



# CF CIMIC Operations 1990-2010

## *An Annotated Bibliography*

Neil O'Reilly  
*Royal Military College of Canada*

DRDC CORA CR 2010-275  
December 2010

**Defence R&D Canada**  
**Centre for Operational Research & Analysis**

Strategic Analysis Section



National  
Defence

Défense  
nationale

**Canada**



# **CF CIMIC Operations 1990-2010**

*An Annotated Bibliography*

Prepared By:

Neil O'Reilly

Royal Military College of Canada

PO Box 17000

Station Forces

Kingston Ontario

K7K 7B4

Royal Military College of Canada

Contract Project Manager: Dr. Michael Hennessy, 613 541 6000 x 6845

CSA: Neil Chuka, Strategic Analyst, 613 998 2332

The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the Contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.

## **Defence R&D Canada – CORA**

Contract Report

DRDC CORA CR 2010-275

December 2010

Principal Author

*Original signed by Neil O'Reilly*

---

Neil O'Reilly

Approved by

*Original signed by Stephane Lefebvre*

---

Stephane Lefebvre

Section Head Strategic Analysis

Approved for release by

*Original Signed by Paul Comeau*

---

Paul Comeau

Chief Scientist

Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA)

- © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2010
- © Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2010

## Abstract

---

This Contract Report is an annotated bibliography of open source published material that either directly or indirectly touches on the doctrinal subject of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). The publications cover the period from 1990 to 2010. As a whole, the books, articles, monographs, and manuals listed below provide a partial history, overview of activities, and some analysis of the CIMIC function during the post-Cold War timeframe. The selection of articles looks at the planning, the intent, the delivery and the outcome of various CIMIC activities and covers the period of the 1990s when no formalized CF CIMIC doctrine existed. The source material includes publications from military, government, media and academia and provides a diverse representation of the evolution of CIMIC over the past two decades.

## Résumé

---

Le présent rapport de contrat est une bibliographie annotée de documents publiés de source ouverte qui traitent directement ou indirectement de la coopération civilo-militaire (COCIM). Les publications couvrent la période allant de 1990 à 2010. De façon générale, les livres, les articles, les monographies et les manuels indiqués ci-dessous donnent un historique et un aperçu partiels des activités de la COCIM ainsi qu'une analyse de ses fonctions durant la période de l'après-guerre froide. Les articles choisis traitent de la planification, des buts, de l'exécution et des résultats des activités et couvrent la période des années 1990, lorsqu'il n'existait pas de doctrine officielle de COCIM au sein des FC. Les documents sources sont notamment les publications militaires, gouvernementales, médiatiques et universitaires; ils donnent des éclairages différents de l'évolution de la COCIM au cours des deux dernières décennies.

This page intentionally left blank.

# Executive Summary

---

## CF CIMIC Operations 1990-2010: An Annotated Bibliography

O'Reilly, Neil; DRDC CORA CR 2010-275; Defence R&D Canada – CORA; December 2010.

CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) is defined by the Canadian Forces terminology bank as “the coordination and cooperation, in support of a mission, between the military and civil actors, including the national population and authorities, as well as international, national, governmental, and non-governmental organizations and agencies.” The CIMIC function includes liaison and the facilitation of information exchange, activities which, for most missions the CF is engaged in, are critical to achieving any level of success. After turning to ad hoc solutions during the various missions in the Balkans in the 1990s, the CF formalized CIMIC doctrine in 1999 in an effort to provide a foundation for training activities and operations. The following is a list of books, documents, articles, case studies and briefings that collectively provide a broad doctrinal and academic discussion of CIMIC in both a theoretical and practical standpoint. It can be seen that, even though this bibliography spans two decades, the literature is relatively shallow when compared to other more mature military capabilities and functions. This bibliography is not designed to pinpoint any one definition or perspective of CIMIC, but to expand the breadth and scope of discussions regarding this topic. Hopefully it will succeed in allowing anyone interested in exploring this matter a variety of perspectives from which to understand the nuance and complexity of CIMIC.

## Sommaire

---

### **CF CIMIC Operations 1990-2010: An Annotated Bibliography**

**O'Reilly, Neil; DRDC CORA CR 2010-275; R & D pour la défense Canada – CARO; Décembre 2010.**

La coopération civilo-militaire (COCIM) est définie dans la banque de terminologie des Forces canadiennes comme étant « la coordination et la coopération, à l'appui de la mission, entre les intervenants militaires et civils, y compris la population et les autorités nationales, ainsi que les organisations et organismes internationaux, nationaux, gouvernementaux et non gouvernementaux ». La fonction de COCIM englobe la liaison et la facilitation de l'échange d'information. Pour la plupart des missions auxquelles participent les FC, ces activités sont essentielles pour le succès de la mission. Après avoir essayé des solutions *ad hoc* durant diverses missions dans les Balkans durant les années 1990, les FC ont officialisé la doctrine de la COCIM en 1999 afin d'établir la base des activités d'instruction et des opérations. Vous trouverez ci-après une liste de livres, de documents, d'articles, d'études de cas et d'exposés qui, ensemble, donnent un aperçu doctrinal et académique de la COCIM à la fois du point de vue théorique et pratique. Comme on peut le constater, même si cette bibliographie couvre deux décennies, la quantité de documents est plutôt maigre par rapport à ceux qui existent pour d'autres capacités et fonctions militaires plus anciennes. Cette bibliographie n'a pas pour but d'établir avec précision une définition ou une perspective de la COCIM, mais d'élargir la portée des discussions sur ce sujet. On espère qu'elle fournira à toute personne intéressée à approfondir ce sujet une diversité de perspectives lui permettant de comprendre les nuances et la complexité de la COCIM.

## Table of contents

---

Abstract .....	i
Résumé .....	i
Executive Summary.....	iii
Sommaire.....	iv
Table of contents .....	v
1 Introduction.....	1
2 Annotated Bibliography.....	2
Distribution list.....	19

This page intentionally left blank.

# 1 Introduction

---

CIMIC is defined by the CF as “the coordination and cooperation, in support of a mission, between the military and civil actors, including the national population and authorities, as well as international, national, governmental, and non-governmental organizations and agencies.”<sup>1</sup> This definition is very broad and encompasses activities that portions of any military force, not just those designated as CIMIC personnel, engaged in a contemporary mission would be expected to perform. In some ways, the definition presented in the Army’s 2006 CIMIC Tactics, Techniques and Procedures manual helps to clarify what is meant by the CIMIC function: “CIMIC is a military function that supports the commander’s mission by establishing and maintaining coordination and cooperation between the military force and civil actors in the commander’s area of operations.”<sup>2</sup> The CIMIC function includes liaison and the facilitation of information exchange, activities which, for most missions the CF is engaged in, are critical to achieving any level of success. In fact, the secondary but critical function of information acquisition performed by CIMIC personnel is indispensable in operations where the host nation population holds the most important intelligence.<sup>3</sup>

Clearly the interaction and cooperation between CF and various Canadian and other civilian actors and authorities is not new, but the extent and importance of these interactions became highlighted during and in the aftermath of CF operations as part of the UNPROFOR I and UNPROFOR II in the Balkans in the early 1990s. During these operations CIMIC-type activities were conducted *ad hoc* as conditions on the ground developed, and according to individual initiatives and ingenuity. Lessons were learned through trial, error and experience, and no formal training existed. There was no attempt to consolidate the knowledge that area commanders were accumulating in their dealings with civilian counterparts on operations. The experience of the CF in the Balkans illustrated a move towards greater civil- military cooperation in order to secure areas of operations and better coordinate logistics and reconstruction efforts. At this time, there was a realization that the doctrinal formalization of what are now considered CIMIC activities would partially redress the improvised nature of their conduct in the Balkans. The formalization of the function would also provide the foundational material for the CF training system. In 1999 the CF published its first CIMIC doctrine.

The following is a list of books, documents, articles, case studies and briefings that collectively provide a broad doctrinal and academic discussion of CIMIC in both a theoretical and practical standpoint. It can be seen that, even though this bibliography spans two decades, the literature is relatively shallow when compared to other more mature military capabilities and functions. This bibliography is not designed to pinpoint any one definition or perspective of CIMIC, but to expand the breadth and scope of discussions regarding this topic. Hopefully it will succeed in allowing anyone interested in exploring this matter a variety of perspectives from which to understand the nuance and complexity of CIMIC.

---

<sup>1</sup> DND Defence Terminology Bank, Entry Record Number 336, 11 October 2009.

<sup>2</sup> DND, *Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, B-GL-355-001-FP-001. DND: Ottawa, 1 March 2006. p.2

<sup>3</sup> Christopher Ankerson, “Peacekeeping Intelligence and Civil Society,” in *Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries*, David Carment and Martin Rudner, eds. NY: Routledge, 2006, pp.105-116.

## 2 Annotated Bibliography

---

**Abiew, Francis Kofi, “NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations,” in Henry Carey and Oliver Richmond, eds., *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGO's*, London: Frank Cass, 2003.**

At the time of this writing Abiew was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. This piece is an examination of factors that impede effective CIMIC from the perspective of NGO actors. He concludes with recommendations on how to improve the civil-military relationship for better effect. Though not dealing specifically with CF CIMIC activities, this publication offers useful insight on the larger concerns colouring the perspective of NGO and other civilian actors.

**Ankersen, Christopher, “Coordination, Cooperation, or Something Else: A Framework for Assessing Power Relations in Civil-Military Interactions,” in Douglas Bland, David Last, Franklin Pinch, and Alan Okros, eds., *New Missions, Old Problems: Challenge and Change for the Military*, Kingston: Queens-McGill University Press, 2004, pp. 81-100.**

Ankersen is a fellow of the London School of Economics and Political Science. In this chapter he presents a conceptual framework for the interactions of civilian organizations and military forces simultaneously engaged in humanitarian operations. Ankersen's primary interest here is the power relations between civilian organizations and the military. This piece is highly conceptual in regards to the relationship and roles played by each actor, but offers valuable insights into how military and civilian organizations can (or should) either cooperate as independent entities or coordinate their efforts in conflict and post-conflict environments.

**Ankersen, Christopher, “Peacekeeping Intelligence and Civil Society: Is Civil Military Cooperation the Missing Link,” in David Carment and Martin Rudner, eds., *Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries*, New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 105-116.**

In this chapter, based on a conference presentation, Ankersen presents an argument for the benefits of intelligence collection through good civil-military relations. In addition to securing an area of operations, a military force that can be trusted by a population will be more likely to glean intelligence from that population, which acts as a force multiplier if the aims of the mission are perceived to be in their own interests. This is an interesting addition to the literature on CIMIC and offers a new perspective on what exactly it is the function can potentially accomplish.

**Ankersen, Christopher, (ed.), *Civil Military Cooperation in Post Conflict Operations: Emerging Theory and Practice*, New York: Routledge, 2008.**

This is a collection of essays includes case studies and theoretical approaches from practitioners, academics, and military practitioners of CIMIC. This volume is valuable for its representation of a variety of perspectives on the subject. Of particular interest from the Canadian perspective is Owen Savage's “Yes, But Is It Peacebuilding” (pp. 103-143).

**Arbuckle, James, *Military Forces in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Peace Operations: No Job for a Soldier?* New York: Routledge, 2006.**

Arbuckle, who retired from the military after 36 years of service, makes the assertion that “joint civil-military efforts are needed...they cannot be added on as afterthoughts when all else has failed” (p. 6). Arbuckle's tome is vast in scope and depth. Though he focuses mainly on the military side of the civil-military equation, he also comprehensively covers such areas as institutional prejudices of both NGO's and military organizations, and organizational and structural causes that impede CIMIC. His conclusion calls for greater training of both military forces and non-military agents to better understand their environment of operations, and the roles of other actors within that environment.

**Barr, D.E., “Update on Op Palladium ROTO 6: Extract from End-Tour Report, September 2000,” *The Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 2001.**

LCol. Barr was the commanding officer of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry in Bosnia-Herzegovina during rotation 6, from March to September, 2000. In this excerpt from the end-tour report he comments on the significant role CIMIC played in the operation. Barr stresses the need for enhanced CIMIC capabilities for future Palladium rotations as refugee flows were expected to increase. This would require more cooperation with the local community, the UN, the ICRC and other NGO's. This emphasis on humanitarian work and inter-agency cooperation informed contemporary Canadian CIMIC doctrine.

**Canada's Coalition to End Global Poverty, *Aid in the Crosshairs: Civil Military Relations in Afghanistan*, CCIC Briefing Note, April 2009. Available at:**

**[www.ccic.ca/ files/en/what we do/003 apwg 2009-04 brief note civil military afghanistan.pdf](http://www.ccic.ca/files/en/what_we_do/003_apwg_2009-04_brief_note_civil_military_afghanistan.pdf). Accessed 9 February 2010.**

This document, produced by a coalition of Canadian aid organizations who are actively engaged in Afghanistan, calls on Canadian government officials to clearly delineate the roles of the military and civilian organizations involved in stability and reconstruction. This includes Government of Canada departments and agencies such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Canadian International Development Agency. It advocates a separation of civilian aid and development activities from military operations. This is an interesting example of the view of civilian and NGO actors in the Afghanistan.

**Canada, *Canadian Forces Operations*, B-GJ-005-003/FP-000, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, August 2005.**

This is the official doctrinal manual for the full spectrum of Canadian Forces operations. Chapter 19 deals specifically with CIMIC. This provides a brief overview for Canada's military CIMIC operators and operations. More detail concerning this matter is provided in the dedicated Department of National Defence CIMIC manual *Civil Military Cooperation on Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*.

**Canada, *Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, B-GL-355-001/FP-001, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, March 2006.**

This is a manual produced by the Department of National Defence detailing contemporary Canadian CIMIC doctrine. It outlines in clear and comprehensive detail the multitude of factors

to be considered in Canadian CIMIC operations, and how these considerations should be operationalized. This is the official doctrine of the Government of Canada in regards to CIMIC operations.

**Canada, *Civil Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*, B-GG-055-004/AF-023, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, January 1999.**

This is really the first doctrinal CIMIC manual produced and introduced by the Government of Canada for the CF. As such, it is also the foundational piece of literature for today's CIMIC operations conducted by the CF. It provides clear guidelines so that Canadian field commanders do not have to rely on an ad hoc approach to CIMIC. There is a recognition that it must be seen as a "living" document, in that contemporary realities may necessitate a revision of some parts of the text. This same issue requires it to be read with a mind towards current engagements and on the ground realities.

**Canada, *Counter Insurgency Operations*, B-GL-323-004/FP-003, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, December 2008.**

This is the official Land Force Counter Insurgency (COIN) manual of the CF. As such it is the authoritative document of doctrine for land operations in a counter insurgency context. Given the primacy of civil military relations in CF counter insurgency doctrine, this is a valuable tool to guide CIMIC operations, in both counter insurgency and peace support capacities. Much of the document deals with relations between the military (CF) and indigenous populations and institutions. Chapter 5, section 522, titled "CIMIC Activities by the Military" deals explicitly and exclusively with CIMIC.

**Canada, *Guidelines on Humanitarian Action and Civil-Military Coordination*. Ottawa: Government of Canada, June 2006.**

This is an official Government of Canada document that is intended for senior decision makers, in accordance with the current policies of the CF. It pertains to the role of the CF in the execution of humanitarian tasks. It defines the parameters and role of the CF in their relationship with both the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in regards to humanitarian missions. It also clearly articulates Canadian CIMIC policy in humanitarian missions.

**Canada, *Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Operations*, B-G7-005-307/FP-40, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, May 2005.**

This document is designed as a complement to the *Joint Doctrine Manual: Peace Support Operations*. It specifically addresses the division of tasks between different government bodies in the execution of both foreign and domestic disaster relief and humanitarian missions. The document clearly identifies the responsibilities of the CF in relation to those of civilian government agencies (DFAIT, CIDA, Public Safety) in disaster and humanitarian response situations.

**Canada, Department of National Defence, "HUMINT During Peace Support Operations," *Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers*, Vol. 8, No. 1, June 2001.**

This issue of the *Dispatches* series deals explicitly with Human Intelligence (HUMINT). However, many of the lessons learned are easily applicable and transferable to the conduct of CIMIC. It details the proper conduct of soldiers on patrol in order to maximize the intelligence gathering potential of their interactions with civilians in theatre. This is essentially a guide for the practice of CIMIC during operational patrols and meetings. As this issue of *Dispatches* deals with lessons learned from the Balkans, primarily *Operation Kinetic* from June 1999 to June 2000, some points need to be updated for contemporary environments in which the CF finds itself.

**Canada, Joint Doctrine Manual: Peace Support Operations, B-GJ-005-307/FP-030, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, November 2002.**

This is an official Department of National Defence doctrinal manual designed as the response of the CF to the “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping (Brahimi Report).” It details the new approach to Peace Support Operations adopted by the CF in the wake of operations in the Balkans but prior to the large commitments in Afghanistan.

**Canada, Department of National Defence, “Lessons Learned in Civil Military Cooperation,” *Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers*, Vol. 5, No. 3, February 1999.**

As part of the *Dispatches* series issued by the Department of National Defence, this is a comprehensive overview of CF CIMIC capabilities. It includes sections on doctrine (Part 2), Organization (Part 3), Command (Part 4), and a list of considerations in operations (Part 5) including the legal aspects of CIMIC (Part 5.7). It is designed specifically for soldiers engaged in CIMIC activities, but also serves to enlighten any reader of the philosophy and organization of CF CIMIC capabilities.

**Canada, Lesson Synopsis Report 08-004 Civil Military Cooperation, Kingston: Department of National Defence, Army Lessons Learned Centre, March 2008.**

This is a brief report based on the experience of the CIMIC platoon of Canada’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), in Kandahar and operational since August of 2005. This is an unclassified release of the synopsis document. It briefly details key lessons and observations of the CIMIC platoon, and makes recommendations for the future conduct of CIMIC operators and PRT personnel in both training and in theatre.

**Canada, Lesson Synopsis Report (09-018) Expansion of the Stability Zone, Kingston: Department of National Defence, Army Lessons Learned Centre, January 2010.**

This brief highlights the expansion of stability zones through a “Whole of Government” (WoG) approach. It recommends that all soldiers involved in the Stability Company (Stab Coy) become versed in the WoG approach to the counter insurgency operations that are being undertaken. It also recommends inter-agency training days, and greater contracting skills for CIMIC operators. There is a call for greater cultural awareness training to smooth the interaction between soldiers of the CF and the Afghan population.

**Canada, *Lesson Synopsis Report 07-020 PRT Force Protection (FP) Coy Training and Operations TF 3-07*, Kingston: Department of National Defence, Army Lessons Learned Centre, Kingston, December 2007.**

This is a brief report that makes recommendations promoting high readiness in the operations of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), operating in Kandahar since August of 2005. It recommends greater cooperation and integration of the force protection company (FP) and CIMIC platoon. It also calls for greater cultural awareness training for the FP as they deal with civilians and the indigenous Afghan population and interact with them on a regular basis.

**Canada, *Lesson Synopsis Report (LSR)(09-016) Stabilization Company- Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT)*, Kingston: Department of National Defence, Army Lessons Learned Centre, January 2010.**

This brief report outlines the establishment and employment of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) Stabilization Company (Stab Coy), operating in Kandahar since August, 2005. The document stresses the high degree of interaction that takes place between the Stab Coy and other government actors, NGO's, and indigenous Afghan actors. The "Key Lessons" component recommends the utilization of Reservists skills from their civilian experiences and occupations, greater awareness on the of the Stab Coy of their role in relation to indigenous and other actors. There is also a call for an electronic communications network to better facilitate cooperation between the CF and non- military actors.

**Canada, Department of National Defence, "Negotiations During Peace Support Operations," *Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers*, Vol. 8, No. 2, October 2001.**

This issue of the *Dispatches* series is based on the low level negotiation techniques taught at the Peace Support Training Centre to CF personnel prior to deployment on Peace Support Operations (PSOs). As such, it includes recommendations and guidelines pertaining to their conduct during negotiations between opposing belligerents, and in their own dealings with other actors in the theatre of operations. This is essentially a guide to better CIMIC for those who will be involved in negotiations during their deployments.

**Canada, Department of National Defence, "Operation Assistance: Lessons Learned," *Dispatches: Lessons Learned for Soldiers*, Vol. 4, No. 4, January 1998.**

This instalment of the *Dispatches* series deals with the Canadian Forces role as Aid to the Civil Authority during the flooding of the Red River in Manitoba during April and May of 1997. This *Lessons Learned* highlights the great emphasis that was placed on joint coordination and planning between military and civilian leaders. Of particular note to those interested in CIMIC is the section "Building the Civil Military Relationship" (pp. 16-18). This entire publication is a detailed lesson in CIMIC, with a domestic setting as the backdrop.

**Canada, *Lessons Learned, 2009 Roll- Up Report (3333-1)*, Kingston: Department of National Defence, Army Lessons Learned Centre, March 2009.**

This brief summary deals with all aspects of lessons learned in the Afghan theatre of operations up to and including 2008. Of special note to those interested in CIMIC is a section in

“Observations O(6)”, which calls for more females to accommodate communication with Afghan women and children. The attached Master Observations List also includes a section on CIMIC under Influence Activities in sections D-15, O-10, T-16 and P-4.

**Canada, Department of National Defence, “Seeing Through the 'MIST:' The Military Information Support Team,” *The Bulletin*, Vol. 4, No. 3, February 1998.**

From the Army Lessons Learned Centre this issue of *The Bulletin* details communication efforts aimed at local inhabitants, be they friendly, neutral or hostile, during Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Though this falls under the sphere of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), the attempt to reach an indigenous population also makes MIST a tool of CIMIC. This article details MIST through the experience of the CF in both Haiti and the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s. Though it does not mention CIMIC specifically, it refers to MIST as “a force multiplier which can reinforce successful military and political actions.” (p. 5). This makes MIST consistent with the aims of CIMIC doctrine.

**Canada, *The Strategic Advisory Team Afghanistan*, Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Joint Doctrine Note 02/08, May 2008.**

This doctrine note details the roles and function of the Canadian Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan (SAT-A), active from September 2005 until August 2008. It stresses the purpose of these teams as an aid to the civil Afghan authority, and as a tool of the Afghan Government for the purpose of strengthening that Government's indigenous capacity. It details an integral component of Canada's “whole of government” approach to reconstruction in Afghanistan, and the steps that were taken toward this end.

**Canada, *Topic Lessons Report (TLR) 09-018- Application of Nanawateh (Forgiveness/Protection) in our Stabilization Efforts*, Kingston: Department of National Defence, Army Lessons Learned Centre, October 2009.**

This lessons learned report is partially based on interviews and discussions with the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team's (PRT) CIMIC operators, who have been active in Kandahar since August of 2005. It is designed as a guide to responding to civilian deaths in which Canadian Forces personnel have been implicated, through either accident or during operations. It details the importance of the customary law of “Pastunwali,” and how this should be considered in dealing with the indigenous population. It stresses the need for cultural awareness and training, and cooperation with indigenous elements in addressing civilian deaths.

**Capstick, Mike, “The Civil Military Effort in Afghanistan: A Strategic Perspective,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 10, Issue 1, Fall 2007.**

As a Colonel in the CF, Capstick led a fifteen man Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan from August 2005 to August 2006. His credentials in the field of CIMIC make this piece necessary reading for anyone trying to understand how Canada was conducting these operations in Afghanistan. Capstick takes the popular “Three Block War” theory to task with an assertion that the problems in Afghanistan are simply too complex for any catch-all solutions. He cites a need for constant and integrated cooperation between the CF, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and the Canadian International Development Agency as prerequisites for

Canada to meet its objectives in Afghanistan. As a prognosis of the situation, Capstick points directly to the lack of coordination in command and control as a cause of avoidable setbacks to the varied international development program in Afghanistan.

**Civil-Military Co-Operation Center of Excellence, *Gender and Civil Military Relations: Moving Towards Inclusion?* Final Report of Seminar Conducted in “Langoed Huize Bergen,” Vught, Netherlands, July, 2006. Available at [http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/gender2\\_0.pdf](http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/gender2_0.pdf). Accessed 13 February 2010.**

Though Canada is not a member of the Center of Excellence, it has and will continue to work in close partnership with other NATO allies involved in the organization. This seminar includes points of interest to Canadian CIMIC via Canadian speakers and commentary on the missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. The primary focus is on gender issues in CIMIC operations. This introduces an often overlooked dimension to civil- military interactions and provides useful guidelines and recommendations for including gender issues in CIMIC operations.

**Cohen, Lenard J., *Armed Nation Builders: Balkan Legacies in Civil Military Cooperation, Conference on the Co-Ordination of Post Disaster and Peace-Building Missions, Victoria, B.C.: Center for Global Studies, University of Victoria, March 14-18, 2007. Available at [www.failedstates.org/uploads/Civil-Military\\_Relations\\_March\\_2007\\_.pdf](http://www.failedstates.org/uploads/Civil-Military_Relations_March_2007_.pdf)***

Cohen is a professor Emeritus of International Studies at Simon Fraser University. His analysis is based on experiences gained through the various conflicts that emanated in the Balkans after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. A particular point of interest is his identification of the role national interest play when states decide to participate in international missions. He concludes with an analysis of general lessons learned, and their implications for contemporary and future operations.

**Connaughton, Richard, *Military Intervention and Peacekeeping: The Reality*, Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2001.**

Connaughton is an associate with the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at the University of Lancaster, UK. This book is an exploration of modern “peacekeeping” and military interventions in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leon. From a Canadian perspective, chapter 7, “Rwanda: Tropical Genocide” (pp. 139-190), is of particular interest. This chapter details the activities of the Canadian contingent, under Romeo Dallaire, in trying to organize, mediate, cooperate, facilitate, and provide security for the myriad of different civilian NGO, UN and local actors that occupied the same space during the Rwandan genocide. This is an examination of the difficulties of conducting a mission amongst competing and disparate factions.

**Coulon, Jocelyn, *Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping and the New World Order*, Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott (Trans.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998.**

Coulon completed this survey of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions through extensive fieldwork in seven peacekeeping operations, and through interviews with soldiers, diplomats and experts in peacekeeping activities. This book traces the development of peacekeeping in the twentieth century, and shows the development of a new kind of operation during last decade of the century. There are numerous references of the Canadian Forces civil-military interactions

sprinkled through descriptive vignettes of various operations. Of particular note for those interested in Civil- Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is the experience of General Lewis Mackenzie in Sarajevo in Chapter 10 “Peacekeeping Takes a Back Seat to Politics” (pp.135-144).

**Delaney, Doug, “CIMIC Operations During Operation Kinetic,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2000-2001, pp. 29-34.**

Delaney, now head of the War Studies program at the Royal Military College of Canada, has served in Kosovo as a company commander with the First Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). In his post-operational analysis of operation “Kinetic,” covering from August to December 1999, he identifies the positive manner in which CIMIC operations were conducted, and defines areas where organization and effect were lacking. One point of particular interest is his identification of the CIMIC officer as an “enabler” (p. 30), in so much as his job is to bring various parties together in pursuit of a common goal.

**Demers, A. “To Help or Not to Help—CIMIC and Project Management,” *The Bulletin*, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 2005.**

In this article Major Demers details the work and function of CF CIMIC activities in Afghanistan during Operation Athena, ROTO 1, from February to August 2004. He addresses the issue of managing expectations and, more importantly, raises the issue of whether short term, high impact projects might be detrimental in the long term. Demer concludes by emphasising that CIMIC is just one part of Information Operations, and not “an NGO in uniform”.

**Douglas, Stacey, “Towards a Comprehensive CIMIC Doctrine: Interagency Cooperation and the Influence of Allies in the Balkans,” *Canadian Military Journal*, November 2002. Available at [www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2009/04/douglas02.pdf](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/cdai/uploads/cdai/2009/04/douglas02.pdf). Accessed 6 February 2010.**

Douglas’s article provides a historical overview of events that have led to Canada’s initially ad hoc development of Civil-Military Relations. It reviews the growth of the CF’s CIMIC capabilities via a comparative analysis of similar operations conducted by the U.S., Britain, France and the Dutch throughout their experiences in the latter half of the twentieth century. It concludes by making recommendations for an increased Canadian CIMIC capability based on the experience of Canada’s allies, and the experience of Canadian Forces in the Balkans.

**Dupuis, Daniel, “CF Health Services Providers and Humanitarian Aid in Afghanistan,” *The Bulletin*, Vol. 11, No. 7, 2005.**

In this article, Dupuis, then a captain in the CF explores the administration of health care by military-medical professional to an affected populations in a humanitarian crisis. He outlines the SPHERE program, a collaborative effort on the part of NGOs and the ICRC and Red Crescent to enhance the quality of care to people affected by disaster. He then uses this model to explore the issue of military-medical responsibilities in similar circumstances. He concludes by raising questions regarding the ethics of military- medical aid as a political/strategic tool.

**Ellis, W.J., “COMD TFK End Tour Report Operation Athena ROTO 2: 9 Aug. 04- 10 Feb. 05,” *The Bulletin*, Vol. 11, NO. 2, March 2005.**

This end of tour report covering from August 9<sup>th</sup>, 2004 to February 10<sup>th</sup>, 2005, is a brief but comprehensive analysis of what worked and what could be improved on the next rotation. He cites the CIMIC platoon for their work. However, Ellis also asserts that CIMIC activities suffered from a lack of funding.

**Rudd, David, Jim Hanson, Adam Stinson, eds., *Future Peacekeeping: A Canadian Perspective*, Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001.**

This is the transcript of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies annual *Canadian Strategic Forecast* seminar from the fall of 2000. The list of speakers included diplomats, Officers of the Canadian Forces, and NGO executives gathered to explore the future of Canadian peacekeeping operations. Given the inter agency makeup of the seminar; the entire discussion is peppered with reference to CIMIC. Of particular note is Colonel Ian Fenton’s (Commander, Canadian Contingent, KFOR) description of inter-agency cooperation, and lack thereof, in his segment entitled “Canada’s Role in Kosovo and KFOR” (pp. 15-22).

**Hatton, S.T., “Police and Military Cooperation in a Theatre of Operations,” *The Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 2001.**

Lieutenant Hatton was a troop commander in Bosnia during *Operation Palladium*, ROTO 6, from March to September 2000. In his position he had to deal extensively with local police forces within his area of responsibility (AOR). This article illustrates his working relationship with both the local police force and the UN sponsored International Police Task Force (IPTF). By developing a cordial relationship with local actors, namely the police, Hatton was able to work to greater effect in his AOR. As he states, “maintaining a good relationship with the IPTF and the chief of police...has proven to be essential in accomplishing various operational objectives.” In this case CIMIC allowed him to complete his tasks to greater effect than would otherwise be possible.

**Hayes, Richard, James Landon, “National Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination in peace and Humanitarian Assistance Operations,” *Evidence Based Research, Inc.*, Vienna, Virginia, U.S.A. Available at [www.dodccrp.org/files/landon\\_hayes.htm](http://www.dodccrp.org/files/landon_hayes.htm). Accessed 13 February 2010.**

Evidenced Based Research is a research, development and analysis company that works with governmental, private sector and non-profit decision makers. This piece provides a very brief sketch of the nature of CIMIC activities as conducted by the Russian Federation, the U.S.A., Britain, France, Canada, and the Nordic countries. As such, it allows for a comparison, albeit superficial, of the different approaches and philosophies of CIMIC as pursued by each nation/region. In this regard, it provides an easy reference point for further examinations of the subject.

**Jean, Richard, “The Operationalization of the 3-D Policy,” produced for the Canadian Forces College, October 2006. Available at <http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/amsc/amsp9/jean.doc>. Accessed on 15 February 2010.**

Jean's research paper, completed as a requirement for his course of study at the Canadian Forces College, argues that "the CF will need to adjust its doctrine so as to allow for the peculiarities of each key player, be they Other Government Departments or Non-Governmental Organizations." (p. 1). He specifically addresses the concept of CIMIC within the Canadian Forces (p. 7) and the nature of CIMIC operations with regard to NGO's (p. 10). It includes recommendations on how to improve the concept of CIMIC for greater effect in operations.

**Larose-Edwards, Paul, "NATO and Militaries as Trusted Partners in Civil- Military Interactions," *Pearson papers*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, Spring 2008, pp. 22- 41.**

Larose Edwards is the founder and Executive Director of CANADEM, Canada's reserve force of civilian experts. This piece identifies both the need, and steps taken, to move away from an *ad hoc*, militarily dominant approach to civil-military relations in an operational field environment. Larose-Edwards is critical of the military's seemingly commanding role in CIMIC operations, citing the Canadian deployment of Strategic Advisory Teams under operation "Argus" (see Canadian Vignette, p. 33-39). His conclusion calls for more civilian involvement in CIMIC operations to create equilibrium, and so that civilian actors can feel that the military is a partner in reconstruction, rather than dictating the terms.

**Last, David, Michelle Malenfant, "Special Operations and Post-Conflict Stability", in David Last and Bernd Horn, eds., *Choice of Force: Special Operations for Canada*, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005, pp. 188-203.**

Last is a former officer in the CF and teaches at the Royal Military College of Canada. Malenfant is a reserve CF intelligence officer and has worked with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and NATO. In this piece they explore the role of special operators as serving in the capacity of public and civilian affairs specialists, given their small working groups and proximity to indigenous populations. They argue that a combined capacity of special operators to apply direct action and administer to matters of civil affairs can make them a valuable tool of small footprint, post- conflict stability operations. They cite the use of PRTs in Afghanistan as a model of how such a unit might combine CIMIC to direct action for the greatest desired effect.

**Latinovich, Ryan, John Gallo, Rob Lowe, Shane Schreiber, "Leadership at the Platoon Level in Peace Support Operations: The OP Palladium Experience," *The Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 2001.**

This article outlines the challenges faced by small unit commands in PSOs. Of particular note is the emphasis placed on theatre-specific training in the pre-deployment phase of operations. The authors, who served with 3 Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry during *Operation Palladium*, ROTO 6, from March to September 2000, stress a need for cultural and situational awareness of the conditions that will exist in theatres of operations. As they are basing this piece off of their experiences in Bosnia, they also stress the need to understand the mandates of other in country actors, such as local administration, UN, ICRC and NGO's.

**Lehmann, Ingrid, *Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire*, London: Frank Cass, 1999.**

Lehmann is a UN official who has worked extensive experience in peacekeeping and public information. In this book she explores the role of public information campaigns through case studies of UN sanctioned peacekeeping missions. Of particular interest is the Canadian command of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). Lehmann details the function and effective of Military Information Support Team (MIST) used by the CF during their mission in Haiti (pp. 122-124). The conclusion is that MIST provides a “capability to facilitate communications between security forces and the Haitian people” (p. 124).

**Longhurst, Graham, “The Evolution of Canadian Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC),” *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 4, Winter 2006-2007, pp. 55-64.**

Major Longhurst provides a brief but clear and comprehensive breakdown of the history of Canadian CIMIC operations from the Balkans through Afghanistan, and clearly identifies the “who,” “what” and “why” of Canadian CIMIC activities. At the time of this writing Major Longhurst was an officer for CIMIC Land Forces Western Area. As such he brings both a professional and authoritative knowledge to the piece. He cites the Canadian experiences in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti and Afghanistan, with an uncompromising analysis of what worked and what impeded the effective implementation of CIMIC operations in each theatre. Longhurst concludes with seven recommendations on how CIMIC activities can be improved in contemporary and future Canadian deployments. This is an effective piece in understanding the development of Canadian CIMIC activities and how these operations should be implemented in the future.

**Longhurst, Graham, “Civil- Military Cooperation- The Inukshuk,” *The Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 2004.**

In this article Longhurst refers to experiences of CIMIC drawn from the CF Operation Palladium, ROTO 11, in Bosnia-Herzegovina from September 2002 to April 2003. He refers to CIMIC as being an essential component of Information Operations, and must work in conjunction with Information Operations, Psychological Operations, and Intelligence to provide the greatest effect. He outlines questions that CIMIC operators should be asking when on operations and provides anecdotes of personal initiatives that resulted in effective CIMIC operations. The lessons related illustrate how CIMIC can be an effective force multiplier and increase the chances for overall mission success.

**MacEachern, R., “Brigade Level CIMIC,” *The Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 7, November 2004.**

In this piece Major MacEachern discusses in detail the CF operationalization of CIMIC during operation ATHENA, ROTO 0, from August 2003 to February 2004. He includes a background on personnel selection and training, and describes the command and control structures of CIMIC operations within the Kabul Multi-National Brigade Headquarters. Most importantly, MacEachern provides lessons learned and best practices, and includes recommendations for future CIMIC operations.

**MacKenzie, Lewis, “Peace keeping: Into the Grey Zone,” in David Code and Ian Cameron, eds., *Canadian Forces and the Modern World*,” Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 1993, pp. 25-51.**

This is the transcript of a speech given by MacKenzie at the Conference of Defence Associates 9<sup>th</sup> Annual Seminar. At the time of this conference Major-General MacKenzie (ret'd) was commander of CF Land Forces Central Area and had been Commander of UNPROFOR's Sarajevo Sector from May to October, 1992. In this symposium lecture he comments in great length of the difficulties of working within the United Nations (UN) structure. According to Mackenzie there was little in the way of a productive relationship between the military forces in Sarajevo and the UN. Additionally, at that time most international organizations and NGOs had pulled out of the area, leaving the military to conduct humanitarian activities. He does, however, comment on the positive experience he had in dealing with the media that was covering events in the area. The events described have contributed to the foundation of current CF CIMIC doctrine.

**Maloney, Sean, John Llambias, *Chance for Peace: Canadian Soldiers in the Balkans, 1992-1995; An Oral History*, St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing, 2002.**

Maloney is a professor in the Department of History at the Royal Military College of Canada, and Llambias is a former Lieutenant in the CF. This book is an account of the CF in the Balkans conflict between 1992 and 1995. It is comprised of first hand accounts of the experiences of individual soldiers who served as Canada's peacekeeping forces in that conflict. Much of what is related has to do with interactions between the CF members and local actors in their areas of operations, from village leaders to NGO's and civic leaders. As this was the start of Canada's formalized Civil- Military Cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine, the accounts from soldiers provides a first hand view of what CIMIC really is, and what it entails in practice.

**Maloney, Sean, "Canada to Kandahar-Provincial Reconstruction Team or *Operation Enduring Freedom: Two Sides of the Same Coin*," *Institute for Research on Public Policy*, May 2005. Available at [www.irpp.org/po/archive/may05/maloney.pdf](http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/may05/maloney.pdf). Accessed February 2010.**

Maloney is a professor in the Department of History at the Royal Military College of Canada and an official historian of the CF in Afghanistan. This article traces the rather haphazard development of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams that employ CIMIC as a tool for the allied effort in Afghanistan. Maloney attempts, with some success, to explain the complex inter-relationship and variant interests of ISAF, *Operation Enduring Freedom*, the Afghan government, Afghan militia forces, and the humanitarian and development NGO organizations that are active in Afghanistan. It is essentially a descriptive analysis of the complex conditions that awaited the CF, for the consideration of PRT and CIMIC activities, prior to its deployment to Kandahar in 2005.

***Managing Civil Military Cooperation: A 24-7 Joint Effort for Stability*, in Sebastian Rietjens, and Myriame Bollen, eds., Burlington: Ashgate, 2008.**

Both editors are with the Netherlands Defence Academy and specialize in Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). This book is a collection of essays by academics and practitioners of CIMIC, including military and humanitarian personnel. It provides first hand accounts of lessons learned and analysis by actors involved in CIMIC. Though there is no reference to Canada *per se*, it does represent views by a number of Canadian allies and active partners. Thus, it provides insight into allied approaches to CIMIC operations, and lessons learned are equally applicable in the Canadian context.

**Marten, Kimberly, “Kandahar Lesson in Civil-Military Cooperation,” *On Track*, Winter 2009-20010, pp. 37-39.**

Marten is a professor of Political Science at Columbia University and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. In this article she examines the “Whole of Government” (WoG) approach that Canada has developed as its strategy in Afghanistan. Marten highlights the positive developments that have come about through inter-departmental cooperation and in some cases, integration. She warns of a need not to lose this institutional memory of refined CIMIC, and claims that this article is an attempt to “encourage the organizational memory process.”

**Meharg, Sarah, “Measuring the Effectiveness of Reconstruction and Stability Operations,” *Pearson Papers*, Vol. 10, Issue 1, pp. 29- 44.**

Meharg is a research associate at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Politics and Economics at the Royal Military College of Canada. In this piece she calls for a greater method of measuring the success or failure of stability and reconstruction operations. Her analysis is based on the Canadian model of interaction, or the lack thereof, between the Canadian Forces(CF), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and the Canadian International Development Agency, though she does cite examples from USAID, Britain's DFID and the World Bank. She calls for greater cross departmental communication to improve the performance of CIMIC operations, as she sees the measurements of success or failure to be largely based on a militarily influenced quantitative analysis, as opposed to the measurement of effect from “the people’s perspective” (p. 43).

**Moore, Steve, “Operational Chaplains: Establishing Trust With The Religious Other Through the Building of Relation,” in LCol Jeff Stauffer and Craig Mantle, eds., *In Harm's Way- Leveraging Trust: A Force Multiplier for Today*, Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008, pp. 73-86.**

Major Moore is the chaplain of the Royal Military College of Canada and has been deployed to the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and to Afghanistan to conduct research on the Provincial Reconstruction Team and nation building. Though this article does not involve CIMIC in the strict sense of the term, it introduces the important concept of engaging local religious figures as an element of peace and stability operations. As such, Moore expands the idea of what should be considered as a potential aspect of CIMIC, and what can fall under the purview of local engagement activities within CIMIMC operations.

**Moore, Steve, “Recommendations for Humanitarian Aid in UN Operations,” *The Bulletin*, Vol. 6, No. 1, August 1999.**

At the time of this writing Moore was a Captain and Chaplain in the CF, and bases his writing on his experiences serving with the Royal 22<sup>nd</sup> Regiment in 1997 as it was supporting the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH). This article deals with the distribution of aid to indigenous populations in conflict and post- conflict regions. Moore highlights the benefits to morale that come to soldiers through their participation in carrying out humanitarian activities in theatres of operations, though he avoids discussing the tactical considerations (intelligence gathering, area stabilization). He makes recommendations on how the distribution of aid can be

better coordinated, and calls for greater continuity between rotations via after action-reports and knowledge transfer between CIMIC officers.

**Mykytiuk, Maj. Tom, “Company Command in the Three Block War : November Company-Task Force Kabul- ROTO 0- Operation Athena”, in Col. Bernd Horn, ed., *In Harm's Way- On the Front Lines of Leadership: Sub-Unit Command on Operations*, Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2006, pp. 129-142.**

Major Mykytiuk was Officer Commanding (OC) of “N” Company, 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group, in Kabul from April 2003 to July 2004. In this piece he relates his experience as a light infantry company commander operating in an environment befitting the conceptual “3 Block War.” Mykytiuk admits to underutilization of Civil- Military Cooperation (CIMIC) capabilities due to the lack of a comprehensive CIMIC plan (p. 139). In describing this shortcoming of CIMIC utilization, he also asserts that it can be a valuable tool towards meeting objectives if used effectively.

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine*, AJP-9, June 2003. Available at <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/ajp-9.pdf>. Accessed February 2010.**

This is the official NATO doctrinal manual on CIMIC operations conducted under its mandate. It provides a definition of and synopsis of the applicability of CIMIC in NATO sanctioned operations. It also provides a guide on the command structure of CIMIC within the framework of the alliance. It is a valuable tool in understanding contemporary views, and instances, of CIMIC operations within the mandate of the alliance structure.

**Oehring, George, “Negotiations,” *The Bulletin*, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 2000.**

In this article Colonel Oehring (ret'd) describes tactics that he developed and employed during negotiations with belligerents during peace keeping operations and as UNPROFOR commander, Section South, in 1993-1994. He describes conducting activities at the operations level, but asserts that the same tactics are equally applicable at levels of a mission, and to all soldiers, as they invariably must deal with a variety of actors in the execution of their duties. Though not designed to be a doctrinal manual, Oehring's recommendations are applicable to the conduct of CIMIC operations with NGO's and local actors, as well as negotiating terms between belligerents.

**Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (Draft)*, DCD (2005)8/REV 2, April 2005.**

This document outlines a broad framework of recommendations made by the OECD to be considered by signatory nations of the OECD (including Canada) in their engagement of fragile states. It details twelve principles that are intended to “maximize the positive impact of engagement and minimize unintentional harm.” While not a guide to conducting intervention, it does stress the need of local actors and civil institutions to “buy in” to operations by foreign agents that will necessarily affect their nations future.

**Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Support to Piloting the Principles to Good International Engagement in Developing States (Synthesis Report)*, Room Document 4, Fragile States Group, September 2006.**

This document is a review of the “pilot” projects undertaken in fragile states according to recommendations initially laid out in the OECD’s *Principles for Good International Engagements in Fragile States* document. This examination of the application of OECD/DAC sanctioned operations identifies both strengths and weaknesses of the principles in actual operations with reference to particular country case studies. It highlights the successes of cases where local actors have “bought in” to foreign engagements, while recommending even greater inter-departmental and organizational cooperation to both better implement the principles and to have greater desired effect in engagement operations, i.e., interventions.

**Peabody, David, “The Challenges of Doing Good Work: The Development of Canadian Forces CIMIC Capability and NGO's,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Spring 2006.**

Peabody, a graduate of the University of Calgary’s Master’s of Strategic Studies program, delivers a comprehensive survey of the development of CIMIC operations, with a focus on the Balkans and Afghanistan. It details the problems associated with the movement of the military into areas traditionally reserved for NGO activity, and how these problems are being reconciled. The article provides a good overview of the evolution of Canadian CIMIC operations.

**Pollick, Sean, “Civil Military Cooperation: A New Tool for Peacekeepers,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3, Autumn 2000, pp. 57-63.**

Pollick, then a Sergeant in the Canadian Forces and MA candidate in the War Studies program at the Royal Military College of Canada, presents an analysis of Civil-Military Cooperation in terms of military interactions with NGO's in post conflict zones. He details the nature of the interactions between NGO and military forces, and highlights areas of cooperation where the mandates of the organizations coincide and capabilities are complimentary. He also highlights areas where these interests are divergent and a lack of cooperation is a detriment to the overall aims of the mission. Though based on the experiences of the CF in the Balkans and Haiti post-Cold War, and prior to September 11<sup>th</sup> notions of peacekeeping, some of the lessons related are still very much relevant.

**Rietjens, Sebastian, “Understanding the Importance of Civil-Military Cooperation: A Case Study of the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team,” *The Pearson Papers*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp. 42- 70.**

Major Rietjens, an assistant professor at Netherlands Defence Academy, states that his goal in this paper is to “explain the performance of civil-military cooperation in stabilization and reconstruction missions” (pp. 43-44). His analysis explores the effect and evaluation of CIMIC activities in general, with a case study of CIMIC performance by Dutch teams in Afghanistan. Though his primary focus is on Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Teams lessons learned and methods employed, the recommendations are clearly applicable to Canadian forces partaking in the same mission and acting in partnership with the Dutch forces in Afghanistan through NATO.

**Savage, Owen, “But is it Peacebuilding?: Evaluating Canadian CIMIC in Afghanistan,” in Christopher Ankersen, ed. *Civil- Military Cooperation in Post Conflict Operations*, New York: Routledge, 2008, pp.103-143.**

Savage, a Captain in the CF, was part of a Canadian Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) team responsible for project management in 1999. This piece examines the role of the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan in Kandahar, operational since August 2005. He begins with a brief history of peace building in the modern context (since 1990) before moving on to the establishment of PRT's in Afghanistan. Savage focuses on the Canadian PRT in Kandahar (p. 120-136), with a detailed description of the constituents of the team, its overriding operational criteria, and the execution of its mandate. His analysis is in depth, comprehensive and insightful. His conclusion includes a well articulated critique of the program and recommendations for improvements in the effectiveness of Canada's PRT.

**Skidd, Alden, “The Evolving Role of CIMIC Operations in International Settings,” *The Bulletin*, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 2005.**

In this article Lieutenant Skidd examines lessons learned during Operation Athena in Kabul, beginning in August 2003, from a CIMIC perspective. He manages to articulate the complexity of conducting CIMIC activities in a complex environment like Afghanistan, while maintaining the overall goal of the mission by acting as a force multiplier. He makes recommendations on how CIMIC activities can be better integrated as a normal aspect of military capability through better training and awareness at the command level of its utility.

**Stewart, Pamela, “On Broader Themes of Canadian Forces Transformation,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 9-26.**

Stewart is a graduate of the University of Calgary's Master's of Strategic Studies program and has eight years of service in the Communication branch of the Naval reserve. This piece focuses on transformation within the CF as a whole, but includes a specific section on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). Her analysis of CIMIC within the CF can more accurately be characterized as an analysis of civil-military relations. This is essentially a discussion of the transformation of civil-military relations in the Canadian context.

**Sullivan, Mike, “A Few Thoughts on Being A Liaison Officer”, *The Bulletin*, Vol. 6, No. 1, April 1999.**

Sullivan was a Captain with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry attached to SFOR as a liaison officer in 1996. In this article he relates his experience and makes a detailed list of recommendations for future liaison officers on deployment. Many of his recommendations deal with the liaison officer's relationship with their translator and indigenous actors. He deals considerably with the importance of knowing and understanding the mandates of the NGOs that are in theatre, and how to relate to the non-military actors with whom a liaison officer must work. Sullivan presents a list of nuanced behaviours that can increase the effectiveness of one's tasks as a liaison officer in dealing with civilian actors in theatres of operations.

**Vertefeuille, Col. Francois, “Civil Military Operations in Combined Force Command-Afghanistan,” in Col. Bernd Horn, ed., *In Harm's Way- The Buck Stops Here: Senior***

***Commanders on Operations, Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007, pp. 179-190.***

In this piece Col. Vertefeuille, CF, relates his experience as the staff officer of Combined Joint 9 (Civil- Military Operations), as part of Combined Force Command Afghanistan. He relates the difficulties and successes of his mission as part of CJ-9, from February until August 2005, and presents the challenges of commanding a multi-national contingent in an operational environment. Vertefeuille's recollections provide valuable insight into the conduct and operationalization of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) at the command level.

***Winslow, Donna, "Strange Bedfellows in Humanitarian Crisis: NGO's and the Military," in Natalie Mychajlyszyn and Timothy Shaw, eds., *Twisting Arms and Flexing Muscles: Humanitarian Intervention and Peacebuilding in Perspective*, Burlington: Ashgate, 2005, pp. 113-130.***

Wilson is the Chair of Anthropology at Vrije University in The Netherlands. In this paper she explores the tensions that arise between civilian relief workers and military personnel in areas of peace operations. She identifies organizational culture, method of operations, definitions of success and time frames, and adequacy of resources as major causes for these tensions. This piece is useful for understanding the dynamics that influence relationships between the military and civilian actors, especially aid organizations, in areas of operations.

***Zaalberg, Thijs Brocades, *Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006.***

At the time of publication Zaalberg was an analyst at the Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies in The Hague. This book deals extensively with civil military relations in small wars, conflict, and post conflict scenarios. Of particular interest to the study of Civil- Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is a section in chapter eight entitled "CIMIC: The Fig Leaf for the Gap" (pp. 275-285). This section deals with IMIC operations in Bosnia under IFOR. It describes in great detail the functioning of CIMIC in theatre, highlighting both the positive and negative lessons learned. Specific reference to Canadian CIMIC operations is made on pages 280-281.

## Distribution list

---

Document No.: DRDC CORA CR 2010-275

### Information

#### Internal

- 1 SH Strat A [PDF via email]
- 1 Contract Scientific Authority [PDF via email]
- 1 Library [CD and print]

#### External

- 1 DST Land [PDF via email]
- 1 CFWC [PDF via email]
- 1 DLCD [PDF via email]
- 1 DRDKIM [CD]
- 1 Author [PDF via email]

This page intentionally left blank.

**DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA**

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)

1. ORIGINATOR (The name and address of the organization preparing the document. Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Centre sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, are entered in section 8.)  Neil O'Reilly Royal Military College of Canada PO Box 17000 Stn. Forces Kingston Ontario K7K 7B4		2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (Overall security classification of the document including special warning terms if applicable.)  UNCLASSIFIED	
3. TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C or U) in parentheses after the title.)  CF CIMIC Operations 1990-2010: An Annotated Bibliography			
4. AUTHORS (last name, followed by initials – ranks, titles, etc. not to be used)  O'Reilly, Neil			
5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (Month and year of publication of document.)  December 2010		6a. NO. OF PAGES (Total containing information, including Annexes, Appendices, etc.)  31	6b. NO. OF REFS (Total cited in document.)  0
7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (The category of the document, e.g. technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of report, e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.)  Contract Report			
8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (The name of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development – include address.)  Defence R&D Canada – CORA 101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2			
9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.)  RMC SLA 2009-0297		9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written.)	
10a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER (The official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.)		10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s). (Any other numbers which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.)  DRDC CORA CR 2010-275	
11. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (Any limitations on further dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification.)  Unlimited			
12. DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT (Any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the Document Availability (11). However, where further distribution (beyond the audience specified in (11) is possible, a wider announcement audience may be selected.)  Unlimited			

13. **ABSTRACT** (A brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), (R), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is bilingual.)

This Contract Report is an annotated bibliography of open source published material that either directly or indirectly touches on the doctrinal subject of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). The publications cover the period from 1990 to 2010. As a whole, the books, articles, monographs, and manuals listed below provide a partial history, overview of activities, and some analysis of the CIMIC function during the post-Cold War timeframe. The selection of articles looks at the planning, the intent, the delivery and the outcome of various CIMIC activities and covers the period of the 1990s when no formalized CF CIMIC doctrine existed. The source material includes publications from military, government, media and academia and provides a diverse representation of the evolution of CIMIC over the past two decades.

Le présent rapport de contrat est une bibliographie annotée de documents publiés de source ouverte qui traitent directement ou indirectement de la coopération civilo-militaire (COCIM). Les publications couvrent la période allant de 1990 à 2010. De façon générale, les livres, les articles, les monographies et les manuels indiqués ci-dessous donnent un historique et un aperçu partiels des activités de la COCIM ainsi qu'une analyse de ses fonctions durant la période de l'après-guerre froide. Les articles choisis traitent de la planification, des buts, de l'exécution et des résultats des activités et couvrent la période des années 1990, lorsqu'il n'existait pas de doctrine officielle de COCIM au sein des FC. Les documents sources sont notamment les publications militaires, gouvernementales, médiatiques et universitaires; ils donnent des éclairages différents de l'évolution de la COCIM au cours des deux dernières décennies.

14. **KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS** (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

CIMIC; Civil Military Cooperation; Influence Activities; Info Ops; Information Operations

## Defence R&D Canada

Canada's Leader in Defence  
and National Security  
Science and Technology

## R & D pour la défense Canada

Chef de file au Canada en matière  
de science et de technologie pour  
la défense et la sécurité nationale



[www.drdc-rddc.gc.ca](http://www.drdc-rddc.gc.ca)

