De-Alerting Nuclear Forces
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the issues surrounding de-alerting of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). "De-alerting" is defined as the introduction of reversible changes to ICBM nuclear weapons, their launch and/or command and control systems in order to lengthen the time required to launch these weapons. De-alerting the posture of the United States nuclear arsenal is a concept that has been examined at length by military and non-governmental communities since the 1990s. Indeed, the United States de-alerted several classes of nuclear weapons both during and after the Cold War. Today the primary concern of de-alerting proponents is an uncontrolled escalation spiral in a crisis that leads to a rapid launch of promptly alerted nuclear forces. The call for de-alerting U.S. nuclear weapons does not affect all components of the nuclear triad equally. The posture of heavy bombers, for instance, has already been significantly relaxed. Submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), while relatively prompt are also survivable. Thus, there is less pressure to use or lose these weapons in a crisis, and therefore less impulse to de-alert SLBMs. For these reasons, the focus of de-alerting proponents is mainly on ICBMs.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA536263
Entities
People
- Rebecca Davis
- Tim Miller
Organizations
- United States Air Force Academy