Deriving Candidate Technical Controls and Indicators of Insider Attack from Socio-Technical Models and Data

Abstract

The insider threat continues to be one of the prime issues facing government entities and organizations across critical infrastructure sectors. Extensive catalogues of case material from actual insider events have been used by CERT(R), part of Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute, to create socio-technical models of insider crime to help educate organizations on the risk of insider crime. Building upon this work, this paper seeks to demonstrate how a useful method for extracting technical information from previous insider crimes and mapping it to previous modeling work can create informed candidate technical controls and indicators. This paper also shows current examples of case material and candidate indicators that have been successfully converted into well-received insider threat training modules.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 2011
Accession Number
ADA536089

Entities

People

  • Michael Henley

Organizations

  • Carnegie Mellon University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Cyber

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Cybersecurity
  • Databases
  • Department Of Defense
  • Engineering
  • Governments
  • Information Systems
  • Infrastructure
  • Insider Threats
  • Intellectual Property
  • Knowledge Management
  • Law
  • National Security
  • Network Protocols
  • Security
  • Security Personnel
  • Software Development
  • United States Government

Fields of Study

  • Computer science

Readers

  • Cybersecurity.
  • Research Science/Academic Research
  • Systems Analysis and Design