Confronting the 'Essence of Decision': Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis
Abstract
This Technical Memorandum, which is the first full case-study in a series of eight, examines how Canada dealt with the Cuban Missile Crisis. The case will focus on accounting for why the Diefenbaker government, in the context of a grave threat to North American security and defence, delayed increasing the readiness level for the CF as requested by Washington, and the role played by the mechanics of Canadian Government decision-making at the time. By reconstructing the events and decision-making processes that existed in the political, bureaucratic and military domains, the case begins to build the 'story' of the Canada-US strategic defence relationship. In doing so, it recounts a sad story of leaders, both political and military, too readily accepting reasons to justify inaction in the face of a clear and present danger. Thus, while having a more streamlined national security structure cannot always negate the effect of personality on decision-making, what this case-study demonstrates is that the national security structure in place during the crisis allowed military civilian leadership to get away far too easily with finding reasons for inaction. While it is accepted that personality always makes itself felt, the lack of rigour in the system did nothing to soften its sharp edges since it did not force realistic and timely assessments of the nation's geostrategic imperatives, or of the developing threat from Soviet missiles in Cuba. Indeed, this case-study has shown that a degree of strategic laziness, enhanced by a slow move away from a mobilisation paradigm to one with large forces in-being, had crept into the nation's strategic planning and understanding of the likely nature of the next conflict.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA535364
Entities
People
- Brad W. Gladman
- Peter M. Archambault
Organizations
- Defence Research and Development Canada