



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**CAN LOCAL POLICE AND SHERIFFS' DEPARTMENTS  
PROVIDE A HIGHER DEGREE OF HOMELAND  
SECURITY COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION  
THROUGH CONSOLIDATION OF POLICE SERVICES?**

by

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September 2010

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**CAN LOCAL POLICE AND SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENTS PROVIDE A  
HIGHER DEGREE OF HOMELAND SECURITY COORDINATION AND  
COLLABORATION THROUGH CONSOLIDATION OF POLICE SERVICES?**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

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(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
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## **ABSTRACT**

Police consolidation is examined in this thesis because it fits with the homeland security mission of integrating and coordinating intelligence information, standardizing policies, procedures, and training, leveraging police resources in combating terrorism, while working to create a uniform response system to major police incidents. Though this thesis has a special focus on San Mateo County, California, the makeup of the San Mateo County system of small jurisdictional policing within specific boundaries is replicated throughout the United States. The claim of this thesis is in order to provide integrated homeland security protection to communities; cities must abandon decentralization for consolidated policing. This thesis will use a comparative case study model and policy options analysis to examine the benefits of police consolidation. The overarching theme is this country continues to face challenging threats against determined terrorist and local police agencies have an obligation to become an integral part of the homeland security mission. To fulfill that obligation, cities must explore abandoning the current fragmented system of policing for a system that promotes coordination of intelligence, uniformity of policy and procedures, standardization of training, comprehensive prevention plans and unified response procedures that address the unique challenges facing police in the twenty-first century.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

|       |                                                  |
|-------|--------------------------------------------------|
| AISO  | Australian Security Intelligence Organization    |
| BJS   | Bureau of Justice Statistics                     |
| CAD   | Computer Aided Dispatch                          |
| CPO   | Community Service Officer                        |
| CSIS  | Canadian Security Intelligence Service           |
| CSO   | Community Service Officer                        |
| DCRG  | Directorate Central General Intelligence         |
| DCRI  | Direction Centrale de Renseignement Interieuror  |
| DHS   | Department of Homeland Security                  |
| DOJ   | Department of Justice                            |
| DUI   | Driving Under the Influence                      |
| DST   | Directorate if Territorial Surveillance          |
| FBI   | Federal Bureau of Investigations                 |
| FTE   | Fulltime Equivalent                              |
| GPS   | Global Positioning Device                        |
| GTF   | Gang Task Force                                  |
| ILP   | Intelligence-Led Policing                        |
| IT    | Information Technology                           |
| JPA   | Joint Powers Act                                 |
| JTTF  | Joint Terrorism Task Force                       |
| K-9   | Canine                                           |
| LEA   | Law Enforcement Agency                           |
| LETPP | Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program     |
| MDT   | Mobile Dispatch Terminal                         |
| MOU   | Memorandum of Understanding                      |
| NCRIC | Northern California Regional Intelligence Center |
| NJSP  | New Jersey State Police                          |
| NRT   | Neighborhood Response Team                       |
| OHS   | Office of Homeland Security                      |
| PAL   | Police Activities League                         |

|       |                                               |
|-------|-----------------------------------------------|
| POA   | Police Officers Association                   |
| PER   | Parking Enforcement Representative            |
| PERS  | Public Employees Retirement System            |
| RCMP  | Royal Canadian Mounted Police                 |
| RMS   | Report Management System                      |
| SNARE | SafetyNet Automated Report Exchange           |
| STTAC | State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center      |
| STTAS | State Terrorism Threat Assessment System      |
| SUASI | Super Urban Area Security Initiative          |
| SWAT  | Special Weapons and Tactics                   |
| SWOT  | Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats |
| TEWG  | Terrorism Early Warning Group                 |
| TOCA  | Theory of Cooperative Advantage               |
| U.S   | United States                                 |

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# **I. INTRODUCTION**

## **A. PROBLEM STATEMENT**

In *Physics and Philosophy* (1943), Sir James Jean stated in regard to new ideas:

They usually advance by a succession of small steps, through a fog in which even the most keen-sighted explorer can seldom see more than a few steps ahead. Occasionally the fog lifts and, an eminence is gained, and a wider stretch of territory can be surveyed-sometimes with startling results.

This thesis will explore the possibility of policing society in a different way. It will examine the changing world of globalization and the impacts on local communities that globalization brings. There is a fog of fragmented policing that is currently lifting in society, and we can now see a different and startling horizon of future terrorist attacks that may dictate a change in the traditional way local communities police themselves.

Terrorist plots and criminal activity can be stopped by police through a tight web of information sharing, ongoing analysis, and response planning; yet police departments, like those in San Mateo County and around the United States, are losing their flexibility to respond to the ever-changing needs placed upon them. Police departments are being stretched to address gang issues, an increase in violence due to drugs, and the need to prevent terrorism, while at the same time police budgets are being slashed due to rising costs of personnel and a serious prolonged economic downturn.

The duplication of police services in San Mateo County and around the United States hinders the ability of cities to effectively share information and prevent terrorist acts or other criminal behavior. Currently, in San Mateo County there are 19 municipal police departments and one sheriff's office providing police services throughout the county. Like many counties throughout the U.S., San Mateo County is still exploring the best way to share intelligence information to stop crime patterns before they proliferate. Cities in San Mateo County like others throughout the U.S. are experiencing severe financial difficulties that are forcing them to provide basic police services or look for alternative ways to police their cities. For example, the San Carlos Police Department

just took bids to outsource police services because of the severe financial burden a standalone police department brings upon a city. Four other police departments are also exploring a different policing model because of financial hardships. Though currently driven by a poor economy, cities must also explore the possible homeland security advantages that police consolidation may yield.

The structure of police departments in San Mateo County is representative of those that are typically found nationwide. All 20 departments have their own chief/sheriff and command staff. Fifteen out of the 20 also have their own dispatch center, records division, investigations bureau, training program, and patrol division. Many agencies have their own special weapons and tactics, gang, and narcotics units. These systems of policing as represented by the San Mateo County model are found in counties all across the United States.

The duplication of police services throughout the country may be acting as a barrier to a superior method of crime fighting, which would include a more uniform, systematic, and cost-effective approach to securing communities against the variety of today's threats. This duplication can hinder coordination by agencies that should be working to leverage resources in order to provide the highest and greatest service to the community. The current approach to policing has failed to take into consideration that crime is not static within city boundaries, but rather criminals and crime move from city to city. Coordination of police services across these boundaries is essential to crime fighting. Without a coordinated approach to information sharing, intelligence, response planning, and training, communities and their populations are left vulnerable to continued victimization by criminals who traverse those city borders.

Historically, the cities within San Mateo County have had moderate crime rates and enjoyed the success of a high degree of apprehension and prosecution. They have also enjoyed a great spirit of cooperation that appears to exceed that found in other jurisdictions. However, with the advent of ongoing domestic and foreign terrorist threats, gang issues, and prolific narcotics distribution in the United States, police departments are being asked to do more with fewer personnel.

Counties like San Mateo are small enough that it should examine the possibility of being policed by one law enforcement agency. San Mateo County's population is currently 712,690, with 266,797 housing units (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). The land mass consists of 449 square miles with an average population of 1,575 per square mile (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002). San Mateo County is among the most 20 affluent counties in the United States, in terms of personal, per capita, and household income (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). Though San Mateo County is a wealthy county, all but one of the 20 law enforcement agencies is currently considering serious police budget cuts.

The 20 law enforcement agencies in San Mateo County employ 1,196 law enforcement officers at an annual cost to the tax payers of approximately \$280,000,000. (Information was obtained from department budgets). According to department budgets, this equates to 2.71 officers per 1000 residents in the county. Do these departments, with an annual total cost of \$280,000,000, provide the highest and best homeland security levels to the community? It is important to remember that currently, due in large part to the fact that there are 20 individual agencies, that there is no established procedure to determine the overall law enforcement goals in the county. Likewise, there is not a method in place to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement as a group in San Mateo County. Effective and efficient policing in the county would involve intelligence sharing that leads to the early apprehension of criminals, reduction in crime rates, a reduction in gang activity, reductions in narcotics usage and drug related crimes, a decrease in police response times, positive public perception about crime, and terrorism preparedness to name a few. Without a way to collectively measure the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts in the county, there is no way to determine if tax payers are getting the best deal for their tax dollars. This policing method is not unique to the county of San Mateo but rather is repeated all across the United States.

Currently, city budget cuts related to police are not one-time cost cutting but rather long-term reductions. These cuts are coming at a time when some cities are building new housing projects and business complexes that will further put a strain on reduced forces. As officers get stretched further, they have less time to engage in proactive policing and become reactive. Proactive policing allows officers to deter crime

before it occurs by stopping criminals and arresting them for things like warrants, probation and parole violations. Community oriented policing programs are often the first to be cut when departments start to downsize as every department's first essential duty is to staff patrol so officers can answer calls for service. In the 1990s, for example, most cities were bolstering their community policing programs, with a 30 percent increase in community policing programs from 1997 to 1999 (Hickman & Reaves, 2001). This resulted in an increase nationwide from 21,000 dedicated CPOs to over 113,000 (Hickman & Reaves, 2001). Post 9/11 many cities have suffered severe financial deficits and were forced to eliminate community policing programs to concentrate on calls for service. Cities are now facing new challenges as gangs and drugs proliferate, yet they were forced to cut the services that were in the neighborhoods preventing those illegal activities. These new challenges also include fighting the war on terror.

In his article entitled *Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and Counter-Terrorism After 9/11*, Waxman (2008) recognizes local police play an important part on the war on terror. In *Terror and Consent*, (Bobbitt, 2009), the assertion is made that a state can fail to defeat the enemy, but still achieve victory by fulfilling its goal. The U.S. may never win the war against terrorism, but it can still be victorious by preventing and mitigating the impacts of terrorism. Officers on the streets are in a key position to prevent terrorist from achieving their goals. But since fighting the war on terror is a relatively new concept for many police departments, training officers about how to detect terrorists and respond to terror attacks has become more important to the police mission of providing public safety. Currently in counties across the United States, there is no uniform ongoing training for officers. For example, in San Mateo County, one will find a wide variety of training programs, as in most departments across the United States. Since different neighboring departments have dissimilar training, one will find a variety of techniques deployed when responding to incidents in a county. Though mutual aid is usually available in every county, agencies may not know the other agencies' policies or procedures and follow its own when called to any scene. In San Mateo County, all local law enforcement agencies can switch to a county operated communications channel in order to communicate with each other during a major police

incident. If terrorists were to attack anywhere in San Mateo County, neighboring officers would respond with different training, tactics, policies, and procedures.

For example, if there was a terrorist attack involving an active shooter at a mall in San Mateo, officers in that city would respond with certain and specific tactics to immediately neutralize the threat. Other surrounding police agencies, depending on their training, tactics and policies, may wait for a special weapons and tactics team before entering the mall. This could cause confusion between the agency where the event is occurring and agencies responding from surrounding jurisdictions. The difference can be critical in a terrorist attack or any significant event calling for immediate outside assistance.

In San Mateo County, like most jurisdictions, crime is transitory in nature. Because many criminals are mobile, crimes committed in the city of San Mateo today may be committed in neighboring communities tomorrow. Most counties in the United States currently have no system of data sharing or information sharing that would allow them to track crimes outside individual city borders. Furthermore, there is no viable interlinked communication system that would allow adjacent agencies to know what crime was just committed. If, for example, an officer needs help in a neighboring jurisdiction, the dispatch center from one jurisdiction must call the next jurisdiction to dispatch an officer for help. In fact, neighboring officers may be in a better position to respond to the incident based on where units are around the city borders. As departments are reduced and officers respond from one call for service to the next call for service, they will have less time to interact with the community. In addition, neighboring police officers and officers could potentially lose those bonds with the communities that have served them so well.

In summary, the structure of policing in San Mateo County, and around the United States, has been well established throughout the years but may not meet the demands placed on law enforcement today, including fighting the war on terror. There is a need to determine if existing police resources in San Mateo County and around the United States can be leveraged to provide a better level of service and safety at a more cost-effective price. There is also a need to understand the driving factors that encourage

and discourage consolidation. Though this study focuses on San Mateo County, California, the analysis will be valuable to counties throughout the United States. This is due to the fact that the predominant method of policing throughout the United States is by small police jurisdictions within established city borders. According to Alexander and Mack (2007) 74 percent of police departments in the U.S. have 10 or less officers. These departments for the most part do not have established methods of sharing information to track crimes that could potentially be related. As will be discussed later, intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination to consolidated police departments might be a key role for a local fusion center to play.

## **B. RESEARCH QUESTION**

This thesis will examine the dynamics of how modern-day police departments are structured to determine if the current structure has created a gap in the protection of society. This thesis will attempt to determine if there is a more cost effective way of providing police services in the twenty-first century that also provides a higher degree of capability against the combined threat of terrorism, gangs, narcotics, and the proliferation of violence in today's society.

The primary research question is:

*Can local city police and sheriff's departments provide a higher degree of homeland security coordination and collaboration through consolidation of police services?*

For purposes of this thesis, the term consolidation shall mean the merger, in whole or in part, of police functions between two or more police entities. In order to respond to this primary research question, this thesis will also endeavor to answer the following sub-questions:

- What factors may make consolidation of law enforcement an attractive alternative for cities and counties?
- What factors prevent city and counties from consolidating law enforcement services?
- How can the homeland security intelligence network be enhanced through police consolidation?

- What role could the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC fusion center) play in the consolidation efforts?

### **C. RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE**

This research will explore a critical gap in the modern-day homeland security mission of police departments. Individual police and sheriff's offices in small geographic regions are systems that may have outlived their historically useful life. The fragmentation of policing may be resulting in security gaps that can be or is being exploited by terrorist and other criminals. Lack of communication and cooperation beyond the individual borders of cities can allow criminals to stay at large and avoid capture because resources are not leveraged to maximize intelligence information to track them. The fragmentation of policing in the United States could also be hindering our ability to effectively prevent and respond to acts of terrorism or natural disasters in the United States. The utilization of intelligence-led policing concepts, where more officers are placed in areas of high crime, is difficult to deploy when cities patrol small geographic areas particularly with current budget cuts.

The question that remains is what is the optimal size of a consolidated department? The answer is no one size fits all, but consolidation should take place around similar geographic masses, criminal activity, interest and larger political boundaries like county lines. In San Mateo, California, this would involve developing a metropolitan police force based throughout the entire county. Though those county lines could act as a barrier to intelligence sharing, local fusion centers could play an integral role in closing those gaps once large metropolitan police departments are formed. In other words, if the consolidation concept were to proliferate throughout California based on county lines, fusion centers would be bringing together intelligence information from 58 counties rather than trying to bring together information from well over 400 individual police departments. This would be much more manageable for fusion centers and act to close the intelligence gap between local police departments that could be exploited by terrorist.

This research could have a significant impact on the future of how we police in the United States. This thesis will act to underscore an existing but underutilized model

of policing in America that may be more economical and provide a higher degree of safety to the public. In these very difficult economic times, where police departments are losing critical staffing on the frontlines, this thesis will explore the benefits and detriments of consolidation which should be explored by every police department prior to eliminating front-line officers.

#### **D. ARGUMENT: MAIN CLAIMS, SOLUTIONS, COUNTERARGUMENTS AND CHALLENGES**

In order for law enforcement to more effectively fight terrorism and crime in communities like San Mateo, cities must work to consolidate/regionalize local police departments. The current lack of consolidation has resulted in exploitable gaps in the protection of counties across the United States. These exploitable gaps consist of the following:

- Lack of standard policy or procedures regarding a response to major incidents,
- Minimal interoperability of radio frequencies,
- Minimal unified command capability,
- Marginal sharing and coordination of crime data,
- Unequal training standards for officers in the county
- No common process for intelligence support from fusion centers to the communities they serve, which continue to lack adequate situational awareness.

Gaps are also seen in response times and the ability to leverage resources to fight crime through intelligence-led policing standards.

The reason why this topic is so important, especially today, is that our homeland security system in the United States has been tested and twice failed. The first failure was the unorganized police response to 9/11 and the second was the lack of coordination of police resources in the government's response to Hurricane Katrina. In Hurricane Katrina police response was fragmented due to the lack of interoperable of radios, policy, and procedures, and the lack of coordinated response plans between police agencies. Kettl (2005) stated:

Hurricanes pay no attention to the jurisdictional lines between Louisiana parishes or, for that matter, between the federal, state, and local governments. But terrorists have surely learned. They know about the fragmentation of our system and are planning on exploiting it.

Like these other locations, San Mateo County is not immune to natural disasters or criminal incidents that cross jurisdictional lines. These types of incidents can quickly overwhelm the resources of individual agencies and demand the immediate response of adjoining agencies.

The vast majority of police departments in the United States, including all those in San Mateo County, are too small to respond to a terrorist attack, major crime, or a natural disaster on their own. San Mateo County police departments, like police departments around the country, struggle when they respond to a situation requiring a unified command. This became evident in a recent school bombing in the city of San Mateo that required a multiagency response from many police departments throughout the county. Different departments responded with different policies, procedures and training. If San Mateo experienced a Mumbai type of multi pronged attack, small police agencies would quickly be overwhelmed. With different response procedures in place throughout the county, the opportunity for a strong unified command would be bleak. Officers would do their best to handle the situation, but the system of policing in San Mateo County and throughout the U.S. is simply not built to address these difficult challenges that terrorism events bring. Lack of unified command was also evident in the response to Hurricane Katrina. Former congressman Lee Hamilton, who served on the 9/11 Commission, made it very clear on the government's ability to create a unified command at the site of a disaster when he stated, "We're falling far short of where we would like to be four years after 9/11" (Kettl, 2005).

Kettl (2005) reported that after seeing a documentary on rollover accidents, he just missed witnessing such an accident. What he did witness was an upside down SUV with passengers hanging from their seatbelts. He also witnessed two police officers from different jurisdictions arguing about where the accident actually occurred, as the passengers were literally left hanging (Kettl, 2005). His point was that the passengers in the accident did not care about jurisdiction, but rather that they just wanted help (Kettl,

2005). As an additional demonstration of the problems that can exist between jurisdictional lines, Kettl cited the case of tourists in Louisiana, who, after Katrina, were advised by New Orleans authorities to leave the city via the Crescent City Connection into neighboring Greta City. Once the tourists crossed the bridge, they were met with gunfire over their heads by the Greta City police who were refusing them entry into the city (Kettl, 2005). The boundaries connecting these neighboring jurisdictions in Louisiana became a barrier to a unified response by the government that was sworn to protect them. As evidenced above, when departments cannot respond in a uniform manner they lose the ability to fully protect communities.

### **1. Argument for Police Consolidation**

The concept of police consolidation is not new. In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice saw the fragmented system of policing as a major obstacle to effective law enforcement (U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1967). The commission called upon each law enforcement community to pool resources and consolidates in ways that would provide for the most effective police services to communities (GPO, 1967). Several departments have, in fact, consolidated police resources over the years; with the two most notable are the Las Vegas, Nevada Metropolitan Police and the Jacksonville, Florida Police Department.

The 800,000 law enforcement officers around the country represent the first line of defense against terrorists living in our communities. According to Thompson (2008):

Properly trained and equipped, local police can recognize the ordinary crimes that terrorists inevitably commit in preparation for their attacks - minor traffic violations, coupon fraud, the use of fake IDs—and deal with the terrorist cells well before they are able to strike.

If police departments consolidated there would be uniformity in training, policy and procedures, communication, equipment, and the data collection and analysis processes. Currently, many cities in San Mateo County operate different report management systems that are not effectively linked, although exciting and promising efforts are in place to link them through Coplink technology. This technology has the potential to give all police departments in San Mateo County access to each other's

information. Each city is handicapped in solving and preventing crime by single source report management systems that do not provide the quick analysis needed to identify crime trends in the county. Criminals and terrorists do not stay within borders and, in order to fully understand crime patterns and links between terrorists, cities must be willing to collaborate on the sharing of data to get a broader picture of crime. Cities in close proximity to each other may have similar crimes that are not being linked. In essence each may be holding different pieces of a crime puzzle, but no one city has the ability to put that puzzle together. This allows criminals and possibly terrorist to exploit gaps in intelligence sharing that led to ongoing crime and possible execution of a terrorist plot.

Law enforcement efforts are repeatedly being duplicated and this fragmentation is leading to the disconnection of police services throughout a region. Each city may not need its own chief, dispatch center, detective bureau, patrol division, records unit, and crime analysis unit because it is a waste of money and acts as a barrier to the delivery of coordinated services to the community on a regional basis. This tremendous duplication of resources is resulting in the waste of millions of dollars of tax payer's money that could be better utilized by purchasing state of the art technology that can provide access to information for officers to utilize in the field. Such technology, such as Coplink, already exists and can be readily implemented.<sup>1</sup>

Law enforcement budgets are getting very tight and departments are looking at cutting officer positions to save costs. These cuts usually result in the reduction of frontline services, which directly impacts the safety of communities. This is a dangerous area to make cuts in because it is important to preserve our frontline forces to fight terrorism and crime. In order to properly protect society, departments can be consolidated and management positions can be eliminated to save costs while at the same time promoting efficiencies. Economies of scale can be utilized from the elimination of duplication in overhead and technology that each department is forced to purchase. Though there may not be many current examples of police consolidations, evidence from

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<sup>1</sup> Coplink Solution Suites is software that organizes and rapidly analyzes vast quantities of structured and unrelated data. For more information, see <http://www.coplink.com/>.

the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and the Jacksonville, Florida Police Department demonstrates that consolidation is a viable option that can result in a better policing model.

## **2. Counterarguments to Police Consolidation**

The opponents of consolidation argue that local cities would lose local control of their ability to provide safety to communities. Cities believe that it may cost more in the long run and reduce service levels to the communities that they are charged with protecting.

Though the research does suggest that costs have risen in some consolidation studies, like the Las Vegas Police consolidation, those departments were usually underfunded at the time of consolidation. In other words, they were not providing the community with an adequate level of police protection and the consolidation corrected that problem. The other problem with police consolidation is that it can be very difficult to assess if service was improved or reduced in past consolidation. The research suggests that there are too many factors to take into consideration to fully attribute success or blame of on the consolidation for increased or decreased crime rates. City officials also fear the loss of control over public safety through outsourcing. City councils in San Mateo County have enjoyed a great deal of control over public safety because each has its own police department that can be directed through the city manager of each city. Public safety is the number one priority in most cities so many officials feel that the loss of control over a department can lead to increased safety concerns.

## **3. Challenges**

It may be irresponsible for cities to eliminate police officer positions without determining if police consolidation is a viable option. Further evidence of viability of consolidation is found in a study recently completed where the San Mateo County Sheriff's Department proposed policing a local community for millions of dollars less than the city is currently spending (Munks, 2010). The current system of each city or township having its own police department is rich in history but today makes little fiscal

or service sense. Police are unable to develop widespread crime patterns in counties because of the current fragmented system of policing in the United States.

Better protection of communities is possible through consolidation of police resources, but cities must be willing take a chance on a new way of policing in the twenty-first century. Police consolidation may result in a better response to crime, acts of terrorism, or natural disasters. It could allow for a holistic approach to crime analysis that will result in the intelligence-led policing model of deployment of resources. Consolidation may also allow departments to leverage resources to create a web of police services that will frustrate the movements of criminals and terrorists. The factor that may provide the driving force to the consolidation process today is the bleak financial crisis that cities are currently enduring. Desperate financial situations in the past have brought about change; these difficult financial times might be the force that pushes more cities toward a police consolidation model.

#### **4. A Time for Change**

Law enforcement has entered a time in history where a new norm has emerged. Gone are the days of law enforcement being immune from the budget axe. Data suggest most public safety accounts are over 50 percent of the total of municipal budgets. Law enforcement is being forced to cut like every other department and in many cases more. The new norm in California is the rising cost of public safety and decreasing city revenues. This downward spiral is not likely to change in the near future. Revenue loss with the emerging threat of terrorism and natural disasters has opened the door for a different model of policing. This model is not based on city borders drawn on a map but rather a law enforcement agency based on regional needs. The question that remains is if consolidation or regionalization of law enforcement services is a viable answer.

The Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (fusion), can play a more important and ongoing role in the education and intelligence gathering capabilities at local police departments in Northern California. Intelligence-led policing (ILP) can be developed in the region to ensure that pertinent information related to terrorism, drugs, gangs and other regional crime trends is identified so that metropolitan police can

develop strategies around these trends. This requires consolidation of police services because there needs to be uniformity in the region to collect and disseminate intelligence information across whatever borders are in place. Even if San Mateo County managed to consolidate resources, it would be just as important to gather intelligence outside that border as it is within those borders. This is where a fusion center can play an important role in the analysis of that information so it can be pushed back out to the police agencies.

Law enforcement agencies typically do a very good job of protecting the borders in which they operate. This study looks at the leveraging of the ability of individual agencies to provide a coordinated service of public safety. Using a baseball analogy, we are exploring a model that takes individuals and turns them into a team that plays well together on one big field. This model incorporates one coach, with one set of rules, wherein all the players receive the same training and same signals. Each player knows the strengths and development areas of the team and therefore the coach utilizes those resources in a way to bring about the best outcome for the entire team. This regional approach to policing is what may make San Mateo County a safer place against terrorism, drugs, gangs, and all other crimes. It may lead to a more coordinated response when that natural disaster strikes in the Bay Area, most likely to be in the form of a major and divesting earthquake.

The need for a coordinated regional response in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster is imperative to the success of the operation. How do we know this? The public safety response to the hijacked American Airlines flight that hit the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 at 9:37 am gives us the affirmation that regionalization works in a time of crisis. The 9/11 Commission found in pertinent part the following:

While no emergency response is flawless, the response to the 9/11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon was mainly a success for three reasons: first, the strong professional relationships and trust established among emergency responders; second, the adoption of an Incident Command System; and third, the pursuit of a regional approach to response. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 Commission], 2004)

Furthermore, on February 23, 2006, Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, recounted how important it was to learn from the failures of Katrina and noted that emergency responders learn from those failures as situations tend to repeat themselves (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). Townsend demanded that we as Americans are obligated to learn from our failures to make America, “Safer, stronger and better prepared” (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). The lessons cited by Townsend centered on planning, resource management, situational awareness, communications and coordination (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006).

These are the same issues facing police departments at the local level. Local police will be the first on the scene to any terrorist attack or any natural disaster and their ability to communicate, coordinate, evacuate, and manage the scene will be the difference in life and death. They must be able to adequately manage the situation before state and federal help arrives. Police departments that have merged and regionalized are likely to be in a better position to sustain life because of their unified training, command, policy and procedures, and coordinated communications.

## **E. METHODOLOGY**

This thesis will explore how consolidation/regionalization of police services might help provide a better delivery service of public safety to local communities. Consolidation and regionalization of public safety services is not unique to San Mateo County in that fire services have forged coordination of delivery of public safety services through a defined system of mergers and consolidation. Yet, local police services have resisted consolidation and regionalization efforts.

The hypothesis explored in this thesis is that like many fire services, police will be better prepared to in their planning and response to acts of terrorism or natural disasters through consolidation/regionalization of services where all officers are trained the same, operate under the same policy and procedures, utilize the same equipment, and operate under a controlled and coordinated management system in times of crisis. At this time of financial crisis in local jurisdictions, coupled with the threats of terrorism and natural disasters, we must work to improve our homeland security vision.

In order to understand how the new age of collaboration and coordination must give way to the historical approach to fragmented policing, this thesis will examine how police departments were established in San Mateo County and why this has made change so difficult. It will also explore the homeland security goal espoused by Ms. Townsend (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006) to making our communities, safer, stronger, and better prepared. It is also be important to understand the current intelligence gathering and sharing challenges that exist in the fragmentation of policing and how the local fusion center can play an integral role in bridging the intelligence gap once police departments become regionalized.

## **F. RESEARCH DESIGN**

In order to fully understand the drawbacks, benefits and challenges surrounding consolidation of police services, the case study method will be utilized. Researcher Robert K. Yin (1997) defines the case study method as, “An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.” The research question has been defined and two cases will be utilized to determine why consolidations worked, failed, or stalled. The descriptive elements of these attempts at shared services will be instructive to those police agencies that may be considering shared services. The cases that have been identified are follows:

1. The successful consolidation of the Corte Madera and Larkspur Police Departments in 1979 California and
2. The in-progress proposed shared services model between the San Mateo Police Department and neighboring Burlingame Police Department in California.

This will be a comparative-based case study process to determine the similar aspects and problem areas of any proposed shared services model.

The central focus will be why these attempts at consolidation succeeded or failed and if are there lessons to be learned from the failures. The departments chosen are all

located in Northern California, and, with the exception of the San Mateo and Burlingame Police Departments, they match in size and population.

Additionally, a policy options analysis will be conducted. The policy options model will first determine the various options, identify criteria for success/failure, explore possible outcomes of different models, develop and explore a comparison options matrix, and the best option will be identified and explained.

## **G. ORGANIZATION**

Chapter II will discuss the literature reviewed for this thesis and the impact the literature has on the subject matter. Though there have been no modern day consolidation of police departments in California, the literature is informative in regard to past consolidations and illustrates why they have failed or taken shape. Chapter III will include the Corte Madera/Larkspur police consolidation and the proposed San Mateo/Burlingame consolidation. Each case study will start with an outline of the cities and cover why they considered consolidation, followed by the outcomes and lessons learned. Chapter IV discusses the policy options analysis and identifies possible options. It will explore alternatives and result in a recommendation. Chapter V will discuss how the size of a police agency can have an impact on that agencies preparedness to prevent acts of terrorism. Chapter VI will discuss the intelligence/operational implications of a shared model of policing. Chapter VII will consist of a comparative analysis of other countries intelligence network how police consolidation has impacted those intelligence sharing capabilities. Chapter VIII will outline the strategic implementation plan for consolidation of police services and Chapter IX recount conclusions, recommendations and next steps.

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## **II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

This review will examine the duplication of police services by small police departments to assess if that duplication acts as a barrier to a possible superior model of policing through consolidation. This review will also examine the literature to explore if the consolidation of police departments in counties across the U.S. would provide for a more uniform, systematic, and cost-effective approach to securing communities against terrorism and the variety of threats communities face today.

Kettl (2005) found two major failures in the homeland security system, (9/11 and Hurricane Katrina). The problem of a unified and coordinated police response to any disaster, especially a large-scale terrorist attack, is something police departments around the country still struggle with. In large part, Kettl (2005) attributes that problem to what he refers to as “slop over boundaries” that blur the political and organizational structure in the United States today. The problem with the lack of unified and coordinated response of police became very clear during the World Trade Center terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. After extensive re-creation of the events on 9/11, the 9/11 Commission found, “Any attempt to establish a unified command on 9/11 would have been further frustrated by the lack of communication and coordination among responding agencies” (2004).

Local police play an important role in the battle against terrorism. Officers represent the first line of defense against terrorists living in our communities. Officers, because of their ongoing presence in neighborhoods, are uniquely positioned to communicate with communities and have the ability to draw on their experience and training to determine when criminal activity is afoot. According to Thompson (2008):

Properly trained and equipped, local police departments can recognize the ordinary crimes that terrorists inevitably commit in preparation for their attacks—minor traffic violations, coupon fraud, the use of fake ID—and deal with terrorist cells well before they are able to strike.

Though there is not an abundance of recent literature on the consolidation of police services and the impact on communities, there is a successful police consolidation

case in Northern California to examine along with an in progress examination of consolidation possibilities by two San Mateo County agencies. The literature on the failed attempts at consolidation reveals an important insight into why more police agencies have not pursued this route.

The literature has been divided into the following three categories for further examination:

- The problem with fragmentation of services
- Opportunities for police consolidation
- Drawbacks of police consolidation

#### **A. THE PROBLEM WITH FRAGMENTATION OF SERVICES**

Police agencies in the United States are characterized by decentralization. With an estimate of 20,000 police agencies in the United States (LaGrange, 1987), the number is staggering in comparison to other countries: England has fewer than 50; West Germany with 100, and Canada with 750 (Skoler, 1977). Per capita, Germany has 2.9 police per 1000, the U.S. has 2.7, the United Kingdom has 2.0 and Canada has 1.7 (Skoler, 1997). According to Nationmaster.com Crime Statics (2010), 85 percent of police agencies consisting of 50 officers or less, over 50 percent with less than 10 and 9 percent with a single officer, the argument for consolidated services is self evident.

There can be problems with a decentralized system. LaGrange (1987) suggested that a problem facing law enforcement is that the fragmented system of policing does not allow for coordination of crime-fighting efforts. Resources and information are not leveraged in a manner that provides the public with a cohesive web of safety. For example, crimes committed in one jurisdiction are not tied to patterns in a broader area. In addition, information is not being passed along to investigators that would allow for the individual pieces of the puzzle to come together to form a big picture.

There has been at least one national attempt to fix this fragmentation. In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement saw the fragmented system of policing as a major obstacle to effective law enforcement and called upon each law enforcement community to pool resources and consolidate in ways that would provide the most

effective police services at the most cost efficient price (Katzenbach, 1967). According to David Miller (1995), in his writings, entitled *The Fiscal Organization of Metropolitan Areas: The Allegheny County Case Considered*, traditional reformist argue, the polycentric metropolitan systems are associated with diseconomies of scale in service production, a lack of service coordination, fiscal inequities, and minimal political accountability.” In order to address these shortcomings, reformist advocates greater consolidation of government resources (Miller, 1995).

Even after the 1967 attempt, fragmentation and duplication of efforts remains a problem. Kimmel (1997) points out that law enforcement duplicates efforts on many fronts in small jurisdictional areas and this fragmentation leads to disconnect of police services throughout a region. The implication is that fragmentation and duplication of law enforcement services is inefficient and does not provide adjoining communities with the tools they need to combat crime throughout a region. Though not specifically mentioned as a reason to consolidate, the need to approach terrorism in a cohesive and coordinated manner may be extrapolated from the literature. The need to take an “all crimes” approach to regionalization of law enforcement, appears the best way to leverage existing resources. Thus, the literature suggests that no city and no police department is an island unto itself. Gangs, drug dealers, robbers, and certainly terrorists are transitory in nature and must be addressed through a flexible system that allows for clear tracking, communication, and interdiction. Though cities clearly mark their boundaries and often take a parochial approach to crime fighting, criminals know no boundaries and will use the lack of police coordination in an effort to avoid detection and capture.

The practice of consolidation of policing enjoys both support and skepticism. According to LaGrange (1987):

Three perspectives on urban fragmentation that are useful for understanding differing sentiments towards consolidation are: The classical administrative approach; the public choice perspective; the classical racial conflict perspective.

The classical perspective often criticizes government fragmentation (decentralized control in small geographic locations) as being too small to achieve any economies of

scale. Classical perspective proponents also cite lack of professionalism of personnel and single service units that are not accountable to the communities they purport to serve. According to LaGrange (1987), “those following the traditional reform approach argue that the polycentric metropolitan systems are associated with the diseconomies of scale in service production, a lack of accountability, lack of service coordination, fiscal inequities, and minimal political accountability.” These people tend to be reformists who want to improve government.

The public choice perspective tends to like decentralized control of communities and feels that the pro-consolidationalists are wrong in their assumption that bigger means better. This group comes from many different socio/economic backgrounds and tends to enjoy the individual nature of their communities. They see decentralization as a choice that they have made as a community. The anti-consolidationalist believes that the claims of efficiency and effectiveness of central government consolidation have no merit. They see the fight for resources within a large consolidated government as fierce and destructive (LaGrange, 1987).

The classical racial conflict perspective supports consolidation because proponents of this view fragmentation as a way to keep them impoverished with little resources (LaGrange, 1987). They believe that they are tied to areas that are poor with little hope of improved services. They see consolidation as a re-distribution of wealth that addressed the inequities of poor service. While the classical perspective supports consolidation of government because it is rational, the classical racial conflict supports it as a means to get more services to the poor. All these perspectives play a major role in any attempt to consolidate police services in a region (LaGrange, 1987).

## **B. OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLICE CONSOLIDATION**

There is a strong commonality in the protection that police provide to communities. There is also a long and well-documented history of how officers from different jurisdictions support each other in their jobs every day.

Krimmel (1997) suggests that consolidation is a natural consequence of growth, coupled with the increase in the expense of policing and decrease in tax revenue. City managers are now looking at consolidation as a way to close the widening budget gaps in their communities. A study by the Public Administration Service (1966), entitled *Coordination and Consolidation of Police Services-Problems and Potentials*, outlines how communication centers in counties can be consolidated with little impact on services. With the automation of computer aided dispatch and of 911 systems, re-routing calls from one city dispatch center to another is a very easy task. This is often viewed as a good initial step to consolidation because it is somewhat seamless and invisible to the public. The advantage in consolidation of dispatch appears to be an increase in awareness and communication between two agencies. If a crime has been committed in a neighboring jurisdiction and vehicle or suspect information is broadcast, the police net surrounding the suspect becomes bigger when neighboring cities are hearing about each other's crimes.

The increased communication aspect appears to be a major part of dispatch consolidations, but what really appears to be driving this type of consolidation is the elimination of duplication and the increase in cost efficiency. City dispatch centers are very expensive to operate with ever changing technological enhancements necessary to serve the public. Personnel costs, especially retirement costs, are another reason cities are looking at consolidating dispatch services.

Though many cities start consolidation with dispatch services, many other cities have explored further consolidation of services, up to and including, complete mergers of police departments, like the Twin Cities Police Department in California or the Northern York County, Pennsylvania, police consolidation. Though the research shows that instances of consolidation have been rare as compared to the numbers of existing individual police departments still in operation, the success stories tell us that there is a viable model if cities and counties are willing and have the fortitude to work through a myriad of roadblocks on the way to consolidation. (These roadblocks will be discussed in the next section: Drawbacks).

Complete consolidations have taken place in the form of city-to-city and city-to-county, although many more cities have explored consolidation than have actually decided to consolidate. One of the major arguments in favor of consolidation is the standardization of policies and procedures, along with the standardization of response to a major critical incident like a terrorist attack. Police departments not only have different policies and procedures on how to respond to events, they have different radio frequencies that do not provide for interoperability. Typically, when units from adjoining agencies arrive at the scene of a disaster, the most crucial time for the first responders is spent organizing their response rather than carrying out the response. This is very difficult for agencies that do not have standardized training, procedures, or communication capabilities.

Krimmel (1997), in reviewing the Northern York County Police (NYCRPD) consolidation experience, suggested that consolidation of police services allows for uniformity in training and standards. Officers and command staff of Northern York County are usually much more proficient in their response to critical incidents because they have trained together to respond to those critical incidents. They have the advantage of common communications, which was a key criticism of the first responders approach to 9/11 (Krimmel, 1997). Krimmel also found that the NYCRPD provided the same police coverage as did a comparison group, but they did it for 28 percent less and the cost per call is 70 percent less in the regionalized police department.

The other argument for police consolidation is a more equitable distribution of police resources throughout a region. If a city has the money, they are able to protect themselves; however, a poorer community in a given region will only receive the service it can afford. Since crime is transitory in nature, especially in the area of narcotics trafficking and gangs, some suggest that it makes sense to pool resources in a geographic region to address crime holistically, particularly since different communities are often addressing the same problems.

The resulting impact of consolidation can be a more professional police department serving the community with higher wages, which attracts more qualified personnel (Crank, 1978). Conversely, smaller departments can become training grounds

for officers who then leave after a few years to seek more opportunity at better paying departments. This results in a continuing cost for those departments that become training agencies for the bigger departments.

### **C. DRAWBACKS OF POLICE CONSOLIDATION**

Consolidation of police is one of the biggest undertakings local governments can ever expect to get involved in. According to Morris:

Obstacles to coordination and consolidation of police are the most formidable, primarily because police services is generally considered to be one of the most local of government services and even the smallest local jurisdiction wants to believe they can provide at least the minimal amount of police services. (Morris, 1966)

There have been several studies on the economies of scale in regard to police consolidation, but no universal conclusion on the financial viability. In 2002, a study was conducted on the consolidation of police services in Halifax, Canada (McDavid, 2002). The study used data from three years before consolidation compared to four years after consolidation. After the consolidation, the number of officers was reduced and the workload went up for those officers. Service levels, measured by the number of officers, also decreased. Expenditures on police services went up due to salary adjustments and crime rates were not impacted. The vast majority of citizens surveyed believed police services stayed the same (McDavid, 2002).

Though many attempts have been made to consolidate police services, they are often derailed because local politicians feel that they will lose control of the public safety component of government. Police services are so important to local government that even the smallest of cities like to believe they can provide police services to the community. Successful consolidations take into account the unequal size of the consolidating agencies in order to make sure the collaboration in place is based on equity. Additionally, many agencies that have consolidated services did not reap financial benefits right away. According to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Web page the city of Las Vegas actually saw their budget grow as a result of police consolidation. The startup costs can be great and many agencies found that they could not provide the level

of service that the public demanded without adding more officers than they originally planned. Furthermore, labor relations and morale can be a big factor in consolidation efforts because they can be negatively impacted. The consolidating agencies have to deal with salary and benefit differences, seniority issues, schedules, and working conditions. Any one of these issues is large enough to derail a consolidation effort.

The transition planning can take years and acts to distract an organization as different politicians and city managers come and go during the process. In addition, layoffs could become an issue as departments downsize to try and meet economies of scale. A huge factor in every attempt to consolidate has been public opinion and the perceived service level that will be offered to the community. Even if the city realizes savings through consolidation, communities have balked at this proposition if it includes a decrease in service level that leaves them less prepared. Response time, crime rate, and staffing levels all have to be very carefully considered during the process.

Though most politicians are focused on the financial aspects of proposed police mergers, there is a strong operational component that must also be considered. The ability of police departments to gather and leverage information in a meaningful way is imperative to preventing terrorist attacks and crime. According to Riley, Treverton, Wilson & David “Terrorism respects no boundaries. It is both a foreign and domestic matter, one that requires responses from both intelligence and law enforcement agencies, among many other entities” (Riley, Treverton, Wilson & David, 2005). The Rand report *State and local Intelligence in the War on Terrorism*, supports the notion that local law enforcement plays an integral role in the intelligence field and it is the local police that act as the eyes and ears of the war on terror (Riley et al., 2005). Though not specifically stated in the study, there appears to be a strong nexus between centralized intelligence gathering and the impact that information can have when properly utilized. The study suggest that intelligence gathering has taken on a new importance after 9/11 as there are now new pressures on law enforcement to play a major role in counterterrorism efforts in the U.S. (Riley et al., 2005).

Law enforcement officers are entrenched in the neighborhoods; they know the people on their beat, and they have built relationships with the communities they serve. Local law enforcement is in a unique position to assist in the national effort to prevent terrorism by leveraging the resources and relationship that no other counterterrorism agency has. Whether fighting terrorism or preventing crime, intelligence gathering and dissemination of information have become necessary duties in the law enforcement business. The question that remains is how to fill the gap when many small police agencies in a county do not have the resources to gather or leverage the intelligence information needed to fight terrorism and crime. In Northern California, the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) is purportedly filling this gap. The vast amount of small agencies in the area, with different agendas and priorities, may make coordination of intelligence efforts a daunting and impossible task for the NCRIC.

The 72 fusion centers throughout the United States can act as that single point contact, but may be more effective if they had less points of contact to deal with. This can be achieved through consolidation where metropolitan counties become the single point of contact. In Houston, for example, the fusion center is under local control though they have a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Liaison Officer assigned to the center. The Houston fusion center covers 13 counties where its role is to coordinate, analyze, and disseminate information across all law enforcement lines (Titch, 2010). This has proven to be a successful model in the Houston region.

The references and resources identified provide a conflicting future for police consolidation. More than ever, economics are forcing municipalities to take a closer look at resolving the ongoing duplication of services throughout small regions. Yet much research indicates that local governments are not ready to relinquish control. The research reveals many possible benefits to consolidation, but there are just as many counter arguments. Of those counter arguments, the question that remains is: If there is one overarching reason that more police agencies should not explore a regional approach to policing? The answer to that question may be found in the references that show that terrorism is clearly a local issue. The literature is replete with examples of breakdowns in the response to the 9/11 attacks in New York due to lack of interoperability in

communication, resource overload, lack of information sharing, and lack of a unified response.

What is lacking in the police consolidation literature is recent information that outlines why consolidation is more feasible now due to advances in technology, along with analysis on how the current fiscal crisis is impacting police consolidations. Though there are reports in the Bay Area (California) that cities are now looking at police consolidation due to the severity of the budget crisis cities are facing, there are no current studies to show that long-term financial savings can be achieved by these consolidations. There is also a gap in the literature in how modern day service levels would be impacted with police consolidation in light of community expectations with the implementation of community policing programs. This is one of the biggest hurdles that any city facing police consolidation will face. There is great concern with councils and the public as to the quality of the police services that they have come to know in any given city. The dilemma remains that many cities cannot sustain the current fragmented and individualized system of policing that exist today, yet they fear the loss of control and quality of services should they outsource those services. There are a few, but very limited documented studies on customer satisfaction with services provided by consolidated police departments. In one consolidation three citizen groups who had called the police before and after consolidation were surveyed to compare perceptions before and after amalgamation. The results of the survey indicated that “nearly 32% of those surveyed felt that police services had gotten worse since amalgamation, and nearly 25% felt services remained the same” (McDavid, J. 2002).

Chapter III will conduct case studies of one of the only successful police consolidation in California and one case study of an attempt to consolidate police services. With the lack of literature on how police consolidation can impact homeland security concerns or provide communities with a better model of policing, these studies will play an important role in determining if consolidation works and what modern day obstacles to consolidation will cities encounter.

### **III. CASE STUDY OF THE SUCCESSFUL CONSOLIDATION OF THE LARKSPUR/CORTE MADERA POLICE DEPARTMENTS**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION LARKSPUR/CORTE MADERA POLICE**

The Larkspur and Corte Madera Police Departments, located in Marin County, California, found themselves in a unique position in late 1978 when the Larkspur Chief of Police resigned. Due to the necessity for a search of the next chief of police, the town of Corte Madera offered to share their chief with Larkspur on an interim basis. The Chief of Corte Madera, Phil Green, became the chief of two separate police departments overnight.

According to their Web page, the town of Corte Madera was incorporated in 1916 and is located approximately 12 miles north of San Francisco. The population of the town is now approximately 9,425 and is considered a bedroom community that encompasses four (4) square miles, (Corte Madera, 2010). According to their Web page, the city of Larkspur is geographically adjacent to Corte Madera and was incorporated in 1908. The city of Larkspur, like the town of Corte Madera, is a bedroom community with approximately 12,000 residents in 3.5 square miles (City of Larkspur, 2010).

Prior to the merger of the two police departments, both cities operated fully functional police departments that consisted of separate patrol divisions, dispatch, investigations, command staffs, chiefs, and their own police buildings. The city of Corte Madera Police Department had its own photo lab and holding facility, but Larkspur did not. The town of Larkspur had adequate training space and meeting rooms, while the city of Corte Madera did not. In maintaining two buildings, the departments incurred separate building maintenance, water, electricity, heating, and telephone systems, (Twin Cities Police Department, 1979). Each city also conducted its own training and had separate records divisions and court officers. Another costly duplication was supervision. The Twin Cities Report noted the total geographic policing areas of both cities was 7.5 miles, with a combined population of approximately 21,000 residents, each city required

a sergeant to be on duty at all times. The report also indicated that staffing levels for each city were two to three officers, and each city had the additional cost of a sergeant on each shift.

A study presented jointly by the city managers to each city council in 1979, entitled, *Twin Cities Police Department*, indicated that there were other areas of loss of efficiency and effectiveness due to duplication of services. The managers cited the Detective and Juvenile Bureaus, for example, where both bureaus for each city investigated similar crimes but never tied them together. In this example, the managers cited facts where detectives from one city would gather bits of information and clues and, even though the investigators had a close working relationship, they found that the lack of a central repository for information and the physical separation hampered their efforts to collectively solve crimes. They even cited one example where juvenile officers unknowingly counseled the same juvenile offenders for similar incidents. In general, they found the separation prevented proper information sharing and collaboration. They felt that this lack of information led to less than optimal protection of their communities, (Twin Cities Police Department, 1979).

## **B. THE MOVE TOWARD CONSOLIDATION**

In January of 1979, both the Larkspur and Corte Madera departments came under the direction of one chief on an interim basis. The city managers for Larkspur and Corte Madera found that through the combination of efforts between the two police departments, the police were providing a better and broader level of service to both communities. This concept of a better and broader service would become the cornerstone to the consolidation of both police departments into the Twin Cities Police Department. What the city managers found was that by sharing a chief they started to break down barriers that existed between the two agencies. The first step in implementation was an automatic response between the two departments; the situation before was one of mutual aid. Under the mutual aid, a formal request for aid had to be made before assistance would arrive. With the shared chief, a formal request was not required. Where one agency sensed the need to support the other, like traffic stops, felony calls, or any other

calls that may need additional resources, the sister agency automatically deployed. According to the Twin Cities Police Department (1979), the end result was more flexibility on the street that not only provided better security to the community but also improved officer safety as it became clear there was more safety in numbers.

In their report, Twin Cities Police Department (1979), both city managers reported the following situation as one of the ongoing benefits that they observed:

Approximately one month ago the burglar alarm sounded at Video Paradise in Corte Madera. The two duty officers in Corte Madera, as well as two officers from Larkspur responded to the call. The Corte Madera officers apprehended the suspect as he attempted to flee the scene. The apprehension was made some distance from the Video Paradise so the Larkspur officers responded to the burglary scene. While Corte Madera handled the arrest, Larkspur searched the premises for additional suspects and protected the scene from destruction of evidence and further loss of property. This is just one example of where improved cooperation and coordination of effort has been, and could be, beneficial to both communities as well as the field officers.

The two cities also found it beneficial to share a juvenile officer for counseling services because they found in many cases they were dealing with the same juveniles and same juvenile issues. The cities, prior to the merger, also developed joint community programs where they used officers from both police departments. Jointly developed programs included rape and women's safety, home and business security, personal safety, child abuse, bicycle safety, and drug abuse seminars.

These two communities working together through shared police services were able to better prepare a community for crime prevention with a joint message. In today's world of an "all threats" approach to homeland security, the Corte Madera and Larkspur police approach could easily be adopted to leverage police resources in adjoining communities to ensure a better prepared community on a regional basis.

Police agencies can then consolidate their intelligence needs and crime analysis could be supported by a local fusion center. The more departments consolidate, the more viable this fusion center model would become. Furthermore, dual police facilities were a

major consideration for the proposed departments. The departments decided to keep both facilities open at the beginning of the merger while looking for an opportunity to build and operate one facility.

Initially, the cities were also able to hold joint training seminars so that all officers received the same training, and they applied jointly for grants by leveraging their combined population and crime rates. Both agencies were also able to share physical resources that allowed them to leverage those resources in a way that benefited the community. Instead of each agency buying radar units or extra radios, they would share equipment in a way that benefitted the community financially. Most importantly, they were able to share personnel who would respond to calls for service in both communities without the necessity of deploying overtime personnel. Prior to the actual merger, officers were very comfortable operating in both cities in responding to calls for service, backing each other up, enforcing traffic laws, or sharing information.

This type of cooperation also leads to the standardization of policies and procedures, especially in the area of robbery response, range qualification, reporting methods, property storage, and report writing. This standardization could be an important step to a regional approach to combating terrorism or responding to a natural disaster. The Larkspur and Corte Madera Police Departments felt that they had only scratched the surface of the potential for operational advantages and financial savings.

In the document entitled *Twin Cities Police Department*, city managers acknowledged that their cities, and presumably other cities, could do what they were doing on an informal basis, yet they believed that a complete merger of police departments would benefit the community due to their ability to completely combine all facets of police operations. The managers believed that each city would receive better and broader police services at a reduced cost.

The two non-starters for many cities in regard to consolidation of police services are the loss of local control and a reduction of responsiveness to community needs; however, the Larkspur/Corte Madera experience was exactly the opposite. The managers

found that through consolidation of police services they could provide a better service to the community while maintaining a level of control they felt comfortable with.

The managers used the following chart (Table 1) as an example of what staffing levels were before and what they would be at after consolidation:

Table 1. Consolidated Police Services (From Twin Cities Police Report, 1979, p. 5)

| <u>Existing Corte<br/>Madera/ Larkspur<br/>Personnel</u> |      | <u>Twin Cities<br/>Personnel</u> |    |
|----------------------------------------------------------|------|----------------------------------|----|
| Police Chiefs                                            | 2    | Police Chief                     | 1  |
| Lieutenant                                               | 1    | Lieutenants                      | 2  |
| Sergeants                                                | 9    | Sergeants                        | 6  |
| Detectives                                               | 3    | Detectives                       | 2  |
| Juvenile Officer                                         | 1.5  | Juvenile Officer                 | 1  |
| Police Officers                                          | 15.5 | Police Officers                  | 19 |
| Dispatchers                                              | 6    | Dispatchers                      | 5  |
| Secretary                                                | 1.5  | Secretary                        | 1  |
| Parking                                                  | 0    | Parking                          | 1  |
| Total Personnel                                          | 39.5 | Total Personnel 38               |    |

Though, at first glance, the savings in personnel appear very modest, further analysis in the above report reveals that the Twin Cities Police Department decreased duplication in administrative staff while at the same time increasing its front line services to the community by 18.5 percent. They were able to achieve this increase in frontline officers while lowering the departments overall cost. That is a significant increase for a small department and represents frontline services that could potentially impact terrorism or natural disasters response. Through consolidation the Twin Cities Police Department was hoping to better serve the community by putting more resources on the street during peak times. The managers cited in the Twin Cities Police Department Report improved response times, higher visibility patrol, an increase in information sharing, and a decrease

in the duplication of services as the major benefits of a consolidated police department. The managers also felt that the officers would benefit from a broader exposure to public service and calls for service as each respective department would double in size in regard to their service population. In addition, this would give officers a better breadth and depth of experience and exposure to police work than working in the individual smaller cities (Twin Cities Police Department Report, 1979).

Since both departments were in need of updating antiquated systems, such as their dispatch centers, considerable money could be saved in updating one dispatch center while splitting the cost. The Twin Cities police department would reduce expenses because they would realize a reduction in cars and obtain new report management and dispatch systems while at the same time splitting the cost of new office equipment. In the report the city found the initial savings to the combined agency approach was approximately \$50,000 in personnel and equipment. While small by modern day standards, the cities felt the increase in coordination, information sharing, service levels to the community, and officer safety far outweighed any financial savings.

In their report the city managers cited the following as the next steps that would be necessary for a full merger of police services:

1. Draft a Joint Powers Agreement setting forth the obligations of both jurisdictions
2. Develop a funding formula
3. Develop a uniform set of Personnel Rules and Regulations including employee group recognition procedures for a single Police Department.
4. Evaluate existing retirement systems and take necessary steps to create one Twin Cities Police Department system under PERS.
5. Evaluate existing salary and benefit systems in order to create a uniform system.
6. Develop procedures to handle the “meet and confer” process under existing State and local laws,
7. Decide in the JPA which jurisdiction will handle police budgeting, payroll, warrants, etc.
8. Design and distribute new patches, badges, and modify cars insignias.

9. Review compensation and general liability questions and determine how future losses and claims would be handled.
10. Develop uniform general orders while keeping in mind unique local concerns.
11. Establish hiring procedure including that of future chiefs of police. Also determine recruitment strategy and dismissal procedures.
12. JPA will have to establish termination procedures and arbitration clauses to resolve future disputes.
13. JPA will have to address future expansion of police services due to increases in population and commercial growth.

Any city facing consolidation will likely face these and other obstacles. It was extremely important to these agencies that the obstacles be identified upfront so that both cities could work to resolve them. The advantage that Larkspur and Corte Madera had was that by the time the managers recommended the merger to their respective city councils, in many ways; the departments had already been operating as one department with one police chief at the helm for over a year. By the time this matter reached the council, the managers had concrete evidence that they believed both communities would be better served by a bigger department. In their report, the managers believed the community would receive better service from the combined police departments, but they would do so at a more economical cost to the tax payers. The managers also noted that in a 1979 ballot measure that was placed before the tax payers of Corte Madera and Larkspur. When asked the question, "Shall the County, Cities and Special Districts of Marin seek all feasible way of consolidating public services including fire and police," 70 percent of the voters in Corte Madera voted yes, and 71 percent of the voters in Larkspur voted yes (Green, 1981). This demonstrated a clear signal to the city managers and council members that the public supported a police merger.

### **C. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

The Twin Cities Police Consolidation enhanced the overall effectiveness of field operations while reducing cost. The Twin Cities Police Department report revealed the agencies went from putting 15.5 officers on the street collectively to jointly deploying 19 street offices, representing an 18.5 percent increase at a reduced cost. The change in staffing added flexibility to scheduling, training, and deployment of resources (Green,

1981). Chief Green, a year after the departments merged, reported that the improved allocation of personnel resulted in an improvement in response times and enhanced officer safety in both departments (1981). He also noted in his National Academy Report, *Regionalized Consolidation of Law Enforcement Services*, that centralized records and the coordinated exchange of intelligence information on criminals assisted investigators in the identification and apprehension of criminals in a more timely and effective manner (Green, 1981). The information sharing and joint intelligence gathering can be a major factor in preventing and responding to terrorist attacks, though terrorism was not a major concern for police departments in 1981 when Chief Green prepared his report.

Certainly the dynamics of threats have changed for police departments today, thus making the coordination of information and intelligence sharing is one of the major benefits of merging police agencies. The importance of sharing intelligence in preventing terrorism will be discussed in later chapters, but the Twin Cities merger clearly found though merging of the intelligence capabilities of the police departments, they could improve their crime fighting ability. The Twin Cities Police Authority works under a Joint Powers Agreement. Two council members from each city develop policy and jointly act as the Twin Cities Police Council. The management of the police authority still rests collectively with the city managers of Larkspur and Corte Madera. The merged police department operated out of two buildings for 30 years, but just recently broke ground on a joint 20 million dollar police facility that will put all police operations under one roof (Upshaw, 2010).

#### **IV. CASE STUDY: THE CITY OF SAN MATEO/ BURLINGAME STUDY TO CONSOLIDATE POLICE SERVICES IN SAN MATEO COUNTY**

##### **A. INTRODUCTION SAN MATEO/BURLINGAME POLICE**

In August 2009, the city managers of Burlingame and San Mateo, located on the San Francisco Peninsula in California, requested a study regarding shared services and/or a merger of the two city police departments (Callagy, 2010). This study came as a logical response to declining financial conditions in both cities coupled with the ongoing rise in employee costs, especially retirement costs. Further exacerbating the financial conditions of the cities were substantial cuts from the state of California, which is suffering a fiscal crisis of its own. Lending to this opportunity for shared services was the pending retirement of the Burlingame Chief of Police after more than 35 years of service to the Burlingame community.

The two city managers directed that the study should provide the following:

1. Identify where duplication of police services are taking place from the supervisor positions up in both organizations.
2. Maximize use of resources in both agencies and, when possible, enhance law enforcement services to both communities.
3. Maximize cost effectiveness of law enforcement operations by the elimination of duplicate administrative, patrol, investigative, communication, and support service.
4. Develop conceptually, at a macro level, what shared services or a consolidated police agency might look like after eliminating duplicative services from supervisors positions up in both organizations.

Since both cities were facing financial constraints, the financial feasibility of shared services or consolidation was a primary focus, with the goal of reducing costs. Both cities made it very clear that cost reductions could not come at the expense of service reductions. That is to say that service levels should not be diluted in either community in an effort to save cost. It was the hope of both agencies that cost reductions could be realized through the elimination and leveraging of duplicate services.

Both cities have a history of mutually beneficial cooperation and are available for assistance on an as needed basis. Informal understandings have been in place for years that have allowed for reciprocal mutual aid during any time of crisis or when there are no units available to respond and a priority call is holding. The two cities have individual SWAT teams that have trained and worked together for well over 10 years. Moreover, the teams have collaborated with the use of K-9 units.

For example, when a unit is off duty in one city, the other city is willing to provide that service at no charge, thus avoiding overtime and time delays by bringing in a K-9 officer from off duty. Additionally, the departments have worked together on the Gang Task Force (GTF) in the central part of the county and have a unique understanding of how gang members interact with each other in each city.

As a result of an early strategy meeting, a preliminary command structure was developed for the consolidation of both departments. Though substantial savings and increased service levels may be realized in other areas by leveraging resources, this group focused primarily on the structure from the supervisory positions to the Chief of Police.

While the structure contemplated by the committee still needs extensive examination and vetting to work out many operational issues surrounding service levels and expectations, it appears to address duplication concerns, which would result in substantial savings. Though there are various options, the model chosen is one that could expand services to both communities by increasing communication. It also is effective and efficient at policing a geographic region that is tied by common goals, demographics, customer service philosophies, and borders. This case study will focus on the potential for sharing resources and/or consolidation of services in the following areas:

- Reduction of duplication of services in communications.
- Shared, dedicated IT services that would unite Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) and Report Management System (RMS) systems while working on a common goal of enhanced police services through technology.
- Shared chief and command staff with the reduction of an executive secretary.
- Records sharing and opportunities for shared supervision of records' functions.

- Shared Traffic Unit and supervision.
- Shared Parking Enforcement Unit.
- Shared Recruitment and Background Services.
- Shared Patrol Sergeants in an effort to leverage resources in a manner that will allow for 24-hour, seven-day-a-week, year-round coverage of street supervisors.
- Shared Investigations Unit, which will act to leverage resources and supervision, and enhance intelligence-led policing capabilities of both agencies.
- Shared Rapid Notify System.

Additional areas that this study could easily examine:

- Shared K-9 services, which would provide better around-the-clock coverage to both communities;
- The combining of both parking enforcement programs that allows for shared supervision at a potentially substantial cost savings;
- Shared street patrol;
- Shared property services; shared evidence collection and Community Service duties;
- Shared court officer services;
- Joint SWAT team;
- Enhanced Street Crimes and Narcotics Teams that would bring additional services to the city of Burlingame;
- An expanded Police Activities League (PAL) into the city of Burlingame;
- Unification of the School Resource Program, which operates in the same high school district;
- Shared Reserve Program with the possibility of developing a weekend transportation of prisoners detail that would keep officers on the streets as opposed to the time wasted transporting prisoners;
- Shared red light camera services;
- Shared tow, massage, and taxi cab permitting services; and
- Shared accounting services.
- Shared crime analysis and intelligence

These services are listed to illustrate areas that may be ripe for shared services or consolidation. It does not have to be an all or nothing scenario, but rather it can be a gradual move toward consolidation of resources or a “selected services” modeling of leveraging resources.

## **B. BACKGROUND**

The cities of Burlingame and San Mateo are full-service municipalities, and both cities currently operate separate, full-service police departments. According to the City of Burlingame Web page, the city of Burlingame has a population of approximately 28,000, with 12,511 households and 6,956 families, and covers a geographic area of 6.0 square miles. According to the City of San Mateo Web page, the city of San Mateo is slightly larger and has approximately 96,000 residents with 36,501 households and 22,172 families residing in the city, which consists of a geographic area of 16.0 square miles. According to the city of San Mateo Web page the total combined service level of each city would be for a population of approximately 120,000 with 61,523 households in 22 square miles, a relatively small geographic area.

Both the cities of Burlingame and San Mateo have been faced with a reduction of operating revenues over the last several years. In addition to a severe national and statewide recession not experienced since the 1930s, the state of California is facing an economic crisis of unprecedented proportion. This has resulted in the redirection of state revenue that used to flow to cities and upon which cities have come to depend. In recent years, both cities have been forced to reduce public safety spending because of declining revenues in order to meet budget demands. While public safety budgets have been reduced, the demand for services has steadily increased. This picture of a declining economy combined with law enforcement needs in the communities has resulted in the review of operations in both cities. The purpose of this review, as set out by Burlingame City Manager Jim Nantell and San Mateo City Manager Susan Loftus, was to examine the duplication of police services in both cities to determine possible financial efficiencies through shared services or consolidation while maintaining or enhancing service levels.

During the preceding years of revenue loss, both cities conducted a detailed review of police operations that resulted in the streamlining of services through budget reductions. These measures included the loss of personnel, use of technology to leverage resources, the raising of some fees, and the strategic reallocation of service levels through the use of technology. Both cities would prefer not to reduce resources further, thus avoiding further reductions in service, so other progressive considerations were explored. The most logical consideration at this time would be to reduce duplication of services in an attempt to find capacity that could be utilized to the benefit of both agencies.

The alternatives to the reduction of frontline services that will be explored by this study are the sharing and merging of police services. Again, this does not have to be an all-or-nothing proposition but rather may be based on a “selective services” level where certain duplicative operations are blended together over time. One advantage of the timing is that the current fiscal climate provides both cities an opportunity to look at public safety through a different lens.

The homogenous relationship that now exists between the San Mateo and Burlingame police departments and city managers is demonstrated by the mutual respect and close working relationships of the two organizations. Both police agencies have had preliminary talks with police representatives and meetings have been held between the city managers and command staff to consider the possibility of consolidation.

## **C. FACTORS SUPPORTING A SHARED SERVICES MODEL, CONSOLIDATION AND SHARED INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT**

### **1. Geographical Similarities**

Both Burlingame and San Mateo share geographical boundaries, and they have contiguous boundaries that share common streets that connect to a local highway. El Camino Real is a major arterial street that traverses the length of both cities and leads into many surrounding neighborhoods of both cities. In addition, there is a common transportation system of bus and train routes. Furthermore, a large part of both city populations use the common streets and transportation systems to access business districts, neighborhoods, and events held in either Burlingame or San Mateo.

There are other similarities other than geographical boundaries. Both cities enjoy quiet residential areas, busy business districts focused around downtowns, and diverse populations. Both cities also have a hospital, churches, schools, active parks, and a desire to provide a high level of service to the community they serve.

## **2. Political**

In addition to geographical commonalities, the two cities are set up and run similarly and have a history of cooperation. Both cities are General Law cities with the city council being elected at large from the population. The mayor's position in each city is ceremonial in nature, but represents the council at a variety of forums in the community. The city of Burlingame was incorporated in 1908, and the city of San Mateo was incorporated in 1894. Both cities have a council-manager form of government with functional departments consisting of police, fire, community development, public works, and finance.

As mentioned earlier, both cities have a long history of cooperation and sharing services. Examples include the SWAT team, collaborations on the Gang Task Force, joint criminal investigations, and the relationships that have been developed between the command staffs of both agencies. Additionally, there has always been an informal agreement of asking for and receiving assistance when one agency does not have sufficient resources to handle any given situation. The relationship between the police departments and city managers promotes a great foundation for future shared service or consolidation models of policing.

Depending on the city managers' preferred model of operation, the Chief Executive Officer of a fully consolidated police department could be answerable to both city managers. The day-to-day operations could be overseen by the existing deputy chief with divisions overseen by three captains. Moreover, lieutenants would be assigned throughout the geographic boundaries of the consolidated force to lead all intelligence-based policing efforts.

Many similar efforts to share services or consolidate resources have failed because of fear of losing control. Even so, control of the department and the level of

services can and have been addressed in the detailed agreement where successful consolidations have taken place, such as with the cities of Larkspur and Corte Madera.

#### **D. SHARED SERVICES CONCEPT**

The concept of shared law enforcement services is not new. In 1967, the Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) and the Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973) asked local governments across the nation to study combined or contracted police services in an effort to eliminate duplication of services and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall police function. There are many ways to accomplish a sharing of services. The most typical ways are:

1. Total or select services consolidation;
2. Regionalization;
3. Contracting for total or specific police services; and
4. Informal sharing of services.

In order to move to the next step of eliminating the duplication of services, a more formalized agreement must be established. If a complete consolidation is to take place and a true partnership is desired, then the typical model would be the utilization of the Joint Powers Authority (JPA). Both San Mateo and Burlingame cities currently belong to JPAs, so they are familiar with its organizational structure.

##### **1. The Joint Powers Agreement**

Typically, a joint powers agreement consists of two council members from each city. These council members represent the Joint Powers Board or the Police Council. The board would then act as the governing representative for the police department. The two city managers represent the day-to-day administrative oversight and essentially act in the same role that they currently do. The benefits include:

1. Each city has equal representation on the Board.
2. Neither city would be able to dominate the operation of the police department.

3. Neither city would be able to make unreasonable fiscal demands concerning operations of the JPA.

Drawbacks may include:

1. If both councils do not give the council representatives full authority to make decisions, delays may be encountered.
2. Disagreements can and will arise over specific programs and funding, although these disagreements historically have been resolved through the JPA.
3. Some believe that for the sake of consistency, the city managers should be part of the JPA instead of being on the management team.

## 2. The Proposed Joint Powers Authority Model

If it is decided that a JPA is the way to proceed with consolidation of services in Burlingame and San Mateo, then the following model, which has been used in other successful police consolidations, could be utilized (depicted in Figure 1).




Figure 1. Proposed JPA Organization Chart (From Callagy, 2009)

### **3. Funding**

The cities of Burlingame and San Mateo have different workloads, and as a result, a formula to allocate the cost for a consolidated police department would have to be developed. Resources that the city of Burlingame would receive as a result of consolidation would also have to be entered into the cost formula. Models do exist, like that of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department in Nevada or the Twin Cities Police Department in Marin County that could be utilized to guide us in developing a cost formula.

As an alternative, Burlingame could decide to contract for specific duplicative services and maintain other services on their own. Though a less used model, this would allow Burlingame and San Mateo to pick specific areas where services could be blended while the specific department identities are maintained.

### **4. Organizational Environment**

Another component of consolidation to consider would be the organizational environment. A consolidated police department could provide a higher degree of service to both communities through increased communication and the implementation of intelligence-driven policing wherein early warning systems are put in place to detect crime patterns and take action before they proliferate. A consolidated police department would have to perceive itself as representing both communities equally while fully identifying with both communities. This process may take a while to take root, but once it does, service in both communities should be indistinguishable.

The benefits of a consolidated police department may include:

- Flexibility in staffing.
- Increased staffing for patrol or traffic duty.
- Increased supervision.
- The elimination of duplication of services.
- Standardized equipment that may allow for better buying power.
- More opportunities for personnel for professional growth.
- Better opportunities for training and exposure to a wider variety of crimes.

- Opportunities for extended, proactive programs, such as Neighborhood/Business Watch, Police Activities League, Neighborhood Response Team, and Special Investigations Unit (narcotics/vice/human trafficking).
- Expanded use of Community Services Officers (CSOs) to take cold reports so that police officers are freed to address far more serious crimes and prevention activities.

The challenges of consolidation may be:

- Need for two facilities. The utilization of one facility can result in a large fiscal savings, but can result in loss of identity and convenience for one agency.
- The salary benefit structure, seniority issues, public view and political will can be drawbacks. The difference in police cultures would have to be examined. There would be a host of union issues to work through, but all of these drawbacks have been addressed in successful police consolidations and they are not insurmountable.
- A real or perceived decrease in service in one or both communities.
- Increase in areas of responsibility and supervisor to officer ratio.

## **5. Community Acceptance**

Another aspect of possible consolidation would be community acceptance. The Burlingame Police Department and San Mateo Police Department both enjoy outstanding approval ratings in their respective communities. Both police departments have done a very good job of addressing community needs and are considered by the community to be extremely competent, professional, and courteous. Given that and the long tradition of individual police departments, some community and internal pushback was expected but not to the degree that actually took place. (That pushback will be explored later in this document).

In the future, upon the council's approval, and before formal agreements are worked out, a committee advisory group be formed and extensive outreach to the communities in the form of education be conducted. Press releases should be crafted to inform the public of the plans for consolidation. Furthermore, in-house committees should be formed and various supportive personnel from each agency conduct outreach to the members of the Burlingame and San Mateo Police Departments.

## **E. THE JOINT ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL**

### **1. Command Staff under a Consolidated Police Department**

The organization model for a Burlingame/ San Mateo Police Department is one that adheres to the original intent of this process. The proposed model eliminates expensive duplication of resources while increasing service levels to both communities through the coordination of information that is valuable in reducing crime.

Under a consolidated Burlingame/San Mateo Police Department, the organizational structure could be as follows:

- 1 Chief of Police
- 1 Executive Secretary
- 1 Deputy Chief (could be eliminated through attrition)
- 3 Captains (could eliminate 1 through attrition)
- 6 Lieutenants (addition of one lieutenant)
- 3 Support Secretaries

The department could be divided into three divisions: Operations, Support Services, and Investigations. The Investigations Division would be responsible for providing the NCRIC with all intelligence information gathered by the department. The three-division model would be sufficient to operate the department for the foreseeable future. The deputy chief position should be evaluated to determine future attrition. If retained, a two-captain model should be evaluated for further cost savings. The Operations Division would be responsible for providing direct law enforcement services to both communities and would consist of the following program areas:

1. Patrol Services
2. Traffic Services
3. Neighborhood Response Team
4. School Resource Program
5. Downtown Units

The Operations Division would contain the majority of our sworn and support personnel.

The Support Services division provides for all technical and support services necessary for the day-to-day operation of the police department as well as our community outreach efforts. Support Services would include media relations, PAL, background/recruitment, and facility maintenance. The Support Services Division is comprised of the following programs:

1. Support Services
2. Communications
3. Records

The Investigations Division provides all highly-specialized investigative services for the police department they are:

1. Investigations
2. Special Investigations Unit (narcotics/human trafficking)
3. Terrorism Liaison
4. Family Relations Unit

In developing the organizational model, comparative agencies were examined to determine a predominant model for this consolidated agency. Organizational charts of agencies with populations of 120,000 to 150,000 were reviewed. These agencies are similar in size to a Burlingame/ San Mateo consolidation. Those organizations are Elk Grove Police, Hayward Police, Corona Police, Fullerton Police, Salinas Police, city of Orange Police, Simi Valley Police, and Pasadena Police. Organization charts were obtained from these cities, and it appears that the majority of these organizations operate with a three-division configuration. Based on the combined size of a consolidated San Mateo and Burlingame police departments this three division model could be applied to the consolidated departments.

## **F. THE CONSOLIDATED DIVISIONS**

### **1. Dispatch Consolidation**

As mentioned before in this thesis, communications could be the first of many shared services between the Burlingame and San Mateo Police. This shared service could act to save both departments considerable money that is now being duplicated in a

small geographic area. In the budget year 2005/2006, Rich Brady of Matrix Consulting Group, as part of a comprehensive mid-county dispatch consolidation study, specifically looked at a Burlingame/ San Mateo dispatch consolidation model. The Matrix study did an in-depth analysis of salaries, workload, and seniority. That study recommended less dispatchers than both agencies currently have with two (2) shift supervisors, and one (1) manager (Brady, 2004).

After an extensive review a joint Burlingame and San Mateo dispatch center could operate with less dispatcher's. Though the Matrix study utilized shift supervisors, this model utilizes lead dispatchers. This study would need further specific analysis as indicated above as it does not take in to account vacation relief. San Mateo's current dispatch schedule does not take into consideration vacation but is backfilled with per diem and overtime when necessary.

The consolidation of dispatch would give the combined departments four police channels over which to operate. Various business models could be utilized that would take into consideration dispatch of low priority calls by Mobile Dispatch Terminals (MDT), shared call-taking responsibility, utilizing a secondary channel to run subjects, simulcast radio transmissions over both channels, and moving to a secondary channel on any prolonged search or operation.

One of the advantages of shared dispatch would be the leveraging of resources and increased communication concerning crime in a neighboring jurisdiction. This could allow for a better understanding of crime patterns while also increasing calls for assistance in neighboring jurisdictions.

Based on calls for service by hour, it appears that for periods of each day there is radio capacity that would allow both Burlingame and San Mateo Police to operate on a single radio channel. This capacity would allow both agencies to leverage their resources in a way that could result in better coverage for both agencies during peak hours of service. Additionally, both departments have IT support that not only assists in dispatch but performs IT support functions throughout the police department. For the most part,

both departments use similar technological systems, and one full-time person could handle this function for both departments. Therefore, that position is included in this consolidation plan but will need further study.

The staffing assumptions are applicable if further studies show that during non-peak hours Burlingame, San Mateo, and Brisbane could share one channel. San Mateo Police and Brisbane Police, currently share a dispatch channel. The savings also do not take into consideration one-time conversion costs or any additional potential substantial savings shared by eliminating the duplication in communication equipment. Moreover, the model above does use per diem assistance to supplement full time equivalent (FTE), for vacation relief. Further studies would have to be conducted to understand the full implication of that cost.

## **2. Technical Feasibility of Dispatch Consolidation**

The following represents a breakdown of the various systems being utilized in communications.

### ***a. Radio***

Currently, the cities of San Mateo and Burlingame each own FCC licenses for one primary police channel and one secondary police channel. The city of San Mateo owns three transmit/receive radio sites and three receive only sites. The city of Burlingame owns two transmit/receive sites and three receive only sites. For cities of their size, both San Mateo and Burlingame have a very robust police radio system. Linking the two systems will allow superior radio coverage for the two cities with the potential of four radio channels being made available for use. There will be some engineering costs to link the systems

### ***b. Telephone***

Both cities currently operate independent 911 dispatch centers with their own 911 telephone and local phone lines. For the past six years, the two dispatch centers have acted as the emergency backup center for each other. Today, incoming 911 calls have the ability to ring fully for either city in either dispatch center with the simple flick

of a switch. On a temporary basis, local seven-digit phone lines from the Burlingame center could be call forwarded to San Mateo or vice versa. The circuit switch could be made permanent if necessary.

***c. Public Works***

Both cities dispatch for public works after hours and on weekends. Burlingame public works is linked directly to Burlingame's CAD system and uses entry screens to track service calls. Operational considerations, such as how calls are entered into the system, will be needed with the merging of CAD systems in the new dispatch center.

***d. Computer Aided Dispatch and Report Management Systems***

Both San Mateo and Burlingame operate their dispatch centers on Hitech Systems Computer Aided Dispatch/Report Management Systems (CAD/RMS). Even though the systems are by the same company, Hitech, the internal databases are different, and how the systems are physically used is very different. For example, at the completion of a call for service, the Burlingame dispatchers add considerable information to the calls such as parties involved and disposition. In contrast, in San Mateo, the information is very basic and is mainly added by the patrol officers. As a business practice, Burlingame has become accustomed to this information. The integration of the two CAD systems could pose some technical challenges for the cities, and some expensive programming may needed by the CAD vendor. It could be possible to run both CAD systems from San Mateo independently, which would reduce the cost and effort of merging systems.

Additionally, Burlingame hosts the SafetyNet Automated Report Exchange (SNARE) regional records sharing server for San Mateo County Hitech agencies. This could be managed jointly.

***e. Automatic Vehicle Location***

Burlingame uses Automatic Vehicle Location (GPS) linked to its CAD system. This allows the CAD system to locate the closest unit to a call or find an officer

during an emergency. San Mateo does not have this service but that could be added for about \$25,000. This is an expense that would improve service to the community and provide better officer safety for field officers.

***f. Dispatch Centers***

Currently, Burlingame and San Mateo have stand-alone dispatch centers located in their respective cities. The centers act as backup centers for each city in case of a catastrophic failure in the communications center. San Mateo has a new state-of-the-art dispatch center that is capable of housing the additional dispatchers needed to operate a consolidated dispatch center. San Mateo's informational technical room is also set up to house additional technology needed during any consolidation.

**3. Consolidation of Command Staffs**

Based on organizational charts reviewed from several cities with the same size population of a consolidated Burlingame/San Mateo, savings could be found in the command ranks. As discussed above, typically cities with a population of 120,000 to 150,000 divide the structure of the police department into three divisions: Operations, Support, and Investigations. Some cities of this size have a deputy chief position.

A sixth lieutenant is necessary to achieve intelligence-based geographic policing in all areas throughout both cities. This is an operation that is critical to customer service. The city of Burlingame would have a lieutenant assigned as the geographic lieutenant. An intelligence-based policing model allows an area lieutenant to be extremely responsive to the community through analysis of data and information received in his or her assigned geographic area. This area lieutenant also oversees all community events in his or her geographic region and conducts all community outreach efforts in the area. The geographic lieutenant has at his or her disposal all department resources to use judiciously on any given problem in his or her geographic area. The sixth lieutenant is necessary due to the enhanced geographic area covered by a consolidated police department. For purposes of this document, I have listed the additional lieutenant as an administrative lieutenant that would be assigned to Burlingame. The best use of the lieutenant's position merits further discussion.

#### **4. Consolidated Traffic Unit**

A consolidated traffic unit is a natural and easy transition for both cities. This would allow both cities to run joint operations on problem streets and provide support in case of a major traffic accident. Burlingame and San Mateo already share major traffic thoroughfares that connect both cities. They also currently engage in joint enforcement operations that result in traffic units from Burlingame and San Mateo spending time on problem areas in each city. This coordination of resources could lead to enhanced enforcement in both cities as: Office of Traffic Safety Grants could be applied for with increased statistical information, joint drunk driving checkpoints could be operated, regional traffic safety programs could be developed, and each city could leverage the expertise and equipment of traffic officers assigned to this division. The structure of a consolidated traffic unit would be as discussed below.

Currently, San Mateo uses per diem college students to conduct parking enforcement operations. Though San Mateo budgets two FTEs, it has built up a group of young parking enforcement representatives (PERs), who provide great flexibility at substantial savings. They are scheduled by a Community Service Officer (CSO) and supervised by the traffic sergeant. They also act as traffic control during major incidents or accidents. Another advantage of the PERs is that San Mateo can deploy more per day extending the eyes and ears of the police department in the downtown area. The San Mateo Police Department also uses contractors to repair meters and collect meter revenue. The city of San Mateo currently collects from and maintains approximately 1,000 parking meters in the downtown area. The public works department is exploring pay stations as an option that would reduce collection sites to approximately 85. If this were to come to fruition, this could create significant capacity that could be leveraged for both cities. The supervisor in this area would be directly overseeing six officers and one CSO and would also be assume responsibility for a large geographic area with more complaints related to traffic and parking.

## **5. Consolidated Investigative Unit**

Both cities operate a full-service investigations unit. Investigators in both cities usually work a 4/10 work week with weekends off. Investigators are on call 24-hours-a-day with the expectation that they will respond to serious crimes that need extensive follow-up or specialized expertise. Investigators respond to and investigate robberies, burglaries, sexual assaults, kidnappings, murders, and other high-profile crimes.

After reviewing both organizational structures, it was determined, due in large part to the autonomy and expertise of individual detectives that if Burlingame and San Mateo merged investigations units, it would result in a decrease in the combined amount of investigators needed to police both cities. A joint investigation bureau would bring about better communication and coordination of resources throughout the region so that crime trends could be addressed early on and allow both cities more flexibility and leverage to address serious criminal cases.

## **6. Consolidated Support Services Unit**

It also appears that there are opportunities for consolidation of services in the area of support services. The Support Services Division provides essential functions to the day-to-day operation of the police department. These functions include recruiting/backgrounds, training, records, property storage, dispatch (previously discussed), facilities, media relations, and the Police Activities League (PAL). Though Burlingame and San Mateo provide many of the same functions in support services, San Mateo has dedicated full-time personnel in recruiting/backgrounds, training, and property, where these are ancillary duties in Burlingame. Therefore, some type of apportionment of cost would have to take place when sharing these resources.

Both agencies use the Hitech system for their Report Management System, but this area would need much more analysis as San Mateo has just gone to a new on-line reporting system called Presynct. The Presynct product appears to work very well and will allow for the automation of reporting. The information from Presynct has been interfaced with Hitech, which makes the extraction of that information easy and universal. If this meets all of San Mateo's expectations, Burlingame might want to

explore this system. Though Burlingame has achieved some on-line reporting capabilities, its Hitech on-line reporting system is not fully functioning at this time.

Additionally, San Mateo and Burlingame have historically manually entered citations. San Mateo is in the process of using automatic ticket writers and a software called Crossroads. Though San Mateo has not interfaced the Crossroads software with Hitech, all citations will automatically be downloaded into the Crossroads system for storage. This will eliminate any manual data entry that took almost one FTE position to accomplish. Should this automation achieve the goals that San Mateo desires, Burlingame may want to consider this software application.

San Mateo has not fully realized the benefits of the automation of records currently underway. If this automation meets San Mateo's goals and it is used in a shared services model, it seems reasonable that it could be leveraged to add efficiency and effectiveness to a shared Burlingame/ San Mateo system. The services can certainly be shared and could be streamlined based on that sharing model. It also seems reasonable that a combined total of nine records specialists would not be needed in this model; reduced personnel here could result in substantial savings.

The San Mateo Police Department also has a steady volunteer team that greets visitors to the police department and who handle routine counter requests. This arrangement has allowed the records specialists to be focused on the more important aspects of their jobs. Volunteers have been extensively expanded in San Mateo to assist with traffic complaints and could be expanded into Burlingame as the infrastructure is in place.

More savings are not realized in the area of support services due to the fact that some officers in Burlingame manage multiple units because those individual units are not big enough to support a FTE. Because of their nature, some San Mateo positions, such as training and property, have the ability to add capacity without disrupting the current operations. Other areas, such as the lieutenant's position, appear to be a maximum capacity. This leveraging of resources will act to benefit both communities.

## **7. Consolidated Operations Division**

The Operations Division would house the majority of the department's personnel because it encompasses the patrol function. San Mateo utilizes CSOs to handle property crime calls with no suspect information when a report is necessary. These crimes include auto burglaries, residential and commercial burglaries, and frauds. These CSOs are also trained as evidence collection technicians and will respond to crime scenes for evidence collection. This has worked to keep officers on the streets for a more critical function of crime prevention, traffic enforcement, and responding to emergency calls. San Mateo Police currently has four CSOs assigned to patrol that could be leveraged to cover calls for service in Burlingame.

San Mateo also utilizes a Neighborhood Response Team (NRT) to combat gang activity and to respond proactively to crime trends in neighborhoods. San Mateo has two NRT teams that provide coverage up to six days a week. Since Burlingame and San Mateo share a border and therefore share gang members who traverse between the cities, it makes sense to coordinate efforts to combat gangs in a proactive manner in both cities. This would also give Burlingame a fluid tool to use for special investigations such as serial burglaries/frauds around the hotels.

This team would also give the Burlingame community a proactive tool to address ongoing crime issues in the commercial or residential districts of the city. The command staff that oversees patrol consists of one captain and four lieutenants. One lieutenant works Monday through Friday as the administrative lieutenant; one lieutenant would be assigned to Burlingame, and the other two lieutenants would be attached to their respective A or B patrol teams. All four lieutenants have geographic responsibility to address crime issues and citizen concerns in specific areas of the city.

## **8. Summary**

The proposed consolidation would allow for better police coverage and better communications. It would allow the agencies to utilize CSOs to handle cold and other non-suspect property crime calls, which can consume the time of officers. This would allow for the highest and best use of officers in the field. The field sergeants' supervision

from 0700 to 1400 would expand, as would that of the midnight sergeant. During day shift on weekdays administrators are present and there are usually multiple sergeants, such as the traffic sergeant on duty. Weekends during that time period would be the exception, but the swing shifts sergeants' time could be staggered for an earlier start. The model calls for three sergeants during the busiest time of the day, and then one sergeant between 0300 and 0700 hours. Several different models will need to be explored to achieve the right amount of supervisor to officer ratio. Under this joint patrol model, much more flexibility is given to the Burlingame patrol schedule with 24 hour supervisory coverage, along with consistent minimum staffing levels. The consolidated model also provides the benefit of specialized services with increased career ladders and personal/professional growth. This model provides for the unification of supervision and elimination of duplication to achieve the optimum of effectiveness and efficiency. The consolidated services could allow for a better buying power and the ability to recruit and retain officers, given that a consolidated services model would serve a diverse population of 120,000.

#### **G. POTENTIAL FINANCIAL SAVINGS**

When considering the possibility of shared services, a complete merger or a hybrid contracting of services, a cursory review of potential savings was examined. If the model described above was instituted, the duplication of services would be eliminated with a potential savings into the million dollars each year, with other cost reductions possible. This approximate figure is offered only as an illustration of possible savings and could vary as operational and service level models are vetted. In order to avoid lay-offs, many of these savings would have to be realized over time through attrition as several of the consolidated positions are currently occupied. It appears that the biggest savings would be realized through elimination of duplication in the consolidation of communications and the command staff (namely, the chief's position). Though these savings are appealing, a thorough financial review is warranted.

The first phase of this study was to examine a consolidated police department that would meet the needs of the community. Early in the preparation of this study, it became

evident that the task of preparing a combined salary and benefit package would be extremely onerous. Much more analysis would need to be completed in order to get a better picture of cost savings associated with personnel. One assumption that was made was that ultimately both cities would be consolidated physically into one department. San Mateo is believed to have the capacity to accommodate the additional personnel and equipment, though parking issues would have to be examined. If, in fact, both departments were able to consolidate under one roof, both Burlingame and San Mateo could benefit financially from a reduced infrastructure cost. Extensive analysis and a cost-sharing ratio would have to be established to ensure an equitable distribution of cost.

On any contemplated shared service model, there will be one-time conversion costs associated with that model. Those conversion costs are unknown at this time and will have to be thoroughly vetted.

#### **H. INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING THROUGH CONSOLIDATION OF SAN MATEO/BURLINGAME P.D**

One of the driving forces behind police consolidation is the opportunity to implement intelligence-led policing (ILP) in the consolidated cities or throughout an entire consolidated metropolitan police department. Consolidation allows for the elevation of the intelligence process throughout a region because of the information sharing that is a natural byproduct of consolidation. According to Colonel Joseph R. Fuentes, Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police, over a third of the victims of 9/11 lived in New Jersey and 11 of the 19 hijackers spent time in New Jersey. Colonel Fuentes uses these facts to illustrate that terrorism is a local issue that has brought on a new era for police administrators in the area of managing risk. Police departments need a better tool that could be utilized in determining where and how to deploy their resources. By consolidating the San Mateo Police and Burlingame Police Departments, ILP can be adopted as a better way to deploy resource in order to better protect the public.

According to Colonel Fuentes (2006), the implementation of ILP at the New Jersey State Police required four main components that the San Mateo/Burlingame Police Departments could utilize. Those four components consisted of:

- Reorganization of Investigations to facilitate rapid deployment of intelligence and investigative assets.
- The adoption of the intelligence cycle to support situational awareness
- The creation of an intelligence center
- Use of strategic planning and intelligence driven analysis to support priorities

The purpose of ILP would be to collect better data and then use it constructively to develop a strategic plan for crime prevention or response. It is important to understand the operational environment so that the chief of the San Mateo and Burlingame police department can make the most informed choices on how to control crime. Fuentes (2006) notes that police departments have to move from emphasizing post event evidence collection to gathering all relevant data as well as drawing on intelligence analyst and relevant data bases. This means that officers would have to become better data collectors and consumers. The key role ILP would play in the consolidation of the two police departments is to create a system of better information sharing, improve communication over a larger geographic area and enhance coordination and efforts of the two departments. By doing this it allows decision makers to make the best decisions with respect to crime control strategies, allocation of resources and tactical operations (Fuentes, 2006).

According to Fuentes, the intelligence cycle consist of the following components:



Figure 2. Intelligence Cycle from (From Fuentes, 2006)

In phase I of the planning and direction, the consolidated departments would define their priorities for data collection and intelligence efforts. This is defined for every branch of the organization and that really delineates each division's collection and analysis needs (Fuentes, 2006). Phase II consists of the gathering of raw data that fulfills the policy set for the departments' collection and intelligence priorities. Officers in this phase need to be trained to collect the right kind of data. The training must consist of what to collect, along with who, where and how to collect it to fulfill the department's needs. This would include utilizing all resources and data bases offered at the state, federal, and county levels, along with utilizing open source resources (Fuentes, 2006). Phase III in this consolidated ILP model would involve the analysis of the information gathered. This is where the raw data is "transformed" (the most important part of ILP) into intelligence information that can be utilized by the agency. According to Fuentes, the raw data must be evaluated for its validity and reliability so that a timely analysis can take place which is then articulated in reports and briefings.

Neither San Mateo nor Burlingame currently have a dedicated crime analyst, so they could jointly create this important position or look to outsource this important task to the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center. This is something the NRCIC does

not currently do for all crimes. The later choice would be the best possible solution because the NCRIC currently has access to vast amounts of regional information and that would be able to determine regional trends and issues. According to Fuentes, intelligence products should include the following types of intelligence reports:

- Tactical intelligence which are focused on particular targets (Leaders of gangs, expected terrorist, specific burglars or robbery suspects)
- Operational intelligence targets focus on a particular group (a particular gang, a specific ring of thieves or a drug distribution network, a network of terrorist)
- Strategic intelligence focuses on overall regional or statewide issues (gangs, terrorism, drugs, burglary at statewide or regional level)

Phase IV involves the use of the NRCIC to distribute the finished intelligence product to the widest possible audience (this is why I believe the NCRIC should also do the analysis in this consolidation). It is important that the intelligence gathered within the policy of the agency be distributed to those internally and externally who can benefit from that intelligence product. This may also involve informing our private sector partners of trends and threats that have been uncovered through the ILP process. Phase V consist of giving feedback on the intelligence information that is being gathered. There should be a dedicated police captain in this consolidation that would liaison with the NCRIC to ensure that the finished intelligence product is meeting the goals established by the consolidated departments. This must be continually evaluated to ensure that the intelligence information provides operational awareness that allows for strategic planning to prevent crime.

## **I. CONCLUSION**

This study has concluded that through the consolidation, Burlingame and San Mateo Police Departments could meet the following primary objectives:

- Maximum leveraging of resources to maintain and enhance law enforcement services to each community;
- Maximum cost efficiency and effectiveness of law enforcement operations through the elimination of costly duplicative administrative, operational, and support services;

- Provide a full service police department to both cities that results in appropriate supervision and 24-hour coverage.
- Implement an intelligence-led policing component that results in better communication, more information sharing, and enhanced allocation of resources.

It is clear that instituting ILP should be one of the goals in the consolidation of these two departments. The development of ILP could greatly benefit both communities and be an outstanding byproduct of this consolidation. It has the potential to lead to a model that more effectively polices both communities.

The cost analysis indicates that a consolidated Burlingame and San Mateo Police Department could result in joint savings of millions of dollars, with the potential for more savings through reallocation of resources and technology.

The financial benefit to each agency could improve if they operated in one facility and shared the cost of that facility. This is not a necessity, but rather a suggestion and should not be implemented until years into this project. Some form of police customer service desk should always be maintained in Burlingame for public convenience, while the bulk of behind the scenes police operations could be housed in one building, thus eliminating expensive overhead. The studies also showed that improved service levels could be achieved and more specialty services could be incorporated into the city of Burlingame. Officer safety through improved communications would be a benefit, and the community of Burlingame would also be well served through a geographic policing model.

If the agencies proceeded, it was recommended that an incremental process of shared services take place with the first step being the consolidation of dispatch services. When a shared services model is implemented with shared IT personnel, the additional savings reach over \$700,000 per year. For the majority of all shifts, Burlingame would still be able to operate on its own frequency, and shared frequencies would only be utilized during low-call volume hours of operation. This model will potentially give better staffing service to both agencies, especially on weekend evenings where call

volumes for both agencies reach maximum levels. Not only does this model provide better service during peak hours, it helps to close the communication gap between agencies and will result in a safer community.

In areas such as the training manager, parking enforcement, and evidence, San Mateo has immediate capacity to act for both combined agencies. The command staff structure is another area that can be executed with one chief and the existing command staff, saving several hundred thousand dollars.

Clearly, the proposed structure of the consolidated agency is lean and flexible. It would allow for creative response to future law enforcement needs in both communities. A Joint Powers Authority (JPA) would allow for complete and equal control by selected council representatives over both agencies, with the two city managers exercising the day-to-day management over the department head.

It was also recommended that an exploration of a joint prisoner transportation plan be put in place which would cover both cities on weekend nights. This could be accomplished through per diem transport officers, reserve officers, or a dedicated officer assigned to transportation. The value of officers on the street is greatly diminished when an arrest is made due to the length of time associated with the booking and transportation process. The goal of this program would be to maximum officers' time on the street preventing crime and taking proactive steps to improve safety in the community by eliminating the wasteful time spent on the booking and transportation process. When an arrest is made in one of the cities the transport vehicle is summoned and the prisoner is turned over to the transportation officer thereby allowing the arresting officer to immediately return to service. Weekend nights are clearly the highest call volume times when officers are needed on the streets.

The policing of a community is often very personal to that city and, therefore, needs to be based on the direction of both city councils with input from the respective city managers. The purpose of this study was to see if consolidation of both departments is feasible. The unequivocal finding is that it is feasible and should be seriously considered.

It is nearly impossible to address every expectation without further direction regarding service levels or operational needs of a joint enterprise. A logical next step would be to isolate one area of shared service (like dispatch) and work toward a shared model of services.

The initial case study detailed sufficient information and proposed a financial savings for the city managers of San Mateo and Burlingame to plan their next steps. The city managers decided the deputy chief from the city of San Mateo would be appointed the interim chief of the city of Burlingame. The managers believed that the new interim chief in Burlingame would then work with the chief of San Mateo to select a consultant that would take a micro look at the economies of scale of consolidation while also developing a governance plan.

Both sides worked on a contract proposal and the proposed interim chief met with Burlingame City Council members so they could get to know him and answer any questions they may have had. During this process of developing the strategic plan to move forward, members of the press made inquiries into this possible consolidation. This inquiry expedited the planned strategic release of information and did not allow for the coordination of information in the way both cities desired. Ideally, the information was planned to be released to members of both police departments and the public at the same time.

On April 19, 2010, the contract to bring the San Mateo Deputy Chief into Burlingame Police Department as the interim chief went the respective city councils. The San Mateo City Council, after no public input, voted four to one in favor of the contract. In an open council meeting past and present members of the Burlingame Police Department, along with members of the public, lobbied the Burlingame City Council to not follow the plan suggested by the Burlingame city manager. In particular, the Burlingame Police Officers Association lobbied residents and businesses to oppose the hiring of the Deputy Chief from San Mateo into Burlingame and many opposed the idea of consolidation outright. The Burlingame City Council heard approximately 30 members of public speak in opposition to the contract. Well after mid-night, they called for a vote on the contract. The mayor called for the contract to be rejected and that

motion was seconded. The council voted three to two to reject the contract. A motion was then made to approve the contract with the provision that an outside study first be conducted; that vote failed three to two. The Burlingame City Council then voted to table the contract pending the hiring of an outside consultant who would conduct a feasibility study to determine the economies of scale and if certain service levels could be maintained. The cities are now in the process of retaining a consultant to conduct the independent feasibility study.

The intelligence sharing component of this consolidation and the resulting homeland security implications are extremely important. The intelligence-led policing aspect of this consolidation will be discussed in chapter VI.

## **J. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND NEXT STEPS**

An initial study of a merger between the San Mateo and Burlingame Police Departments, in whole or in parts, appears to make fiscal and operational sense. This case study shows that in large part, consideration should be given as to how the public and employees of the impacted departments should be notified and brought into the process at an early stage. The importance of trust and early buy-in by all involved parties is essential. The coordinated timing of the release of information so that both departments receive the information at the same time cannot be overstated. It is imperative for police departments to get their message out to the public before other interested parties put their spin on any police consolidation efforts. It is inevitable that parties will put their own slant on consolidation in an effort to perpetuate an antiquated system of policing and the misinformation that comes from those parties can be very persuasive to an uninformed public. Great care must be given to getting all stakeholders in the process early in an effort to reach consensus on how to move forward.

In this particular case study, both city managers were motivated to find creative solutions to on-going fiscal concerns of financial stability. The preliminary study, prepared by members of both agencies, enumerated numerous economies of scale that could be realized without impacting frontline officers. What this could mean to both departments is an opportunity to better prepare both communities against terrorist attacks

and natural disasters. Both cities have a strong interest in exploring how their communities can benefit from shared services and what obstacles or governance models may inhibit such collaboration.

Any shared services model will need to include the cooperation of the employees and public. This study demonstrates that the closer the organizations get to a shared services model, the more important it will become to have employee committees established to work through wage/benefit and seniority issues, to name a few of the obstacles the cities must overcome.

## **K. ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES**

### **1. Analysis**

Consolidation of policing can be a viable law enforcement tool used to fight the war on terrorism, but getting past early discussions about consolidation has been a huge hurdle for many police departments. In an attempt to understand why the Twin Cities model of consolidation of policing was successful right from the start, while the San Mateo/ Burlingame model did not proceed as originally planned, an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of both consolidations was conducted

In an effort to more fully understand the implications of a shared/consolidated services model, a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis was conducted.

### **2. Strengths**

The strength of the Twin Creeks consolidation was really grounded in the supportive nature the two city police departments had with each other long before consolidation efforts started. The fact that both the Larkspur and Corte Madera police departments were relatively the same size, and had supported each other for years, played a major factor in their success. Being relative small departments, they had shared equipment and resources with each other. Personal relationship among the officers, councils, and city managers was very good. Both communities had similar crime issues and would benefit from a shared dispatching and officer coverage. They also found that

by combining efforts, they could provide more street coverage and proactively address juvenile crime issues. Nonetheless, the real strength was the way the program was presented to the community and enacted with dialogue and in incremental steps always testing the water before going deeper. Twin Cities did an outstanding job of putting a strategic plan in place and meeting the needs of the community before moving forward. They waited for the right opportunity when the chief of Larkspur resigned and thus the consolidation did not result in anyone being pushed out the door.

The overarching strength in the San Mateo/Burlingame process was two committed city managers who were innovators and shared a joint vision of modern policing in the twenty-first century. Other immediate strengths included increased communication and coordination in a broader region, along with much needed financial savings through the elimination of duplicated services. In regard to dispatch services each agency had vacancies that could have resulted in consolidation without layoffs. Backup calls for service would also be immediate thereby enhancing the safety of officers.

Both cities have similar crime patterns and similar demographics. “Exhibit A” shows a 10-year trend for both departments. Both communities will be better served by addressing these crimes through the leveraging of joint resources.

### **3. Weaknesses**

There were some things in the Twin Cities model that should have been considered. The Twin Cities model did not result in much initial savings, and actually with initial conversion cost, may have resulted in the initial increase in budgets. The other weakness would be the initial desire to maintain two public safety buildings that did not allow for the immediate integration of police services. The question could have been asked that without any real savings, why do it at all? The consolidation is operated by a Joint Powers Act, (JPA) which could change as the personalities and goals of the council members change.

One of the things San Mateo and Burlingame needs to consider in the consolidation effort is that San Mateo is approximately four times the size of Burlingame and has more crime than the city of Burlingame. Issues that came from the disparate size of the agencies were as follows:

- Burlingame employees and some citizens thought because of the different size of the agencies, service levels in Burlingame would change and resources previously dedicated to Burlingame would be used to supplement San Mateo crime fighting efforts.
- There was a feeling of a takeover and not a true collaboration.
- If a JPA was the preferred governance model it could lead to instability of the partnership, which is a characteristic of any JPA.
- This was a historic and innovative move by the managers in these cities and they did so without any roadmap. If all parties were to embark on this endeavor again, all parties would agree that the pre-planning stage would be one of the most critical aspects of any consolidation.

#### **4. Opportunities**

It was a great opportunity for both Corte Madera and Larkspur Police Departments to share resources, increase street coverage, collective work on juvenile issue, share intelligence and communication through a combined dispatch and report management system, while decreasing cost. The Twin Cities achieved a higher level of service to both communities at a more economical cost resulting in a better safety model to both cities. This was innovation at its best when the opportunity presented itself with the retirement of a police chief. The fact that both cities had developed a relationship at every level well in advance of this opportunity only acted to enhance their chances of success. Both cities positioned themselves to take on the new future demands of policing in society, including the prevention of terrorism in a day of declining police budget.

Twin Cities also increased their purchasing power, opened up more opportunities for grants based on their now combined size, and could engage in uniform training to help prepare officers for the new challenges that a changing world would bring.

Currently, the economics in California dictate that in order to meet the needs of communities, the elimination of duplication of services should be explored as a way to reduce costs. Cities must look for opportunities that will allow them a viable transition to consolidation.

The Burlingame chief retired in December 2009 after 35-plus years of dedicated service to the city of Burlingame. This retirement provided a unique opportunity to realize the economies of scale with one Chief of Police and the current command staff. Studies of similar cities with populations ranging from 120,000 to 150,000 indicate that the above structure can work well. It also shows that a high level of service can be obtained through that structure. This leveraging of services could bring a higher level of communication, service, and coordination to both geographic communities. The elimination of duplication to avoid wasting tax dollars makes good fiscal sense. Due to financial constraints and the resignation of the chief's position in Burlingame, Burlingame and San Mateo are in a unique position to really move beyond conversation toward implementation of shared services. This is a rare chance with a relatively short window of opportunity.

If both agencies adhered to an 11-hour schedule, it would result in seven built-in training days for both agencies. All mandatory trainings are addressed during this time frame, therefore reducing training overtime costs. Additionally, crucial areas of high liability are addressed during these training days. The 11-hour shift results in a staggered start time for officers in the morning with a shift starting at 7 a.m. and another one at 10 a.m. This provides for better coverage later in the evening as calls for service tend to increase.

A dedicated geographic lieutenant in the city of Burlingame would allow for more community outreach and opportunities to work with the public and understand their needs. It would lead to the early detection of crime patterns through intelligence led policing and rapid deployment of resources to address those ongoing community concerns where long-term solutions can be implemented. It would also allow for better coordination of services at street events, cars shows, bike races, dignitary protection, and relations with the hotels in Burlingame.

## **5. Threats**

In Twin Cities, if members on the council change and goals of member of the JPA change, the consolidated department is in jeopardy. There is always a chance that a fiscal crisis in one city could result in the inability of one city to sustain the partnership.

In San Mateo/Burlingame, the proposed consolidation is at risk because, because unlike the Twin Cities, there is no history of sustained success in sharing core services. This proposed consolidation could be derailed by the concerns of staff, the public, council members or the respective city managers. The inability of one party to pay in the future is always a risk, as is public dissatisfaction after consolidation takes place. It could be very difficult to restart a police department once the assets have been sold or become antiquated. There is also a threat that the projected fiscal savings will not be met, resulting in the public placing blame on council members. It clearly takes a leap of faith to go down this path, and it must be done carefully, that is why an outside consultant should be hired to assess the financial viability of consolidation.

The following is what the committee reviewed as real challenges to shared services or consolidation:

- Seniority
- New memoranda of understanding (MOUs)
- schedule changes
- standardization of rules and regulations
- cultures
- union negotiations
- vacation
- service levels
- infrastructure
- standardized reports
- IT issues
- conversion costs
- feelings of a takeover
- feelings of inequity

All of these issues have been addressed and overcome by other agencies, but great care and detail would have to go into each of these items to ensure a smooth transition.

#### **L. MAKING SENSE OF THE ANALYSIS:**

All of the research has indicated that true shared service models is viable but should proceed with caution. The respective city councils must share this vision as well as city managers and department heads. This concept needs to be carefully vetted in the involved communities and through both departments. It will be doomed for failure if it is seen as a takeover by one city rather than a shared vision based on trust with the overarching goal of superior service and cost savings through the elimination of duplication.

A careful analysis of all financial considerations must take place so that there is a complete and full disclosure of cost. Twin Cities did a careful analysis and realized the cost. San Mateo/Burlingame will have to continue their own due diligence. The model suggested above must be examined in relation to needs and service levels of the communities. If resources are diluted at the cost of overworked employees and a decrease in service, then this model will become counterproductive. An appropriate management board must be put in place to ensure an equal representation and voice in the operation of the police department. Measureable goals should be established to ensure that the services and/or consolidation objectives are being met.

Committees should be established to help with transition and implementation plans. It is imperative that employees play an integral part of the planning to ensure buy-in from the beginning. Other successful models should be thoroughly explored in an effort to take advantage of lessons learned.

The Twin Cities case study has demonstrated that their success was based upon careful and calculated steps. First, they consolidated neighboring police departments that were approximately the same size. This eliminated the “take over” argument that was present in the initial steps of the San Mateo/Burlingame attempt to study consolidation. The Twin Cities model was also successful because they carefully studied the issue of consolidation, developed a strategy of implementation involved all stakeholders in the

process took incremental steps, and reported back on the goal. They put one chief in charge of both departments so that policy and procedures were unified. The chief was getting one message out to the department and the public, which really resulted in progress toward the ultimate goal of consolidation.

A strong working relationship is important at every level prior to consolidation. There must be a feeling of trust and a joint vision of all parties working through those disagreements toward a shared final vision.

The case study of the Twin Cities consolidation creates a roadmap that all departments that contemplate consolidation should follow. The San Mateo case study underscores the “snail darters” that can work to destroy even the best planned modern day attempts at consolidation. These case studies should act as valuable tools for any agency that is considering consolidation of police resources.

## **V. POLICY OPTIONS TO FILL IN THE CRUCIAL GAPS IN HOMELAND SECURITY POLICING**

### **A. THE PROBLEM DEFINED:**

Most police agencies lack the coordination, uniform training, resources, financial capability and understanding of homeland security issues to effectively protect communities against the threats of terrorism, natural disasters and emerging crimes. The following will examine police policy options in San Mateo County. These options are applicable to most counties throughout the country where the majority of police operations are conducted by individual small police agencies.

### **B. POLICY OPTIONS IN SAN MATEO COUNTY**

#### **1. Dissolve All City Police Departments and Create One Metropolitan Police Department under the Auspices of One Chief in the County Of San Mateo to Increase Homeland Security Protection**

The first solution would require the city councils of all 20 police agencies in San Mateo County to come under the control of one elected or appointed chief for the purpose of eliminating duplication and fragmentation, while at the same time enhancing homeland security capabilities. The potential for financial savings, at least in part, can be invested in front line services. While eliminating duplication in areas of administration, dispatch, records, evidence, investigations, a more comprehensive policing model could be developed. Training throughout the county would be uniform, purchasing power would increase, intelligence sharing and communication could be greatly enhanced, and the metropolitan police department serving a population of over 700,000 would be considered a large department and eligible for other grant opportunities. Crimes that plague the county such as serial robbers and burglaries, along with gang and drug activity could be collectively addressed. A Joint Powers Authority (JPA) or police commission could be formed that would allow each city oversight capability of public safety operations. Agencies would no longer compete for officers and the size and opportunities presented in a metropolitan police department may make it more attractive for recruits.

The real advantage would be the ability of the county to coordinate homeland security issues more easily and uniformly with standard operating policies and procedures.

**2. Start Consolidation in San Mateo County by Forming Three Distinct Police Agencies; North County, South County and Central County**

Cities in San Mateo County currently partner with agencies in the three county zones for mutual aid purposes and training purposes on occasion. These are already established zones and the city police departments have an on-going working relationship with one another. The three zones will give cities a bit more flexibility and autonomy to address specific issues that may impact their particular areas of the county. This would also allow the police agencies to be more flexible to the specific service needs of some cities in a particular zone. The zone police departments would still be able to focus on homeland security issues standardize training, and it would be easier for the three chiefs in the county to coordinate joint efforts rather than the 20 existing chiefs. Economies of scale could still be realized through the elimination in duplicative services like dispatch, records, evidence, training, and administration. Cities could still stay involved with oversight through a JPA or a police commission.

**3. Consolidate Individual Neighboring Police Departments Based on Fiscal Needs While Increasing Homeland Security Capabilities Of The Departments**

Cities in San Mateo County are suffering financially, just like other cities around the United States. After years of rising cost and decreasing revenue, cities have made cuts to the point of now providing only basic city services. While challenges and demands on law enforcement continue to grow as the homeland security landscape continues to change, frontline police officers continue to be eliminated. The city of San Carlos, located in San Mateo County, is in such a dire fiscal crisis that they suggested turning all the street lights off at night. They are now looking at disbanding the police department and contracting police services with the sheriff's department.

The Millbrae Police Department in San Mateo County has cut police services to just basic patrol and has hired a part time chief and detectives in order to meet budget constraints. They are now sharing a chief with a neighboring community and are looking

at consolidating. Every other city in the county of San Mateo is looking at ways to save public safety expenses, and now more than ever the timing allows cities to examine the possibility of consolidating police departments with neighboring communities.

#### **4. Limited Consolidation of Resources in San Mateo County in Order to Maximize Homeland Security While Preserving Autonomy**

The existing 20 San Mateo County Law Enforcement Leaders could commission a study on how to best consolidate resources in San Mateo County to increase homeland security efforts and save money while maintaining individual police departments. Departments could look to share information through COPLINK in order to share valuable homeland security information while leveraging their own information systems. Dispatch efforts could be shared in the county through one centralized dispatch center. Records, evidence, court officers and investigations could also all be centralized resulting in projected substantial savings. Homeland security training could be standardized in the county along with all other police training. Extensive JPAs would not have to be created as they could be created under MOUs. There is a history of this existing in the county in the form of the County Crime Lab where individual agencies pay their pro rata share of services based on usage. This allows each agency to realize savings through the elimination of overhead and personnel and has resulted in standardized collection, testing, and reporting of all evidence in the county.

#### **5. Maintain the Status Quo as It Has Been in Place for Over 100 Years**

“Why fix it if it is not broken?” Cities in San Mateo County have had police departments, in many instances, for over 100 years. They have served the individual cities well and when requested cities are more than willing to help with mutual aid. The current financial crisis may prove to be an anomaly, and things may return to normal in a year or two. So weather the storm in order to preserve the individual nature of the city police departments which in some cases have vastly different service levels.

### **C. CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS/FAILURE**

1. Cost: Refers to the amount of money that would be necessary to implement the recommended changes.

2.     **Legality:** Is the suggested solution currently legal to enact without force or litigation?
3.     **Political:** Amiability and suitability of the solution to employees, city councils, city managers and the public.
4.     **Level of Effort:** Refers to the amount of work hours that it would take to implement.
5.     **Effectiveness:** The anticipated result following the implementation of the action when compared to the cost (cost benefit analysis).
6.     **Potential Fiscal Savings-** The potential savings to cities once the action is undertaken.
7.     **Increase in homeland security:** More effective policing by implementing intelligence-led policing which results in increased operational awareness and information sharing.

#### **D.     POTENTIAL OUTCOMES OF DIFFERENT POLICY OPTIONS BASED**

##### **1.     Dissolve All City Police Departments and Create One Metropolitan Police Department Under the Auspices of One Chief in the County of San Mateo to Improve Homeland Security Protection**

This dissolution could result in a very favorable outcome depending on the support of the various unions, chiefs, city councils, managers and citizens. The prospects of one unified homeland security effort in the county where all officers are equally trained and equipped, are operating under the same set of policies, and procedures are a viable prospect. Existing fragmentation and duplication would be eliminated with the potential for large scales of economy. Cities now suffering under huge deficits would be relieved of substantial employee and overhead cost. Joint efforts throughout the county could focus on serial criminals that are responsible for ongoing victimization. Terrorism prevention could become more of a focus in the county and resources could be leveraged to provide better coverage throughout the county. Though clearly the most attractive because of its potential to increase homeland security efforts through implementation of ILP, coordination of efforts, and leveraging of resources, it would also be the most difficult to implement. There is currently no legal remedy available that would force cities in San Mateo County to consolidate, and any attempt would be met with expensive and long lasting litigation. With the many different interests in the county, it may be virtually impossible to align those interests at one time.

**2. Start Consolidation in San Mateo County by Forming Three Distinct Police Agencies; North County, South County and Central County**

For many of the same reasons in the option immediately above, this option could also be very attractive. It would lead to more flexibility of specialized services in a given region in the county and would result in a better coordination of intelligence and information sharing. This would result in better homeland security coordination and allow for more uniformity of training, policy and procedures. Cities could still reap considerable financial savings addressing the deficits that they now face. The challenges would be those discussed above cities could not be forced into consolidation and any attempt could be turn citizens against the idea and cause expensive litigation.

**3. Consolidate Individual Neighboring Police Departments Based on Fiscal Needs While Increasing Homeland Security Capabilities of the Departments**

This option could also result in a very favorable outcome. Unlike the larger consolidations, this one would be easier to manage as it would only usually involve two cities with contiguous borders that share the same geographic based crime issues and challenges. The ILP model could be easily implemented and lead to more effective policing of the communities. These departments usually support each other with mutual aid, and the officers and command staffs are already engaged in cooperative joint efforts. In many cases, the fiscal savings could be substantial. For example, the San Mateo/Burlingame case study revealed a possibility of saving several million dollars. Additionally, being on the same radio channel could result in improved officer safety and communication. The fact that San Mateo and Burlingame would be acting as one department would result in the increase in intelligence sharing that could act to solve more crimes in the geographic area. Solving crime is like a puzzle, the more pieces identified, the faster the puzzle is solved. When those pieces of the puzzle are scattered over a geographic area with no viable way to connect them, crime problems linger and more citizens are victimized. Additionally, homeland security efforts could be increased through standardized training and the standardization of policy and procedures.

**4. Limited Consolidation of Resources in San Mateo County in Order to Maximize Homeland Security While Preserving Autonomy**

Limited consolidation of resources in San Mateo County would be a step in the right direction. If keeping individual police departments are a priority of the public and officials then law enforcement should look for ways to increase homeland security efforts while at the same time trying to save money and keeping their autonomy. The consolidation and centralization of dispatch could be done almost immediately with the existing technology in the county. Increases in intelligence gathering and communication could be achieved through the use of COPLINK, which that links all the various Report Management Systems together in the county so that information vital to link analysis for development of crime patterns could be readily available. ILP could be implemented at a county level through a joint memorandum of understanding (MOU). This would act to preserve the individual identity of police departments by maintaining their individual front line serves and management, while consolidating the prevention and investigation of crime. Cities, therefore, would reap the benefit of both worlds while saving money. This proposition could be done with MOUs instead of JPAs.

**5. Maintain the Status Quo as It has Been in Place for Over 100 Years**

While it may be easy to maintain the status quo, this is not a viable option. New challenges, such as our homeland security mandate, demand that we start sharing information while working together. The financial crisis that cities are now facing has put unprecedented pressure on cities to find ways to cut costs. That cost cutting usually results in the loss of frontline officers. This is a system that cannot be sustained and must change. The days of cities being islands unto themselves are gone and innovative and creative solutions must be sought to bring better security and lower costs to the homeland. There are viable alternatives to the existing system that provide a much better option than the status quo.

## E. COMPARISON OF POLICY OPTIONS

Table 2. Policy Options Impact Matrix (From Callagy, 2009)

| Solutions | Cost   | Legality | Political | Effort | Effectiveness | Savings | Homeland Security |
|-----------|--------|----------|-----------|--------|---------------|---------|-------------------|
| B.1       | High   | No       | High      | High   | High          | High    | High              |
| B.2       | High   | No       | High      | High   | High          | High    | High              |
| B.3       | Medium | Yes      | Medium    | Medium | High          | Medium  | Medium            |
| B.4       | Low    | Yes      | Low       | Medium | Medium        | Medium  | Medium            |
| B.5       | High   | Yes      | Low       | Low    | Low           | Low     | Low               |

### 1. Dissolve All City Police Departments And Create One Metropolitan Police Department Under the Auspices of One Chief in the County of San Mateo to Increase Homeland Security Protection

The cost of this venture would be high, both financially and politically. The initial cost would most likely eliminate any early savings, as was the case in the Las Vegas consolidation where cost went from 13 million dollars annually for the two departments to 29 million annually within five years (Krajick, 1979). The ability to overcome the union opposition and the citizens that would be swayed by the city officers could prove to be insurmountable. Though savings, effectiveness and homeland security efforts could improve with this option, the ability to consolidate all the police resources in the county at this time is not viable. A major terrorist event that exposes the fragmentation of policing or severe continued financial crisis may make this is a viable option in the future.

### 2. Begin Consolidation in San Mateo County by Forming Three Distinct Police Agencies; North County, South County, and Central County

Though slightly easier than creating one metropolitan police department, the prospect of creating three regional based departments in the county is daunting. The possibility of organizing police departments on a regional basis is an exciting prospect, but the need by many departments to maintain their own identity, even at the cost of increased homeland security is a theme that will dominate the safety model for the near future. Again, a significant terrorist attack or major natural disaster that exposes the weaknesses in the current fragmented system of policing in the county may act to make

this a more viable option. Even the increase in the financial crisis facing cities will not bring sufficient pressure to adopt this option. Even having cities understand that this model is an investment in the future that may save them money in the long term through prevention, will also not be an incentive to move this option forward. Though this option would be highly effective in promoting increased homeland security through ILP, shared communication, training, and standardized policy and procedures, the political process, effort of implementation, and cost will be too great to make this a viable option.

**3. Consolidate Individual Neighboring Police Departments Based on Fiscal Needs While Increasing Homeland Security Capabilities of the Departments**

This option has promise as the effort to consolidate two police departments is much easier than attempting to consolidate a region. Typically these types of efforts will start with the alignment of a shared vision between city councils and city managers, who usually have a strong history of collaboration and shared resources/issues. Contiguous borders are easily traversed by officers and serious economies of scale can be realized with just a two city consolidation. This type of collaboration is being examined as an option in San Mateo County, but is only an option because of a financial crisis rather than a homeland security motivation. Regardless of the motivation, this option can have the dual effect of reducing police cost while increasing homeland security efforts. It would allow for the immediate development of an ILP model with the consolidated agencies.

**4. Limited Consolidation of Resources in San Mateo County in Order to Maximize Homeland Security While Preserving Autonomy**

This option is achievable and could be a good start that works to address current concerns about information sharing and training. This could result in some cost savings and increase efficiencies with little disruption to the individual identities of the current policy departments. It does not address the management of these departments and the ability to interact with state/federal officials as a concentrated group rather than 20 individual agencies, but it could begin the synergy of consolidation in the county. It would also allow for the immediate implementation of ILP. This option appears to be the best option with little downside and low upfront cost.

## **5. Maintain the Status Quo as It Has Been in Place for Over 100 Years**

This is no longer a viable option. City economics can no longer support the increased cost of individualized public safety. Without new revenue to support city services or drastic cuts that compromise homeland security, the current fragmented and independent system of policing each city cannot be sustained. New homeland security demands will dictate more cooperation between city police departments. This traditional method of policing will become obsolete and the change will be driven by financial constraints rather than by security concerns. The political fallout will be low, unless a terrorist attack takes place wherein the weaknesses in the fragmented system of intelligence sharing, information sharing, and training are exposed.

## **F. THE BEST SOLUTION**

The best option given the choices is a combination of consolidating individual neighboring police departments based on their fiscal needs. Departments should also seek limited consolidation of resources opportunities in San Mateo County in an attempt to maximize homeland security protection while preserving the individual autonomy of each city. These are represented in options three and four in the matrix. These are the most realistic options given the current consolidation climate among San Mateo County Police agencies.

## **G. WHY OPTIONS 3 AND 4**

The goal of consolidation of police resources is to increase our homeland security network by increasing our intelligence sharing capabilities and communication, while standardizing training and policy and procedures. Though administrators and council may be driven by fiscal savings, the combination of options three and four meet both fiscal and homeland security goals. It allows those agencies that want to stay independent to do so while participating in consolidation efforts. The consolidation of dispatch, records, court officer, investigation units, and evidence could be accomplished with little political involvement or visibility. The implementation of ILP could also take place with relative ease. Those who are willing to go further could pick and choose their partners and work together on a common vision at a pre-planned pace. This would be a politically

acceptable compromise, and one that potentially could save agencies millions of dollars. There is also precedent in the form of the crime lab that has established uniformity and economies of scale in a countywide consolidation plan. This combined option would go a long way to achieving the goal of enhancing homeland security through consolidation efforts.

While it is important to examine the policy options available to departments that are considering the consolidation process, it is also important to determine if the size of a police agency may impact that department's ability to provide homeland security to the community they serve. The answer to that question may impact an agencies' decision to consolidate. In other words, if police agencies believed they be better prepared to protect their communities against the variety of challenges they face if they consolidated resources, this may act as a motivating factor to consolidate. Chapter V explores if larger police agencies are better prepared to provide communities with an effective homeland security plan.

## **VI. CAN THE SIZE OF A POLICE AGENCY HAVE AN IMPACT ON TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS?**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

According to Ostrom and Smith (1976):

The verdict has been reached: Small police departments by their very smallness are judged not to be viable agencies of law enforcement in metropolitan areas. The assumption that small departments, especially those called “Lilliputs” with fewer than 20 officers, are ineffective and inefficient is widely accepted. Action-oriented national and state criminal justice commissions are willing to act on this assumption and recommend without qualification the elimination of thousands of small departments.

A DOJ report, entitled *Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 2004*, reported there were nearly 17,876 state and local law enforcement agencies in the United States. Of those 17,876 agencies, the vast majority, 12,766 are local police agencies with an additional 3,067 sheriff’s departments and 1,400 special police agencies, There are over 800,000 commissioned police officers in the country according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), but what is most interesting is that the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that in 2000 over 74 percent of law enforcement agencies in the United States had 10 or fewer officers (Mack, 2003).

Does this extreme fragmentation of policing in the U.S.hurt law enforcement’s ability to share vital intelligence information that may prevent terrorist attacks? How can so many small departments serving small populations effectively communicate and share information with each other and the Intelligence community?

There is no doubt that law enforcement must play a critical role in the detection and prevention of attacks by terrorists in the United States. But is the law enforcement community, in its fragmented state of policing prepared or capable of terrorism prevention?

In 1995, RAND Corporation conducted at study to determine the preparedness of U.S.local law enforcement agencies. The research was conducted by the Homeland Security Program at RAND Corporation.

## **B. STUDY RESULTS**

The Rand study was conducted on behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice to specifically determine if the U.S. was prepared for a terrorist attack. That study clearly indicated that local law enforcement was lacking in preparedness (RAND, 1995). The study specifically found that there was poor liaison and communication among federal, state and local officials, little or no training related to terrorism preparedness, little to no intelligence and strategic threat-assessment capability and minimal expert review of plans and training exercises (Davis, Riley, Ridgeway, Pace, Cotton., Steinberg, Damphousse, and Smith, 2004). Since that 1995 study, we have seen two significant terrorist attacks, in Oklahoma City and New York.

Have we learned from these attacks and become more prepared? The answer to that question may depend on the size of the local police agency. In 2002 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was formed with the purpose of addressing flaws previously discussed within federal law enforcement agencies. As part of DHS, the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) was formed to prepare state and local first responders on terrorism related issues. To accomplish its mission, DHS needed information on challenges first responders faced so that they could set in place a strategic plan. RAND Corporation was asked to replicate the 1995 study to determine if U.S. preparedness had changed. The RAND report addressed five key areas of concern to ODP and DHS:

- Response experience and threat assessment;
- Steps taken to counter the threat;
- Law enforcement support needs;
- Law enforcement preparedness activities and
- The perception of risk, funding and preparedness. (Davis et al., 2004)

With regard to threat assessment, half of the local law enforcement agencies thought that the possibility of a terrorist attack in their jurisdiction within the next five years was very low. In other words, in developing agency priorities, the prevention of acts of terrorism would not be high on the list for half of the local law enforcement agencies in the country (Davis et al., 2004).

The RAND study revealed that after 9/11, agencies located in larger counties made changes that resulted in being more prepared for a terrorist attack (Davis et al., 2004). Those changes included more personnel being assigned to emergency response planning, updating response plans, and increasing department spending to focus on terrorism prevention. Those larger agencies also received guidance and information from the FBI on what type of information they should collect, report, and pass on in regard to suspected terrorist activity. The higher the threat perception, the more prepared the agency became (Davis et al., 2004).

It was also determined that agencies that lacked specialized terrorism units, in general were less actively involved in terrorism training. This suggests that the smaller agencies with fewer resources devoted to terrorism related issues are less prepared to respond to those events. This is particularly disturbing with the knowledge that 74 percent of law enforcement agencies in the U.S. comprise of 10 officers or less. Thus, the vast majority of police agencies in the U.S. are not prepared to respond to terrorist attacks, and that some correlation can be drawn between the size of the law enforcement agency and its ability to prepare for terrorism related events, including the detection and sharing of terrorism related information. The RAND study also indicated that larger agencies were more proactive in doing risk assessment than those smaller county agencies throughout the U.S. (Davis et al., 2004). In larger county agencies the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) were often cited as sources of counterterrorism information, where in small county police agencies this was not the case (Davis et al., 2004).

In general, the RAND study found that law enforcement agencies in large counties, which are typically comprised of larger agencies, were vastly more proactive in addressing terrorism related preparedness in contrast to those police agencies located in smaller counties (Davis et al., 2004). The information suggests that by bringing agencies together into larger groups, law enforcement is better able to conduct risk assessment, train, collect and analyze terrorist information, liaison with federal agencies, and gain valuable experience through actual responses. They are able to interact with the JTTF on

a more regular basis, receive guidance from federal law enforcement agencies, and organize in a coordinated and comprehensive manner to terrorism related issues.

Additionally, over a third of law enforcement agencies in large counties wanted more intelligence information about terrorist threats and capabilities (Davis et al., 2004). In stark comparison, few law enforcement agencies in small counties desired more intelligence information (Davis et al., 2004). The same information was found in relation to response planning and training needs. Police agencies in larger counties desired more planning and training, while few police agencies in smaller counties considered this a necessity. Additionally, this RAND study found that the law enforcement agencies in larger counties desired new and better communication systems to make communication interoperable (Davis et al., 2004). Also interesting is that those agencies who were more prepared received more funding opportunities, indicating that the funding was going to those police agencies in larger jurisdictions. There was also a strong correlation between the perceived threat to an agency and their having updated response plans and training exercises.

Figure 3 is illustrative of the findings regarding size and preparedness of an agency.



Figure 3. Rand MGT104-S-1. (From Davis et al., 2004, p. xxv)

## **C CONCLUSIONS**

As the chart indicates, the size of the police jurisdiction clearly has an impact on the preparedness of the agency to respond to terrorism, with larger agencies being more prepared. The size of the agency has no correlation on the perceived risk or receipt of funding, but funding does play a part in preparedness. Thus, the size of an agency and the perceived risk of a terrorist attack lead to better preparation to prevent the attack.

What causes alarm, however, is if larger cities are considered safer than smaller cities, most of the critical infrastructure and high value targets (like nuclear power plants) are located in less populated jurisdictions. The implication could be that if smaller police jurisdiction consolidated into larger ones, they would be better prepared to address terrorism issues because they would have a perceived higher risk, seemingly have more resources to devote to terrorism, and therefore receive more funding to put towards equipment, training and planning.

The 2002 RAND study also resulted in a strong indication that for law enforcement to engage in a more meaningful intelligence function related to terrorism, they would somehow have to overcome the fragmentation of information sharing that now exists at the local level in places such as San Mateo County. With 20 agencies collecting data in separate ways, there is little ability to coordinate, leverage, and disseminate that information in a meaningful way. There is a clear indication that larger cities are more invested and prepared to fight the war on terror, so there is at least some evidence that larger combined police departments may make this nation safer against acts of terrorism, or better prepared to respond to natural disasters.

An integral part of countering terrorism is the gathering and dissemination of intelligence information in an attempt to stop attacks before they occur. This is something that few small agencies are prepared to do. Chapter VI discusses the intelligence implications in a shared services model.

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## **VII. INTELLIGENCE IMPLICATIONS OF A SHARED SERVICES MODEL**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Intelligence can be defined as information gathered through some form of data collection methods which provide a longer-term view of a problem that shapes long-term interventions (Riley, Treverton, Wilson, & Davis, 2005). Currently the FBI and major city police departments are the only agency that engages in counterterrorism intelligence gathering, traditional information gathering and evidence collection. By contrast law enforcement agencies (LEA) typically engage in criminal information gathering and evidence collection. How do we engage the 800,000 law enforcement officers throughout the U.S. in the counterterrorism intelligence process?

### **B. ANALYSIS**

The 9/11 Commission (2004) stressed in its findings the importance of intelligence analysis that can draw on all relevant sources of information. It also found, “The biggest impediment to an all-source analysis to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots—is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information (Riley et al., 2005). What the 9/11 Commission also found was that information was available before 9/11 that could have been crucial to the prevention of the terrorist acts, but it was a situation where an agency had to ask for it. In other words, it was basically a need to know basis. The flaw with that theory exists in local law enforcement today; law enforcement agencies often do not know what they need to know before they need to know it. In other words, when information is shared in a manner that allows the pieces of the puzzle to be filled in, agencies get a better idea of what they need to do. This is true when fighting crime, preventing terrorism or dealing with national disasters. The 9/11 Commission suggests that in these new threats, law enforcement agencies have a responsibility to share information in a meaningful way (2004). The commission suggests that making this information available is one way to repay the taxpayers for the investment they made in the collector.

In their analysis of information sharing, the 9/11 Commission spoke of how information procedures should provide incentives for sharing information to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge (Raley et al., 2005). Though the Commission was referring to federal agencies, this statement could be equally true for local police as well as they play a crucial role in combating terrorism. Local police agencies, which are best positioned to know their communities and are represented in almost every community in the United States, should be in a position to assist the federal agencies with intelligence information.

In 2005, the RAND Corporation undertook a study to determine if LEA intelligence gathering has changed since 9/11. They wanted to determine if, after 9/11, LEAs were supporting national security objectives. This report came on the heels of the 2004 RAND report, “When Terrorism Hits Home: How Prepared Are State and Local Law Enforcement?” That report found that there was a correlation between a larger size police agency and likelihood of increased preparedness; but that report did not examine a possible correlation between size of the agency and increased intelligence gathering capability. The Rand survey was administered to a random sample of 250 local LEAs in all 50 states. Of the 18,000 law enforcement agencies across the country approximately 1000 have 100 or more full-time sworn officers (BJS, 2002).

According to the RAND study, approximately one-third of the local LEAs collaborate with the FBI’s JJTFs (Riley et al., 2005). The survey found that the larger the local LEA, the more likely it was to participate in the JJTF (Riley et al., 2005). The survey also found that local LEAs have not formed separate intelligence gathering units, but rather they have been incorporated into the investigation functions of police departments. A crucial finding in the RAND study is that few local LEAs have the capacity to collect, receive or analyze intelligence information and although grants have been available, LEAs have used those grants for equipment rather than consequence management, analysis or training (Riley et al., 2005).

It appears that only large police agencies (over 100 officers) have the capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations. Counterterrorism efforts are an important and often overlooked distinction from investigative efforts. Investigations typically involve a crime

that detectives link to the person who committed the crime. In contrast, counterterrorism is the piecing of intelligence information together in order to prevent a crime. Small police agencies that make up the vast majority of LEAs in San Mateo County and throughout the country simply do not have the capacity to engage in counterterrorism efforts. If these agencies were consolidated, capacity could be built in to address the modern day policing obligation associated with terrorism prevention. The study also showed that currently LEAs are absorbing the expense for intelligence efforts out of their own funds and that this cannot be sustained, especially for a smaller agency (Riley et al., 2005). The training for LEAs is insufficient, and there is no coordination of state and local LEA intelligence gathering efforts. Though the RAND study did not specifically address the sheer amount and fragmentation of LEAs throughout the country, the hypothesis is the number of LEAs plays a major role in the lack of standardization and coordination of police agencies throughout the country (Riley et al., 2005). The number of police departments hinders communication and intelligence sharing, two of the crucial police tools utilized to prevent terrorism and crime.

Many LEAs lack experience with terrorism related events and only larger LEAs (over 100 officers) reported receiving twice as many hoaxes related to terrorism than smaller police agencies. This could be significant because even the hoaxes help prepare and train the officers for the real thing. An argument can be made that by consolidating smaller police agencies into larger ones police agencies will be better prepared to respond to a terrorist attack. The RAND report also indicated that prior to 9/11 the FBI had 36 JTTFs, there are now 104 (Riley et al., 2005). Only one-third of local LEAs reported interacting with the JTTF after 9/11 primarily to share information or receive counterterrorism information. Also larger police agencies conducted a threat assessment prior to 9/11 as opposed to only one third of the smaller police departments (less than 100 officers) (Riley et al., 2005).

## **C. CONCLUSIONS**

The RAND survey has some interesting results that tend to support the fact that counterintelligence efforts are not being conducted by the smaller LEAs, due to lack of

capacity. The larger police agencies have a heightened awareness and collection capability (Riley et al., 2005). This is a major issue in the protection of communities throughout the United States given that 74 percent of the police agencies in this country consist of 10 officers or less. There is no way that these agencies can be prepared to collect intelligence information on terrorism or respond to an act of terrorism in a comprehensive manner.

While larger police agencies invest in training, response plans, coordination of intelligence, and terrorism preparedness measures (Riley et al., 2005) smaller police agencies simply do not have the staffing or budgets to invest in training, response planning, coordination of intelligence and terrorism preparedness. This should be a major consideration and concern to the Department of Homeland Security. Thus, this data would indicate that that the vast majorities of LEAs (less than 100 officers)) are not involved in or prepare for acts of terrorism.

San Mateo County has two LEAs that would be considered large police agencies (more than 100 officers). Clearly, the RAND survey indicates that future funding must be directed toward the training and preparation of smaller police agencies (Riley, et al., 2005). It also seems to support the hypothesis that bigger police agencies are more likely to be involved in intelligence gathering and preventative counterterrorism efforts than smaller police agencies. This supports the proposition that in the war on terror, consolidation of police departments into larger entities could make our nation less vulnerable to terrorism. This hypothesis would also apply to the county of San Mateo, where smaller agencies could be consolidated into larger ones, making communities in San Mateo County safer against terrorist attacks.

If the increasing homeland security intelligence capabilities are an integral part of police consolidation, how can agencies be assured that increased intelligence capability is an outcome of shared services? Chapter VII will examine comparative look at other countries that have increased their intelligence capabilities by consolidating local police and by making local police an integral part of all counterterrorism efforts.

## **VIII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN COUNTRIES THAT HAVE CONSOLIDATED POLICING**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Domestic intelligence programs in the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Australia all have their own structures to collect, analyze, and distribute information on domestic threats of terrorism. The one constant factor with these countries that distinguishes them from the United States is the close professional relationship that they maintain with their regional/metropolitan/federal police. In large part, this is due to the relatively small number of police agencies that fight crime in these countries. As noted above, though these countries have far fewer local police departments than the United States, the per capita policing numbers are not that much different per 1000 population than police agencies in the U.S. (Nationmaster.com Police Statistics, 2010). The implication is that national, Metropolitan, province or regional policing does work and it provides for a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to creating a network of counterterrorism efforts.

England, Australia, Canada and, until recently France, have all created security systems wherein counterterrorism intelligence agents have no arrest powers. This allows intelligence agents to concentrate exclusively on information gathering and communication. The systems these countries have created result in agents being embedded in the community, continuously gathering information as their primary task. They have become “force multipliers” that have greatly enhanced the potential scope of national surveillance efforts (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004). One of the major benefits of the work that these counterterrorism agencies do, which is the major emphasis of this comparative analysis, is that the security and intelligence agencies in each of the above countries stress the necessity of developing ongoing terrorist threat assessments that local police agencies can utilize to develop strategic plans. By divesting the intelligence agencies of arrest and detention powers, it has forged a closer working relationship with

local police through dedicated coordinating entities that act to tie the intelligence information to the detention and eventual arrest of terror suspects (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004).

## **B. POLICING TERRORISM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM**

The United Kingdom does not have a national police force but rather is divided into 43 metropolitan police departments that coordinate counterterrorism efforts as the enforcement arm of the law. Internally, MI5 is the United Kingdom's intelligence service that works to prevent domestic threats to the nation. In addition to terrorism, MI5 also works on cases of espionage and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004).

MI5's mandate is to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence, while having no powers to arrest. Based on this lack of arrest powers, MI5 must work closely with the local police in order to provide national security. The fact that there are only 43 metropolitan police departments in the United Kingdom makes the prospect of cooperation and coordination an achievable goal. Police can be moved around the country as needed to confront and abate crime trends. What supports this flexibility is the standardized training that the officers receive along with the uniformity of policy and procedures. In the fight against terrorism or in the response to natural disasters, uniformity of training and policy and procedures allows for a more coordinated response.

The key link between the local police and MI5 is the Special Branch assigned to metropolitan/regional police departments. Each of the 43 police forces in England and Wales have Special Branches that vary in size from a couple of dozen to several hundred (Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary [HMIC], 2003). The Special Branch was started in 1883 in London's Metropolitan Police Department. Special Branch Officers were established in regional police departments after massive protests in 1967 and 1968 (Bunyan, 2003). Special Branch Officers are local officers that have been trained by MI5 and support the mission of MI5. Special Branch Officers have powers of arrest as does any police officer, thus MI5 must rely upon the relationship with the Special Branch Officers to fulfill their counterterrorism duties. The Special Branch officers play a

primary role in preventing terrorism through their close ties to the streets, officers in their regional station and their close working relationship with MI5. The Special Branch Officers, which have grown from 1,638 officers in the 1980s, to over 4,200 by 2003, are the conduit between the local police and the intelligence world of MI5 (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004). This is a significant aspect of counterterrorism that is missing in the United States.

What the United States is lacking, and what the United Kingdom provides, is consolidation of police entities into manageable groups (43 total) which form close links between the local uniform police, the community that they serve and the Special Branch Intelligence Bureau. The Special Branch acts as the constant reminder to local law enforcement that it is every officer's job to act as counter terrorism agents in an effort to protect the homeland. The reason this works so well is because liaison officers are present in all 43 police departments. Contrast this with the United States trying to foster the same relationship with all 18,000 police departments. Though the Special Branch is there to support MI5 efforts, it can also run their own informants and perform acts of infiltration. MI5 agents must have a very close working relationship to the Special Branch officers or face becoming ineffective. This spirit of cooperation on counterterrorism efforts in the UK is in stark contrast to the system of competition between law enforcement branches in the United States.

Where the Special Branch is most effective is at helping to set the strategic goals of local law enforcement based on their unique insight into the counterterrorism needs of a given region. This type of relationship with the intelligence bureau simply does not exist in the United States in large part to the sheer number of U.S. police departments. Local beat officers in the United Kingdom are often reminded what an important role they play by preventing terrorism through their community contacts (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004). The Special Branch Officers provide valuable intelligence to MI5 based on their strong community ties and the close relationship with the officers in their department.

The main points of interest in the examination of policing terrorism in the United Kingdom are as follows:

1. Regional police departments are utilized for coordination of strategies and goals toward counterterrorism;
2. By making all officers an integral part of counterterrorism, they act as force multipliers;
3. The Special Branch Officers who are tied to regional departments as officers and also support MI5, act as an outstanding conduit between local police and MI5;
4. With MI5 being a specialized unit with no powers of arrest, the UK has established a system wherein local police have become an integral part of the counterterrorism mission.

### **C. POLICING TERRORISM IN FRANCE:**

The French system of security operates with a national police force and paramilitary forces, which are highly centralized (Bunyan, 2003). Like many countries, the current threat to France is not from homegrown domestic terrorism, but rather from Islamic extremists. Of all the European countries, France may have the most experience in the use of intelligence to stop both terrorism and insurgency. The main intelligence branch of France was formally the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, (DST, Directorate of Territorial Surveillance), with one of its main mandates being counterterrorism. France also had the Direction Centrale des Renseignements Generaux (DCRG, Central Directorate of General Intelligence), with both being controlled by the National Police. The DST was equivalent to the United Kingdom's MI5, and the DCRG was equivalent to the United Kingdom's Special Branch. On July 1, 2008, the DST and DCRG were merged into the Direction Centrale du Renseignement Interieur, or DCRI. This combination effectively makes the DCRI the equivalent of the United States FBI, with the police having both arrest and intelligence gathering responsibilities.

The French police system is broken up into two distinct national police forces. The National Police (Direction Generale de la Police Nationale), exercise jurisdiction in large urban areas and reports to the Ministry of the Interior. The National Gendarmerie (direction Generale de la Gendarmerie) has the responsibility for policing small towns and is under the direction of the Ministry of Defense (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004). Both of these national police forces maintain strong working relationships with the DCRI. The relationship is really coordinated by the Anti-Terrorism Coordination Unit which is a

group charged with coordination of resources at the working level (Government Accounting Office [GAO], 2000). Like the United Kingdom, France has done a very good job linking counterterrorism efforts from the intelligence agency to local law enforcement through a specific coordination unit.

#### **D. POLICING TERRORISM IN CANADA**

Canada, like France, is mostly free from domestically grown terrorists, but because of its large immigrant population, there is political, financial, and logistical support for Islamic radicals (GAO, 2000). Responsibility for counterterrorism in Canada falls to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), which was created by parliament in 1984. Prior to the development of CSIS, the responsibility of intelligence gathering for domestic security rested with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004). When first formed, counterintelligence consumed 80 percent of the duties of CSIS, while counterterrorism accounted for 20 percent of those duties. That ratio is now inverted with CSIS devoting 80 percent of their time to counterterrorism efforts (GAO, 2000).

Prior to 9/11, the relationship with CSIS and the police was operationally handled through the RCMP. The RCMP contracts policing services to eight provinces in Canada. Those provinces consist of Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, the Manitoba, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Winnipeg and New Brunswick. They additionally contract services to 201 of the 571 municipalities (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004). The relationship of CSIS has now been extended to the municipal police departments outside of the RCMP jurisdictions for three primary reasons: The first being that terrorism is now handled under the Criminal Code in Canada. Second, comprehensive counterterrorism investigations far exceed the resources of the RCMP. Third, many of Canada's domestic terrorism problems are located in the metropolitan area of the country (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004). To keep up with the information sharing between the intelligence branch and law enforcement, permanent liaison arrangements are in place. The liaison officers operate out of the Integrated National Security Assessment Center. Much like we saw in the United Kingdom, the CSIS has no power of arrest, so this has helped to facilitate a close

working relationship between CSIS, RCMP and other local and provincial police departments. Additionally, CSIS maintains offices around the country to ensure relationship building and the flow of information to the local police forces.

The main points of interest in the examination of policing terrorism in Canada are as follows:

1. Liaison officers are used to maintain close ties between the intelligence agents and police.
2. The majority of Canada's police departments are regional or metropolitan police departments allowing for a unification of goals when it comes to counterterrorism.
3. CSIS have no powers of arrest thus promoting a strong working relationship between local the police and Canadian intelligence agency.

#### **E. POLICING TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA**

Australian's Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) is the lead counterterrorism agency in that country. The agency was created in 1949 and, like the MI5 agents, have no powers of arrest. Their powers were modified in 2003 to allow them to detain and question suspects on limited bases (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004). According to Chalk & Rosenau, "The ASIO principal mission is to secure Australia for people and property, for government business and national infrastructure, and for special events of national and international significance" (2004).

The main asset of this group is their strong community ties and reliance on human intelligence. Much like the United Kingdom, France, and Canada, the ASIO has an outstanding working relationship with local police and federal police because it does not have arrest powers and must rely upon this cooperation to get their job done.

The main points of interest in the examination of policing terrorism in Australia are as follows:

1. National police department which allows for a focus on the mission of counterterrorism.
2. Liaison officers used to link the police with intelligence agents.
3. Intelligence agents with no powers of arrest thus necessitating a strong working relationship between the police and intelligence agency.

## **F. CONCLUSIONS**

The United States counterterrorism efforts can be enhanced by learning from the security methods employed in the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Australia. These countries have centralized and consolidated their police services in an effort to have their nations' police officers play an integral role in terrorism intelligence gathering and counterterrorism efforts. The smaller number of police agencies in the countries allows for a more proficient system of interactions between the intelligence community and the local police officers. In these systems, police officers have an integral role in preventing terrorism. The same cannot be said for the regular beat officers who patrol the streets in the United States. In the United Kingdom the use of Special Branch Officers puts counterterrorism officers inside the police departments where intelligence can be gathered and shared. Instead of 18,000 police departments in the U.S. model, England has consolidated to a manageable model of 43 metropolitan agencies. The premise appears to be that the less decentralized police departments are the better chance of using officers as force multipliers in the war on terror. Though the United States is much larger than these other countries and there is no expectation that police department in the U.S. will consolidate to the extent these countries have, these examples of consolidation represent a model that is working in other countries to close the intelligence gap between local police officers and the intelligence community.

As stated several times in this thesis, the fact that police officers do not play a more critical role in homeland security has left this country vulnerable to terrorist attacks. From the information articulated above, it appears that other countries have worked to close the gap between street officers and the intelligence community through consolidation of the forces into metropolitan departments or in some cases a national police department. By focusing on the role of local police through consolidation, these countries have leveraged one of their most important assets; police officers that patrol the streets everyday and have the most interaction and connections to the communities they serve. Though the U.K. has experienced terrorist activity, it has done a very good job of preventing terrorist attacks over the last five years.

The findings throughout this thesis point to the fact that police consolidation can lead to a better model of homeland security for local law enforcement. The evidence points to better coordination, better training, better intelligence capabilities, and increased counterterrorism capabilities once small police departments are consolidated into larger ones. Chapter VIII outlines the strategic planning process for police consolidation.

## **IX. THE STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR CONSOLIDATION OF POLICE SERVICES**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, “Taxes are the price I pay for civilization” (Organization Change, n.d.). Though government is a great way to achieve common community goals, it often underachieves due to poor management and failure to adapt to changing circumstances. Policing systems that have been in place for over 100 years can be very difficult to change. In order to create a more efficient way of protecting society that challenges the norms of traditional government, cities must be willing to think of consolidation of police services as the new norm. The time is right for innovation in government, as one poll showed that 54 percent of respondents agreed that government should be made “more effective through better management” (Organization Change, n.d.). Society is ready for change in government, but blocks in front of the wheels of progress remain in place.

### **B. CREATING VALUE INNOVATION**

Creating value innovation through consolidation of police departments may prove to be an essential element of policing in the next decade. As cities continue to be crushed under the weight of a financial crisis that has cut city services to the bone, public safety becomes more and more of an issue for communities. While the front lines of police departments continue to be cut, cities are faced with on-going gang violence, drugs, and a new war on terrorism.

Though value innovation can be accomplished when the cost goes down and consumer value goes up, this modern day blue ocean strategy of consolidation of police services is often fought by police, councils and citizens. Some officers are quick to fight consolidation because they see it as a loss of autonomy. They feel a loss of identity and pride for a department that they signed up for. They see it as an unknown change that can disrupt a secure professional life they have grown accustomed to, and they see uncertainty as to what their voice might be in the new consolidated department.

The public, many times at the urging of the officers, will fight police consolidation based on the loss of their “own” police officers. They often feel that their safety will be compromised or that they will not receive the benefit of the protection that they pay for. Good or bad, they have grown used to the policing of their community without really understanding whether or not their police are actually effective.

Councils feel the loss of control of the most precious service in their communities; that of public safety. They often feel pressured by constituents to keep their independence even though intellectually they understand that their current system of independence makes no sense.

Tough economic times allow for great innovation, but change does not come easy to the government process. The value innovation that I developed for police consolidation is outlined as follows:




Figure 4. Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create (From Callagy, 2010)

This innovative concept aligns innovation with utility and cost. The utility comes from increased communication and intelligence sharing that will lead to a more cohesive policing model, while at the same time reducing costly duplication of services that exist in every city in counties across the United States.

Consolidation denotes a theme of cooperation and collaboration between entities. It is important to remember that today's neighbor, may be tomorrow's partner. It is very difficult to start a partnership with someone one does not know or trust. Consolidation will take a tremendous amount of relationship building that must be nurtured over several years. Clearly, to achieve the goals of value innovation, one must have a well thought out and fully developed strategic plan in place.

### **C. MEASURING RELATIONSHIPS**

We have heard many times that what one cannot measure, one cannot evaluate. Measuring is an imperative part of any partnership. Measuring relationships can tell a lot about one's own reputation. Relationship building takes time and effort and is difficult when there is constant change in organizations. If one were to consider consolidation without really understanding and measuring the reputation one's own organization with the police agency with which consolidation is planned, it may lead to a very rocky start. The relationships that must be measured will include those of city council members. It is important to understand the relationship between partnering agencies and the relationship between the officers in those partnering agencies. Additionally, the agency's relationship with the public must be carefully scrutinized. Can they be trusted by the officers, businesses, and citizens to make the right choice on behalf of the citizens? Without this type of credibility by the council, any consolidation is doomed from the start.

Equally important is the relationship of the police chief with the community. Understanding the reputation of the chief in the communities where the chief will serve is a crucial step to the success and failure of the proposed consolidation. Understanding the relationship of the city managers is equally important. City managers must understand these relationships and determine if the cities will work well together and continue to have the same long-term vision. City managers must also determine if they are able to stand up to the scrutiny that comes with innovation. These are all issues that need to be addressed before a consolidation of police services is attempted. Many attempts at consolidation have failed because departments failed to measure and fully comprehend the existing relationship between the officers, sergeant, and command staffs in consolidating

police agencies. Nothing will doom a consolidation faster than lack of trust and support by the line level officers. That lack of trust originates from the consolidating agency, the council, the manager, or the chief, but understanding any lack of trust and working to overcome it prior to consolidation is a key strategy to the success of any consolidation.

Relationships are essential to any proposed collaboration and must be built over time. Overestimating these key relationships can doom organizations irrespective of the intended goodwill. Measuring relationships should be assessed prior to any other step.

#### **D. MEASURING GOALS**

Measuring the goals will reveal the strengths and weakness of a plan (Paine, 1977, p. 8). From a strategic standpoint, an outside consultant should be hired to take a macro and then micro view of these goals. For example, if the goal of the consolidating agency is to save two million dollars with a consolidation, that goal should be measured to determine if it is achievable prior to implementation. This strategic act will work to validate certain assumptions prior to implementation. The consultant may say we can only save \$50,000 by consolidating, thereby saving the agencies the time, expense and heartache of endeavoring to make a change that will never result in the realization of their stated goal. Independent consultants add credibility and impartiality to the process.

Measurements by a consultant on police consolidation must include at the very minimum the following:

1. The identification of opportunities to combine some or all police services of the interested agencies;
2. Identify and assess major issues that will allow for or impede the cost-effectiveness or feasibility of the merger;
3. Determine the cost savings and other benefits of a merger of police services;
4. Identify a plan of implementation should the parties wish to proceed after vetting the above issues.

In order to achieve the strategic measurement of this identification process, consultants should be encouraged to meet with representatives from both agencies, including union representatives, staff members, and elected officials, while maintaining a

list of issues that are identified by these groups, The consultants should also review staffing and technical issues, complete a document review of prior studies, identify all current costs, perform a salary and benefit review of the agencies, identify overall cost and areas of potential savings. In the end, the consultant should bring forward a measureable assessment of the feasibility and cost effectiveness of consolidated police departments. A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (S.W.O.T) analysis should be a byproduct of the report that outlines these aspects of consolidated services.

Measuring and checking assumptions through a thorough and unbiased process is the best reason to move forward with a value innovation or to stop it before it gets started. Many people believe that measurement should be conducted when a program is over. The truth is that strategic purpose measurement should take place at the beginning of a program, especially when the program is innovative (Paine, 1977, p. 13).

Katie Paine (1977), in her book *Measuring Public Relationships*, believes that every communication professional must be able to answer 10 important questions. Those questions are applicable to any consolidation efforts and strategically will help those who endeavor to undertake consolidation efforts. These are questions which have been modified for a police consolidation process between the San Mateo and the Burlingame police departments. The questions and answers are as follows:

1. What is the city's goal with consolidation?
  - The goal for police consolidation would be to reduce the cost of police services through the elimination of duplicative backroom services like dispatch, records, evidence and administrative services.
2. What are the police department objectives?
  - To eliminate the cost of duplication while providing a more coordinated and comprehensive police service to a broader geographic location.
3. What are you going to do with the information you get from your research?
  - The process of consolidation of police services can not be done in a vacuum and therefore all reports will be made public for community vetting purposes.

4. What Departments will be affected?
  - Both police departments will be impacted, but the Burlingame Police Department, being a smaller agency, may experience a larger impact. It will be important to vigilantly monitor employee concerns and keep them involved in the consolidation process.
5. What are your key messages?
  - Both city councils, city managers, police departments and communities will work together to build a more economic and comprehensive police safety agency, where services to both communities are enhanced. Implementation, if determined to be feasible, will be done cautiously with input at every level.
6. Who are your program's target audience?
  - Our customers are those people that we have sworn to serve in the San Mateo and Burlingame communities.
7. Who influences that audience?
  - The officers in both agencies and the council members.
8. How do you distribute your service?
  - Our delivery is personal. It is through our dispatchers, officers, community service officers, clerks and volunteers who come in contact with our service members.
9. What measurement programs are currently underway?
  - The consolidation of the two departments is currently being studied by an independent contractor to measure and test our theories regarding the opportunities, the economics and the service levels associated with consolidated police services.
10. What's important to your audience?
  - Simply put; a high level of police services. Rigorous and proactive crime control, traffic enforcement, outstanding criminal investigations with empathy and compassion in policing.

These questions help focus the implementation team on outcomes so the measurement process can help check their assumptions before the new program is implemented. These are the building blocks of a relationship that must bring about consensus prior to undertaking an innovative program like police consolidation.

## **E. MEASURING THE MEDIA**

The most important part of media's relationships are the outputs generated by the media about your organization. This is to say that the most important measurement of the media is what they say about your organization rather than how they feel about you personally (Paine, 1977, p. 41). Another fatal error in the consolidation of police departments would be to underestimate the power of the press. Negative press in regard to a consolidation effort can seriously hinder or halt that process in its tracks. The way that the consolidation is represented in the media may have a great impact on how the public perceives the consolidation. In order to strategically work with the press on consolidation efforts, you must determine which media in your area will be the most influential when consolidation efforts are reported. From my experience, local print media will have the greatest influence on any consolidation efforts. Television news will only be able to hit on the topic once or twice for a few minutes at a time, while conversely, printed media can do in depth coverage on a daily basis if there is enough interest. They have the ability to put any slant on the topic they want, starting with the headlines and where it is placed in the paper. These papers are the most likely to reach the target audience and may be extremely influential to that audience. Strategically, it is imperative to cultivate a close working relationship with the press and this is done over time by building a trusting relationship.

All too often police departments tend to be dismissive of reporters. These reporters play a very important role in society and should always be treated with respect. Departments need to develop a policy of transparency that results in an open and trusting relationship with the press. Departments must also take every opportunity with the press to get their message out. Therefore, they need to be prepared to send a well thought out and coordinated message about consolidation when they are approached by the press and make sure that everyone in the organization and council has heard that message before it is reported in the press. This will involve asking members of the public that can trust to give the department open and honest feedback on how they perceived the message as articulated in the press. Departments also need to measure success by determining if the article got their message out the way they wanted it reported.

Though the media is an outstanding way to deliver messages on police consolidation, departments need to develop their own sources of delivering messages through Facebook, Twitter and mass email, where they can reach the target audience with a direct and unfiltered message of their own.

The power of the press to persuade or dissuade the target audience should never be underestimated. This one element alone could make or break police consolidation efforts and every attempt should be made to build an on-going close professional relationship with the media.

#### **F. STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR CONSOLIDATION**

According to John Bryson (2004) in his book, *Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations*, achieving successful collaboration becomes more difficult as more stakeholders or organizations become involved. This is why, as a matter of strategy, it appears best for police consolidations to take place is with two to three agencies at a time rather than trying to consolidate entire counties at one time. Too many partners will doom any police consolidation before it gets off the ground. When considering consolidations, intra-organizational collaboration is easiest, followed by inter-organizational, and then followed by community collaboration (Bryson, 2004, p. 377). What is most interesting about police consolidations is that they involve the unique dynamic of all three and therefore may be the hardest of collaborations to accomplish.

Bryson describes the complexity of this type of collaboration mainly being due to its voluntary nature and the veto power of those involved in the process. In the case of police consolidation veto power to some degree does rest with the officers, administration, city managers, councils and the public. Lining all of these elements up in two different communities is a daunting task at best, and that is why for strategic purposes it may be best to start with two small agencies of relatively equal size.

The strategic goal at the start of any collaboration should be to create a framework that promotes discussion, dialogue, learning, decisions, and action (Bryson, 2004). In order to achieve collaboration, participants must first understand how collaboration works. The theory of collaborative advantage (TOCA) consists of a challenge with

subsidiary challenges connected to the collaborative effort. The overreaching challenge pits collaborative advantage against collaborative inertia. Collaborative advantage is the achievement of something through a collaboration that could not have been achieved without that collaboration. The collaborative inertia is the stumbling block of progress. Collaborative advantage is empowering while inertia represents the setback in efforts (Bryson, 2004).

The reason that it is so important to understand this concept is that most police consolidation will face both collaborative advantage and inertia, and they must be ready to deal with the inertia that is inevitable as part of the strategic planning process. Bryson (2004) described the need for collaborative thuggery to overcome the inertia. The thuggery consists of manipulating the collaborative agenda and playing politics. Both will typically be present in any type of collaboration, especially one that involved so many different elements. Managers of collaboration must understand inertia and have a plan in place ahead of time to move beyond it.

One of the most helpful guides available regarding collaboration were guidelines outlined in Bryson's (2004) book entitled, *Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations*. They are compelling enough to the strategic practice of collaboration that they need recounting here so they can be readily used in the collaboration process.

1. Collaboration takes effort, communication and nurturing: Collaboration/consolidation may be born out of necessity and in the case of police consolidation that necessity is financial in nature. But out of necessity comes true collaborative advantage that will act to benefit the public. This should be the goal of all public collaborations. To achieve this goal, as mentioned earlier, today's neighbor may be tomorrow's partner. Therefore sustainable relationships must be built and be strong before attempts at collaboration begin.
2. Reframe the existing reality to show public value: policing today is fragmented and in this day of terrorism, police must come together to share information and intelligence in a meaningful way. The cost of individual police departments may not be sustainable, but there may be a more fiscally responsible model of policing that may provide the public with a higher degree of safety.
3. Leadership is very important: Ensure that the leadership that you start with in any collaboration is strong, credible and has the trust of all stakeholders.

4. Be prepared to devote a lot of time to the agreement stage: This stage will take a lot of energy as all parties work to protect their interest. This agreement must be set up in a way that an outcome based matrix can be achieved. This will be essential to the prolonged life of any collaboration.
5. Build a strong constituency of collaboration: this would be the bringing together of a strong group of representatives from both entities that believe the collaboration is in their best interest. This constituency will represent a broad group of stakeholders.
6. Develop a road map: Those involved will want to know where they are going, how they will get there and what success looks like. This needs to be developed before the process is started.
7. Create a governance structure: There should be a structure that is appropriate to the purpose, context and membership of the collaboration.
8. Effective meeting management: It is important to remember that meeting management is extremely important to accomplish goals in a timely manner.
9. Integrate systems: bring together the people, budgeting, management, information systems and performance measurements of the collaboration.
10. Nurture the collaboration: Also work to strengthen the relationships and trust of the collaborative partners.

## **G. CONCLUSIONS**

Bryson's 10 steps to the strategic planning of collaboration are straightforward, but absolutely crucial to success (2004). Inertia can come from many different sources when you are involved in something so complicated like a police consolidation so you must plan from the start to overcome that inertia.

As discussed above, there is value innovation that can be found in police consolidations and it has been demonstrated in this paper that in this day and age of natural disasters, terrorism, gangs and drugs, the fragmentation of policing can no longer stand. There is a new model of policing on the horizon, but that horizon cannot be achieved without the comprehensive and strategic pre-planning that has been outlined in this chapter. Chapter IX will address the overall conclusions related to police consolidation, recommendations, and the next steps that should be taken in order to better position police to achieve the homeland security mission

## **X. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND NEXT STEPS**

### **A. CONCLUSIONS**

The traditional model of individual departments policing small geographic areas no longer fits the demands of a modern day society with all its complexities. Terrorism and natural disasters are a real threat to San Mateo County communities and communities throughout the United States. Terrorism, natural disasters, and crime pay no attention to city boundaries and local police departments can no longer sustain the luxury of duplicating police services. Due to an extreme financial crisis that almost all police agencies are facing, police services at the street level are being cut to an unacceptable level that now necessitates a change in policy. The policy change recommended is one of consolidation of services while establishing uniformity in policy, procedures, training, intelligence gathering, and dissemination of information. Desperate times can bring positive change in the white space. For the context of this thesis, the white space constitutes the unfilled need of coordination of police services to increase homeland security. The policy of consolidation and coordination of police services must be adopted by the city administrators as a viable option to ensure continued and improved public safety.

The research question in this thesis asked if law enforcement can increase homeland security coordination and cooperation through consolidation of services. The hypothesis of this study asserts that through consolidation, intelligence sharing will take place, communication among agencies will increase, standard policy and procedures will result in a more coordinated and cooperative approach to large scale events, like terrorist attacks or natural disasters, and coordinated training will put all officers on equal footing when responding to a disaster. Law enforcement officials, who are responsible for securing the homeland at the local level, owe it to their communities to examine consolidation as a way to better delivery services to and protect the public.

A comparative case study was conducted between the Twin Cities Consolidation and the current San Mateo/Burlingame attempt at consolidation. All involved were innovative in their attempts and lessons can be learned from the way each attempt was approached. The San Mateo model faced obstacles that were not present in the Twin Cities scenario and consolidation has still not been achieved. This attempt to consolidate should be closely monitored because if successful, it will provide a valuable roadmap to police consolidations.

Consolidation is being driven in San Mateo County by fiscal constraints as the San Carlos Police Department looks at outsourcing police. The Millbrae and San Bruno police have a shared chief as they study the prospect of consolidation. Though driven by fiscal constraints, the important byproduct may be increased homeland security cooperation. The purpose of this thesis is to increase awareness and continue the dialogue surrounding the consolidation of police efforts. Though county police agencies have a history of cooperation and some collaboration, their efforts have fallen short in these modern times of terrorism. Hurricane Katrina, September 11, Oklahoma City Bombing, and Hurricane Andrew have all shown us that history can, and will, repeat itself.

Public safety officials have no excuse for lack of preparedness and coordination. When the President of the United States asked what were the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, advised the lessons learned concerned planning, resource management, evaluation, situational awareness, communications and coordination (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). What has been proposed here is that these goals cannot be achieved in a fragmented system of policing.

What was found in the policy options analysis was the best policy at this time is a hybrid consolidation consisting of voluntary city consolidations as opportunities arise, along with a comprehensive examination at the intelligence, communication, records function, investigations, and evidence collection aspects of police agencies. This more

conservative approach to consolidation can have a profound impact on homeland security and existing technology to link information systems now available in the state of California.

It appears from the research that other counties that have consolidated police resources into regional, metropolitan, or national police have been able to set up a very meaningful and effective communication and information sharing network between the police and their intelligence community. Those cities include Las Vegas, Jacksonville, and the Northern York County police consolidations, to name a few. Those counties have acted to leverage officers in a way that increases homeland security and makes beat officer's part of the counterterrorism effort. This simply does not exist in the United States because of the sheer number of police agencies in this country.

It is also clear from the research that consolidation cannot be reached without a solid strategic plan. Relationship building cannot start with consolidation, but it must be in place long before any efforts are undertaken. A shared vision and goal will be essential the project must be transparent to all involved stakeholders. The guide to strategic planning should be used as a roadmap for any police agency hoping to consolidate services.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. Establish a System of Intelligence Sharing Throughout the State of California**

Immediately require police departments to explore an integrated system of information technology that will act to maximize the sharing of intelligence data and communication between all county law enforcement agencies. Coplink is an established information sharing and analysis software that is being implemented in San Mateo County to connect all five report management systems currently being utilized by the 20 law enforcement agencies in the county. This system has the potential to be utilized throughout the state of California, and the governor of California should make this a mandated priority for law enforcement agencies in the state.

In this region, like others, information tends to be regional in nature. It will be important for agencies to include counties surrounding each other in order to form a network of intelligence information.

The funding for this program can be obtained through homeland security grants that could be requested on a regional basis and administered through the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, which would be responsible for oversight and implementation of the system. The fusion center should coordinate the collection and dissemination of information regionally, while identifying threats and crime trends in that same area. The goal of this regionally based information system and analysis would be to maintain and enhance the safety of all residents from terrorism, drugs, gangs, and other regionally based crime trends. This regional approach to information sharing could lead to safer communities while improving cooperation and information-sharing between law enforcement agencies.

Fusions centers throughout the state should work together with the information they receive to track terrorism and statewide crime trends. Fusion centers would also be able to report on regional based crime trends that will allow consolidated departments to engage in intelligence led policing. It can be argued that the current number of departments prohibits the NCRIC from playing an integral role in coordinating and disseminating intelligence information. If departments consolidated into regional areas, the NCRIC could be better positioned to gather intelligence information, analyze it based on geographic areas or statewide trends, and then disseminate it to police agencies. This simply means that departments, based on state, regional and local intelligence reports, could be better positioned to predict the type of crime occurring on a real time or historical basis and be able to deploy resources in a more meaningful way.

## **2. Establish a Regional Dispatch Center**

An area that must be explored for immediate consolidation is dispatch services. In San Mateo County, the redundancy of dispatch centers plays a major part in the

disconnect of intelligence information in the county. Dispatch centers in California should be combined into regional centers, such as the San Francisco and San Jose police departments.

This could result in tremendous financial savings and more importantly, result in an increase in communication throughout the county as information on crimes that were just committed in one jurisdiction could be readily broadcast throughout the county resulting in a better coordination. There is technology that exists today that was not available in the past that can link different computer-aided dispatch systems. This technology would act to minimize the conversion cost of this project. Consultation should be initiated to study the financial and operational benefits along with any drawbacks of dispatch consolidation to ensure an unbiased analysis is formulated.

### **3. Establish Countywide Policy and Procedures**

Police departments should begin consolidating policy and procedures based on the regions where they operate. The goal in the region would be to develop a set of county protocols that would be followed in cases of terrorism, requests for mutual aid, homicides, child abductions, serial crimes, crowd control/dignitary protection, violent felonies, gang intelligence, narcotics intelligence, terrorism prevention, response, planning, and response to major natural disasters. Regions should explore all other opportunities to merge policies and procedures on a county level. The purpose of this initiative would be to enhance the response capabilities of all police units in regions while establishing uniformity in approach to issues common to all. Established regional protocols, policy, and procedures will help to assist agencies dealing with a major response such as the one encountered at the Hillsdale High School bombing in San Mateo County. Uniformity is necessary to avoid delays in response and confusion at the scene of major incidents. This is by no means an attempt to abrogate the ability of individual agencies to establish policies and procedures that local service requirements mandate, but rather an attempt to coordinate crossover events that dictate uniformity in policy and procedures due to operational necessity.

#### **4. Establish Countywide Training Including Intelligence Collection and Reporting**

One of the most important aspects of policing in any region is uniformity of training. In order to leverage resources in the region, every agency should feel confident that if they call for mutual aid due to criminal activity, a terrorist act or a natural disaster, they will receive officers from outside jurisdictions that have been properly trained and are able to meet the challenge of the situation. Currently, there is disparate training in most regions, with some officers being highly trained while others receive no training. Opportunities must be found to establish uniform academy training and ongoing training of all officers in geographic regions. In these tough financial times, training budgets are being drained to keep basic services. Training needs to be a priority in regions to maintain a professional department that must be ready to respond to the changing world of policing. By establishing countywide training programs, Chiefs would be leveraging resources in regions to address some of the financial concerns while also establishing uniformity. Active shooter scenarios are just one example where uniformity of response is essential to the success of the operation.

#### **5. Establish Ongoing Dialogue With Regard to Consolidation Possibilities**

Historically, consolidation efforts in regions have failed, mostly due to lack of political will. The unprecedented times police departments now face are putting cities on the brink of cutting major services, or bankruptcy. The time is now for cities to seriously start a dialogue about consolidating services in whole or in part. There is a need to keep frontline officers on the street so they can continue to engage and include the community in the fight against crime. The concept of community oriented policing is a proven commodity, but we cannot continue to cut frontline officers and continue this resource intensive effort. More and more patrol officers are overwhelmed with calls for service and have little time to work with the community on their beats. The chiefs need to seriously start discussions on consolidation or risk the loss of basic services at the operational level.

Cities need to embrace a new policy of collaboration and consolidation at all levels. Consolidation efforts should include regional SWAT teams, county violent crime units, consolidation of records functions, court officer duties, evidence collection and storage, chief positions, command staffs, traffic units, patrol teams, DUI checkpoints, gang units, narcotics units, investigations teams, and training and recruitment teams.

#### **6. Department of Justice Should Actively Study the Impact of Consolidation on Homeland Security**

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) should take an active role in studying consolidation and the impacts it may have on furthering homeland security goals. DOJ has a vested role in consolidation because it will enhance intelligence sharing, standardization of prevention and response methods to major disasters, and promote uniformity of training and standardization of policies and procedures. The fewer police agencies that the Department of Homeland Security has to interact with, the more impact they can have. Consolidation of police services will push police agencies to play a more central role in homeland security protection. Consolidation does not mean the cutting of frontline services, but rather cuts to the duplication of services that leads to fragmentation in mission and response.

To help with the consolidation process, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the California Police Officers Standards and Training Bureau (POST) should commission an advisory board that brings together administrators from successful and failed consolidations. This board, under the direction of IACP, should establish guidelines for police consolidations. The Department of Justice should also offer grants for consultants that can guide departments through the consolidation process. DOJ should also consider grants that will help with initial start up costs that may initially make consolidation look like an expensive proposition.

DHS has spent millions of dollars since its inception on tools for police departments to fight terrorism, but there is no way to measure the success of those investments. Consolidation of police can be measured in terms of decreased cost, increase in information sharing, increase in the focus on homeland security, and increase

in contact with DHS representatives. We have seen from the RAND study that the larger the police department the more likely the role in homeland security and the more likely they had contact with representatives of DHS.

## **7. City Managers Need to Support and Push Consolidation**

The city managers of each jurisdiction are the linchpins in the consolidation process. While many will not support consolidation for a variety of reasons, as previously discussed, City managers will have to drive this effort through a unified vision. Fire departments throughout California are light years ahead in fire service consolidation efforts. The fire departments in San Mateo County and around the country are sharing chiefs, have dropped boundary lines, are sharing equipment, are sharing intelligence, and have standardized training and policies and procedures. The nationally established Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) has made the fire service an important part of the Department of Homeland Security preparedness plan (Suburban Emergency Management Project, 2009). FSIE is a collaborative effort of the State and Local program Office, Office of Intelligence Analysis, Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Fire Administration (Suburban Emergency Management Project, 2009). The purpose of this program is to:

Incorporate the Fire Service Interest (defined as fire and emergency operations, emergency medical service operations, rescue operations, hazardous materials operations, fire prevention/protection, fire investigation, incident management, and responder safety) into national standards, protocols, and mechanisms for homeland security information and intelligence sharing. (Suburban Emergency Management Project, 2009)

City managers may be driven by economics, but the byproduct of the economies of scale realized through consolidation as evidenced by fire service is an increase in operational information sharing, preparation and coordination.

## **C. NEXT STEPS**

The proposed study of consolidation of the San Mateo and Burlingame Police Departments, along with the study of the consolidation between San Bruno and the

Millbrae Police Departments in San Mateo County should be closely monitored. These two consolidation studies could act as a guideline for consolidation efforts throughout the state of California. If the departments do consolidate, IACP or the Department of Justice

should use their research capability to create a guide to police consolidation. There will also need to be quantitative research on those consolidations to determine if the goals are met. Among those goals to be examined are:

- Service to the community,
- Emergency preparedness,
- Intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities,
- The impact of standardized training, policy and procedures in the consolidated department's response to major events.

The economies of scale will also play a major role in the success or failure of a consolidation and a close audit of the departments should be conducted pre-and post-consolidation.

Are police agencies better prepared to defend the homeland and respond to manmade or natural disasters through consolidation? The answer to this question is unequivocally yes. Consolidation will enhance intelligence led policing which could be a more effective way to police communities in the twenty-first century as information sharing on a regional level through ILP will allow police administrators to develop operational awareness that will lead to strategic prevention planning. Consolidation of policing must be further explored as it will lead to an improved homeland security system of integrating and coordinating intelligence information, standardizing policies, procedures, and training, leveraging police resources in combating terrorism, while working to create a uniform response system to major police incidents.

Cities must challenge the current fragmented system of policing characteristic of police departments across the United States. The main premise of this thesis is that in order to provide integrated homeland security protection to communities, cities must abandon decentralization for consolidated policing. As this country continues to face

challenging threats against determined terrorist, natural disasters, and ongoing crime trends a different model of policing model may hold the answer.

Local police agencies have an obligation to become an integral part of the homeland security mission. To fulfill that obligation, cities must abandon the current fragmented system of policing for a system that promotes uniformity of policy and procedures, standardization of training, comprehensive prevention plans, unified response procedures, and intelligence-led policing in order to address provide a better system of homeland security while facing the unique challenges of policing in the twenty-first century.

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