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Counterinsurgency Overview

Presented to:

MORS Irregular Warfare Workshop

19 April 2010

USA/USMC COIN Center
 U.S. Army Stability Operations Proponent
 U.S Army Security Force Assistance Proponent
 COL Daniel S. Roper, Director



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Agenda

- COIN Center Overview
- Understanding the Environment
- US COIN, Stability Operations, and Security Force Assistance Doctrine
- Human Terrain
- Assessments & Metrics




COIN Center Origin & Mission

- Founded Summer 06 – GEN Petraeus and Gen Mattis, USMC
- Assist with FM 3-24 Integration and Implementation
- “Connect the Dots”



Mission Statement: USA/USMC COIN Center provides oversight of ground force COIN integration in order to improve US ground forces' capability to operate in a full spectrum/COIN environment.

- **Integrate** COIN initiatives
- **Research** best practices
- Improve **Doctrine**
- Improve **Education**
- **Advise** leaders and organizations
- Conduct **Outreach** to other military & civilian entities



Lines of Effort

Assist Army/USMC in implementation/application of the body of thought in FM 3-24

Global COIN Center Partners



Land Force Doctrine and Training System



*StaffCollege
Special Operations
Forces School*



*UK Land Warfare
Centre*

COIN Centers for Excellence



*COIN and Stability
Operations Center*



*COIN Training Center–
Afghanistan*



UK: Land Stability and COIN Centre



Netherlands: Doctrine



France: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre



NATO: Joint Force Training Centre



Afghanistan: COIN Consultations

Liaison Officer Integration



Japan



Netherlands



Brazil



Italy



Australia



New Zealand



France



United Kingdom



Germany

Media

- BBC
- National Public Radio
- McClatchy
- Chicago Tribune
- Congressional Quarterly
- Inside the Army
- AUSA Magazine

U.S. Military Centers

- USA/USMC COIN Center
- USJFCOM Joint Irregular Warfare Center
- SOCOM J10
- USMC Irregular Warfare Center
- USAF Irregular Warfare Center
- USCENTCOM Interagency Task Force
- Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

U.S. Government

- US Department of State
- U.S. Agency for International Development
- Department of Justice
- National Security Council

Think Tanks

- RAND
- U.S. Institute of Peace
- Center for New American Security
- Small Wars Journal

Academia

- Harvard
- US Military Academy
- Johns Hopkins
- Princeton
- Stanford
- Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute
- University of Kansas

COIN Center, Stability Operations, Security Force Assistance Proponent - *Engagements*

Timeframe	Event
2009	• Operational Mentor Liaison Team Training, Poland • Multinational Engagements: (<i>UK, Italy, NATO Def College, France, Germany, Russia</i>) • COIN Leaders Workshop: <i>Pakistan/Afghan border</i> • Thailand Subject Matter Expert Exchange • Pakistan COIN Conference • Afghanistan coordination visits
2010	• COIN Leaders Workshop: <i>Afghanistan Azimuth Check</i> • Thailand <i>COIN Subject Matter Expert Exchange</i> • Arizona State University <i>Foreign Policy Conference</i> • COIN Collaboration: (<i>Canada, Turkey, Pakistan</i>) • Afghanistan Training Command <i>COIN Consultation</i> • Defense Summit Asia Conference

Understanding the Environment



MG McChrystal ISAF Commander Assessment, 30 August 2009



“This is a different kind of fight. Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; **our objective must be the population**. Gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people’s choices and needs. [We must] change the operational culture to connect with the people. ISAF [must] focus on protecting the Afghan people, **understanding their environment**, and building relationships with them.”

Understanding the Operational Environment

Not ... *what to think*

Or even . . . *how to think*


In COIN & Irregular Warfare, focus on ...

how to think about:

environment in which you operate &

how to influence both environment & actors in it.


A Multiple-Problem Set



We must understand in detail the situation, however complex, and be able to explain it to others.

GEN McChrystal, 13 June 2009

Moral vs. Physical Domain




"It is an irony of political warfare—and a political fact to be considered and understood—that the rules are not the same for both sides."

Robert Taber, *War of the Flea*, 1965

Information as a “Lens” in COIN

Achieving a degree of coherency in word, actions, images & outcome




US COIN, Stability Operations, and Security Force Assistance Doctrine

Quadrennial Defense Review 2010

COIN/SO/SFA

Key Mission Areas



- Succeed in *counterinsurgency* and *stability operations*
 - retain the capability to conduct large-scale *counterinsurgency* and *stability operations* in a wide range of environments
 - increase *counterinsurgency* and *stability operations* competency and capacity in general purpose forces
- Build the *security capacity* of partner states
 - strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for *security force assistance*


COMISAF Directive

“Counterinsurgency is an order. It is not a technique we record. It is how we are operating this campaign. It is how we will win. It is not open to people’s personal philosophy.”




16 March 2010

COIN, IW, SO, & SFA



USG COIN Guide




“Whether the United States should engage in any particular counterinsurgency is a matter of political choice, but that it will engage in such conflicts during the decades to come is a near certainty. This Guide...will serve best if treated not as a rigidly defined set of recipes, but rather, as a **stimulus to disciplined, but creative thought.**”

U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide Preface (January 2009)


Essential Doctrine




**FM 3-07,
Stability Operations**
Level: Operational
Scope: Army
Published: Oct 2008




**FM 3-24.2,
Tactics in COIN**
Level: Tactical
Scope: Army Bde and below
Published: Apr 2009




**FM 3-07.1: Security Force
Assistance**
Level: Operational/Tactical
Scope: Army SFA
Published: May 2009




FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5
Level: Operational/Tactical
Scope: Army/USMC COIN
Published: Dec 2006



COIN.ARMY.MIL



JP 3-24: COIN
Level: Operational
Scope: Joint
Published: Oct 2009



Irregular Warfare JOC
Scope: IW Joint Operating Concept
Signed: Sep 2007


FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency (Next)*



"Today insurgency is mutating, thus forcing an intense reevaluation of U.S. strategy and operational concepts."


Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century"

FM 3-07 Stability Operations



A "Comprehensive Approach"

“Success” in Counterinsurgency



“A victory is not [just] the **destruction** in a **given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization**. It is that, plus the **permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population**, isolation not enforced upon the population but **maintained by and with the population.**”

David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 1964

Human Terrain



Human Terrain



The element of the operational environment encompassing the *cultural, sociological, political, and economic* factors of the local population.

"You cannot operate in this environment without a detailed understanding of all the PMESII variables, particularly the political and informational."

GEN Ray Odierno, September 2009

Relevant Context in the Operational Environment

Operational Variables

- **Political**
- **Military**
- **Economic**
- **Social**
- **Infrastructure**
- **Information**
- **Physical terrain**
- **Time**

Civil Considerations

- **Areas**
- **Structures**
- **Capabilities**
- **Organizations**
- **People**
- **Events**

Integrate to paint detailed picture of local perceptions & dynamics



	P Political	M Military/Security	E Economic	S Social	I Infrastructure	I Information
A Areas	District / Provincial boundary	IED sites, military/ insurgent bases	Bazaars, farms, repair shops, bazaars	Picnic areas, bazaars, meeting sites	Irrigation networks, medical services	Radio, gathering points, graffiti, posters
S Structures	Shura halls, Court House	Police HQ's, military bases	Bazaars, banks, industrial plants	Mosques, Wedding halls	Roads, bridges, electrical lines, dams	Cell, radio and TV towers, print shops
C Capabilities	Dispute resolution, judges, local leadership	Military/Police Enemy recruiting potential?	Access to banks, development, black market	Traditional structures, means of justice	Ability to: build/maintain roads, dams, irrigation	Literacy rate, phone service
O Organizations	GOV & NGO organizations	Coalition & Host Nation Forces	Banks, landholders, economic NGO's	Tribes, clans, families	Gov Ministries, Construction companies	News organizations, mosques
P People	Governors, councils, elders, Judges	Coalition/ host nation military/ police leaders	Bankers, landholders, merchants, criminals	Religious/ civic leaders, elders, families	Builders, contractors, development councils	Civic/religious leaders, family heads
E Events	Elections, meetings, speeches, trials	Kinetic events, military/police operations	Drought, harvest, business opening	Weddings, deaths/birthsf unerals, bazaar days	Road/bridge/s chool construction, well digging	Festivals, project openings

COMISAF Training Guidance

“You must understand your operational environment. All of us must learn the ASCOPE methodology to refine our awareness of the operational environment. This gives us an understanding of civil considerations from the point of view of the population, insurgent, and counterinsurgent.”



Information Management

PROBLEM: “Little [relevant information] from the ground level in Afghanistan reaches a central repository where customers who need information can access or search for it. Instead, vital information piles up in obscure SharePoint sites, inaccessible hard drives, and other digital junkyards.”

MG Michael Flynn, p. 17.

REQUIREMENT: An integrated capabilities-driven technical approach that can meet the need for normalized, time-sensitive, population-centric (PMESII-PT, ASCOPE, indicators) information. . . .

CHECKMATE Command Post
Executive Summary, 2010



Civil Information Management

PROBLEM: The lack of a standardized assessment process that allows civil and military personnel to determine and target the grievances/root causes of instability and conflict in Area of Operations (AO).

What Information?

- Demographics
- Economics
- Social constructs
- Culture
- Political processes
- Political leaders
- Civil - military relationships
- Infrastructure nodes
- Non -state actors in the AO
- Civil defense
- Public safety and health capabilities
- Environment
- Events

DIME


D iplomatic
I nformation
M ilitary
E conomic

PMESII-PT

P olitical
M ilitary
E nvironment
S ocial
I nfrastructure
I nformations Systems
P hysical Environment
T ime

ASCOPE

A reas
S tructures
C apabilities
O rganizations
P eople
E vents



SWEAT-MUS

S ewage
W ater
E lectricity
A cademics
T rash
M edical
U nemployment
S ecurity

TCAPF – Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework


Reason for change in population?
What is the most important problem facing the village?
Who do you believe can solve your problems?
What should be done first to help your village?

Assessments & Metrics

Design

“When you get a new job to do, spend most of your time discovering exactly what your new mission is. Then break it down into workable units.”

GEN Matthew Ridgway



Frame the Problem

- What is the force trying to accomplish (ends)?
- What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state (ends)?
- How will the force achieve the end state (ways)?
- What sequence of actions is most likely to attain these conditions (ways)?
- What resources are required, and how can they be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)?
- What risks are associated with that sequence of actions, and how can they be mitigated (risk)?


U S OBJECTIVE IN AFGHANISTAN

President Obama, United States Military
Academy, 1 December 2009


**“Our overarching goal...: to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten
America and our allies in the future.”**

HOW DO WE MEASURE THAT?


MOE – Not a New Issue




January 2010




AY 05-06



December 1966



June 2009



June 2009

Measure of Effectiveness

“A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.”

(Joint Pub 3-0, *Joint Operations*.)

“At best, measures of combat efficiency are measures of how quickly or cheaply forces perform military missions. They do not gauge whether mission success will achieve political purposes.”

Robert S. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*



History Repeating Itself?

*“...requirements exist for **methods or analytical models** that are suitable or adequate for gaining greater understanding of insurgency / counterinsurgency-type situations, **for measuring progress**; for detecting and assessing causal relationships; and for evaluating alternative allocations of effort, tactics, and strategies.”*

Lawrence J. Dondero, Head, Military Gaming
Dept “Measurement of Pacification Progress in
Vietnam (U)” Research Analysis Corporation
(RAC), **September 1968**

MOE in a Complex Environment

It is important to preface any attempt to establish analytic criteria, and measures of effectiveness, for a conflict like the Afghan War with some important caveats:


- There is a natural desire to find bottom line metrics and judgments, but the **task is to manage complexity and not to oversimplify**.
- Any **metrics or analysis which focus narrowly** on formal command structures, or national boundaries, **are inherently wrong**.
- It is far **easier to quantify what is easily measured** than to quantify what is relevant.
- **Metrics often imply a false precision**, particularly since they are rarely shown as full ranges or rounded to reflect uncertainty.
- **Numbers that are unsupported by narrative are a remarkably poor method of communication**.

**Andrew Cordesman, Analyzing the Afghan-Pakistan War, Draft 28 July 09*

MOE in Afghanistan

FY 2010 Defense Authorization Act

The committee requires the President to **assess U.S. progress** in four areas for Afghanistan, including: assisting the Afghan people with building a functional government; spreading the rule of law and reducing corruption; reducing the ability of anti-government elements to carry out attacks in and from Afghanistan; and improving the economy. The administration is directed to **develop goals and timelines** to achieve the aims listed, **in addition to measures of effectiveness for accurate assessments** in each area.





Measure of Effectiveness



“The measure of effectiveness will not be the number of enemy killed, it will be the number of Afghans shielded from violence.”

GEN Stanley McChrystal

“Because political objectives are just that—political—they are often ambiguous, contradictory; it is one of the greatest sources of frustration for soldiers. . . .”

Dr. Eliot Cohen

Concerns


- What are the relevant indicators of success?
- How will those indicators be measured?
- How will information regarding those indicators be forwarded?
- How can the information be used by units on the ground?
- What are the conditions that have to be established for the desired end state?

"Not everything that can be counted counts,
and not everything that counts can be counted."

Einstein

To Determine Progress. . .

- Must maintain a common set of core metrics
- Must maintain a consistent methodology
- Cannot simply measure, must also interpret
- Must determine categories for metrics
 - Population
 - Host nation government
 - Security forces
 - Enemy
 - Development



Kilcullen, "Measuring Progress in Afghanistan," Dec 09

Attributes of Good Metrics

GENERAL

1. Operationally defined
2. Efficient, feasible, parsimonious
3. Variable
4. Created within spatial and temporal domains
5. Consider classification level and whether data exists at the required level

p. 4

SPECIFIC

- | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Transparent | 7. Rigorous |
| 2. Repeatable | 8. Good enough |
| 3. Shared | 9. Linked |
| 4. Layered | 10. Generalizable |
| 5. Reasonably easy to do | 11. Systematic |
| 6. Defendable | 12. Reliability |

p. 10

THE RICH CONTEXTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF PAKISTAN &
AFGHANISTAN (PAKAF)

A Strategic Multilayer Assessment Project

METRICS WORKSHOP

17 – 18 MARCH 2010

Prepared for:

JS/J-3/DDGO
STRATCOM/GISC
OSD/DDRE/RRTO

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UNITED STATES ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER

Fort Belvoir, Kansas

<http://coin.army.mil>

Link to COIN Website here

Schools and Centers

CAC-K Knowledge

CAC-CDID
Capability Development
Integration Directorate

CAC-LD&E
Leader Development
and Education

Separate Organizations

COUNTERINSURGENCY, SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE, STABILITY OPERATIONS WEBSITE

Home Page

Knowledge

Director's Corner

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/directors_corner.asp

About Us

COIN Center Blog

Knowledge Center

HTS-COIN 2009-09
Training (NEW)

Leaders' Workshop

Slides available here
Videos are here

SFA November
Symposium

Research

Colloquium

Public Affairs

Events

DEMOCRACY DENIED: NO DISTRICT ELECTION 2010

Thursday, January 07, 2010 4:26:00 PM



COIN Symposium
11-13 May 10
COIN Azimuth Check -
Afghanistan

Link to Director's
Corner here

In Co Af an Parliamentary Elections would be held on 22 May. What they did not announce is that although District elections are mandated by the Afghan constitution they are cancelled for 2010. Parliamentary and District elections are not as sexy as the presidential elections of 2009, but from a counterinsurgency perspective, they play a key role in establishing the legitimacy of the government by

providing a venue for people to solve their problems and govern themselves locally.

Unfortunately, the Afghan 2010 election cycle is flawed and doomed to further erode the already tenuous legitimacy of the Afghan Government and its electoral

Get Help

Our Site link has
been moved to CAC-
LD&E menu on CAC
homepage.




Framework for COIN

Approach to Counterinsurgency

1. Separate insurgents from Population
2. Connect Population to Government
3. Transform Environment to be inhospitable to Insurgents

Framework for Counterinsurgency: “War Amongst the People”



Successful COIN Practices- Afghanistan

Clear Hold Build



Build and develop cleared areas

“...use projects and work programs to bring communities together.”

Population



Focus on population

“We need to embrace the Afghan people.”

By/With/Through HN



Political and military cooperation

“Partner with ANSF at all echelons.”

Security



Deny sanctuary to insurgents

...separate insurgents from the center of gravity, the people.”

COMISAF Guidance, Aug 09

Security Force Assistance Activities

FM 3-07.1

Plan and **resource**

Host Nation
security
force
operations.

Generate

Host
Nation
capacity.

Partner with HN
security forces.
Embed advisors to
support capacity
building.

Transition

to Host
Nation
legitimate
authority.

Sustain Host

Nation
security
forces.
Develop and
support
relevant
programs.

“Building [partner] capacity is arguably as important as,
if not more so than, the fighting the United States does
itself.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
Foreign Affairs

PLAN

PREPARE

EXECUTE



A

S

S


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Assessing

The warfighting functions are integrated and synchronized in the MDMP to generate combat power. Variances during execution disrupt this synchronization.



During execution, commanders and staff also assess the underlying framework of the plan itself. This involves reexamining the original design concept and determining if it is still relevant to the situation.