Strategic Reassurance if Iran "Goes Nuclear": A Framework and Some Propositions
Abstract
Faced with continuing uncertainties about Iran's nuclear weapon ambitions, reassurance and deterrence have figured prominently in our discussions of Gulf and wider Middle East security. During this workshop, presentations also have addressed what may yet be done in an attempt to influence Iran's nuclear weapons calculus as talks begin between the P-5 + 1 and Iran. My presentation seeks to address issues of strategic reassurance if Iran crosses the nuclear weapon threshold. More specifically, I first posit that Iran has crossed the nuclear weapon threshold. Then I briefly set out what I call the strategic reassurance legacy baseline, the set of measures used by the United States to reassure its NATO allies during the Cold War. My presentation then considers likely reassurance requirements on the part of countries in the Gulf and the wider Middle East confronting an emboldened newly-nuclear Iran. Against that backdrop, I set out a series of propositions about providing strategic reassurance if Iran succeeds in crossing the nuclear weapon threshold. Finally, I will offer some brief concluding thoughts that return to today's question of "what next with Iran's nuclear ambitions?"
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA534514
Entities
People
- Lewis A. Dunn
Organizations
- Naval Postgraduate School