Security Guarantees and Extended Deterrence in the Gulf Region: A European Perspective
Abstract
Extended deterrence consists in extending the logic of deterrence to a third party, that is, persuading a potential adversary that the costs of attacking a protected country would exceed its benefits through a security guarantee given to the protected party. To a large degree, it stems from any form of military alliance between a stronger country and a weaker one-although alliances per se generally include a mutual defense commitment, which is not a prerequisite to extended deterrence. Extended deterrence may translate into various kinds of arrangements. At one end of the spectrum, extended deterrence may rely on mere unilateral statements of protection. At the other end, it may rely on the permanent presence of nuclear weapons on the protected country's territory. In between is often a web of policy statements, consultations mechanisms, joint exercises and planning, defense cooperation, ports visits, and presence of foreign troops- varying from country to country. If the protector has nuclear weapons, extended deterrence may become, explicitly or not, a form of extended nuclear deterrence. But the protector may have an interest in maintaining ambiguity on this point. Any State aggressor foolish enough to confront a nuclear-armed protector would do it at its own peril.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA534379
Entities
People
- Bruno Tertrais
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School