Extended Deterrence and Iran

Abstract

Despite nearly seven decades of Nuclear weapons, (NWs) and four decades of Cold war in which they figured prominently, we still do not know very much about, or with any degree of assurance, what NWs can and cannot do beyond create widespread destruction. Questions about deterrence, extended deterrence and the political utility of NWs and whether these are general propositions/laws or culturally or state specific, cannot be reliably answered. In this paper I first discuss extended deterrence during the Cold war and after. I then turn to the case of Iran. The paper is thus doubly speculative, raising questions about how extended deterrence might apply in the case of Iran; discussing several features of the case and speculating about how Iran might react in a nuclear context. The questions are intended to stimulate further thinking about the specific and more general propositions. These can-and doubtless will-be fleshed out in the course of events.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2009
Accession Number
ADA534513

Entities

People

  • Shahram Chubin

Organizations

  • Naval Postgraduate School

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter WMD

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Defense
  • Arms Control
  • Chemical Weapons
  • Cold War
  • Command And Control
  • Defense Systems
  • Deterrence
  • Governments
  • Human Behavior
  • International Organizations
  • Middle East
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Security
  • Terrorists
  • United States
  • Weapons
  • Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Readers

  • Educational Psychology
  • Strategic Security Studies