, the world are facing is more properly dubbed a global insurgent movement that emanates from al Qaeda at the international level and that slowly seeps into legitimate (and illegitimate) national secessionist movements around the world. What follows is an argument in support of the claim that al Qaeda is essentially the world’s first attempt at a global insurgency.

According to General Wayne Downing, USA (Ret.), “terrorism is a tactic used by Salafist insurgents to attain their strategic goals, which are political in nature.”¹ Indeed, terrorism is a tactic—and one cannot wage war on a tactic. Though this is a correct but superficial criticism, it has never led to any meaningful discussion regarding the implications of this point or what it is that the U.S. military is actually combating. Only a few authors have asserted that al Qaeda is an insurgency, and even fewer have made the connection between al Qaeda’s terror tactics. Audrey Kurth Cronin was one of the first scholars to hint that al Qaeda is a global insurgency, writing soon after 9/11 that it was aiming not so much at the World Trade Center or the Pentagon or even the United States, but was instead aiming to destroy the U.S.-led global system.² David Kilcullen claims that the West is facing a “global jihad,” which is much more akin to a global insurgency and has as its chief aim the imposition of a worldwide Islamic caliphate.³ One of the newest entries into this field of argumentation is Dan Roper, who is not only one of a new breed of scholars who clearly sees the folly of declaring war against a tactic, but also one of the few to argue that the U.S. Government and military are facing a global insurgency and to provide some concrete policy recommendations.⁴

This article seeks to expand on this embryonic line of argumentation, but in order to establish al Qaeda as the first global insurgency, a review of the definition of insurgency and its link to terrorism must be conducted. Next, al Qaeda’s rhetoric and demands are briefly examined. The article concludes with an analysis of al Qaeda’s strategy for fomenting global insurgency through its exploitation of failed and failing states and of (often legitimate) domestic insurgencies around the world.

Insurgency and Terrorism

David Galula, in his seminal work *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, defines insurgency as “a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.”⁵ Field Manual 3–24, *Counterinsurgency*, defines an insurgency along similar lines as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” Frank Kitson expands on these notions, emphasizing that the successful insurgent generally starts with little power but a strong cause, while the counterinsurgent has a near monopoly of power but a weak cause or reason for holding that power, which the insurgent levers against the counterinsurgent over time until those in power are ousted.⁶ Bard O’Neill adds three types of insurgency, which he dubs “anarchist,” those wishing to overthrow government but not replace it; “egalitarian,” those attempting to replace the current government with one that emphasizes distributional equality; and “traditionalist,” those bent on replacing corrupt modern society

with a mythologized distant past that emphasizes traditional values often rooted in fundamental interpretations of religion.⁷ The relationship between insurgency and terrorism is not without controversy. While most scholars see the two as related, some view terrorism as an indicator of failed insurgency in its last death throes, while others deem it an essential first step toward gaining momentum. Galula views “blind,” or indiscriminate, terrorism as the first step in “bourgeois-nationalist” insurgencies where a fledgling movement is seeking to gain notoriety for its cause.⁸ This is followed by a second stage of “selective” terrorism in which an insurgency gaining strength seeks to target counterinsurgents and isolate them from the people.⁹ Sometimes terrorism is seen as the only viable tactic for an insurgent facing a severe asymmetry in the balance of military force. In this case, terrorism becomes one of the feasible forms of “lesser violence” that can be implemented against a superior conventional force.¹⁰ But not all agree that terrorism is a tactic that can be employed successfully by insurgents. Anthony Joes, for instance, came to the conclusion that terrorism is antithetical to the waging of successful guerrilla warfare after examining modern insurgency movements. He notes that in all but one of the insurgent cases, terrorism was employed as a last resort by “insurgencies that were losing, or that eventually lost.”¹¹ While one could certainly conclude that terrorism is the tactic of choice for the weak, the evidence for the assertion that it is a tactic of failed insurgencies is unconvincing. Galula’s argument that terrorism is the initial stage of an insurgency seems more plausible. That terrorism is the tactic of choice for insurgencies facing overwhelming conventional threats does not conclusively indicate weakness or future failure. In fact, in a recent study for the RAND National Defense Research Institute, Daniel Byman found that while not all terrorist groups are insurgencies, it does appear that “almost every insurgent group uses terrorism.”¹²

Demands from al Qaeda

Establishing that terrorism and insurgency are closely linked and that many national insurgencies have used terrorism both to draw attention to a cause and later to isolate counterinsurgents from the people is insufficient to substantiate the claim that al Qaeda is an insurgency. An examination of al Qaeda’s own words and deeds is necessary to close the correlative link.

Cronin argues generally that the Western world has been slow to recognize that terrorist activity has increased in response to U.S.-led globalization, or what is being termed “Western imperialism.”¹³ This is an important point; it is this backlash against globalization that al Qaeda is tapping into in fomenting its own global insurgency. Al Qaeda leaders have referenced the intrusion of Western nations as colonial oppressors, military bullies, and economic exploiters.

Al Qaeda’s brand of insurgency against perceived imperial intrusion is grounded in the work of the 12th-century Islamic thinker Ibn Taymiyya, who grew up experiencing a brutal Mongol invasion and oppressive occupation. This created a problem, as the invading Mongols were also Islamic; hence, Taymiyya had to devise a way around Koranic law, which specifically forbade the killing of any Muslim by another, to justify killing fellow Muslims. He had to expand the notion of what it is to be Muslim and differentiate between “good” and “bad” Muslims. Obviously, since the Mongols were an invading people, they had to kill Muslims to achieve their goals, and this fact, coupled with their horrible treatment of conquered Muslims, allowed Taymiyya to make a convincing argument that invading Mongols were “bad” Muslims. The road became clear when he declared that the invading Mongols and the rulers who bowed down to them were apostates. Now distinctions could be drawn between self-professed and real Muslims, and some could be determined to be enemies of Islam and were, therefore, subject to death.¹⁴

The reason this is so monumentally important to al Qaeda is that Taymiyya’s revolutionary shifting of targets allows al Qaeda free rein to conduct its terror attacks against a much broader

group of infidels. Not only are apostate Muslims fair targets, but so are infidel women and children. In fact, al Qaeda has a written directive in a seized training manual that specifies that “apostate rulers”¹⁵ presiding over predominantly Islamic nations are more of a threat than past colonial oppressors. The link to Taymiyya is clear, for as one author writes, “Islamic radicals everywhere see the United States as the neo-Mongol power lurking behind the apostate governments that they seek to topple.”¹⁶ According to al Qaeda theologian Faris Al Shuwayl, Shia Muslims are portrayed as polytheists and worthy only of death. Christians and Jews can obey sharia law and Islamic theological directives or be expunged. The broadening of enemies of Islam initiated by Taymiyya, expanded by Wahhabi, and carried into modern times by al Qaeda serves as the foundation for terror attacks aimed at overthrowing Western dominance, capitalism, globalization, and modernization, which currently define the world system. While apostate rulers within Dar al Islam are singled out as the prime targets of al Qaeda’s global insurgency, al Qaeda has made it clear that Western powers, especially the United States, are not off the hook. The demands from al Qaeda regarding Western powers are instructive, as they have the flavor of demands made by many domestic insurgent groups. Osama bin Laden has on several occasions demanded that the United States withdraw all support for Israel and remove all presence from Saudi Arabia, especially military presence.¹⁷ A slightly expanded version of these demands was offered in a letter sent to the New York Times by al Qaeda propagandist Nidal Ayyad the day after the 9/11 attacks. In this directive, al Qaeda demanded that the United States cut economic and military aid to Israel and cease interference in all domestic affairs within any Middle Eastern state.¹⁸

In the final analysis, al Qaeda’s demands that Western imperialists leave the Middle East and refrain from interfering with domestic Arabian politics, that apostate rulers in Arabia step down, and that illegal Israeli colonizers give up their claim to Israel are strikingly similar to demands from the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka or the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia, both of which demand autonomy from unfair and abusive state rule. The only significant difference is that al Qaeda’s claims stretch across multiple Islamic countries instead of being confined to a specific region in a recognized nation-state. O’Neill’s characterization of a traditional insurgency seems appropriate when attempting to categorize al Qaeda. He writes, “Within the category of traditionalist insurgents, one also finds zealous groups seeking to reestablish an ancient political system that they idealize as a golden age.”¹⁹

Dune Insurgency

Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal offer an interesting reinterpretation of al Qaeda as an organization. Instead of classifying it as a hierarchical (almost no one claims this anymore) or a networked organization, Mishal and Rosenthal perceive al Qaeda as being “Dune-like.” According to these authors, a Dune organization “relies on a process of vacillation between territorial presence and a mode of disappearance. The perception of territorial presence is associated with stable territorial formations: nation-states, global markets, or ethnic communities.”²⁰ Like sand dunes, Mishal and Rosenthal see a temporary network attaching and detaching and “moving onward after changing the environment in which it has acted.”²¹ This analogy seems to depict al Qaeda accurately and explains why direct confrontation is so difficult. Mishal and Rosenthal argue that Dune movement is “almost random,”²² but this assertion is debatable since al Qaeda seems to be spreading and growing in strength.

The Dune analogy captures the movement and actions of al Qaeda and helps illustrate how a complex and adaptive global insurgency works. Combating a Dune insurgency is difficult because once one tries to stamp a sand dune with his foot, he is likely to find either the wind has blown most of the sand to a different area or his foot is now stuck in the sand. Worse

still, successfully dislodged sand can blow back into an area that was previously cleared. This certainly appears to be the modus operandi with al Qaeda's global insurgency. From the movement's humble birth in the late 1980s as a successful mujahideen insurgency against Soviet invaders in Afghanistan, bin Laden and al Qaeda constructed their first significant Dune in Sudan. Al Qaeda built a close relationship with the Sudanese government, developing joint business enterprises in exchange for a safe haven and, on at least one occasion, securing hundreds of Sudanese passports for al Qaeda operatives to use for travel.²³ While in Sudan, al Qaeda branched out, meddling in any regional problem that contained an Islamic component. In Somalia, 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed in a particularly brutal battle on October 3, 1993, by Somali fighters trained by al Qaeda operatives in Sudan.²⁴ Eventually, the United States continued to apply diplomatic and economic pressure on the Islamic-dominated government of Sudan, and in 1996, bin Laden and his organization had to seek refuge in Afghanistan.²⁵ But once again, al Qaeda is regaining influence in both Sudan and Somalia. The dislodged sand is accumulating once more. J. Stephen Morrison argues that this should be expected as "both states are highly porous, fractured, and weak (or wrecked) states; both welcomed al-Qaeda in the past and retain linkages to it today."²⁶

After Sudan, al Qaeda set up shop in its old haunt, Afghanistan. But Afghanistan was by no means the only base of operations. Al Qaeda had learned in Africa to spread its operations and to foment violent radicalism wherever possible. While it was only able to operate freely in Afghanistan under fundamental Taliban rule from 1996 until the government itself was removed from power by coalition forces in 2002, al Qaeda grew in strength and complexity not only by continuing to perpetrate successful attacks against the United States but also through linking itself and its Salafist cause to many domestic insurgencies and secessionist movements throughout the world. What is most interesting during this period is that al Qaeda seemed to ramp up its emphasis on global insurgency. Southeast Asia became a target of choice and remains one of the group's most prominent fixations.

There are several reasons why the region is a good fit for its brand of insurgency. Zachary Abuza argues that Southeast Asia is perfect for al Qaeda and other terror organizations because of widespread poverty, lack of equal education, lax border controls (due to many states being reliant on tourism), and the spread of Wahhabist and Salafist Islam.²⁷ Another enticement for al Qaeda is that there is already a fairly well-established regional terrorist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah, which espouses the grand goal of establishing a caliphate encompassing all Southeast Asian states.²⁸ Finally, there are numerous Islamic secessionist movements looking for support. The Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia, multiple Islamic secessionist groups in the Philippines, and recent secessionist movement in southern Thailand all provide fertile grounds for al Qaeda to infiltrate. Al Qaeda began laying the seeds of insurgency in Southeast Asia while headquartered in Sudan. Ramsey Youssef, a chief architect of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was one of the main actors managing al Qaeda's growing regional network in Southeast Asia. Youssef regularly visited the Philippines and consulted with the Abu Sayyaf group and coordinated cooperation between it and al Qaeda.²⁹ Al Qaeda continued to expand this initial cooperation while in Afghanistan, supporting secessionist movements and regional insurgent movements in Southeast Asia, which allowed it to gain a strong foothold and a networked base of operations there. In fact, by 2002, it is estimated that nearly 20 percent of all of al Qaeda's organizational strength was in Southeast Asia.³⁰ Simultaneously with the infiltration in Southeast Asia, al Qaeda began to align itself with a strengthening fundamental Islamic movement in Pakistan.

Islamic fundamentalism sprang up, in part, due to the Pakistani government's decision to back the fundamental Taliban regime against Soviet invaders. When the Taliban mujahideen succeeded in resisting Soviet occupation, an explosion of fundamentalism occurred in Pakistan.

The number of fundamentalist madrassas there increased tenfold in the decade after the Soviet Union was unceremoniously expelled from Afghanistan, and these religious schools began training insurgents who would become influential leaders of radical terror organizations in Southeast Asia.³¹ Al Qaeda grew as an organization, and the sand dune that was seemingly dislodged from Sudan reappeared in Afghanistan. While in Afghanistan, al Qaeda gained a strong foothold in Southeast Asia that it largely retains today. In 2002, coalition forces would kick the sand again and al Qaeda would relocate to the nearby Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan. Many pundits, political leaders, and high-ranking members of the military quickly proclaimed that al Qaeda was severely damaged when its operations were forcefully dislodged from Afghanistan,³² that it could no longer operate as it used to, and that bin Laden and his whole organization were hopelessly on the run. But these proclamations were soon proven premature as al Qaeda continued to perpetrate, or at least inspire, major attacks against Spain and Great Britain. Al Qaeda also continued to infiltrate Southeast Asia and revisit old haunts in North Africa. In fact, U.S. intelligence agencies reported in 2007 that al Qaeda had actually become stronger and more dangerous almost 6 years after coalition forces dislodged it from Afghanistan. The organization has also continued to strengthen in Sudan and is actively supporting the Islamic Courts movement in Somalia.

Al Qaeda consistently calls for an Islamic caliphate and the destruction of Western imperialist interveners in Islamic affairs. It persists in demanding the dissolution of the state of Israel. It continues to grow in strength and arguably in scope even though successful efforts dislodged the organization from two separate nation-states that it was using as its main bases of operations. Al Qaeda is acting like a Dune insurgency, and forceful attempts to disrupt this organization are meeting with what appears to be short-term success but long-term failure.

Implications

Al Qaeda appears to be using terrorism as an early-stage tactic to draw attention to its insurgent cause and to separate the people in multiple nation-states from the counter-insurgents just the way Galula predicted. It also shows the characteristics of being what O'Neill describes as a traditionalist insurgency attempting to rail against global forces and return at least the Muslim world to a mythologized caliphate emphasizing traditional, fundamental Islam. Finally, al Qaeda appears to be perpetrating a successful Dune insurgency, transitioning nimbly between short periods of territorial presence and then seemingly disappearing until it becomes evident that it has set up shop elsewhere, perhaps even in multiple locations.

If the above analysis proves true, then combating a complex Dune insurgency will be problematic. Successfully countering al Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan, while vital, does not necessarily encompass all that needs to be done to counter a global insurgency. Unfortunately, the old counterinsurgency mantra "clear, hold, build" now applies to almost everywhere there is an exploitable instability. Kinetic options will likely meet with limited success as the main course of action, as the al Qaeda movement has spread deeply into multiple states and regions, and no coalition force could hope to intervene militarily in all of these places simultaneously. What really needs to be combated is instability and fundamentalism, as al Qaeda thrives off of these two features. Instability provides a perfect environment for al Qaeda to step into. Groups with sometimes legitimate secessionist demands provide potential allies, because poverty and human rights abuses provide causes that al Qaeda organizers can latch on to and use to leverage popular support for their larger global cause. One of the great ironies of the al Qaeda insurgency is that it could unintentionally unite the industrialized world in the first genuine, concerted effort to eradicate poverty and human rights abuses in the developing world. Stability operations performed by the military take on prime importance in such a struggle.

Finally, strategic communication will be a key in managing the al Qaeda problem. Industrial powers will need not only to foster stability in the developing world but also to broadcast the benefits of modernization and freedom to a large and diverse body of people that is largely wary of outsiders and that has been exploited by European colonizers. None of these tasks will be easy, but the sooner it is accepted that al Qaeda is a complex, adaptive global insurgency, the sooner real debate and discussion regarding these and broader, more global initiatives can occur.

But one must also take caution when combating al Qaeda's global insurgent movement. Kinetic options are necessary to take out irreconcilables, but widespread kinetic operations can actually feed the movement and serve to coalesce disparate groups around the al Qaeda banner. One must always bear in mind that the implication of an attempted global insurgency is that al Qaeda has declared war against the world, and the sheer magnitude, and perhaps hubris, of such an undertaking might mean that it is doomed to fall under the weight of its own ambitions.

Endnotes

1 Wayne A. Downing, "The Global War on Terrorism: Re-Focusing the National Strategy," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*, ed. Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, 2d ed. (Dubuque, IA: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 439.

2 Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/2003), 38.

3 David J. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (August 2005), 598, 603–604.

4 Daniel S. Roper, "Global Insurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War," *Parameters* 37, no. 3 (Autumn 2008).

5 David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 4, emphasis in original.

6 Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* (Saint Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 1973), 29.

7 Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 2d ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 20–21.

8 Galula, 58–59.

9 Ibid.

10 O'Neill, 57.

11 Anthony James Joes, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004), 20.

12 Daniel Byman, *Understanding Proto-Insurgencies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007).

13 Cronin, 34.

14 See Michael Doran, "The Pragmatic Fanaticism of al-Qaeda: An Anatomy of Extremism in Middle Eastern Politics," *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 2 (Summer 2002), 179; and Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002), for a more complete accounting of Taymiyya and his influence on al Qaeda.

15 Doran, 180.

16 Ibid., 183.

17 Barry R. Posen, "The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/2002), 40.

18 Benjamin and Simon, 12–13.

19 O'Neill, 21.

- 20 Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal, "Al-Qaeda as a Dune Organization: Toward a Typology of Islamic Terrorist Organizations," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28 (2005), 282.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Benjamin and Simon, 112.
- 24 Ruth Wedgewood, "Al-Qaeda, Military Commissions, and American Self-Defense," *Political Science Quarterly* 117, no. 3 (Autumn 2002), 358.
- 25 Benjamin and Simon, 133.
- 26 J. Stephen Morrison, "Somalia's and Sudan's Race to the Fore in Africa," *Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (Spring 2002), 192.
- 27 Zachary Abuza, "Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24, no. 3 (December 2002), 428.
- 28 Mishal and Rosenthal, 280.
- 29 Wedgewood, 359.
- 30 Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkley Books, 2002).
- 31 Irm Haleem, "Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia: Recruiting Grounds for Terrorism?" in *Democratic Development and Political Terrorism*, ed. William Crotty (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2005), 146.
- 32 Mary Louise Kelly, "Is Al Qaida Stronger Six Years after Sept. 11?" Transcript from National Public Radio, *Morning Edition*, September 11, 2007, available at <<http://current.com/10i9e4c>>.

Eliminating High Seas Piracy: Legal and Policy Considerations

James P. Terry

Reprinted with permission from the 3rd Quarter 2009 issue of *Joint Force Quarterly*.

In December 16, 2008, the United Nations (UN) Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1851 authorizing states to mount land-based operations in Somalia against pirate strongholds. This reflects the deep concern of all UN members with respect to the unacceptable level of violence at sea perpetrated by Somali pirates. As noted by then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in her statement in support of the resolution before the council's vote:

“Because there has been no existing mechanism for states to coordinate their actions, the result has been less than the sum of its parts. . . . We envision a contact group serving as a mechanism to share intelligence, coordinate activities, and reach out to partners, and we look forward to working quickly on that initiative. A second factor limiting our response is the impunity that the pirates enjoy. Piracy currently pays; but worse, pirates pay few costs for their criminality.”¹

Combating piracy—not only off the coast of Somalia but also in other areas of the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, and Red Sea—has been a subject of great U.S. concern for years, although it has been accentuated in recent months. In November 2008, the Saudi supertanker *Sirius Star*, with \$100 million worth of crude oil aboard, was seized by Somali pirates and held for more than 2 months until January 9, 2009, when a \$3 million ransom was paid. Somali pirates held a Ukrainian cargo ship, the *MV Faina*, seized in late September 2008 with 33 tanks and other weaponry aboard, for a similar period until a ransom was paid. These incidents are not unique. In 2008 alone, more than 100 pirate attacks were reported in the busy shipping lanes off eastern and southern Somalia.

Legal Dimension

There is no question that the increase in acts of piracy emanating from Somali territory over the past year is a reflection of the near state of anarchy plaguing that nation. Nevertheless, nearly all UN member states, in passing Security Council Resolution 1851, underscored that actions to combat this dangerous phenomenon must conform to international law standards, including the Law of the Sea Convention.

The standards for addressing the international crime of piracy, and the available enforcement mechanisms, are not in dispute. Piracy, at its core, encompasses “illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft in or over international waters against another ship or aircraft or persons or property on board. (Depredation is the act of plundering, robbing or pillaging.)”² The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention added to the definition: “any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft,” and “any acts of inciting or intentionally facilitating [such acts].”³

In international law, piracy is a crime that can be committed only on or over international waters, including the high seas, exclusive economic zones, international airspace, and other

places beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any nation.⁴ The same acts committed within the internal waters, territorial sea, or national airspace of a country are within that nation's domestic jurisdiction.

U.S. law addressing the international crime of piracy emanates from the Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall have Power . . . to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the Law of Nations."⁵ Congressional exercise of this power is set out in Titles 18 and 33 of the United States Code.⁶ U.S. law makes criminal the international offense in section 1651 of Title 18, where it states: "Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterward brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life."⁷

U.S. statutes further authorize the President to deploy "public armed vessels" to protect U.S. merchant ships from piracy and to instruct the commanders of such vessels to seize any pirate ship that has attempted or committed an act of depredation or piracy against any foreign or U.S. flag vessel in international waters.⁸ These sections also authorize issuance of instructions to naval commanders to send into any U.S. port any vessel that is armed or the crew of which is armed, and which shall have "attempted or committed any piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation, or seizure, upon any vessel," U.S. or foreign flag, or upon U.S. citizens; and to retake any U.S. or foreign vessel or U.S. citizens unlawfully captured on the high seas.

While U.S. law makes criminal those acts proscribed by international law as piracy, other provisions of U.S. municipal law describe related conduct. For example, Federal statutes make criminal the following: arming or serving on privateers⁹, assault by a seaman on a captain so as to prevent him from defending his ship or cargo¹⁰, unlawfully departing with a vessel within the admiralty jurisdiction¹¹, corruption of seamen to unlawfully depart with a ship¹², receipt of pirate property¹³, and robbery ashore in the course of a pirate cruise.¹⁴

Under provisions of the High Seas Convention and the Law of the Sea Convention, a pirate vessel or aircraft encountered in or over international waters may be seized and detained only by a nation's warships, military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service.¹⁵ U.S. warships seizing pirate vessels or aircraft are guided by U.S. Navy regulations and the fleet commanders' U.S. basic operational orders.¹⁶ Under this guidance, U.S. authorities may also arrange with another nation to accept and try the pirates and dispose of the pirate vessel or aircraft, since every nation has jurisdiction under international law over acts of piracy.¹⁷

UN Effort to Stem Piracy

The UN Security Council has been concerned with the disintegration of Somali government control over its territory since the late 1980s. It has also addressed piracy arising from that state in council resolutions since 1992. In 2008, the Security Council got serious about addressing the piracy issue directly and not only in the context of the crisis inland in Somalia. In Resolution 1814 of May 2008, for example, it called upon member states "to take action to protect shipping involved with . . . United Nations authorized activities."¹⁸ This was followed by Resolution 1816 in June 2008, which called upon all nations "to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia."¹⁹

On October 7, 2008, in Resolution 1838, the Security Council ratcheted up its direction to states with maritime interests. What made this resolution significant was its specific call for "States interested in the security of maritime activities to take part actively in the fight . . . in particular

by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft.”²⁰ This resolution further advised all states to issue guidance to their flag shipping on appropriate precautionary measures to protect themselves from attack or actions to take if under attack or threatened with attack when sailing in waters off the coast of Somalia.²¹ On December 2, 2008, after Somali pirates seized the Saudi supertanker *Sirius Star*, the Security Council, in an unprecedented provision in Resolution 1846 under Chapter VII of the Charter (authorizing all necessary means), determined that for a period of 12 months, warships of member nations were permitted to enter Somali territorial waters for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy consistent with such action permitted on the high seas.

The December 2, 2008, resolution, when paired with Resolution 1851 of December 16, 2008, weaves a tight pattern around piracy activities in the waters of the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. In Resolution 1851, moreover, the Security Council went one step beyond authorizing member nations to enter territorial waters when it extended that right to the Somali landmass for the purpose of U.S. law addressing the international crime of piracy emanates from the Constitution suppressing piracy. The resolution provides that states and regional organizations can “undertake all necessary measures ‘appropriate in Somalia,’ to interdict those using Somali territory to plan, facilitate or undertake such acts.”²²

Having dealt with the jurisdictional issues related to operations, the council next addressed the criminal jurisdiction concerns affecting all nations that happened to take individuals engaged in piracy into custody. In Resolution 1851, states and regional organizations were asked to conclude special agreements with countries willing to take custody of pirates and that were willing to embark law enforcement officials onboard from the latter countries to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of persons detained. Following passage of Resolution 1851, U.S. and allied leaders represented in the Combined Maritime Force agreed to enhance the entire ongoing counter-piracy effort in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

Marine insurance for ships transiting the Gulf of Aden. The report found that commercial shippers could require a special war risk insurance premium costing additional tens of thousands of dollars per day, and that these additional costs could adversely impact international trade during the current global economic downturn.

The subcommittee hearing on February 4 provided a comprehensive examination of piracy, to include its prevalence, its current and potential impact on shipping, and the nature and effectiveness of the international efforts being implemented to following passage of Resolution 1851, U.S. and allied leaders represented in the Combined Maritime Force agreed to enhance the entire ongoing counter-piracy effort Congressional Support On February 4, 2009, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in the House held a lengthy hearing on International Piracy on the High Seas in its Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. The hearing, the first held by the subcommittee on this subject, was precipitated by a Congressional Research Service report dated December 3, 2008, that focused attention on economic and humanitarian threats posed by pirates to the global seafaring community and the smooth flow of international trade.²³ The specific focus of the report was that, given the marked increase of pirate attacks, the cost of transporting cargo in international waters could rise dramatically because of the sharp increase in ocean combat this threat. The hearing established that the international community has mounted a multifaceted response in the Gulf of Aden–Indian Ocean region, and that the United States is taking an active role in this effort through its leadership in Combined Task Force (CTF) 151. However, as subcommittee chair Congressman Elijah Cummings (D–MD) stated in his opening remarks, “Given the size of the ocean area that international forces must patrol and their limited manpower, international naval powers are unlikely to be able to protect every ship passing the Horn of Africa from pirates.”²⁴

The hearing identified recent actions by the U.S. Government to respond to this threat, including the national strategy document, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan²⁵ (hereafter National Strategy), issued by the National Security Council with the President's approval in December 2008. The National Strategy recognizes that lasting solutions to the piracy problem require significant improvements in governance, rule of law, security, and economic development in Somalia. The strategy is realistic, however, in recognizing that, in light of the current threat, steps can be taken in the near term to deter, counter, and reduce the risk of attacks by Somali pirates. The strategy calls for preventative and precautionary measures that include:

- Establishing a senior level contact group of nations that have the political will, operational capability, and resources to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa.
- Strengthening and encouraging the use of the Maritime Security Patrol Area in the Gulf of Aden
- Updating Ship's Security Assessment and Security Plans to harden commercial shipping against pirate attacks.
- Establishing strategic communications plans to emphasize the destructive effects of piracy on trade and on human and maritime security and to encourage the rule of law.

The second prong of the National Strategy addressed at the hearing looks to interrupt and terminate acts of piracy through effective antipiracy operations. These operations are designed to interdict vessels used by pirates, and where possible to intervene in acts of piracy. The National Strategy also calls for identifying, disrupting, and eliminating pirate bases in Somalia and, to the extent possible, impacting pirate revenue.²⁶

The final prong of the National Strategy addressed at the hearing relates to the requirement to hold pirates accountable for their crimes. All participants agreed during the hearing with the statement in the National Strategy that piracy is flourishing because it is highly profitable and nearly consequence-free. For this reason, developing the capacity to capture and successfully prosecute these criminals is critical to combating piracy. To that end, the National Strategy supports the development of agreements and arrangements with states in Africa and around the world that will allow pirates to be captured, detained, and prosecuted.

Operational Response

The Combined Maritime Force (CMF), comprised of ships and assets from more than 20 nations and commanded by a U.S. flag officer from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, has its headquarters in Manama, Bahrain. On January 8, 2009, the CMF formally established CTF 151 for counter-piracy operations.²⁷ Previously, in August 2008, the CMF created the Maritime Security Patrol Area in the Gulf of Aden to support international efforts to combat piracy. At that time, the only organization within the multinational CMF tasked with counter-piracy operations was CTF 150, which had been established at the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

The mission of CTF 150, however, was focused on the deterrence of all destabilizing activities at sea in the region, with an emphasis on drug smuggling and weapons trafficking. Piracy, although destabilizing, was not a major focus. Moreover, several of the navies of the 20 nations whose assets anticipated did not have the authority to conduct counter-piracy missions. It was for this reason that CTF 151, with its sole focus on piracy, was established. This would allow CTF 150 assets and the nations supporting this mission to remain focused on drugs and weapons

trafficking, while at the same time providing tailored training and operations for the counter-piracy requirement in CTF 151.

The unclassified execute order (EXORD) for CTF 151 was published by the CMF commander on December 30, 2008. The mission of CTF 151 is clear:

CTF 151 is to conduct counter piracy operations in the CMF battlespace under a mission-based mandate to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime commerce, enhance maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.

This order mirrors the prior authorizations provided in the UN Security Council resolutions described above. It provides that ships of nations cooperating in the counter-piracy operations may board and search vessels where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the vessels are engaged in piracy; may seize and dispose of these vessels, arms, and equipment used in the commission of piratical acts; and detain those suspected of engaging in piracy with a view to prosecution by competent law enforcement authorities. While the EXORD authorizes entry into Somali territorial seas by participating warships, nowhere does it grant CTF personnel the authority to enter the land territory of Somalia as provided in UN Security Council Resolution 1851.

Despite this limitation, CTF 151 has deployed highly trained U.S. Navy Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) teams, as well as the Coast Guard's elite Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) 405 aboard the command ship USS San Antonio.²⁸ The role of LEDET 405 is to supplement and train the VBSS teams in various maritime interdiction operations mission areas, including maritime law, boarding policies and procedures, evidence collection and preparation, and tactical procedures.

The rapid escalation of armed attacks off the Horn of Africa in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean has prompted an unprecedented counter-piracy response within the National Security Council, U.S. Congress, United Nations, and the Combined Maritime Force. The December 2008 Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan, issued by the National Security Council, is realistic in recognizing that there are steps that can be taken in the near term to deter, counter, and reduce the risk of attacks by Somali pirates.

The United Nations has similarly begun to seriously examine the dangerous conditions in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean off Somalia's coast. In December 2008, the Security Council unanimously passed two sweeping resolutions that authorized the warships of the multinational Combined Maritime Force to enter both the territorial waters of Somalia and the land territory of that state when necessary to destroy pirate strongholds. These actions and this authority are unprecedented and indicate the deep UN commitment to deal effectively with this threat to international peace and security.

The establishment of Combined Task Force 151 in January 2009 reflects U.S. and allied commitment to provide a choke hold around the actions of pirates off the coast of Somalia. In the Navy's commitment of its Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure teams and the Coast Guard's assignment of its Law Enforcement Detachment unit, moreover, the U.S. military has committed its best.

There is no question that piracy will continue in the highly vulnerable shipping lanes of the Gulf of Aden as long as the rewards outweigh the risks. With the establishment of CTF 151, that equation may be changing.

Endnotes

- 1 Condoleezza Rice, remarks at United Nations (UN) Security Council, New York, NY, December 16, 2008.
- 2 A.R. Thomas and James C. Duncan, Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, sec. 3.5.2 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1999), 222–223.
- 3 Sec. 101 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Opened for Signature December 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261; Art. 15 of the Convention on the High Seas defines piracy in essentially identical terms. See 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 92, Geneva, April 29, 1958.
- 4 Thomas and Duncan.
- 5 Art. I, sect. 8, U.S. Constitution.
- 6 See 18 U.S.C. 1651–1661 (1996) (piracy); 33 U.S.C. 381–384 (1996) (regulations for the suppression of piracy); and 18 U.S.C. 1654 (1996) (privateering).
- 7 18 U.S.C. 1651 (1996).
- 8 33 U.S.C. 381–384 (1996).
- 9 18 U.S.C. 1654 (1996).
- 10 18 U.S.C. 1655 (1996).
- 11 18 U.S.C. 1656 (1996).
- 12 18 U.S.C. 1657 (1996).
- 13 18 U.S.C. 1660 (1996).
- 14 18 U.S.C. 1661 (1996).
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Thomas and Duncan, sec. 3.5.3.1.
- 17 Art. 19, Convention on the High Seas; Art. 105, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- 18 Para. 11, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1814 (2008).
- 19 Para. 7, UNSCR 1816 (2008).
- 20 Para. 2, UNSCR 1838 (2008).
- 21 Ibid., Para 6. See also International Maritime Organization (IMO) Resolution A–1002 (25), which requested that IMO member states issue similar guidance to all vessels flying their national ensigns.
- 22 Para. 6, UNSCR 1851 (2008).
- 23 Rawle O. King, Ocean Piracy and Its Impact on Insurance, Report R40081 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 3, 2008).
- 24 Elijah Cummings, statement before the House Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Hearing on International Piracy on the High Seas, February 4, 2009, 1.
- 25 National Security Council, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2008).
- 26 Ibid., 10.
- 27 “New Counter-Piracy Task Force Established,” January 8, 2009, accessed at <www.navy.mil/local/cusnc>.
- 28 See testimony of RADM William Baumgartner, USCG, before the House Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Hearing on International Piracy on the High Seas, February 4, 2009, 6.

China's New Security Strategy for Africa

Jonathon Holslag

Reprinted with permission from the July 2009 issue of *Parameters*.

In December 2008, the Chinese Navy deployed three warships into the Gulf of Aden. This operation is not just a key moment in the development of China's blue-water navy, but also demonstrates China's growing willingness to secure its economic interests in Africa. The question is how successful this policy will be. The deeper China ventures into the resource-abundant African continent, the more it stumbles upon various security challenges. It is obvious that the People's Republic of China (PRC) desires to be Africa's most prominent economic partner. It is also unmistakable that the PRC is swiftly gaining diplomatic leverage. What is less clear, however, is how it will respond to the perils that lie ahead. Throughout history, most external powers for whom Africa's mineral wealth became indispensable to their industrial growth backed up their economic forays with a projection of military might, to suppress local resistance in their dominions or defend their realms from imperialist competitors. The dispatching of forces to Africa derived from the desire to reduce vulnerability while not having to rely on others.¹

Now China has achieved a stage of economic development which requires endless supplies of African raw materials and has started to develop the capacity to exercise influence in most corners of the globe. The extrapolation of history predicts that distrust and uncertainty will inevitably lead the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to Africa in staggering numbers. In application of the self-help paradigm, China is expected to confront security challenges autonomously, while keeping other powers at bay. This article provides an overview of recent security challenges and the ways in which China has been adapting its security policy, then discusses what China's options are for the future and to what extent unilateral military action in Africa is feasible.

Security Challenges

There are several sources of uncertainty regarding China's aspirations in Africa. Chinese mining activities often fall prey to endemic instability and violence in economic partner states. Since 2004, several Chinese companies have been in the frontline of internal conflicts. In 2004, rebels abducted Chinese workers who were working in southern Sudan.² In April 2006, a separatist movement detonated a car bomb in the south of Nigeria, warned that investors from China would be "treated as thieves," and threatened new attacks on oil workers, storage facilities, bridges, offices, and other oil industry targets. A spokesperson for the militant Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta condemned China for taking a \$2.2 billion stake in oil fields in the delta.³ In July of that year, violent protests erupted at the Chinese-owned Chambisi copper mine in Zambia, resulting in five deaths and severe material damage. In November, Sudanese rebels launched three attacks on Chinese oil facilities and briefly seized the Abu Jabra oil field close to Darfur.⁴ In January 2007, five Chinese telecommunications workers were kidnapped by gunmen in the oil city of Port Harcourt in southern Nigeria. Two weeks afterward, another nine Chinese oil workers went missing after being attacked by an armed group in Bayelsa state, Nigeria.⁵ A month later, four assailants raided a Chinese stone plant in Kenya and killed one Chinese employee.⁶

In April 2007, nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopian oil engineers were killed during an assault on an oil exploration site operated by SINOPEC's Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), an ethnic Somali

group, kidnapped and later released seven Chinese men. The ONLF has repeatedly warned foreign oil companies to leave the region bordering Somalia. In 2008, the Chinese government organized the evacuation of 212 compatriots from Chad to Cameroon after clashes in N'Djamena, Chad's capital. In the seas around Africa another risk looms. Chinese trawlers have been poached repeatedly when approaching the Horn of Africa. Between 2000 and 2006, seven incidents involving Somali pirates were reported. In 2008, pirates targeted six Chinese ships in the Gulf of Aden.

Violence also threatens economic interests indirectly. Mindful of Deng Xiaoping's proverb, "safeguarding world peace to ensure domestic development," Beijing is investing an increasing amount of effort into branding itself a responsible actor on the international scene.⁷ "The multifold, multilevel, and multichannel cooperation within the international community has become the realistic choice," Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing wrote in 2005. "The vigorous pursuit of peace, development, and cooperation by the people of all countries has formed a tide of history . . . China's diplomacy has made bold headway, serving domestic development and contributing to world peace and common development."⁸ Mayhem in the Sudanese province of Darfur, however, cast some doubt on these ambitions.⁹ China was not only criticized for supporting Khartoum following the commission of war crimes, but the situation in Darfur also put Beijing in a bind between two diverging aspects of China's new diplomatic standards. On the one hand, there is the traditional emphasis on sovereignty and noninterference, principles that have proved to be lucrative in establishing economic deals in Sudan and elsewhere in Africa.¹⁰ On the other hand, the principle of constructive engagement as described by Minister Li is essential to maintaining good relations with nations and participating in multilateral organizations. In Sudan, China's traditional policy of noninterference was contrary to the expectation of other African nations that Beijing would contribute to the stabilization of Darfur. Domestic violence from China's point of view reduces its diplomatic maneuverability and ability to maintain the policy of noninterference which facilitated business with various countries.

The Chinese position became even more awkward when violence in Sudan started to spill over into Chad. Following the establishment of diplomatic ties with Chad in 2006 and the consequent oil deals, the government in N'Djamena made it clear to Beijing that the infiltration of rebels from Darfur into its own territory had to stop. During a visit to Beijing in April 2007, Chad's Minister of Foreign Affairs urged the PRC to pressure Khartoum into ending its support of the Chadian armed opposition. After the siege on N'Djamena in the early part of 2008, Chad's envoy to the United Nations stated, "China was a friendly country to both the Sudan and Chad," and he expressed the hope that "China would bring to bear more pressure on the Sudan to stop the process of destabilization in Chad." The Sudan was trying to overthrow the legitimate government of Chad, in order to settle the conflict in Darfur. It was in China's interests to pressure the Sudanese.¹¹ When Li Zhaoxing visited the Central African Republic, President Francois Bozize joined Chad's appeal for exerting more pressure on Sudan. In April 2006, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked by the Ethiopian government to take a more active stance on the crisis in Somalia, implying that China should condone the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia to drive out the Union of Islamic Courts.

Finally, China is concerned about the increasing military presence of other powers.¹² Between 2000 and 2006, the United States increased the number of its forces in Africa from 220 to nearly 1,000. The establishment of a new US Africa Command (AFRICOM), announced when Chinese President Hu Jintao was completing a tour of the region in 2006, raised eyebrows in Beijing. Although the Chinese government did not officially comment, state-controlled media reported that the American initiative stood for "Cold War balancing" and that this move was "rejected by African countries."¹³ An official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs interpreted the establishment

of AFRICOM mainly in the context of the war against terrorism, but also recognized that “for the Americans, military diplomacy is a way to counterbalance China and to maintain a strategic edge.”¹⁴ Lin Zhiyuan, the deputy director of the Academy of Military Sciences, went further: “AFRICOM will surely facilitate coordinating or overseeing US military actions in Africa for an effective control of the whole of Africa,” he wrote. “The United States has enhanced its military infiltration in Africa in recent years, with its military aid to the continent doubling and its weaponry sale skyrocketing continuously.”¹⁵ Chinese officials also tend to believe that, in the case of Sudan and Zimbabwe, Washington is not really concerned with human rights, but that it highlights such issues to constrain China and to eventually effectuate a regime state at the expense of China’s influence.¹⁶

India is also expanding its military presence in the region. Along the East African coast, it has inked defense agreements with Kenya, Madagascar, and Mozambique and initiated joint training programs with Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and South Africa. Its naval dominance in the strategic maritime shipping lanes around Africa in particular makes Chinese security analysts worry about the safety of Chinese supply routes. Delhi has convinced island states such as Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Seychelles to cooperate on maritime surveillance and intelligence gathering. India’s fleet in the Indian Ocean is becoming one of the most powerful naval forces and includes state-of-the-art aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and other surface combatants.¹⁷ “As one of the emerging powers in the world, India is now catching up with their involvement in Africa,” one Chinese expert asserted. “The maritime build-up of India along the African shores is one of these endeavors taken by India. The purposes are multifold: economically for market and resources, politically for international influence and support for possible permanent membership in the UN Security Council, and it may also involve competing with China for influence in Africa.”¹⁸ Another scholar, Zhang Yuncheng, claims that “if some accident occurs or if the Strait [of Malacca] is blocked by foreign powers, China will experience a tremendous energy security problem.” This assessment is also shared by Zhu Fenggang, who points to the possibility of sea denial as a coercive measure against China.

Instability and geopolitical rivalry loom over China’s future supply of natural resources. Most of Africa’s energy deposits are located in the violence-plagued area that surrounds Sudan or in the Gulf of Guinea where the United States continues to step up its influence. In the east, India has begun converting the Indian Ocean into a sphere of influence. The most urgent need for Beijing is the protection of Chinese citizens and companies whenever they fall prey to instability overseas. The long-term risk is that local tensions and conflicts will entice external powers to interfere and to exploit this instability to gain clout at the expense of the People’s Republic. It is this double security challenge that Chinese experts and policymakers have started to address.

China’s Current Security Policy

In response to the attacks in Africa during the last five years, China has confronted the problem of nontraditional security threats in several ways. Two senior researchers of the State Council’s study department categorized nontraditional threats as a strategic economic challenge and called for including a series of new measures in the national security strategy, in congruence with China’s position as an “influential world power.”¹⁹ Following the lethal attack on a Chinese oil facility in Ethiopia, *China Daily* headlined: “China needs to consider new channels to protect overseas interests.” The article stressed that “China must break through traditional diplomatic thinking The principle of self-restraint is insufficient to protect ourselves or to safeguard overseas economic interests and development.”²⁰

The PRC's initial reaction is to work with local governments. "China will cooperate closely with immigration departments of African countries in tackling the problem of illegal migration, improve exchange of immigration control information, and set up an unimpeded and efficient channel for intelligence and information exchange," China's 2006 *Africa Policy* stated. "In order to enhance the ability of both sides to address nontraditional security threats, it is necessary to increase intelligence exchange, explore more effective ways and means for closer cooperation in combating terrorism, small-arms smuggling, drug trafficking, transnational economic crimes, etc."²¹ Beijing has instructed its embassies in Africa to keep a close watch on local security. The swift and successful evacuation of Chinese citizens from Chad also demonstrated that China has developed operational scenarios to deal with these emergencies. The Chinese government has also started issuing travel advisories. In Sudan and Kenya, state-owned companies receive protection from local armed forces against attacks by rebels. Beijing has signed an agreement with South Africa to prevent the Chinese diaspora from turning into a target for armed gangs.²²

Such measures are designed to help Chinese citizens and companies avoid some of the risks related to operating in Africa, but they do not provide any guarantee for safeguarding China's economic activities if the situation keeps deteriorating. In the case of Sudan, China learned the hard way that prodding instable governments can have drastic consequences. If problems start to occur at the regional level, supporting these emerging states might prove even riskier. Nor does this narrow security response address China's uncertainty about the military capability of African nations. The dilemma reverts back to the realistic supposition of self-help. Is the PRC trying to safeguard its interests by building up its own military presence in Africa?

Bilateral military exchanges are a first indicator to test whether this assumption holds true. According to the Chinese government, interaction with other armed forces expanded significantly, with 174 high-level visits in 2001 and more than 210 in 2006. This upward trend was not maintained in Africa, however, where such bilateral exchanges have remained stable at an annual average of 26. Beijing has established a permanent military dialogue only with South Africa. Interviews with European diplomats in ten randomly chosen African countries also reveal that the number of accredited military officers in Chinese embassies, i.e., military attachés and their support staff, has barely or not expanded at all in the last few years. In fact, only in 15 countries are Chinese military attachés assigned on a permanent basis.²³ China's military diplomacy in Africa remains modest, and it has not kept up with the impressive number of Chinese trade officials posted in African nations to strengthen economic ties in the last few years.

Military aid is another indicator. Providing military hardware to partner nations can serve various objectives. In a context of competition, it helps to thwart defense cooperation with other states or to prevent other powers' attempts to alter the regional military balance. Defense aid might help a privileged political partner to safeguard economic interests. Whereas these three objectives are motivated by security issues and long-term economic interests, defense aid may well be the result of more short-sighted aspirations. There is no evidence that China's military aid successfully counterbalances other powers, such as the United States. Apart from Sudan and Zimbabwe, most countries that have received Chinese military aid in the last few years are also supplied by Washington. In 2007, Beijing temporarily froze the supply of heavy arms to Khartoum after pressure from the West.²⁴ When Nigeria's Vice President, Atiku Abubakar, announced that his nation would turn to China instead of the United States for arms, Beijing's response was reluctant, and no major supply operations materialized. China's military aid programs should not be considered as support for its forays into the mining industry. For instance, between 2004 and 2008, resource-rich Nigeria received only half as much military aid as Ghana or Uganda. During this period, China provided more military assistance to Angola than to Sudan, even though the security challenges in the latter were much greater. Although violence in Somalia has threatened

China's oil exploration activities in both Ethiopia and Kenya, China only made a commitment to Kenya to help in protecting its border. China has, at times, provided military aid, but such assistance does not seem to be part of any coherent strategy related to protecting its security interests.

Finally, self-help would imply the deployment of military forces whenever China's interests are threatened, possibly in an attempt to train friendly armed forces and dissuade any challengers. Yet, such a Chinese military presence is negligible. China has no bases in Africa, as does the United States and France, nor has it trained African soldiers to counter threats to its national interests. In Sudan, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, and Gabon, China has employed teams of three to ten instructors, but they are assisting in the maintenance of equipment, rather than providing training for combat missions. In Zambia and Algeria, similar examples of cooperation exist but are limited to medical activities. Other major powers deployed naval vessels in an effort to combat piracy and to maintain the maritime supply lines surrounding Africa. During such operations, the Chinese Navy has rarely shown its flag. In 2000, China sent its newest *Luhai*-class guided missile destroyer and a supply ship to Tanzania and South Africa. A 2002 fleet composed of a guided missile destroyer, the *Qingdao*, and a supply ship, the *Taicang*, visited Egypt.²⁵ These voyages were gestures of courtesy rather than a reaction to security challenges. They were limited in duration, and no actions were attempted against pirates or poachers. In December 2008, however, the Chinese government did deploy two destroyers and a replenishment ship in the Gulf of Aden to participate in the United Nations-backed mission against piracy. A mission that was only undertaken after receiving a positive signal from US Pacific Command chief Admiral Timothy Keating.

Instead of dealing with security threats unilaterally, China has resorted to bandwagoning. Although in the 1980s and early 1990s, Beijing opposed attempts by the international community to intervene in African security issues, nowadays it tends to join them. Beijing is increasingly recognizing the United Nations' role in resolving the numerous conflicts and safeguarding the sovereignty of developing nations. In the 1990s, China began supporting United Nations (UN) missions designed to implement peace agreements between rivaling parties, on the condition that a well-defined and restricted mandate was included. Traditional peacekeeping operations such as those in Somalia (UNSOM I), Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone all were supported. When the UN Security Council decided to dispatch forces to Liberia in 2003, China offered to support the mission and gradually increased the number of its peacekeepers to 1,300 in 2007.

At the same time, however, failed states and national governments that had actively participated in atrocities challenged the efficacy of many of the traditional UN operations. China's focus on the primacy of sovereignty, requiring at a minimum the state's consent, collided with the willingness of other nations to intervene aggressively under the UN Charter's Chapter VII mandate. Beijing loudly opposed the move by European countries to push for Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, Washington's call to broaden the UNSOM mandate, or France's demand for a troop increase in the 2004 UN operation in Ivory Coast. Despite its strong concerns, China did not veto these interventions at the UN Security Council, but rather abstained and remained aloof from implementation. Sudan was the first instance where China actively lobbied an African government to permit a UN mission on its soil. Via active brokering and indirect pressure, China succeeded in neutralizing the incompatibility between its economic interests and the principle of noninterference on the one hand, and western appeals for intervening in Darfur and the need for long-term stability on the other.

That Beijing recognizes the importance of collective security became apparent in 2006, when China was the first nation to ask the UN Security Council for a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. In June that year, at a Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa, China's Permanent Representative to the UN, Wang Guangya, scolded other diplomats for neglecting Somalia and urged them to support the deployment of peacekeepers. "I was reluctant to take on this role," said Wang, explaining that African governments had been pushing China to raise the issue in the Council, "but there was a lack of interest by the other major powers." Initially, the proposal was tentatively received by Great Britain and the United States, but after various talks in New York, Beijing and Washington jointly sponsored a resolution for the deployment of a UN mission. In 2007, in early consultations with France, China supported a French draft resolution on Chad calling for the dispatch of mainly European peacekeepers under the auspices of Chapter VII. It was significant that China approved the "close liaising" with the Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), where earlier it had objected to the development of links between UNAMID and UN missions. "Our support for the resolution on Chad shows that we are prepared to cooperate to tackle security issues at a regional level and that our awareness on the increasing complexity of violent conflicts in Africa grows," a Chinese diplomat explained.

China is also turning to African regional organizations to collaborate on security issues.²⁶ In the China-Africa Action Plan, approved in November 2006, Beijing vowed "to support Africa in the areas of logistics" as well as "to continue its active participation in the peacekeeping operations and demining process in Africa and provide, within the limits of its capabilities, financial and material assistance as well as relevant training to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union."²⁷ In June 2006, the Chinese government granted the African Union's Mission in Sudan \$3.5 million in budgetary support and humanitarian aid. Earlier, it provided financial and technical support to the Association for West African States.

Slowly but surely, China is showing itself ready to participate in international efforts to prevent conflicts, fueled by the easy availability of small arms and illegally exported natural resources. In 2002, for instance, Beijing revised its regulation on the control of military products for export and published the "Military Products Export Control List" supplying guidelines for the export of military-related products. In the same year, it signed the "Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms," which committed the People's Republic to control the manufacturing, marking, import, and export of firearms, and to confiscate and destroy all illicit firearms.²⁸ In 2005, the government launched a national information management system for the production, possession, and trade of light arms, and it introduced a system to monitor end-users of Chinese-made weapons to prevent the arms from finding their way to "sensitive regions" around the world via third parties.²⁹ In 2006, China supported a draft UN resolution on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons, in contrast to the United States.³⁰ In 2002, China joined the Kimberley Process, a joint government, international diamond industry, and civil initiative designed to stem the flow of conflict diamonds originating from Africa.³¹ In 2005, China allowed a voluntary peer review of its support for the Kimberly Process.³² Although these actions still have many flaws, they seem to prove that China wishes to do more than just put "boots on the ground" in response to Africa's internal conflicts.

Despite the strategic importance of Africa, China does not try to safeguard its foothold in the region by unilaterally projecting military power. In Africa, its military diplomacy remains limited when compared with defense initiatives in other regions. If the PRC does pursue bilateral cooperation programs, these are more likely to be a part of its diplomatic charm offensive, rather than addressing threats to China's economic and security interests. Instead of relying on a military presence to counterbalance other powers, the PRC tends to join collective security efforts within the framework of the United Nations and African regional organizations. Over the past few years,

this strategy of joint ventures has evolved from passive support to active cooperation. Beijing has softened its devotion to noninterference. While maintaining the primacy of sovereignty, it has become willing to support interventions whenever regional stability is at stake.

Although China has become a revisionist power in terms of its economic aspirations on the continent, it is acting as a status-quo power in terms of security objectives. There are several explanations for this stance. First, China only recently began its economic focus on the African continent. For the past two decades, China concentrated on curbing the military and diplomatic influence of Taiwan; the focus on “economization” of its Africa policy only began in the late 1990s. Hence, the security challenges it is facing now are a recent phenomena, and solutions to these challenges are just starting to be explored. The PRC is going through the early stage of resecuritization of its Africa strategy, and joining with other nations in an allied strategy can be considered the easiest immediate response. Second, and related to this point, China has not developed sufficient means to back up its security policy with military power. This is a matter of budgetary constraints. Building an independent and sustained military presence is a costly affair and would, at present, overstretch the PLA’s capabilities, while Asia remains its primary focus. The PLA does not possess the logistical capacity to support sustained region wide deployment in Africa. Its long-range airlift and sealift, as well as its intelligence and command capabilities, are not up to the task. Third, the Chinese government wants to avoid the People’s Republic being perceived as a hegemonic power.

In the initial stage of its economic charm offensive, the PRC tried to pursue a business-as-usual approach, maintaining a low profile and steering clear of political entanglements. That approach is no longer possible now that China stands at the forefront of Africa’s political scene, actively altering the economic balance of power. Beijing is well aware of the dichotomy between its weak and strong identities and is reluctant to demonstrate any independent military capacity. Such a show of strength might reduce its diplomatic maneuverability, increase resistance from African nations—just as Washington is now experiencing—and raise suspicions elsewhere regarding Chinese intentions. Yet, as interests, perceptions, and capacities are susceptible to change, the question remains whether China will stay on this track of cooperative security.

China’s interests in Africa have changed over the past decades and will undoubtedly continue to evolve. The concept for its security policy in the region will depend on the role that Africa plays as a supplier of natural resources. Africa currently supplies approximately 30 percent of China’s oil imports. Beijing and its African partners announced that they are preparing to increase bilateral trade to \$100 billion by the year 2010. Most of this increase will come from the import of raw commodities. In recent years, Chinese companies have laid the foundation for a substantial increase in the production of resource industries. Exploration in the Gulf of Guinea, Angola, and the Horn of Africa have the potential for an increase in oil exports to China of more than 80 percent in the next ten years. Chinese companies are just starting to tap the large mines that were recently acquired in Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, and elsewhere on the continent. Given the fact that other emerging markets such as India and Brazil are shifting the use of their raw materials from export to domestic consumption, the economic relevance of Africa to China cannot be overstated.

How necessary it is to back up these Chinese economic ventures with more overt security measures is yet to be seen. The incidents described in the first section of this article, the persistent instability in nations, as well as the weak position of amicable political leaders will undoubtedly position Africa higher on Beijing’s foreign security agenda and require a more complete approach. The question again arises whether it is in China’s best interest to apply its African policy independently or in synergy with other nations. The short-term costs of any unilateral action

would certainly exceed those of collective action, but long-term uncertainty about the intentions of other major players might influence any concerns related to cost-effectiveness. If Washington or Delhi decides to change course and contain China's expanding influence in Africa by pursuing a strategy of counterbalancing and sea denial, the repercussions for the People's Republic will be dramatic. The concerns of the national security establishments in India and the United States and their expanding military presence in Africa are not unnoticed in China, and they highlight the necessity for the PRC to build a legitimate capacity to deal with crises unilaterally.

China's diplomatic identity will help shape policy decisions in support of a more active and autonomous security strategy. Beijing is realizing that the comfortable cloak of frailty it previously presented to the world no longer fits. African partners do not attach much value to China's diplomatic schizophrenia and the complex image of an economic giant, political dwarf, and minor military player it projects. When mayhem erupts, China automatically ends up on the frontline, finding itself hounded by African governments asking it to exercise its leverage. The cases of Chad and Somalia are not the only examples of this. South Africa has accosted China regarding illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe.³³ Central Africa has carefully examined the violent incursions from Sudan.³⁴ The African Union has called upon China several times to play a more active role in promoting security. The possibility exists that individual countries may be compelled to form a closer alliance with China in order to reduce their current reliance on the European Union and United States for security. Nigeria's announcement that it would rely on China instead of the United States for military support hints at this direction. The ability of the PRC to keep a low military profile is diminishing.

On the other hand, China's self-perception is also in transition. The "Century of Humiliation" is far behind and is being replaced by a national attitude of confidence and assertiveness. Chinese leaders have built on the success of their policy of good neighbor diplomacy that resulted in fewer frictions and more influence in Asia. The People's Republic has drawn confidence from the successful launch of a number of new defense systems. As China sees its diplomatic leverage expanding geographically from the Strait of Formosa, via Asia to the rest of the developing world, its ability to deal with emerging security issues is likely to follow suit.

Finally, there is the factor of capacity. China is gearing its military for a greater deployment capability. Its large immobile army is gradually being converted into a highly specialized and flexible organization. Simultaneously, the PLA is launching new military systems that will enhance its capacity to transport these forces. In 2007, the Chinese government approved the development of large passenger jets, including military transport variants similar to the American C-17 Globemaster III. Beijing has also ordered several new ships in an effort to enhance its naval transport capacity. In 2006, the hull of the first T-071 vessel was laid. This landing-platform dock has a range that goes far beyond Taiwan, with the aim of providing sea-based support to operations on land, humanitarian aid, and assisting in evacuations and disaster management. These vessels will be supported by a new generation of large replenishment ships and could be escorted by advanced frigates and destroyers. The Chinese flotilla that was sent to Somalia demonstrates China's new blue-water capacity. The type 052C *Lanzhou*, for instance, is a showcase of the advanced detection capacity for China's Navy. Its multifunction, active phased-array radar has a detection range of 450 kilometers and is complemented with a long-range, two-dimensional air search radar that has a 350-kilometer range and three additional systems to detect incoming missiles and aircraft.³⁵ China is advancing its ability to pursue a more confident and independent security policy in Africa.

Will all this newfound military activity be sufficient to offset the antagonistic response it is likely to provoke? Probably not. If China decides to go solo and to pursue a more aggressive security

policy in Africa, it is improbable that it will be able to overcome countermoves by India and the United States. As this article previously detailed, it will be difficult for China to safeguard maritime trade with Africa if India exercises its naval dominance in the Indian Ocean. The sheer geographical divide between the PRC and the African continent makes it extremely difficult to support military activities if the United States or India opposes them. Contrary to China's revolutionary phase of the 1950s and 1960s when trade and economic interests only played a small part, China's increasing reliance on Africa renders it highly vulnerable to sea denial operations or a *guerre de course*. The fragile Cold War balance between the United States and the Soviet Union that allowed Mao to meddle with America's interests in Africa without having to fear political or economic reprisals can no longer be counted on. These days China has much to lose if it provokes Washington or Delhi.

Conclusion

There are several reasons to assume that China will abandon its security cooperation strategy in Africa. The persistence of the double security challenge, the growing strategic importance of Africa, and China's growing military might and diplomatic assertiveness may lead to a more strident and unilateral security policy. For the long-term haul, however, the geo-economics in question, specifically the vulnerability of its long supply lines, will prevent China from resorting to a unilateral diplomacy that a number of nations previously pursued. Despite changing interests, perceptions, and means, China is and will remain dependent on the good will and collaboration of other players to help safeguard its economic interests in Africa. As long as its economic stability relies on a supply of Africa's natural resources, China will stick to the path of security cooperation. In fact, it will be the main stakeholder in terms of maintaining peace, social stability, good governance, and equitable development in its partner countries. Beijing's only option is to avoid future friction with other world powers by not being drawn into national power plays and by preventing regional and domestic hostility. Unlike any other external power, it is in China's interest to turn regional actors into flexible and globally supported organizations, and by demonstrating strategic leadership and conflict management while doing so.

Endnotes

Acknowledgements go to Chris Alden, Bates Gill, David Shinn, Gudrun Wacker, and He Wenping for their constructive remarks.

1. Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, eds., *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent* (London: Routledge, 2004); Shaun Gregory, "The French Military in Africa: Past and Present," *African Affairs*, 99 (July 2000), 435-48; Louis Balmond, ed., *Les Interventions Militaires Françaises en Afrique* (Paris: Pedone, 1998).
2. "Two Chinese Abducted by Rebels in Sudan," *China Daily*, 17 March 2004.
3. Craig Timberg, "Militants Warn China over Oil in Niger Delta," *The Washington Post*, 30 April 2006.
4. Associated Press, "Sudan Rebels Attack Kordofan Oilfield," *Sudan Tribune*, 27 November 2006.
5. Martin Espinola, "Nigerian Militants Attack Oil, Gas Industries," *Reuters*, 25 January 2007.
6. Qiang Guo, "Chinese Engineer Killed in Kenya Attack," *China Daily*, 2 February 2007.
7. On the transition of China's diplomatic identity, see Rosemary Foot, "Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State," *The China Journal*, 45 (Spring 2001), 1-19; Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, 82 (November/December 2003), 21-35; Zhao Kejin, "Hard Diplomacy, Soft Landing: On the Formation and Consequences of the New Thought of China's Diplomacy," *International Review*, May 2005; Su Changhe, "Discovering China's New Diplomacy: Multilateral International Institutions and New Thought of China's Diplomacy," *World Economics and Politics*, 4 April 2005.
8. Li Zhaoxing, "Banner of Diplomacy Stressed," *People's Daily*, 23 August 2005.

9. Jonathan Holslag, "China's Diplomatic Maneuvering on the Question of Darfur," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 17 (February 2008).
10. On the application of noninterference as an economic lever, see Jonathan Holslag, "China's New Mercantilism in Central Africa," *African and Asian Studies*, 5 (no. 2, 2006), 133-69.
11. United Nations, "Press Conference by Chad's Foreign Minister," 26 February 2008.
12. Horace Campbell, "China in Africa: Challenging US Global Hegemony," *Third World Quarterly*, 29 (February 2008), 89-105; Jiang Chunliang, 21 shiji shijie shiyou jingzheng yu Zhongguo shiyou anquan [21st Century World Oil Competition and China's Oil Security] in 21 shiji Zhongguo shiyou fazhan zhanlue [21st Century China's Oil Development Strategy] (Beijing: Shiyou Gongye Chubanshe, 2000), 30-43; Kang Sheng, "American Factor and Chinese Petroleum Security and Diplomacy in Africa," *Journal of Socialist Theory Guide* (April 2006); Wang Jinchun, "Geopolitical Analysis on USA's Oil Strategy towards Africa," *Development and Economy* (September 2003).
13. See, for instance, "African States Reject US Military Command Center," *China Daily*, 27 June 2007; and "North Africa Reluctant to Host US Command," *Xinhua*, 24 June 2007.
14. Author's interview at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 7 December 2007.
15. Lin Zhiyuan, "U.S. Moves to Step up Military Infiltration in Africa," *People's Daily*, 26 February 2007.
16. Peng Jianli and Luo Huijun, Dangqian Fazhanzhong Guojia dui Meiguo Renquan Waijiao Ying Caiqu de Duice [On the Countermeasures the Developing Countries Should Take Against America's Human Rights Diplomacy], Hunan Shifan Daxue Shehui Kexue Xuebao [Journal of Hunan Normal University], (April 2002); Holslag, "China's Diplomatic Maneuvering on the Question of Darfur."
17. Jonathan Holslag, China, India, and the Military Security Dilemma (Brussels: Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, 2008), 13-25; Zhang Wenmu, Jingji quanqiuhua yu Zhongguo haiquan [Economic Globalization and China's Seapower], Zhanlue yu guanli [Strategy and Management], no. 1 (January 2004), 90-96; Zhang Jie, Zhongguo Nengyuan Anquan de Maliujia Yinsu [The Malacca Factor in China's Energy Security], Guoji Zhengzhi [International Politics] (February 2005).
18. E-mail to author from Chinese Africa expert, Beijing, 28 February 2008.
19. Li Shantong and Hou Shantong, Zhongguo "shiyiwu" jingji zhanlue zhimian ba da tiaozhan [China's eleventh five-year plan faces eight strategic economic challenges] (Beijing: State Council Development Research Center, 16 June 2007).
20. Zhongguo chuantong waijiao shoudao fei chuantong tiaozhan [China's traditional diplomacy challenged by nontraditional security threats], *China Daily*, 28 April 2007.
21. Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China, China's Africa Policy (Beijing: 12 January 2006), section 4.4.
22. Author's interview with expert at China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, 17 December 2007.
23. Susan Puska, "Military Backs China's Africa Adventure," *Asia Times*, 8 June 2007.
24. Author's interviews with European Union official, Brussels, 20 February 2008, and European diplomat, New York, 21 February 2008.
25. Puska.
26. Wan Yulan, Feimeng yu Feizhou Anquan Tixi de Goujian [African Union and the Creation of African Security System], Xiya Feizhou [West Asia and Africa] (June 2007); Luo Jianbo, Lixiang yu Xianshi: Feimeng yu Feizhou Jiti Anquan Jizhi de Jiangou [Ideal and Reality: AU and the Construction of African Collective Security Mechanism], Waijiao Pinglun [Foreign Policy Review] (April 2006).
27. "Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: Addis Ababa Action Plan, 2004-2006" (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Second Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 15-16 December 2003).
28. "China's Vice Foreign Minister on Small Arms Issues," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 10 December 2002.
29. Qiao Zonghuai, "Statement by Chinese Representative at UN Workshop on Small Arms and Light Weapons," Beijing, 20 April 2005.

30. United Nations Disarmament Committee, "The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects," revised draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.15/Rev.1, 19 October 2006.
31. Kimberly Process, "Participants World Map," http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/structure/participants_world_map_en.html.
32. Global Witness Publishing and Partnership Africa Canada, "Implementing the Kimberly Process," June 2005; Clive Wright, "Tackling Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme," *International Peacekeeping*, 11 (Winter 2004), 697-708.
33. Author's interview with South African scholar, Brussels, 5 February 2008.
34. Author's interview with French foreign affairs official, Paris, 12 February 2008; e-mail to author from French diplomat, Bangui, 13 February 2008.
35. "Chinese Naval Fire-Control Radars," *Jane's Naval Fire Control Radars*, 27 May 2008.

Chapter 2 - USAFRICOM Overview/Operations of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)

LTC Leda Rozier

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) LNO to CJTF-HOA

Background

On 6 February 2007, President Bush and Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced the creation of USAFRICOM. The decision was the culmination of a 10-year thought process within the Department of Defense (DOD) acknowledging the emerging strategic importance of Africa, and recognizing that peace and stability on the continent impacts not only Africans, but the interests of the U.S. and international community as well. Yet, the department's regional command structure did not account for Africa in a comprehensive way, with three different U.S. military headquarters maintaining relationships with African countries. The creation of USAFRICOM enabled DOD to better focus its resources to support and enhance U.S. initiatives that help African nations, the African Union, and the regional economic communities succeed. It also provides African nations and regional organizations an integrated DOD coordination point to help address security and related needs.

The designers of USAFRICOM clearly understood the relationships between security, development, diplomacy, and prosperity in Africa. As a result, USAFRICOM reflects an integrated staff structure that includes significant management and staff representation by the Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other U.S. government agencies involved in Africa. The command also incorporates partner nations and humanitarian organizations, from Africa and elsewhere, to work alongside the U.S. staff on common approaches to shared interests.

USAFRICOM's Mission

USAFRICOM, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.

Organization: An organizational chart of USAFRICOM is located on the following page.

Headquarters, USAFRICOM is located at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany. The command has a significant U.S. military presence in numerous African nations, to include Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, as well as DOD personnel assigned to U.S. embassies and diplomatic missions to coordinate defense programs supporting U.S. diplomacy.

In early December 2008, the U.S. ambassador to Italy and the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs announced in Rome that the South Eastern Task Force (SETAF) officially assumed duties as the Army component headquarters for AFRICOM. As the Army Component Command, they, in concert with national and international partners, conduct sustained security engagement with African land forces to promote peace, stability, and security in Africa. As directed, SETAF deploys as a contingency headquarters in support of crisis response.




Figure 5-1. USAFRICOM organizational chart

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) established the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) on 19 October 2002. Since then, CJTF-HOA personnel have used military-to-military mentorship as the cornerstone to building partner country security capacity.

Seventeenth Air Force (17 AF) was activated on 25 April 1953 at Rabat, Morocco. 17 AF supported a geographic area of North Africa, Portugal, Austria, the Middle East, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, and the Mediterranean Islands. The command's units and resources steadily expanded through the mid-1950s. In August 1956, HQ USAFE relocated 17 AF headquarters to a more central location at Wheelus Air Base, Libya, as the command expanded into Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The command exchanged its support mission for the defensive and offensive air missions in Central Europe in 1959. The headquarters was then relocated in November 1959 to Ramstein AB, Germany. The command's inventory included more than 500 tactical and 150 support aircraft operating from bases in Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Italy. After the 1961 Berlin Crisis and a U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) headquarters reorganization, 17 AF assumed responsibility for five bases in Great Britain from Third Air Force.

In December 2007, the U.S. Air Force began organizing its air component of USAFRICOM, later to stand up as the 17 AF. 17 AF, also known as Air Forces Africa, supports USAFRICOM via command and control of air forces to conduct sustained security engagement and operations as directed to promote air safety, security and development. For the foreseeable future, the 17 AF will operate as a functional staff, without assigned weapon systems, and be headquartered at Ramstein AB, Germany.

U.S. Naval Europe-U.S. Naval Forces Africa (NAVEUR-NAVAF) area of responsibility (AOR) covers approximately half of the Atlantic Ocean, from the North Pole to Antarctica; as well as the Adriatic, Baltic, Barents, Black, Caspian, Mediterranean, and North Seas. NAVEUR-NAVAF

also covers all of Europe and nearly the entire continent of Africa. It encompasses 105 countries with a combined population of more than one billion people and includes a landmass extending more than 14 million square miles. The AOR covers more than 20 million square nautical miles of ocean, touches three continents, and encompasses more than 67 percent of the Earth's coastline, 30 percent of its landmass, and nearly 40 percent of the world's population.

On 14 November 2008, Marine Forces Africa (MARFORAF) officially began operations in Africa. MARFORAF's strategic and tactical roles will include civil affairs and supporting humanitarian missions when necessary. Additionally, MARFORAF will support improving peacekeeping operations, supporting counterterrorism, and reducing threats from groups that are committed to violent extremism. MARFORAF is responsible for the entire African continent with the exception of Egypt. Specific Marine commands have supported the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership over the last few years and have been stationed on the African Partnership Station.

Operations

Africa Command has administrative responsibility for U.S. military support to U.S. government policy in Africa, to include military-to-military relationships with 53 African nations. Through the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, USAFRICOM provides mentors for a number of command post exercises. Once trained, these ACOTA forces can be deployed under the auspices of the Africa Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), or regional security organizations. USAFRICOM and its components will continue to support ACOTA by providing mentors/advisors to participate in missions, coordinate ACOTA missions into AFRICOM's overall engagement efforts and continue to collaborate with European nations interested in partnering with peacekeeping training, and as part of the ongoing military-to-military relationships.

USAFRICOM Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) provides military support to the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism (TSCT) program. OEF-TS engagements in the TSCT program focus on overall security and cooperation rather than solely on counter terrorism. The OEF-TS partnership comprises the United States and 10 African countries.

Through OEF-TS, U.S. AFRICOM trains, equips, assists, and advises partner nations through activities including, but not limited to the following:

- Military information sharing.
- Communications systems interoperability.
- Joint, combined, and multinational exercises enhancing cooperation.
- Countering extremist ideology.
- Sustaining regional operations.
- Building upon mutual military professionalism and accountability.
- Airlift and logistical support.
- Ground and aviation training and maintenance support.

USAFRICOM engages OEF-TS nations and supports the TSCT program through a variety of activities, such as:

- Joint Planning Assistance Teams (JPATs).
- Mobile Training Teams (MTTs).
- Civil-Military Support Elements (CMSEs).
- Military Information Support Teams (MISTs).
- Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET).
- Foreign military financing, foreign military sales, and international military education and training.
- Senior leader engagements to gain perspective and build regional cooperation.

The Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team (ADAPT) facilitates sustained security engagements and supports existing theater security cooperation programs such as ACOTA and Africa Partnership Station (APS). ADAPT bridges the gap between limited capacity and a nation's will to participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance/DR activities. To accomplish its mission, USAFRICOM components provide instruction via traveling contact teams (TCTs) of three to six personnel, focusing on military logistics and transportation.

The APS is a U.S. Navy-led program aimed at strengthening emerging partnerships in West and Central Africa to increase regional and maritime safety and security. The APS is a series of activities which build maritime safety and security in Africa in a comprehensive and collaborative manner. The APS is typically aboard a ship; as such, it functions as a mobile university, moving from port to port fostering long-term relationships between the United States and international partners. Training events focus on broad ranges of areas including maritime domain awareness, leadership, navigation, maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, civil engineering, and logistics. Crew members also participate in humanitarian assistance efforts led by interagency and non-governmental organizations in support of the U.S. embassy and country plans.

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program provides funds for international personnel to attend U.S. military professional training programs. The overall objectives of the IMET program are to further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations, provide training that augments the capabilities of participant nations' military forces, and increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain democratic values.

The Partnership for Integrated Logistics Operations and Tactics (PILOT) is a joint Canadian government/USAFRICOM initiative aimed at building long-term operational logistics planning capacity within the African Union Standby Force (ASF) while simultaneously promoting interoperability between the U.S. military and the ASF. PILOT familiarizes mid-level ASF officers with the knowledge and techniques necessary to be successful in both complex and traditional peacekeeping missions. The PILOT programs are assigned to provide participants with the skills they need to be more effective logisticians for roles in UN or African Union peacekeeping missions and improve deployment and sustainment capabilities of the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force (ESF) through multinational collaboration.

U.S. forces serve as examples of military professionalism while supporting DoS and USAID programs and activities. Projects include schools and clinics, health programs, well-digging, clothing, and food donations. The PILOT program also promotes stability and improves disaster response. As well, as in counties with high HIV/AIDS rates, the United States works at the military-to-military level to fund and coordinate awareness, treatment programs, and clinics, enabling African troops to participate in UN and African Union missions.

The following are samples of engagements USAFRICOM has supported either directly or indirectly on the continent.

Sample of Countries Supported

Kenya

The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) supports the International Support Training Center (IPSTC) by providing mentors to the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program. Former military contract instructors put a “military face” on the training.

The International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) is a Kenyan Ministry of Defense organization which trains military, police, and civilian personnel in all aspects of peace support operations.

U. S. Army Medical Research Unit – Kenya (USAMRU-K) is one of five U.S. military research overseas labs. USAMRU-K was first established in 1969 at Kenya’s invitation to study trypanosomiasis, a parasitic disease transmitted by the tsetse fly. In 1973, the unit was permanently set up in Nairobi, working through an agreement with the Kenya Medical Research Institute. USAMRU-K has 10 U.S. Army Soldiers, two Army civilians, and more than 400 Kenyan contractors — a mix of doctors, nurses, scientists, and laboratory technicians who work together to research, test, and prevent disease.

Gabon

U.S. AFRICOM facilitated Exercise Africa Endeavor in 2009, allowing 25 African nations to test their abilities to communicate with each other for two weeks. The exercise tested the nations’ information technology equipment to determine if they could communicate with each other via e-mail, Internet, and radio. Furthermore, the exercise teaches the countries how to communicate with each other during operations outside their country of origin (e.g., during peacekeeping operations where they have forces from 10 or more countries in the area). The goal, as a learning point during the exercise, is to be able to talk via radio or send data and have that information be successfully received by another country, regardless of the kind of equipment used.

Senegal

Air Forces Africa senior leaders met recently in Mali and Senegal to discuss improving air domain capacity and building airman skill sets for African air forces. Forces in both of these West African nations perform a variety of military operations, ranging from support, to peacekeeping operations, to internal border defense, to humanitarian assistance.

Topping the list of theater security cooperation objectives between Mali and U.S. forces are enhanced aircraft maintenance and logistics systems, increased interoperability with U.S. and other regional partners, and further professionalizing of Mali's defense forces.

In addition to meeting with the Air Force chief of staff and touring operations and maintenance facilities, U.S. senior leaders served as guest speakers at the graduation ceremony of the first class of instructors for the Senegalese NCO Academy.

Since its inception in 1971, the Senegalese NCO academy has trained more than 2,100 noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and now has produced the first 12 instructors trained in-house. Currently, many officers and NCOs attend training courses—ranging from pilot training, to core skill training, to professional military education—in other African and European nations as well as the United States.

Botswana

Members of the U.S. Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) arranged site visits and interviews with senior members of the Botswana Defense Force (BDF), and local non-governmental organizations (NGO) where discussions focused on the State Partnership Program relationship between the BDF and the North Carolina National Guard. Discussions also covered training and how the BDF benefits from training opportunities for its soldiers under the International Military Education and Training program. USAFRICOM provides training and curriculum assistance to the BDF Defense Command and Staff College (DCSC) in suburban Gaborone.

Through USAFRICOM's Humanitarian Assistance Program, a Botswana-based non-governmental organization (NGO), named Tebelope (Setswana for "going forward") provides voluntary counseling and testing.

Operation Survive and Thrive, now in its fourth year, is held annually to encourage BDF soldiers to learn their HIV status through voluntary counseling and testing. This year's campaign slogan, "Sekwata," is a Setswana language term associated with the military in Botswana that essentially translates as "squad mate" or "battle buddy," aimed to encourage soldiers and their peers to get tested and to promote responsible behavior.

Sekwata and Operation Survive and Thrive are part of a cooperative effort between the U.S. Department of Defense and the BDF to reduce HIV infections among soldiers, family members, and local civilians as well as improve force readiness within the BDF. These campaigns are funded through a \$2 million program under the president's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, managed by the USAFRICOM's Office of Security Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Gaborone.

Seychelles

Representatives from the U.S. Embassy in Mauritius and the Government of Seychelles hosted an event to address questions related to the presence of the MQ-9 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in the island nation. The MQ-9 Reaper is the first hunter-vehicle designed for long-endurance, high-altitude surveillance used by the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy.

The media and other guests received a brief overview of the MQ-9's capabilities as well as information on how the war on piracy needs to be fought on many fronts, nationally and internationally. With 1.3 million square kilometers of ocean in the Seychelles exclusive economic zone, combatting piracy is a complex problem that requires a wide range of resources.

The temporary stationing of MQ-9s in the Seychelles falls under the operational authority of USAFRICOM. This effect is part of a collaboration between the U.S. and Seychelles governments to determine the feasibility of using UAVs in support of maritime and border-related security initiatives in and around the Indian Ocean.

Liberia

The Liberian harbor of Greenville recently reopened for use after Dutch and U.S. naval survey teams completed joint hydrographic surveys of its waterways, clearing the way for commercial traffic to begin using the harbor again.

The week-long, joint surveys in Liberia focused on the harbors of Buchanan, Greenville, and Monrovia. Motion reference, multi-beam echo sounding, and precise global positioning system (GPS) technologies were used to paint a complete picture of each harbor's sea floor. The naval survey teams also installed tide gauges to document the ever-changing levels of tides in each harbor. The surveys generated data necessary to produce up-to-date navigational charts, making each harbor more accessible to commercial maritime traffic, in turn contributing to each harbor's economic development and maritime safety. Although the Greenville harbor is reopened for use, the port must await commercial industry verification prior to allowing commercial traffic.

Additionally, APS brings an international team of maritime experts, including elements from Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United States to offer assistance in addressing maritime safety and security challenges (e.g., unlawful, unregulated, and illegal fishing, piracy, and illicit trafficking). APS began as a U.S. initiative under U.S. Naval Forces Africa, the Navy component of USAFRICOM.

Mali

During a recent visit to Mali, where the official language is French, members of U.S. Air Forces Africa toured the Malian Air Force English Language Lab in Bamako. The lab in Bamako is one of three such labs spread across the country to prepare officers for training in the United States and other nations, as well as participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions.

The Bamako lab currently conducts two six-month programs and produces about 40 graduates a year, with materials provided through the U.S. Embassy and U.S. DOD. Two classes are taught each day in morning and afternoon sessions.

Instructors for the labs are resourced from the Malian defense forces. Instructor candidates are given a test; those with top scores attend an immersion course at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, provided through funding from the U.S. DoS's International Military Education and Training Program. In 2009, program funding totaled more than \$18 million, with participants from 49 African nations.

As stated previously, Air Forces Africa senior leaders met recently in Mali and Senegal to discuss improving air domain capacity and building airman skill sets for African air forces. Forces in Mali and Senegal perform a variety of military operations, ranging from support to peacekeeping operations to internal border defense to humanitarian assistance. Air mobility is a necessary component if they are to execute these missions successfully.

Topping the list of theater security cooperation objectives between Mali and U.S. forces are enhanced aircraft maintenance and logistics systems, increased interoperability with the U.S. and other regional partners, and further professional development of Mali's defense forces.

Malian defense leaders noted that a long-term strategy that improves their capability will benefit other nations in the region and around the world.

“Our common framework is combating terrorism,” said General Poudiougou, General Chief of Staff of the Mali Air Force. “More engagement and discussion will allow us to build a better common operating picture in combating terrorism at a worldwide level.”

Summary

USAFRICOM’s support of long-term missions with its partner nations has increased their capacity to provide their own security through sustained engagements. Enabling these partner nations to provide their own security in the region increases their capacities to control borders and increases the effectiveness of their military forces.

U.S. Army Africa: A Team Like No Other

MG William B. Garrett III

From ARMY Magazine, September 2009. Copyright 2009 by the Association of the U.S. Army.
Limited reprint permission granted by AUSA.

When a U.S. Air Force C-17 landed at Kigali International Airport, Rwanda, in early January to airlift vital equipment to peacekeepers in Sudan, it marked a change in U.S. policy toward assisting in the Darfur peacekeeping mission. It also marked a change for the U.S. Army in Africa. Just a few weeks before, in early December 2008, Southern European Task Force (SETAF) began its transformation to become U.S. Army Africa, the Army component to U.S. Africa Command.

CPT Charlie Jones and SSG Brian Ruse, two U.S. Army Africa soldiers, were on the tarmac that day, assisting Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) soldiers with uploading the U.S. cargo plane. The team was sent to mentor RDF logisticians on how U.S. soldiers load aircraft and support logistical missions; they were at the right place at the right time. In early January, then-President George W. Bush authorized the airlift mission. On January 14, U.S. cargo planes landed at Kigali, where the RDF soldiers loaded their equipment using lessons learned from their U.S. Army Africa mentors. In turn, the partnership effort offered immediate support to multinational peacekeepers serving in Sudan's war-torn region.

This type of engagement is indicative of U.S. Army Africa's new role. Small groups of soldiers with unique skill sets partner with African militaries to share knowledge and information, allowing Africans to choose which ideas apply to their situations and empowering them to resolve problems their own way.

U.S. Army Africa spent the first weeks of 2009 gearing up for missions in Africa during Lion Focus, a two-week exercise conducted concurrently with a mission readiness exercise at the Joint Warfighting Center in Suffolk, Va., that prepared troops heading to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. The goal was to improve the way our headquarters staff plans and conducts operations, with an Africa focus. It also gave U.S. Army Africa staff its first look at the road ahead, a major change from past operations. Based in Vicenza, Italy, SETAF supported NATO missions for more than 50 years, focusing primarily in Europe. Five times within the last 15 years, however, SETAF deployed assets to Africa in support of crisis-response operations.

U.S. Army Africa's new mission is twofold: conducting sustained security engagements with African land forces to promote security, stability and peace; and providing a contingency headquarters in support of crisis response. U.S. Army Africa staff have tackled their new mission, planning and participating in ongoing U.S. Africa Command missions and taking on new initiatives.

In February, a U.S. Army Africa officer went under way with the USS Nashville as part of the U.S. Navy's Africa Partnership Station, a training, goodwill and outreach mission to the five West African nations of Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon.

In March, CSM Earl Rice and SSG Christopher Upp represented U.S. Army Africa during a visit to South Africa's Special Forces (SASF), a mission conducted jointly with the U.S. Army Ranger Training Brigade. SASF leaders had previously attended a U.S. Army Ranger School graduation, and after seeing how Ranger professionalism is combined with technical and tactical proficiency,

they invited the U.S. soldiers to South Africa to discuss the development of a course for junior leaders. While plans are to have SASF troops interact with U.S. Army Africa noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and U.S. Army Rangers to build South African military capacity, it was U.S. soldiers who had a taste of hardcore SASF training. A few weeks after the initial visit, three Army NCOs underwent a grueling three-week survival course in the South African bush, learning valuable lessons on adapting to the environment, maintaining endurance and overcoming nearly insurmountable challenges—a “tool kit” they carried back to their units.

Later in March, a U.S. Army Africa team headed to Gaborone, Botswana, to share their logistics knowledge with a group of officers from the Botswana Defense Force. Once again, a small team that included a senior NCO and a warrant officer was effective, offering Army ideas on movement control while opening a two-way dialogue on the challenges of carrying out operations in Africa. Building rapport with soldiers in partner nations is an added benefit from such engagements, which can lead to future opportunities to share information on critical Army skills with soldiers in Botswana and elsewhere.

Throughout the year, U.S. Army soldiers serving under Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa have partnered with several African militaries. Soldiers from the 218th Field Artillery Regiment based at Fort Still, Okla., recently wrapped up a 15-month tour conducting military-to-military mentorship programs in Uganda, Ethiopia and other East African countries. Soldiers also lent their military expertise to several missions under the U.S. State Department’s Africa contingency operations training and assistance program.

Meanwhile, in the United States, Kenyan military officers visited the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. Senior NCOs from Kenya visited U.S. Army NCO training at Fort Benning, Ga., and toured the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas.

In April, U.S. Army Africa staff attended the Land Forces Symposium in Nairobi, Kenya. During discussions with senior African military leaders, the primary topic was not simply how the U.S. Army can help now, but rather a dialogue on achieving long-term goals through planning and partnership.

Our bottom line is that U.S. Army Africa efforts must support the policies and plans established by the U.S. embassy in each nation, many of which have U.S. Army officers serving as defense attachés. There are no plans for a large U.S. Army footprint in Africa; the deployment of a battalion or a brigade would happen only in the case of a crisis. Instead, the command deploys small teams of mentors. These teams work traditional “train-the-trainer” missions, building the capacity of partner nations’ instructors and enabling them to turn around and teach their own people.

A great example of this took place recently in Rwanda. Two senior U.S. Army Africa NCOs joined a British-led mentorship mission held in Gabiro. The task was the classic infantry “four stack” for clearing buildings. One afternoon, Rwanda Defense Force instructors gathered in the shade of a tree, taking in each step. Then they walked through the tactic. By the next morning, the RDF instructors were teaching their own troops.

As we move forward, mentorship is also happening at senior levels. In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, four U.S. Army lieutenant colonels are at the core of teaching and leadership within the Ethiopian army war college. African officers and NCOs also attend stateside U.S. Army schools, such as the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Success in Africa can only be achieved through partnership with other services within the U.S. military, other governmental agencies and civilian organizations. With no assigned forces, U.S. Army Africa relies on support from commands within the active component, the National Guard and the Army Reserve. In some cases, citizen-soldiers have unique skills and niche capabilities that active component soldiers do not.

This spring, LTG Clyde A. Vaughn, then-director of the Army National Guard, and LTG Jack C. Stultz Jr., chief of the U.S. Army Reserve and commanding general of the U.S. Army Reserve Command, met with key U.S. Army Africa leaders to discuss how citizen-soldiers' important capabilities— from those of civil affairs personnel and engineers to medics and military police— can be put to good use in Africa.

U.S. Army Africa also uses established efforts, Such as the National Guard's state partnership program (SPP), to further U.S. Army interaction with African nations. For more than 15 years, U.S. soldiers have worked with foreign militaries during SPP events. In all, there are seven state partnerships with African nations: California with Nigeria, New York with South Africa, North Carolina with Botswana, Utah with Morocco, Vermont with Senegal, Wyoming with Tunisia and North Dakota with Ghana. Often, U.S. National Guard units fulfill similar roles to the militaries of partner countries in Africa, training to both deploy in support of national missions and respond to local emergencies.

In October, U.S. Army Africa will lead an exercise in Uganda based on a disaster scenario that warrants immediate crisis response. It will validate what we've learned, test our abilities to operate safely and successfully on the continent, and mark places for improvement. Most of all, it will bring together U.S. soldiers with African troops from five partner nations, an interoperability challenge that will allow U.S. Army Africa to deepen our understanding of their abilities and map future mentoring missions to build African military capacity.

Army Africa is America's premier Army team, dedicated to achieving positive change in Africa. Our missions in Africa will continue to be both complex and novel as situations change. The rewards will be high, as we have a chance to forestall crises rather than merely respond. Together, we will make a positive difference—for our nation and for the people of Africa.

Exercise in Africa Breaks Many Molds

Rita Boland

Reprinted with permission from the January 2010 issue of *SIGNAL Magazine*.

A new host, new participants, and requests for industry involvement are a few changes for annual event. African nations are overcoming the tyranny of distance posed by their massive continent through an exercise designed to increase command, control, communications and computer capacity. Representatives from more than two dozen African countries met in Gabon at the end of last September through the beginning of October to test technology compatibility. The event helps build relationships and enhance interoperability during disaster relief and peacekeeping missions. The most recent effort built off past exercises and included a variety of first-time occurrences. It also identified new areas of need such as the addition of an information assurance technical working group.

The annual Africa Endeavor communications exercise not only includes individual African nations but also involves the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). Two European countries—Sweden and Switzerland—participate in technical advisory roles. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) served as the facilitator in 2009 for the first time. Previously, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) filled that role.

Africa Endeavor is an offshoot of Combined Endeavor, a EUCOM area-of-responsibility exercise. Countries participating in Combined Endeavor have more robust technologies and working groups. When AFRICOM came into existence, it logically inherited Africa Endeavor. “So we facilitate it and enable all these countries to come together,” Cmdr. Britton Talbert, USN, exercise director of Africa Endeavor, AFRICOM, says. Some participants need help traveling to the exercise, so the command contributes what it can to help them make the trip. Other responsibilities include setting up logistics and working with the host nation. Cmdr. Talbert explains that his command’s goal is to have the host nation do the work and present the exercise, while AFRICOM helps in any way it can, including answering questions and providing requested assistance. The command’s goal down the road is for the AU to run the exercise completely.

Also new in 2009, the Economic Community of Central African States observed the exercise for the first time and will participate in 2010. “That was a big deal,” Cmdr. Talbert says. He adds that African nations put heavy emphasis on regional organizations, which have a strong influence over countries. Participation by such organizations helps the event succeed. The exercise has been planned for the last four years, but 2009 marked only the third execution because of a last-minute cancellation the previous year. The event would have been held in South Africa in 2008 and was held in Nigeria the two previous years. The 2009 Africa Endeavor took place in Libreville, Gabon.

An overarching goal of Africa Endeavor is to support the AU and the standby brigade in the command, control, communications and computers (C4) realm so forces can communicate during relief efforts. Another major goal for the event is for African nations to enhance their C4 capacity. “That’s an underlying theme for the whole exercise,” the commander states. During the exercise, countries test their equipment to ensure it is compatible with that used by neighboring countries. “The bottom line is that if there’s a natural disaster or peacekeeping operation and several countries contribute forces, the goal is that they’ll already know which communications equipment is compatible with each other,” Cmdr. Talbert explains.

Placing a heightened effort on increasing the capacity of the countries enables the nations to handle peacekeeping and disaster response operations more quickly on a continent that includes many developing nations. Cmdr. Talbert says AFRICOM is there to help those countries increase their C4 capacity and to assist them in any way the command can when the countries ask for help.

A significant discovery during this year's exercise uncovered difficulties with information assurance (IA). One issue was contamination of portable drives. Technicians bring computers to all the planning conferences. "As part of the processes and procedures we're trying to implement, we scan all the thumb drives," Cmdr. Talbert says. "At the planning conference, every single thumb drive that was scanned had a virus on it."

To help mitigate the effect from contaminated drives, the event introduced policies and procedures to help ensure that they were virus-free. Personnel set up scanning stations and held classes and distributed material on topics such as malicious software and how to protect computers with antivirus software. The problems were so widespread that, this year, an IA technical working group will be added to the two previously established technical working groups: single channel radio (voice) and data networks. IA formerly was part of the data networks working group. As more specific questions about IA started coming in from the participants, the African delegation chief said the nations would like to introduce a technical group to deal with the area. "It's what they wanted, so we're all for it," Cmdr. Talbert says. Each nation contributes at least one technician to each of the technical working groups.

The IA technical working group was not the only change African nations requested for the future. The countries also would like to see an operational side of Africa Endeavor. Unlike many military exercises, Africa Endeavor has not involved fictional scenarios; participants simply tested their technologies with others. For 2010, Cmdr. Talbert says, exercise planners will introduce a scenario that requires C4 models. Various delegation chiefs will compose a working subgroup to create the scenario for which technicians from the various countries will create and test a communications architecture. The change enables participants to take their testing and apply it to operational situations so they can practice for events such as disasters or peacekeeping missions.

The Joint Interoperability Testing Command administers and runs the testing during Africa Endeavor. At the end of the event, a book is released that shows the result of every test so that countries have a reference. For example, a country such as Cameroon can use this book to determine which of its equipment works best with Kenya's equipment in the event the two nations conduct an operation together, Cmdr. Talbert explains. "It shows status of compatibility," he says.

The commander emphasizes that a failed test during the exercise is not necessarily a bad result. Failures identify problems that two countries can explore and resolve technically, whether the issue is on voice or data equipment. Cmdr. Talbert says Africa Endeavor offers the venue to work out just such problems. "If all the tests ... worked, we wouldn't have any problems to identify," he shares.

Another important part of the exercise has nothing to do with technology. Cmdr. Talbert calls the human interoperability portion of Africa Endeavor a "huge deal." The event creates a platform for more than two dozen nations to meet at the annual exercise as well as the planning conferences, enhancing relationships and bonds between the countries. "That carries forward once they get home and start interacting with their neighbors and other countries in their region," Cmdr. Talbert says.

All the meetings strengthen bonds and relationships from the delegation chief level through the technician level. “It’s an exercise for the Africans, run by the Africans, enhancing African C4 capabilities,” Cmdr. Talbert says. The commander also explains that increasing the C4 capabilities of the African nations and forwarding the human relationships are what make Africa Endeavor important. The exercise generally includes three planning conferences held once a quarter beginning in December. The planning conferences have less attendance than the actual exercise, but they still bring together representatives of various countries. Generally, the Africa Endeavor event itself takes place in July, but in 2009 it was postponed because of elections in Gabon.

One of the biggest challenges of Africa Endeavor also is on the human side. The commander shares that having representatives from so many countries on the continent gather in one place and talk to each other—in this case to discuss C4 issues—helps solve many problems. He continues that face-to-face interactions with other technicians sitting together and discussing why technologies fail to work takes problem solving to a new level above calling a help desk.

Though some countries have equipment that is more advanced than that of other countries, the commander says technology sophistication has little impact on how nations interoperate. The difference in equipment rarely is great enough to prevent them from communicating with one another. Countries that own the most advanced equipment pass down their knowledge to those with less effective tools. In some cases, countries without certain equipment ask to observe one year and then participate the next year. Cmdr. Talbert says such growth is a goal of Africa Endeavor.

The work of AFRICOM and Africa Endeavor is similar to work in U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and AFRICOM staff has had talks with counterparts at their cross-ocean ally. Cmdr. Talbert shares that the commands have had several discussions about how SOUTHCOM handled many of the situations AFRICOM now faces, particularly how SOUTHCOM helps countries help themselves. Both commands cooperate with developing countries, and this collaboration includes a large amount of interagency involvement. No agencies have yet participated in Africa Endeavor, but the AFRICOM personnel are exploring that as a future option.

Another group that has played almost no role in Africa Endeavor is industry. Except for the use of its equipment, the private sector has no involvement in the exercise. However, representatives of African nations have suggested bringing vendors into the event. Such a move has not yet been approved, but Cmdr. Talbert says AFRICOM is examining the possibility of having an afternoon when vendors can display their equipment and services. He explains that such a move requires background research to ensure the best procedures, but he feels confident planners and organizers will find a way to make the idea a reality.

Because industry has the latest and greatest technologies, exposure to their expertise would enhance Africa Endeavor, adding another aspect to the event. Industry could bring in technologies the military cannot for various reasons.

The sheer size of the African continent both poses a challenge for Africa Endeavor and makes the event more important. Cmdr. Talbert says the continent is so huge that it takes a long time to travel to other places on the land mass. The exercise offers a venue for nations that might never otherwise communicate or collaborate to share ideas and potential solutions, or even simply exchange information. Through the exercise, nations can create and continue relationships. The commander relates that at the closing ceremony, everyone was encouraged to look at it not as

a closing but as a continuation of relationships enhanced through Africa Endeavor. When the representatives return home, they can build on the bonds forged during the technical testing to enhance their communication.

The Battlefield Surveillance Brigade as a Joint and Multinational Task Force Headquarters: 560th BFSB Lessons from Exercise Natural Fire 10 in Uganda

COL Peter C. VanAmburgh

The battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB) is a modular brigade designed to accept augmentation and incorporate non-organic units or capabilities to accomplish its purpose of conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). The BFSB is also built to act as a force provider with or without an assigned area of operation (AO). In October 2009, the 560th BFSB was assigned the role of task force (TF) headquarters for a joint and multinational force supporting Exercise Natural Fire 10 (NF10) in Uganda. The exercise provided an excellent forum to test the concept of using a BFSB as a TF headquarters augmented by a wide variety of joint and multinational assets with an assigned AO. This article focuses on the employment of a BFSB as a joint and multinational TF headquarters and the lessons for integrating capabilities and units to accomplish missions not doctrinally envisioned for a BFSB.

Exercise Natural Fire 10, Entebbe, Kampala, and Kitgum, Uganda

NF10 was a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercise from 16–25 Oct 2009 in the Republic of Uganda intended to enhance interoperability and the capability to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies. The exercise had three major components: a tabletop exercise (TTX) among East African countries (EACs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Kampala; employment of a coalition joint task force (CJTf) headquarters in Entebbe; and a tactical element (TF Kitgum) to conduct medical, dental, and engineer activities and train partner nation (PN) personnel in critical activities necessary to function collectively in disaster environments. NF10 was the largest US/PN operation in Africa and a test of U.S. Africa Command (U.S. AFRICOM), U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), and a BFSB's ability to command and control (C2) a large and diverse grouping of activities simultaneously in East Africa.

The 560th BFSB served as the command headquarters of TF Kitgum, directing 1,009 personnel from the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines; and soldiers from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The mission of the 560th BFSB was to provide C2 for all joint and multinational forces in Kitgum, Uganda 9–26 Oct 09. The 560th BFSB conducted field training exercises (FTX), humanitarian civic assistance (HCA) operations, and joint logistics support to synchronize operations and enhance the interoperability among participating forces. The NF10 mission supports the premise that a BFSB can be an enabler to stability operations and further reinforces the operational theme of employing a BFSB for peacetime military engagement, although not simply for intelligence collection support.

BFSB Core Mission Essential Task List

Providing the command element of TF Kitgum during NF10 supported the Core Mission Essential Task List (CMETL) for the 560th BFSB. The unit exercised its brigade staff in pre-deployment tasks including Soldier readiness processing, mobilization planning, tactical operations center (TOC) battle drills, force protection, and cultural training. The mission required the synchronization of HCA, FTX and joint logistics adding to the unit's ability to conduct C2, protect the force, provide sustainment, and conduct civil support operations.

<u>560th BFSB Core METL</u>		<u>Exercise NF10</u>
1.	20-CC-0001 Perform Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)	
2.	20-CC-0002 Support Targeting	
3.	20-CC-0003 Protect the Force	X
4.	20-GM-0001 Conduct C2	X
5.	20-GM-0003 Provide Sustainment	X
6.	01-CC-0009 Conduct Civil Support Operations	X
7.	AUTL ART2.11 Conduct Mobilization of Tactical Units	

Figure 8-1. 560th BFSB Core Mission Essential Task List (CMETL)

560th BFSB C2 Organization for the NF10

In July 2009, the 560th BFSB accepted the requirement to provide C2 for the tactical element of NF10. The short span of time between mission acceptance and mission execution (70 days) set in motion an urgent chain of activities to prepare and deploy to Uganda. The first involved determining the weaknesses among the staff elements required to direct the diverse operations and joint/multinational capabilities contained in the TF Kitgum arrangement. The HCA missions necessitated the addition of engineer and medical planners not normally associated with the BFSB headquarters. Counterintelligence (CI) personnel were levied into the S-2 section due to partner nation personnel working in the TF headquarters. The S-3, S-4, and S-6 sections prepared to incorporate liaison personnel from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Additionally, the 560th BFSB were supported by CH-47 aircraft providing movement of personnel and cargo, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and air assault training requiring the brigade aviation element (BAE) to deploy as part of the headquarters arrangement. The mission did not have a significant future planning requirement; instead the focus was on synchronization of assets, resources, and operations pre-identified for the mission.

TF Kitgum Command Organization




Figure 8-2. TF KITGUM Command Organization

The 560th BFSB employed an integrated TF command structure to provide unity of command for the disparate operations and requirements of the TF. The deputy commander was a lieutenant colonel from Uganda and the staff was composed of representatives from each of the five EACs involved. Standing operating procedures (SOPs) and battle drills such as MEDEVAC procedures were developed and rehearsed in detail for the contingencies TF Kitgum would potentially execute during the conduct of NF10. All TF headquarters members had a working knowledge of English which was used throughout the mission.

TF KITGUM Task Organization




Figure 8-3. TF KITGUM Task Organization

TF Kitgum was organized into three elements for process ownership of functions and to best utilize existing chain of command protocols. The FTX element was led by a U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) major who coordinated and directed training events including live fire ranges for five multinational companies from the participating nations and USMC personnel. The HCA element was led by an Army major and consisted of U.S. Navy (USN) Seabees conducting engineer civic action programs (ENCAPs), U.S. Air Force (USAF) and U.S. Army (USA) medical elements executing medical civic action programs (MEDCAPs), and USMC dentists performing dental civic action programs (DENCAPs). Imbedded in the HCA element were a joint civil affairs (CA) team and a psychological operations (PSYOP) team. The final element of the TF was a U.S. Army element from the 21st Theater Support Command providing the mayoral and logistics support to the TF.

TF Kitgum also had direct support aviation (CH-47) and a forward area refueling point (FARP) established to conduct MEDEVAC. The 560th BFSB and aviation unit liaison controlled and directed all flight missions while the logistics TF provided support for the FARP.

In addition to the functions described above, TF Kitgum was assigned an AO that encompassed the six locations in the region where HCA, training, and logistics support were conducted. As an AO owner, the 560th BFSB had responsibility and authority to conduct military operations in partnership with Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF). The AO and area of interest (AI) for NF10 in Uganda was somewhat permissive but still an imminent danger pay (IDP) zone. As the TF Kitgum headquarters, the 560th BFSB performed traditional AO governance activities such as intelligence collection, force protection and security, air/land movement control, CA, and PSYOP.

Discussion

There has been significant discourse as to the employment of a BFSB headquarters as an AO owner and whether the structure can accommodate assimilation of the joint or service-specific assets necessary to conduct AO governance. Exercise NF10 provided an outstanding venue to test the ability of a BFSB to be assigned an AO, incorporate a wide variety of assets, and serve as a multinational TF command element. Although clearly designed for multidiscipline ISR employment, the BFSB headquarters is organized around the six warfighting functions of movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, C2, and protection. The warfighting functions enable the BFSB to be used as a platform for operations beyond intelligence collection.

The TF command role the 560th BFSB played in NF10, an exercise supporting peacetime military engagement and controlling joint and multinational forces, demonstrates the flexibility of the headquarters to adjust to changing operational requirements. The weaknesses in staffing for this operation, namely for engineer, medical planning and military police, were easily solved by incorporating those capabilities into the TF headquarters. For the 560th BFSB and other Army National Guard (ARNG) organizations, it is fairly common to have those skills resident among assigned members who often possess multiple specialties. During NF10, the 560th BFSB found sufficient expertise internally for the safe and successful conduct of the ENCAPs, MEDCAPs, and DENCAP missions, as well as force protection support from the military police.

Incorporating and employing CA and PSYOP was a routine task for an organization that synchronizes intelligence collection among small teams with a significant human intelligence (HUMINT) capability. The relevance for combining CA/PSYOPS with HUMINT collection is well documented and provides for a symbiotic relationship among the functions. Subsequently, the personnel and command element of a BFSB are well versed in having small teams operating

semi-autonomously and apart from their headquarters. NF10 was no exception to that operating model. NF10 reinforced to all participants the positive results of arranging CA/PSYOP under a headquarters comfortable with decentralized operations.

The BFSB's ability to synchronize its diverse grouping of ISR assets also prepared the 560th BFSB for pooling of multinational and joint resources to support the various operations conducted by TF Kitgum. With each element, joint force, or partner nation force came an array of capabilities and resources. As with ISR planning and synchronization, HCA, FTX, and support activities had to be synchronized to support the exercise objectives. Cuing, redundancy, and mix are techniques for ISR management that served the staff well in programming joint and multinational resources to successfully conduct the decentralized execution of TF Kitgum's MEDCAP, DENCAP, ENCAP, and FTX operations.

The final results produced by TF Kitgum during NF10 included 11,698 persons treated through the MEDCAP and DENCAP activities, three facilities (two schools and one health center) renovated, 636 soldiers from five countries trained in a variety of disaster response measures, seven radio broadcasts conducted, and the establishment of a successful logistics and FARP operation. This all was done with an integrated, multinational tactical operations center synchronizing, resourcing, and battle tracking the 1,009 joint and East African personnel who accomplished the mission.

Conclusions

The BFSB is a multi-disciplined intelligence organization with obvious potential for employment beyond intelligence collection. NF10 appeared to demonstrate the flexibility of a BFSB headquarters to both govern an AO and incorporate joint and multinational assets for mission accomplishment. The modular aspect of the BFSB and the varied elements that make up its charter lend itself to integrating diverse assets. Expertise gaps in the staff were easily resolved with internal personnel from the headquarters. Decentralized execution of projects for NF10 was an effortless transition for a headquarters comfortable with semi-autonomous ISR collection. Area of operation assignment and governance in a permissive environment (albeit an IDP zone) were well within the scope of BFSB capability. Ultimately, the 560th BFSB, as TF Kitgum, organized and integrated the expertise to enable CA; PSYOP; medical; dental; engineer; military police; additional logistics; aviation; and soldiers from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda to collectively complete all missions in the largest U.S.-sponsored exercise in Africa to date.

Chapter 3 - USCENTCOM Operational Design for ISAF in Afghanistan: A Primer

Julian D. Alford and Scott A. Cuomo

Reprinted with permission from the 2nd Quarter 2009 issue of *Joint Force Quarterly*.

Afghanistan is at a tipping point, and the next 12 to 18 months will prove decisive in determining the country's future. This has become the view of many scholars, politicians, diplomats, and military leaders around the world. To tip the scale in favor of defeating the insurgency and thus toward improving stability and governance in Afghanistan, the international community will significantly increase the diplomatic, military, and economic resources dedicated to these efforts in the coming year. Part of this resource increase involves expanding the ranks of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by adding at least four U.S. Brigade Combat Teams and potentially thousands more troops from other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. The primary purpose of this article is to provide an operational design for how these units should execute a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign once on the ground. This design accounts for the doctrinal principles of Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, yet adapts these principles in light of the current situation in Afghanistan and the hard lessons learned while fighting the insurgency over the years.

The Mindset

Counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan have to involve a great deal more than fighting insurgents. They must also include combating terrorists, criminals, warlords, and drug lords; mitigating sectarian and inter- and intratribal conflict; and curtailing government corruption while building governmental capacity and setting the conditions for reconstruction and development. Accordingly, ISAF units must be ready to fight sporadic, high-intensity engagements, often of short duration, and simultaneously to combat criminals and terrorists using police or constabulary tactics. These same forces must also be prepared to operate as armed social workers while facilitating reconstruction efforts, and as referees when coordinating governance development efforts among warring religious, ethnic, tribal, and governmental factions.¹ This type of warfare is contrary to what most, if not all, we, as ISAF, have been prepared to execute. If we are going to succeed, the force has to understand the differences between our training and the realities on the ground in Afghanistan.

We must also focus on the word *succeed* instead of *win* in this campaign, because success is ultimately tied to the will of the Afghan government and people—the only ones who can truly “win.” The definitions of these two words have important distinctions. *Succeed* means “to make good, thrive, prosper, flourish, or progress in order to accomplish a favorable aim or outcome.” *Win* means “to acquire, be victorious, or triumph as a result of a fight.”

At the operational and tactical levels, the distinction implies that we must design our operations with the Afghan people as the focus of effort. They are the center of gravity in this campaign; thus, the prize on the Afghanistan battlefield is the mind of the population. Some have argued, based on Joe Strange's model for analyzing potential centers of gravity in war², that the will of the populace is not the center of gravity, but rather is merely a critical objective for both sides. We caution strongly against this thinking. The simple fact is that the will of the Afghan people is the key to our success. We can eliminate 1,100, 1,000, and even 10,000 insurgents but will still fail if we do not succeed in the battle for the people's will. On the other hand, if we succeed in

winning the public over, it is also highly likely that, without firing a single bullet, the enemy's numbers will rapidly drop from 10,000 to 1,000 to potentially fewer than 100 insurgents. This is the mindset that must be instilled in all ISAF personnel, from the most senior leaders to the most junior Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen. To succeed in the battle for the people's will, we must commit to attacking the problems within Afghanistan across all lines of operation, using the political, economic, social, informational, and military elements of our nations. The military element of operational design requires a significant mindset shift in our military establishment. Although ISAF leadership should not (and could not) be responsible for executing the nonmilitary elements of the overall COIN strategy, it is responsible for playing a supporting role, and must be prepared to temporarily fill the void in the development of governance and reconstruction, particularly at the district and village levels.

The question now is whether ISAF can adjust its organization, training, and most importantly its corporate mindset to succeed in Afghanistan. We think the answer is yes, if the leaders of our militaries understand, support, and lead units to implement the operational design described herein. The importance of unity of purpose and closely coordinated methods of operation cannot be overstated. Tactical operations in COIN will often have a much greater impact on the operational and strategic outcomes of the campaign than will tactical operations in a conventional war. ISAF units employed incorrectly or in a disjointed manner, or focused on the wrong objectives, will create far more adversaries and problems than they will ever eliminate and thus will negatively impact our efforts to defeat the insurgency.

Force Composition

Due to the nature of the Afghanistan operating environment, ISAF units must work as a single, cohesive force, intimately partnered with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The force required under this single unit is a combination of light infantry, artillery, and logistics units working in concert with specialized forces such as intelligence, civil affairs, psychological operations, human terrain teams, military police, explosive ordnance disposal, and engineers. Rotary- and fixed-winged aviation assets must also provide support as an integral part of the team. This force will normally operate under a single infantry battalion task force and will be assigned a single area of operation (AO). These types of forces are general purpose forces (GPF). Above the battalion task force level, all regiments, brigades, and regional and theater level command headquarters must operate under a single concept of operations and must establish objectives, coordinate actions, apportion and control terrain and boundaries, and allocate or aggregate resources as required between and among the GPF. Finally, special operations forces and other governmental agencies must also play a vital role in the operational design, and these units must synchronize their efforts with the GPF.

The importance of selecting a light infantry battalion as the base force deserves further clarification. Conventional mechanized and armored formations are often counterproductive in conducting COIN, particularly in Afghanistan.³ These forces often have a mindset that connects them to their equipment and the firepower it delivers. They are frequently predisposed to vehicle-mounted (that is, road-bound) patrols to enhance their speed and survivability—both intuitive qualities of mechanized forces. Unfortunately, this approach only further separates them from the population, while also playing into one of the enemy's strengths: ambushing road-bound vehicle units. One Russian journalist who embedded with Soviet forces in Afghanistan frequently from 1979 to 1989 described a major reason for the Soviet military's failures: "During the 9 years of war we were constantly separated from the country by 8 millimeters of bulletproof glass through which we stared in fear from inside our armored carriers."⁴ We can ill afford to repeat past mistakes. If the majority of our mechanized units do not reorganize into light infantry forces,

trading their vehicles for good pairs of boots, they will quickly become a detriment to one of the main requirements in COIN: connecting with the population. In AOs that support vehicle movement, there is, however, a need for a motorized and potentially a mechanized task force held in reserve. All AOs must also have a heliborne reserve, and these forces must be available at the regimental/brigade level.

Framework

The operational design framework rests on five essential and sequential tasks: understand, shape, secure, hold, and build. While our GPF understand, shape, secure, hold, and build, they must concurrently assist the Command Security Transition Command– Afghanistan (CSTC–A) advisor in organizing, training, and operating with the ANSF. Finally, the GPF must develop the ANSF to a point where they are capable of largely independent operations.

To understand is to gain an intimate knowledge of the human and environmental dynamics impacting the campaign, particularly within a unit's AO. To orient to the challenges in our AOs, we must first work to understand not only our enemy, but also the history, culture, traditions, and languages of the Afghan people. Simply studying enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures will leave us with a limited understanding of our AOs. We must also understand the family, clan, tribe, or community organization, and must know who now wields and who has historically wielded power in these groupings if we are to maximize the decision making processes. Additionally, all ISAF units must map the human terrain so they can understand issues and actions from the many perspectives of the Afghan population. We must recognize that we will never fully understand what it means to be an Afghan, but through daily contact with Afghans, we can gain a critical appreciation for their values. This routine contact will engender trust and mutual respect over time.

Shaping an AO is the ability to influence and inform the perceptions, allegiances, attitudes, actions, and behaviors of all players in the AO before we move in to secure it. Shaping operations that influence the population are human activities requiring personal contact. The base unit commander, who will likely be at the battalion task force level, must have the ability to anticipate, recognize, and understand the strengths, vulnerabilities, and opportunities available in his AO to shape successfully. Without understanding or, more specifically, without mapping the human terrain so we know who wields power in our AOs, we will never maximize our ability to shape operations. It implies a less confrontational approach, like a policeman handling an uncertain but potentially hostile situation.

Clearing implies a destructive or escalatory mindset and may be suited in limited situations, but is more appropriate for warfare against another state army. When the GPF secures an area, it must be done discreetly and with precision. Killing insurgents is not the main objective. Large unit clearing sweeps and the heavy use of firepower are detrimental to effective COIN operations, as these tactics sometimes create fear and anger in the populace, prevent the establishment of normalcy, and sometimes demand revenge in the Afghan society. These results are often the goals of the insurgents.

Securing an AO means to gain possession of an area's key terrain in order to deny its use to the enemy and also to provide security for the population. We intentionally say secure instead of clear. To secure is "to gain possession of a position or area, with or without force, and to prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action."⁵ To clear, on the other hand, is "the removal of enemy forces and elimination of organized resistance in an assigned zone, area, or location by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces that could interfere with

the unit's ability to accomplish its mission.”⁶ Securing is a more appropriate mindset for COIN in Afghanistan. The GPF and ANSF must have a plan when they secure an area to establish an accepted rule of law, provide basic public safety, and create links between the people and a government they accept as legitimate. Securing an area is best done with tactical units at the platoon and company level, partnered with ANSF, whose actions are coordinated with adjacent units and commanded at the battalion level acting as the base unit. The “base” unit is the largest unit whose leader is in direct and continuous contact with the population. This unit is the most important formation in COIN operations because it is generally the element that has the greatest impact on protecting the population and is where practical problems arise and are usually solved.⁷

Holding an AO means that we and the ANSF are present and intend to remain until a legitimate local government is ready to provide security and governance. Both the people and the insurgents must truly appreciate the extent of this commitment; otherwise, the people will never feel safe, and the insurgents will have continuing ability to influence the population. Demonstrating this level of commitment requires the GPF, along with the ANSF, to live and operate among the Afghans. If the ISAF and ANSF team only interacts with the population during cordon and search, vehicle checkpoints, and raid operations, it fails to understand the center of gravity in Afghanistan. Large “secure” bases far from the population are arguably good for force protection and maintaining a “Western” quality of life for our troops, but these remote bases are counterproductive to accomplishing objectives. Living and operating out of such facilities creates an “us versus them” attitude between the GPF and population. It also inhibits the GPF and ANSF from gaining the human intelligence required to succeed. Simply put, the GPF and ANSF must “hug” the population to protect them. This means we must eat and sleep in the villages and towns without displacing a single family to build the relationships required to physically and psychologically separate the insurgents from the people.⁸

Building an AO means maintaining a safe environment for the people and the local government so both can pursue their political, social, and economic goals. At the tactical and operational levels, ISAF building efforts must be focused on facilitating popular support for the district and provincial governments through the clan, sub tribal, tribal, and/or village leadership, and providing an atmosphere for political reconciliation. One of the first functions we must accomplish to establish this atmosphere is to identify who the past and current informal and formal leaders are in our AOs, which, once again, requires mapping the human terrain.⁹ We must then work with the local leadership to develop a legitimate rule of law and help to enforce the laws. Afghanistan has a signed national constitution that is the primary source for the rule of law. However, there are also more traditional rules of law, such as tribal or village jirgas. While not officially sanctioned by the national government, jirgas have long served as an accepted rule of law in specific areas. One of ISAF and the international community's main challenges in the future is to assist Afghans in integrating national laws with provincial, district, and in some cases village and tribal laws. That said, ISAF units should leverage the experience of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), along with the many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have operated in Afghanistan pre- and post2001, to help with all aspects of the building stage. We must appreciate that we might have to serve as a supporting effort to UNAMA, and even to NGOs, when it comes to tasks such as enabling elections and major infrastructure projects.

Working at the local level to stimulate the economy and to improve basic services for the people must also be a priority during the building stage. To this end, monies in the hands of the base unit commander and the ability to immediately use them to enhance peoples' lives are critical assets in Afghanistan. Young-and middle-aged men who are unemployed for even a limited time represent discontent on which the insurgency can capitalize.¹⁰

Partnering with the ANSF

Organizing, training, and operating with the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and Afghan Border Police (ABP) are essential tasks for ISAF's general purpose forces in this COIN campaign. We must avoid performing any operation if we are not partnered with an ANSF unit. We must also resist the inclination to build the ANSF using a Western model. Additionally, we must assist the ANSF in taking the lead in the campaign even before we think they are ready. Much of this transition will have to be carried out while the ANSF are engaged with the enemy and living among the population. This said, ISAF must come to grips with the realization that we cannot succeed alone. The ANSF must play a decisive role to facilitate the Afghans' trust in their nation's security forces. This will be at least a 10-year mission that will require patience, significant resources, and ongoing international support.

To begin, we must focus on continuing to build an ANSF that can deal with the internal threats to the sovereignty of Afghanistan. The ANSF, specifically the ANA, must be organized, equipped, and trained to fight the insurgent threat. The ANA must be a light, highly mobile GPF that can operate dispersed in platoon- and company-sized formations. We need not develop an ANA that can fight another state army. That is a mid- to long-term goal the Afghan government will move toward at an appropriate time. We must help the ANSF develop an air force that can provide fire support, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and heliborne Quick Response Force (QRF) capabilities. Thus far, the ANA is the one bright spot in the ANSF, but with only one-third of the Kandaks (battalions) possessing a capability milestone 1 (CM 1) status,¹¹ the ANA still requires many years of partnering, mentoring, and support.

In conjunction with ANSF tactical training and employment in combat, ISAF must accelerate and heavily fund programs to bring ANA personnel to NATO military academies and war colleges. Furthermore, NATO-staffed professional military schools of shorter duration are needed in greater numbers in Afghanistan to gain momentum in the development of the ANSF professional officer corps. A strong officer corps capable of independent operations is vital to combating the enemy in Afghanistan. To repeat, this is a 10-year fight at a minimum, and a captain at a NATO school today will likely play an instrumental role in ultimately defeating the insurgency. Simultaneously, ISAF must significantly increase efforts to develop the ANP and ABP, which are frequently viewed as corrupt, incompetent, and loyal to warlords. An additional challenge is that there is virtually no viable criminal justice system in Afghanistan, which further undermines confidence in the central government and cripples legal and institutional mechanisms for the ANP and ABP to use in prosecuting insurgents and criminals. Establishing a legitimate judicial structure at the national, provincial, and district levels is not a task for ISAF, but it is nonetheless essential if a legitimate, nationwide rule of law is ever to be implemented in Afghanistan.

While waiting for this judicial structure to be created, ISAF must still make developing and operating with the ANP and ABP a top priority and work with the Afghan government to ensure that these units have fortified police stations and border outposts, local jails, armored vehicles, a nationwide command and control system, and embedded ISAF military and contractor trainers/mentors. Even before taking these steps, ISAF must work closely with the Afghan Ministry of the Interior to assist in recruiting, organizing, and training a professional ANP and ABP force. After all, at the local level, an area does not have true security until it has a legitimate local police force that is of and for the people. These police forces must also have the ability to secure essential facilities and critical infrastructure such as government buildings, financial centers, electric power installations, water and sewage treatment plants, schools, main roads, and highways. The police forces, with backing from the local leadership, must be heavily funded with handsome salaries and supported with top equipment to lure any militias and low-level

insurgents into an alternative, lucrative, and legitimate profession. It is critical to remember that only a local police force can gain the trust of the local populace and penetrate a community thoroughly enough to gain the intelligence needed to destroy the insurgents' infrastructure permanently.¹²

Professional Advisor Force

Once the ANSF are equipped, trained, organized, and on the verge of being able to conduct independent operations, ISAF must pull back its GPF and transition to an advisor-only force that works closely with CSTC-A to provide logistics, fire support, MEDEVAC, and a QRF until Afghan forces can furnish these services. This marks a shift to an indirect approach by ISAF at which time the ANSF will take the lead and truly become the main effort in the campaign. The GPF base unit commander on the ground must make the assessment as to when the posture of the ISAF unit must change, and when having more overt ISAF units becomes a liability rather than an asset, as "over-partnering" can be detrimental to success. This judgment-based decision is made as the overall situation enters a "gray zone." Yet in spite of its prolonged state in time, this period will serve as the operational tipping point to the final success of the campaign. In this gray zone, ISAF units become less visible, less intrusive, and less restrictive to the population while the ANA and, more importantly, the ANP and ABP begin to provide the primary elements of security.

The transition to the indirect approach, using a professional advisor-only force, facilitates the major drawdown of ISAF units. This will in turn posture the force for the inevitable prolonged COIN mission, and this indirect approach will likely facilitate long-term NATO support.

In this gray zone and for the remainder of the conflict, ISAF will likely have to increase its advisor requirement, selection criteria, and support for CSTC-A. At this stage, ISAF's advisors will serve as its decisive element. Accordingly, it is of even greater importance that this force be comprised of career officers with combat experience. This force must be regionally and culturally aware and possess a desire to immerse itself within the ranks of the ANSF, providing advice and support at the brigade, battalion, company, and even the platoon and police station levels.

The Afghan government and ANSF, supported by the ISAF advisor force, will win in the long run by proving their legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people. Through professional training, sound military and policing advice, and robust support, the advisor force will assist the ANSF in driving the insurgency to lower and lower levels of violence while the insurgents' political will erodes. When the population looks exclusively to the legitimate government for protection and services, and the ANSF are operating independently, all ISAF military units can be withdrawn from the theater.

Problems to Solve

Success in these areas will set the conditions for ISAF to address three problems that have plagued the COIN effort for years. First, ISAF must focus on creating legitimate and productive village- and district-level governments. Only by providing tangible services and meeting real needs at these levels will the national government gain legitimacy—and then credibility—in the eyes of most Afghans. Unfortunately, poor governance, in part due to the absence of security, has plagued the counterinsurgency effort to this point, especially in the eastern and southern provinces. Polls consistently show that the lack of roads, electricity, and potable water is the main concern of the population, particularly in rural areas. Also, the majority of Afghans believe that corruption is a serious problem, and nearly two-thirds think it is increasing. In particular, the

majority of Afghans believe that government officials profit from the drug trade in the eastern and southern provinces.¹³

This leads to the second major problem, drugs. The Afghan National Development Strategy states that narcotics are the single greatest threat to the country's future and security.¹⁴ Immediate eradication, however tempting it may be, is not the answer. ISAF must start by securing the population in the most important areas that produce these narcotics, and then over time ISAF, with the help of the government, can wean farmers off poppies and to a lesser extent cannabis. This should be done by bringing farmers back to agriculture as it existed prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979. While poppy fields provide a livelihood for farmers, they are also a substantial source of income for the insurgents in eastern and southern Afghanistan. ISAF and the government have made serious mistakes in the past by attempting to implement poppy crop eradication programs without providing an alternate source of income. Worse, past eradication efforts were attempted without securing the people first, which led to prime recruiting seasons for the Taliban. The intricate relationship among narcotics, security, economic development, political reform, and the social aspects of COIN operations is readily apparent in eastern and southern Afghanistan. While poppy production is viewed as a national security problem by both the government and ISAF, it is now a critical part of the socioeconomic fabric of many eastern and southern provinces. Great care must be taken to address the issue, lest the coalition continue to alienate the population and drive more farmers and harvesters into the sphere of the Taliban. Alternate crops such as fruits, nuts, and spices may provide a solution; however, poppies are easy to grow and provide the highest return. For ISAF to fix this problem, it must first secure the population and then work with the government to move to an alternative economic solution. This solution must be agricultural-based and subsidized in the near term, and it must provide development in hydroelectric power, irrigation systems, and roads for the long-term growth of the licit agriculture sector.

The third and arguably most complex problem for ISAF and the government is that insurgent groups have established sanctuaries in Pakistan. These groups have often obtained external assistance from a global jihadist network, including players with a foothold in Pakistan, such as al Qaeda. These groups have also acquired support from tribes and criminal organizations there.¹⁵ For the time being, ISAF must accept that it alone can do little about the sanctuaries on the Pakistan side. What ISAF and the ANSF can do is "poison the water" for the insurgents on the Afghan side of the border instead of worrying about "spearing the fish" on the Pakistan side.

Admittedly, this reality does not sound promising. It is important, though, for ISAF commanders to understand the realities, complexities, and opportunities available on the Pakistani side of the border. The new president, Asif Ali Zardari, is the widower of the late Benazir Bhutto, killed by the Pakistani Taliban in December 2007. President Zardari has expressed his commitment to defeating extremism, to include taming extremist madrassas and eliminating training camps that support the Afghan (and Pakistani) insurgency from within Pakistan.¹⁶ He has also backed his words with deeds. Recent army operations in the Bajaur tribal region demonstrated President Zardari's seriousness, as his army destroyed an insurgent stronghold that had long served as a gateway into Afghanistan's Kunar Province. Multiple tribes within Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas have also shown a desire to fight the Taliban movement.¹⁷ Internationally, the Saudi Arabian government has begun to pressure the Taliban to begin political negotiations with the Afghan and Pakistani governments.¹⁸ The main takeaway for ISAF commanders concerning Pakistan is that developments over the past year on both sides of the border have provided an opportunity to deliver a significant blow to the insurgency. The number one action ISAF can take to enable this blow is to secure the people in Afghanistan's eastern and southern border provinces. This will, in effect, trap thousands of insurgents inside Pakistan, where the new COIN efforts of the Pakistani government can defeat them.

Securing Afghanistan's eastern and southern provinces is no small task. These regions are where the Taliban first established itself in Afghanistan, where it is often strongest, and where it has longstanding relationships with tribes just across the border. One possible approach to securing these regions is to increase ISAF and ANSF presence in a way that embraces the Pashtunwali code. Approximately 45 percent of Afghan society follows a conservative Islamic ideology and adheres to a strict code known as Pashtunwali. This code exists within most of the Pashtun ethnic group, which predominantly lives in eastern and southern Afghanistan and also stretches into Pakistan. The fundamental tenet of Pashtunwali is an honor code that amounts to an unwritten law of the people that guides individual and collective community behavior. Pashtunwali represents a set of moral codes and rules of conduct that impact the daily lives of many Afghans to a greater degree than the tenets of Islam. It promotes self-respect, independence, justice, hospitality, revenge, and tolerance. The use of violence to defend the honor of oneself, the family, or tribe, to the death if necessary, is one of the most significant aspects of Pashtunwali.

The Afghan government, with support from ISAF, should use this code to recruit young Afghans, through traditional village ties, into ANSF units. ISAF should launch an intense recruiting campaign that promotes honor and service to oneself, family, and tribe by belonging to a legitimate local police force, ABP, or ANA. Closely tied to this initiative, ISAF and the ANSF should also work closely with and protect district, village, and tribal leaders and mullahs to gain support in using the Pashtunwali code of honor to bring young Pashtun men into the ANSF. The enemies of Afghanistan are using this same code to recruit young fighters into the insurgency. ISAF must support and promote the tenets of Islam together with the Pashtunwali code to beat the Taliban to the punch for this support. The code and the young fighters who fiercely adhere to it may just be the true center of gravity of the Afghan COIN campaign.

The question remains whether the International Security Assistance Force can develop and implement the appropriate operational design to succeed in Afghanistan. We think it can, but a significant corporate mindset shift is needed first. This shift requires recognition of the human and environmental imperatives of Afghanistan and of the fact that ultimately, the Afghan government and its security forces must win the conflict. This campaign is a prolonged struggle that can only be successful with greater investments in talent, time, and treasure by NATO and the rest of the international community. ISAF must first focus on securing and gaining the support of the people instead of hunting down and killing insurgents. At the same time, capacity-building for the government, starting at the local level, and developing the Afghan National Security Forces require significantly greater resources. Only when success grows in these two vital missions will the Afghan people believe they have a legitimate and credible government that, with ISAF support for a limited period, will offer them a brighter and more honorable future than the insurgency. The basic mechanism of conducting counterinsurgency can be summed up as build or rebuild a political machine from the population upward.¹⁹

Endnotes

1 J. Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency," *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2007, 59–61.

2 Joe Strange and Richard Iron, "Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities," available at <www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf>.

3 Lester M. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, *The Other Side of the Mountain* (Quantico, VA: USMC Studies and Analysis Division, 1995); Lester M. Grau, ed., *The Bear Went over the Mountain* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996); and Lester M. Grau and Michael A. Gress, ed., *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), provide numerous examples of the disadvantages encountered by Soviet mechanized and armored units when fighting insurgents in Afghanistan. Coalition forces have

relearned similar lessons since 2001, and many who have served in Afghanistan over the past 7 years believe that the insurgents' tactics, techniques, and procedures are primarily designed to kill coalition forces when mounted in vehicles.

4 Artyom Borovik, *The Hidden War: A Russian Journalist's Account of the Soviet War in Afghanistan* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990), 12.

5 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, September 27, 2001), C4-C5.

6 Ibid.

7 David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 110-111.

8 *Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, June 7, 2006), 25.

9 For a cultural operator's guide to understanding and identifying informal and formal power structures in societies, see Paula Holmes-Eber and Barak A. Salmoni, *Operational Culture for the Warfighter* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008), 155-166.

10 *Tentative Manual*, 31.

11 *CM 1 status* implies an ANA unit assessed as fully capable of conducting operations at the battalion level and below, while still requiring ISAF's combat enabling support.

12 *Tentative Manual*, 68-70; and also see F.J. West, *The Village* (New York: Pocket Books, 1972), for a detailed description of how U.S. Marines, combined with local indigenous forces, destroyed the insurgent infrastructure in a village in Vietnam.

13 The Asia Foundation, "Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People," 2008, 15-23, available at <<http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2008-poll.php>>.

14 *Afghan National Development Strategy: An Interim Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction* (Kabul: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, n.d.), 94-98.

15 Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, vol. 4 of RAND Counterinsurgency Study (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 37.

16 Ron Moreau, "Good Intentions," *Newsweek*, September 9, 2008, available at <www.newsweek.com/id/158092>.

17 "Pakistan Tribesmen Fight Taliban, Al Qaeda," CBS News, September 13, 2008.

18 Faiza Saleh Ambah and Candace Rondeaux, "Saudis Held Talks between Taliban, Afghans," *The Washington Post*, October 22, 2008, A13.

19 Galula, 136.

The Use of Airpower in Combating Terrorism in Iraq

Staff Maj Gen Qaa'id K. M. Al-Khuzaa'i, Iraqi Air Force

Reprinted with permission from the Spring 2009 issue of *Air & Space Power Journal*.

Nations have used their air forces to fight conventional wars and combat insurgents. Most air force planning, training, and preparation have depended upon a conventional view of warfare, and air forces have proven effective in such conflict. A nation with a strong, effective air force would likely win battles if it properly employed that force during planning, target selection, and execution of combat roles such as strategic bombing, air superiority, and close air support (CAS), as well as in support operations such as airlift, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Air forces have used various types of aircraft, satellites, and other platforms to perform these conventional roles, and powerful nations have become extremely skillful at using conventional airpower. For example, the United States military has distinguished itself by producing decisive effects by means of air and space power at the desired time and place in the conventional wars it has fought.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare, however, is another matter altogether. According to Dr. Thomas Searle, "We are very good at conventional warfare. Too bad that isn't enough any more. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military quickly defeated enemy conventional military forces and brought down hostile regimes. Afterward, however, counter guerrilla operations did not fare so well."¹ So the US Air Force (USAF) found itself unprepared for this new phenomenon, known variously as terrorism, guerrilla warfare, or COIN—depending upon the various labels/euphemisms given it by politicians, military people, or others. This type of warfare differs from that which the United States and other countries have encountered in such places as Vietnam.

Those of us in the old Iraqi Army experienced COIN warfare in northern Iraq, where a dictatorial regime attempted to put down Kurdish rebels fighting for their legitimate rights. The Kurds fought honorably and targeted those who opposed them—that is, the Iraqi Army. They did not hurt innocent people or use the cowardly tactics of today's terrorists. In that struggle, the Iraqi Air Force (Iraqi AF) undertook reconnaissance and CAS missions, but Saddam Hussein sent weapons of mass destruction against the Kurdish town of Halabja and other places in Iraq. Therefore, we should not be surprised by the practices of his remaining thugs who now use the vilest and most cowardly means available to kill the innocent.

Terrorism

In the last few years of the twentieth century, new enemies appeared—those who threaten civilization and seek to spread terror and commit genocide. Lacking a particular objective or clear ideology, they exploit people whose primary concern is making money. This much is clear to us, based on what these enemies have done in Iraq. They have an Islamic identity and use Islam to justify their actions, yet they besmirch this faith—the religion of love and peaceful coexistence, which abides by the tenet "There is no coercion in religion."

These enemies differ from those involved in the insurgency and rebellion movements that emerged after World War II—"limited wars" in which air forces participated very effectively. Communist rebels employed guerrilla warfare and insurgencies—old forms of conflict—whether their ideology was Communism, Marxism-Leninism, or Maoism. Superpowers openly backed and sponsored these generally well-organized and well-run rebellions, but the new enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan consists of a group of criminals, thieves, rebels, and terrorists similar to

those in Colombia and the Philippines. Although several definitions and names have emerged for terrorism, the variety found in Iraq has proven distinctive. I regard as terrorists those who adopt abominable and backward sectarian ideologies, terrify and kill innocent civilians, destroy civilization, and create instability, havoc, chaos, and lawlessness in order to gain money and privileges.

This terrorism in Iraq has enjoyed secret support from a number of nations and well-known people, including non-Arab regional powers as well as Arab states and personalities, in an attempt to export terrorists to places outside their own borders. Tellingly, we hear that a person who kills innocents and stirs up instability in neighboring Arab or non-Arab countries is a terrorist but that one who does the same thing in Iraq is a mujahid. Other neighboring countries have additional motives, such as their fear of emerging democratic trends in the Middle East. The United States and its allies promoted democracy in that region after suffering terrorist attacks of the sort espoused by the rogue regimes of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. As for those who lost their absolute authority and illicit privileges after the fall of these regimes, they aim to tear apart the fabric of the state by any means possible, including the manipulation of simple criminals who only want to earn money, regardless of its source, and who take refuge among ordinary citizens and then target them. Elusive as fish in the water, these terrorists constantly change their tactics, making them difficult to catch, but they lack discipline and are less proficient with advanced weapons than many Cold War-era rebels. For the most part, terrorists in Iraq fall into four categories:

- 1. Members of al-Qaeda—people who have adopted vile, heretical ideas and have veiled themselves as Islamists.
- 2. Baathists—Saddamists who lost their former privileges and power.
- 3. Members of the Islamic militias who call themselves “Shiite Islamists” and receive support from Iran and some Arab nations interested in keeping America involved in a guerrilla war inside Iraq. They may also fear the growing trend of democracy in that country, considering that form of government a threat to their existence, future, and position.
- 4. Terrorists pushed into Iraq by other states under the pretext of participating in a jihad but actually exported to remove the threat they represent to those nations.

Events Following 11 September 2001

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States alerted the world to a new type of terrorist aggression that will stop at nothing and can strike anywhere. Shocked by this horrifying criminal deed, the world realized that no government could continue to defend the rogue regimes that had supported terrorism, particularly those of Saddam and the Taliban. On the basis of these developments, the United States proceeded to mobilize the world’s media and undertake a military response to bring down these foes, after which Libya and North Korea softened their stances. The US military encountered no difficulty in bringing down Saddam, aided by the discontent of the Iraqi people, who had no will to fight and no desire to sacrifice themselves for a lost cause and a government that neither represented nor appealed to them. Because even the Baathists lacked conviction, we saw no well-known commanders fighting bravely and dying in battle; indeed, not a single prominent military commander fell in battle alongside his unit. Everybody thought of running away because no one believed in Saddam, who in fact was one of the first to flee, fearful of dying at the gates of Baghdad or at one of his palaces. For this

reason, Iraq presented an easy target for the US military. During this battle, the USAF undertook many aerial missions, including strategic bombing, air strikes, air superiority, CAS, and other operations in coordination with ground forces. Transport planes effectively provided air bridges for moving units and carrying out other logistical missions. Other aircraft engaged in all types of reconnaissance.

The USAF achieved excellent results, bringing down Saddam and the Taliban, but a new phase emerged that featured insurgency operations, terrorism, and instability aimed at preventing the restoration of government authority. The paucity of intelligence, inaccuracy of target selection, and general ambiguity of this operational environment have created problems for air and space forces in Iraq. Who are the terrorists? What are their objectives? Their practice of blending in with civilians complicates efforts to locate and deal with them, particularly for the USAF—not that it has performed poorly; it simply lacks a clear vision of the battles being fought. This problem has led to many mistakes and has contributed to a negative psychological reaction on the part of the news media. In short, the situation in Iraq requires particular weapons; accurate, reliable intelligence; and ground/air coordination on all levels, particularly the lower ones, in addition to communications and liaison capabilities.

A lack of clear objectives, inadequate doctrine, and insufficient proficiency in carrying out necessary counterterrorism missions limits airpower's role in Iraq. Military forces have a problem figuring out how air and space power can contribute to operations that do not involve a major battle. Airpower found itself confined to air transport, maintenance of air bridges, reconnaissance, and other supporting roles. Helicopters, used extensively in Iraq, suffered heavy losses because they fly at low altitudes, presenting an easy target for terrorists deployed in hidden areas hard to discern from the air. However, aircraft did execute a number of effective missions, and remote-controlled planes undertook reconnaissance and bombardment of selected targets, especially in battles involving Najaf as well as Fallujah and other Anbar areas. Nevertheless, served poorly by an inadequate intelligence apparatus and inaccurate target selection, the USAF mistakenly bombed many civilian areas. Later on, airpower's role began to expand in terms of involvement in and adaptation to battles, and intelligence began to improve. The air strike against the criminal al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi represented a crowning achievement of this development and coordination; furthermore, it reflected noticeable changes in the use of helicopters and remote-controlled aircraft at night.

Terrorists and Their Methods

By 2007 the terrorists' objectives had become abundantly clear. On the whole, they wanted to create instability by attacking oil installations, oil pipelines, electrical power stations/power lines, and the country's infrastructure in general. They also attacked civilians and residential areas with car bombs, explosive belts, and booby traps, assassinating persons randomly or according to their names or tribal affiliations. In addition, they struck army camps and air bases with mortars and Katyusha rockets, attacked convoys moving along highways, and set up false checkpoints. Moreover, these terrorists, who also deal in the drug trade that operates in the region, undertook an armed rebellion in Fallujah and Najaf, seeking protection in the midst of civilians. Currently, we see the same activities in the northern province of Mosul and the southern province of Basra, as well as in the relatively inaccessible mountainous areas of Afghanistan.

The Role of Intelligence in Combating Terrorism

The actions of insurgents differ in five substantial ways from those of combatants engaged in conventional war: "time, civilian-military 'duality,' tactics, logistics, and centers of gravity."² In

Iraq, in particular, terrorism differs from that seen elsewhere by virtue of the despicable actions perpetrated, the targets attacked, the terrorists' melting away among civilians, and their forcible use of civilian houses during operations or skirmishes. These factors underscore the importance of assembling accurate intelligence, and airpower offers an important means of such information gathering. Additionally, reliable intelligence enables an air force to perform its missions effectively with the necessary accuracy in terms of time and place. No planning for any military operation—whether in the air, on land, or at sea—can be successful without exact information concerning the enemy, terrain, and so forth. When we combat terrorism, intelligence increases in importance. In my opinion, it becomes three-quarters of the battle. Without proper targeting data, the army and its firepower stumble, accomplishing nothing; people die; and many resources go to waste. The right information, however, allows us to use less force and effort to conduct decisive attacks against terrorist targets—and suffer fewer casualties in terms of lives and equipment. Thus, by taking the initiative, we could weaken the morale of terrorists and strengthen that of our forces.

Fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, remote-controlled aircraft, satellites, and balloons can play effective roles in gathering information by means of surveillance and reconnaissance. In spite of its small number of aircraft and limited capability, the Iraqi AF has contributed to this effort by undertaking praiseworthy reconnaissance missions involving the detection and pursuit of oil smugglers, thereby helping ground forces realize their objectives. However, we have not yet attained the level to which we aspire in terms of gathering generally accurate information and intelligence. This is true not only of the Iraqis but also of the coalition forces throughout Iraq. For example, many times Iraqi and coalition forces have gone after targets and either found nothing or arrived too late—and our aircraft have erroneously hit the wrong targets. In the meantime, terrorists strike Baghdad's Green Zone, the center of government and location of foreign embassies, hitting important headquarters and bases with relative impunity. They assail these targets from nearby areas within shooting range of coalition and Iraqi forces, despite our balloons and other means of detection. So our monitoring system remains ineffective, and our intelligence apparatus unsuccessful, insufficient, inaccurate, and unable to ascertain and combat the methods of the terrorists. Clearly, all parties should address this dilemma in terms of means, methods, personnel, management, command, and completion of missions without wasting time and effort.

Despite the aforementioned circumstances, we have seen a fair amount of progress in both American and Iraqi intelligence, in the methods utilized by coalition forces, and in their cooperation with air forces to eliminate al-Zarqawi and other terrorist leaders. Similarly, the Iraqi AF has benefited from US military aid and training in modern US reconnaissance aircraft capable of sending information and aerial images—night and day, under various weather conditions—to ground stations, units, and planes that conduct air strikes. Furthermore, we are encouraged by the willingness of individuals in “awakening councils” throughout Baghdad and the provinces to inform Iraqi and coalition forces about the terrorists' movements. Nevertheless, much work remains in terms of enhancing the capabilities of coalition forces and the Iraqi AF, improving training, and clarifying doctrine.

Future Horizons

Major Kenneth Beebe, USAF, notes that “the lack of doctrine has nothing to do with the lack of airpower's and space power's applicability [to COIN but that] decisions on the types of weapons systems procured can and should be influenced by COIN doctrine.”³ Certainly airpower plays important roles, including surveillance, reconnaissance, CAS, and supporting communications. But these roles will not attain the desired performance level without clear doctrine, which

requires distilling lessons from experience, thoroughly examining them, incorporating them into training through special counterterrorism programs, conducting exercises, writing pamphlets and publications, and tapping the experience of senior field commanders who have combated terrorism and experienced all of its features. So we have to revise the training system and give sufficient attention to counterterrorism operations in terms of practical exercises and theoretical studies that include the methods, procedures, and art of conducting battle movements. Importantly, we must prepare the entire force because the new Iraqi military does not yet possess sufficient expertise in the type of warfare now waged in Iraq.

Air Force Doctrine for Combating Terrorism

After examining terrorist methods, we should know what we need in the air forces of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the coalition—or in any other air force expected to combat terrorism. The first requirement that comes to mind—selecting the necessary weapon systems—derives from adopting a counterterrorism doctrine and then implementing it. If we rule out the role of air defense at this stage, particularly for the Iraqi AF, we will tend to acquire aircraft meant to provide CAS, including not only helicopters but also reconnaissance and remote-controlled planes equipped with systems for communicating with ground units. Aircraft would operate in accordance with an easy, automated, well-known system and would require joint planning and coordination with land units at multiple levels—that is, with battalions as well as higher commands. As Dr. Searle reasons, “Because of the decentralized nature of counter guerrilla operations, we need to push air-liaison elements (real air planners, not just enlisted tactical air controllers) down to lower ground headquarters.”⁴ This policy would apply to both the USAF and Iraqi AF. Once both air forces effectively integrate with each other via command and control systems and possess communications gear suited to controlling and guiding aircraft from the ground or from helicopters, all parties will need to adhere to the new operating doctrine.

Coordination with US Airpower

We need effective coordination, joint cooperation, and dynamic interaction between the USAF and the Iraqi AF on the one hand, and between the Iraqi AF and US Army aviation on the other. We must do this in order to provide the necessary facilities for conducting battles, exchanging intelligence, conducting domestic and foreign training, providing logistical support, and performing search and rescue operations. Since the Iraqi AF still lacks these capabilities, it is not fully effective at combating terrorism. Coordination is essential because we are all fighting the same worldwide battle against a common enemy—international terrorism.

Coordination among Iraqi Forces

The Iraqi AF needs more effective coordination and liaison at all levels with forces that specialize in combating terrorism, as well as with ground forces. More precisely, we require forces capable of moving quickly after receiving accurate intelligence, utilizing helicopters or ground vehicles, depending on the circumstances. This calls for coordination as well as the use of advanced aerial equipment and wireless communication. For example, to protect the pipeline between Kirkuk and Mosul, we need to station well-trained forces at a nearby base and employ reconnaissance planes and other sensors to patrol and monitor this area. Such platforms would send confirmed information about terrorist movements to ground forces, who would then conduct a quick analysis and relay it to troops located at the aforementioned base; they in turn would fly to the suspected locations via helicopter to attack the terrorists, killing them if they resist or attempt to flee.

Raising another subject worth mentioning from the viewpoint of individual safety and security, I believe that my experience in Iraq confirms that the military forces, police, and guards who protect oil pipelines and other vital installations should not come from the local population or area. The fact that they are well known to others could subject them and their families to threats and even death, a fate that has befallen many people. Additionally, despite the large numbers of security forces assigned and the small enemy presence, certain local police forces and army soldiers in various sectors have clearly proven ineffective—witness the destruction of installations, pipelines, and electrical power lines as well as the poor performance of police forces in the provinces of al-Diwaniyah, Basra, and other areas in Iraq.

Role of Air and Space Forces in Combating Terrorism

Air and space forces can effectively combat terrorism if they have modern technology and very advanced aircraft flown by expert, well-trained pilots. Examples include conducting reconnaissance and air strikes with remote-controlled aircraft equipped with night vision equipment and precise aiming instruments capable of locating the target, distinguishing it, and accurately hitting it in all types of weather. This would go a long way toward destroying the morale of terrorists. Coalition forces in Iraq have already used these planes. Regarding this matter, Dr. Searle suggests that “we . . . bring our space-based concept down to the counter guerrilla level by deploying persistent aerial [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] platforms that provide similar wide-area coverage focused on the specific signatures of these weapons. The air platforms could take the form of tethered blimps, unmanned aerial vehicles, or manned aircraft. Whatever the system, it would have to provide the location of the enemy weapon that fired.”⁵

We should use light, simply constructed ground-attack aircraft such as T-6s or L-39s. The T-6s, for example, “proved their worth as superb counterinsurgency aircraft in French, British, Portuguese, and South African hands for decades after World War II. The T-6s were cheap and readily available. Their slow speed and long loiter time made them excellent aircraft for observing artillery fire or for spotting small terrorist bands from the air and marking targets for strike aircraft.”⁶ In addition to their good maneuverability and the accurate, modern weapons and targeting systems they carry, such planes are better suited for these missions than are the expensive ground-attack aircraft that fly at supersonic speeds yet require much maintenance and fuel.

These light planes—equipped with navigation and targeting instruments effective during day/night and all weather conditions, weapons such as advanced laser-guided missiles and cannons, and systems enabling contact with ground units—would prove formidable in the fight against terrorists. We need reconnaissance planes able to withstand Iraq’s desert climate and able to operate from short, unpaved runways. We also need light, easily maintained turboprop transport aircraft equipped with both side and rear doors and capable of carrying at least 40 soldiers, taking off from short, hastily constructed runways, and functioning under conditions that complex aircraft cannot tolerate.

Light attack helicopters can serve as effective counterterrorism platforms, provided they are maneuverable and can function in unusual environments and weather characteristic of desert and mountain areas. They should feature suitable weaponry and communications systems compatible with those possessed by ground units, sufficient space to transport antiterrorism forces, and enough mobility/flexibility to concentrate the needed volume of firepower. Furthermore, we must review our methods of using helicopters in Iraq in order to learn from errors that have led to casualties among both coalition forces and civilians.

I have barely touched upon the subject of communications systems, but during my past four years in the new Iraqi AF, working with the USAF, I have seen the importance of communications in command and control as well as in directing fire at the enemy. Moreover, effective command of units and good planning are impossible without a communications system capable of consolidating control of the air effort in coordination with ground units and antiterrorist forces. We must establish control between units carrying out operations and those conducting air defense. (We envision taking appropriate steps that will soon make the latter completely available in Iraq.) Further, we must emphasize close ties among ground, air, and naval forces via capable liaison officers (something needed in the IqAF and perhaps to some extent in the USAF) and conduct exchanges of such officers with their US counterparts at all levels, offering them special training and determining their role in the counter-terrorism fight. Additionally, air controllers, who must become skillful and capable in their work with antiterrorism forces, need training in the system of frontline air control capable of communicating with aircraft and directing them to their targets in the battle arena.

We in the Iraqi AF still suffer from shortages of air bases, logistical support, infrastructure, and personnel. The USAF should help us solve these problems and rapidly build up the Iraqi AF so that it can take the initiative in combating terrorism and relieve the burden on the USAF by assuming many of the missions that it currently performs. Because of the importance of personnel to airpower, we must create innovative mechanisms for encouraging people to volunteer for the Iraqi AF and must use the media to support this effort by conducting an awareness campaign throughout the country. We should establish safe and secure recruiting centers so that we can attract more volunteers who meet the criteria and qualifications specified in our regulations.

Practical and Theoretical Training

We must have joint training with ground and antiterrorism forces, as well as training and cooperation with coalition forces, in order to exchange experiences and benefit from the superior expertise of the USAF in combating terrorism on all levels—from the training of pilots and technical personnel to positions in high command. I believe that IqAF personnel should be trained for the next four years outside Iraq until we prepare a complete group of specialists to work in our Air Force Academy so that it can do its job. At that point, we will have sound training in Iraq that will produce expert pilots, technicians, and specialists. In terms of exchange of expertise, however, elements of the IqAF should still participate in training exercises conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other military organizations.

Conclusion

The use of airpower in combating terrorism requires us to think in new ways, employ new tools, and cooperate more fully. This unique mission calls for doctrine that facilitates the efficient employment of airpower. We must determine the most effective weapon systems for the task at hand. Small fixed-wing aircraft and light attack helicopters can ensure the relevance of airpower in this new mission. To attain strategic and tactical effectiveness, we must hone command and control functions among all branches of the US, coalition, and Iraqi forces to allow rapid coordination, joint cooperation, and dynamic interaction for airpower. Coalition and Iraqi forces should conduct ongoing joint exercises and personnel exchanges to refine tactics, improve procedures, and stay abreast of evolving terrorist methods. USAF personnel should also benefit from the experience of local air forces and their development, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, in order to be able to carry out their assigned missions. This will prove helpful to the USAF because terrorism is a worldwide enemy whose activities cross all national borders.

*Editor's note: This article is an abridged version of the one published in the Fall 2008 issue of *Air and Space Power Journal-Arabic*, available at <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-a/2008/fal08/alkhizal.pdf>.

Endnotes

1. Dr. Thomas R. Searle, "Making Airpower Effective against Guerrillas," *Air and Space Power Journal* 18, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 13, <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj04/fal04/Fal04.pdf>.
2. Maj Kenneth Beebe, "The Air Force's Missing Doctrine: How the US Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency," *Air and Space Power Journal* 20, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 30, <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/spr06/spr06.pdf>.
3. Ibid.
4. Searle, "Making Airpower Effective against Guerrillas," 17.
5. Ibid., 20.
6. James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 431–32.

Predator Command and Control: An Italian Perspective

COL Ludovico Chianese, Italian Air Force

Reprinted with permission from the Fall 2008 issue of *Air & Space Power Journal*.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Italian Air Force flew its new Predator fleet in support of combat operations. The Predator, an American-made, medium-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) used for surveillance and reconnaissance, has a range of up to 400 nautical miles and can fly at altitudes up to 25,000 feet. Cruising at a speed of 70 knots, it can loiter for hours over targets.¹ Even though Italian Predator operations generally have been considered successful, some issues still need solving in order to maximize efficiency and effectiveness. Changes in the character of air warfare are occurring now, and the Italian Air Force must adapt to them. During that service's Predator operations in Iraq, most problems originated in the command and control (C2) structure, reflecting a lack of strategic doctrine, an incomplete application of basic doctrinal principles, and an inadequate level of operational command. In this article, the author compares his knowledge of the Italian Predator operation—derived from his experience as the Italian air component commander from December 2005 to April 2006 in Tallil, Iraq—with doctrine as well as past and present US Predator operations. After a brief overview of the significance of doctrine and C2, the article then introduces Italy's Operation Antica Babilonia (Operation "Ancient Babylon") and describes the C2 structure for the Italian Predator, pointing out the main problems encountered during operations and proposing some final recommendations to stimulate, develop, and integrate a strategic vision and policy for Italian UAVs in future expeditionary and national missions.

The Significance of Doctrine

The word doctrine has different connotations. For many people, it recalls lofty and arcane discussion by theorists and academicians that offers little to average military personnel trying to operate down at the unit level. The US Air Force points this out very well in its basic doctrine manual, warning us against settling for the rules of thumb so often used in operations.² Instead, we must capture the accumulated body of knowledge, consciously and formally incorporating it into doctrine, which consists of fundamental principles by which militaries shape their actions in support of national objectives and, on operational and tactical levels, in support of the commander's intent.³ Ideally, all major operations are based on a campaign plan that reflects doctrinal principles and tenets derived from the "accumulated body of knowledge" mentioned above. But in some instances, the Italian Air Force has not followed these almost obvious recommendations, performing some military operations with neither a precise doctrinal strategy in mind nor a strategic directive—or simply without completely applying appropriate basic principles and tenets of doctrine. By way of accounting for this situation, historian Frank Futrell suggests that airmen, not known as prolific writers, have "developed an oral rather than a written tradition."⁴ Additionally, some leaders believe that "adherence to dogmas has destroyed more armies and cost more battles than anything in war."⁵ In fact, bad doctrine overly bounds and restricts creativity, and if "not properly developed, and especially if parochialism is allowed to creep in, doctrine will point to suboptimal solutions."⁶ In the case of Italian Predator operations in Iraq, no strategic doctrine existed for UAVs in general or for Predators in particular. Although the first two reasons may have played some role, the main reason for not having such guidance was the lack of previous experience with this specific asset and insufficient time to develop sound, timely doctrine. Even if UAVs are no longer considered a technical innovation in the United States, where research and development related to these aircraft are significantly advanced, they represent a significant leap forward for the Italian Air Force. But an air force

needs more than advanced technology to provide effective capability. After purchasing Predator technology “off the shelf,” Italy’s air service rapidly fielded it in Iraq before developing a strategy or doctrine for employment. Predictably, its Predator force suffered the consequences, learned many valuable lessons, and should profit from this experience.

Command and Control of Airpower: Doctrinal Basics

In the realm of doctrine, C2 has always been considered an important issue for military organizations and leaders. A vital and integral part of war fighting, it requires careful planning and execution in order to be effective. In the beginning of Italian aviation history, the famous air theorist Giulio Douhet wrote that “the war in the air is the true war of movement, in which swift intuition, swifter decision, and still swifter execution are needed. It is the kind of warfare in which the outcome will largely be dependent upon the commander.”⁷ Indeed, Italians in Iraq learned what Americans had experienced in Serbia, just seven years before, as noted in the Air War over Serbia Report:

In the air war over Serbia, command and control worked well at the tactical level. For example, the rapid re-targeting of attack aircraft against targets detected by the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle was innovative and quite successful. At the operational and strategic levels, however, Air Force leaders repeatedly noted two dominant problems. The first was that command and control structures and coordination procedures were overlapping and confusing. The principle of unity of command must be reinforced in future training, doctrine, and operations.⁸

The Italian Air Force experienced surprisingly similar problems in Iraq. That service could have better exploited American lessons learned with Predators to compensate for its lack of experience with this asset, especially in the C2 architecture, since US forces have operated UAVs in general and Predators in particular since 1995.⁹

At an even higher level, each military leader should be able to apply C2 principles and tenets universally since they are considered common knowledge. Unity of command, for example, “ensures concentration of effort for every objective under one responsible commander.”¹⁰ Simplicity calls for “avoiding unnecessary complexity in organizing, preparing, planning, and conducting military operations.”¹¹ One must also prioritize air and space power, thus assuring that demand for air and space forces will not overwhelm air commanders in future conflicts.¹² But these abstract principles require an operational capability to put them into practice. Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, former US Air Force chief of staff, once said that “a commander without the proper C2 assets commands nothing except a desk.”¹³ Effective C2 becomes possible only by dedicating significant resources for equipping, training, and exercising C2 operators; thus, US Air Force doctrine directs commanders to “ensure their people are fully proficient at using designated C2 systems when performing wartime duties.”¹⁴

Antica Babilonia: Italy’s Debut in UAV Operations

Italy’s involvement with the multinational forces in Iraq began on 15 April 2003 when Franco Frattini, minister for foreign affairs, addressed Parliament on the government’s intent to support the military coalition in Iraq. About a month later, Defense Minister Antonio Martino instructed the military to plan the deployment of a national contingent to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. The resulting military operation, known as Antica Babilonia, began on 15 July 2003, consisting of an Italian joint task force formed around an army infantry brigade.¹⁵

At that time, Iraqi Freedom had just “ended major combat” and had started security, stability transition, and reconstruction operations.¹⁶ Combined Joint Task Force 7 in Baghdad included two US-led multinational divisions in north and northwest Iraq, a Polish-led multinational division in south-central Iraq, and a British-led multinational division in southeast Iraq. By 15 May 2004, coalition forces had organized into two commands, Multi-National Force-Iraq as the operational command, and Multi-National Corps-Iraq as the tactical command, with Italy’s participation described by a national operational directive.¹⁷ For Antica Babilonia, three Italian general officers assumed key positions in the Baghdad headquarters.¹⁸ A sector within the British multinational division was assigned as an area of responsibility (AOR) to the Italian joint task force, commanded by a fourth Italian general.¹⁹

Unfortunately, the end of major combat did not mean that peace had returned to Iraq. The Italian 3,000-soldier contingent, based in An-Nasirya, the capital of Dhi Qar province, faced violent conflict between US-led coalition forces and insurgents.²⁰ For the most part, Antica Babilonia focused on stabilization operations, security-sector reforms, training, and nation-building measures.²¹ Deployed forces and assets underwent adjustments according to the changing threat. Land forces were augmented by a joint air task group of two helicopter squadrons and, since January 2005, by a UAV squadron equipped with RQ-1 Predators for surveillance and reconnaissance missions.²²

Predator Command and Control Architecture: A Complicated Puzzle

The following observation, found in a US joint publication on multinational operations, certainly applied to Antica Babilonia: “No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command but one absolute remains constant; political considerations will heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure.”²³ Italy, however, did not always keep in mind the principle of simplicity when it established the Predator C2 system. In fact, it opted for a model that allowed for coalition employment of its forces but also ensured national control, particularly for key assets (fig. 1). Drawing on its experience with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Italy used the latter’s doctrine to define its command relationships. For example, the Italian Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa (defense chief of staff) always wields operational command (OPCOM), the highest level of command in the military hierarchy, comparable to combatant command in the US military. His functions are similar to those of the US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although the Italian officer has command authority over the service chiefs. The defense chief of staff in Rome retained OPCOM of the Italian forces deployed to Iraq. The following command relationships applied:

- Tactical Control (TACON): “the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.”²⁴
- Operational Control (OPCON): “authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.”²⁵
- OPCOM: “authority granted a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as he or she deems necessary. . . . It does not include responsibility for administration.”²⁶

- Administrative Control (ADCON): “direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.”²⁷




Figure 1. UAV and helicopter command and control in Antica Babilonia. (Adapted from Direttiva Operativa Nazionale COI-O-153-R [Roma: Comando Operativo di Vertice Interforze, April 2005].)

OPCON of most Italian forces, however, was transferred to the British commander of Multi-National Division-Southeast in Basra. The Predators represented a significant exception to this command relationship in that the Comandante del Comando Operativo di Vertice Interforze (COI) or chief of the permanent joint task force retained OPCON of those UAVs as a national-only asset, made available to the coalition on an excess-availability basis. The COI and his staff plan, prepare, and direct joint military operations and exercises for the defense chief of staff. The COI does not deploy from his location in Rome but can deploy a theater joint task force with OPCON of assigned assets.²⁸

In Antica Babilonia, the chief of the permanent joint task force retained Predator OPCON, unlike that of helicopters, for all missions within the AOR, exercised through the national contingent commander, who also commanded the Italian joint task force on the coalition side and represented unity of command of the Italian contingent through a dual-hatted arrangement. Even though the same person holds these positions (national contingent commander and commander

of the Italian joint task force), the remainder of this article uses the terms separately to indicate the chain of command (national only for national contingent commander, coalition for Italian joint task force) under discussion.

On the other hand, missions requested by other Italian national agencies and the coalition, if not in direct support of the Italian contingent, required case-by-case direct approval from the chief of the permanent joint task force, who exercised OPCON directly over Predator operations. The air component commander, head of an air-forward command element acting both as tasking authority for the Predator squadron and coordinating agency with Iraqi Freedom's combined air operations center (CAOC) in Al Udeid, Qatar, exercised TACON of the UAVs.²⁹ Although helicopters and UAVs were part of the same joint air task group of the Italian joint task force, the former fell under TACON of the joint air task group commander but the latter under TACON of the air component commander.³⁰ The commander of the joint air task group also exercised ADCON over the UAV personnel.

In summary, the Italian defense chief of staff assigned the mission and tasks (under his OPCOM authority) to a different subordinate commander—the COI commander or chief of the permanent joint task force—in order to deploy a joint task force in Iraq. The chief of the permanent joint task force then delegated OPCON to the joint task force commander, except for Predators. Figure 1 shows the dual-hatted relationship of the Italian joint task force on the left of the diagram (representing the coalition chain of command) and the national contingent commander on the right of the diagram (representing the Italian chain of command). US Air Force doctrine calls for caution when “multi-hatting” commanders because doing so could distract them from focusing on the right level of war at the right time. On the other hand, not multi-hatting a commander may degrade unity of effort, which, as we will see later, occurred in the case of Italian Predator activities at the tactical level.

Unity of Command and Unity of Effort

Unity of command is a principle of war.³¹ As stated before, such concepts are not always taken into consideration, as was the case with Italian Predators in Iraq. Figure 1 shows that the Predator squadron had two separate lines of authority: a relationship with the commander of the joint air task group (ADCON) and one with the air component commander (TACON). Despite having a single commander at the operational level—the national contingent commander/commander of the Italian joint task force—in practice, this double relationship meant that two different tactical commanders existed for the same UAV squadron. This apparently minor issue turned out to be one of the main sources of C2 problems.

Presumably, the original rationale behind this structure entailed having a single commander for all air assets (commander of the joint air task group). But when Predators were “plugged in” to what was a joint helicopter squadron in 2005, headquarters in Rome required a national-only line of command and introduced the air component commander.³² While the air component commander exercised TACON over the Predators, the joint air task group commander had responsibility for their administration and support. This arrangement often caused friction.

In 2005 official quarterly reports from Italian air component commanders to their superior command in Italy showed continuous evidence of confusion, rivalry, and overlapping authority between officers appointed as air component commanders and joint air task group commanders.³³ Personnel assigned to the UAV squadron frequently referred their problems either to the air component commander or the joint air task group commander, without really understanding who was responsible for what. The national operational directive lacked sufficient detail to distinguish

between the authority of the joint air task group commander and air component commander. According to that directive, the joint air task group commander was responsible for providing all daily support to personnel and for filing efficiency reports for every single Italian aviator deployed in Tallil, Iraq, except the air component commander. He commanded a full staff, which enabled robust support in ensuring the execution of his decisions.

On the other hand, although the air component commander had only one officer and one warrant officer directly supporting him, he exercised full authority over Predator missions and tactical command over personnel involved in them, from planning through execution. The authority of the air component commander, typically functional in nature, was often misinterpreted by some operators and sometimes by the two commanders themselves, especially in overlapping activities involving both supporting and operational tasks such as management of the intelligence exploitation cell, distribution of imagery-intelligence products, and management of technical personnel. This slowed decision-making processes, and personnel appeared generally confused and sometimes even reluctant to speak up about problems. For example, in May 2006, when an Italian UAV crashed due to a malfunction, there was no specific, detailed plan for its emergency recovery.³⁴ Although analysts had predicted the problem in previous months and despite intensive effort to lay down plans and procedures, lack of a decision about who had approval authority prevented agreement on a final plan.³⁵

Because of the location of the joint air task group commander and air component commander under separate chains of command, unity of effort required a strong working relationship and a shared sense of mission. The two commanders eventually committed to daily meetings in Tallil to solve issues related to UAV C2, but one should not consider this a permanent fix. Competition for resources, lack of understanding of aircraft capabilities, and competing mission priorities could destroy even the most cordial arrangement.

One must not leave the effective C2 of precious air assets to chance. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, tells us that “unity of command ensures concentration of effort for every objective under one responsible commander. This principle emphasizes that all efforts should be directed and coordinated toward a common objective.”³⁶ AFDD 1 also calls for centralized control and decentralized execution to assure concentrated effort.³⁷ During World War II, the Allies learned from their mistakes and adapted their doctrine accordingly:

As Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Eisenhower invoked new doctrine by insisting upon a single air commander reporting directly to him. The Allied campaign in North Africa during World War II began with air power parceled out to various commanders. . . . The limitations of this arrangement quickly became apparent, particularly during the battle at Kasserine Pass. During the 1943 Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt and Churchill approved a new command structure that centralized control under an airman. This new concept quickly found its way into Army doctrine: “Control of available airpower must be centralized and command must be exercised through the air force commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited.”³⁸

The above example draws its lessons learned from one of the largest conflicts in history, whereas the Italian air effort in Iraq drew support from a relatively small number of helicopters and Predators (10 and four, respectively). Unity of command, unity of effort, and simplicity constitute fundamental principles of war that one must apply across the range of military

operations and at all levels of war.³⁹ The Italian Predator operation should not have been an exception to this basic doctrine.

Consequences of Misplaced Operational Control

OPCON of the Italian Predators during Antica Babilonia resulted in several problems, such as inappropriate employment in relation to their capabilities and characteristics, slower decision-making processes, and confused target prioritization.⁴⁰ Simply “falling in on” the existing joint task force clearly showed a lack of operational innovation. For instance, the headquarters of the joint task force would request UAV support with little or no advance notice in response to the immediate tactical needs of ground troops, as if the Predators were an air-defense asset ready to be “scrambled.” This practice probably resulted from the Italian joint task force’s familiarity with the Pointer, a man-portable, low-altitude, short-range small UAV. However, a Predator, unlike a Pointer, needs at least one hour of ground checks, so by the time it reaches the area of operations, it is too late to meet the immediate intelligence requirements of ground forces. This procedure initially caused significant problems with the CAOC in Al Udeid because, although Italian helicopters did not require inclusion in the CAOC’s air tasking order, the Predators did. Predators, which usually fly at higher altitudes than helicopters, require air-traffic deconfliction. Failure to follow airspace-control orders and air-traffic procedures greatly increases the risk of a mishap with other aircraft flying in the same altitude block.

Because the CAOC included no Italian liaison officer, the Predator mission had no advocate and frequently lacked the information and coordination channels to make timely decisions. On several occasions, the author witnessed ineffective Predator missions because he could not obtain air-traffic deconfliction over busy areas such as Baghdad or last-minute changes to the air tasking order. Flights were sometimes cancelled at the last minute, result ing in frustration and wasted effort for both the Predator crews and the tasking agencies in Rome.

When broadcasting capability of satellite imagery became available and the chief of the permanent joint task force in Rome began to receive Predator imagery, strategic needs soon trumped tactical ones, and the C2 architecture appeared even more inappropriate than before. When, for example, other commands—such as the British in Basra or intelligence agencies in Rome—tasked specific strategic missions, only vague priority criteria existed to deconflict missions assigned at the tactical level. This situation forced the air component commander to seek clarification and case-by-case authorizations from Rome, a task made even more difficult by limited secure communications.

Since Predators originally “fell in” as an organic tactical asset under the deployed joint task force commander, no special mechanism was in place at higher levels of command to deal with immediate operational issues. There was no continuously functioning operations center with visibility or decisional authority over UAV missions in Rome, the source of many strategic Predator missions. One had to process necessary clearances during working hours, coordinate extensively with different offices, and—since no one was officially in charge—obtain authorizations from the highest levels. This resulted in confusion, frustration at all levels of command, a slower decision-making process, and unclear prioritization of missions. Additionally, some Italian joint task force commanders regarded Predators as a limited resource for the fulfilment of the Italian contingent’s mission in Iraq, despite the significant expenditure of money needed to rent the satellite bandwidth required to fly strategic missions tasked by Rome.⁴¹ These examples demonstrate why we must take a fresh look at our doctrine and ad hoc C2, particularly the assumption that UAVs should remain under a land component commander deployed in-theater.

In doctrinal terms, Americans have never assigned Predator OPCON to a commander deployed into a theater. The Italian choice could prove dangerous because of the strong temptation to control these aircraft at the tactical level, which would prevent optimum employment and even abort operational innovation. In particular, one could conclude that Predators are too expensive if one uses them simply to watch what happens on the other side of the hill—a role for which Pointers and other kinds of UAVs have been specifically engineered. Imperfect understanding of the characteristics and missions of Predators could jeopardize the potential roles of UAVs in the Italian armed forces since their cost-effectiveness might appear insufficient. In the near future, technology will offer Italians better opportunities to link Predator imagery to a strategic headquarters in Italy or a CAOC anywhere in the world. UAVs may have an attack role, and their flights will require integration into a more complex and robust air effort—likely at a CAOC. One will understand and employ them as more than a tactical asset, but current Italian C2 relationships and capabilities are not up to the task. Learning how to command and control UAVs from a distance takes time and resources—improvisation is not an option.

Operational Control: An Examination of Alternatives

Ultimately, one develops doctrinal principles from real-world experience.⁴² In Iraq, the chief of the permanent joint task force chose to delegate OPCON of UAVs to the national contingent commander, who, in practical terms, served as the land component commander deployed into the AOR (air force personnel comprised only 3 percent of the total Italian force).⁴³ This *modus operandi*—assigning OPCON of air assets to the deployed joint task force commander—has been used in every past Italian expeditionary joint operation, and the joint task force commander is usually an army officer. But since 1995 Americans have never assigned Predator OPCON to a deployed land component commander, and we should remember that US forces have accumulated more than a decade of operational experience with UAVs.

The first European deployment of US Predators occurred during Operation Nomad Vigil in April 1995 in support of Joint Task Force Provide Promise, based in Gjader, Albania. The joint task force's headquarters provided tasking through the Southern Region Joint Operations Intelligence Center in Naples, Italy. The NATO CAOC in Vicenza, Italy, performed the required airspace coordination.⁴⁴ The second European deployment occurred in March 1996 for Operation Nomad Endeavor in support of Operation Joint Endeavor, with Predators based in Taszar, Hungary. Tasking came from a forward element of US European Command through the US National Intelligence Cell at Vicenza, Italy. OPCON of the Predators remained with European Command, and NATO's CAOC exercised TACON.⁴⁵

One finds the same architecture in 1999 during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, where the United States used Predators for the first time in the targeting role.⁴⁶ Before Allied Force, Predators could transmit targeting imagery to their operators on the ground as part of the intelligence-collection network. During the Kosovo operation, the Americans invented new processes to exploit Predator data feeds with advanced technology and procedures for analysis. Doing so enabled review of Predator video in real time, and analysts immediately provided pilots with the location of mobile Serb targets. In Afghanistan and Iraq, tasking came from US Central Command's CAOC in Al Udeid, while imagery was centrally analyzed in the United States, where operators remotely controlled the Predator missions and received imagery via satellite communications.⁴⁷ So, forward air-command elements exercised TACON only—limited to launching, recovering, and maintaining the aircraft; in none of these missions did the Americans delegate OPCON to a land component commander deployed in the AOR, as the Italians have done in Iraq.

This does not mean second-guessing Italian military planners since at the beginning of the operations, that was the only option available. In fact, until Predators reached full operational capability, one could broadcast their imagery only within the theater, so OPCON by any element outside the theater would have destroyed the usefulness of near-real-time imagery. Surprisingly though, even the attainment of full capability on 17 February 2006 changed nothing in the C2 structure, raising the question “Why?”⁴⁸

One possible explanation is that the Italian Air Force has mainly deployed helicopters in past joint or combined expeditionary operations.⁴⁹ Typically considered an organic asset of terrestrial units according to Italian Army doctrine, helicopters have always remained under the OPCON of the deployed task force commander since they better served tactical, rather than strategic, roles. Over the years, this has reinforced a doctrinal mind-set that if one had to deploy land forces, any air asset (usually helicopters) would come under the authority of a land component commander, who also headed the joint task force. So when Predators first deployed to Iraq, a lack of operational experience and the absence of Predator doctrine led planners to assume they could be managed just like helicopters; thus, the deployed task force commander exercised OPCON of these aircraft. Another plausible reason for this choice is that the Italian joint task force already included a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition army regiment equipped with Pointer UAVs.⁵⁰ The similar roles of Predators and Pointers may have led to the assumption that one could manage their C2 in the same way.

Recommendations

Based on the considerations discussed so far, what would represent the most appropriate C2 architecture for Italian Predators in future expeditionary operations? First, the Italian Air Force should review its air doctrine from an expeditionary perspective and articulate a strategic vision for near-term and midterm UAV operations. It should incorporate current and future UAV capabilities and missions for supporting the joint force with near-real-time reconnaissance and surveillance and possibly target acquisition, as well as widely accepted doctrine on C2.⁵¹ Additionally, UAV units should support a single chain of command.⁵² The Italian experience in Iraq has confirmed what US doctrine recognized as early as 1993: when “UAV units are tasked to support more than one command . . . simultaneously, degradation of effectiveness can result.”⁵³

Second, UAV doctrine should also emphasize the appointment of a single air component commander, rather than two commanders, in order to grant better unity of command and simplicity. Deployed air units, typically a joint air task group, should remain subordinate to a single deployed commander with tactical command over all air assets and should receive a single air tasking order from the Italian air and space operations center (AOC), NATO CAOC, or coalition CAOC, depending on the nature of the conflict.

Third, doctrine should describe the roles of the national AOC and lay a foundation for determining the necessary capabilities and resources it requires.⁵⁴ The US Air Force has dedicated tremendous effort to standing up its AOCs as a “weapon system” to support joint and coalition operations.⁵⁵ For instance, it awarded a \$589 million contract to Lockheed Martin Corporation to serve as the AOC Weapon System Integrator, evolving C2 centers to support net-centric joint and coalition operations worldwide.⁵⁶ Although the Italian Air Force may have neither the requirements nor resources to go this far, it does need to carefully determine the AOC’s role in the C2 of its UAVs, the ways in which it can play a role in better integrating UAV operations, and the resources it will apply toward the problem. Figure 2 provides a basic sample layout for future C2 architectures in expeditionary operations that assumes full connectivity with deployed UAVs: (1) a single, dual-hatted airman for helicopters (or other air assets) and

Predators (unity of command and simplicity) and (2) Predator OPCON assigned to the Italian Air Force's joint force Air component commander in Italy and exercised through the AOC.




Figure 2. Suggested notional C2 structure for future UAV deployments

Giving OPCON of UAVs exclusively to the joint force air component commander will ensure command of air forces by an airman. The peculiarity of air assets in general, and Predators in particular, requires specifically trained personnel and consolidated experience in the C2 of the air domain—better achieved by an airman. AFDD 1 makes it clear: “The axiom that ‘airmen work for airmen, and the senior airman works for the joint force commander . . .’ not only preserves the principle of unity of command, it also embodies the principle of simplicity.”⁵⁷ As Predators and future UAVs move closer to Douhet’s original vision, becoming a decisive asset in a “true war of movement,” they will indeed require “swift intuition” and “swifter decision.” It follows, then, that we must empower the joint force air component commander to both command and control.

Conclusion

Antica Babilonia was the first military operation with Predator UAVs for the Italian armed forces. Because the general trend in military aviation is toward unmanned systems, we must be ready. The Italian Air Force, in particular, must ensure that its unmanned-aviation technology is paired with sound, timely doctrine—starting with the fundamentals of C2.

If properly applied without overly bounding or restricting creativity, basic principles and tenets such as unity of command, unity of effort, simplicity, priority, airmen commanding airmen, and appropriate levels of C2 will offer a good starting point for future UAV doctrine. In the specific case of Predators, we should not limit lessons learned to Italian national experience. Rather, we must include other valuable perspectives, such as those of the Americans, since they have operated the same system worldwide for more than a decade. Our way forward will require not only an investment in technology but also an intellectual investment. As Douhet's proud successors, we cannot morally afford to ignore his teachings. For the Italian Air Force, the time to change is now.

Endnotes

1. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v., "MQ-1 Predator," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RQ-1_Predator (accessed 8 February 2007).
2. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 1.
3. Ibid., 3.
4. Quoted in *ibid.* 2.
5. J. F. C. Fuller quoted in *ibid.* 4.
6. Ibid.
7. Quoted in AFDD 2-8, Command and Control, 16 February 2001, 1. (This document was replaced by a new version as of 1 June 2007.)
8. Quoted in *ibid.*, 13.
9. "RQ-1 Predator MAE UAV, MQ-9A Predator B," Global Security. org, 20 October 2006, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/predator.htm>.
10. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 20.
11. Ibid., 26.
12. Ibid., 32.
13. Quoted in AFDD 2-8, Command and Control, 43.
14. Ibid.
15. Ministero della Difesa, "Comando Operativo di Vertice Interforze (COI), Cosa è," 2003, <http://www.difesa.it/SMD/COI/cosaè.htm>.
16. On 1 May 2003, from the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, Pres. George W. Bush declared major combat ended. "President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended," The White House, 1 May 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html>.
17. "Multi-National Force-Iraq," SourceWatch, 2 September 2006, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Multi-National_Force-Iraq. The national operational directive (Direttiva Operativa Nazionale in Italian) is the military directive describing the assigned mission and C2 relationship among units. Direttiva Operativa Nazionale COI-O-153-R (Roma: Comando Operativo di Vertice Interforze, April 2005).
18. The three generals held the following positions: chief, coalition operations (Multi-National Force-Iraq), deputy commander ITSNR (Multi-National Corps-Iraq), and deputy commander (Multi-National Division-Southeast). Direttiva Operativa Nazionale COI-OPR-153-R. (Restricted) Information extracted is unclassified.
19. An Italian brigadier general was permanently appointed as deputy commander, Multi-National Division-Southeast. Direttiva Operativa Nazionale COI-OPR-153-R. (Restricted) Information extracted is unclassified.
20. Wikipedia: L'enciclopedia libera, s.v., "Guerra in Iraq" (see "Il coinvolgimento italiano"), http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerra_in_Iraq#Il_coinvolgimento_italiano (accessed 5 February 2007).
21. Direttiva Operativa Nazionale COI-OPR-153-R. (Restricted) Information extracted is unclassified.

22. Ibid.
23. Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Multinational Operations, 7 March 2007, II-5.
24. NATO Standardization Agency, AAP-6 (2007), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), 2-T-2, <http://www.nato.int/docu/stanag/aap006/aap6.htm>.
25. Ibid., 2-O-3.
26. Ibid.
27. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 93. The Italian armed forces refer to ADCON as comando gerarchico—typical of an airexpeditionary unit commander. Normally, this authority includes tactical command over operational units, so the Predator's case has been an exception.
28. Ministero della Difesa, "Comando Operativo."
29. For this operation, the term air component commander identifies the UAV (only) air component commander. His authority did not affect helicopter assets, which remained under a separate authority (commander of the joint air task group). The author was UAV air component commander from December 2005 to May 2006. Direttiva Operativa Nazionale COI-O-153-R.
30. The joint air task group (Reparto Operativo Autonomo in Italian) was based on an air force helicopter squadron for combat search and rescue and a dual-role (attack and mobility) army squadron. Ibid.
31. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 20.
32. The joint air task group was based on two air force squadrons (one equipped with helicopters for search and rescue and the other equipped with Predators for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions) and one army squadron (equipped with attack helicopters).
33. The air component commander reported daily and quarterly to the Italian Comando Operativo Forze Aeree (COFA), based in Poggio Renatico (Ferrara), Italy. Commanded by the joint force air component commander, the COFA had only logistic support authority over Predators. Nevertheless it received quarterly reports from the air component commander and joint air task group commander, as the air force command.
34. Official news of the Predator accident was reported to the joint force air component commander in Italy in May 2006 at the COFA during a briefing by the air component commander on the post mission report. This information has also appeared in the quarterly Operation Antica Babilonia report, but details remain classified. On the Web, one can find general information in specialized international magazines. See "Italian Predator Crashes in Iraq," Air-Attack.com, 18 May 2006, http://www.air-attack.com/news/news_article/1617/Italian-Predator-Crashes-in-Iraq.html.
35. Author's participation in post mission briefings and experience drafting procedures for Predator recovery in Operation Antica Babilonia.
36. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 20.
37. Ibid., 29.
38. AFDD 2-8, Command and Control, 5.
39. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006, II-1.
40. "Operazione Antica Babilonia," Air Component Commander Quarterly Report (Poggio Renatico: Comando Operativo Forze Aeree, May 2006).
41. Ibid.
42. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 7.
43. Direttiva Operativa Nazionale COI-O-153-R (Roma: Comando Operativo di Vertice Interforze, April 2005).
44. "RQ-1 Predator MAE UAV, MQ-9A Predator B."
45. Ibid.
46. Statement of General John P. Jumper, Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 26 October 1999, <http://house.gov/hasc/testimony/106thcongress/99-10-26jumper.htm>.
47. According to the author's experience in the daily UAV tasking process in Tallil, all Predator missions had to be coordinated with US Central Command Air Forces' CAOC in Al Udeid, Qatar, which disseminated the air tasking order after the appropriate air-traffic deconfliction.

48. “Operazione Antica Babilonia.”

49. After World War II, Italian tactical aircraft have flown in joint and combined combat operations in only two cases: Operation Desert Storm (17 January 1991, the first combat mission since World War II) and Allied Force in 1999. “L’Aeronautica Militare Oggi: La Guerra del Golfo,” *Aeronautica Militare*, 9 September 2002, <http://www.aeronautica.difesa.it/SitoAM/Default.asp?idsez=21&idarg=25&idente=1394>; and Wikipedia: L’enciclopedia libera, s.v., “Operazione Allied Force” (see “La partecipazione italiana”), http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operazione_Allied_Force#La_partecipazione_italiana.

50. Direttiva Operativa Nazionale COI-O-153-R.

51. Unlike the US Predator, the current version of the Italian Air Force’s Predator lacks target-designation capability.

52. JP 3-55.1, *Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Support for Joint Operations*, 14 April 1993. Even if it is no longer current, this publication underlines some capstones and tenets that remain important, such as those in chapter 2, “Employment.” See http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-55_1/3-55_1c2.htm.

53. Ibid.

54. The Italian AOC is presently embedded in a major command—the COFA (see note 33), colocated with NATO’s CAOC 5 in Poggio Renatico, Italy. This means that the integration between the national and NATO C2 functions could also be enhanced for future coalition UAV operations if NATO’s joint force air component commander and his AOC exercise OPCON.

55. The Air and Space Operations Center - Weapon System, AN/USQ-163 Falconer, for example, is the senior element of the US theater air control system. The cost of this program in 2004 was \$26.982 million. See various unclassified exhibits regarding the Air and Space Operation Center - Weapon System, February 2005, <http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2006/AirForce/0207410F.pdf>.

56. John McHale, “ESC Awards \$589 Million AOC Weapon-System Integrator Contract,” *Military and Aerospace Electronics*, October 2006, http://mae.pennnet.com/articles/article_display.cfm?article_id=275862.

57. AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, x.

Chapter 4 - USEUCOM

USAREUR: Building Partner Capacity for the Future

GEN Carter F. Ham, Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army

From ARMY Magazine, October 2009. Copyright 2009 by the Association of the U.S. Army.
Limited reprint permission granted by AUSA.

Rising concerns over regional conflicts, globalization, climate change, illegal trafficking of people and material, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are just some of the complex factors undermining stability in Europe. As European militaries prepare for a future of persistent conflict, they look to the United States for leadership. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) continues to provide this leadership through theater security cooperation (TSC) activities while transforming to meet emerging threats and security challenges. Today USAREUR is a dynamic, full spectrum force that is training and leading European land forces for the future. USAREUR's history is intertwined with the 60-year legacy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Once focused exclusively on the collective defense of its members, NATO has evolved into an alliance committed to out-of-sector operations—ensuring peace and preempting extremists from disrupting global security. USAREUR has also evolved— from a massive force with a largely conventional defensive mission to a smaller, agile and more flexible force that deploys from sanctuaries across Europe to conduct full spectrum operations. While doing so, USAREUR has maintained its leadership role in NATO through its continuous presence on the European continent.

USAREUR soldiers and families, like those everywhere, are experiencing the stress of repeated deployments. Over the past two years, more than one-third of USAREUR forces were deployed at any given time. Other USAREUR soldiers, such as the medical professionals at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany, provide enduring world-class support to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and throughout the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Central Command areas of responsibility. USAREUR is also in the midst of substantial rebasing initiatives. Since 2004, more than half of USAREUR's force structure has returned to the continental United States, relocated within Europe or wholly inactivated. Synchronizing deployment timelines with rebasing actions is a complex process that must be accomplished effectively to give our soldiers and families maximum predictability.

In addition to deploying worldwide to support overseas contingency operations, USAREUR soldiers play a pivotal role in increasing the interoperability and capabilities of our allies and Coalition partners. This is not a new task, but one that has taken on increased importance in the context of full spectrum operations. In the 21st century, America will confront complex, dynamic and unanticipated challenges to our national security and that of our allies and partner nations. The idea that one country can “go it alone” to ensure its own security against hybrid threats is untenable. The global economic crisis is forcing nations to make hard funding decisions, which has resulted in diminished defense budgets. Coalitions are the norm. Current operations in Afghanistan provide a salient example of the multiplicative power of coalitions as NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ramps up offensive operations to reclaim extremist-controlled areas. Today nearly 90 percent of Coalition forces in Afghanistan come from Europe.

USAREUR—executing USEUCOM's strategy of active security—conducts continuous TSC activities to improve the capabilities and interoperability of our allies and partners. These range

from attending noncommissioned officer academy courses to multilateral exercises that increase the professionalism and competencies of Coalition forces. This year alone, USAREUR will conduct more than 30 exercises with soldiers from 38 nations.

From small-scale, squad-sized elements teaching basic tactics to multinational exercises with as many as 10 countries, each participating nation increases its ability to operate effectively as part of a coalition force. The positive effects on the warfighting capabilities of these armies is powerful.

Exercise Regional Response in Azerbaijan was the first U.S. Army exercise in that country, and Immediate Response in the Republic of Georgia was another critical training event in the Caucasus. Exercises conducted at non-U.S. training areas are enhanced by the Seventh U.S. Army Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) exportable training capability. With this organic capability, enabled by the exportable instrumentation system, fully instrumented training is possible anywhere in the world. This spring, JMTC participated in testing the Army's exportable training capability concept with the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, at Fort Bragg, N.C. The same capabilities that prepared the 82nd for combat operations aid our Coalition partners in preparing for their own deployments.

Enduring TSC events that build on the successes of previous rotations are vital to increased regional security. "Episodic engagement" with our allies and partners will not generate the synchronized coalition forces required to win on today's asymmetric battlefield. USAREUR is in its fifth year of a well-established TSC initiative in Romania and Bulgaria. Each year, these exercises have grown in scale, scope and complexity. This summer, a task force from the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment conducted bilateral training that increased interoperability among U.S., Romanian and Bulgarian land forces. In addition, the controlling headquarters was augmented by our sister services and allies to create a joint, combined staff. Exercises in Romania and Bulgaria provide valuable experience at both the staff and unit levels and have been enhanced by JMTC's exportable training capability. These exercises are Coalition enablers, introducing Romanian and Bulgarian forces to the latest tactics, techniques and procedures in preparation for their ISAF deployments. Ranges in both countries are not solely USAREUR training venues; they are also used by our sister services and other organizations, making them year-round training locations of choice.

JMTC is a valuable element of USAREUR's initiatives to build partner capacity. Soldiers at Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels bases in Germany routinely conduct mission rehearsal exercises and counter improvised-explosive-device and operational-mentor-and-liaison team training. JMTC has conducted such exercises for deploying Polish, Romanian and other Coalition formations that have made positive gains in Afghanistan and other areas of operations. Coalition forces use these competencies to train the Afghan National Army. JMTC is also home to the Warrior Leaders Course (WLC). More than 400 NCOs from 25 countries have attended the WLC. These soldiers develop a better understanding of the vital roles that NCOs play in our Army; when they return to their respective countries, they become role models for their nations' soldiers. A key NCO-led TSC event this year was the third annual Conference of European Armies for Noncommissioned Officers, co-hosted by the USAREUR command sergeant major and his Polish land forces counterpart. Senior enlisted leaders from 38 European armies met to develop tools to enhance the professionalism of their NCO corps, improve training, and share lessons learned and best practices. One of USAREUR's major contributions to the Year of the NCO is demonstrating military professionalism to NCOs of other nations while influencing the development of the NCO corps of European armies. JMTC was the primary location for Austere Challenge 2009 (AC09), the joint task force (JTF) certification exercise for USEUCOM. During

this exercise, USAREUR headquarters was certified to perform as the core of a JTF/joint forces land component command—a significant step in our headquarters’ modular transformation. In late 2008, USAREUR headquarters migrated to a functional staff alignment from a traditional Napoleonic design. During AC09, the new staff construct—with a joint manning document rounded out by our sister services—tested the staff’s ability to successfully plan and execute full spectrum operations. AC09 also provided the first opportunity to test the reach-back capabilities of this headquarters. Certification as a JTF-capable headquarters adds a significant new dimension to USAREUR, USEUCOM and the total force.

As our Army becomes increasingly more expeditionary, cultural awareness and the ability to interact with many cultures with confidence have become more important. USAREUR soldiers, through repeated interaction with foreign militaries, develop the confidence to operate in unfamiliar cultural and social scenarios. Multinational training experiences instill the expeditionary mind-set required to operate in foreign environments. Similarly, our soldiers and families experience different perspectives and develop increased cultural awareness by interacting with host-nation citizens. These are benefits to a forward presence that cannot be replicated in the United States. In addition to experiencing different cultures, USAREUR families enjoy a quality of life that is steadily improving. We are committed to taking care of the all-volunteer force, our families and our civilian workforce. We are upgrading living arrangements with renovated bathrooms, expanded kitchens and private laundry facilities. Modern schools, commissaries, post exchanges and child development centers are a reality. In Vicenza, Italy, we are building a new home for the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in preparation for its consolidation south of the Alps at Dal Molin Air Base. Grafenwöhr has a new look with recently constructed homes, barracks, administrative areas and Europe’s largest post exchange. USAREUR is well on its way to completing rebasing initiatives over the next five years.

In the future, USAREUR will remain a valuable force provider to overseas contingency operations while continuing to help our allies and partners transform their land forces for the 21st century. As the recent conflict between Russia and the Republic of Georgia demonstrated, a lasting peace in Europe and Eurasia is tenuous. We remain a steadfast leader within the NATO alliance as we ask for unprecedented commitments to the war in Afghanistan, and we continue to help our host nations and other European partners transform their land forces. These missions, which are of paramount strategic importance to our nation, will keep USAREUR relevant for years to come and ready to accomplish any mission, anywhere.

Strengthening the Bridge: Building Partnership Capacity

ADM James G. Stavridis, U.S. Navy, and COL Bart Howard, U.S. Army

Reprinted with permission from the January-February 2010 issue of *Military Review*.

ADMIRAL MIKE MULLEN has said, “Developing a relationship on the battlefield in the midst of a crisis with someone I’ve never met before can be very challenging . . . Trust has to be built up over time. You can’t surge trust.”

Trust comes from years of cooperative experience, listening, success, and failure, and is held together by a common vision of a secure and prosperous future. Because relationships are so important, it is critical never to take them for granted. That is why building partnership capacity is the centerpiece of all that European Command does and is clearly the command’s top priority.

What is partnership? By definition, it is a relationship between individuals or groups that is characterized by mutual respect, cooperation, and responsibility for the achievement of a specified goal. Notice that it is not a one-way exchange, but a two-way relationship, a relationship between partners who both have a stake in the outcome. We chose the word “partnership” carefully. Partnerships are built on unique experiences, imply recognition of both strengths and shortcomings, complement each other to reach mutual goals, and learn from each other. We in the European Command believe no one person, service, agency of government, or nation is as good as a coalition of willing partners working together.

Forward-based, Partner-focused

European Command is a geographic combatant command stationed in the center of a partner region. It is as easy to overlook this fact, as it is hard to quantify the effect this has in all we do. For decades, our members have had the opportunity to live and work in host nations. Many senior leaders often remark that one of their fondest memories of service is their first tour in Europe. Then as now, service members and their families form lasting personal relationships with local nationals, both at work and in the community. Discovering local cuisine, using local public transportation, and learning the language are simple, yet meaningful steps to gaining mutual respect and building alliances. These personal experiences become the foundation for larger organizational relationships. The reverse is also true for our allied friends. How many times have you heard an allied member recall fond memories of a treasured U.S. exchange assignment? Living with and near our partners gives European Command members a unique perspective and solid credibility with our allies. We recognize that knowledge is a powerful commodity, and it takes effort to understand the culture in partner nations. Understanding the history of Europe helps us see our allies’ world view and why they approach problems and situations in the manner they do. Without a sense of this view, we are like moviegoers arriving late to a film and wondering what is going on and why major characters are reacting so strongly.

As Americans, we often seek quick solutions and comment that “time is short.” Our European allies may see things a bit differently. The United States is a young nation. A yearly festival, the Ducasse de Mons, is celebrated near Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe, in the city of Mons, Belgium. Rich in symbolism and tradition, the festival dates back to the year 1349 and has occurred nearly every year for more than 650 years. Clearly, our partners may see things with a different lens given their culture and history.

To gain a better understanding of this tapestry of history and culture, European Command has recently published a reading list of over 80 titles with genres ranging from history to literature. (This can be found at <http://useucom.wordpress.com/2009/08/06/what-are-you-reading/>).

European Command members are encouraged to find an area of interest and learn more about their host country or a specific period in its history. For example, after reading *Where Have All the Soldiers Gone*, by James J. Sheehan, a reader may have a much better insight into the differing approaches of our partners. No single approach is “correct.” Partners give each other ideas and learn from one another. It may be hard for Americans to fully comprehend the influence of disastrous 20th century wars, both hot and cold, and their aftermath on the psyche of our partners, but we owe it to ourselves and to our friends to try.

If you understand the European culture, you will understand the United States better. The United States is a country with strong ties to the European continent. The recent 2008 U.S. Census revealed that approximately 60 percent of the U.S. population identifies somewhat with European ancestry. A glance at some of the name tags of European Command members validates this unique connection. As the names Cimicata, Gallagher, Rodriguez, and Stavridis suggest, America is a nation of immigrants; but immigrant offspring quickly assimilate into contemporary culture. One indication of this assimilation is our loss of the native tongue. Only 8 percent of DOD members speak a foreign language, and European Command likely mirrors this statistic. Thus, we almost always conduct business with our partners in English. By comparison, a visitor to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, would hear a variety of languages in the hallway and cafeteria, but as soon as a meeting would start, virtually all the international staff would display an admirable mastery of English.

Europe is a continent of many languages. The European Union has 23 official and more than 60 indigenous languages, so it is a significant challenge to communicate in host-nation languages with our partners. For that reason, European Command has challenged all its members to study a foreign language using the various tools the services offer, such as the award-winning language software, Rosetta Stone. Furthermore, European Command is exploring ways to make it easier for its members to have access to more language resources. European Command recognizes that the study of a language is a tremendous way to gain insight into another culture. The knowledge of basic phrases can help build trust between individuals.

Challenges and Opportunities

Never have the challenges or opportunities been greater for European Command to strengthen the bonds of partnership. Our partners face an array of hazards, ranging from international terrorism, extremism, shifting demographics, and economic turbulence to concerns over access to energy. We do not want to face these hazards alone. The United States cannot obtain its strategic objectives without a unified approach, and the military is seeking more innovative solutions using proven concepts.

NATO

After 60 years, NATO still stands as the most successful military alliance in history. One legacy of this alliance is the adoption of hundreds of “standardization agreements.” These agreements established processes, procedures, terms, and conditions for use of common military and technical procedures and equipment among member countries. They may seem bureaucratic, but in reality, these agreements have vital relevance to our operations today. The fact that the

International Security Assistance Force in Kabul produces operations orders using a standardized NATO planning process, in English, and in formats that staff members are familiar with, is a minor miracle. It is easy for those who work with these standard processes regularly to overlook them, but our neighbors do not do so. Indeed, countries seeking to work closer with us often aspire to achieve the “NATO standard.” NATO’s investment in interoperability decades ago continues to be beneficial in both old and new partnership enterprises.

Although our collective memory of training in Europe during the Cold War is fading a bit, we can and should build upon the positive legacies of that era. Through exercises, unit partnerships, and exchange assignments, the United States and its allies in European Command have built a common framework of principles for conventional warfare. We must be comfortable training for irregular warfare on one day and stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction the next. Our emphasis on training will not only be on how to perform a mission, but also on how to “train the trainer.”

The Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams Program (OMLT, pronounced “omelet”) is a prime example of this change in focus and the synergy of multiple partnerships. An OMLT is a small team of partner-nation officers and noncommissioned officers whose primary task is to deploy to Afghanistan to coach, teach, and mentor an Afghan National Army unit. They also provide a conduit for command and control and, when required, provide support with operational planning and employment. Operational mentor and liaison teams help Afghans develop collective and individual skills to achieve and maintain peace and stability. In this process we should avoid “Americanizing” our partners and impart the concept of service and professionalism. It is better to allow them the flexibility to fit such concepts into their culture.

European Command plays an important role helping our partners train and deploy for this vital mission. Hungary recently deployed a team that was small in size, but huge in impact—an OMLT aided by European Command training, resources, and mentorship. It would have been difficult years ago to imagine Hungarian forces training and partnering with U.S. forces, then deploying out of Europe to the distant land of Afghanistan with the ultimate mission of mentoring the Afghan National Army. This example demonstrates the power of cooperation and unity of effort when trust is formed based on professional relationships.

However, there is more to this story, much more. Due to the highly successful State Partnership Program, a bilateral training and mentoring association that began in 1993, this particular OMLT included not only members of the Hungarian Armed Forces, but also 30 members of the Ohio Army National Guard. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program continues to be one of our most effective security cooperation programs. By linking American states with designated partner countries, we promote access, enhance military capabilities, improve interoperability, and reinforce the principles of responsible governance. Currently 20 states have partnerships with 21 countries in the European Command area of operations (see box). Our intent is to build enduring military-to-military, military-to-civilian, and civilian-to-civilian relationships, all of which enhance long-term international security. In the end, personal relationships trump everything, and are the key to our success.

To achieve our common goals, we must partner with many organizations in addition to traditional military allies and coalition members. To succeed, we must work more closely with other departments and agencies of the U.S. government, such as the Department of Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Agency for International Development. We seek the same strong relationships and trust with multinational organizations and nongovernmental organizations as we have with uniformed allies.

One of European Command's most important assets is a bastion of knowledge, not a weapon system. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, has hosted thousands of participants from numerous nations to promote dialogue and understanding. For this command, the Marshall Center demonstrates the primacy that building partnership has in our mission. We cannot surge trust, and we do not want to try to build relationships and seek capabilities after a crisis has started. We want to know each other long before.

A Holistic Approach

Building partnership capacity is not a specialized program or a single event. We approach this key mission with a strategic campaign plan that touches all staff directorates and components. We challenge ourselves by asking the question, "How does this action contribute to building partnership capacity?" or "What have I done for our partnerships today?" To be successful, we must synchronize not only our efforts, but also our words and deeds.

We know the best partnerships have open communication and seek an exchange of ideas with eyes on a goal. We do not have all the solutions or all the right answers. The goal of European Command is not "Americanization." We share techniques and processes that have worked for us, but recognize that each partner has a unique culture and approach to problem solving. Even so, we may be justifiably proud that many nations actively seek to emulate our professional noncommissioned officer corps and our emphasis on discipline, ethics, and individual initiative.

We often learn innovative solutions from our partners. The term specific capability crops up frequently in forums exploring how smaller nations contribute to large enterprises. The Irish Army may seem small at 8,500, but it has contributed superb individual augmentees to the International Security Assistance Force headquarters. For example, a dinner conversation in a dining facility in Afghanistan became especially enlightening for an American Army officer when an Irish officer told him that improvised explosive devices were a decades-old issue for the Irish Army, not a recent phenomenon. This prompted a longer discussion, and the American gained greater perspective and useful ideas. We do not always measure knowledge and experience in a specific capability in terms of troop strength. That American officer benefited immensely from the impromptu laboratory facilitated by his Irish counterpart. Ideally, such tangible and salient lessons can have a broader reach than just one person. A formalized innovative process that reaches out to our military and civilian partners can be a catalyst for similar broad results. We established an "innovation cell" in European Command to build partnership capacity through research and exchange of ideas, techniques, technologies, and procedures.

We recognize that building partner capacity is rarely about materiel solutions. It is easy for some to envision a technological solution to every problem—a "silver bullet." If only our partners had more (fill in the blank), they would be more capable. In European Command, we have found that materiel solutions are not always the best way to build capacity. Each partner nation is different, and materiel solutions can result in new, additional requirements. The need to maintain, train, and operate complex and expensive platforms can be challenging for smaller countries. At European Command, we understand that building capacity is not always about "things." It may also be about the power of ideas and concepts. Our noncommissioned officer corps is an example of an investment in people, not materiel. As we work with our partners, we seek to find the right balance between materiel solutions and ideas.

Communication

We are proud that we are pioneering the use of social networking to reach out to our partners. From a command blog (www.eucom.mil/english/bridge/blog.asp) to Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn, we are seeking new ways to tell our story and emphasize the two-way communication central to any successful partnership. We are also working diligently to improve communication with our attachés using collaborative tools such as Defense Connect on Line to hold “town hall meetings” to exchange ideas and improve situational awareness. European Command strives to be a learning organization and to communicate through many means.

Chapter 5 - USNORTHCOM
The Future of Warfare:
Canadian Counterinsurgency Manual Reflects US-Canada “Synergy”

Anthony Fenton

Reprinted with permission from the July 2009 issue of *The Dominion*.(www.dominionpaper.ca).

Capping a sweeping transformation that began in the late 1990s, the Canadian Forces recently issued their first counterinsurgency (COIN) operations doctrine, which will help Canadian soldiers prepare to fight the wars of today and the “foreseeable future,” alongside its chief ally and the sole global superpower, the US.

In development since 2005, the COIN manual was authorized by Chief of Land Staff Lt. Gen. Andrew Leslie in the waning days of the Bush administration. It was not formalized for another two months—six weeks after the inauguration of President Barack Obama.

Obama’s administration has sent clear signals, through political appointments and holdovers (such as Defense Secretary Robert Gates), that the US military and national security apparatus’ transformation toward fighting smaller, “irregular wars” begun under Bush will continue apace.

Only a week before Bush left office, Gates, together with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Director of USAID, Henrietta Fore, co-signed the *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide*. Neo-conservative historian Eliot Cohen, who oversaw the Guide’s creation, wrote in its introduction:

Insurgency will be a large and growing element of the security challenges faced by the United States in the 21st century...Whether the United States should engage in any particular counterinsurgency is a matter of political choice, but that it will engage in such conflicts during the decades to come is a near certainty. This Guide will help prepare decision-makers of many kinds for the tasks that result from this fact.

According to Lt. Gen. Leslie, the Canadian Army is “at the cutting edge” of Western armies readying themselves to fight 21st-century wars.

The paradigms of the past based on the Cold War have changed a great deal. We have demonstrated beyond any doubt that we can adapt our doctrine and training quickly in order to meet scattered, complex operations focused on counterinsurgency missions” Leslie told a Senate defense committee meeting in March.

Shifts in Canadian policy adhere closely to those of her allies, like the US, the UK and other NATO partners. These governments are at the forefront of institutionalizing COIN principles and practices in military culture, across the “whole-of-government,” and, eventually, within the “whole of society.”

Based on the “comprehensive approach,” the Canadian COIN manual represents a synthesis of two recent US Army Field Manuals: *Counterinsurgency* (FM 3-24); and *Stability Operations* (FM 3-07).

In 2007, after over one-and-a-half million downloads, the US Army COIN manual was published in print by the University of Chicago Press and received wide media coverage. The subsequent US Army *Stability Operations Manual*, published in early 2009, has also been widely distributed. By contrast, the Canadian manual is not yet publicly available. A copy of the Canadian COIN manual was obtained by The Dominion from the Department of National Defense.

Writing in the *Canadian Military Journal* last fall, Leslie defined the comprehensive approach as the “ability to bring to bear all instruments of national and coalition power and influence upon a problem in a timely, co-ordinated fashion.” This definition aligns with that of the US Army, as found in the *Stability Operations Manual*:

A comprehensive approach...integrates the co-operative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

The concept of “unity of effort” is drawn from classical counterinsurgency theory and doctrine. In 1966, John J. McCuen wrote in *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* that, “Unity of effort... is extremely difficult to achieve because it represents the fusion of civil and military functions to fight battles which have primarily political objectives.”

As the Canadian manual foregrounds, today’s insurgencies remain inherently “a political problem.” “The nature of operations today and in the future will resemble the Three Block War construct—one that demands that soldiers interact with many different players other than their own armed forces, and undertake non-traditional tasks,” wrote Leslie in the *Canadian Military Journal*.

In October 2003, Hillier made the Three Block War scenario “a guiding concept for the Canadian Army.” Hillier’s support for the Three Block War was one of the reasons he was selected to be Chief of Defence Staff in 2005. According to then-Prime Minister Paul Martin, “[Hillier] advocated a concept called the ‘three-block war,’ to describe the [military’s] mission...This was not a rejection of our peacekeeping tradition, but a revision to suit tougher times, and I supported it.”

Martin’s government dovetailed the Three Block War approach with the broader institutionalization of the “whole-of-government” (or 3D: Defence, Development, Diplomacy) foreign policy approach in its International Policy Statement of 2005. This trajectory has continued, with minor modifications, under the minority Conservative governments of Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

That Canada should shift its foreign and defence policies in concert with the US comes as no surprise given their close historical relationship, even if the level of integration is often downplayed by the mainstream media. “No two militaries are more closely united than those of the United States and Canada,” said US Ambassador to Canada David Wilkins in 2007.

With counterinsurgency practices and principles on the rise under the Obama administration, an increasing level of “COIN-synergy” exists between the two militaries.

“We are learning from others. I happen to know General David Petraeus, who is very good man. You will find that some of our recent philosophies closely match his and those of the US Army and our friends and allies,” Lt. Gen. Leslie told the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence in March.

Gen. Petraeus is likely the person who contributed the most to the resurrection of a new “counterinsurgency era” in the US. He oversaw the drafting of the *US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual* in 2005 and 2006, and supervised its implementation during “the surge” in Iraq in 2007.

As Commander of US Central Command, Petraeus currently oversees both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Many followers of Petraeus have risen to prominence within Obama’s cabinet; others have gone on to become “experts” in private think-tanks and appear regularly in the US media as proponents of counterinsurgency war.

Petraeus visited Calgary this week for a “social” meeting with Canada’s top military brass. Partly a public relations exercise, the meeting saw Petraeus and Canadian Chief of Defence Staff Walt Natynczyk, who once served in Iraq at the same time as the US general, donning cowboy hats as they attended the Calgary Stampede. There, according to Petraeus, they discussed “the way forward for the next two years” in the COIN fight in Afghanistan.

Petraeus was subordinate in rank to Natynczyk when the Canadian general was Deputy Commander of the Multi-National Corps in Iraq in 2003-04. At the same time, Petraeus commanded a small number of Canadian soldiers in Iraq on a low-key NATO mission to train Iraqi soldiers, according to declassified documents obtained by *The Dominion* via Access to Information.

The clearest embodiment of COIN’s institutionalization and the Canada-US “comprehensive approach” can be found in the US Army and Marine Corps COIN Center. Established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 2006 by Petraeus and US Marine General James Mattis, it was from the COIN Center that the *US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (FM 3-24) was drafted.

The COIN Center’s pamphlet describes its purpose as “facilitat[ing] the development of a culture that enables us to more effectively adapt as a whole government when called upon to deal with future COIN or COIN-like threats.”

Canada is identified in the pamphlet as a key COIN-partner of the US in the “COIN SITREP reports” that Lt. Col. Daniel Roper, Director of the COIN Center, publishes periodically. “Each country needs to institutionalize it in a way that works for them,” Roper told *The Dominion*. “But I see some pretty impressive collaboration at the inter-agency level in Canada, with people of cross-functional expertise trying to grapple with some issues; some similar things that we’re doing.”

Since General Leslie signed off on the COIN manual last December, the COIN Center and Canada have collaborated on more than 20 exchanges, including “COIN Leader Workshops” and “COIN Integration” meetings. Members of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) met with the COIN Center for discussions about “US-Canada COIN synergy” five days after Leslie wrote in his issuing order for the new COIN doctrine that it is “complementary to our allies.”

In April, the US COIN Center “visited military installations and think-tanks in Canada to inculcate the Canadian military establishment with COIN doctrine and best practices.”

During one presentation with top officials from Prime Minister Harper’s government, the COIN Center found that “policy advisors were most interested in how the merits of [Canada’s new Afghan COIN] strategy could be explained to the Canadian public and Canadian political leadership.”

Figuring out ways to sell the COIN campaign to a skeptical Canadian public has been a key aim of the Canadian government and military, and Canada's COIN manual emphasizes the goal of "creating and maintaining the legitimacy of the campaign." One of the central figures steering the Canada-US COIN-synergy is Lt. Col. John Malevich, who joined the COIN Center in November 2008 by way of a newly created exchange program between the two countries. He is currently the Deputy-Director of the COIN Center and recently gave a series of COIN lectures in Canada.

Reached via telephone upon his return to Ft. Leavenworth, Malevich told *The Dominion* that the biggest assets that he brings to the COIN Center are his scholarly background in asymmetric warfare and first-hand COIN experience in Afghanistan. Prior to joining the COIN Center, Malevich was a member of the Strategic Advisory Team—a team of military advisors set up by General Hillier to provide direct advice to top Afghan cabinet ministers. He was later seconded to the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission, where Malevich says he "came up with their operations plan and their security plan" for the presidential elections scheduled for August 2009.

"When I speak, these guys give me a pretty good respect and they're pretty grateful to have this help...they're very grateful to have Canadians among them and grateful for the contribution we've made in Afghanistan," said Lt. Col. Malevich of his colleagues at the COIN Center. Col. Roper, who says he's been to Canada "four or five times" to discuss COIN, told *The Dominion* that by having Malevich "institutionally embedded" in the COIN Center, "The Canadian Army benefits from having a full-time person working in here with full access to everything we've got and recognizing [when] he stumbles upon something here that, hey, he knows somebody in the Canadian Army that might benefit from that; he can very quickly share that information."

Invoking Gen. Charles Krulak, the US marine who coined the term "Three Block War" and who, in 1997, predicted the importance of "transnational movements" to 21st-century warfare, Roper said that today, "what we're looking at are transnational insurgencies."

Partnering as closely as possible with key allies like Canada is seen as crucial to conducting what some COIN experts call "global counterinsurgency." According to Malevich, one of his key roles is "bringing [US COIN] expertise up to Canada and bringing it into the Canadian military culture." Such a level of COIN integration has never been undertaken before, and it is difficult to foresee the possible implications for Canada's military culture, which inevitably spills over into broader society. "The better the people understand the pros and cons and the risks [of COIN], the more informed a decision they can make," says Roper.

In her introduction to the University of Michigan Press edition of the US Army *Stability Operations Manual*, Janine Davidson acknowledges that, "[There] are those who see the new doctrine as another dangerous step on the slippery slope toward imperialism."

Davidson dismisses those critics, writing that they "seriously misunderstand the purpose and role of military doctrine"—because the military doesn't set the policies that send them to occupy other countries.

On the other hand, influential COIN advocates such as Eliot Cohen have argued that the US needs to establish an "Imperial Army," the likes of which Canada is increasingly becoming appended to.

The Enduring Value of NORAD

Gen. Victor E. Renuart Jr. USAF

Reprinted with permission from the 3rd Quarter 2009 issue of *Joint Force Quarterly*.

The armed forces of Canada and the United States are completing a historic commemoration. Just over 50 years ago, our two nations signed the Agreement for the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), which established a bi-national command to provide air defense against the Soviet bomber threat. For five decades now, we have ensured the aerospace sovereignty of North America. Since September 11, 2001, NORAD (now the North American Aerospace Defense Command) has refocused its mission to include defense against surprise and internal threats. With this new threat in mind, in May 2006, Canada and the United States added maritime warning as a NORAD mission.

Recognizing the broader aspects of the 21st-century security environment, our two nations are now assessing opportunities for enhanced military cooperation among the commands charged with defending our home territory. Our leaders have repeatedly underscored the importance of international cooperation for homeland defense and security. In the spirit of a neighborhood watch, Canada and the United States have a great opportunity to create a set of new relationships that build on the strengths and benefit from the challenges of earlier times. By changing the lenses we have looked through for generations, we can develop processes and procedures to reduce the geographical, inter-domain, interagency, and intermodal gaps that currently exist in our defenses.

There are a number of ways to address these new relationships. Whichever approach we take must acknowledge all members as equal partners. That approach must also respond to changing conditions and adapt to the possibility of new participants. In that light, this article offers a retrospective on NORAD, looks at the relevance of NORAD today, and suggests an outline of considerations for future enhanced military cooperation between Canada and the United States in the defense of our neighborhood. These considerations, now in parallel with a Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)–directed study, are not presented as all-inclusive or exhaustive, but rather reflective of the potential that exists.

History of Cooperation

The modern story of defense cooperation between our two countries extends back to World War II, when the threat of German and Japanese incursion into Alaska and the Maritime Provinces brought the United States and Canada together. In August 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King issued the Ogdensburg Declaration, which voiced the concept of joint defense and sanctioned the establishment of the Canada-U.S. (CANUS) Permanent Joint Board on Defense. At the war's end, collective security for continental defense remained of vital interest to both nations, and in February 1947, Ottawa and Washington announced the principles of future military cooperation, including consultation on air defense issues.

The growth of Soviet long-range aviation in the late 1940s, and the test of a Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, brought Canada and the United States under direct threat of nuclear attack for the first time, encouraging even closer cooperation in continental defense.

In the early 1950s, the two nations agreed to construct a series of radar stations across North America. The first undertaking was the Pinetree Line in 1954. By 1957, a Mid-Canada Line or McGill Fence was completed about 300 miles north of the Pinetree Line. The third and most challenging joint air defense undertaking of the 1950s was the construction of the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line), a transcontinental line along the 70th parallel, about 200 miles north of the Arctic Circle.

This three-tiered radar defense line now gave our population centers 2 to 3 hours warning of bomber attack, sufficient time to identify and intercept enemy aircraft. Should the enemy have attempted to circumvent the three lines and approach from either the Pacific or Atlantic Oceans, they would have encountered offshore barriers composed of airborne early warning aircraft, Navy picket ships, and offshore radar platforms called Texas Towers.

Since the operation of this network required daily coordination on tactical matters and the merging of plans to a greater extent than ever before, the logical next step was to establish a formal structure for operational control. To that purpose, in 1951, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) placed a liaison group at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado, home of the U.S. Air Force Air Defense Command, to carry out planning. Soon it became obvious that the most effective air defense required common operating procedures, deployment according to a single plan, means for quick decision, and authoritative control of all weapons and actions.

In the spring of 1954, the RCAF Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal C. Roy Slemon, and the head of the Air Force Air Defense Command, General Benjamin Chidlaw, met to discuss the best means for providing defense for North America. On the basis of these talks, their staffs prepared a plan that called for a combined air defense organization under a single commander. In late 1954, General Earle E. Partridge, commander of the newly formed joint U.S. Command, Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), directed another detailed study of North American defense issues. The results again pointed to the establishment of a combined air defense organization.

On August 1, 1957, the United States and Canada announced the establishment of an integrated command that would centralize operational control of all air defenses. On September 12, NORAD operations commenced at Ent Air Force Base, with General Partridge named as commander and Air Marshal Slemon as his deputy. Eight months later, on May 12, 1958, the two nations signed the formal NORAD Agreement. NORAD now commanded both Canadian and U.S. air defense forces, which included Canadian Air Command, Air Force Air Defense Command, Army Air Defense Command, and Naval Forces CONAD/NORAD.

The next several years saw a dramatic growth in air defenses. By the early 1960s, a quarter of a million Canadian and U.S. personnel operated a multilayered and interlocking complex of sites, control centers, manned interceptors, and surface-to-air missiles.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the character of the threat changed as the Soviet Union focused on deploying intercontinental and sea-launched ballistic missiles, while developing an anti-satellite capability. In response, the command developed a space surveillance and missile warning system to provide worldwide space detection and tracking and to catalogue objects and activity in space. When these systems became operational during the early 1960s, they came under the control of the NORAD commander. Over the years, the evolving threat broadened the NORAD mission to include tactical warning and assessment of a possible air, missile, or space attack on North America. The 1975 NORAD Agreement acknowledged these extensions of the command's mission, and the 1981 agreement changed the command's name from the North American Air Defense Command to the North American Aerospace Defense Command.

Economic moves begun in 1963 caused the reduction of aircraft fighter-interceptor forces and closed portions of the land-based radar network; however, there were improvements that helped reduce the vulnerability to intercontinental ballistic missile attacks. Two hardened underground combat operations centers were set up: one inside Cheyenne Mountain near Colorado Springs, and an alternate center at North Bay, Ontario. These facilities became the nerve centers for integration and assessment of data gained from the broad network of early warning systems being established.

In May 1979, Congress directed the U.S. Air Force to prepare a blueprint for modernization of air defenses and cost-sharing discussions between Canada and the United States. The main features of the modernization programs that followed were the replacement of the DEW Line radar system with an improved Arctic radar line called the North Warning System; the deployment of Over-the-Horizon Backscatter radar; the assignment of F-15s, F-16s, and CF-18s to NORAD; and the greater use of Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft.

The end of the Cold War brought major changes for the command. NORAD again reassessed its mission and refocused its resources to meet emerging threats. In 1989, Congress assigned the Department of Defense a role in the U.S. counterdrug effort. With Canadian ratification of the counterdrug mission, NORAD operations expanded to include tracking small-engine aircraft, then the primary means of smuggling drugs. The command also developed procedures to coordinate its counterdrug activities with Canadian and U.S. law enforcement agencies. These efforts demanded the utmost diplomacy as the command delved into delicate civil and diplomatic areas not traditionally included in day-to-day military affairs.

On May 12, 1996, the renewal of the NORAD Agreement prepared the command for the next century with a commitment to maintain NORAD as the cornerstone of CANUS post-Cold War national security. Five years later, in 2001, NORAD senior leaders were deep into assessment of how the command should meet future challenges when the playing field suddenly changed. Responding to the tragedy of September 11, NORAD has increased its visibility and significance as a partner in the national security of Canada and the United States. One major example is the continuous fulfillment of responsibilities associated with Operation Noble Eagle, which include:

- Monitoring and intercepting flights of interest within the continental U.S. and Canadian territory
- Flying air defense missions for our nations' leaders, national special security events such as the Group of Eight summits, North American Leadership Summit, Republican and Democratic National Conventions, Olympics, and large sporting events such as the Super Bowl
- Conducting city and critical infrastructure air patrols
- Assuming responsibility for integrated air defense over the U.S. National Capital Region
- Providing interior radar and radio coverage developed through enhanced interagency cooperation with NAV Canada, Transport Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation Security Agency, and Department of Homeland Security.
- Employing improved rules of engagement.

Looking back over the past 50 years, it is evident that NORAD has served as a credible deterrent to any aggression that might threaten North America, continually adapting to the changing strategic environment. Advances in technology have reduced the requirement for large numbers of personnel and air defense resources, but NORAD today remains the most formidable aerospace defense capability in the world. Strategic Environment Since the turn of the century, the overall threat to the North American continent from the aerospace, space, land, sea, and cyber domains has greatly increased, and the proliferation of weapons of mass disruption and their delivery systems to state and non state actors has emerged as a major security challenge. This evolution has introduced asymmetric threats that have the potential to affect the decision making processes associated with the defense of North America. Additionally, the proliferation of cruise missile technology, unmanned aerial systems, and nonmilitary air activity associated with drug trafficking and other illegal activities is of continuing concern.

Domestically, the overall volume of daily air traffic flowing to, from, and within our airspace will continue to expand and dictate an even higher degree of coordination between our national airspace surveillance and control systems and military components. Additionally, cyber security and the wide range of threats to our continent coming from the seas and major waterways will pose significant challenges. Finally, our vast and open borders, including a more accessible Arctic, will require both a closer level of cooperation between land and maritime forces and facilitation of military-to-military defense support to civil authorities.

Back to the Future

In response to this dynamic environment, there are three commands immediately responsible for the defense of North America: NORAD, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and Canada Command (Canada COM). The CANUS Basic Defense Document requires the commanders to establish close relationships with each other and with supporting agencies, ensuring a timely and coordinated response to threats to Canada and the United States. With that in mind, the CDS and CJCS requested the commanders of NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada COM to develop options for the way ahead in their relationship. Since that meeting in July 2006, the three commands have been working closely to study and improve their understanding of each other's roles, missions, and responsibilities with the aim of eliminating gaps and redundancies, while strengthening daily military cooperation in the defense of North America. As a previous deputy commander observed, the Tri-Command Study promises to be one of the most important things we do in the next 10 years.

While respecting national sovereignty, the study focuses on strengthening the Canadian and U.S. Armed Forces' ability to:

- Act in a timely and coordinated fashion.
- Identify, deter, disrupt, and defeat threats to Canada and the United States in all domains, in concert with their interagency partners
- Provide timely, effective, and efficient support to civil authorities as directed.

In examining future options for increasing military cooperation in defense of North America, a number of assumptions come into play:

- An attack on one country is an attack on the other and will have economic, defense, and security implications.
- The nations believe it advisable to expand military-to-military cooperation.
- Enhanced military cooperation will increase the layered defenses of all participants.
- Improving coordination and reducing seams along borders and among domains will improve the defense and security of all participating nations. Increasing decision time will provide decision makers a greater ability to respond to threats.
- Current policies do not prevent expansion of military cooperation. as Hurricane Gustav approaches, August 2008
- Differing international perceptions of the value and difficulty of cooperation with U.S. forces will influence the effectiveness of enhanced military cooperation. A change to NORAD is a politically sensitive topic.
- Canadian forces may provide a successful conduit for military cooperation with other nations.
- The lines between security and defense have become blurred.
- The concept of CANUS military cooperation is as relevant today as it was during the Cold War and offers a strong foundation for the defense of North America for the next 50 years.
- There is an excellent opportunity to consider expansion of both bi-national and bilateral cooperation in the areas of multi-domain awareness, assistance to civil authority, and information operations.

Where This Is Leading?

Even while the study progresses, the real-time demands of the global geopolitical structure require constant preparedness. One of the vital concepts of this defense is anticipating the unexpected. In NORAD, several key elements will contribute to our readiness.

Our gap-filler program will allow us to see air activity within our borders to a much greater degree—from border to border and down to the ground. In addition, command and control (C2) upgrades, advances in technology, and new organizational structures will greatly improve our defenses and extend our decision time against cruise missiles and other unmanned air-breathing vehicles.

In the maritime domain, NORAD will provide binational warning, benefiting from the maritime domain awareness capabilities of both nations. This cooperation among multiple maritime agencies will provide a great deal of synergy in the watch over approaches to North America. An additional strong point in this effort is the fact that we view maritime activity through a binational, rather than a national, lens.

In the political arena, the NORAD Agreement expresses a shared statement of the two nations' interdependencies and vulnerabilities. It acknowledges geographic, economic, cultural, defense, and security issues while giving an equal voice to both partners. The agreement underscores

respect for sovereignty and continues to build public trust and confidence in NORAD. Fundamentally, it provides a shared means for both nations to agree on military action in defense of Canada, Alaska, the continental United States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Militarily, NORAD enjoys a number of advantages. In the area of C2, each nation has an equal voice in decisions affecting NORAD missions. This unity of effort strengthens our protection from direct military attack and provides expanded surveillance and control over North American airspace and warning in the maritime domain. Through continuous improvement of our C2 systems, we have tightened the seams around domains, borders, and agencies. Generally speaking, either nation can exercise C2 of both nations' assets assigned to NORAD.

The way we do business also provides valuable training and operational experience, not only for NORAD missions, but also in United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and other multinational operations. Furthermore, collocation of NORAD and USNORTHCOM staffs has gone far to facilitate trust, familiarity, and confidence by promoting U.S. understanding of Canadian issues and vice versa. This familiarity has done a great deal to shorten response time to crises.

As far as our bread and butter is concerned, aerospace warning and aerospace control continually provide space surveillance and missile warning to both governments. We detect, track, and report every missile launch in the world, assessing the threat to North America. Our defensive forces respond to all Russian long-range aviation approaching our borders and secure the investment in the North Warning System and coastal radars in Canada. In this regard, we continually improve the interoperable C2 mentioned above and shorten response time.

Our new mission of maritime warning supports a formal nation-to-nation umbrella for sharing maritime information and provides authority to explore and identify what information both nations need to share among military and nonmilitary agencies and departments. This mission highlights the requirement for a common user-defined operating picture and supports the ability to use established intelligence-sharing protocols existing in the aerospace domain, once again shortening the decision cycle.

It has been over 63 years since the end of World War II and the emergence of the Soviet threat. Throughout five of those decades, the North American Air Defense Command has met the threat, adapted to changing conditions, and provided a shield over North America. The command's flexibility and adaptability have been significant in its continuing defense of our nations. Today, the lines between security and defense have become blurred, and it is time to rethink the division of labor that can lead to stovepipes within governments and militaries. Eliminating seams or gaps among missions, domains, and operational functions is essential to success. As the first step toward that goal, Canada and the United States should concentrate on the best information-sharing practices among all departments and agencies.

To further enhance military cooperation, the command must continue to leverage lessons learned from its 50 years of successful operations. The concept of bilateral military cooperation has served us well, remains as relevant today as it was during the Cold War, and provides a strong foundation for the defense of North America for the next 50 years. As we investigate how our nations' armed forces can best work together, there is an excellent opportunity to consider expansion of both bi-national and bilateral cooperation to the areas of multi-domain awareness, assistance to civil authority, and information operations. Processes and procedures that allow the Canadian and U.S. military to be more scalable, flexible, and responsive will also improve our effectiveness.

In light of recent events around the globe, we know we can never let our guard down. The citizens of our two nations expect and deserve to rest easy in a troubled world. Our solemn commitment at the end of the day is to continually strengthen the defense and security of Canada and the United States, such that our mutual societies continue to prosper in a North American community that is free and safe.

Chapter 6 - USPACOM

U.S.-Vietnam Defense Relations: Deepening Ties, Adding Relevance

Lewis M. Stern

Reprinted with permission from the September 2009 issue of National Defense University
Strategic Forum.

Normal defense relations between the United States and Vietnam emerged from discussions conducted from mid-1995 to late 1996. The first years of interaction between the American and Vietnamese defense establishments revolved around learning about one another, developing a common language, becoming accustomed to the differences in how the respective ministries managed policy and exercised authority, and learning to work with the personalities on both sides who were the mainstay of the relationship. At the outset, the Vietnamese were suspicious, conservative, and not inclined to move beyond argument about the “legacy issues,” such as the effects of Agent Orange and alleged U.S. Government support to anti-regime organizations.

In 2000–2004, the United States made the first efforts to modestly expand the scope and pace of defense engagement. Vietnamese military reluctance to ratchet up activities that smacked of close defense cooperation did not altogether preclude defense ministry officials from recognizing the dividends that could derive from the relationship with the U.S. military, and organizing for at least gradual shifts in views that enabled new types of engagement in the early 2000s. During his March 2000 visit to Hanoi, Defense Secretary William Cohen and Defense Minister Pham Van Tra agreed that ship visits would be a positive aspect of a gradually expanding plan for military engagement. Following that visit, on the instructions of the minister, the Vietnamese defense ministry entered into a long series of technical discussions with U.S. Pacific Fleet representatives that, in late 2003, enabled the first U.S. Navy ship port call in Vietnam. President Bill Clinton’s November 2003 visit to Vietnam sustained that momentum, focused on the successes of demining cooperation, and legitimized high-level discussions aimed at managing wartime legacy issues in a more effective fashion.

The bilateral defense relationship with Vietnam developed in three phases. The first phase, from initial contacts during which the notion of defense normalization was broached in 1995–1996 to the preparations for the March 2000 visit of then–Secretary of Defense William Cohen, was characterized by Vietnamese caution regarding U.S. intentions, and matching reservations in Washington plus a concern regarding the importance of preserving the prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) priority focus.

In the second phase, from 2000 to 2004, the United States took the first efforts to modestly expand the scope and pace of defense engagement. The Vietnamese clarified the more rigid aspects of their position on enhanced defense relations, dug in their heels, and resisted anything beyond the most symbolic forward movement in defense relations.

In the third phase, from 2005 to 2007, the United States began to look for ways to broaden defense interaction with Vietnam, believing that the new activities could be easily integrated into the existing plan, and that shared concerns for the well being of Southeast Asia and a common approach to broad transitional issues in the region suggested a natural basis for strategic community between Hanoi and Washington. The Vietnamese defense establishment began to explore steps that could enhance the relationship, take military-to-military engagement to the next level, and infuse some real strategic content into the defense relationship.

First Overtures

Discussions conducted between mid-1995 and late 1996 produced a foundation for normal defense relations between the United States and Vietnam. Formal military-to-military relations were initiated in November 1996, a year after government-to-government normalization, though Hanoi had taken some earlier steps toward rapprochement including the accreditation of a U.S. Defense Attaché in December 1995. The first real steps toward military-to-military relations were halting, modest, and cautious, revolving around mutually agreed initiatives that were constrained in scope and deliberately low key in nature.¹

In the first phase, Vietnam's defense ministry was reluctant to be drawn into activities that regional observers could interpret as a firm and warm embrace of the fledgling defense relationship, and the U.S. Government focused tightly on economic, trade, consular, and diplomatic normalization. The Vietnamese defense ministry was perfectly content to keep the pace constrained and scope modest, and the Department of Defense (DOD) was prepared to stick with an exploratory approach that fixed on benign, uncontroversial areas of focus as the starting point for bilateral military engagement.

The first years of interaction between the Vietnamese and U.S. defense establishments revolved around learning about one another, developing a common language, becoming accustomed to the differences in how the respective ministries managed policy and exercised authority, and learning to work with the personalities on both sides who were the mainstay of the relationship. The startup U.S.-Vietnamese defense relationship in 1997 consisted of three types of activities: U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)-hosted, Title 10 funded multilateral conferences and seminars; senior level visits; and practical bilateral cooperation in areas such as search and rescue; military medicine environmental security, and demining.

The parameters of this relationship were defined early. In 1996–1997, the United States offered Vietnamese defense ministry a range of starting points for a program of military engagement and adduced a series of simple precepts for defense relations: POW/MIA remained the national priority; all activities had to be transparent and not aimed at impacting the equities of other bilateral defense relations; the relationship was to unfold in a carefully calibrated manner intended as slow and deliberate; and the relationship was to be a “two-way street.” The Vietnamese reacted in 1997 with a parallel set of starting points that emphasized sovereignty, independence, national dignity, and the importance of a cautious, modest pace for the process of normalization. The decision during the tenure of the 9th Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam to retain an extremely modest focus on military medicine, military scientific and technological cooperation, and disaster relief/humanitarian projects guided the relationship from the earliest joint activities in 1997 through at least 2000–2001.²

Officers from the defense ministry's External Relations Department (ERD) were suspicious, conservative, and not inclined to move beyond argument about the “legacy issues,” such as the effects of Agent Orange and alleged U.S. Government support for anti-regime organizations. Senior defense officials found it difficult to understand U.S. intentions and presumed that military-to-military relations were just one more means by which Washington could manipulate the POW/MIA issue. While the United States referred to “defense relations,” the Vietnamese spoke of “military-to-military contacts,” implying a relationship that was orders of magnitude more confined and modest than a defense relationship. Eventually, as the relationship became routine and sought a consistent level of communication, the phrase military-to-military became much less of a means of drawing a distinction between the DOD term of art and the preferred ERD nomenclature.

In this period, both sides fixed their attention on fulfilling a light schedule of low-profile annual plans that began with the first post-normalization visit of the U.S. Commander of Pacific Forces to Hanoi, an initial orientation visit to the United States by a group of ERD senior colonels, the opening of the Vietnamese defense attaché office in the Vietnamese embassy in Washington, and visits to Vietnam by U.S. military officers from the National War College and Air War College for area familiarization. The primary channel of communication evolved between working level representatives of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) and the ERD. These activities became frequent set piece actions between directorate level officials representing organizations with singularly different mandates and vastly different levels of policy authority that were ultimately responsible for shaping an annual plan of activities in the bilateral defense relationship.

While the ERD was the defense ministry's eyes and ears on U.S.-Vietnamese relations, senior officers manning key positions had decidedly less maneuvering room at the negotiating table. They were less inclined to make judgments about the acceptability of recommended activities than were ISA representatives. They were more directly responsible to the defense ministry and more inclined to defer decisions until explicit instructions arrived from that quarter, whereas ISA functioned on the basis of broad instructions and had more of an ability to innovate at negotiating sessions without requesting additional guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In fact, following the first few steps in the original November 1996 plan, including the visit to Hanoi by the commander of USPACOM and the visit to the United States by the defense ministry's senior colonels' delegation, in April 1997 the Vietnamese ERD unceremoniously postponed the remainder of planned activity for the year, including the visits by the U.S. National Defense University (NDU) and Air War College study groups. The reason given for the postponement was the upcoming National Assembly elections, which would require senior leaders to set aside other activities so as to ensure successful election to the legislature of a predetermined number of People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) candidates.³

Nevertheless, a number of achievements in the relationship were chalked up from 1996 to 1999, including the visit of the Deputy Chief of the defense relationship, the February 1997 trip to Hanoi by the commander of USPACOM, and the arrival of Vietnam's first defense attaché in March 1997.

In late 1997, the legacy issues of Agent Orange and Vietnam's MIAs became central in all ISA and ERD dialogue on military relations. In October 1998, Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam visited the Pentagon, followed by Deputy Defense Minister Tran Hanh's trip to the United States in the same month. ISA-ERD planning meetings in 1999, a successful Air War College study group visit to Vietnam (including the first flight line visit to Nha Trang Pilot's School), and an April 1999 visit by U.S. military engineers that initiated the important demining training program for Vietnam were followed by lengthy discussions that culminated in the March 2000 visit to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City by Secretary Cohen.

Circumspect Courtship

In 2000–2004, the United States took the first efforts to modestly expand the scope and pace of defense engagement. The Vietnamese clarified the more rigid aspects of their position on enhanced defense relations, dug in their heels, and resisted anything beyond the most symbolic forward movement in defense relations. For example, through the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Vietnamese claimed a longstanding aversion to anything involving U.S. special forces, but managed to overcome that reluctance when they became convinced of the attractiveness of demining-focused activities and events involving U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific.

During this “courtship” period, the Vietnamese continuously asserted their clear objections to anything that smacked of explicitly military education. DOD could often press beyond standard objections and concerns by describing and defining mountable hurdle involved the “vetting” of Vietnamese participants nominated for an activity as free of any prior involvement in acts against human rights. The U.S. side described the legislatively mandated vetting requirement as the most effective means of identifying professional military officers who would profit from participation in proposed events. Often that satisfied Vietnamese concerns and gave the defense ministry enough of a comfort level to authorize PAVN participation in USPACOM-hosted, Title 10-funded seminars, multilateral conferences, and other educational opportunities.

Throughout the tenure of three defense ministers, the Vietnamese military made clear that Hanoi would never put troops in the field with uniformed U.S. forces for the purposes of joint activities or training on Vietnamese soil. Over time, training possibilities took on new and unique shapes, including multilateral options and training in peacekeeping methods, and the U.S. Government explored those possibilities with the Vietnamese. Still, the Vietnamese were slow to show any inclination to get past their own rhetoric. The generation of Soviet-and Chinese-trained troops and engineers might have to pass from the scene or become so overwhelmingly helpless in the face of new technologies before the Vietnamese would become more receptive to working with the U.S. Military.

However, pronounced Vietnamese military reluctance to ratchet up activities that smacked of close defense cooperation did not altogether preclude the possibility of defense ministry officials recognizing the dividends that could derive from the relationship with the U.S. military, and organizing for at least gradual shifts in views that enabled new types of engagement in the early 2000s. For example, during 3 years’ worth of working level discussions, the U.S. side made clear the DOD view regarding the utility and positive contribution ship visits could make to global naval diplomacy. The Vietnamese stuck to their stated disinterest in port calls, noting that this decision would have to come from the top and could not be driven by inspired discussions at planning sessions. During his March 2000 visit to Hanoi, Secretary Cohen and Defense Minister Pham Van Tra agreed that ship visits would be a positive aspect of a gradually expanding plan for military engagement. Following that visit, on the instructions of the minister, the Vietnamese defense ministry entered into a long series of technical discussions with U.S. Pacific Fleet representatives that, in late 2003, enabled the first U.S. Navy ship port call in Vietnam. President Bill Clinton’s November 2003 visit to Vietnam sustained that momentum, focused on the successes of demining cooperation, and legitimized high-level discussions aimed at managing wartime legacy issues in a more effective fashion.

Nudging Things Forward

In 2002–2003, OSD Policy began to look for new ways to realize the great potential of this bilateral defense relationship, reasoning that new activities could be easily integrated into the existing plan and that the shared concerns for the well-being of Southeast Asia and a common approach to broad transnational issues in the region suggested a natural basis for strategic communication between Hanoi and Washington. Senior DOD leaders cited the clear similarities in strategic viewpoints between Hanoi and Washington as the basis for their argument that the United States should be able to build on existing relationships, recent positive precedent-setting meetings, and a generally positive predisposition in favor of the bilateral defense relationship. The trajectory of the relationship was sustained by:

- Continued bilateral cooperation on matters such as demining, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and environmental security.

- Slow but steady expansion of the areas in which the two militaries conducted practical bilateral cooperation.
- An enhanced level of visits and formal discussions including successes in the USPACOM–defense ministry planning talks (the Bilateral Defense Dialogues) and policy-level discussions that led to the first Political-Military Dialogue in October 2008.

Defense Minister Tra’s November 2003 visit to the United States and the first U.S. Navy ship visit in the same month jump started a series of successes that fueled progress in developing normal military relations through 2008–2009. The relationship took on positive momentum beginning with the meeting between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Prime Minister Phan Van Khai in mid-2005, to Secretary Rumsfeld’s visit to Hanoi in mid-2006, to the unprecedented visit to the Pentagon by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in June 2008. During 2005–2008, the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship grew steadily, expanding in scope in measured but noticeable ways:

- In 2005, Hanoi signed the end-user agreement that was the prerequisite for starting International Military Education Training (IMET) and foreign military sales.
- In 2006, International Traffic in Arms Regulations restrictions were modified to enable some constrained arms sales.
- Five years after laying out the plan for port calls by U.S. Navy vessels, the Vietnamese side yielded slightly on the “one ship per year rule” allowing a hydrographic vessel and later a humanitarian ship to enter Vietnamese waters in 2007–2008, even though a gray hull had already taken the single allotted slot.
- The number of high-level visits, also the subject of early Vietnamese efforts to control the pace and scope of relations by restricting the number of senior DOD visitors, became a matter of what the traffic would bear.
- Practical bilateral cooperation in search and rescue, environmental security, and demining remained consistently high-quality engagements involving well-thought out interactions at the specialist level.

The Vietnamese began considering expanding the levels of activity to include meteorological and hydrographic studies, and capacity-building in humanitarian disaster relief.

In 2005–2007, the defense ministry began to more seriously explore strategic objectives in the relationship, such as formal interaction focused on building disaster response capabilities for the People’s Army, and a more effective means of working together on search and rescue operations and exercises. In that time frame, the Vietnamese, though still guarded in their statements, were inclined to support informal discussions about steps that could enhance the relationship, take military-to-military engagement to the next level, and infuse some real strategic content into the defense relationship. The Vietnamese entertained possibilities of peacekeeping training, simple joint naval exercises (such as a passing exercise), an acquisition and cross servicing agreement, a strategic dialogue between the defense ministry and OSD, hydrographic cooperation and joint studies of the strategic impact of meteorological shifts and sea level changes, and continuing routine operational level interaction with USPACOM planners in the form of the Bilateral Defense Dialogue aimed at planning the annual calendar for the relationship.

Though these were significant and noticeable breakthroughs in the relationship, the Vietnamese defense ministry did not commit to these steps until it had sufficient assurances that the pace and scope of developing defense relations with Washington would not throw its equities in regional relations out of balance. The ministry worked hard to make sure its commitment to enhanced military engagement with the United States was not perceived as a tilt in overall foreign policy objectives toward a one-sided reliance on a single friendship. The Vietnamese defense ministry did not signal its readiness to sign the end-user agreement, subscribe to rules governing IMET (including mandatory human rights vetting), or proceed with an annual schedule of ship visits on the basis of a strategic calculation that closer defense and security cooperation was the answer to its security concerns. Indeed, the ministry did not agree to an accelerated schedule of DOD leadership visits or entertain the possibility of expert level consultations on possible future topics for bilateral cooperation until there were assurances that these decisions would not have a strategic impact on the relationships the Vietnamese remained most concerned about: bilateral links with China, multilateral links with Southeast Asian neighbors, and organized interaction with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). That is, senior defense ministry officials decided to press forward on initiatives meant to enhance bilateral defense relations between Hanoi and Washington during 2005 and 2006 once it became clear there would be no fundamentally costly strategic consequences for proceeding. The ministry had long required some quiet signal that there would be no consequential blowback from China on anything in the U.S.-Vietnam defense relationship.

Building Relations

During 2008–2009, the bilateral defense relationship started to focus on building capabilities and developing new skill sets in specialized areas: peacekeeping, environmental security, multilateral search and rescue coordination, and regional disaster response. The Vietnamese defense and foreign ministries mastered the nuances and details of the programs and understood the funding realities and recoiled less in the face of a newly proposed U.S. initiative. The Vietnamese prepared to discuss issues surrounding the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)—including their concerns with seizure actions and the views of the United Nations (UN), as well as the compatibility of PSI with existing national law—in ways that suggested recognition of new possibilities in bilateral defense cooperation and more confidence in their regional and global role and the requirements necessary to fulfill those responsibilities.

There was an increasingly important multilateral dimension to U.S.-Vietnam interaction, and a heightened interest in cooperating with the United States to meet transnational challenges. Vietnam staked out a role for itself in the region and on the global stage, and it intended to make the most of its term as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council. Senior Vietnamese representatives reinforced this intent by focusing on the multiplier effect that bilateral defense and security cooperation with the United States had on Vietnam's ability to play meaningful leadership roles in the region and by taking foreign policy positions that stressed the need for Washington to do better at managing its relations with ASEAN. Vietnam applauded the Obama administration's movement in the direction of acceding to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as an important step, and argued that the U.S. Government could make a real difference by committing to a U.S.-ASEAN summit before the end of 2009. Hanoi also made the case that the United States should take a higher profile position on South China Sea issues, perhaps moving out in front of an ASEAN consensus (if one could ever be developed) by cautioning China of the potential political consequences of continuing its trajectory on this issue in the face of a united ASEAN.

Bilateral issues still abounded. Vietnam remained chagrined in 2008–2009 that Congress kept passing punitive legislation that spoke to Vietnam’s human rights record, and that the administration had not been actively speaking against these legislative initiatives. Agent Orange was, in effect, Vietnam’s POW/MIA issue, one that galvanized broad popular sentiment, generated activism within specific constituencies, and promised to remain a domestic issue with significant foreign policy consequences. However, such issues no longer were show-stoppers. They were integrated into a bilateral dialogue that tested possibilities, explored new avenues of cooperation, reviewed existing programs, and allowed venting on sensitive issues.

During 2006–2008, the defense ministry made a real effort to bring to the table several levels of representation beyond its External Relations Department, including the Institute for Military Strategy, a relatively new organization subordinate to the Office of the Minister of Defense. The level of ministry participation in bilateral meetings and events showed a broadening interest in the relationship and also demonstrated the increasing depth of expertise in Vietnam about the United States. The ministry was positive about the idea of a military-to-military policy-level dialogue, something that was discussed briefly at the meeting between Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Prime Minister Dung in June 2008, and had earlier been an agenda item in exploratory private discussions with senior and midlevel defense ministry officials. This suggested an interest in pushing the relationship toward bilateral discussions on regional defense issues, strategic thinking, plans and intentions regarding defense relations in the region, and defense modernization and requirements.

In the same time frame, the Vietnamese foreign ministry resumed a more active role in defense and security relations, returning to a level of involvement it had during the first working level discussions of the modalities of military-to-military normalization from 1994 to 1995. In June 2008, during the prime minister’s visit to Washington, which featured a meeting with President George W. Bush and a separate visit to the Pentagon for talks with the Secretary of Defense, the Vietnamese agreed to a Political-Military Dialogue led by the State Department and foreign ministry, which took place in early October 2008. Vietnamese embassy efforts in Washington to invigorate lines of communication with DOD and its think tanks continued this trend. In 2008 and 2009, embassy officials encouraged informal discussions between visiting Vietnamese strategic thinkers and NDU, and entertained the possibility of sending Vietnamese officials to the university as participants in the International Fellows program. Foreign ministry officials and embassy senior staff embraced in principle a proposal to expand and upgrade the annual delegations of U.S. National War College students to include representatives of NDU, and conduct a dialogue with the defense ministry’s National Defense Academy and the foreign ministry’s Diplomatic Academy. The Vietnamese ambassador in Washington took the initiative following his 2007 arrival to revive the practice of a quarterly meeting with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia, expanding that format to include both the Defense Attaché and a representative of the Political Section.

In 2008, DOD leadership focused again on how the United States could be doing more and how the department should shape efforts to heighten the tempo and spectrum of cooperation. Senior OSD Policy officials felt the need for a new organizing concept that went beyond the idea that the relationship should proceed cautiously and incrementally for the foreseeable future. The idea of regional sensitivities to increasing proximity between Hanoi and Washington struck many as an old notion that did not recognize the extent to which the region itself considered the enhanced relationship as a development that resonated positively with regional goals.

The defense ministry, perhaps at the urging of the office of the prime minister and the foreign ministry, had moved forward slightly beginning in 2005 by agreeing to look at capacity-building in narrow areas such as disaster response, humanitarian crisis coordination, and military medicine. Certainly, Hanoi did not plunge into these areas of cooperation by embracing initiatives, subscribing to assistance programs, or agreeing to launch there was an increasingly important multilateral dimension to U.S.-Vietnam interaction, and a heightened interest in cooperating with the United States to meet transnational challenges tailored initiatives. However, in 2007 and 2008, the Vietnamese defense establishment was more open to the argument that the initial constraining parameters that helped define the modest pace and scope of early defense relations could be modified. There was still no Vietnamese military support for discarding restraint and plunging into active cooperation on a strategic level, looking at possible joint training and exercising opportunities, or ratcheting up cooperation in areas such as resource management reform, military professionalization, or doctrinal modernization.

Both sides had by 2009 experienced slightly more than 12 formal years of military-to-military engagement. The United States had placed a succession of four Defense Attachés in Hanoi since December 1995. Vietnam had assigned four similarly talented senior colonels to Washington since March 1997. Vietnamese officers involved during the earliest days of the defense relationship had been promoted in rank and elevated in assignments. A former Vietnamese defense attaché in Washington had become the deputy director of the Military Strategy Institute in 2006. Junior PAVN officers who served as staff functionaries supporting ERD negotiations with ISA from 1997 to 2001 had been elevated to key jobs in the leadership suite of the ERD. Similarly, former U.S. Defense Attachés had returned to Washington and taken teaching positions in critical professional military education institutions and assumed leadership roles with the Joint Staff and with the Defense Language Institute. The Vietnamese defense ministry leadership responsible for the startup discussions regarding military relations in 1996 had retired, a pattern replicated among U.S. counterparts responsible for policy issues in the earliest years of the defense relationship, suggesting that the policy of improving defense relations was now generational.

There were new institutional actors on both sides, including Vietnam's Military Strategy Institute, and the subordinate Institute for Foreign Defense Relations, as well as the new Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs on the U.S. side of the equation, established in late 2007 to replace the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Both sides had become more knowledgeable about one another, better equipped to react to opportunities and determine the most effective use of resources to improve practical interaction, and more inclined to frank and straightforward dialogue. This was a relationship that was growing, flourishing, and showing promise beyond the expectations that greeted the idea of military-to-military normalization in 1995–1996. However, a range of hard problems revolving around attitudes and issues that are artifacts of the war, Vietnam's commitment to the principles of nonalignment, a hypersensitivity to matters of sovereignty, hesitancy about embracing certain aspects of practical bilateral defense cooperation such as training and exercises, and Hanoi's concerns regarding the consequences of increasing proximity to Washington suggest that this relationship will continue to progress in measured ways.

Where to Go from Here?

How will the United States move the relationship from where it is today? How can we press beyond the current parameters? And how can we best nudge the Vietnamese toward a much more direct military cooperation?

Three variables need to be factored into planning next steps in the defense relationship with Vietnam:

- High-level buy-in to a concept of enhanced defense relationships does not translate readily into anything more than a commitment to make a commitment. Though the prime minister endorsed the idea of more profound dialogue, heightened interaction, and accelerated practical bilateral cooperation, the act of translating that idea into an instruction can be agonizingly long and incredibly frustrating.
- All appreciable advances in the relationship have been cultured first in an “informational exchange” period, where the United States and Vietnam have agreed to a formal interim step involving a substantive exchange of data as a means of building confidence, raising levels of knowledge, and buying time for determining intentions, exploring ulterior motives, and maneuvering to achieve perceived advantages en route to a final commitment to a program, an event, or a process.
- The existing mechanisms for managing the defense relationship will govern the possibilities for the near term, and those mechanisms will seek to relate proposals to existing forms of interaction, familiar events and activities, and already functioning routines and practices.

This means the Vietnamese will regard with suspicion proposals for events that do not conform to expectations. The defense ministry will look at new initiatives as exceeding existing agreements. The office of the prime minister will be more than happy to allow the defense ministry to manage the relationship, confident that it will not get ahead of the consensus regarding what is politically possible in defense relations.

It is therefore best to think in terms of small and incremental advances, rely on already existing forms and routines, defer to existing channels of communication, and exercise patience.

The Vietnamese defense ministry may seem as though it is ready for something new, but it will not so readily embrace significant departures from existing forms and commitments. The prime minister clothed his points to Secretary Gates during the June 2008 meeting in the most conservative vocabulary possible, and the defense ministry is likely to react to the position that defense relations can and should be expanded in slow, measured, and exceedingly cautious ways. This is a system that does not quickly embrace change, even when it senses opportunities and commits to altered trajectories and new policy goals. The way to work within these confines: start by identifying familiar forms of interaction as the means of introducing new ideas; utilize existing mechanisms of communication as the way to socialize new initiatives; and identify the least dramatic way of accomplishing a new activity. Some basic guidelines for conducting the U.S. Vietnam defense relationship include:

- Frame advances in the vocabulary of the existing relationship
- Utilize informational exchanges as the means to introduce new ideas

- Stick to formulas that enshrine the reciprocal dimension to the relationship
- Treat Vietnam as a strategic equal
- Deliver the humanitarian assistance necessary to grease the cogs
- Confront the domestic legal and political realities of the Agent Orange issue
- Minimize rhetoric that proclaims every success as a net loss for China
- Synchronize new bilateral developments with ASEAN-approved activities
- Recognize Vietnam's concern with being left behind as the region thrives
- Build slowly and carefully on existing bilateral activities
- Give Vietnam the level of attention it craves
- Build on Vietnam's regional interests and global concerns.

In program-focused terms, the United States should press the Vietnamese toward using IMET for much more strictly mainstream military education opportunities. The U.S. Government should move employment of IMET resources from the agreed upon areas of use—military medicine, military scientific and technological cooperation, and humanitarian cooperation—to areas of real military training, perhaps beginning with some modest Mobile Training Teams focused on airport safety, armored personnel carrier (APC) maintenance, and other areas that have been at the core of “theoretical” discussions with the Vietnamese of what might be possible in the future. Enrolling Vietnamese military officers in more expanded IMET courses focused on professionalism and civil-military relations would be an important means of developing a comfort level with the notion of selling hardware and systems to Vietnam.

The United States should continue to urge the Vietnamese to sign on to the Proliferation Security Initiative, whose principals represent common ground. Hanoi continues to fret about the international law involved, level of commitment required, and consequences for its nonaligned status. Between the desire within DOD to define an inventive means of bringing the uncommitted and undecided along and Vietnam's own continuing inquisitiveness about this program, Washington should be able to find a way to move things along in a manner that satisfies Vietnam's concerns and serves U.S. interest by getting Hanoi married to regional counter proliferation activities.

The United States should see Vietnam's decision to sign a letter of request (LOR) for price and availability information regarding long-discussed helicopter parts as a positive step, even if that process has stalled as Vietnam's military takes another look at the requirement. Vietnam's agreement to take the first step in that process with an eye to acquiring spare parts and possible repairs or restorations for the UH-1s that remain in country, followed by a similar LOR involving APC parts, opens up a new set of opportunities for advancing practical military relations. The foreign military sales process is lengthy and legally complex, but in the end it is a positive step toward cooperation on ways that can benefit the PAVN, develop existing capabilities, enhance professionalism, and help identify common ground on which the United States and Vietnam can cooperate.

The United States should urge Vietnam to agree to more than one U.S. Navy gray hull ship visit a year and should consider a decision to diversify these activities. DOD encourages refueling stops and passing exercise-type activities that would enhance Vietnam's maritime safety procedures, and in early 2009, DOD accomplished a fly out to the USS Stennis, overcoming an early and overwhelming reluctance on the part of Vietnamese defense policy leaders to engage with the United States in a fashion that would put Vietnamese in proximity with American war making capabilities, advanced technology, aircraft carriers, and other significant modern platforms. These are activities that should be encouraged because they would nudge Vietnam toward opportunities to derive training value from activities with the U.S. military.

Vietnam should sign an acquisition cross-servicing agreement, a bilateral agreement that facilitates the exchange of logistics support, supplies, and services during ship visits, exercises, training, or emergency situations. Hanoi's concern with this agreement is that it could involve providing services for U.S. military assets deploying in ways that are not supported by the Vietnamese government. The United States should focus on the bilateral advantages of being able to pay in kind in a fashion that facilitates ship visits to Vietnam, or enabling the use of local resources in the context of bilateral training and exercise events, as a means of selling the practical, operational advantages of an acquisition cross-servicing arrangement.

The United States has worked with Vietnam to engender an interest in enhancing its peacekeeping and search and rescue capabilities, so that Vietnam is prepared to utilize existing U.S. programs to develop those niche abilities. Hanoi's willingness to assume increased obligations in the region and on the global stage as a leader and catalyst for transnational cooperation has made it slightly more comfortable with the notion of engaging in multilateral activities, informational exchanges, and regional educational opportunities in which the United States is involved, and even bankrolling such exercises. Vietnam has committed to participate in the U.S. Government's Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, though the highest levels continue to add caveats suggesting some residual reluctance to embrace this opportunity entirely. The United States needs to identify the additional effort necessary to achieve unconditional Vietnamese comfort with the initiative in a way that will make cooperation on other regional challenges—maritime security, for example—that much easier to broach when the time comes.

The key to moving ahead on defense cooperation, the critical step necessary to take the relationship to the next level, is a willingness to press beyond existing parameters and policies and to chip away at longstanding ceilings and limits on activities. There are several mutually accepted limits that have been a part of the relationship since 1997, including the ceiling on the number of high-level visits per year, annual ship visits, and monthly activities in the defense relationship. The United States understands that there are operational limits to Vietnam's ability to take advantage of opportunities. However, these ought not to be limiting factors, especially when opportunities that can contribute in a positive way to improving cooperation and understanding are at stake. These limits no longer serve the relationship. The result is the inability to take advantage of even the most tantalizing and logical of chances for enhanced bilateral cooperation on security and defense issues of mutual interest.

It is important to help the Vietnamese get accustomed to the notion that as the bilateral defense relationship begins to focus on building capabilities and developing new skill sets in specialized areas—peacekeeping, environmental security, search and rescue, and regional disaster response—our two defense establishments eventually will have to turn attention to defense reform, professional military education, standards of conduct, and civil-military relations.

These issues will have to become as much of a part of the bilateral dialogue as the more management-focused efforts to keep the calendar of events in the defense relationship organized and compelling, not only because of the legislative requirements, end-user obligations that are explicitly a part of IMET and foreign military financing, but also because of the trajectory the bilateral dialogue should take. The U.S.-Vietnam relationship will benefit by developing from practical cooperation on programs to a much more strategic approach to developing defense establishment resources and capabilities. The DOD dialogue with the Philippines involves a mutual investment in Philippines Defense Reform. The U.S. defense relationship with Indonesia has taken on a similar dimension. And the U.S. defense relationship with Thailand also involves a commitment to defense resource management reforms. This might be down the road for Vietnam, but the United States needs to acknowledge that a real partnership will also end up having the two sides speaking to one another about growing the military relationship in a way that focuses on these responsibilities.

The idea of a “policy dialogue” between the Department of Defense and the ministry of defense, mentioned during Prime Minister Dung’s mid-2008 meetings with Secretary Gates, will bring real dividends for both sides by elevating the dialogue from program management and issues of practical cooperation to enduring defense and security issues regional and global in scope, to envisioning the strategic future of U.S.-Vietnam defense and security cooperation, and to wide-ranging discussions of future trends and challenges in a transforming world.

Endnotes

1 A long history of humanitarian activities in Vietnam predated normalization. Since the late 1980s, civic action work by U.S. Pacific Command focused on schoolhouse construction, medical civil action programs, and flood relief, associated in the period from 1988 through 1994 with prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) activities. When Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy developed the entry level program that led to normalization of military relations in November 1996, the Pentagon sought to utilize the kind of confidence-building activities that had paved the way for increased access in the context of the POW/MIA program during 1987–1990

2 During Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman’s visit to Hanoi in summer 2005, Defense Minister Pham Van Tra articulated this trilogy of interests, clearly indicating that this approach continued to define the maximum feasible parameters for bilateral defense cooperation.

3 See Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler, “Paint-by-Numbers Democracy: The Stakes, Structure, and Results of the 2007 Vietnamese National Assembly Election,” *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 4, no. 1, 1–48. At the time, the External Relations Department’s explanation of its abrupt departure from the agreed-upon plan of action was regarded as a cover for enduring defense ministry tentativeness about the proposed work toward defense relations with the United States.

Unlocking Russian Interests on the Korean Peninsula

Major John W. Bauer

Reprinted with permission from the Summer 2009 issue of *Parameters*.

The close relationship that once existed between Moscow and Pyongyang is a relic of the Cold War. In fact, there is reason to believe that the two neighbors now share little in common. Yet decades ago, the Soviets exercised tremendous influence over the North Korean regime, anecdotally evidenced by Kim Il-sung's fateful request to Josef Stalin asking to invade the South in 1950. Stalin, after much consternation, finally gave his approval.¹ By deferring to Stalin, Kim Il-sung sought continued Soviet support, which he received for roughly 40 years until the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, however, this partnership changed significantly.

Russia's national interests have conspicuously drifted since then, favoring South Korea over the North. What has caused the shift in Moscow's attention south from Pyongyang to Seoul, and what are the strategic consequences of this development in light of South Korea's goal to one day reunify the peninsula? This striking change in Russian focus is significant because it offers opportunities to enhance the United States-Republic of Korea alliance, opportunities that should be carefully incorporated into America's strategic planning.

This is not to say that the Russians have lost interest in North Korea. Russia, which shares an often overlooked 12-mile border with North Korea, is naturally concerned about its neighbors, especially when one of them maintains the fourth-largest military in the world, claims to possess nuclear weapons, struggles with widespread famine, and is ruled by a regime vulnerable to collapse. North Korea is also the only territory separating Russia from an overland connection to South Korea, the 15th-largest economy in the world and one that has been growing at a feverish pace during the past two decades.² It is no surprise that energy-rich Russia and energy-hungry South Korea have developed a symbiotic attraction. The former is anxious to bring to market its abundance of untapped energy resources, while the latter continues to grow its insatiable demand for bio-carbon fuels. On the other hand, Russia sees little value in the declining North Korean economy, which for the most part remains closed and continues a downward spiral. If in the long-term Russia is looking to North Korea for any economic boon, it is for access to North Korean territory to enable further trade with the South.

Regardless of what the future holds for North Korea, whether it is peaceful economic and political transformation, catastrophic regime change, or even war waged in desperation against the South, insight into Russia's perspective is critical to any strategic course charted by the United States. In order to develop this understanding, a willingness to depart from conventional thinking, namely an outlook that encourages blind skepticism and even cynicism toward Russia, is required. This article will present a characterization of Russian interests at odds with assumptions positing that in any war or regime collapse scenario, the Russians would necessarily be uncooperative with South Korea. On the contrary, the long-term convergence of Russian and South Korean economic interests creates cause for optimism and presents strategic possibilities in the event of a North Korean crisis.

Moscow's Distancing from Pyongyang

Russia's abrupt about-face in its long-standing patronage of North Korea began at the end of the Cold War. At that time, Russian diplomats were eager to demonstrate to the world that their nation had truly reformed and that Russia had wholeheartedly replaced totalitarian-Communist

thinking with the western, democratic free-market ideal. In a dramatic shift in policy, Russia in 1990 diplomatically recognized South Korea and shortly thereafter ceased its sizable flow of military and technical aid to North Korea.³ Andrei Kozyrev, Boris Yeltsin's Foreign Minister, even went on to accuse North Korea of serious violations of human rights and to declare that a change in its government was needed.⁴ Today, the basic principles behind this radical change in policy endure, although the rhetoric has been somewhat tempered by the Putin and Medvedev administrations. Nevertheless, it is clear that Russia has no interest in propping up the current North Korean regime, and it would most certainly not support the North militarily in the event of war.

Russia more recently, however, has shown that it wishes to restore some semblance of its favorable diplomatic relations with the Kim Jung-il regime, which has led to a policy that can be summarized by the simple phrase "the road to Seoul lies through Pyongyang."⁵

There are two aspects of this statement, one figurative and one literal, and both have important meanings. Figuratively, Moscow realizes that in order to most effectively engage the South Koreans, Russia has to appear to be in a position of influence with respect to the North. In other words, diplomatic and economic opportunities will materialize when Seoul believes it is dealing with a major regional player capable of placing constructive pressure on Kim Jung-il. The literal meaning highlights the fact that any overland linkage with the South, whether it is via road, rail, or pipeline, must cross North Korean territory. For the Russians to obtain transportation corridor would be a watershed event, effectively connecting not only Russia to South Korea, but also South Korea to Europe through Russia. The point of failure for both of these initiatives is an uncooperative North Korean regime.

Russia's recent desire to improve relations with the North has not stopped Moscow from condemning Kim Jung-il's bad behavior. When North Korea conducted ballistic missile and underground nuclear tests in 2006, Russia responded by supporting United Nations Security Council resolutions 1695 and 1718, condemning both events.⁶ Six months later, Vladimir Putin demonstrated even further disapproval by signing a decree prohibiting Russian government agencies and commercial ventures from exporting or transporting military hardware, equipment, materiel, or technical assistance that could be used in any of North Korea's weapons programs.⁷

Russian actions have shown that their desire for relations with North Korea does not eclipse their other, more compelling security interests. With its eye on broadening trade with South Korea while stifling North Korean antagonism, Moscow's interests most closely match those of Seoul rather than Pyongyang. In the opinion of Professor Alexander Vorontsov, Russia has come to consider future Korean unification as a desirable outcome provided that the merging of the two states occurs in a manner that is both prosperous and advantageous to Russia.⁸ Since South Korean domestic and international policy offers conditions most beneficial to Russia, this leads to a logical conclusion that should be emphasized. Russia in principle would not oppose South Korean-led reunification, a position that would have been unthinkable during the Soviet era. At the same time, according to Professor Vorontsov, Russia does seek to avoid military conflict on the Korean Peninsula for the following reasons:

- To ensure the security of Russia's Far East regions.
- To prevent an ecological or humanitarian disaster on Russian soil, especially if nuclear weapons are used.
- To avoid complicating relations with Washington and Tokyo.

- And to protect the considerable investment Russia has made in rail and pipeline infrastructure in the Far East.⁹

The remainder of this article will focus on the principal endeavor underlying the last of these four rationales: the Russian economic project vis-a-vis South Korea.

A Matter of Economics

The center of gravity for Russian exports falls unmistakably within the oil and natural gas sectors, which have also been the driving force behind Russia's economic growth during the past five years.¹⁰ According to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, Russia in 2007 derived 64 percent of its export revenues from these two commodities alone.¹¹ Russian oil and natural gas production has a significant effect on the aggregate world supply. Russia in 2007 had the distinction of being the world's largest exporter of natural gas and the second-largest exporter of oil.¹² More recently, claims are being made that Russia has surpassed Saudi Arabia in volume of oil exports, making it the largest producer of "black gold" in the world.¹³ Consequently, the impact of changes in world oil prices on the Russian government is staggering. Depending on the direction, a \$1 per barrel change in oil prices results in a \$1.4 billion loss or gain in Russian revenues.¹⁴ Russia's principal challenge, then, in obtaining increased government revenues and economic growth is the expansion of its oil and natural gas exports.

The region offering perhaps the greatest promise for expanded Russian energy export is the Far East, with its chief limitation being a lack of distribution infrastructure. A great deal of Russia's resources are ideally located to serve Pacific Rim markets, from vast oil and natural gas fields in eastern Siberia to reserves on Sakhalin Island. By itself, Sakhalin Island, just north of Japan, holds 25 percent of Russia's oil and six percent of its natural gas.¹⁵ Due to the lack of pipeline infrastructure, these resources remain largely untapped. Adding further inefficiency to Russian exports is the absence of a true ice-free port in the Russian Far East. Of the three major ports in the vicinity of Vladivostok, all experience some degree of icing during winter months.

Vladivostok's limitations have recently led Russia to show interest in the North Korean port of Najin, situated in the remote northeastern corner of the Korean Peninsula. Unlike Vladivostok, Najin is ice free.¹⁶ It lies inside a special administrative region called Rason, one of four special economic zones in North Korea. In 2007, Russian Railways chief executive officer Vladimir Yakunin and North Korean authorities signed an agreement to open the port for the first time to foreign trade, and in March of 2008, both sides agreed to start the construction of a 34-mile Russian-built rail segment connecting Najin to Russia.¹⁷

By gaining access to Najin, Russia hopes to relieve congestion at Vladivostok, increase year-round trade with Japan and South Korea, and make initial progress toward its most sought-after prize, the proposed trans-Korean railroad.

From the rail transit perspective, the prospect of a trans-Korean railroad that would connect South Korea to the Russian railway network stands as a tremendous opportunity for Russia.¹⁸ While the project has been effectively stalled by the North Koreans, the vision of a rail line connecting the Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR) to South Korean markets and the Asian transshipment hub of Pusan has inspired Moscow to engage Pyongyang aggressively on the issue.¹⁹ For example, in 2004 when North Korean Railway Minister Pak Jong Song endorsed Putin's plan to link the TSR with the Korean rail networks, Russia responded with a 35,000-ton shipment of wheat, its first-ever food aid shipment to North Korea.²⁰ If Russia can connect the TSR to an ice-free port and eventually to South Korea, it would not only expand the volume of

its own exports, but would also create a land bridge stretching from Pusan to Europe. Russia in turn would receive transit fees from the overland shipment of goods.

Along with import and export revenues, transit fees are a significant source of income for Russia. According to Russian estimates, the establishment of a rail line connecting Najin and the TSR could yield up to \$1 billion in transit fees annually.²¹ If Russia succeeds in making the TSR an attractive alternative to maritime shipping, the overland transit of goods from Asia to Europe could replace the circuitous Indian Ocean shipping lanes as the route of choice.²² This would be beneficial, among other reasons, because the transit phase is two to three times faster along the TSR than by sea. The sea route is further complicated by the inherent necessity to pass through pirate-infested shipping lanes.²³

Russian rail infrastructure investment in the Far East, which might also eventually include an overland link to South Korea, holds great promise for Russia as the world increasingly recognizes the potential benefits associated with the transcontinental shipment of goods.

Improved rail infrastructure is not the only major endeavor currently pursued by the Russians in the Far East. A substantial investment is under way in pipeline projects, perhaps the most noteworthy being the nearly 2,000-mile-long Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean Pipeline. At a cost of \$16 billion to \$18 billion, Russia hopes to expand its existing pipeline network and deliver low-cost oil from East Siberia and Sakhalin Island to South Korean and Japanese markets.²⁴ Together, pipeline projects and TSR upgrades are part of a \$550-billion transportation infrastructure initiative announced by Prime Minister Putin in May of 2008, and touted as the biggest investment project in Russian history.²⁵ To say Russia believes that infrastructure is the key to its long-term economic growth would be an understatement.

In the remote Russian Far East, a lack of rail and pipeline infrastructure alone stands in the way of fully realizing the economic opportunities presented by China, Japan, and South Korea and provides the key to Russian economic growth.

A Convergence of Interests

Recent collaboration between Russia and South Korea has demonstrated that the two countries share common interests at a variety of levels. In fact, the current bilateral course may very well lead to an unprecedented partnership. From the South Korean perspective, the partnership has two main advantages. First, Russia's pressure on North Korea to become more economically open, especially with regard to the trans-Korean railway initiative, is vitally important. Many observers believe that the more North Korea opens its doors to capitalistic enterprise, the more likely peaceful reunification will occur.

Second, South Korea foresees the expanded use of the Trans-Siberian Railroad as a cost effective means of transporting goods to and from Europe.²⁶ A long-term arrangement to use the Russian rail network as a conduit for trade with Europe would inevitably reduce the cost of imported goods and broaden South Korean export opportunities.

In the wake of stalled discussions on the trans-Korean railroad, South Korea has recently struck a deal with Russia to build an exclusive-use South Korean port facility in the vicinity of Vladivostok.²⁷ This interim move effectively bypasses the overland rail route that the North Koreans have refused to provide, namely the eastern branch of the trans Korean railroad linking Pusan to Vladivostok. In exchange for exclusive rights to the port, Seoul has agreed to import natural gas from Russia for 30 years beginning in 2015.²⁸

The agreement is part of a \$102-billion natural gas and chemical contract, an arrangement that would significantly reduce South Korean dependence upon natural gas from the Middle East. To minimize transit costs, Seoul intends to build a pipeline from Vladivostok through North Korean territory. If in the short-term the North Koreans reject this proposal, the South Korean plan is to transport liquefied or compressed gas from Russia via ship. Until last year, South Korea had never imported natural gas from Russia.²⁹

In 2015, it expects to receive 20 percent of its natural gas supply from Russia. By completing the Vladivostok deal, Moscow entered into an agreement that expanded the scope of its energy exports and confirmed its intentions toward South Korea. This latest development appears to be only the tip of the iceberg, the initial step toward a relationship of economic interconnectedness between two nations that are on increasingly good terms. While it is obvious that mutual trade is beneficial for both countries, the real strategic point of convergence is their shared vision of a more economically open North Korea.

The Chinese Competition

Russia's hope to gain broader economic access to the Korean Peninsula has not gone unchallenged by China. Over the past several years, the Russian plan to transit goods through an ice-free North Korean port has been complicated by the Chinese, who like the Russians recognize the value of Najin. In December of 2006, China broke ground on an exclusive-use port facility of their own in Najin, a project valued at nearly \$1 billion.³⁰ The Russian Railway newspaper Gudok has characterized this development as the "China threat."³¹ It appears that China has capitalized on its diplomatic pride of place with Pyongyang to gain access to Najin first and in a way that would guarantee that the Chinese benefit from Russia's planned rail initiative. The Chinese plan to preempt the Russians has not only their own economic interests at heart, but also highlights Russo Chinese competition and the divergence of their strategic goals over the past two decades, particularly with respect to the Korean Peninsula.

Prior to the Najin deal, China's past attempts at making economic inroads with North Korea have been halfhearted at best. In contrast to China's economically progressive form of communism, North Korea has been almost entirely closed to foreign enterprise, with the exception of specially designated regions situated at its four corners: Rason (which includes Najin, in the northeast); Sinuiju (in the northwest); Kaesong Industrial Complex (in the southwest); and Kumgangsan Tourist Region (in the southeast). Rason, pressed up against the border with Russia and China, has been a special economic zone since 1993, yet it has remained largely undeveloped. The Sinuiju Special Administrative Region, which was established in 2002 in the hope of luring Chinese businesses, has been even less successful.³² Despite North Korea's past economic overtures toward China, the Chinese have for the most part been unwilling to reciprocate with large-scale investment.

China's lack of enthusiasm for North Korean economic transformation might be for good reason. Unlike Russia, China is quite satisfied with the geostrategic placement of its Stalinist neighbor.³³ North Korea has long stood as a territorial buffer between China and the US-backed Republic of Korea. Despite being South Korea's number-one trading partner, China's economic interests have yet to outweigh its political concerns regarding a reunified, pro-western Korean republic situated along its border. Hence, China seems to have every reason to resist any catalyst for dramatic economic change within North Korea, on the grounds that greater economic openness would be the precursor to South Korean-led reunification.³⁴ This Chinese view is in stark contrast to the Russian perspective, which looks forward to the day when goods will transit freely through the Korean Peninsula.

Understanding Russia's Past

While Russian and South Korean interests are finding common ground; there is risk that the opportunities this convergence creates for US foreign policy may be hampered by lingering mistrust from Russia's Soviet past. This phenomenon has been exacerbated by Moscow's seemingly unpredictable, unilaterally contrived conduct during the past decade. Seen in this light, the evidence supports those who would say that it has been impossible for the former Soviet Union to depart fully from its shadowy Cold War tendencies, for example the Russian incursion in Kosovo in June of 1999. When 200 Russian forces preemptively seized Pristina airport before NATO units could arrive, then-NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark reacted by describing the Russian move as "bizarre."³⁵ Even though the tense situation subsided and Russian peace keepers eventually became part of the NATO Kosovo Force mission, the damage to Russia's reputation had already been done. Russia gave the impression it could not be trusted. Yet what was not apparent at the time was the extent to which Russia opposed the West's vision of the post-war Balkans, specifically when it came to Kosovan independence. The subject endures to this day as a point of contention between Russia and the West.³⁶ In hindsight, Russia seemed to have been acting in its own national interests, attempting to carve out a sector under the protection of Russian peacekeepers that would overcome calls for a future Kosovan state.

A more recent example of Russia's unexpected conduct has been its incursion into Georgia. Hidden from most media reporting were points made by former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock, who suggests that Georgia "poked Russia in the eye" and argues that Georgia has long been tempted to subdue the Ossetians and Abkhazians by force. In his opinion, Russia saw its intervention as similar to NATO's involvement in Kosovo.³⁷ In contrast, the mainstream western reaction was quick to accuse Russia of an unjust war against a sovereign state. Little was mentioned of legitimate Russian interests, such as its long-standing peacekeeping mission and its desire to prevent civil war or a humanitarian crisis in neighboring Georgia. Opportunistic Georgian leadership, which may have seen its sizable contribution to the US mission in Iraq as a guarantor of American support, might even be to blame for having started the war.³⁸ From the standpoint of US policy, perhaps the problem was not as much Russian audacity as it was American policymakers' inability to recognize Russian interests and anticipate its actions. If a habitual inability to understand Russia persists, America and its western allies are at risk of suffering from strategic miscalculation and, in the case of North Korea, potentially a missed opportunity.

Russia's interventions in Kosovo and Georgia clearly demonstrate that Russia will not hesitate to use military force if a regional crisis threatens its national interests. In light of these two examples, one might be quick to conclude that the Russians will similarly intervene in the event of a Korean crisis. Recent Russian policy, however, seems to suggest the possibility of an entirely different outcome if a Korean crisis were to occur. This is because a remarkable convergence in long-term interests between Seoul and Moscow has begun to occur, one that has led Russia to militarily isolate North Korea and to pressure Pyongyang to open its doors economically. The origin of this shift in Russian policy has been Russia's desire to create a lasting, mutually beneficial economic partnership with South Korea.

Russia's economic partnership with South Korea is causing the strategic calculus on the Korean Peninsula to change dramatically. The long-standing stalemate, once exacerbated by the Soviet Union's support to Pyongyang, is beginning to show signs of fissure as Russia now appears more like a potential ally to the South Koreans than a belligerent. Rather than presenting a direct challenge to South Korean-led reunification, Russia may now actually be in the position of supporting it. Nevertheless, Moscow's delicate diplomatic stance remains tenuous as it tries

to balance the risk of alienating the North against the benefits of favoritism toward the South. Adding to the equation is the United States, whose inherent skepticism toward Russia potentially jeopardizes the tremendous opportunity Russia is presenting to America's close military ally, the Republic of Korea.

For nearly 60 years, the United States has invested vast resources to help keep the North Korean military machine at bay. If American policy is firmly committed to a reunification of the peninsula under the purview of its alliance partner and if a future North Korean crisis is in fact a real possibility, then the United States should consider this new prospect, namely Russian cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, as an asset that could help undermine the North Korean regime. The strategic value of such a partnership might even be efficacious enough to directly lead to a final termination of the decades long standoff in Korea. Yet this opportunity may be missed if not carefully nurtured now, before war or crisis occurs within North Korea.

Endnotes

1. Bradley K. Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2006), 63-64.
2. Central Intelligence Agency, "Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity)," 2008 estimates, *The World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html>.
3. James Brooke, "North Korea's Other Axis: With Moscow," *The New York Times*, 24 March 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/24/world/north-korea-s-other-axis-with-moscow.html>.
4. Ibid.
5. Alexander Vorontsov, *Current Russia-North Korea Relations: Challenges and Achievements* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2007), <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/vorontsov2007.pdf>, 22.
6. Ibid., 23.
7. "Russia Makes U-turn, Joins UN Sanctions Against N. Korea," *RIA Novosti*, 30 May 2007, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2007/dprk-070530-rianovosti01.htm>.
8. Vorontsov, 5. Professor Vorontsov was an emissary at the Russian embassy in Pyongyang at the turn of the millennium.
9. Ibid., 2-3.
10. Bernard A. Gelb, *Russian Oil and Gas Challenges* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 3 January 2006), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/58988.pdf>, 3-5.
11. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, "Country Analysis Briefs, Russia: Background," May 2008, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Russia/Background.html>.
12. Ibid.
13. Andrew Osborn, "Russia Oil Production Overtakes Saudi Arabia," *The New Zealand Herald*, 23 August 2006, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10397661.62 Parameters
14. Gelb, 3-5.
15. Ibid., 1.
16. Brooke, "North Korea's Other Axis: With Moscow."
17. "Russia, North Korea, South Korea: Hurdles to a Strategic Rail Project," Stratfor Global Intelligence, 20 May 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia_north_korea_south_korea_hurdles_strategic_rail_project.
18. See Georgy Bulychev, "A Russian View on Inter Korean Summit," *Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online*, 11 September 2007, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07068_Bulychev.html; and Leonid Petrov, "Presidential Elections and the Future of Russian-Korean Relations," *Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online*, 25 February 2008, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08016Petrov.html>.

19. Choe Sang-Hun, "South Korea Struggles to Open Rails," *The International Herald Tribune*, 12 June 2006, <http://www.ihb.com/articles/2006/06/12/business/train.php>.
20. James Brooke, "Russia Wants to Supply Energy to North Korea," *The New York Times*, 4 July 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/04/world/russia-wants-to-supply-energy-to-north-korea.html>.
21. Sergei Blagov, "North Korean, Russian Ties Firmly on Track," *Asia Times Online*, 27 August 2002, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/DH27Ag01.html.
22. The only other choice for an overland route connecting the Far East and Europe is the Silk Railway, dubbed the New Asia-Europe Land Bridge. In 1997, the costs of transit over the Silk Railway were three times higher than by sea, mainly because of the tariffs and delays imposed from transiting so many different countries and the number of transloads required due to changes in track gauge. In contrast, freight on the Trans-Siberian Railroad does not cross a border until it reaches Western Europe. See Xu Shu, "The New Asia-Europe Land Bridge—Current Situation and Future Prospects," *Japan Railway and Transport Review*, December 1997, http://www.jrtr.net/jrtr14/pdf/f30_xu.pdf.
23. Boris Dynkin, "Comments on the Regional Railroad Network and Electric Grid Interconnection" (Khabarovsk, Russia: Far Eastern State Transport University, 2002), <http://www.nautilus.org/archives/energy/grid/2002Workshop/materials/DYNKIN.PDF>, 2.
24. "Country Analysis Briefs, Russia: Oil Exports."
25. "Russia, North Korea, South Korea: Hurdles to a Strategic Rail Project."
26. Petrov.
27. Ser Myo-ja, "Russia to Offer Exclusive Korean Port, Factory Site," *Joong Ang Ilbo*, 1 October 2008, <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2895522>.
28. Shin Jung-Won, "South Korea, Russia Reach Natural-Gas Deal," *The Wall Street Journal*, 30 September 2008, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122273364147888393.html>.
29. Ibid.
30. "China Breaks Ground on North Korean Port," *Chosun Ilbo*, 10 March 2006, <http://www.chosun.com/international/news/200603/200603090370.html>.
31. "Russia and China Vie for Najin Port," *Chosun Ilbo*, 2 February 2007, <http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200702/200702020016.html>.
32. Recently North Korea has once again tried to revive the failed project in Sinuiju. See Toru Makinoda, "N. Korea Plans Free Trade Zone on Island," *Daily Yomiuri Online*, 23 January 2009, <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/world/20090123TDY05306.html>.
33. Balbina Y. Hwang, testimony at hearing on "China's Proliferation and Its Role in the North Korea Nuclear Crisis," US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 10 March 2005, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_03_10wrtr/hwang_wrts.pdf.
34. Ibid.
35. Brian Knowlton, "'Bizarre' Push by Russian Forces Rattles the Allies," *The New York Times*, 14 June 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/14/news/14iht-A1_28.html.
36. Oksana Antonenko, "Russia and the Deadlock over Kosovo," *Survival*, 49 (Autumn 2007), 95.
37. See Jack Matlock, "Ambassador Jack Matlock's Essay on Russia, Georgia, and More," 3 September 2008, <http://www.russiaotherpointsofview.com/2008/09/ambassador-jack.html>. Matlock is a retired career Foreign Service officer and was the US ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1991.
38. Ibid. On 8 August 2008, Georgia launched an attack on the breakaway region of South Ossetia using conventional military forces, prompting Russian military intervention.

Fires in the Pacific's Theater Security Cooperation Plan

COL Jack K. Pritchard

Reprinted with permission from the June 2008 issue of *Fires Bulletin*.

Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander, US Pacific Command (USPACOM), expressed his vision of the fiscal years 2008 to 2011 training strategy as, “A joint and combined training and exercise program that enhances, demonstrates and certifies the readiness of USPACOM forces in challenging events combining live, virtual and constructive environments.”

The Pacific theater poses unique requirements. Five of the seven security treaties to which the US is a party— Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand—reside within USPACOM's area of responsibility (AOR). Ensuring the ability to meet these obligations is a key focus of the training strategy and USPACOM's Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Plan.

The USPACOM AOR spans half the world's surface, 13 time zones, and includes five of the world's six largest armies. And, unlike Europe with its modern, technologically savvy armies linked by extensive alliances, the Asia-Pacific region is characterized by under-developed nations, a vast maritime environment and a culture of nonalignment. Additionally, throughout the Pacific, post colonial and socio economic internal frictions, as well as unresolved territorial claims and mistrust between countries, threaten stability.

The recent demands of providing forces to other geographic combatant commands has strained USPACOM's ability to meet unit training requirements and to develop effective habitual relationships with the armed forces of other nations of the Asia-Pacific Region. These challenges, compounded by population growth and increasing environmental concerns, have limited available lands and training facilities for the conduct of realistic military training.

Despite these challenges, numerous opportunities exist within the USPACOM AOR. The ongoing realignments, movements and force reductions of US-PACOM forces throughout the AOR will force new partnerships and operational relationships with the armed forces of the Asia-Pacific region.

Technological advances in simulations allow unprecedented interactive training between forces without necessitating physical collocation. Because of the threats of transnational terrorism, new requirements, missions and technologies are emerging, creating the need for partnerships with nations such as India, China and Indonesia.

The USPACOM commander established priorities for training programs within the Asia-Pacific region to establish and maintain credible joint and multinational forces trained to assure partners, dissuade competitors, deter aggressors and be capable of agile, decisive response to crises throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

TSC Plan

The USPACOM TSC Plan is an active engagement strategy with missions ranging from train-and-equip programs for building partner nation capacity to regional security initiatives and humanitarian assistance actions. The participation of fires and fire support elements in this plan long has been an integral part of the overall regional training strategy. Fires participation in

USPACOM TSC Plan exercises ensures our long-term security goals within the AOR. Participation can range from Artillery and fires subject matter expert (SME) exchanges to command post exercises (CPXs) and staff exercises (STAFFEXs) for corps-level combined staffs. Recent exercises focusing on multinational operations clearly have demonstrated the need to continue to develop our partnerships with regional nations and improve our fire support interoperability throughout the Pacific.

Balikatan

Balikatan is a USPACOM TSC exercise conducted annually in the Republic of the Philippines. Balikatan consists of civil-military operations, a field training exercise (FTX) and a STAFFEX/CPX. The exercise fosters interoperability and enhances the armed forces of the Philippines. The STAFFEX focus is to improve crisis-action planning and normally involves a crisis-response scenario. The FTX is designed to improve interoperability and training on joint activities and operations.

Typically, a US Army, Pacific (USARPAC) or Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) Artillery unit provides a firing battery to conduct interoperability training and SME exchanges with the Philippine Army during the FTX portion of this exercise.

Cobra Gold

Cobra Gold is an annual multinational TSC plan exercise conducted in the Kingdom of Thailand. Participating nations include the US, Thailand and a number of nations operating in a coalition task force. Cobra Gold reinforces USPACOM commitments in the Southeast Asia region by supporting regional War on Terrorism (WOT) operations and activities, focusing the exercise scenario on the most likely contingency operations in the Southeast Asia region.

Cobra Gold consists of three events: a CPX, humanitarian projects and a FTX. The corps-level CPX facilitates improved US joint and multinational forces interoperability and the ability to plan and execute complex multinational operations. Fires elements of the participating staffs perform typical contingency planning and execution along with their regional partners. Humanitarian civic assistance project sites are conducted at locations that directly support WOT and TSC Plan objectives. The battalion-level FTX improves multinational combined-arms interoperability and operational tactical readiness and military-to-military exchanges. Artillery and mortar live-fire trainings and exchanges with the Thai Army advance US joint interoperability and tactical operational readiness.

Key Resolve/Foal Eagle

Key Resolve (formerly RSOI or reception, staging, onward movement and integration) is a US and Republic of Korea operations plan (OPLAN)-oriented warfighting CPX conducted annually in the Republic of Korea. Key Resolve focuses on USPACOM and Combined Forces Command OPLANs that support the defense of the Republic of Korea. Foal Eagle is a series of joint and combined FTXs held concurrently with Key Resolve. These two exercises demonstrate US resolve to support the Republic of Korea against external aggression while improving Republic of Korea and US combat readiness and joint and combined interoperability. Past CPXs have involved the fires staffs heavily in the joint and combined planning and execution of OPLAN functions. The FTX has included Artillery SME exchanges and live fires with Republic of Korea forces.

Ulchi Freedom Guardian

Ulchi Freedom Guardian (formerly UFL or Ulchi Focus Lens) is a US and Republic of Korea OPLAN-oriented, corps-level warfighting CPX held annually in the Republic of Korea. Ulchi Freedom Guardian is a key component of the US Forces, Korea (USFK), annual training program with the Republic of Korea. Ulchi Freedom Guardian is a combination of two events: a Republic of Korea national mobilization exercise involving several hundred thousand Republic of Korea citizens practicing wartime activation and traveling to mobilization sites; and a Combined Forces Command warfighting CPX. The commander, USFK, uses this exercise to conduct training initiatives to transform the command and demonstrate enhanced warfighting capabilities. Major combined participants include the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command Military Armistice Committee (UNCMAC). Typically, corps fire support elements provide joint and combined interoperability with their Republic of Korea counterparts.

Yama Sakura

Yama Sakura is a bilateral US and Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force exercise focusing on full-spectrum operations. It is a computer simulated CPX involving both conventional and unconventional forces and is designed to improve US and Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force readiness and interoperability. Key focus areas for fires elements in previous years have included joint targeting, lethal and nonlethal effects synchronization and consequence management tasks.

Talisman Saber

Talisman Saber is a biennial US and Australia exercise that includes a combined CPX and FTX with force-on-force and live-fire training modules. The exercise is the primary Australia and US bilateral training evolution, exercising the commands as a combined task force in short-warning, power-projection and forcible-entry scenario. The exercise is designed to improve US and Australia combat readiness and interoperability, maximizing joint and combined training opportunities. In the process, Talisman Saber demonstrates US resolve to support a key ally in the region and advances the USPACOM TSC plan.

The Talisman Saber focus is high-end combat operations, transitioning into peacekeeping or other post-conflict operations. AUSARPA CorMARFORPAC Artillery unit provides a firing unit to conduct interoperability training and SME exchanges with the Australian Army during the FTX portion of this exercise.

Terminal Fury

Terminal Fury is an annual CPX designed to support USPACOM continuum of events to prepare USPACOM staff and Joint Task Force-519 for a major theater contingency. Terminal Fury provides venues for biennial Joint Task Force-519 certification and exercises warfighting decision-making and staff processes to achieve training objectives. Joint targeting and joint effects workgroups, centers, cells and boards are major exercise focuses, as Terminal Fury challenges participating commanders with competing demands of setting the conditions for success should deterrence fail.

These exercises are just a few of USPACOM's exercises supporting the TSC plan strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Future opportunities to expand the fires and fire support participation are

emerging as mission sets evolve and new partnerships emerge. Future exercises will focus on conducting major contingency operations; however, trends in identifying and defeating non-state, transnational threats are achieving increased attention. The USPACOMTSC Plan exercises will remain the most significant portion of the region's engagement strategy.

Chapter 7 - USSOUTHCOM

Time to Improve: U.S. Defense Structure For the Western Hemisphere

Dr. Craig A. Deare

Reprinted with permission from the 2nd Quarter 2009 issue of *Joint Force Quarterly*.

As the Nation adjusts to the reality of the Obama administration, the time is ripe for a fundamental improvement in the Pentagon's relationship with its counterparts in the Western Hemisphere. It should be acknowledged that U.S. foreign policy in general, and defense policy in particular, is not routinely engaged in matters of importance to the nations of the hemisphere. Given the nature of a globalized world, and the fact that the United States is no longer the only security option available to the region's actors, American policymakers must work to remain relevant and engaged with those open to being our partners.

This article runs the risk of being a bit "inside baseball" regarding U.S. defense policy toward the region as it seeks to explain the primary structural shortcomings associated with both the formulation and execution of policy. It does not recommend specific policies for particular countries or concerns; rather, it is intended to address matters of structure and process. There are a number of reasons why the quality and level of Department of Defense (DOD) engagement with the nations of this hemisphere have been suboptimal. Among these, the current organizational structure within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Unified Command Plan (UCP) for this hemisphere is the result (not the cause) of key factors responsible for our traditional inattention. At the end of the day, however, key structural changes within OSD and in the current UCP are required to significantly improve the quality of DOD policy formulation and security cooperation with the partner nations of the Western Hemisphere. This is not to suggest that structural changes alone are necessary; clearly, sound policy requires informed analysis and wise decision making. As Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson stated, "Good national security policy requires both good policymakers and good policy machinery."¹ Indeed, one cannot be divorced from the other, but the focus here is on the machinery.

It is important to understand the context in which this effect has occurred to make the decisions necessary to correct the structural shortcomings. For reasons that will be addressed briefly, the geopolitical realities at play in this part of the world are serious and troublesome. They will not disappear in the short term, but they will require the dedication of time and attention by senior defense decision makers sooner rather than later.

A Current Snapshot of Defense Concerns

Prior to delving into DOD structural shortcomings, we must address why it is more important than ever to have a more effective configuration of assets to engage the region. Space limitations preclude addressing all 35 countries of the hemisphere, but make no mistake—the security issues at play in this part of the world represent real and present dangers, and DOD has an important role to play. This is particularly true given the department's recent policy of elevating stability operations to the same priority level as those related to combat, and the reality that the region presents a target-rich environment for the entire range of tasks involved in those operations.

The notion of threats, challenges, and other concerns represents the consensus language that emerged from the Conference on Hemispheric Security in Mexico City in October 2003. The consensus was required to bridge the wide gaps in regional views among countries as diverse as the United States, Bolivia, and Saint Kitts and Nevis. Classical military threats that characterized

the bipolar world do not represent the perceived threats dominating the security thinkers of most countries in the Western Hemisphere. As U.S. security elites think about the region, they must recognize that nontraditional, transnational, and other than state-on-state aggression is the most pressing danger their counterparts there see.

Transnational Threats

Trafficking of Drugs, Small Arms/ Weapons, and Contraband

Although these items are linked, the menace of drug smuggling is perhaps the most pernicious and troubling. The effects of the transshipments of drugs, and increasingly their consumption in the countries of production and the transit zone, are wreaking havoc throughout the hemisphere. The monies derived from these illicit activities are funding the acquisition of greater firepower than is available to local and national police forces, requiring the militaries of many countries to play a direct role. These trafficking routes are also available to terrorist organizations.

Terrorism/Insurgency

Most U.S. policymakers equate terrorism with al Qaeda and its derivatives, but the region has its own homegrown varieties. The best known are the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia and Sendero Luminoso in Peru. Although Colombia's President Álvaro Uribe has led a successful effort to combat the FARC, that endeavor is not yet concluded. For its part, Sendero Luminoso, believed to have been defeated and eradicated in the 1990s, is making a comeback. And while Islamic radical terrorist cells are not known to be operational in the region (yet), there are groups present within the hemisphere, some in urban areas. It is widely believed that Islamic groups raise funds legally and illegally to finance operations around the world. The Venezuela-Iran linkage is particularly troublesome. As well, there are small groups of insurgents in Mexico and other countries that merit close monitoring.

Organized Crime

Listed as a separate entity from the trafficking trio, this term refers to the large number of active criminal networks and their role in undermining societies and governments. In the majority of countries in the hemisphere, organized criminal networks play a debilitating role over the viability of the state. Included in this category are the Maras, or gangs, that operate in a transnational fashion as well, generating greater levels of violence and insecurity throughout Central America, Mexico, and beyond.

Priority Countries

Mexico

Although many things are going right in this key neighbor's territory, its security situation is bad and getting worse. There are seven major narcotics trafficking cartels operating throughout the country, generating violence and challenging the very authority of the state. According to the private intelligence agency STRATFOR (Strategic Forecasting, Incorporated), "the 2008 death toll related to drug trafficking reached 4,325 on November 3, far exceeding the total of nearly 2,500 for all of 2007."² President Felipe Calderón has given the mission to the armed forces, due to the combination of factors related to Mexican law enforcement (corruption, ineffectiveness, and no national police force). The watered down Mérida Initiative represents a tepid attempt to address this serious situation; much bolder thinking and far more resources will be required.

Venezuela

Despite protestations to the contrary and words about democracy, this country is a de facto military dictatorship. Hugo Chavez has essentially dismantled any semblance of democratic institutions, and threatens the military balance of South America with planned acquisitions of 4.5 generation aircraft, submarines, tanks, and anti-aircraft capabilities. His active pursuit of relationships with Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, Belarus, and North Korea is anything but benign. Matters will get considerably worse before they improve.

Brazil

The country of the future is arriving. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has taken on the role of regional leader, moving beyond the potential to the real. Beyond mere economic and political influence, defense minister Nelson Jobim has bold and grand designs for a much more robust and energetic military role, in terms of both new capabilities and leadership. Jobim has created the Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano (South American Defense Council), a regional defense entity that excludes the United States. A new defense strategy is in the offing, seeking strategic relationships with France, Russia, and other extra-regional actors. The United States needs to consider its national security interests as it ponders whether to deepen or reduce its defense relationship with this key player.

Bolivia

Internal political strife is running high, and although the likelihood of the country splitting in two is not great, it is nonetheless a possibility that bears monitoring. The fact that Hugo Chavez has promised to intervene militarily in the event of civil infighting presents a challenge to the countries of the region. How will DOD react to such an eventuality?

Cuba

The question of what happens when the Castro brothers disappear from the scene remains open. This land, the size of Pennsylvania and with 11 million people, is at what the National Security Strategy would describe as a “strategic crossroads.” DOD’s stability operations mission has serious implications when matters begin to unravel. Conversely, should the Obama administration decide to engage the government of Cuba, and understanding the preeminent role of the Cuban armed forces, the policy implications for DOD could be significant.

Colombia

This country comes closest to acting as an ally in the region. The Ministry of Defense and the armed forces have transformed significantly during the tenure of President Uribe, although many observers will continue to emphasize the human rights shortcomings of the government far more than those of the insurgents. To its misfortune, Colombia is located in a less than desirable neighborhood, bordered to the east by Venezuela and to the south by Ecuador. How will DOD engage the Colombian military in the future?

The above limited sample does not fully capture the wide range of challenges that confront the region; there are myriad other vital issues meriting attention. It does underscore that there are many matters of substance calling for improving the structure to ensure they are properly served.

Factors Contributing to Inattention

A number of specific factors are responsible—in large part—for the relatively consistent (save periodic crises) lack of DOD attention in matters related to the Western Hemisphere.

A Dangerous World

National security challenges in East Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa in by the Colombia-Ecuador-Venezuela “crisis” in March 2008. Despite the unlikely event of state-on-state violence, the number of both transnational and internal threats and challenges related to violence and crime warrants increasing attention.

It’s the Economy

The principal U.S. interest in this hemisphere has long been, in general terms, economic. Washington’s foreign policy has emphasized democracy, market economics, and stability, dating from the Monroe Doctrine in the 19th century and the Roosevelt Corollary in the early 20th century. However, more recently it has been formed in response to crises. Examples beyond Colombia where U.S. administrations paid significant attention to the security situation include Haiti (1994/2004), Panama (1990), Central America in general (Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala in particular in the 1980s), Grenada (1983), and the Dominican Republic (1965). The recent level of U.S. commitment to Bogota is an exception to this general trend, and was due initially more to an effective Colombian diplomatic campaign with the Department of State and Congress than to a DOD-led effort.

Developmental Challenges

The primary challenges confronting the majority of nations of the hemisphere are developmental in nature. The institutional frailty of general, as well as Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, China, Russia, and other locales demand the attention of the Secretary of Defense on an almost daily basis. Very infrequently do issues in this hemisphere call for his immediate attention, and in many important ways, this is a very good thing.

A (Relatively) Peaceful Region

The risks represented by national security challenges in this hemisphere seem to pale in comparison with those elsewhere. Canada is a strong and dependable ally; Mexico is an increasingly capable partner; our “third border,” the Caribbean, is relatively stable (though currently facing important internal concerns). The average level of defense spending (approximately 1.5 percent) of the nations of this hemisphere is the lowest in the world, which is fortunate in broad terms. This reflects the reality that the likelihood of state-on-state conflict is low though not impossible, particularly if we are inattentive, as evidenced many of the democracies, the myriad challenges confronting the societies (from poor educational systems to struggling health care delivery), the uneven character of the economic programs, and the predicament of the justice systems and the rule of law are the fundamental issues that confront the region. These challenges, and the regional governments’ deficiencies in addressing them, have led to the aforementioned internal—and increasingly transnational—security threats. Organized crime, gang violence, and trafficking of drugs, persons, and small arms are the effect. These issues are not resolved with military means, although the armed forces can and do play an important role in dealing with the associated security effects of the developmental problems. In fact, because of the institutional weaknesses of many governments, the military is all too often called on to perform missions not traditionally within the scope of the armed forces.

Heterogeneity

Yet another complicating factor is heterogeneity. Non specialists tend to think of the hemisphere—to the extent they think of it at all—as Latin America, or perhaps Latin America and the Caribbean. And it is true that both of those “areas” share a number of culturally similar characteristics. But the fact is that there are 19 different “Latin American” countries, and 13 different “Caribbean” countries, as well as 14 U.S. and European territories and dependencies. This reality makes the notion of crafting a “defense policy for Latin America” or a “defense policy for the Caribbean” exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, in practical terms.

Divergent Conceptions of Security and Defense

A subset of the great heterogeneity is that each country has a different understanding of the role of the armed forces in its security and defense equation. As mentioned previously, some armed forces are required by constitution to be involved in the internal security matters of the state (for example, Guatemala), while others have been limited to reacting exclusively to external military threats of state actors, greatly reducing their roles (for example, Argentina). Because of these distinctions, the interaction between DOD and the militaries of other countries may be quite different, as in Chile, Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico. This reality exacerbates the general lack of understanding of the region, making the task of crafting coherent and nuanced policy more difficult.

Having reviewed the reasons for the relative neglect by DOD, the hemisphere is distinct in one critical variable: it is our hemisphere in the sense that this is where we live. It is worth repeating—those who pay attention to the region know this intuitively—that this hemisphere in general, and Latin America in particular, is thus the area of the world that most directly affects our citizens’ daily lives.

To highlight just one of many examples of the region’s impact, U.S. trade with countries in this hemisphere in 2007 was 29.16 percent of the Nation’s total, essentially double that with the European Union (15.22 percent), and more than triple that with China (9.77 percent).³ The importance of stable economic markets, and the role of security and defense toward achieving that stability, is self-evident. As Senator John McCain said to an audience of broadcasters during his Presidential campaign, “To all of the people and governments of our shared hemisphere: No portion of this earth is more important to the United States. My administration will work relentlessly to build a future with liberty and justice for ALL.”⁴ Although President Obama may not have shared the same view, he now needs to get up to speed quickly.

Addressing the Challenges

These realities did not come about overnight; they are the cumulative effect of many years of inattention and/or disinterest by U.S. administrations of both parties as well as the inexperience, inconsistency, and incompetence of many regional governments. Clearly, the resolution will also take considerable time and will depend on both U.S. and regional efforts. A major challenge regional governments must overcome is a history of authoritarian and military rule, a reality not shared by the United States. Many countries continue to work their way through relatively fresh civil-military wounds, with some efforts actually exacerbating rather than healing those wounds. That said, there are two comparatively simple structural changes that DOD can adopt to fundamentally improve the nature of the defense relationship between the United States and the countries of the region.

First, DOD should create the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA). In essence, this calls for exchanging the configuration of one ASD office with a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) office within the same directorate.”

This upgrade of the DASD WHA to ASD WHA employs similar logic to that used to create the office of the ASD for Asian Affairs. Prior to the latest OSD reorganization in 2006, Asian affairs were the domain of the DASD for Asia-Pacific Affairs, situated within the ASD for International Security Affairs (ISA) (as were the DASDs for Inter-American Affairs, African Affairs, and Near East-South Asian Affairs). Given the scale of the region and the influence of Asian affairs in general—the cases of China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea, and India, among others—it made good sense to carve out the Asian affairs portfolio and create a separate ASD office. Robert Kaplan argues that a confluence of the experience of three key individuals—Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Myers—was a key factor in this shift.⁵ For reasons listed previously, a similar organizational rearrangement is called for in the Western Hemisphere.

A separate but also key issue of this “elevation” is that it more appropriately balances the relationship between the policy-makers position and that of the combatant command commanders. Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense are many levels removed from the Secretary of Defense, having to route their recommendations through multiple levels of bureaucrats, most of whom know little and care even less about the region.⁶ In hierarchical terms, a DASD is roughly equivalent to a major general, while geographic combatant are among the most powerful four-star general/flag officers in the system. Over the years, combatant commands from this hemisphere have routinely bypassed the DASD, consulting directly with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy or the Secretary, effectively relegating the DASD to a senior staff officer within the bureaucracy. On the other hand, Assistant Secretaries of Defense are four-star equivalents, requiring confirmation by the Senate (DASDs do not require confirmation). An individual sufficiently senior and experienced to receive Senate confirmation as the ASD WHA, would be able to establish and maintain clear lines of policy supremacy vis-à-vis the combatant commander.

As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the principal military advisor to the Secretary and the President, a combatant commander should be the principal military advisor for issues in the Western Hemisphere to the OSD leadership. An ASD WHA should be the individual responsible for providing advice on defense issues and defense policy—a more strategic and broader perspective than purely operational military matters, which are the purview of combatant commanders. As when the Chairman accompanies the Secretary to Capitol Hill, the combatant commander should accompany the Assistant Secretary, clearly reinforcing the hierarchy of the civilian policymaker for the region over the subordinate military operational commander.

On another note, from a reciprocity and protocol perspective, one should not underestimate the impact of the level of the official charged with defense policy for the hemisphere. Most countries were offended when they were informed of (but never consulted about) the moving of the office responsible for regional policy development from the ASD ISA to the newly created ASD for Homeland Defense (HD). Many senior regional officials questioned whether the United States considered their countries as subordinate to the defense of the American homeland, and why regions such as Africa and the Middle East were still within ISA, while Inter-American Affairs migrated to a newly created office responsible for internal defense of the United States. Upgrading the office responsible for regional policy formulation would go a long way toward reassuring the region that DOD assesses it as important. Moreover, this bureaucratic upgrade would enable the Assistant Secretary to interact on par with the other ASDs within the policy office.

An ancillary advantage of the ASD WHA upgrade is the associated level of congressional (specifically Senate) involvement in Western Hemisphere matters. Senate Armed Services confirmation hearings will require much greater attention than currently exists. Aside from U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) annual testimony, scant attention is paid to the region for reasons already listed. It is also safe to assume that a nominee for ASD WHA would have to be a senior individual with a demonstrated record of experience related to the region. No longer would the office responsible for DOD policy in the area be filled by relatively junior political appointees with limited regional defense experience or expertise.⁷

The “exchange” of an ASD WHA for the ASD HD is warranted. The creation of the ASD HD office in the post-9/11 environment was an effort to adjust to serious internal threats to U.S. security. The reality, however, was that in broad terms, there was little substantive change in DOD policy. Defense Support to Civil Authorities (or Military Support to Civil Authorities, as it was known previously) is longstanding in U.S. military tradition. DOD’s relationship with the Department of Homeland Security, as well as other relevant actors within the interagency community, does not require this level of organizational interface, particularly in terms of policy. DOD’s role remains what it has long been: to respond to requests from other lead agencies when military capabilities are required to support domestic law enforcement or other agencies. The important civilian policy matters related to Homeland Defense will continue to be performed, but under ASD WHA oversight. Nonetheless, DOD’s primary focus remains external threats and challenges.

This new configuration would be as follows:

- ASD WHA. This official now receives the same level of support as his counterparts. He is assigned two military assistants (colonel/captain), a confidential assistant, an executive assistant, and so forth. The ASD would move about the Pentagon, as well as the interagency community and abroad, with much greater prestige, credibility, and authority. The ASD would be supported by a principal deputy and three DASDs.
- Principal DASD WHA. Among the perks of being an ASD is the advantage of having a deputy to assist in running the office, typically focusing on the Pentagon, leaving the ASD to work externally. In many cases, the Principal DASD is a career member of the Senior Executive Service (SES), not a political appointee. Ideally, this position would be filled with a career civil servant with 20 years or more of defense experience with Latin American and/or Caribbean issues.
- DASD for North American and Caribbean Affairs. This DASD would have responsibility for two of the most important U.S. partners in the world: Canada and Mexico. Despite attempts to shoehorn issues into the Security Prosperity Partnership, the fact is that Canada and Mexico have different security and defense challenges, and require distinct policy management. The Caribbean, for its part, has perhaps the least heterogeneous binding among the sub-regions, with 15 Caribbean Community members of British Commonwealth and Anglophone influence. Nonetheless, the cases of Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic are major exceptions to this commonality. Moreover, the countries of Central America cannot be arbitrarily separated from Mexico, as in the artificial separation resulting from a U.S. Northern
- Command (USNORTHCOM)/USSOUTHCOM boundary. Policies and operational relationships for Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Belize, Costa Rica, and Panama must be made in a coherent and consistent fashion.

- **DASD for South American Affairs.** The major actor of this continent, Brazil, demands much greater time and focus than it has received in recent history, not simply because of its physical size, but because of the combination of its geopolitical weight, its growing economic and energy importance, the sophistication of its armament industry, and its ability to change hearts and minds in the region. Many other countries also require attention in their own right, and for diverging reasons: Colombia, Chile, Peru, and Argentina to name a few. And a key country of significant current concern is Venezuela.
- **DASD for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities.** The office retains its principal functions as it did under the ASD HD. The DASD and his subordinates continue to interface with Homeland Security and other key interagency actors to ensure effective Defense Support to Civil Authority policies.
- **DASD Crisis Management and Mission Assurance.** This office, too, remains organized as it was under the ASD HD, performing Defense Critical Infrastructure Program activities as well as conducting the DOD Key functions conducted within the DASD for Homeland Security Integration are melded into the other two DASDs responsible for homeland defense matters, and this “DASD-ship” is disestablished. A final issue is the quality and the quantity of the individuals assigned to the organization. Over the years, both of these variables have tended to decline. The high-water mark was probably during the 1980s, when a confluence of factors (events in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and elsewhere) focused Presidential-level attention on the region. Nestor Sanchez—a well-known interagency player with years of experience—was the DASD, and he remained for many years. Since that time, the office’s principal director shifted from a general/flag officer to a career (typically junior) SES,⁸ and the country directors shifted from the colonel/General Schedule (GS)–15 level down to major/ lieutenant colonel/GS–13, –14, –15 levels.⁹ Equally important, the number of personnel assigned to the office declined, routinely totaling fewer than 10 individuals. Moreover, although the military personnel tended to be Army Foreign Area Officers with genuine regional experience, many (if not most) of the civilian personnel had little to none. To be truly effective, the upgrades suggested must include significantly increased numbers of experienced individuals to pay sufficient attention to the region.

The second structural change DOD can make to change the nature of the defense relationship between the United States and the countries of the hemisphere is to establish U.S. Americas Command (USAMCOM). This action is not a replica of the newly created U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), which was essentially carved out of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM); rather, it merges the Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) functions of USNORTHCOM—essentially those related to the external relationship with Mexico, as well as those non-North American Aerospace Defense Command issues specifically related to Canada—with those of the long-standing USSOUTHCOM. The fundamental reason underpinning this UCP change is simple and profound: unity of command. This UCP change eliminates an unnecessary and counterproductive seam between the two existing combatant commands in the hemisphere, and places all counterdrug/ counter narco-terrorism, disaster relief/ humanitarian assistance, and operational and TSC responsibilities for the hemisphere under a single unified commander. While not an original proposal—this idea has been debated for years¹⁰—it is an important complement to the establishment of the ASD WHA office. For the first time, responsibility for defense policy for the entire hemisphere would be consolidated under an Assistant Secretary of Defense, supported operationally by a single combatant commander.

For its part, USNORTHCOM is disestablished as a geographic combatant command, but its homeland defense operational responsibilities remain in its new designation as a sub-unified command of USAMCOM. A major advantage is the removal of TSC responsibilities, which are largely a digression from the internal missions of the command, the most important of which is the defense of the homeland. The command has been distracted by trying to perform its core mission of anticipating and conducting homeland defense and civil support operations to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests.

One of the arguments against creating an inclusive USAMCOM is that it would be “unmanageable,” with a span of control too large to be effective. Consider the following facts related to other geographic commands: U.S. Pacific Command’s span of control includes 39 countries, 60 percent of the world’s population, and 50 percent of the world’s surface; USEUCOM’s span was 92 countries and now is 40 (including Russia); USAFRICOM’s span is 53 countries. In contrast, USAMCOM’s span of control would be 35 countries, an expansion of just three countries to USSOUTHCOM’s current area of focus. The argument that a USAMCOM span of control would be too unwieldy simply does not withstand scrutiny.

The consolidation affirms the principle of unity of command, a longstanding U.S. military principle of war. Current joint doctrine clearly states that “unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key considerations when considering organization of forces.”¹¹ This principle should apply when conceptualizing how to organize the Nation’s military forces to engage with the militaries of the hemisphere. As one example clearly illustrates, drawing an arbitrary boundary in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico—as well as between Mexico and Guatemala—exacerbates significant challenges already present for conducting counternarcotics operations in this area. Consider the following: the newly established 4th Fleet, the naval component commander for USSOUTHCOM, has no responsibilities for Mexico, yet USNORTHCOM has no naval component.

If USAMCOM is such a good idea and has been around for years, why has the UCP not been amended to fix these issues? The reasons have varied, but in essence they have all revolved around a similar reality: four-star equities. Despite divergent views from certain offices in the Pentagon, the Joint Staff continues to support having two separate geographic combatant commanders and indeed to expand USNORTHCOM’s area. This is in no small part due to the excellent personal relationship between the commanders of both U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command. Left to their own devices, it is highly unlikely that either the Joint Staff or the Chairman would recommend against the desires of two combatant commanders. Clearly, senior leader attention will be required for this UCP change to occur.

Regional realities have evolved over the years; consequently, resolving this challenge will take significant time and effort by both the United States and all the governments of the hemisphere. Among the main challenges for the hemisphere’s governments is to overcome similar histories of authoritarian and military governments. Despite encouraging trends in the 1990s toward democratically elected governments and away from authoritarian regimes, the realities of 2008 caused concern because of a resurgence of militarization across the region.

The matter of the relationship of the U.S. Government with the region is far broader than just DOD. The general lack of U.S. foreign policy attention to the region is due to causes similar to those listed above, and it too requires attention. Although this analysis clearly advocates improved U.S. defense policy and interaction, this must be done as a subset of larger U.S. foreign policy interests in the hemisphere. Absent that, the United States runs the risk of exacerbating

the perception of a military-focused approach. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates apparently agrees: “This has led to concern among many organizations . . . about what’s seen as a creeping ‘militarization’ of some aspects of America’s foreign policy.”¹² Getting the U.S. Government to exert greater effort and then obtaining positive results from regional governments will be difficult, but the matter at hand is important, so the effort must be made. Secretary Gates continued: Broadly speaking, when it comes to America’s engagement with the rest of the world, it is important that the military is—and is clearly seen to be—in a supporting role to civilian agencies. Our diplomatic leaders—be they in ambassadors’ suites or on the seventh floor of the State Department—must have the resources and political support needed to fully exercise their statutory responsibilities in leading American foreign policy. A steep increase of these capabilities is well within reach, as long as there is the political will and the wisdom to do it.¹³

The ongoing Project on National Security Reform, led by executive director James Locher, is one ongoing effort to restructure the 20th-century national security system to one capable of dealing with 21st-century threats and challenges. The Obama administration should recognize the strategic importance of the region and act accordingly to persuade Congress to provide funding for needed programs. As Admiral James Stavridis noted in his 2008 posture statement, “The U.S., in general, needs to be capable of assisting our partners in addressing underlying conditions of poverty and inequality.”¹⁴ Those conditions are shaped by political, economic, and social factors and require greater civilian-led interagency efforts, with the military in support.

For defense issues, however, the two previously identified structural changes— simple to articulate but difficult to implement due to a variety of political and bureaucratic obstacles— would give the Secretary of Defense a more robust, authoritative, and effective organizational staff element, coupled with a more coherently organized combatant command/military capability. But these steps in and of themselves do not guarantee success. Well-conceived, -coordinated, and -articulated defense policies for the region still must be crafted, and that is done by experienced specialists. As Senator “Scoop” Jackson sagely concluded during his examination of the national security machinery, “The heart problem of national security is not reorganization—it is getting our best people into key foreign policy and defense posts.”¹⁵ But getting the individuals with the right background and experience will call for a stronger and more effective organizational structure. Finally, sound policies require a well-resourced and culturally aware combatant command to execute them.

In January 2009, the Obama administration assumed the high responsibility of formulating U.S. foreign, national security, and defense policy. The risks confronting the administration as it attempts to understand and adapt to the myriad challenges of this globalized world will test its wisdom, experience, and judgment. The Western Hemisphere is deserving of attention as the new administration seeks to reestablish U.S. credibility abroad.

Endnotes

1 Final Statement of Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, November 15, 1961, 4.

2 See <www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081110_mexico_security_memo_nov_10_2008>.

3 U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Washington, DC, February 14, 2008.

4 “McCain’s June 20, 2007, address on Latin America,” Miami, FL, June 20, 2007, available at <www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/12/21/mccain.trans.latinamerica/>. Capitalized *ALL* in the original transcript.

5 Robert D. Kaplan, “What Rumsfeld Got Right,” *The Atlantic* (July-August 2008), 64–74.” *The Atlantic* (July-August 2008),

6 There are five distinct levels to negotiate before reaching the Secretary: the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD); the Assistant Secretary of Defense; the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

7 The DASD as of this writing, Steve Johnson, is a notable exception to the recent rule. He is a mature individual with an established record of policy attention to the region. The previous three—Roger Pardo-Maurer (2001–2006), Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (1998–2000), and Maria Fernandez-Greczmiel (1996–1998)—were political appointees as well, all relatively young (late 30s to early 40s) and inexperienced in the ways of OSD. Taking nothing away from their individual qualifications, the message received by many regional counterparts was that the Pentagon had relegated the regional portfolio to a junior partner.

8 Most of whom have arrived with scant regional knowledge.

9 With the advent of the new National Security Personnel System, the GS–13, –14, –15 grade levels no longer apply, of course, but their use here emphasizes the point.

10 The first formal proposal of which the author is aware was in 1990, presented to then-Chairman General Colin Powell. A more recent proposal was made in the Report of the National Defense Panel of December 1997. See also the recommendations of Lieutenant Colonel John E. Angevine, USA, “Americas Command: Promoting Regional Stability in the Western Hemisphere,” U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2005.

11 Joint Publication 3–0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September 10, 2001), II–12.

12 Robert M. Gates, Pentagon press conference, July 16, 2008.

13 Ibid.

14 Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, *U.S. Southern Command 2008 Posture Statement*²⁰, available at <www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/files/0UI011204838891.pdf>.

15 Jackson, 4.

Islamic Terrorist Activities in Latin America: Why the Region and the US Should be Concerned

Rene Novakoff, Senior Analyst, US Southern Command.¹

Reprinted with permission from the July 2009 issue of *Air & Space Power Journal*.

While the world is focused on the war in the Middle East and countering Islamic terrorist group activities there and in South Asia and to a lesser extent the US and Europe, there is only periodic focus on other regions vulnerable to Islamic terrorist activity; Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa. This article focuses on the first two areas and describes a consistent pattern of Islamic extremist activity over the past twenty years that ranges from revenue generation and logistic support to more sinister activities. This paper makes the case for why US, Latin American, and Caribbean leaders need to be diligent in halting the ongoing terrorist-related activity in those regions.

There are many myths about Islamic terrorist activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Most literature on the subject paints a dire threat, stating that attacks are imminent either in the region or from the region. Just as much literature downplays the threat, stating that the over 3 million Muslims or about 1% of the population in the region are peaceful and just trying to make a living. As is usually the case, the truth is somewhere in the middle. In the Triborder Area (TBA) of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay alone, counter-terrorism organizations have uncovered over 50 people suspected of sympathizing with extremism and of financing Islamic terrorism over the past 10 years, according to local media.²

Undoubtedly the vast majority of the individuals living in the vibrant muslim communities scattered throughout the region have no ties to terrorism and even abhor terrorism. Evidence from multiple sources in several different countries also shows that there are individuals in the region who are affiliated with terrorist groups and use the region as a cooling off area, a revenue generation area, or as a recruiting pool. Senator Richard Lugar issued a report in 2007 that stated that while there are no operational cells in Latin America or the Caribbean that pose a direct threat to the continental United States, pockets of people in the TBA, Venezuela, and Guyana are ideological, financial, and logistical supporters of terrorist groups in the Middle East.³ In fact, Islamic radicals in the TBA, Guyana, and Trinidad have launched multiple operations in and from the region over the last 20 years.

Attempted Islamic Coup in the Western Hemisphere

The Jammat al Muslimeen (JAM), a Sunni organization, is Trinidad and Tobago's most notorious Muslim organization and the only organization in the region to attempt a coup to install a sharia-based government. The group leader, Abu Bakr, instigated a bloody coup in 1990. With over 100 JAM members, Bakr led attacks against the parliament building and took over Trinidad and Tobago's television network. The standoff between the JAM and the government lasted 5 days while rioting and looting gripped Trinidad's capital. Many people were killed. Bakr finally surrendered to authorities, but was only jailed temporarily as part of negotiations.⁴ Officials released Bakr from jail in 1992. He continues to lead the JAM and the Trinidadian authorities have re-arrested him on several occasions over the years. Most recently, he faces charges of sedition, promoting a terrorist act, and inciting others to breach the peace. He currently remains free.

Abu Bakr maintains ties to questionable individuals and organizations. He considers Libya's Muammar Qadhafi a friend.⁵ Bakr is also well regarded in Sudan where he is considered one of the most significant Muslims in the west.⁶ In 2004, the JAM website had links to a Hamas website.⁷ The website had several other links to jihadist websites and rhetoric.⁸ According to a US undercover agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Bakr's group maintained ties with Afghanistan as they were shipping heroin from Afghanistan to the US via Trinidad.⁹ JAM members are implicated in at least talking to members of the 2007 plot to blow up John F. Kennedy airport¹⁰ and Abu Bakr studied at university with one of the operation's plotters.¹¹ As of 2005, JAM members were still being charged with weapons possessions; two members had 569 rounds of ammunition, a hand grenade, and a rifle during a local sting operation against them.¹² In 2004, another JAM member was tried in US court for possession of 60 AK-47 rifles, 10 MAC-10 machine guns, and 10 silencers.¹³

Hizballah Attacks in Latin America

According to Israeli terrorism expert Ely Karmon,¹⁴ Hizballah has had a presence in Latin America since the late 1980s. It is present in the TBA, Colombia, and Venezuela. Hizballah members use free trade areas for legal trade and illegal smuggling activities. A Sao Paulo newspaper reported that it is common to find young men on the streets of Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil one of the two major cities that make up the TBA, with Hizballah tee-shirts.¹⁵

Hizballah has an operational presence in the region. According to the Argentine government, Hizballah supporters and Iran were responsible for the bombings of the 1992 Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in 1994. Argentina recently successfully lobbied Interpol to release international warrants for several Iranians it has charged with the bombings.¹⁶ Islamic terrorists operating out of the Triborder Region leveled the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires with a powerful bomb on 17 March 1992, killing 29 people and wounding 252. The bombing was allegedly carried out by Hizballah and coordinated by terrorist mastermind Imad Mugniyah, the official in charge of Hizballah foreign operations.¹⁷ The 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AIMA) was the stronger of the two bombs and resulted in 82 deaths. Argentine officials claim a white Renault van holding a 600 pound bomb was driven into the seven story building where the explosion sheared off the front of the building.¹⁸

In another incident which has gone unclaimed, on 19 July 1992, a suicide bomber said to be Lebanese and unable to speak Spanish or English boarded a commuter flight in Colón, Panama, and detonated a bomb, killing all 21 people aboard, including 12 Jewish and Israeli businessmen, and three US citizens. The bomber was said to have a poorly forged US passport and to have not been in Panama very long.¹⁹

Since then, several additional planned acts of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism have been thwarted. For example, the arrest in 1998 of a senior Abu Nidal Organization leader in Lima, Peru, thwarted a reported plan to blow up the Israeli Embassy and a synagogue there.²⁰ According to O Globo's US sources, an Islamic extremist group supposedly planned an attack against the US Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, in April 2001, at the same time as a planned attack against the US Embassy in Quito, Ecuador. The discovery of the plot (and the consequent reinforcement of security) thwarted the attacks.²¹

Al-Qaida and Other Sunni Links to Latin America

Over the years there have been several disturbing links from Latin America and the Caribbean to militant Sunni individuals and terrorist groups. A Brazilian magazine admits that Usama bin Ladin operative and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammad (KSM) spent nearly 20 days in Brazil in 1995 to visit members of the muslim community there.²² While he was there, the magazine claims KSM founded a charity to help finance Usama bin Ladin. Khalid Shaikh Mohammad reportedly was hosted by Khaled Rezk El Sayed Take El Din, who is considered the mentor of the Holy Land Foundation in the TBA.²³ He remains in the region. US Treasury officials have designated The Holy Land Foundation as a terrorist supporter, frozen its assets, and said the Foundation was sending funds to Hamas.

In 1996, the Brazilian police reportedly discovered that Marwan al Safadi, an explosives expert accused of having participated in the first attack on the US World Trade Center in 1993, was living in the TBA.²⁴ In November 1996, Paraguayan authorities learned that Islamic groups in the Triborder region were planning to blow up the US Embassy in Paraguay to coincide with the first anniversary of the bombing of the Saudi National Guard headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Police who raided Safadi's apartment in Ciudad del Este found it filled with explosives, pistols equipped with silencers, double-barreled rifles, false Canadian and US passports, and a large amount of cash.²⁵

Eventually, Brazilian authorities captured Safadi and extradited him to the United States.²⁶ Although sentenced to 18 months in US prison, US authorities eventually extradited Safadi to Canada, where he received a 9-year prison sentence for drug trafficking. However, al-Safadi escaped from Canada's prisons 3 times, finally succeeding in escaping from prison in Montreal and fleeing back to South America with a false passport.²⁷

Marwan Safadi's case was not the first instance of Islamic Jihad terrorist activities in Latin America. In 1992, Interpol agents arrested seven alleged members of the Islamic Jihad in Quito, Ecuador. The agents claimed that they planned attacks on the Israeli ambassador in Bogotá, Colombia.²⁸

In Brazil, an al-Gama' at Islamiyya cell had been operating in Foz do Iguacu since 1995.²⁹ Mohammed Ali Hassan Mokhles had left Egypt in 1993 and established residency in Foz do Iguacu, Brazil.³⁰ Latin American press claimed that Mokhles was sent to the TBA to collect funds for the Middle East and to conduct logistic support activities such as forging passports or other documents meant for Islamic jihadists.³¹ Press reports claim he was a member or even local leader of al-Gama' at Islamiyya, a group linked to al-Qaida.³² Mokhles reportedly attended a training camp in Khost, Afghanistan where he received combat training prior to the Luxor assault.³³ An investigative expose on Mokhles claims that US and Egyptian information says Mokhles may have been involved in the first World Trade Center explosion in New York.³⁴ Uruguayan officials arrested Mokhles in 1999 while he was trying to cross the border from Brazil with false documents. Mokhles was so desperate to have his pending extradition to Egypt overturned that while in jail awaiting travel to Egypt he attacked two inmates, hoping that he would be tried for those assaults in Uruguay and be able to stay. In 2003, Mohammed Ali Hassan Mokhles was extradited from Uruguay to Egypt.³⁵ Egyptian officials had successfully argued that he was involved in planning a terrorist attack which killed at least 58 tourists in Luxor Egypt in 1997.

Colombian officials arrested Mohamed Abed Abdel Aal, another leader of the al Qaida-affiliated al Gama' at Islamiyya in October 1998.³⁶ He had been in Italy under "surveillance," according to Colonel Germán Jaramillo Piedrahita, the head of Colombia's intelligence police, who was interviewed by Colombia's Radio Caracol on 21 October 1998.³⁷ Abdel Aal was wanted by Egyptian authorities for his involvement in two terrorist massacres: the attack in Luxor, Egypt; and an incident in which terrorists killed 20 Greek tourists by raking them with gunfire outside their Cairo hotel on 18 April 1996.³⁸ Jaramillo explained that sometime in 1998 Abdel Aal boarded a plane in Amsterdam bound for Ecuador because the Colombian consulate in Italy denied him a visa to travel directly to Bogotá. Sometime during 1998, Abdel Aal reportedly participated in transactions with Colombian narcotraffickers that involved arms, drugs, and money, and may have been returning to raise money.³⁹ Colombian police arrested Mohamed Abed Abdel Aal on 19 October 1998, two days after he arrived in Bogotá by bus from Quito.⁴⁰ He was subsequently deported to Ecuador. Abdel Aal was later reportedly turned over to Egyptian authorities.⁴¹

US and Panamanian officials reported that Adnan el Shukrijumah, currently on the US Federal Bureau of Investigation BOLO (Be on the Look Out For) list as an al Qaida operative, was in Panama in April 2001, possibly surveying the Panama Canal.⁴² When Khalid Shaik Mohammed was captured by US forces in March 2003, he claimed Shukrijuma was in charge of a new attack. Shukrijuma holds US, Guyanese, and Trinidadian passports.⁴³ US officials claim he was trained by al Qaida to operate as a terrorist organizer and to lead or coordinate a terrorist assault.⁴⁴ In June 2004, the Honduran Security Ministry announced that Shukrijuma had plotted to attack the Panama Canal.⁴⁵

The press also claims that Brazilian authorities broke up an al-Gama'at al Islammiyya cell in April 2002 with the detention of a Sunni extremist, Mohammed Ali Soliman, also wanted by Egypt for involvement in the Luxor attacks.⁴⁶ Another source claims Soliman was involved in other unspecified attacks in Egypt in 1994.⁴⁷ According to Brazilian press reports, he too allegedly was trained in camps in Afghanistan and is associated with Mokhles.⁴⁸ Brazilian officials released Soliman in September 2002 claiming that Egyptian officials failed to give Brazil sufficient evidence of Soliman's involvement in the Luxor attacks. He lives in Brazil.

Another group, Hizballah Latin America, has two cells. One is in Venezuela and the other in Argentina. It is unclear what the connection is between this group and Hizballah, but the group claims solidarity with Hizballah, Iran, and the Islamist revolution. In Venezuela, the group took on the name, Venezuela Hezbollah apparently sometime in 2005. The majority of its members are from the Wayuu tribe, a small indigenous group in Venezuela which converted to Islam a few years ago under their leader Teodoro Darnott.⁴⁹ In 2006, Venezuelan officials found two explosive devises in Caracas, one near the US Embassy. The devises did not detonate, but contained pro-Hizballah pamphlets. Venezuela Hezbollah took responsibility for the bombs and threatened further attacks.⁵⁰ Venezuelan authorities subsequently arrested and convicted Darnott. In Argentina, the Hizballah Latin America group has direct ties to Iran through the Arab Argentine Home and the Argentine-Islamic Association-ASAI de La Plata which are financed by and cooperate with the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires.⁵¹ It also has ties to more radical Muslims in Argentina and its website has extremely anti-Semitic and anti-Israel propaganda.⁵²

Triborder Area: Local Investigators Crack Down on Terrorist Suspects

The Triborder Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay is one of the most notorious in Latin America as an area where all types of criminality takes place, including harboring of Islamic terrorist facilitators. It is widely accepted among terrorism specialists that individuals associated

with Hizballah and to a lesser extent associated with Sunni groups, live and work in this region. Many articles and news stories have been written about the area in the US and regional press. The US Treasury Department has frozen the assets of a number of individuals who live in this area, claiming they are associated with terrorist groups. The Islamic terrorist group affiliation, coupled with the illegal commerce that takes place in the region, create a concerning mix. As early as 1995, Ambassador Philip Wilcox, former State Department Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, testified before the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives that Hizballah activities in the Triborder region involved narcotics, smuggling, and terrorism. He further asserted that Hizballah also had cells in Colombia and Venezuela, was engaging in fund-raising and recruitment, and was receiving guidance and logistical support from Iranian intelligence officers assigned to Iranian embassies in the region.⁵³

A strong TBA Hizballah leadership exists. Paraguayan officials first attempted to arrest Assad Ahmad Barakat in 2002. He is currently in jail in Paraguay for tax evasion. He lived and worked in the TBA area with his brother Hattem. He also had businesses in Iquique, Chile. Local US officials, and the press have alternately called him the Hizballah leader in the TBA, the Hizballah finance chief, and one of the Hizballah clan leaders. His brother reportedly took over the daily activities of the clan until he too was arrested by the Paraguayans, for document fraud. Assad Barakat has another brother who is a sheikh at a Hizballah mosque in Lebanon. Assad's exact title within Hizballah may not be known, but it is clear that he has strong connections to Hizballah. Paraguayan police found several documents in his office and computer when they arrested him. The documents were from Hizballah leaders thanking Assad for his support. One letter was from Hizballah leader Shaik Hassan Nasrallah, thanking Assad for money for the martyrs program. Meanwhile, Paraguayan reporters have also Linked Assad Barakat to al Qaida by claiming he owned the Mondial Engineering and Construction Company which is suspected of having made contributions to al Qaida.⁵⁴

Also in 2002, the Paraguayan police arrested Ali Nizar Darhough, nephew of Mohammad Dahrough who was a well known Sunni leader in the TBA.⁵⁵ Paraguayan officials told New Yorker reporter Jeffrey Goldberg that Ali Nizar and his uncle were the al Qaida point men for the TBA.⁵⁶ Mohammad Dahrough's name was reportedly found in an address book belonging to Abu Zubaydah, a high ranking al-Qaida official captured by the US.⁵⁷ Mohammad escaped the TBA in September 1998 when Paraguayan officials went out to arrest him for making statements in support of terrorism and for planning possible attacks against US, British, and Israeli facilities in the TBA.⁵⁸ Mohammad is last reported to be in Dubai.⁵⁹ Press reports claim he left TBA to join al-Qaida.⁶⁰ Ali Nizar was sending as much as \$80,000 a month to banks in the US, the Middle East, and Europe.⁶¹ Other reports claim that Ali Nizar sent \$10 million in 2000-2001 from the TBA to US dummy corporations that al-Qaida and HAMAS used as fronts.⁶² Most of the money went into an account under Mohammad's name in Dallas, Texas which is a key site for the Holy Land Foundation which the US Treasury says helped to fund HAMAS.⁶³ When arrested, Ali Nizar had large quantities of Iraqi, Jordanian, and Slovenian bank notes.⁶⁴ Ali Nizar was convicted in Paraguay in 2003 of tax evasion and he received a 5-year sentence.⁶⁵

US Treasury Department Freezes Hizballah Assets in TBA

Most of the activity the individuals associated with Islamic terrorists are involved with are revenue generation and logistics such as document fraud and money laundering. The Paraguayan media reported in April 2006 that millions of dollars were being funneled from the TBA to the Middle East. Several governments in Latin America and the Caribbean take exception to US allegations that local supporters of Islamic terrorist groups raise funds for the terrorist groups in

their countries. In December 2006, the US Treasury Department announced that 9 individuals in Brazil and Paraguay were financing Islamic terrorism, several of whom the Argentine government charged, were involved in logistics support for the 1994 AMIA bombing. Ali Muhammad Kazan is on that list. As a manager of a Lebanese school in the TBA, he allegedly collected \$500,000 for Hizballah. Another alleged Hizballah associate, Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad, sent over \$3 million to the Hizballah Martyrs Foundation in 2000 alone, according to documents the Paraguayan police found when they arrested him. Yet another individual, Mohamed Tarabain Chamas, is the manager of a five-story commercial building in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay (part of the TBA). The Treasury Department says he is responsible for counter-intelligence for Hizballah in the TBA.⁶⁶

Action Returns to the Caribbean Area

In May 2006, the Trinidad Express quotes Trinidadian National Security Minister Martin Joseph as confirming that 2 Trinidad and Tobago citizens who were jailed in Canada for involvement in acts of terrorism had been deported to Trinidad and Tobago. These were likely Barry Adams, alias Tyrone Cole and Wali Muhammad, Alias Robert Johnson, who are believed to be members of the Jammāt al Fuqra, a militant Pakistan-based terrorist group. The men had been imprisoned in Canada in 1994 for conspiring to set off bombs in a Hindu temple and a cinema in Toronto. Prosecutors claimed that the men had lived in Texas under aliases for several years before attempting to carry out their plan.⁶⁷ They served their full sentences without parole and Canada deported them upon their release.⁶⁸

In June 2007, a joint Guyanese/Trinidadian/FBI investigation culminated in the arrest of 4 individuals who plotted to blow up gas lines leading to John F. Kennedy airport in New York.⁶⁹ The individuals were US, Guyanese, and Trinidadian.⁷⁰ The case remains pending in US courts. One of the alleged leaders of the plot, Abdul Kadir, is reportedly an acquaintance of JAM leader Abu Bakr in Trinidad.⁷¹ Members of the group allegedly met with JAM members to obtain support for their plot. Kadir is a former Guyanese parliament member.⁷²

In June 2007, Trinidad's Attorney General John Jeremie told the local press that he believed the country's most notorious group, the JAM, was under control, but that the "landscape had changed since 1990... the structure is different, there are a number of different splinter groups and they pose as much as a threat we think as the original group posed in 1990."⁷³ He went on to say these splinter groups are also involved with criminal activity.⁷⁴

Jamaica is another area of concern, especially now that Sheikh Abdullah el Faisal, the extremist cleric who was convicted in the Britain for soliciting murder and inciting racial violence has been deported back to Jamaica.⁷⁵ El-Faisal, a Jamaican-born Islamic cleric, was the first person in more than a century to be convicted under Britain's 1861 Offences Against the Person Act after he was found guilty of soliciting murder and fueling racial hatred in 2003.⁷⁶ During his trial, tapes of his sermons were played where he extolled his listeners to "kill Hindus and Jews and other non Muslims, like cockroaches."⁷⁷ During his four-week trial in 2003, followers watched as the court heard el-Faisal's voice exhorting young Muslims to accept the deaths of women and children as "collateral damage" and to "learn to fly planes, drive tanks... load your guns and to use missiles."⁷⁸ Following the completion of his sentence on those charges in Britain, authorities there deported him in May 2007.⁷⁹ Jermain Lindsay one of the 2005 London transport system bombers, was also born in Jamaica and connected to Faisal. Press reports claim that Shaikh Faisal influenced Lindsay to partake in the UK bombing plot. He reportedly attended at least one of el Faisal's sermons and listened to his tapes.

What's Next?

The above list of suspicious and in some cases outright terrorist activities, shows there is reason for Latin American and Caribbean nations to be vigilant against Islamic terrorist group activity. The US also needs to continue to pay attention to possible inroads by these terrorist groups and by other Islamic extremists through Latin America and the Caribbean. The list of arrests and convictions also shows that many of the governments in the region are aware of the dangers associated with these terrorist groups.

Two equally likely possibilities exist for future Islamic extremist activity in Latin America and the Caribbean. One possibility will allow for some warning, the other will not without increased vigilance. Either course of action would result in the loss of innocent lives.

The first scenario, and the one that we might have some advance notice of, is an attack by Hizballah. If relations between Iran and the US or Israel deteriorate, it is possible Iran would use its well-organized Hizballah group in the region as a surrogate to launch attacks against either Israel or the US, much like it did in Buenos Aires in the 1990s. Under this scenario, an attack could happen using local Hizballah sympathizers for logistics and support and the attack would likely take place in the region. With this scenario, counter-terrorist specialists would have some warning that an attack could take place based on the deteriorating relations with Iran, but would likely have little warning of where it would take place.

Another, equally likely scenario, but one that is harder for counter-terrorism professionals to plan against, would be a group of homegrown extremists planning and launching an attack against US interests either in the region or from the region in the US. This would be much like the JFK airport plot scenario. Without vigilance by US officials and officials in the region, it would be difficult to halt this type of plot. Increased vigilance and support from the populaces in the Caribbean and Latin America to report unusual activity is needed to help mitigate this threat.

Clearly, Islamic terrorist groups in Latin America and the Caribbean pose threats to US interests. Ignoring these threats or explaining them away as US witch hunts gives those who would do harm to innocents more space to plot and plan.

Endnotes

1. This article reflects the views of the author and not those of the US government.
2. Asuncion ABC, "About 50 Alleged Extremists Were Investigated in the TBA Region," 17 July 05.
3. La Nacion, "US Concerned About Triborder," by Hugo Alconada Mon, 21 January 07
4. Terrorism Monitor, Vol 3, Issue 20, "Al-Qaida's Inroads into the Caribbean," 21 October 2005
5. Port of Spain Trinidad Express, "Time to Mount Tighter Musilmeen Watch," by Camini Marajh, 22 August 2004.
6. Ibid
7. Ibid
8. Ibid
9. Port of Spain Trinidad Express, "T&T—a heroin Rout to US," by Darryl Heeralal, 29 May 2005
10. Georgetown Starbroek News, "Kadir, Ibrahim Remanded" by Nigel Williams , 5 June 2007
11. Port of Spain Trinidad Express, "Jeremie: Splinter Groups of Jamaat Pose Danger," by Juhel Browne, 6 June 2007
12. Port of Spain Trinidad Express, 29 November 2005

13. Port of Spain Newsday, "Extradition of a Musilmeen Member," by Francis Joseph, 26 September 2004
14. Santiago El Mercurio, "The Presence of Hizballah in Latin America" by Juan Antonio Munoz, 11 February 2007
15. Sao Paulo Folha, "Shia From TBA Do Not Comment on Hizballah," by Jose Maschio 18 December 2006
16. Herald Tribune, "Interpol votes against Iran in Argentina terror case," 6 November 2007
17. Library of Congress, "A Global Overview of Narcotics-funded Terrorist and other Extremist Groups," May 2002
18. The New Yorker, "Hezbollah Sets Up Operations in South America and the United States," by Jeffrey Goldberg, 28 October 2002
19. Library of Congress, "A Global Overview of Narcotics-funded Terrorist and other Extremist Groups," May 2002
20. Ibid
21. Ibid
22. Rio de Janeiro Epoca, "Are the Terrorists Here?" by Matheus Machado and Murilo Ramos, 12 March 2007
23. Asuncion ABC, "About 50 Alleged Extremists Were Investigated in the TBA Region," 17 JUL 05
24. Ibid
25. Library of Congress, "A Global Overview of Narcotics-funded Terrorist and other Extremist Groups," May 2002
26. Rio de Janeiro Epoca, "Are the Terrorists Here?" by Matheus Machado and Murilo Ramos, 12 March 2007
27. Library of Congress, "A Global Overview of Narcotics-funded Terrorist and other Extremist Groups," May 2002
28. Ibid
29. Porto Alegre Zero Hora, "Police Say That Terrorist Cell Dismantled With Soliman's Arrest," 17 April 2002
30. Montevideo El Pais, "Egypt Meets Uruguayan Court's Terms to Extradite Terrorist Suspect," 2 July 2003
31. Buenos Aires Clarin, "Bin Ladin Followers in TBA Probed," by Daniel Sanoro, 18 July 1999
32. Asuncion ABC, "Order From Above Stops al-Gama' at Suspect Probe," by Vladimir Jara, 8 July 2002
33. Cairo MENA, "Man Extradited to Egypt for 1999 Terrorist Attack at Luxor," 10 July 2003
34. London Al Sharq al Awsat, "Paper on Arrest of Islamist In Uruguay," by Eduardo Privi, 11 February 1999
35. Cairo MENA, "Man Extradited to Egypt for 1999 Terrorist Attack at Luxor," 10 July 2003
36. Library of Congress, "A Global Overview of Narcotics-funded Terrorist and other Extremist Groups," May 2002
37. Ibid
38. Ibid
39. Ibid
40. Ibid
41. Ibid
42. Terrorism Monitor, vol 3 Issue 20, "Al Qaida's Inroads into the Caribbean" by Chris Zambelis, 21 October 2005
43. Wikipedia.org/wiki/adnan_Gulshair_el_Shukrijumah, 11 November 2007
44. Ibid
45. Ibid
46. Porto Alegre Zero Hora, "Police Say That Terrorist Cell Dismantled With Soliman's Arrest," 17 April 2002
47. Sao Paulo Folha de Sao Paulo, "Brazilian Federal Police Arrest Alleged Egyptian Terrorist in Foz do Iguacu," by Jose Maschio, 16 April 2002
48. Porto Alegre Zero Hora, "Brazilian Authorities Treat Soliman Arrest as Isolated Case," 17 April 2002
49. Santiago El Mercurio, "Chile: Israeli Expert Discussed Hizballah Presence in Latin America," by Juan Antonio Munoz, 11 February 2007

50. Institute for Counter-Terrorism, "Hezbollah AmericaLatina: Strange Group or Real Threat?" by Dr. Ely Karmon, 14 November 2006
51. Santiago El Mercurio, "Chile: Israeli Expert Discussed Hizballah Presence in Latin America," by Juan Antonio Munoz, 11 February 2007
52. Institute for Counter-Terrorism, "Hezbollah AmericaLatina: Strange Group or Real Threat?" by Dr. Ely Karmon, 14 November 2006
53. Library of Congress, "A Global Overview of Narcotics-funded Terrorist and other Extremist Groups," May 2002
54. Ibid
55. Ibid
56. The New Yorker, "Hezbollah Sets Up Operations in South America and the United States," by Jeffrey Goldberg 28 October 2002
57. Asuncion ABC Color, "Triborder Region Injects \$20Million a Year for Islamic Cause," 18 July 2005
58. Asuncion ABC Color, "Egyptian Suspect Wanted in AMIA Bombing Case," 22 September 1998
59. Asuncion ABC Color, 23 September 2001
60. Ibid
61. The New Yorker, "Hezbollah Sets Up Operations in South America and the United States," by Jeffrey Goldberg 28 October 2002
62. Asuncion ABC Color, "Triborder Region Injects \$20Million a Year for Islamic Cause," 18 July 2005
63. Ibid
64. Asuncion ABC Color, "Police Arrest HAMAS Member's Nephew on Piracy Charges," 3 July 2002
65. Asuncion ABC Color, 28 August 2003
66. Asuncion ABC Color, "Bank Accounts for Sending Money Abriad Detected," by Hector Guerin, 7 April 2006
67. Sao Paulo Folha, "Shia From TBA Do Not Comment on Hizballah," by Jose Maschio 18 DEC 06
68. Asuncion ABC, 30 May 02
69. Rio de Janeiro Epoca, "Are theTerrorist Here?" by Matheus Machado, 12 March 2007
70. Port of Spain Trinidad Express, 5 May 2006
71. Port of Spain the Trinidad Guardian, "Trinis Deported for Terror Links," by Dominic Kalispersad, 8 April 2006
72. Ibid
73. Georgetown Guyana Chronicle, "Police Say Maps from Kadir's Home Date Back to 1980s," by Mark Ramotar, 9 June 2007
74. Port of Spain Trinidad Express, "Jeremie: Splinter Groups of Jamaat Pose Danger," by Juhel Browne, 6 June 2007
75. The Sunday Observer, "Islamic Community Extends Olive Branch to El-Faisal," by Petre Williams, 27 May 2007
76. The Times, "7/7 Hate Preacher Deported to Jamaica," 25 May 2007
77. Ibid
78. Kingston the Gleaner, "We Will Meet with El Faisal, While We Investigate," 29 May 2007
79. The Times, "7/7 Hate Preacher Deported to Jamaica," 25 May 2007

War Without Borders: The Ecuador-Colombia Crisis of 2008 and Inter-American Security

Dr. Gabriel Marcella

Reprinted with permission from the April 2009 issue of *Air & Space Power Journal*.

Westphalia in the Andes

Climate change, deforestation, pollution, contraband, weapons proliferation, terrorism, money-laundering, illegal immigration, and gangs combine with the diffusion of technology and modern communication to mock international order. Andean states are experiencing a profound crisis of authority, governance, democratic legitimacy, and territorial security.¹ The crisis is superimposed upon a tradition of laissez faire on ungoverned space and border control and continuing disagreement about terrorism. Given this background, the institutional capacity, the political will, preventive diplomacy, and the mechanisms for effective security cooperation and conflict resolution between states have not caught up to the demands of the new geopolitical realities of wars without borders. An assortment of international criminals prosper from weak borders and weak states.

Midnight in the Amazon

At half-past-midnight on March 1, three A37 aircraft and five Brazilian-made Super Tucanos of the Colombian air force fired precision-guided bombs into a camp of the terrorist-narcotrafficking Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 1.8 kilometers inside the border in a difficult jungle area of Ecuador, an area known as Angostura.² Target of the attack was long time FARC leader Raúl Reyes, who was killed along with 24 others (including four Mexicans and an Ecuadorean).³ Colombian forces recovered the extensive computer files of Reyes, which would become a trove of information.

The camp was located in the north-easternmost part of Ecuador, across from an area in Colombia which has been the redoubt of the FARC's Front 48. Nine hours after the strike, President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia called President Rafael Correa, his Ecuadorean counterpart. Correa was caught totally unaware and led a verbal and diplomatic assault against Uribe and Colombia. It took the Ecuadorean Army 6 hours to reach Angostura, an area so remote that the last Ecuadorean patrol there took place a year before.

By mid-April, Correa's aggressive tone had moderated to a warning that if the FARC crossed into Ecuador, it would mean war, a statement that was well-received in Colombia. Nonetheless, his accusation seemed on the surface to be one of surprising innocence, since generations of Ecuadoreans have memory of border violations by terrorists, traffickers, and contrabandists along its borders, in addition to high levels of crime, and an intense national debate about the ecological integrity of its Amazon region. Moreover, the Ecuadorean polity was hardly innocent in the strategic use of military power. In 1995, its armed forces performed superbly in a short war against Peru, culminating a border conflict between the two countries that had lasted two centuries.

Indeed, the attack had been prepared. Colombia was able to fix the location of Reyes at the camp via an informant on the night of February 29. Reyes had been moving around various camps in Ecuador. Following March 1, there ensued a torrent of incandescent insults and reactions between Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela that lay bare the contradictions that haunt Latin

America when it comes to fighting terrorism and international crime.⁴ The March 1 attack and its aftermath are a part of a larger tableau that depicts the vulnerabilities of weak democracy to the corruption by narcotics, intimidation by terrorism, the need for effective civil-military relations in confronting, the contradictions that populism generates in foreign policy, as well as understanding the unintended consequences of the application of American power, even when intentions are noble.

The results of the attack added strategic value to Colombia's war against the FARC. Reyes was a member of the secretariat of the murderous narco-terrorist FARC. The FARC camp had been in existence for at least 3 months, disposing of such amenities as beds, two gasoline powered generators, a satellite dish, television, training area, chicken coop and pig pen, and stored food, in addition to an arsenal of weapons.⁵ Thus the FARC had established a semi-permanent site in Ecuador.

Clashing Principles

On March 8 the Summit of the Group of Rio meeting in the Dominican Republic unanimously condemned Colombia's violation of sovereignty. Later, the OAS agreed on a consensus resolution on March 17 that "rejected" the Colombian incursion, stating the venerable international law principle: "no state or group of states has the right to intervene, either directly or indirectly, for whatever motive, in the internal or external affairs of another."⁶ The resolution did not condemn Colombia but reiterated the commitment of states to fight irregular groups.

Thus the eternal dilemma of conflicting values in international relations: which is higher, nonintervention or self-defense? Should Colombia have restrained itself, accepting the risk of having its citizens attacked, and informed Ecuadorean authorities prior to the attack? Colombia could not let this opportunity go by. Nonetheless, a judicious approach would have a timely diplomatic call on the night of the attack from Uribe to Correa would helped build confidence in the bilateral relationship, instead of adding to strains and misunderstandings that had been developing for years between the two countries. Three points support these judgments:

1. All states reserve the right of self-defense. Colombia's action could be seen as a preemptive, instead of a preventive or precautionary, military strike made necessary by the FARC's decades-old war against the state and people of Colombia.⁷ That the FARC would strike again had the highest certitude, therefore justifying the preemptive attack. The FARC habitually used safe havens in Ecuador because of Ecuador's inability to control its border and territory, and in Venezuela, because of difficult terrain and the apparent laissez faire complicity and demonstrated support of Caracas for the FARC. According to the International Crisis Group of Brussels, the weak link in Colombia's security policy was its undefended and open borders.⁸ Brazil and Peru made serious efforts to prevent the FARC from using their territories. Moreover, Uribe's military has been pursuing an aggressive decapitation strategy against FARC leaders,⁹ with increasing success. The head of the Colombian National Police stated that this was the fifth time that Colombian forces had attempted to strike Reyes, who had moved around to various locations in Ecuador. Given this information, Colombia's military strategy and its implications for Ecuador should have been well known to Ecuadorean statesmen.

2. Operational security for the plan to strike the FARC might be compromised “Because we didn’t trust Ecuador,” said Colombia’s Defense Minister, Juan Manuel Santos.¹⁰ According to Bogotá’s *El Tiempo*, Colombia’s intelligence service, the Department of Administrative Security (DAS) had informed Ecuador 16 times and as recently as November 26, 2007, including providing a document with the exact location of 25 FARC “bases” inside Ecuador. Colombia alerted other governments about FARC activities on their soils: Argentina four times, Bolivia twice, Brazil seven, Peru four, and Venezuela ten. The DAS report stated that 80 percent of the alerts received no response or “evasive” answers.¹¹ Given apparent ambivalence (if not support) towards the FARC among members of the Correa government, operational security became paramount in Colombian planning. Allowing the FARC and Reyes to escape would be an embarrassing setback for Colombia and a menace for Ecuador.

3. The rudimentary system for early warning and crisis management between Colombia and Ecuador was ineffective.¹² Colombia violated Ecuadorean air space in its campaign against the FARC in 2006. As a consequence, Ecuador activated its air defense, while the two defense ministers made a joint declaration to improve security and avoid border incidents. The Ecuadorean Army maintained 13 frontier detachments.¹³ In January and February 2006, Ecuador activated the air defense system in an effort to prevent border incursions. At the time, Defense Minister Oswaldo Jarrín stated: “The Ecuadorean Army will act in legitimate defense against any element that intends to violate the national sovereignty.”¹⁴

It is uncertain what role corruption in high places may have played in Ecuador’s response, but there were recent intimations of an attempt at vote buying involving a military intelligence officer and a civilian opposition political figure.¹⁵ Earlier, Correa was accused of manipulating promotions among senior admirals of the Ecuadorean Navy. Minister of Defense Wellington Sandoval stated to *El Comercio* on March 30 that coordination between Ecuador’s military intelligence and the police failed.¹⁶ Sandoval also stated that “we knew that Reyes was in Ecuador frequently.”

On the surface these developments in Ecuador’s civil-military relations suggest that military intelligence did not have confidence that civilian officials of the government could be trusted, since those same officials might compromise the information to the FARC. Dysfunctional civil-military relations can be costly for national defense. It appears that at the decision-making level, the Quito government did not have a smoothly functioning working relationship between Correa, his senior advisors, and the military leadership.¹⁷ Moreover, by April 2008, slightly more than a year in power, he had appointed four defense ministers (the first was killed in a helicopter accident), all innocent about defense strategy. At the same time, the Correa government reoriented the military to social and economic development missions and away from national defense. The reorientation risked weakening the link between defense strategy and military strategy.

The fluid domestic political context of weak intelligence coordination, poor border control, distempers in civil-military relations, and the audacity and professionalism of the Colombian attack, engendered strategic surprise. It may also have had the psychological impact of humiliating Correa, leading him to act tough abroad in order to be respected at home. A preventive strike could not be expected to be welcome by Ecuador, as the British strategic analyst Colin S. Gray asserts: “A state and society militarily bested in a surprise assault cannot be assumed to be willing to cooperate with the victorious power of the preventor.”¹⁸ This was

not the first time that Colombia had inserted forces in Ecuador. For example, in January 2006, Colombian planes entered Ecuadorean airspace to pursue a FARC column reputedly containing Raúl Reyes. Uribe declared at the time: “Our Public Force entered Ecuador involuntarily in order to prevent the FARC terrorist group, in violation of Ecuadorean territory, from continuing to launch attacks to kill our soldiers and police . . . in addition to doing damage to our civilian citizens.”¹⁹ Ecuador recalled its ambassador to Bogotá for consultations. In recent years there were numerous violations by Colombian aircraft. Thus, the two countries developed a pattern of responses that served to weaken the trust between them, without developing some institutionalized method for dealing with the incursions and the potential for miscalculation, or worse yet ceding the initiative to the FARC.

While Colombia was succeeding in driving the FARC to the uninhabited southeastern portion of the country closing its lines of communication, statesmen in Ecuador saw the impact differently, more displaced people as refugees and more FARC crossings, and growing Colombian power against weak Ecuador. The declining trust between the two capitals was also evident in the dispute over the spraying of diluted glyphosate by Colombian aircraft to eliminate coca plantations adjacent to the Ecuadorean border. The dispute culminated in studies and counter studies, and rhetorical threats by Correa, even though the spraying aircraft maintained a 10 kilometer distance from the border.²⁰

The attack of March 1 may have humiliated Ecuador because it portrayed its vulnerability to its much stronger neighbor, whose military capabilities had been significantly enhanced by the United States. Therefore, the Colombian attack had a profound psychological impact on the political balance within Ecuador, one that strengthened the popularity of Correa, and led to soul-searching among the political class and intellectual community. The debate over the release of intelligence about FARC related activities shed light on failures of national security decision-making at the highest levels.

Colombia’s Case, Chávez, and Ecuador

Colombia has been assailed for decades by the FARC, who are on the defensive as the result of a vigorous commitment by the government and armed forces. Since the administration of Andrés Pastrana in 1998, Colombia has invested heavily in eliminating the twin scourges of terrorism and narcotics, achieving great success in reestablishing security. The public security forces (military and police) were expanded significantly in size, operational capability, and professionalism. By 2007 Colombia had greater security over the national territory, thanks to implementing the plan called Democratic Security and Defense Policy. Some 30,000 illegal paramilitary forces accepted demilitarization and demobilization. Approximately 10,800 FARC combatants remained in the organization, down from 16,800 in 2002. Security improvements were impressive: 80 percent reductions in kidnappings, 40 percent in homicides, terrorist attacks declined from 1645 in 2002 to 349 in 2007; the murder rate was the lowest in 20 years, and the area of coca cultivation reduced from 163,289 hectares in 2000 to 77,870 in 2006. Moreover, 2.3 million Colombians rose out of poverty. With this momentum of strategic and operational success, the attack on the Reyes camp was immensely popular in Colombia, and would soon be followed by the elimination of other FARC leaders.

The support of the international community in fighting terrorism is mandated by the United Nations and makes superb sense in Latin America. The FARC are terrorists to the United States, the European Union, and Colombia, but neither the OAS nor most Latin American countries have declared them so. The ambivalence is demonstrated strikingly by the posture of Hugo Chávez, who has imperial ambitions fed by petrodollars at 130 dollars per barrel in mid 2008.

Chávez had campaigned internationally to have the FARC recognized as “belligerents.” Captured Reyes computer files show that Chávez may have offered to send up to 300 million dollars to the FARC, coordinated diplomatic moves with them, provided guns and ammunition, as well as sanctuary within Venezuela.²¹ Colombian Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos asserted: “What they (the computer files) show is that the level of cooperation was much more than we had earlier estimated, we knew there was a level of cooperation, but not as intense, not as close and not as effective as we’re now seeing.”²² Moreover, administrative shabbiness and corruption last year allowed some 270 tons of cocaine to pass through Venezuela bound for the United States and Europe. In reaction to the Colombian strike, Chávez ordered 10 battalions and tanks to the Colombian border. Few of the units made it because of the deplorable condition of Venezuela’s military. Uribe coolly ordered no military response, instead he threatened to haul Chávez to the International Criminal Court for aiding terrorism.

The western part of the 590 kilometer Ecuador-Colombia border is economically dynamic. The heavily forested eastern end of Ecuador has never been controlled, allowing drug traffickers, criminals, and contrabandists to move freely in crossing the San Miguel and Putumayo rivers. It is classical ungoverned space where criminals exploit the lack of state presence and security.²³ The narcotics economy across the river in Colombia provided opportunities for Ecuadorean peasants to make money and easy FARC infiltration of the border populations. The International Crisis Group reported in March 2008 that Ecuador is a transit and storage point for Colombian and Peruvian drugs, for the passage of precursor chemicals, and a money-laundering platform because of the dollarized economy.²⁴

In 2005 the Ecuadorean armed forces found some 25 illegal border crossing points. Ecuadoreans claim that the same 25 illegal crossings should have been known to Colombian authorities. The adjacent Colombian departments of Nariño and Putumayo saw a veritable explosion of coca plantings since the 1990s, increasing the competition between the FARC and paramilitary forces.

Given these considerations, Ecuador’s unpreparedness for the incident of March 1 was surprising. The long-term commitment of Colombian governments to eliminate narcotics and terrorists and given the repeated FARC intrusions, incidents of hot pursuit by the Colombian armed forces, the number of FARC camps destroyed within Ecuador, the level of diplomatic interaction with the United States on Ecuador’s regional security, and the intense political-diplomatic-military learning issuing from the 1995 war with Peru, should have prepared Ecuador’s statesmen to manage the eventuality of a serious crisis.

Perspectives from Ecuador

Ecuador’s dynamic and loquacious president, Rafael Correa, is trying to right the ship of a very weak state, a dysfunctional democracy, and sick economy.²⁵ He came to office with a strong mandate in the throes of a deep national crisis which saw eight presidents in the previous 10 years. Armed with a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Illinois, a career in university teaching, a tour as Minister of Economics, and imbued with the concept of a social market economy (as opposed to the neo-liberal market economy), he claims to be launching a peaceful “citizen’s revolution,” as he promotes constitutional reform, and some nebulous “socialism of the 21st century.” The country faces staggering challenges of social exclusion: 56 percent of the people and 80 percent of the Indians live in poverty.²⁶

Ecuador’s former Defense Minister, retired army General Oswaldo Jarrín, eloquently described Ecuador’s internal difficulties in 2004: “High levels of poverty, marginalization, and social exclusion are factors...feed social pressure to obtain more attention to services, opportunities

for work and quality of life, and (create) social frustration which delegitimize already weak institutions and accentuate ungovernability, instability and violence.”²⁷

Responding angrily to the March 1 attack, Correa accused Uribe of lying, broke diplomatic relations, and fulminated against the United States and the international media for its alleged organized campaign against Ecuador. Uribe upheld Colombia’s right to self-defense. The northern border had become increasingly hot with incursions by criminal elements from Colombia. Oswaldo Jarrín reports that an estimated 70 percent of the population of Sucumbíos province conducts commerce with the FARC. To combat the emerging threat the Ecuadorean government implemented border development programs that would provide alternative economic incentives to the local people.

In March 2000, Ecuador’s COSENA analyzed the emerging situation and Plan Colombia and decided to employ preventive diplomacy, “instead of the neorealist confrontational logic, which focuses on solving the problem with force, a control of the situation based on the strategy of influence and the logic of cooperation, within international law and respect for international agreements of which Ecuador is a part.” This posture would guide Ecuadorean foreign policy and defense strategy. For its part, the United States saw Ecuador as an invaluable ally in the counternarcotics crusade, and a partner with Colombia. As will be seen later, American law prevented Washington from providing essential security assistance at a critical moment in Ecuador’s developing weakness.

Referring to the relationship between the two countries, Colombia’s leading strategic analyst, Alfredo Rangel Suárez, calls it a “dialogue of the deaf,” especially for the last 3 years. Rangel’s criticism does not speak well for the academic communities and decisional elites in each country. Eduardo Posada Carbó, one of Colombia’s leading historians, admonishes: “We need to know Ecuador better, a task that should be better handled by our universities, think tanks, and the press.”

Ecuador has taken the principled position that Colombia’s conflict is to be solved by Colombians, that the FARC are irregular forces rather than terrorists. The international law distinction is, argues Ecuador, that to call them terrorists would be intervention in the internal affairs of Colombia and risk reprisal by the FARC.

Ecuador’s position progressively hardened as its internal troubles became more acute. It seems that the Ecuadorean government has magnified its weakness (it ranked as the eighth most corrupt country in 2007). For example, Quito said even before Correa was elected, that the agreement allowing the United States to use a small section of Eloy Alfaro air base at Manta for counternarcotics reconnaissance flights (which helped intercept nearly 208 tons of cocaine in 2007) would not be renewed in 2009. Ecuador’s foreign policy has held the strategically innocent view that the U.S. supported Plan Colombia threatens the security of Ecuador. Correa made a statement on March 15 that defied comprehension: “. . . Ecuadoreans shouldn’t be surprised that there is a plan to destabilize the government and establish a puppet (titere) government which would lend itself to involve the country in the Colombian war and be an associate and an accomplice of the government of Uribe.”

Plan Colombia is designed to promote security, economic development, and justice--achievements which would benefit Ecuador. These are symmetrical with the goals of Plan Ecuador, which is designed to improve security on the northern border. In sum, Ecuador’s unwillingness to publicly recognize the threat to the Colombian state and society is perceived in Bogotá as sympathy for the FARC. At the same time, Colombia does not recognize, as the

influential Alfredo Rangel Suárez admonishes, that Ecuador has made an immense effort to secure its border far beyond what Colombia has done, and this needs recognition on the part of both the United States and Colombia.

Appearing to weaken Ecuador's pristine defense about the March 1 incident was information found in Reyes's computer: Ecuador's Minister Coordinator of Internal and External Security was negotiating with Reyes. Allegedly, the meeting took place in Venezuela to negotiate the release of hostages, such as the notable Colombian-French citizen, former senator, and candidate for president, Ingrid Betancourt, who would be liberated in a daring rescue in early July. Additional information issuing in May from the Reyes computer files indicated that the FARC had sent \$100,000 to the presidential campaign of Correa, which the latter vehemently denied.

Ecuador has asked the United States to support Plan Ecuador, and requested and got an extension of trade preferences for its products to enter the United States so that farmers do not plant coca. The United States Agency for International Development has been supporting with funds Ecuador's job creation and agricultural programs on the northern border. The United States is also working with the Ecuadorean National Police to strengthen drug law enforcement on the northern border, and to control cargo transiting Ecuador's sea and airports. Similarly, U.S. support goes to the military to provide security on the northern border and to improve communication and cooperation with the police. The logic of the Ecuadorean position seems confounding. A weak country with extensive trade with friendly Colombia cannot have it both ways, seek the support of the United States, appear to loosen its commitment to fight the narcotics traffic by telling the United States to leave Eloy Alfaro, and assume a position of virtual neutrality without strengthening its border security and military capabilities to deter "irregular forces" from using its territory to attack its neighbor. American officials state that access to Eloy Alfaro is a convenience, not a necessity, hard to replace to be sure, but the real issue will be Ecuador's commitment to fight the narcotics traffic beyond 2009. Ecuadorean officials have reassured that their country will cooperate.

The contradiction of neutrality is articulated by one of Ecuador's finest scholars, Simón Pachano:

The other task, and the most important, is the country's definition of its position on the Colombian conflict. The recent episodes indicate a strictly reactive character, which expresses the absence of a long range strategy. For many years we have taken refuge in neutrality, without understanding that it is an absurdity in terms of principles and the source of practical problems. All of us who at some moment have supported (neutrality) must recognize the error, for the simple fact that a State (sic) cannot be impartial in the face of an attack by an irregular group against another State which it recognizes as legitimate.

While not in the same geopolitical league, Switzerland and Sweden combine principle and power by maintaining robust military capabilities to defend their neutrality. To be sure, the Correa government attempted to respond to the vulnerability of the northern border. Its Plan Ecuador is intended to improve border security by promoting social and economic development.

Ecuador has done much with limited resources. Foreign Minister María Isabel Salvador and Minister of Government Fernando Bustamante declared at Washington's Inter-American Dialogue on March 18 that Ecuador has an impressive record against narcotics and the FARC, and that, moreover, Ecuador has welcomed some 300,000 Colombian refugees, and in the past asked Colombia to take responsibility for the refugees. Ecuador has dismantled 170 FARC

camps, destroyed cocaine labs and coca plantings, and supports the OAS and other international efforts to eliminate narcotics. Foreign Minister Salvador noted that Ecuador places 11 percent of its military and police (11,000) on the border with Colombia, while Colombia a mere 2 percent%. In 2006, Ecuador seized 38 metric tons of cocaine, arrested 3,327 for drug trafficking, and destroyed 114,000 coca plants. In addition, cooperation for counternarcotics, smuggling, and illegal immigration is very good among the Coast Guards of Colombia, Ecuador, and the United States.

The Ecuadorean people are well aware of the price of insecure borders, having ceded considerable territory to Peru and Colombia in the last 2 centuries. In 1941 Ecuador's best troops were kept in Quito while Peruvian troops occupied the southern provinces. Ecuador fought an expensive war in 1995 that led to the final demarcation of the boundary with Peru. Ecuador feels victimized at a time of national weakness by the insensitivity of Colombia's power and by the United States which supports it.

Good Intentions vs. Principled Pragmatism

The attack on Angostura and the response of the parties directly and indirectly involved has enormous significance for peace, security, and development in Latin America and for the United States. States must do more to secure their borders. There ought to be greater awareness about the insidious threat of terrorism and narcotics and their ability to exploit societal and international vulnerabilities, the seams between international law, sovereignty, official corruption, ungoverned space, and weak state capacity.

At some point, the conspiratorial and bullying Chávez imperio will end because of corruption, administrative incompetence, and the democratic yearnings of the Venezuelan people. Venezuela can then resume its role as constructive member of the international community. Colombia seems to be on its way to peace and security, but needs continued support from its neighbors. In the meantime, a blind anti-American and anti-democratic populist rage, fed by dysfunctional state systems, massive poverty, and social exclusion, is alive across a number of countries, complicating the defense agenda of governments, forcing counterproductive compromises between internal and external domains. Populist governments tend to be idealists on national defense, relying on diplomacy and "development" to solve conflict, often running away from the deterrent potential of the military instrument, while making deals with the devil and distancing themselves from the United States. Such governments tend to focus the military on internal development programs rather than external defense, precisely Correa's pattern. An astute analyst of contemporary civil-military relations in Latin America adds:

Without an external threat to focus on, civilian politicians in a democracy typically assign defense issues a low priority in favor of economic and political ones that will bring tangible electoral returns. Also, militaries with histories of political autonomy and intervention are reluctant to share defense information with civilian politicians, let alone educate them about these issues, for fear of generating alternative sources of power that could threaten their corporate interests.

Correa's populist definition of the national defense problem at the border can be gleaned from an interview with Bogotá's *Semana* magazine of April 20, 2008:

Colombia does not take care of its southern border, it's a deliberate strategy to involve us in Plan Colombia. A great part of the population, especially in

the Amazon, supports the FARC because the Colombian and the Ecuadorean state is not there and those who provide work to the people (drugs, etc.) are the FARC. How do you stop it? Uribe thinks it's by bombing. Our strategy is human development in the region.

The statement once again misinterpreted Plan Colombia and overlooked the fact that the FARC forces peasants into the illegal drugs economy. Moreover, a realistic view would have seen that the Colombia-Ecuador distemper of March 2008 has been brewing for years, because Colombia's neighbors have not secured their borders, and because the FARC would seek refuge in Ecuador and Venezuela if pressure increased in Colombia, and that "human development" is impossible without security. The contrasting views on security underscore that the eloquent declarations of the triumph of peace and diplomacy at the OAS and at the Group of Rio Summit and the handshakes between Uribe, Correa, and Chávez are very much part of Latin American strategic culture, but they leave unfinished the tasks of border security and dealing with the insidious penetration of terrorism, drugs, dirty money, contraband, and international organized crime. The Latin American states need to find common ground between fundamentally different views on what constitutes terrorism versus legitimate political activity. As Uribe stated at the Group of Rio Summit:

It surprises me that they speak of the violation of the sovereign territory of Ecuador, but not of the violation of the sovereignty of the people of Colombia. To speak of territorial sovereignty you have to speak of the other sovereignty, which is more important than the territorial, which is the right of a people not to be attacked.

Uribe was enunciating a new concept of sovereignty, a concept that has not taken root in the ministries and the intelligentsia of Latin America. Terrorism cannot be liberation or irregular warfare to one legitimate democratic government and crime to another. Governments should defend coherent principles in foreign and defense policies, because they all benefit from international order. They must take seriously the combustible combination of drugs, terrorists, at times supported by extreme leftist social protest groups masquerading as nationalists, human rights movements, and legitimate democratic forces while threatening fundamental security and democracy.

Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, and Venezuela should create effective mechanisms for dealing with border security, international crime, and terrorism. A potentially useful initiative is Brazil's proposal for a South American Defense Council. Defense Minister Nelson Jobim stated in the aftermath of the crisis that its purpose would be to strengthen military cooperation and to prevent situations like the Colombian-Ecuador incident. Brazil, with some 15,000 kilometers of practically undefended borders with 10 countries, has a lot at stake. Though various countries signed up for the Defense Council at the May 2008 meeting of the presidents of South America in Brasilia, a number of knotty issues must be resolved. What are the threats that would agglutinate the Defense Council? Unless a majority of members recognize terrorism and drug trafficking as the main threats, what other threats would cause common action? Furthermore, are the members willing to invest in organizing and integrating forces, managing intelligence, training, equipment, and in establishing a political-military command and control system among governments who, in many cases, do not trust each other, especially for ideological reasons? Unless these matters are effectively dealt with, the South American Defense Council might become what one Latin American senior officer termed an opportunity for "diplomatic tourism."

The regional community has an effective mechanism retrievable from its historical memory: the Military Observer Mission Ecuador/Peru (MOMEPE). MOMEPE is one of the most successful peacekeeping efforts ever undertaken. Constituted by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States, it supervised the separation of forces and demilitarization of the zone of conflict after the 1995 war between Ecuador and Peru, and helped establish the conditions for the Peace of Brasilia of 1998, thereby ending a centuries-old conflict. A Brazilian general commanded MOMEPE. A similar arrangement should be possible for the Colombian-Ecuador border, under OAS auspices and perhaps rotating command among Latin American countries, to deal with irregular forces.

The United States: The Price of Noble Intentions

For its part, the United States needs to demonstrate greater sensitivity and respond effectively to the legitimate security needs of regional partners who face a complex blend of threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. The United States is the anchor of international order and of regional security architecture that includes Colombia and Ecuador, but American law and competing global priorities prevented Ecuador from receiving military assistance, except for counternarcotics purposes. Accordingly, Ecuador's current defense vulnerabilities can be partly attributed to the U.S. failure to provide much needed assistance in the form of logistics. In 2006 Ecuador offered to purchase two C130 transport aircraft, boats, troop transports, and equipment for telephone interception from the United States, but was turned down. An editorial in *Diario Expreso* on July 26, 2006, astutely stated that Ecuador "should not ask for but demand" such support because it would benefit Ecuador, Colombia, and the United States. The equipment would have helped Ecuador respond more quickly to FARC incursions. Later in January 2007, Ecuador would lose two of its functioning helicopters when they collided, killing Defense Minister Guadalupe Larriva, her daughter, and five crew members. On April 17, 2008, Correa, saying that previous governments had "satanized" purchasing equipment for the military, announced the purchase of 24 Super Tucanos and radar to help secure the northern border. On May 28, the Commander of the army announced that the government would allocate 57 million dollars over 3 years to improve capabilities to patrol the border.

The American contribution to Ecuador's weakness originates from having to make tough choices about how to apportion its support in the face of competing regional and global priorities. There were also legal impediments from two directions: (1) The American Service Members Protection Act (ASPA) of 2002, followed by the Nethercutt amendment of 2004 ; and (2) The Rome Treaty giving the International Criminal Court, which came into being after the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals after World War II and received new life after the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, jurisdiction over persons committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

ASPA excluded foreign military personnel from receiving U.S. military assistance unless the affected country signed a bilateral agreement with the United States, permitted under Article 98 of the Rome Treaty, which would exempt American military personnel from the jurisdiction of the foreign country's court system. Nethercutt went further, prohibiting countries that ratified the Rome Treaty and had not signed an Article 98 agreement from receiving Economic Support Funds, money that went to counterterrorism, peace programs, and anti-drug trafficking. The weak government in Ecuador, feeling pressure from the left and having second thoughts on the rent-free U.S. access agreement to Eloy Alfaro, refused to sign the bilateral agreement, thereby triggering U.S. sanctions. In October 2006, President George W. Bush signed a waiver that excluded 14 countries, 11 in Latin America, including Brazil and Ecuador, from the provisions

of Article 98. The Defense Authorization Bill of 2007 rescinded the provisions of ASPA. But damage favorable to international disorder had been done. Washington's tied hands not only weakened American influence, it weakened the perilous condition of the Ecuadorean state and its ability to deal with the complex security problems of the 21st century.

The unintended consequences of virtuous intentions were a blow against American interests in Latin America at a notably sensitive period when populist governments of the left needed a foreign antagonist to solidify their domestic political base, for example: the emerging chaotic politics that Correa inherited. The perception that American military personnel have immunity from prosecution for crimes against human rights is difficult to rebut in such circumstances (especially at a time that violations by military personnel at Abu Ghraib and the symbolism of Guantanamo damaged America's moral standing), even if a state has a status of forces agreement with the United States. Colombia, which had such agreement with the United States dating back to the 1960s, saw the advantage of a new Article 98 based bilateral arrangement and signed one, despite significant political opposition within Colombia.

Such legal impediments hardly make sense when the United States needs Ecuador as a front line state in the battle against narcotics and terrorism. There is a contradiction: the United States needs the FOL at Eloy Alfaro for counternarcotics reconnaissance flights to complement a contribution from Ecuador across the spectrum of counternarcotics and counterterrorism, but is constrained to meet Ecuador's legitimate defense needs. Therefore, to some degree, American reticence in providing military assistance contributed to the FARC's ease in establishing camps in Ecuador. At that critical juncture, the Ecuadorean army lacked logistical and communications capabilities, having only one helicopter to transport troops to the border. Yet, the United States, for good reasons that matured into a close alliance, had to support Colombia in combating terrorism and narcotics. The asymmetry in power that ensued over time between Colombia and Ecuador did not help American credibility in Quito, given that government's stated opposition to Plan Colombia, and especially as the coalition of support for Colombia and the United States weakened under the onslaught of populism, an uninformed and idealistic antimilitarism within Ecuadorean academic and intellectual circles, chavismo, self-inflicted wounds by U.S. foreign policy, and the insensitivity in Bogotá to Ecuador's internal dysfunctions. Washington is often unaware of the immense power the United States wields, even if our intentions are noble, especially when such power affects small countries such as Ecuador, where programs of security assistance matter greatly. A good dose of principled pragmatism and smart power is in order.

In the short term, the United States can be an indirect catalyst for confidence-building between Colombia and Ecuador. Given the asymmetries in power and Ecuador's sense of victimization, Colombia will have to take the initiative with Ecuador. Both the United States and Colombia can do more to address Ecuador's concerns. The countries of the region must develop a clearer understanding that intrastate conflict, provoked by illegal actors, can escalate to interstate conflict. Countries must be alert with preventive diplomacy and render more effective the existing international agreements, so that international tensions do not become a platform which benefits illegal transnational groups.

A final reflection takes us beyond the Amazon. The events of March 1, 2008, signify that wars without borders are different from the wars of the past. The wars fought by terrorists and irregular forces avoid battles. They target civilians and control territory by fear, hate, corruption, and by population displacement. They are wars without geographic, legal, and moral constraints. The new wars pit the state against criminals, but the state must be the authoritative defender of standards of legality and human decency. Clausewitz was right that war is the continuation of politics (or policy) by other means. However, the politics have changed while the means,

particularly the analytical and institutional capacities of governments, have not caught up to that change. Unfortunately, ungoverned space is matched by ungoverned space in the human intellect and in the ministries of government.

Endnotes

1. Paul W. Drake and Eric Herschberg, eds., *State and Society in Conflict: Comparative Perspectives on Andean Crises*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006.
2. The Super Tucanos later became a matter of dispute between Ecuador and Colombia. The Ecuadorean government would sustain that the Super Tucanos could not fire precision guided bombs because they were not configured to do so, that thus a third country (implying the United States) was involved. American officials denied involvement. The maker, EMBRAER, says that the aircraft can be armed with air to ground bombs. The bombs were American made.
3. Details on the aircraft are found in Richard Lugar, "Playing With Fire: Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela," Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, April 28, 2008, p. 26.
4. Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega also blasted away at Colombia. Potential reasons: to support oil bearing Chávez and to gain leverage against Colombia over jurisdiction to Caribbean islands and maritime space.
5. Sibylla Brodzinsky, "Rebel camp remains reflect fierce attack," *MiamiHerald.com*, March 11, 2008, www.miamiherald.com/558/v-print/story/448770.html.
6. Sergio Gómez Maseri, "OEA logró un consenso para superar la crisis diplomática entre Colombia y Ecuador"), *El Tiempo*, March 18, 2008, www.eltiempo.com/politica/2008-03.
7. Preemptive vs. preventive military measures are often subjective judgments about the immanence of the threat, while precautionary measures are long term. Both require excellent intelligence. A preemptive attack is offensive in nature and designed to neutralize an immanent threat, while the preventive is defensive, allowing more time to take measures. These distinctions are developed by Colin S. Gray, "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration," Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2007.
8. International Crisis Group, "Colombia's Borders: The Weak Link in Uribe's Security Policy," *Latin America Report No. 9*, September 23, 2004.
9. Juan Forero, "Colombia's Rebels Face Possibility of Implosion," *Washington Post*, March 22, 2008, p. A22, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/21/AR2008032103536_p.
10. "Tirofijo está muerto"), *Semana*, May 24, 2008, www.semana.com/wf_ImprimirArticulo.aspx?IdArt=112103&Ver=k7wf0st972768.
11. Unidad Investigativa, *El Tiempo.Com*, March 29, 2008, www.eltiempo.com/justicia/2008-03-30.
12. There exists a mechanism for military cooperation on border security between Ecuador and Colombia: COMBIFRON. However, the two militaries do not conduct coordinated or combined military operations, though the two ministers of defense Camilo Ospina Bernal (Colombia) and General (ret) Oswaldo Jarrín (Ecuador), agreed in January 2006 "on the importance and necessity to cooperate with all the security organs to implement new and better controls on the entry of chemical precursors, arms, munitions and explosives into the respective countries." See: "Declaración Conjunta de los Ministros de Defensa de Colombia y Ecuador", Bogotá, January 12, 2006, resdal.org/ultimos-documentos/decla-ene06.
13. "Relación Ecuador-Colombia: Esmeraldas: pueblos fronterizos, tierra de nadie", *Hoy*, April 5, 2008, www.hoy.com.ec/impnoticia.asp?row=292584.
14. "FFAA activan sistema de defensa antiaéreo: El gabinete de Palacio se reunió para analizar la incursión de Colombia . . .", *Hoy*, February 1, 2006.
15. "Acosta pide información veraz de las FF. AA.," *elcomercio.com*, March 21, 2008, www.elcomercio.com/imprensa.asp?id_noticia=115923&medio=EC.
16. Arturo Torres, "Sabíamos que Reyes pasaba a Ecuador," *elcomercio.com*, March 31, 2008, www2.elcomercio.com/imprensa.asp?id_noticia=11737&medio=EC.
17. Simón Pachano, "Pluma y Pistola," *El Universo*, April 14, 2008, w.eluniverso.com/2008/04/14/0001/21.
18. Colin S. Gray, "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines," p. 18.

19. Alfredo Rangel Suárez, "Colombia y Ecuador: dos visiones de seguridad, una frontera," Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, www.seguridadydemocracia.or, p. 16.

20. For the great glyphosate debate of 2007, see Gabriel Marcella, "American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment," Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2007, pp. 29-34. The Ecuadorean charge contradicts the results of research conducted by a team of Canadian, Spanish, English, and Brazilian scientists. See Keith R. Solomon, Arturo Anadón, Antonio Luiz Cerdeira, John Marshall, and Luz-Helena Sanín, Environmental and Human Health Assessment of the Aerial Spray Program for Coca and Poppy Control in Colombia, report prepared for the Inter-American Drug Control Commission (CICAD) section of the Organization of American States, Washington, DC, March 25, 2003, pp.11-12. It states:

The risk assessment concluded that glyphosate . . . as used in the eradication program in Colombia did not represent a significant risk to human health . . . Considering the effects of the entire cycle of coca and poppy production and eradication, clear-cutting and burning, and displacement of the natural flora and fauna were identified as the greatest environmental risks and are considerably more important than those from the use of glyphosate.

Ecuador rejected the CICAD report and produced its own, which rendered a contrary judgment. Glyphosate is used in both Colombia and Ecuador, and worldwide, as an herbicide. CICAD reported that 10-14 percent of the total amount of glyphosate used in Colombia is employed in the eradication of coca plants.

21. Juan Forero, "Venezuela Offered Aid to Colombian Rebels," WashingtonPost.com, May 15, 200, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/14/AR2008051403785; "Los E-mails secretos," Semana.com, May 18, 2008, www.semana.com/wf_ImprimirArticulo.aspx?IdArt=111918&Ver=rZSCLcJm1.

22. Forero, "Venezuela Offered Aid," p. 2.

23. For an analysis of the strategic relevance of ungoverned space, see Angel Rabassa et al., *Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007.

24. International Crisis Group, "Latin American Drugs 1: Losing the Fight," *Crisis Group Latin American Report* No. 25, March 14, 2008, p. 17.

25. Correa once declared President Bush "dumb" and "calling him the devil offends the devil." Ecuador's political crisis is well described by Simón Pachano, "Ecuador: The Provincialization of Representation," in Scott Mainwaring, Ana María Bejarano, Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, eds., *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 100-131. See also Thomas C. Bruneau, "Ecuador: The Continuing Challenge of Democratic Consolidation and Civil-Military Relations," *Strategic Insights*, February 2006; Allen Gerlach, *Indians, Oil, And Politics: A Recent History of Ecuador*, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003. The most complete analysis of Ecuador's crisis and the Correa political program is International Crisis Group, "Ecuador: Overcoming Instability?" *Latin America Report* Number 22, Brussels, August 7, 2007.

26. Correa's economic thinking can be found in his book, *La vulnerabilidad de la economía ecuatoriana: hacia una mayor política económica para la generación de empleo, reducción de pobreza y desigualdad*, Quito, Programa de la Naciones Unidas Para el Desarrollo, 2004.

27. Oswaldo Jarrín, "La Junta de Seguridad Ciudadana: El Caso Sucumbíos," *Nueva Sociedad*, No. 191, May-June 2004, p. 147.

PROVIDE US YOUR INPUT

To help you access information quickly and efficiently, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) posts all publications, along with numerous other useful products, on the CALL website. The CALL website is restricted to U.S. government and allied personnel.

PROVIDE FEEDBACK OR REQUEST INFORMATION

<<http://call.army.mil>>

If you have any comments, suggestions, or requests for information (RFIs), use the following links on the CALL home page: “RFI or CALL Product” or “Contact CALL.”

**PROVIDE OBSERVATIONS, INSIGHTS, AND LESSONS (OIL) OR
SUBMIT AN AFTER ACTION REVIEW (AAR)**

If your unit has identified lessons learned or OIL or would like to submit an AAR, please contact CALL using the following information:

Telephone: DSN 552-9569/9533; Commercial 913-684-9569/9533

Fax: DSN 552-4387; Commercial 913-684-4387

NIPR e-mail address: call.rfimanager@conus.army.mil

SIPR e-mail address: call.rfiagent@conus.army.mil

Mailing Address:

**Center for Army Lessons Learned
ATTN: OCC, 10 Meade Ave., Bldg. 50
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350**

TO REQUEST COPIES OF THIS PUBLICATION

If you would like copies of this publication, please submit your request at: <<http://call.army.mil>>. Use the “RFI or CALL Product” link. Please fill in all the information, including your unit name and official military address. Please include building number and street for military posts.

PRODUCTS AVAILABLE “ONLINE”

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Access and download information from CALL’s website. CALL also offers Web-based access to the CALL Archives. The CALL home page address is:

<<http://call.army.mil>>

CALL produces the following publications on a variety of subjects:

- **Combat Training Center Bulletins, Newsletters, and Trends**
- **Special Editions**
- *News From the Front*
- **Training Techniques**
- **Handbooks**
- **Initial Impressions Reports**

You may request these publications by using the “RFI or CALL Product” link on the CALL home page.

**COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC)
Additional Publications and Resources**

The CAC home page address is:

<<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/index.asp>>

Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS)

BCKS supports the online generation, application, management, and exploitation of Army knowledge to foster collaboration among Soldiers and units in order to share expertise and experience, facilitate leader development and intuitive decision making, and support the development of organizations and teams. Find BCKS at <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/bcks/index.asp>>.

Center for Army Leadership (CAL)

CAL plans and programs leadership instruction, doctrine, and research. CAL integrates and synchronizes the Professional Military Education Systems and Civilian Education System. Find CAL products at <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cal/index.asp>>.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI)

CSI is a military history think tank that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp>>.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) <<http://www.usapa.army.mil>> or the Reimer Digital Library <<http://www.adtdl.army.mil>>.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at <<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/>>.

Military Review (MR)

MR is a revered journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview/index.asp>>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas. Find TRISA Threats at <<https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx>> (requires AKO password and ID).

Combined Arms Center-Capability Development Integration Directorate (CAC-CDID)

CAC-CDIC is responsible for executing the capability development for a number of CAC proponent areas, such as Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Computer Network Operations, among others. CAC-CDID also teaches the Functional Area 30 (Information Operations) qualification course. Find CAC-CDID at <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cdid/index.asp>>.

U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps COIN Center acts as an advocate and integrator for COIN programs throughout the combined, joint, and interagency arena. Find the U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps COIN Center at: <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/index.asp>>.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

JCISFA's mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence. Find JCISFA at <<https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx>>.

Support CAC in the exchange of information by telling us about your successes so they may be shared and become Army successes.

Center for Army Lessons Learned

10 Meade Avenue, Building 50
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350
<http://call.army.mil>



**US Army
Combined
Arms Center**

"Intellectual Center of the Army"

www.leavenworth.army.mil

Approved for Public Release,
Distribution Unlimited