

Countering Propaganda in the Global War on Terrorism

What can a Democracy do?

**A Monograph
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Abstract

COUNTERING PROPAGANDA IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM—WHAT CAN A DEMOCRACY DO? by Lieutenant Colonel Leesa J. Papier, US Army, 70 pages.

The extensive use of propaganda by all belligerents during World War I created sensitivity to the relationship between modern communications technologies and the manipulation of public opinion. Government elites and academicians were so concerned with a perceived malleability of Americans that they initiated government and private institutions to protect the masses from anti-patriotic rhetoric. Many of these activities were challenged as the democratic system searched for a balance between first amendment rights and national security. The United States is once again fighting an adversary who challenges the legitimacy of its political system. The USG does not appear to have learned from WWI and the prelude to WWII. The USG should be careful to not assist the adversary in creating an alternate reality of signs and symbols with which to degrade the democratic political system.

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INTRODUCTION

Histories about the modern uses of propaganda almost invariably focus on World War I and its immediate aftermath. This was the period during which people became acutely aware that campaigns and techniques of mass persuasion were an inevitable condition of modern existence. The extensive use of propaganda by all World War I belligerents created a new consciousness about the relationship between modern communications technologies and public manipulation. However the label “propaganda”--with all the negative assumption of orchestrated deception--helped observers and critics understand patriotic hysteria and the repressive domestic climate those passions provoked.

Propaganda was blamed for unleashing those repressive forces, highlighting a perception that human reason and intellect could not withstand the onslaught of mass-mediated images and slogans. Questioning the ability of the masses to think for themselves challenged the democratic belief that a rational public in an environment of informed discourse could result in the eventual triumph of truth and a strong democratic government.¹ Walter Lippman, one of the most influential intellectuals of the World War I generation, captured the pessimism resulting from the population’s encounter with propaganda during the war.² His position shifted as America faced an adversary adept at

¹Brett Gary, *The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press), 3.

²Walter Lippman, *Public Opinion* (New York: MacMillan, 1922). During World War I, Lippmann became an adviser to President Woodrow Wilson and assisted in the drafting of Wilson's

disseminating information on a massive scale. The use of propaganda by adversaries, and in some cases allies, and the creation and dissemination of the US Government's own propaganda, in an attempt to combat adversary propaganda, mobilized a nation to the cause of WWII, but also created an unchecked hysteria. The apparent inability of the American public to discern between fact and fiction led Lippman and others to question the ability of Americans to behave in the country's best interest. An additional unfortunate outcome of this battle regarding propaganda was the public's suspicion of the media and the government's message. The information environment was littered with propaganda from both sides making the intellectual discourse that Lippman longed for seemingly impossible. The nature of the war on terror and its underlying commentary has renewed old suspicions of propaganda, but an informed debate addressing the balance of civil liberties, more specifically the First Amendment, and national security is lacking.

Why don't we talk about propaganda? Actually, one does not hear the word used much; it has been significantly diminished as a term except as a form of "geopolitical name-calling used to marginalize and discredit highly ideological and controversial speech and activity."³ This paper provides a brief overview of the use of propaganda from World War I to World War II and how those actions set the stage for how we

Fourteen Points. Early on, Lippmann was optimistic about American democracy. He embraced the Jeffersonian ideal and believed that the American people would become intellectually engaged in political and world issues and fulfill their democratic role as an educated electorate. In light of industrialization, the events leading to World War II and the concomitant scourge of totalitarianism however, he rejected this view. To his mind, democratic ideals had deteriorated, voters were largely ignorant about issues and policies, and they lacked the competence to participate in public life and cared little for participating in the political process. Early on Lippmann said the herd of citizens must be governed by "a specialized class whose interests reach beyond the locality." This class is composed of experts, specialists and bureaucrats.

³Gary, 9.

contend with radical propaganda in the Global War on Terrorism. For the purpose of this paper propaganda will refer to biased information disseminated by extremists in an effort to recruit supporters, degrade the morale of the American public, attack the democratic political system, or to further their political cause.

It is important to understand the meaning of propaganda and its context within society during the interwar period in order to set the stage for the debate that ensued. Chapter One offers definitions and provides context. These points are important in order to understand the environment and to appreciate the evolution of the negative overtone of propaganda. Chapter Two provides a brief review of the debate of the balance between civil liberties' First Amendment rights and national security in the aftermath of World War I and the lead up to World War II. Examples of government sponsored and civil organizations' attempts to counter Nazi propaganda will demonstrate the negotiations that occurred and the compromises made in an effort to create and maintain a national will prepared for war.

In the interwar period, General George C. Marshall recognized the powerful role of Nazi propaganda aimed at the United States and understood that actively manufacturing public opinion in the United States was a "wartime imperative [that] might require unsatisfactory means to achieve desirable ends."⁴ However, those "unsatisfactory means" are under greater scrutiny today. Chapter Three identifies how the legacy of those actions has sensitized the public to propaganda and helped to tip the scales in favor

⁴Ibid., 101-102.

of freedom of speech. That legacy continues to frustrate civil and military commanders during the global war on terrorism. Chapter Four highlights why countering propaganda is important and explains that once again the United States is facing an adversary adept at using mass communications as an element of power to increase its strength and erode the democratic political system. Lieutenant General Chiarelli, former commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, recognizes that the antagonist has become expert at using technology to advertise its successes. “The sophistication of the way the enemy is using the news media is huge.”⁵

As the enemy has become a master propagandist, the United States has lost the will to take its own side in the intense ideological argument. Chapter Five posits a basic strategy and construct with which to approach radical propaganda. Recommendations made are based on modifying existing organizations and missions in an effort to minimize institutional disruption. Solutions must be feasible and work within the boundaries of the government mandate.

⁵Scott Johnson, “We’re Losing the Infowar,” *Newsweek*, January 15, 2007.

CHAPTER ONE

“It is said ‘The pen is mightier than the sword.’ History has proven this to be true and depending who is holding the pen the outcomes can be productive or destructive. In the early thirties Nazi Germany began their propaganda machine and started to roll out its hate messages.”⁶ Knowing the word propaganda and its contextual meaning will set the foundation for understanding its evolution. Hitler knew the power of propaganda; he understood that “[i]t's effects must be aimed at the emotions, and only in a limited way at the so-called intellect.”⁷ This formidable adversary had to be defeated and understanding the effect of Hitler’s propaganda was imperative. This paper focuses on countering propaganda, the definitions, techniques and methods are the same, the intent is what differs. However, one must understand what propaganda is and does in order to build an appropriate counter.

The word itself originates from the classical Latin verb ‘propagare,’ which means “to reproduce (a plant) by cuttings; spread for sprouting; propagate; enlarge.”⁸ The Roman Catholic Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of Faith (propaganda fide) managed the education of priests, but their activities were not intended to refer to

⁶Michael Levy, “The First Line of Defense,” *Wall Street Journal*, 27 April 2007.

⁷Adolph Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, translated by Ralph Manheim. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943.

⁸Words @ Random. The Maven’s Word of the Day, 22 March, 2000.
<http://www.randomhouse.com/wotd/index.pperl?date=20000322>.

misleading information.⁹ However, as the importance of influencing others to think or act in kind, propaganda took on a life of its own finally evolving into “dissemination of information--facts, arguments, rumors, half-truths or lies--to influence public opinion.”¹⁰ So, in the broad sense of the word, propaganda represents impartial information; however, in the narrow use of the term, propaganda connotes deliberately providing false or misleading information that supports or furthers an agenda. In his study of film and radio propaganda in 1938, Eli Marshall drew a sharp distinction between education as the pursuit of truth and propaganda, which was never adequate as the truth and was usually deceptive.¹¹ “What sets propaganda apart from other forms of advocacy is the willingness of the propagandist to change people’s understanding through deception and confusion rather than persuasion and understanding.”¹²

Over time, the religious meaning shifted to one of politics and the word took on a negative meaning. In an 1842 dictionary of science, literature, and art by W.T. Brande, propaganda, “[d]erived from this celebrated society [for propagating the faith], the name propaganda is applied in modern political language as a term of reproach to secret associations for the spread of opinions and principles which are viewed by most

⁹Ibid. In 1622, Pope Gregory XV established the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide 'the congregation for propagating the faith' in order to centralize all of the Roman Catholic Church's missionary activity under the control of the Holy See. Referred to informally as "Propaganda," the group of cardinals was charged with the direction of ecclesiastical affairs in non-Catholic countries. In 1627, Pope Urban VIII established the Collegium de Propaganda 'the College of Propaganda' in order to educate priests for work in foreign missions. So propaganda originally referred simply to the missionary work of the Church.

¹⁰Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. “Propaganda.”

¹¹Eli Kennerly Marshall, “Next Jobs in Radio and Film.” September 13, 1938. *The National Academies Press*. National Academy of Sciences, V. 56.

governments with horror and aversion.”¹³ German information activities during World War I horrified American elite and were the impetus for propaganda studies during the interwar period. If for no other reason, the mass hysteria created by war-related commentary proved that propaganda in any form could be immensely powerful.¹⁴ During this time Harold Lasswell defined propaganda as a technique for controlling the mental environment stating that “[i]deological control of a population in or out of war would not be achieved by ‘changing such objective conditions as the supply of cigarettes or the chemical composition of food, but through the control of opinion by significant symbols’ or through the use of ‘stories, rumours, reports, pictures and other forms of social communication.’”¹⁵ In other words, Lasswell advised that the only way to manage opinions and attitudes was through the direct manipulation of social suggestion and that the “use of words or symbols for the transmission of attitudes that are recognized as controversial within a given community” was the only way to sway the American public. After all, the goal of the propagandist was always the manipulation of collective attitudes to create an action.¹⁶ “It is not the purpose but the method,” he said, that “distinguishes

¹²J. A. C. Brown, *Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing*. (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1963), 5.

¹³Jay Black, “Semantics and Ethics of Propaganda,” *Journal of Mass Media Ethics* 2001, vol. 16, no.2 and 3, University of South Florida-St. Petersburg, 130.

¹⁴Gary, 60.

¹⁵Harold D. Lasswell, “The Study and Practice of Propaganda,” in Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith, eds., *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1935), 28.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 28

propaganda from the management of men by violence, boycott, bribery, and similar means of social control.”¹⁷

Methods of Propaganda

Methods of propaganda vary according to the propagandists’ analysis of the message, audience and dissemination tools available. A popular method is to seemingly provide a “range of debate in such a way that it appears inclusive of differing points of view, so as to suggest fairness and balance, the suppositions suggested become accepted as fact.”¹⁸ It is always easier to convince a teacher that your homework was eaten by your dog if you have a dog; propaganda is best served with some truth. “A message does not have to be untrue to qualify as propaganda. The message in modern propaganda is often not blatantly untrue. But even if the message conveys only true information, it will generally contain partisan bias and fail to present a complete and balanced consideration of the issue.”¹⁹ The propagandist can use story lines, stereotypes and other techniques to establish a myth: “a partly fictional story, or image, with some historic basis that imparts a lesson to society. In this sense, mythmaking is a culturally unique, effective means of influencing behavior, not something to be easily dismissed.”²⁰ The myth is effective in that it is easy to shift in emphasis and morph based on focus and event.

¹⁷Ibid., 29

¹⁸Brown, 12.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Colonel John W. Jandora, PhD. “Osama bin Laden’s Global Jihad: Myth and Movement. *Military Review*, November-December 2006. Volume LXXXVI, 41.

Another method of channeling discourse is by flooding the environment with a large amount of information to the cause. Much like marketing, the propagandist may seek to influence opinion by attempting to get a message heard in as many places as possible and as often as possible. The approach reinforces an idea through repetition and overwhelms alternative ideas. Propaganda, by its very nature, is of course not a reasoned and leisurely debate in which both sides are given equal time and equal measure. Neither is it an academic exercise in politically correct fairness, nor a well-intentioned effort in being kind to the other side. It is most-decidedly one-sided.

The Utility of Propaganda

The purpose of propaganda is ultimately to influence people's opinions to elicit a behavior. For example, propaganda may be used to elicit support or create disapproval of a position. Rather than present a position or create a fact-based discourse, the propagandist attempts to shape opinion or behavior through direct or subtle methods which separate it from other communication. Propaganda appeals to the target audience's emotion in order to establish a bond, thereby increasing the proclivity for action. The propagandist works to change general understanding of an issue or situation in an attempt to change audience actions and expectations in favor of the propagandist.

Marshall studied propaganda as a pathology of an increasingly media-driven society using the terms "pathology of influence" and "pathology of substitutes" to describe disturbing forces in U.S. political and social life. Of particular concern was the prevailing commercial ethos that casually and continually substituted what he called

“incomplete knowledge” for “genuine knowledge.”²¹ The disturbing trend of partial truths in order to influence affected a nation headed to war during Marshall’s time and forced a review of propaganda within the context of society.

Propaganda in Context

There was no unified response to the challenges presented by German propaganda during the interwar period. The question remained: “How does propaganda threaten democracy? And what should be done about it?”²² Lasswell was concerned that public opinion was shaped by the one with “the loudest or the most-entrancing voice, the most skilful or the most brazen publicity man, [or] the best access to the most space in the newspapers.”²³ This was a shallow way to manage public interest,

Political elites wrestled with a body of ideas about society and the inadequacy of democratic theory at a time of mass communications, public vulnerability, and totalitarian propaganda.²⁴ In light of the growing influence of German propaganda on the American public, the US government considered supporting mass censorship and efforts to counter propaganda. With regard to censorship, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects speech no matter how offensive it’s content. The Courts addressed the issue of propaganda with the question being whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger so as

²¹Gary, 91.

²²Ibid., 17.

²³Harold D. Lasswell, “Review of The Phantom Public,” *American Journal of Sociology*, (January 1926): 533.

²⁴Gary, 250-251.

to bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. The question was one of proximity and degree. “When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.”²⁵ And for those who attempted to constructively counter war time propaganda, “whether interest group advocates contributed to the truth was not really the issue, because social harmony was a more important goal and truth nearly impossible to distinguish a world of competing claims. Thus the use of propaganda was not a moral issue, except insofar as it fostered the positive morality of staving off individual and collective violence. As a technique for ‘controlling attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols,’ propaganda is ‘no more moral or immoral than a pump handle.’”²⁶ The Inter-War Government had some room to maneuver in its efforts to rule on Nazi propaganda.

The startling successes of the Nazi party in Germany revalidated post-World War I anxieties and renewed interest in propaganda. By the mid-1930s, German propaganda’s assault on emotion, reason, and language was once again very much on the mind of U.S. intellectuals. “Nazi mastery of all forms of propaganda techniques suggested that a perilous problem beset the modern era: language, the most necessary for human problem

²⁵Ibid., 189

²⁶Ibid., 64. “How much we value the right of free speech is put to its severest test when the speaker is someone we disagree with most. Speech that deeply offends our morality or is hostile to our way of life warrants the same constitutional protection as other speech because the right of free speech is indivisible: When one of us is denied this right, all of us are denied. Since its founding in 1920, the ACLU

solving, was under siege by deception and lies on a mass scale and presumably rational people were being taken in by it.”²⁷ A threat to civilization was imagined as connections were drawn between superstitious beliefs in words and late 1930s fears of propaganda, especially of the Nazi strain. Language was provoking instinctive and violent responses proving that people could be swayed by emotional language, as opposed to reportorial. It was this tendency that gave language its awesome power to provoke. Lasswell and others believed if they could expand the U.S. Government’s epistemology and identify the gaps between the words people used to describe the world and the world itself, they could fix the problem of irrationality or at least have less-muddled discussions about social problems.²⁸

During interwar discussions about propaganda and democracy the intellectual elites in the Rockefeller Center determined that propaganda is dangerous to U.S. democracy because it is implicitly deceptive, usually foreign, and potentially subversive. In addition, post-World War I propaganda and a belief that the masses were even more easily manipulated in an age of mass communications, consistent with traditional democratic theory, led many to believe that the public was susceptible to foreign propaganda. This same group identified a quicksand-of-language theme which grew out of the widely held idea that “propaganda destroys the intelligible language necessary for

has fought for the free expression of all ideas, popular or unpopular. That’s the constitutional mandate. Interview with Ann Beeson, Associate Legal Director. ACLU: Hate speech on campus.

²⁷Ibid., 40.

²⁸Ibid., 40. See also notes on Easton’s political system and Baudrillard’s representation of simulacra.

rational discussion, reflecting an obsession with the power of words and widespread pessimism about modern men and women's ability to communicate meaningfully and rationally in an age when hucksters and propagandists had become ubiquitous.”²⁹

Ultimately, the question was how a democracy could achieve a balance between political liberty and national security. This concern was continuous from World War I to World War II and is highlighted today.

The negative redefinition of propaganda arose because Hitler's government, and the Soviet Union, admitted explicitly to using propaganda favoring, respectively, fascism and communism, in all forms of public expression. As these ideologies were antipathetic to the democratic political system, the negative feelings toward them came to be projected into the word 'propaganda' itself. Today few admit to employing propaganda but, many accuse their competitor of using it. A complicating factor to propaganda is that mass media has mass effects. After WWI, a war in which propaganda played a significant role, the public believed that the press was an inoculator; through mass communications, the media could manipulate the public. The power of the media naturally concerns many leaders, scholars, and citizens.³⁰

Why Do We Care?

The national elite perceived the American populace as being susceptible to propaganda and that “Americans tended to believe in the “cleverness, ubiquity, and

²⁹Ibid., 17.

³⁰Donald L. Shaw, Colonel, Dr. Bradley J. Hamm, and Thomas C. Terry, “Vertical versus Horizontal Media: Using Agenda-setting and Audience Agenda-melding to Create Public Information Strategies in the Emerging Papyrus Society,” *Military Review*, November-December 2006: 14.

effectiveness of German propaganda.”³¹ Although the actual susceptibility of the American populace to propaganda has never been resolved, the potential palatability of the public is of concern. Considering the notion of total war as wars that are no longer won by armies in the field, but by total popular effort, how does a nation win without the morale of the whole people? Additionally, an attack on the will of the nation is interpreted as “attacks upon our cause...as dangerous and unjustified as if made among the soldiers in rear trenches.”³²

We are facing a global war, a war in which the adversary uses stereotypes, hate speech, half truths and blatant lies to influence potential recruits and the popular public.³³ A West Point study identified five principal themes that recur throughout modern day Jihadist literature--a rejection of pluralism and secular governance; a restoration of the caliphate; a legitimization of violence, including against Muslims; the persecution of Islam and all Muslims by Judeo-Christian societies; a need for revolutionary change as opposed to evolutionary transformation.³⁴ At best, the information released by the adversary has been unbalanced. The Djerijian Report claims that Arabs and Muslims are exposed to heavily filtered media such as limited TV stations and restricted access to the Internet that typically deliver messages in native languages with the American viewpoint

³¹Count Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America* (New York: Scribner's Press, 1920), 14.

³²Chafee on John Lord O'Brian, “Civil Liberty in Wartime,” reports of the New York Bar Association, 275, 291 (1919), vol. 42.

³³The adversary in the global war on terrorism is annotated in this paper in the words of the author cited; when not in quotations, the word adversary is used.

rarely represented.³⁵ At worst, adversaries intentionally build myths based on lies. Radical communities grow as adherents proselytizing to the uninitiated and spreading their strategy to convert others to their own viewpoint. The propagation of these unchallenged myths provide the opportunity for channeling discourse. These types of interactions make a Complex Adaptive System, such as a terrorist network, come alive.³⁶

The impact of the current adversaries' propaganda will be discussed later in this paper; however "across the warfare planning spectrum, efforts to discredit and counter radical Islamist ideologies and agendas are crucial, and they must include both kinetic operations and hearts and minds-oriented missions. Concerted planning before, not after, a crisis erupts is essential, if we are to constrain radical Islamists from spreading their hate-filled messages and attracting vulnerable youth to their causes."³⁷ "It should be noted that the best way to defeat the Jihadists is to take away their allure and to empower moderate Muslims to attack the Jihadists' messages of hate and destruction."³⁸ "A lot of people still value patriotism, but they don't understand how to do propaganda, how to recognize it, how to analyze it, and how to counter-act it."³⁹ Chapter Two will describe

³⁴Jacquelyn K Davis (Principal Investigator). "Radical Islamist Ideologies and the Long War Implications for U.S. Strategic Planning and U.S. Central Command's Operations." *Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis*, Inc. (IFPA) 2007, 13.

³⁵Michael J. Zweibel, "Why We Need to Reestablish the USIA." *Military Review*, Volume LXXXVI, (November-December 2006): 28.

³⁶Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen. *Harnessing Complexity, Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier*. (Basic Books, Perseus Books Group, New York, 2000), 63.

³⁷Davis, 51.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 43.

³⁹Neo-neocon, reluctant. The West—reluctant self-propagandists. February 14, 2006. (<http://neo-neocon.blogspot.com/2006/02/west-reluctant-self-propagandists.html>)

the processes the United States went through during the Interwar period between World War I and World War II to do just that.

CHAPTER TWO

Government officials were startled with the volume of propaganda entering the United States, some of it through the U.S. media. They were concerned that the biased information may affect the American morale, degrade soldiers' will to fight and produce anti-Democracy sentiment during the pre-war period. The debate revolved around the balance of freedom of speech and national security.

The Situation

During World War I Walter Lippman and Edward Bernays were hired by President Woodrow Wilson to participate in the Creel Commission, whose mission was to sway popular opinion in favor of entering the war on the side of the United Kingdom.⁴⁰ Within six months the war propaganda campaign of Lippman and Bernays produced such an intense anti-German hysteria as to impress American business with the potential of large-scale propaganda to control public opinion.⁴¹ The use of propaganda as a weapon of war, both by Hitler's propagandist Joseph Goebbels and the British Political Warfare Executive, as well as the United States Office of War Information continued into

⁴⁰Edward Bernays (November 22, 1891 – March 9, 1995) nephew of psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud, was considered the father of the field of public relations. Bernays was one of the first to attempt to manipulate public opinion using the psychology of the subconscious. He felt this manipulation was necessary in society, which he felt was irrational and dangerous. He was named as one of the 100 most influential Americans of the 20th century by Life magazine. Bernays coined the terms "group mind" and "engineering consent," important concepts in practical propaganda work.

⁴¹ One method employed was a select cadre of individuals adept at inspirational public speaking. The Creel Commission provided themes for speeches for Four-Minute Men, so called because they spoke for 4-minutes. These men spoke at public functions focusing on the talking points provided by the Commission; one of their themes was to encourage censorship of the American press. Because of this and other efforts, the Commission became so unpopular that after the war, Congress closed it down without providing the customary closing funding in order to organize and archive its papers.

World War II. Because of the increased awareness of the power of propaganda and a need to better understand it, the Communications Seminar hosted by the Creel Commission in the Autumn of 1939 conducted propaganda research focusing on propaganda, national security, and the role of experts and their activities.⁴² This group of intellectuals was trying to integrate strategies to deter the Nazis and to influence thinking in allied and adversary capitals. They were looking at a way to broaden the government's toolkit in order to reach particular audiences and shape elites' opinions.⁴³

The Debate of Civil Liberties and National Security

It is crucial to note that pre-World War II analysts found it absolutely necessary to fashion a propaganda-control strategy, largely because of their fear of Nazi propaganda. As in World War I and the first Red Scare, the World War II-era propaganda anxieties resulted in another variation of democracy-constricting, expert-centered politics, this time in the guise of national security.⁴⁴ The debate often came down to an expert-versus-public conflict and the liberty-versus-security conflict. MacLeish, the Rockefeller

⁴²Gary, 88.

⁴³Davis, 43.

⁴⁴Gary, 5. Conceptually and chronologically, the expert versus public-centered conflict (the crisis of democratic theory) establishes the intellectual context for the second liberty versus security conflict (the totalitarian propaganda scare). "Driven by archival research and a narrative that focuses on the institutional response to the threat of totalitarian propaganda and the creation of what Justice Department officials called a "preventive and protective" barrier between the American people and presumably dangerous ideas." The Argument: (In favor of the informed protecting the public) Lippman in both *Public Opinion* and *The Phantom Public* generally "indicts propaganda, advertising, and popular entertainment as destructive forces, these were superficial problems compared to the limitations of human intelligence in combination with a theory of democracy premised on human rationality. For Lippmann, people's emotional and distracted responses to mass communications were just surface manifestations of a larger epistemological problem of which democratic theory did not take account. He was not sure that a public-centered theory of democracy should even be imagined. He envisioned an expert-centered polity guided by scientifically trained opinion makers. Gary, 28-31.

Foundation's John Marshall, and others' dual commitments to liberty and security are emblematic of the conflict-laden struggle to fight a democratic war against invidious forces and ideas. But their struggles show how fragile the commitment to civil liberties, a free flow of information, and ideological tolerance was when the war against totalitarian propaganda reached full throttle; it could not be demobilized when Communists re-emerged as the great propaganda menace threatening the nation.

The power of propaganda was even more feared than in World War I and the same language about subversion and—by contrast, Americanism—that legitimized a crackdown on World War I-era dissenters and radicals resulted in the silencing of domestic Fascists at the onset of World War II. Because of fears about political propaganda, narrowly and punitively defined, some forms of association and communication were deemed unacceptably dangerous and beyond the pale of First Amendment protections. Even the most speech-protective federal jurists balked at protecting propagandistic, or seditious, speech forms. The United States Supreme Court legitimized the state's wartime repression of antiwar and anti-draft speech activities. Additional First Amendment decisions were made that indicated that the Court gave its seal of approval to federal prosecutors to broadly construe and conclude punitive interpretations of the Espionage Act and the Sedition Amendment in the Schenck, Frohwerk, Debs, and Abrams cases.⁴⁵

⁴⁵Ibid., 23.

The legacy of World War I hung heavy and the appropriation of positive and negative lessons from World War I records shows an “effort to determine a democratic course of action and to prepare effectively for total war. The most important First Amendment cases were decided during World War I. In addition, lessons from World War I suggested that there was “too little departmental coordination [which] resulted in too much repression”⁴⁶ Zechariah Chafee “warned against the possibility of those in authority being swept from their mooring by war passion during the next war [World War II] and averred that the most certain defense against this was greater administrative control at the federal level.”⁴⁷

Protection of Free Speech: Zechariah Chafee, Limits of Free Speech

Chafee argued that democratic governments needed to maintain faith in the public’s capacity to make discerning and rational judgments about political ideas. His argument for a “speech-protective balance between internal security and individual liberty was premised on the theory that democracy is almost always strengthened by a plurality of ideas and voices expressed in open discussion, that the real aim of unfettered speech is social wisdom and the pursuit of collective truth, and that democracy is actually more endangered when people are afraid of expressing their ideas.”⁴⁸ For Chafee, this endangered democracy and public faith in democracy, far more than did almost all forms

⁴⁶Ibid., 185.

⁴⁷Ibid., 186. Zechariah Chafee was a Harvard trained lawyer, academic and civil libertarian. He was a staunch advocate for free speech. He wrote several books on civil liberties including *Freedom of Speech*, 1920, *Free Speech in the United States*, 1941, *Government and Mass Communications*, 1947, and *The Blessings of Liberty*, 1956. *Freedom of Speech* established modern First Amendment theory.

⁴⁸Zecharia Chafee Jr., *Free Speech in the United States*, (New York: Athenaeum, 1969), 48.

of extremist expression, because it limited the range of ideas that might be debated, and it made the desire for security greater than the interest in truth thereby stifling a critical discourse. “Chafee’s theory of free speech was grounded on balancing a series of competing interests, those of individuals, the society, and the state. At a time of war those competing interests tilted toward the need for public safety, but in general society had a compelling interest in individual free speech not just for the liberty of individuals but because the search for truth was a collective process.”⁴⁹

Chafee believed the First Amendment focused on protecting political speech that contributed to “an informative and informed public opinion” and that other kinds of speech such as obscene and threatening speech did not rate the same degree of protection.⁵⁰ Judge Learned Hand, an avid supporter of Free Speech, continued in the same vein, writing that the test of gravity required “the strong danger that [an utterance] will cause injurious acts”; he did not discount the power of words to prompt action or change opinions and argued that those words that “counsel the violation of law can not by any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is the final source of government in a democratic state.”⁵¹

Countering Propaganda (Protectionism)

The McCormack Dickstein Committee reported and advised on laws aimed at controlling both Communist and Fascist materials in the United States in 1935 when Nazi

⁴⁹Ibid., 31.

⁵⁰Gary, 50.

⁵¹Marvin Schick. *Learned Hand's Court* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 40.

propaganda was widespread. It required focus because it was diffuse in form, deceptive in practice, and aimed at promoting dangerous hatreds at home and loyalties to foreign causes.⁵² The Committee's job was to protect the United States from the unchecked dissemination of foreign ideologies through propaganda channels. Congress reintroduced legislation that provided for censorship of the press, punishment for interference with the armed services, and control of the mails to prevent their use for the dissemination of allegedly treasonable propaganda. These measures to censor the free press provoked outrage among editors so Congress removed it from emergency legislation.⁵³

Harold Lasswell, a recognized communications theorist, embodied the central tensions and divisions defining U.S. intellectual culture in the interwar era.⁵⁴ He was a fan of both Lippman and Dewey, but he felt scientific, mass-persuasion-based politics was more realistic than a nineteenth-century public-centered one; Lasswell recognized the potential of mass communication.⁵⁵ He was also confident that "propaganda as a tool

⁵²Richard Sanders, Editor. *Press for Conversion!* Magazine, Issue#53, "Facing the Corporate Roots of American Fascism," March 2004. The McCormack-Dickstein Committee (1934-1935). This House committee was named after its chairman and vice chairman, John W. McCormack and Samuel Dickstein. It was called the Special Committee on Un-American Activities Authorized to Investigate Nazi Propaganda and Certain Other Propaganda Activities. In 1934, it held public and private hearings in six cities, questioned hundreds of witnesses and collected testimony filling 4,300 pages. Its mandate was to get "information on how foreign subversive propaganda entered the U.S. and the organizations that were spreading it."

⁵³Gary, 20.

⁵⁴ Harold D. Lasswell was a leading American political scientist and communications theorist. He was a member of the Chicago school of sociology and was a student at Yale University in political science. He was a President of the World Academy of Art and Science (WAAS). Along with other influential liberals of the period, such as Walter Lippmann, he argued that democracies needed propaganda to keep the uninformed citizenry in agreement with what the specialized class had determined was in their best interests. Lasswell, "Propaganda Technique in the World War."

⁵⁵John Dewey, "Public Opinion," *New Republic*, May 3, 1922, 288. Lippman became more skeptical of the capability for objectivity in public discourse. He essentially abandoned his earlier belief

and process of mass persuasion could and should be commandeered to good purposes, especially in wartime” arguing that negativism should not be directed at the “use of propaganda techniques but rather at unproven assertions about their power and effectiveness.”⁵⁶ In *Propaganda Technique*, Lasswell claimed that “total warfare necessitated the mobilization of the civilian mind and no government could have a united nation behind it unless it controlled the minds of its people. Domestic unity could not be achieved by the regimentation of muscles, he said. “It is achieved by a repetition of ideas rather than movements. The civilian mind is standardized by news and not by drills.”⁵⁷

The government focused its efforts on the analysis of foreign propaganda creating defensive propaganda and providing punitive measures for anti-democratic speech. “Some asserted that the distinctive quality of modern propaganda was that it had become an official activity of the state and was, therefore, buttressed by large amounts of money and great organizational skill; some spoke . . . of a new intensity or a new scale and effectiveness.”⁵⁸ Some of the efforts to stop anti-democratic speech were: The Espionage

that journalism would be the instrument for salvaging democracy. The problem was not with the flow of information, but with the epistemology. He was in favor of a self-informed, self-governed public. Dewey was more suspicious of the state and more skeptical of experts as replacements for a self-governing public. Democracy demands a more thorough-going education than the education of officials, administrators and directors of industry. “The essential need . . . is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public.” The role of experts is they would “help provide the public with the information necessary to perform its functions. They would ensure more accurate and adequate public discussion about its interests.” Gary, 35.

⁵⁶Gary, 62

⁵⁷Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique*, 10-11.

⁵⁸Barry Alan Marks. “*The Idea of Propaganda in America*” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1957, 51.

Act, The Sedition Acts, The Foreign Agents Registration Act, and the Voorhis Act.⁵⁹ In addition, in May of 1940, Franklin Roosevelt requested that all incoming mail serving the aims of enemies of the United States be seized at the borders; under this secret directive, together with authority granted by the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, an attorney general opinion from December 1940, and a 1857 postal statute barring incendiary (i.e., abolitionist) materials from the mails, the Post Office Department began seizing enormous amounts of bulk mail at its twelve different ports of entry. Even at the risk of being seen as the same as Nazi activities, i.e. burning books, the Postmaster General Burleson, the Department of the Post Office and the postmaster general

⁵⁹The Justice Department specifically targeted the persistent propaganda attacking the Selective Service Act through the Espionage Act, 1917. In the Attorney General's report to Congress in 1917, it argued that the Act had proved an effective instrument against deliberate or organized disloyal propaganda. The Espionage Act prosecuted three wartime offenses: willfully making or conveying false reports; willfully causing or attempting to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military; and willfully obstructing the recruiting or enlistment service of the US. Conservatives declared during the interwar period that the Espionage Act did not go far enough so the Sedition Amendment of 1918, which specifically protected the recruitment of a militia by targeting anti-draft and antiwar propaganda, was passed. The Amendment made punishable any words or acts supporting or favoring the cause of any country at war with us, or opposing the cause of the United States. The Sedition Acts were primarily aimed at outlawing the Communist and Nazi parties and recommended that their propaganda agents in the US such as booksellers, newspaper publishers, publicity agents, youth orgs, and others be required to register. "*Investigation of Nazi and Other Propaganda*," House Report No. 153, 74th Congress, 1st Session, February 15, 1935. Under the Espionage and Sedition Acts, "Over nineteen hundred prosecutions and other judicial proceedings during the war, involving speeches, newspaper articles, pamphlets and books were followed after the armistice by a widespread legislative consideration of bills punishing the advocacy of extreme radicalism." Chapter 1, 26:Attorney General circular quoted in Ward P. Allen, "*The Espionage and Sedition Acts of 1917-1918—Activities of the Department of Justice*," November 4, 1940). The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, also known as the registration and disclosure laws, indicated that anyone conducting political activities on behalf of foreign governments should register with the federal government and that their materials should be labeled for public consumption as the propaganda of a foreign entity. Zecharia Chafee Jr., *Free Speech in the United States*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941; report, New York: Athenaeum, 1969. And the *Voorhis Act*, 1940, (18 U.S.C. § 2386) requires registration with the Attorney General of certain organizations whose purpose of which is to overthrow the government or a political subdivision thereof by the use of force and violence.

exercised wide latitude in removing antiwar materials from the mail. This was a policy held legal by the Justice Department.⁶⁰

While the Justice Department and Post Office were attempting to prevent propaganda from reaching the American population, activities were underway to study and counter Nazi propaganda. The Committee on Public Information (CPI), Chaired by the progressive publicist George Creel, was the most prestigious activity.⁶¹ CPI promoted the war and Wilsonian idealism as a crusade to preserve liberal democracy and to redeem Europe. However, the Committee was criticized because its propaganda frequently wore a “benign face” and although the creators genuinely believed their efforts to be in the service of an altruistic cause, it showed “an overbearing concern for correct opinion” often to the exclusion of an open and balanced dialogue. “Creel’s agency promoted jingoism, intolerance, and vigilantism, an assessment that quickly became the reigning interpretation both of Creel’s legacy and, at war’s end, of the power of propaganda.”⁶²

Throughout the debate leading up to World War II, the Supreme Court continued to rule from a national security assumption that the state’s duty of self-preservation took precedence over the speech and association rights of groups and individuals. In United

⁶⁰Gary, 157-159.

⁶¹Gary, 91. One of the prominent activities of the CPI was to host the Communications Seminar which drew from political leaders, journalists and social psychologists; the Seminar’s agenda was to conduct offensive and defensive propaganda intelligence work. In addition to the CPI, a number of other activities emerged. The Special Defense Unit was started in April, 1940 by Robert Jackson as a defense effort against propaganda. The Neutrality Laws Unit of the Special Defense Unit began in March of 1941 and morphed into the Special War Policies Unit in May of 1942. These organizations’ main tasks were the construction of a speech-tolerant defense against antidemocratic propaganda materials in the US.

States v. Dennis et al. the Courts accepted the prosecution's arguments that the particular forms of propaganda on trial were evil, dangerous, and beyond First Amendment protection.⁶³ In the ruling, Judge Hand accepted Fascist propaganda as a "probable danger" and "its revolutionary teachings coming to fruition was sufficient evidence for prosecution."⁶⁴ He ruled that a present danger was not required, since probable danger existed. Subsequent rulings explained that the violent capture of all existing governments is one article of the creed of that faith of the Nazis. Hand responded that "either American democracy must meet that faith and that creed on the merits or it will perish" and that one could infer that the state had sufficient evidence of party danger to warrant the incarceration of its leadership; therefore, "[t]he United States could not afford to wait to see if a present danger actually existed."⁶⁵ The verdict was upheld under appeal stating that a "worldwide totalitarian political movement which employs freely the methods of military aggression, civil war, espionage, sabotage, and mendacious propaganda to overthrow non-Communist governments" must be deemed a probable danger.⁶⁶

After the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, U.S. Government officials knew they had to develop a strategy for preventing the spread of Nazi doctrine. Thus the

⁶²Gary, 19.

⁶³United States Supreme Court. Dennis et al. v. United States, 1997, Vol. 1 Issue 1, 1-60.

⁶⁴Gary, 247.

⁶⁵Hand, "Opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit" in the case of United States v. Dennis et al. (August 1, 1950), quoted in Peter L. Steinberg, The Great "Red Menace," 198.

⁶⁶Brief for the United States in the Supreme Court of the United States (October Term, 1950) in the case of Dennis et al. v. United States, 342 U.S. 494 (1951), 160.

President assigned the task to the Rockefeller Foundation. They had to balance the spread of dangerous propaganda while protecting Americans' rights to disseminate, read, and hear that same propaganda.⁶⁷ Members of the Foundation recognized that "propaganda-related work would be controversial but entirely necessary, especially given the absence of such preparation in the federal government... and opinion control and propaganda were insidious in U.S. civilian society but were also necessary instruments of modern warfare, even in a democracy."⁶⁸ Based on these resolves, the government sponsored a number of activities to establish a pro-democratic narrative and to directly counter the propaganda delivered by the Nazis. Donald Slesinger, director of the Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored American Film Center, proceeded to execute the intent of the Communications Seminar by putting experts in social science to work to create "more democratic and intelligent citizens in the face of widespread propaganda."⁶⁹ Slesinger created films that directly and subtly addressed these issues. Communications theorist and political advisor, Harold Lasswell, recognized that in order to make executive decisions, some reliable indices of the content and effect of mass communications must be developed. He realized that in times of duress, such as war,

⁶⁷Gary, 176.

⁶⁸Ernst Kris, "A Register of His Papers in the Library of Congress." Prepared by Michael Spangler, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. The Rockefeller Foundation funded much of the research on propaganda during the interwar and WWII periods and served as an unofficial arm of the state from 1938 to 1944 by mobilizing social-scientific expertise to fight fascism when the Roosevelt Administration was politically unable to do so. For example, the Foundation funded a Research Project on Totalitarian Communication relating to the psychological analysis of Nazi broadcast propaganda during WWII. John Marshall played a significant role in focusing the Foundation on American mass communication research and the national security state.

⁶⁹Gary, 95.

public opinion and national will was more than an academic endeavor.⁷⁰ Lasswell therefore engaged the Library of Congress assets to collect and analyze propaganda and was the basis for the Special Propaganda Defense Unit. This Unit assessed the primary themes and messages of the Nazis and advised the government and entertainment organizations on content for efforts to counter propaganda.⁷¹

Despite all the work done and a common moral imperative, the debate continued to rage over a democracy mobilizing its intellectual resources for war where the struggle for national will would be as important, if not more so, than the military effort. Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress and Assistant Secretary of State, believed that western civilization's failure to resist European fascism would result in a degradation of a democratic society.⁷² However, should information management be conducted in a democratic society; how should a democracy mobilize for total war in an age when official lies, half-truths, censorship, and hate campaigns would be employed by all belligerents; and how should unwanted foreign propaganda materials be kept from the public? He decided that the U.S. should pursue what he described as the "strategy of truth."⁷³

Federal executives and many intellectuals pursued the activities identified in this chapter in an attempt to mobilize for a total war against an adversary with an advanced

⁷⁰Ibid., 124.

⁷¹Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits, and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies*, New York: Free, 1987.

⁷²Ibid., 130-132.

⁷³Ibid., 131.

propaganda capability. Hitler understood the importance of propaganda was a vital tool in achieving his goals and proved this by integrating word with deed. He met nearly every day with his chief of propaganda, Goebels, to discuss operations in the context of his propaganda campaign. Goebels' had unprecedented access to Hitler, thereby proving the importance Hitler placed on the role of information and the media on his war efforts.⁷⁴ Even so, Hitler was impressed with the Allies' attention to propaganda and credited it with breaking the morale of the German troops during World War I.

Once again the U.S. faces a rival who is very capable of disseminating propaganda but yet the debate between civil liberties, specifically freedom of speech, and national security, specifically propaganda, does not appear to be on par. The call for unquestioned support from the 21st Century media at first blush appears ridiculous; however, it fits the World War II logic. What does a global media do in a conflict rooted in ideological or ethnic differences without state boundaries? Americans hold their freedoms sacred and therefore loathe relinquishing them. Even in more information-deprived environments, the days when governments could monopolize, or otherwise control, information are long gone.⁷⁵ Even if the United States mobilized for a total war, would the legacy of World War-era allow for systematic counter-propaganda efforts?

⁷⁴Hitler, 108.

⁷⁵Marina Ottaway. *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003, 152-154.

CHAPTER THREE

Many post-World War pundits addressed propaganda as a new and powerful weapon aimed against America. They based this on a litany of presumably destructive powers: it was a force almost unlimited in its power to capture public will through deception; it eroded the traditional canons of truth and logic. Lasswell declared that the word propaganda conjured a very negative picture of mindless mass manipulation; he stated that “[w]e live among more people than ever, who are puzzled, uneasy, or vexed at the unknown cunning which seems to have duped and degraded them.”⁷⁶

The Legacy of World War II

Many people identified propaganda as the source of social disillusionment after World War II, “propaganda consciousness contributed significantly to the chastened democratic faith of an entire generation of U.S. liberal intellectuals.”⁷⁷ Thus, with the heightened attention on the role of propaganda during the war, the deep and fundamental divisions within modern American liberalism reopened the debate of the public versus expert responsibility, the matters of individual liberty versus collective security, and the role of information management.⁷⁸ Postwar disillusionment also led to a widespread reassessment of the war’s causes and consequences. The propaganda campaigns conducted by all warring nations became explanations for the high hopes and dashed

⁷⁶Harold D. Lasswell, “Propaganda Technique in the World War,” 2.

⁷⁷Harold D. Lasswell, “The Study and Practice of Propaganda,” 3.

⁷⁸Marks, 51.

expectations that characterized nations' moods and, especially, for the vicious hatreds that produced vindictive, doomed postwar sentiments.⁷⁹ Lasswell noted in *Propaganda Technique in the World War* that the word propaganda gained evil meaning during the World War, when inconvenient news and opinion was stigmatized as enemy propaganda. The growth of publicity agents, press agents, and public relations firms during the postwar years—what he called modern promoters of attitudes—further colored the meaning of the word. Negative marketing combined with the fear of Fascist propaganda cemented general suspicion and the growth of propaganda paranoia. These factors explained why the modern public had developed suspicions about the practices of and derogatory associations with the word.⁸⁰ In addition, the detection of propaganda as a tool of mass reach caused a plethora of mainstream and academic study. Many were appalled that a capability such as this would be studied and practiced to achieve an effect by directing attention and emotion by penetrating susceptible, unsuspecting, masses with emotionally persuasive images and ideas.⁸¹ The public denouncement of foreign and domestic propaganda, no matter the intent, was deafening. Congress systematically pulled funding from supporting organizations that had supported the United States' message as it prepared for war.

The defense against alleged foreign propaganda that took place from 1939 to 1954 produced, among other things, a deep fissure between civil libertarians and national

⁷⁹Gary, 1.

⁸⁰Lasswell, "Propaganda Technique in World War," 3.

⁸¹Gary, 2.

security liberals. There was an apparent assault on civil liberties to include a failure on the part of the federal judiciary to protect extreme speech by making sure the tests of its dangerousness were based on proximity and degree and actual effects. The legal liberals in the justice department had not intended to restrict dialogue, but they discovered that they were not well prepared to release democratic propaganda as MacLeish and others had posited. They had hoped for a democratic defense against propaganda that would not offend the public, but would work successfully to balance civil liberties and a democracy at war.

The central questions about the relationship between propaganda and democracy continued into the Cold War. From the end of the 1930s, with the formation of the Justice Department's Special Defense Unit, through the Cold War, concerns with the subversive effects of propaganda remained a perceived threat and consistently resulted in the balance in favor of national security over free speech.⁸² However, the balance began to tilt toward civil liberties as the public realized the destructive nature of propaganda, and counter-propaganda activities in a democracy and as politicians realized the awesome political power of propaganda. The very "idea that propaganda threatened democratic procedures therefore became a powerful fixture in the postwar debates about democratic theory in an age of mass communications."⁸³ This issue, coupled with Congress' concern with the strength of Roosevelt's administration, "loathing the idea of a wartime propaganda agency that might promote Roosevelt's interventionist ideas" made it

⁸²Ibid., 243.

difficult to justify monies from the public coffers to government-sponsored propaganda capabilities.⁸⁴ The general opinion became that mass communications technologies were more likely to be used to harangue and manipulate modern mass publics than to solve collective problems and increase human understanding.

Criticism of propaganda grew, but the critics could not decide if the fault was with the use of emotion-evoking words and pictures or the very idea that propaganda was synonymous with deception and lies. Either way, the critics agreed that propaganda was the enemy of informed debate and rational discussion, thereby impeding the search for truth and undermining a critical tenet of the liberal faith in the marketplace of ideas. Propaganda was thus doubly insidious. Roosevelt's advisors were concerned with any activity that may be labeled as fascist or authoritarian within the U.S. Government and therefore cautioned against moving the propaganda research apparatus into, or in direct support to, the administration. Roosevelt argued that "[s]uch activity, although necessary, belonged outside the government where it could exert its influence in the same way as any other pressure group in a democratic setting, doing its best to bring about change by intelligent persuasion, not by state-sanctioned coercion."⁸⁵ Although the apparatus was somewhat disassociated from the U.S. Government, advisors still flowed in and out of the President's office, critics found their influence to be too strong.

⁸³Ibid., 25.

⁸⁴Ibid., 153-154.

⁸⁵Ibid., 25.

Democratic Theory

Although deeply entrenched in the propaganda war, Lippman and Dewey were significantly shaped by the challenges of managing propaganda in democratic theory and republican forms of government; they had to face that in post war times, the scales tipped in favor of free speech protection and away from national protectionism. Although the discourse acknowledged that a democratic government could and should defend and promote its interests through propaganda, meeting propaganda with propaganda, but Catlin warned, that propaganda should not be used to “terrorize citizens from free discussion.”⁸⁶ “In short, [the government] could not have a monopoly on expression and remain democratic; democracy is based on tolerance and must therefore permit the propaganda of other movement’s free role within the law.”⁸⁷ The question was once again, how should a democracy balance the need to provide a viable message, protecting itself from competing propaganda, while tolerating other messages?

More exposure to revolutionary propaganda brought about by mass communications technologies seemed to be increasing the public’s insecurity intensifying an overall sense of crisis. Concern was exacerbated by the destabilizing and revolutionary power of propaganda used in Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and Fascist Italy and by the Japanese in China. Conditions abroad revealed striking examples of how monopoly control over channels of communication and instruments of violence, led to

⁸⁶Charles Siepmann, letter to Marshall, September 13, 1940, box 224, folder 2674

⁸⁷George E. Gordon Catlin, “Propaganda as a Function of Democratic Government,” in Harwood Childs, ed., *Propaganda and Dictatorship: A collection of Papers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936, 32.

heightened attention to propaganda as an instrument of terror and a threat to political stability.⁸⁸ The public knew on the eve of WWII that propaganda was a dangerous antidemocratic weapon that needed to be combated, but without destroying democratic processes along the way.⁸⁹ It is helpful to reevaluate how the nation experienced war propaganda; beginning with how British propagandists had manipulated both U.S. opinion leaders and the public leading up to the war to the insidious nature of fascist propaganda—both included penetrating the U.S. consciousness through film, pamphlets, and interviews. Stuart Chase correlates bad language, human rootlessness, mass communication technologies, political and commercial propaganda in his book, *The Tyranny of Words*. He warns of the susceptibility to all these forces stating that “Power Age” communities have grown far beyond the check of individual experience, relying increasingly on disassociated communication. This has enlarged the field for words, absolutely and relatively, and has created a “paradise for fakirs.”⁹⁰

Toward A Balance

Journalists do not seem to be as concerned with providing many objective versions of the story, and although it appears there are more choices of source information, it is really not the case. People believe there to be a multiplicity and diversity of information, but there is really not much in the sense of true difference or

⁸⁸Michael Curtis, Free Speech, "The People's Darling Privilege:" *Struggles for Freedom of Expression in American History* (Duke Press, December. 2000).

⁸⁹Thelma McCormack, "As Time Goes By" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 2006, 608; 179, Chapter II. Online version: <http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/608/1/179>.

⁹⁰Chase, Stuart, *The Tyranny of Words* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938), 27.

diversity. The public is unaware that there are only a handful of owners behind most of those products seen on the newsstand, cable or web. “A handful of owners and the same commercial imperative at work ...and this has tended to make the quality of most media product highly dubious.”⁹¹ Journalistic theory provides that news items should be objective and paid articles are advertisement and are intended to be subjective. “Federal law specifically mandates that any advertisement appearing in the format of a news item must state that the item is in fact a paid advertisement.”⁹² The blurring of lines between objective news, news-tainment, and political advertising has increasingly raised questions of journalistic integrity over the last few years.

The democratic political system supports a free press; that same free press will often speak some unpleasant truths that go against our own interests, but it is a question of balance. The balance at the moment is skewed in such a way as to be counterproductive to our own ability to defend ourselves in the marketplace of ideas. A common thread of dialogue, evidenced by one blog site, suggests that the West has lost the conviction to fair and balanced information, or that the U.S. Press has. Some comments go so far as to believe the press has redefined its role to function more in opposition to the government than in lockstep with it. This perception is fed by opposing parties—republican president, democratic press—and “some of it is a real denial of the seriousness of the foe we face. Some of the repugnance the media feels is toward war

⁹¹Crispin Mark Miller. Interview: Mark Crispin Miller. Frontline. January 17, 2007Ibid. .

⁹²Ibid.

itself, perhaps because a smaller percentage of journalists have served there as compared with earlier conflicts.”⁹³

Interwar commentators worried about how the forces of mass communications technologies and propaganda were affecting the common language of democracy arguing that meaningless language had been one of most devastating consequences of the war.⁹⁴

“Our current Supreme Court precedent suggests that even statements that might lead to crime or revolution or be construed as advocating it are protected from government action unless they are directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and plainly likely to produce such action.”⁹⁵ This is as a result of apparent injudicious application of the Sedition Act, repealed in 1921, which is now sometimes compared to the USA PATRIOT Act because of the latter’s perceived chilling effect on free speech. According to a Gallup poll, the public is wary about the Patriot Act. In January 2002, 47 percent of Americans wanted their government to stop terrorism even if it reduced civil liberties. However, by November 2003 this number had dropped to 31 percent, indicating increasing concern with expanding government powers and/or reduced fear of terrorism. From 2003 to 2004, nearly a quarter of all Americans felt that the Act went too far, while most felt that it was either just right or did not go far enough. By 2005, the people polled were statistically divided half and half for and against the Act. The First

⁹³Neo-Neocon, reluctant.

⁹⁴Gary, 38.

⁹⁵Sara Feuerstein. Combat Hate Speech with Dialogue, Not Suppression. USINFO.STATE.GOV. Interview with Law Professor Michael Curtis, Constitutional Law, Free Speech and Legal and Constitutional History, Wake Forest Law School, Winston-Salem, North Carolina. (<http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2006/Feb/15-941841.html>, 12.

Amendment chill is reminiscent of an earlier era when the government attempted to shut down dissent by investigating groups like the NAACP and the Japanese American Citizens League. Notably, those groups and other civil rights, immigrant and free speech advocates today filed briefs supporting the ACLU's challenge to the law. "Sadly, our government has an ugly history of using its investigative powers to squelch dissent," said ACLU Associate Legal Director Ann Beeson.⁹⁶

Since the attacks on U.S. soil, force protection and homeland security have taken on a new urgency. Recognition of an ideological aspect to the current conflict and efforts to influence the strategic perceptions of Allies and the wider Muslim world using information operations and psychological warfare techniques has attracted greater interest among Western governments.⁹⁷ This brings us back to the debate of propaganda in a democracy: how to stabilize democratic theory in an age of mass media propaganda and how to secure the American public from antidemocratic ideas and activities.⁹⁸ Like the Cold War, the Long War promises to be a generational struggle requiring patience and vision, and drawing on all the tools of national power, not just the military. However, this long war does not have a single, coherent, organizing framework around which to rally, like the NSC 69's containment strategy. "Although we were successful with propaganda and counter propaganda as contributory factors of defeating communism ...

⁹⁶ACLU Associate Legal Director Ann Beeson American Civil Liberties Union. *MCA, et al. v. Ashcroft and Mueller*. July 30, 2003. (<http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/16821res20030730.html>).

⁹⁷Davis, 29.

⁹⁸Gary, 5.

it is still difficult to convince people to do it.”⁹⁹ An imperative in the war on terror is to develop the structure, process and agreement to meet 21st century threats in modern conditions with the fewest sacrifices of freedom and democratic principles. Today, like in the interwar period, “in preserving that balance, the mass communications have a peculiar responsibility and opportunity.”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Slesinger, letter to May, June 1940 proposal, box 199, folder 2385.

CHAPTER FOUR

The essential debate that occurred after World War I highlights why as a nation - we should care about propaganda. Although no causal relationship has been established, if anti-democratic propaganda then negative public opinion, the popular inference is that propaganda foments negative opinion potentially affecting national security and national will; this makes propaganda a key issue during a time of war. "In modern times" Chase wrote, violence "comes after the conflict has been set in motion by propaganda. Bad language is now the mightiest weapon in the arsenal of despots and demagogues. Witness Dr. Goebbels."¹⁰¹ Extremists have been effective in setting the stage for their objectives; as David Kilcullen has commented, if bin Laden didn't have access to global media, satellite communications, and the internet, he'd just be "a cranky guy in a cave."¹⁰² As Lasswell saw it, political scientists needed to understand that the struggle for power defined politics and that in an age of propaganda that struggle would take place in the arena of symbols as much as it would in the arenas of economics and organized violence.

David Easton, a distinguished research professor of political science at Harvard, indicated in 1953 that the decision making function of all political systems is the

¹⁰¹Chase, 27.

¹⁰²David J. Kilcullen. New Paradigms for a 21st Century Conflict. eJournal USA. May 2007, USINFOSTATE.GOV. <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijpe/kilcullen.htm>

“authoritative allocation of values.”¹⁰³ Understanding how those values are allocated is important for a political authority to maintain legitimate power; in turn that power is defined and at times coercively influenced by a political authority in an effort to attain its goals against resistance.¹⁰⁴ For a science of politics and the United States Government interested in preventing violence, understanding the manipulation of symbols, as representative of values, and keeping track of those who were most adept at using them was critical. To take a page out of history, the “U.S. anti-fascists needed only to point to the fate of the European nations undermined by fifth columnists to illustrate the threat of pervasive activities in the United States and to argue that some organized response was necessary.”¹⁰⁵ Whether they were opportunists or collaborators, “fifth columnists” used the words, signs and symbols, if not the beliefs, of an ideology to persuade people to their cause.

Adversaries today who espouse ideologies that support an anti-coalition movement in the GWOT have become quite skilled at using modern technology to demonstrate and exaggerate effectiveness. As Lieutenant General John Vines, Multi-

¹⁰³David Easton, *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*. 1953: Alfred A. Knopf, N.Y; 2nd ed. 1971, 1981 Easton is a Canadian political scientist, renowned for his application of systems theory to political science. Much of his work focused on elaborating a systems analytical approach as a central means of understanding how political systems operate. In recent years he has turned to structural constraints as a second major element underlying political systems. Easton recently completed a book about the influence of political structure on various aspects of political life. “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,” 1957: *World Politics*, Vol. IX, pp. 393-400.

¹⁰⁴For example: Max Weber discusses the relationship between legitimate power and authority; Harold Lasswell focuses on coercive influence; and Robert Dahl discusses the attainment of goals against resistance.

¹⁰⁵Clayton D. Aurie, *Propaganda Warriors: America’s Crusade Against Nazi Germany* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 8-23.

National Corps-Iraq Commander observed: “Their flash to bang time is fast; they have no approval process, nothing to slow them down from advertising their violent acts.”¹⁰⁶

Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, in a NEWSWEEK article, echoed the sophistication of the enemy’s use of the media, stating that “[m]ost large scale attacks on U.S. forces are now filmed, often from multiple camera angles, and with high-resolution cameras. The footage is slickly edited into dramatic narratives: quick-cut images of Humvees exploding or U.S. soldiers being felled by snipers are set to inspiring religious soundtracks or changing, which lends them a triumphal feel. In some cases, U.S. officials believe, insurgents attack American forces primarily to generate fresh footage.”¹⁰⁷ The adversary has the opportunity to broadcast simultaneously to multitudes that do not have the capability to broadcast back. The pattern of interaction is highly asymmetric; very different from one where each agent interacts equally with all others; we need to address this asymmetry.¹⁰⁸ Jean Baudrillard, notorious French sociologist, cultural critic, and the theorist of post modernity addressed the murderous capacity of images. He argued that today we only experience prepared realities such as edited war footage and meaningless acts of terrorism; reality has become equivalent to a reproduction. Baudrillard’s example of mass reproduction is the reality that was created by the media through Gulf War film footage. The real is not only what can be reproduced, but that which is always already reproduced that is the hyperreal, a copy of a

¹⁰⁶LTG John Vines, MNC-I (18ABC) Commander, meeting, March 13, 2005.

¹⁰⁷Johnson, MSNBC.com article.

¹⁰⁸Axelrod, 63.

copy, which is entirely in simulation.¹⁰⁹ He goes on to challenge that the whole system of reality and representation becomes weightless, the world is reduced to a simulacrum, not unreal but not real either; the image itself is a representation of a representation, so distant from reality that reality is so distorted it is unrecognizable.

Blair insists that if we recognize this struggle for what it *truly* is, we would at least be on the first steps of the path to winning it, but “a vast part of Western opinion is not remotely near this point yet.”¹¹⁰ Adding Baudrillard’s assertion that the truth is buried in layers of representations, his advice is to first recognize the issue and then to take on the asymmetry of this non-lethal fight: “This [extremist] ideology has to be taken on—and taken on everywhere. Islamist terrorism will not be defeated until we confront not just the methods of the extremists but also their ideas.” Mr. Blair goes on to suggest that “we must reject not just their barbaric acts but also their false sense of grievance against the West, their attempt to persuade us that it is others and not they themselves who are responsible for their violence.”¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹Notes: Baudrillard: Most famously, he argued — in *Symbolic Exchange and Death* — that Western societies have undergone a “precession of simulacra”. [12] This precession is in the form of “orders of simulacra”, from: the era of the original; to the counterfeit; to the produced, mechanical copy, and through; to the simulated “third order of simulacra”, whereby the copy has replaced the original. *Simulacra and Simulation* (*Simulacres et Simulation* in French) is a philosophical treatise by Jean Baudrillard that discusses the interaction between reality, symbols and society. *Simulacra and Simulation* is most known for its discussion of images, signs, and how they relate to the present day. Baudrillard claims that modern society has replaced all reality and meaning with symbols and signs, and that the human experience is of a simulation of reality rather than reality itself. The simulacra that Baudrillard refers to are signs of culture and media that create the perceived reality. Baudrillard, Jean. *Selected Writings*, ed. Mark Poster (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1988. Pages 166-184.

¹¹⁰Blair, 80.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 84.

The discussion above leads to understanding the political importance of communicating with the public in an effort to create and maintain legitimacy. Easton's model of the political system identifies an iterative process of creating and maintaining a legitimate system. Manufacturing demands and supporting concepts affects the decision making policy which gives rise to policies which create an environment that produces other policy-supporting mechanisms. This cycle can be authoritatively managed by creating the means to achieve the end. (See Figure Below)

The Political System




Figure: Concept of the Political System (David Easton)¹¹²

The political system is circular with each step feeding the next. As representations of representations are built, the focus on reality becomes more distorted. In an environment fraught with representations, the decision making process and subsequent policy is created on the simulacra, not on what is real. This system is much

¹¹² Easton, David. An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems. World Politics, Vol. 9, No. 3.(Apr., 1957), page 384.

as Archibald MacLeish described it when he commented that the democratic system's failure to resist European fascism would result in a degradation of the society.

Propaganda and the Political System

In terms of the political system, is injecting propaganda aimed at delegitimizing the democratic system dangerous to the system? With regard to recruiting, the consensus appears to be yes; "but I have no question about the fact that [Osama] bin Laden and [Ayman al-Zawahiri] and others like them quite consciously use the media, including the Internet, as a recruiting tool," Mr. Chertoff said. "In terms of recruiting, I would say that the principal way to enter the U.S. is through the Internet."¹¹³ The insurgent would be foolish to try to match physical forces. "Logic forces him instead to carry the fight to a different ground where he has a better chance to balance the physical odds against him."¹¹⁴ As already indicated, "Effective insurgents rapidly adapt to changing circumstances. They cleverly use the tools of the global information revolution to magnify the effects of their actions."¹¹⁵ These media efforts help to make "Al Qaeda and other parties constitute an active adversary in the propaganda domain."¹¹⁶ Radical Islamists are using the Internet to recruit homegrown terrorists in the U.S., Homeland

¹¹³Chertoff, Michael (Homeland Security Secretary). *Terrorists Using Internet to Recruit*. Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee Report on the National Terror Alert Response Center. March 14, 2007. Hailer Publishing, St Petersburg, Florida. 20

¹¹⁴David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Hailer Publishing, St Petersburg, Florida. 2005, p. 5.

¹¹⁵USMC COIN Manual, December 2006.

¹¹⁶Jones, 109.

Security Secretary Michael Chertoff told a Senate panel; the efforts to legitimize radical efforts and de-legitimize the elements of democracy are significant.

There is a viable link between propaganda, indoctrination, and terrorism/counterterrorism.¹¹⁷ Mere threats to destroy are often as socially disruptive as physical devastation itself.¹¹⁸ “Be it ethnic or religious, identity-shaping is not rocket science.”¹¹⁹ Source Directed Reports from Iraq and Afghanistan identify through detention interviews that jihadist internet sites, media reports of successful violent attacks and radical Friday prayers help to incite the jihadist warrior ethos and serve to build and energize a following. Easton contends that various political myths, doctrines, and philosophies of a political system are transmitted to, and by, each generation and input (support and demand) creating a particular interpretation of the goals and norms of that society.¹²⁰ The soft power of a political system arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture,

¹¹⁷ Prince Peter Alexeevich Kropotkin (In Russian Пётр Алексеевич Кропоткин) (December 9, 1842 - February 8, 1921) credited with espousing the concept of propaganda of the deed. He was one of Russia's foremost anarchists and one of the first advocates of what he called "anarchist communism": the model of society he advocated for most of his life was that of a communist society free from central government. Because of his title and his prominence as an anarchist in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, he was known by some as "the Anarchist Prince". He visited Switzerland in 1872 and became a member of the International Workingmen's Association at Geneva. The socialism of this body was not, however, advanced enough for his views, and after studying the programme of the more violent Jura Federation at Neuchâtel and spending some time in the company of the leading members, he definitely adopted the creed of anarchism and, on returning to Russia, took an active part in spreading the nihilist propaganda. De Mesquita, Ethan Bueno and Eric S. Dickson The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization.. *American Journal of Political Science*, Volume 51 Issue 2 Page 364-381, April 2007

¹¹⁸Hindery, Roderick, "Identifying Religious Terrorism through Profiles of Propaganda", August 4, 2004.

¹¹⁹Corn, 5.

¹²⁰Easton, 399.

political ideals, and policies.¹²¹ What causes concern is that the glamorization of martyrdom and other radical behavior, the unfettered access to the internet, and the extreme language propagated will unduly influence the destiny of a generation and its political processes.¹²² Mr. Blair recognizes that “many in Western countries listen to the propaganda of the extremists and accept it. Every act of carnage some how serves to indicate our responsibility for the disorder rather than the wickedness of those who caused it.”¹²³ This process creates a new reality under which policies are made.

The Old Debate

But how do we negate “Islamist terrorism” persuasion? Enter the historical Dewey-Lippman debate: what role does a democracy play in countering propaganda; what is the balance between freedom of speech and national security? It appears that the debate is beginning anew; however, as a nation at war, a number of influential government officials recognize the need to address and counter our adversary in the information environment. The 9/11 Commission Report stated that the U.S. needs “a preventive strategy...more political as it is military and we should strive to insure they cannot find sanctuary in the least governed most lawless places in the world.”¹²⁴ In his address to the Council on Foreign Relations, February 2006, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that “in the 6th year in what promises to be a long struggle against an

¹²¹Nye, as quoted in Josten.

¹²²Tony Corn. “World War IV As Fourth-Generation Warfare.” *Policy Review*, Hoover Institution, November 15, 2006, 3.

¹²³Blair, 83-84.

¹²⁴The 911 Report.

enemy that in many ways is unlike any our country has ever faced. And, in this war, some of the most critical battles may not be in the mountains in Afghanistan or in the streets of Iraq, but in newsrooms—in places like New York, London, Cairo, and elsewhere. Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today’s media age, but for the most part our country has not.”¹²⁵ He called for an aggressive approach to information in order to counter extremists messages in the world media. “Nervous Liberals” still have their say, however, espousing concern with trampling civil liberties: “As for Rumsfeld’s devotees at the CFR, the problem of savaging civil liberties is never seriously raised.”¹²⁶

Part of the debate in the pre-WWII era was whether the American populace could be well informed on all that matters: “A community of semantic illiterates, of persons unable to perceive the meaning of what they read and hear, is one of perilous equilibrium.”¹²⁷ Chase also argues that with the populace unable to translate words into verifiable reality, they fall victim to information fraud. This is a jihad of the tongue and as part of that, distortions of reality (and of the religion) must be addressed.¹²⁸ We cannot defeat a fanatical ideology just by imprisoning or killing its leaders; we have to defeat its ideas by understanding and its signs and negating, subverting or co-opting those

¹²⁵Donald Rumsfeld, “Council on Foreign Relations,” 25 February 2006, Washington DC.

¹²⁶Gary, 1. Mike Whitney, Rumsfeld’s assault on free speech. Free Press, DATELINE: 25 February 2006

¹²⁷Chase, 27.

¹²⁸Corn, 2. Jihad: The West is obviously not at war with Islam as such and its traditional Five Pillars; but it is most definitely at war with Jihadism, a pure product of Salafism, which posits that jihad is the Sixth Pillar of Islam. From the point of view of threat assessment, the much-discussed theological distinction between a greater (spiritual) and lesser (physical) jihad is utterly irrelevant, and the only thing that matters is the praxeological distinction between three modalities of jihad as practiced: jihad of the sword, of the hand, and of the tongue.

signs.¹²⁹ The United States Government needs to focus its “efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies and objectives ...”¹³⁰ This engagement must be done in a truthful and balanced manner; if the intent is to keep citizens informed on reality so they may govern themselves through fair representation, then there is no reason to not tell the entire story. “This is only one application of the psychology and the propaganda learned through painstaking observation of Al Qaeda, AP, Al Reuters, Dan Rather, and Al-Jazeera’s antics.”¹³¹

Laswell identified a use for state and civilian sponsored dimensions of propaganda: that it was rational and could be used to divert political tensions, diminish the threat of political violence, and serve the ends of a more stable and predictable democratic politic. Achieving each of these dimensions would make the values of democracy clearer and more widely apprehended by modern publics.¹³² The US Government must ensure that “[t]he difference between our propaganda and theirs, Slesinger suggests, was the difference between truth and lies, ‘so, perhaps through no virtue of our own we are forced to fall back on the propaganda of truth as we see it, and that means falling back on education.”¹³³ That education must be brought into the

¹²⁹Blair, 79.

¹³⁰Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-13, *Information Operations*, 13 February 2006.

¹³¹The democracy of it all – bloggers.

¹³²Laswell, “The Propagandist Bids for Power” *American Scholar* 8 (1939), 350-357.

¹³³Slesinger, memorandum to AFC board of directors, October 26, 1943, box 200, folder 2394: AFC.

context of the twenty first century, addressing the anarchy of the internet and the virtual empires it facilitates.

CHAPTER 5

George Catlin, an eminent American political scientist, argued that the liberal state, with its commitment to tolerance, potentially creates the conditions for its own demise. In the interwar period, the danger of propaganda required a rethinking of liberal tolerance; the peculiar weakness of democracy is disclosed, by scientific analysis, to be that of allocating a disproportionate freedom to the individual (free speech), at the expense of authority and of the security which authority guarantees (national security). [Refer to Easton's chart] At a time of crisis such as war, Catlin argues, the stress on individual liberty should be subordinated to the need for collective, or national, security and believed that social sciences could be of use. His premise was that the demand for security, organization, and authority required specific expertise to observe and analyze issues in order to develop a strategy for influencing public will. He insisted that a decision was required as to the role of the propagandist in a democracy and that "The future is that of fight—probably literally so. In time of war one does not inquire what instruments of propaganda one shall use. One uses all available—press, stage, pulpit, radio, telegraphic lobbying, public platforms."¹³⁴

Despite the call to action by President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld and other government officials, apart from the Department of Defense, no US department or agency has devoted substantial resources to long-range planning for a strategic communications message since the demise of the United States Information Agency. There are two issues

with this: the balance between lethal and non-lethal elements has not been struck and there is no overarching strategy including all the elements of government and civil capability. Karen Hughes was appointed as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs by President Bush in 2005 in an effort to lead policy development addressing the United States' communications with the world.¹³⁵ The President also tasked Ms. Hughes to work with the National Security Council to form Policy Coordination Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications. "Ms Huges has a daunting task before her: to improve the image of the US abroad, and to convey key USG strategic messages."¹³⁶ The task is so daunting perhaps that little change has taken place. In *Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab-Muslim World* (The Djerejian Report), Congress stated that the Department of State, charged with communicating US national interests to the rest of the world, has not been doing enough; claiming "U.S. public diplomacy capability is inadequate due to outmoded techniques, insufficient resources, and too little strategic direction."¹³⁷ This comment, however, is somewhat disingenuous as the USIA

¹³⁴Catlin, 294.

¹³⁵Hughes, Bio

¹³⁶Josten, 16.

¹³⁷ The USIA engaged foreign governments through internet services until reined in by Senator Helms' efforts to attach the Smith-Mundt act to internet activities. The USIA Internet service began in early 1994. On January 14, 1995, the Washington Post ran an article written by John Schwartz which was critical of the USIA decision to provide information on the Internet, because of the Smith-Mundt Act. Schwartz described the USIA information as "forbidden fruit" or "propaganda," which "has been carefully withheld from Americans lest it brainwash them." Schwartz quoted Carl Malamud of the Internet Multicasting Service as saying: They're [the USIA] winking at those very fundamental mandates from the U.S. Congress -- Ye shall not do news to the American Public It's important that we understand that cyberspace is part of the real world Just because it's on a computer, it doesn't mean that the basic rules don't

did begin operations on the internet in 1994, only to be challenged by Congress who did not want the USIA to subject the American public to government controlled news broadcasts, and the commercial broadcasters who do not want competition from a free source of news. Both have successfully lobbied to keep the Smith-Mundt Act bar to the US dissemination of USIA information.

Although much political rhetoric, since 9/11, the U.S. government has declined the opportunity to develop a strategy to directly influence the U.S. population. Public Diplomacy (PD) is one of the national instruments of power intended to implement the U.S. National Security Strategy. The responsibility for influencing foreign governments falls under the rubric of PD which does not “attempt to distinguish public diplomacy from propaganda. Instead, it candidly admits that PD is a form of propaganda based on facts.”¹³⁸ What is lacking is the sophisticated public debate required to determine if the US Government has the political will to engage international audiences even at the risk of exposure to the American populace. The debate must consider the balance of free speech

apply. Schwartz also quoted from an article by former FCC Commissioner Newton Minow and Annenberg Fellow Alvin Snyder, whom expressed support for eliminating the legal barrier to dissemination of USIA information to U.S. citizens. Shouldn't we have the opportunity to know what the United States is saying to people in Bosnia, Russia or South America. Yesterday's fear that such programs will 'brainwash' the American public is senseless. We get a steady stream of government views in speeches, briefings and press releases, and we are capable of reaching our own conclusions. According to USIA officials, after the Washington Post article appeared, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), the chair of the Senator Foreign Relations committee, began to press the agency to rein in the Internet program. Senator Helms is also said to favor the elimination of many USIA services, to be replaced by the private sector. Love, James. The U.S. Information Agency On The Internet, Not For American Citizens, Taxpayer Assets Project, Information Policy Note, Crown Jewels, US Information Agency, April 26, 1995 (<http://lists.essential.org/1995/info-policy-notes/msg00135.html>)

¹³⁸Zweibel, 27.

and national security as well as the ability of the American public to weed through massive communications and discern truth from lie.

Policy and procedures referring specifically to collecting, analyzing and countering propaganda is still inadequate. Public Affairs, the comfort zone for government officials, addresses misinformation and disinformation with reactionary comments timed too late and too timidly to make an impact. What is required is a policy and process that postures the communications community to properly address and, in some cases, preempt propaganda. Today, so much of the USG's communications with the world is reactionary. Constantly "countering" the adversaries' propaganda is a dangerous trap and has never met with success.¹³⁹ The USG must transition from reacting to the message to channeling the enemy in the information environment. "Without doubt, the current U.S. strategic communications effort is woefully inadequate to the task at hand, and this reflects a major shortcoming in the way the U.S.G has organized so far to meet the challenges posed by radical Islamist groups seeking to erode U.S. global power and influence."¹⁴⁰ Referring to Easton's model, the USG must manage the input to its system while injecting into the adversary's system. In other words, the USG must understand the adversary's system – reality, signs, symbols – enough to join them in battle while protecting and reinforcing the legitimacy of its own system. We are in a logic of simulation that has nothing to do with a logic of facts and an order of reasons. This simulation is characterized by a precession of a model and around

¹³⁹Galula, xi.

the model circulates a field of events. Those events are created through real events and creation of those events. Facts have no life of their own, but take on a life of their own, serving their purpose at the intersection of models – such as propaganda between the USG model and that of the adversary's. The confusion of fact is what provides room for a new reality within which the legitimacy of the system is challenged.

Addressing this simulation is the secret to an open discourse. The democratic system must remove the ambiguity and establish the position of power in that discourse. The difficulty of addressing the simulation through discourse is that it regenerates and regenerates its own logic. According to Baudrillard, contradicting one set of signs by producing another set of signs causes the system to disintegrate as it moves further from reality. The USG must establish the reality of the democratic system and remain consistent through truth in its representation of that system. As long as the United States responds reactively with ill-thought 'huh-uh' statements to propaganda designed to denigrate and destroy the democratic system, it is doomed to fail in the long war. The democratic logic is threatened by a simulation, the threat of vanishing in a play of words, risking the real power of the system.

¹⁴⁰Davis, 46.

CONCLUSION

Today, as in the 1930s, we must develop an interest in propaganda analysis as a protective strategy against destabilizing and revolutionary movements, promoting the notion of a democratic propaganda offensive against violent anti-democratic forces. “Understanding the mindsets of both the jihadists and the broader Islamic community for the ‘waters in which they [the jihadists] swim’ will be essential, therefore, to any successful effort to develop a comprehensive strategic framework to counter and otherwise de-legitimize the radicals’ appeal and their messages.”¹⁴¹ Analysts need to develop a better understanding of the ideology, objectives, and strategies of the adversary, in addition to understanding the rest of the environment. Analysis must be three hundred and sixty degrees; it must include friendly, neutral and adversarial information capabilities. In addition, analysts must understand the enemy, his plans and operations as well as his strategic communications capabilities and intentions—all this in order to anticipate and preempt his messages.

This trend must reverse if we are to “expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.”¹⁴² However, “we are likely to see a continuing resort to self-righteous fanaticism on both sides.”¹⁴³ So we must

¹⁴¹Davis, 5-7.

¹⁴²Bush, NSS, National Security Strategy objective

¹⁴³Gorkay, 80.

carefully define our dialogue so as to disaggregate the extreme factions. Many have used the words “winning the hearts and minds” with little strategy and analysis associated. Gokay goes on to state that a counter effort requires an equal, yet positively expressed, fervour “expressed as an understandable nationalism, or perhaps a patriotism” while “maintaining the basic principles of modern political life.”¹⁴⁴ “A key counterinsurgency technique is to counter the grievances on which insurgent systems feed, denying energy to their recruiting and propaganda subsystems, and ultimately marginalising them as irrelevant to the population’s aspirations.”¹⁴⁵ The political will must rise to another level: “It is about hearts and minds, about inspiring people, persuading them, showing them what our values stand for at their best. Why are we not yet succeeding? Because we are not being bold enough, consistent enough, thorough enough in fighting for the values we believe in.”¹⁴⁶

Resistance to adversarial propaganda will have to include efforts to legitimize the United States’ political system while delegitimizing the adversary’s. These efforts should consider the lessons learned from the interwar period – engaging in a sophisticated public discourse considering the balance of free speech and adversary propaganda; understanding the adversary’s political system and having the will to input into that system; and managing the input into the US political system ensuring a sense of reality.

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵Kilcullen, 41.

¹⁴⁶Blair, 87.

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