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THESIS

**IMPROVING COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BY
REMOVING MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT ISLAM IN THE
WESTERN WORLD**

by

Imran Khalid Shafi

December 2010

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Abbas Kadhim
Robert Looney

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**IMPROVING COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BY REMOVING
MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT ISLAM IN THE WESTERN WORLD**

Imran Khalid Shafi
Lieutenant Commander, Pakistan Navy
B.Sc. (Hon), Karachi University, 1998
M.Sc., National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, 2009

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2010**

Author: Imran Khalid Shafi

Approved by: Abbas Kadhim, PhD
Thesis Advisor

Robert Looney, PhD
Second Reader

Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

The defining events of September 11, 2001, began a global political era in which Western culture is increasingly pitted against Muslim society, as if there were a fundamental struggle between the two. In fact, Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations hypothesis has morphed into a self-fulfilling prophecy as the international media has capitalized on its divisive rhetoric for profit, and extremist groups have operationalized its message. By highlighting historical and political grievances, fringe groups such as al-Qaeda (whose tactics are expressly forbidden by Islamic faith) are able to boil all aspects of an aggrieved individual's identity down to salient religious aspects, and then redefine historical terms like "jihad" and reinterpret religious themes to compel actors. From a Western perspective, extremist actions combine with media coverage to promote a cognitive bias, cementing a conceptual link between Islam and terrorism. This thesis advances the claim that counterterrorism is an issue of grievance and extremism, and that religion has little to do with the issue. By examining relevant teachings from Islam and other faiths, this paper will aim to dispel common divisive myths and misperceptions surrounding Islam. Ultimately, counterterrorism efforts cannot succeed unless campaigns are undertaken to correct misinformation and widespread biases.

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This thesis is dedicated to all those innocent souls and soldiers who have lost their lives since September 11, 2001, 8:46 a.m.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Some of the best weapons do not shoot.

U.S. Army
Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24
December 2006

Since the creation of the universe, and particularly this world, everyone lives in what is called “the Earth,” timeline references are in use to define events, which gain importance and prioritization in relation to each other. In this very context, the event of the birth of “Jesus Christ” as Christians call him and “Prophet Isa” according to Muslims, gained the utmost importance as far as defining an era is concerned. As of today, the complete timeline of the world’s historical and current events in most countries are recognized and given a relative age in the form of B.C. (Before Christ) or A.D. (Anno Domini)¹ in relation to the conception or birth of Jesus Christ. Today, most of the studies relating to the topics of “terrorism” or “counter-terrorism” start with the statement of either something happened before or after 9/11 (i.e., the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon). As a result, the event of 9/11 now has also taken a place of being an epoch in the annals of history just like B.C. or A.D. to mark chronology and periodization. As far as this paper is concerned, the author equates another important event from history, namely the “*revelation of the Qur’an*,” which has in fact changed the political, sociological, economic, geographical, cultural and religious environment of humankind. The Qur’an, which was revealed by Allah (God) to Prophet Muhammad from 610–632 A.D., became the basis for the completion of the religion “*Islam*,” whose followers are called “*Muslim*” for fourteen centuries. Therefore, events before 610 A.D. and after 632 A.D. have significance in history, as this era has a huge impact on all facets of human lives in the present day.

¹ Paul Brians, *Common Errors in English Usage 2nd Edition* (Oregon: William, James & Co., 2009), 1.

Since 9/11, the media has increased the manifold belief and emphasis in every Western² forum that a relation does exist between Islam and today's terrorism, thus exacerbating the negative image of Islam globally. According to Mustafa Ceric, the Grand Mufti of Bosnia:

The current perception in the West that not all Muslims are terrorists but all terrorists are Muslims is not only morally and politically corrupt, but also factually unsustainable. As the violent small minority of any faith does not represent the peaceful great majority of that faith, therefore Islam is not to be labeled as a "terrorist religion."³

However, blaming the media for its arrogance and the Western world for its ignorance is not the answer; it is much more likely that Muslims themselves are responsible for generating misperceptions about Islam in the West. In this thesis, the author argues that in the first place Muslims in the "Muslim world"⁴ do not practice the true teachings of Islam, which eventually opens the doors for criticism for the West or nonMuslims. As Bernard Lewis comments, "the question is not what has Islam done to the Muslims? But what have the Muslims done to Islam?"⁵ Therefore, it is the responsibility of Muslims to disseminate the true essence of Islamic teachings so that Muslims and nonMuslims are able to combat the misuse of the Qur'an and "*Hadith*"

² The term "West" in this thesis refers mainly to Europe and lands of significant European settlement, primarily North America, but also Australia and New Zealand. The definition is geographical-historical rather than cultural. Today, Christianity, Judaism, liberal democracy, free markets, individualism and consumer culture, while part of a European legacy, is increasingly transnational and global phenomena. To identify them exclusively with the West, as Samuel Huntington and others do, is no longer valid. A geographical-historical definition of the West makes sense for another reason: throughout much of the Muslim world, the West is still viewed through the lens of the colonial and post-colonial European and American global preeminence.

³ Philip Seib, "The News Media and the 'Clash of Civilizations,'" *Parameters*, vol. 34, (Winter 2004–05): 82.

⁴ The term "Muslim world" in this thesis is used to refer to about more than fifty Muslim majority states, which house well over one billion Muslims (and, obviously, other non-Muslim citizens), as well as other states with significant Muslim communities, which house a quarter of a billion Muslims, together making up the world's 1.4 billion Muslims. No assessment or assumption is made about the actual level of religiosity and faith of these 1.4 billion individuals or that they primarily identify as Muslims. Conversely, the term simply conveys the diversity and varied color and thought that exists within any conceptual "world," in this case one with a common defining theme of Islam, itself, with all its diversity as a religion.

⁵ Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2002), 156.

(prophetic traditions).⁶ Extremists today are successful in hiding themselves behind the shield of Islam and declare their opponents as “*kafirun*,” or infidels, and thus smooth the way for slaughtering nonfundamentalist Muslims and nonMuslims alike. Their theology rests upon a simplistic, literal, and highly selective reading of the Qur’an and Hadith, through which they seek to entrap the worldwide Muslim community in the confines of their narrow ideological grasp.⁷

The question this thesis addresses is, *how can the ideology, religion, and culture of Islam be better understood by both Muslims and the Western world and applied to counter today’s rising terrorism?* This question arises in the wake of a continued global effort trying to eradicate all the terrorists and their roots, which is an impossible task. Therefore, it is prudent that the grievances of Muslims be given due importance, understood, and compared with the true teachings of Islam. Nine years after September 11, 2001, the “Western world and especially Europe is still at the stage of treating the symptoms of a mortal illness, and not the disease itself.”⁸ Many leaders of the Islamic world perceive the United States as a threat, due to its policies of globalization and hegemonic culture.⁹ On the other hand, according to Nasir Khan, “the Western world portrays Islam as her main enemy and the Muslim world as a hotbed of terrorism that threatens Western civilization and its democratic values.”¹⁰ One perception about Islam is that it is against free will and disregards democracy, liberty and justice for all men.¹¹ Meanwhile, the Muslim world sees the United States promoting imperialism and hypocrisy by its aggressive use of force in toppling unfriendly regimes. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the unequivocal support of Israel (often at the expense of the

⁶ Juhaya S. Praja, “Islam, Globalization and Counter Terrorism,” *United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders*, February 2006, 8.

⁷ Abdurrahman Wahid, “Right Islam vs. Wrong Islam,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, vol. 3 (2006), 3.

⁸ Claude Moniquet, “Islamism, Jihadism: Treating the Disease, Not Just the Symptoms,” *European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center*, (September 2006), 7.

⁹ Bruce Vaughn, “Islam in South and Southeast Asia,” *CRS Report for Congress* (February 2005), 3.

¹⁰ Dr Nasir Khan, “Islam in Western Mirror,” *Counter Currents*, May 19, 2007, <http://www.countercurrents.org/khan190507.htm> (accessed April 28, 2010).

¹¹ Amil Imani, “Liberal Pacifism Vs Islamic Extremism,” *International Analyst Network*, March 3, 2010, at http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=3378 (accessed May 12, 2010).

Palestinian people) have generated anti-American sentiments on a global level. The outcome of this “*war of ideas*” and perceptions about each other is proving to be unhealthy in terms of lost human lives, mourning families on both sides and adamancy of policymakers to squander taxpayers’ money. Billions of dollars spent in Iraq and Afghanistan on the deployment of troops and their equipment to conduct military operations and rebuild infrastructure has achieved limited results only.¹² The use of force has not worked.

This thesis first examines Islam and terrorism as separate entities, before turning to critical analysis of the relationship between the two. Then it will advance the claim that in order to be able to attain or even define victory in the current war of ideas and clash of narratives, the United States must engage in an explicit public diplomacy campaign in order to promote better understanding of Islam.¹³ By promoting and supporting moderate narratives, the United States can interrupt the vicious cycle of extremism, which is dependent on Western ignorance and fear, and on a “clash of civilizations” narrative that is largely imagined but has not been seriously countered. Ultimately, the thesis will advocate several nonviolent approaches to counterterrorism, which will further the goal of uniting the Muslim world and increasing understanding between differing perspectives.

¹² Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” *CRS Report for Congress* (September 28, 2009), 2.

¹³ Marina Ottaway, “Thinking Big: Democratizing the Middle East,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, January 5, 2003, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1151> (accessed May 8, 2010).

II. UNDERSTANDING THE RELIGION OF ISLAM

Religion is to do right. It is to love, it is to serve, it is to think, and it is to be humble.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882)

A. ISLAM—A RELIGION FOR ALL HUMANKIND

“Islam” is derived from the Arabic root “*salama*,” which means peace, purity, submission and obedience.¹⁴ Islam expresses strict monotheism i.e., to believe in one Almighty Allah and that He is the Creator of all humankind. The followers of the religion of Islam believe that Allah has sent prophets to all of humanity at different times and in different places in order to communicate His message.¹⁵ Examining the literature in the historical context, one finds out that Allah sent approximately 124,000 prophets in all to this world for humankind.¹⁶ As the Qur’an says, “To every people (was sent) a messenger.”¹⁷

These prophets have always been human beings like every other person on earth. They taught humankind about faith in One Almighty Allah and the path of righteousness. The followers of Islam are called Muslims. They believe that as Allah is One and always has been, therefore, His message to humankind through prophets and messengers have always been the same.¹⁸ Muslims argue that in essence, all prophets since time immemorial taught the message of Islam: find peace in life through submission to Allah and follow His guidance. Islam was the religion of Prophet Adam (the first man and the first Prophet of Allah), Prophet Noah, Prophet Abraham, Prophet Moses and Prophet

¹⁴ Seth Nii and Ibipo Johnston-Anumonwo, *Diversity, Multiculturalism, and Social Justice* (New York: State University of New York at Binghamton, 2002), 388.

¹⁵ Amanullah De Soudy and Brady Robertson, *Religious, Moral and Philosophical Studies of World Religions—Islam* (Scotland: Learning Teaching Scotland, 2005), 29.

¹⁶ M. R. Bawa Muhaiyaddeen, *God, His Prophets and His Children* (Philadelphia: The Fellowship Press, 1998), 171.

¹⁷ Al-Qur’an, Chapter 10, Verse 47, for further detail see Chapter 35, Verse 24.

¹⁸ Rosemary Skinner Keller and Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Encyclopedia of Women and Religion in North America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 609.

Jesus;¹⁹ in fact, it was the religion of every Prophet of Allah, because all prophets preached the religion of peace, purity and submission and obedience to Allah alone. As the Qur'an says, "Abraham was neither a Jew nor a Christian but he was (an) upright (man), a Muslim, and he was not one of the polytheists."²⁰




Figure 1. Family Tree of Prophets²¹

¹⁹ Islam for Mankind, "Islam is the Religoin of Mankind. Why?" <http://www.islamformankind.com/index.htm> (accessed on October 16, 2010).

²⁰ Al-Qur'an, Chapter 3, Verse 67, for further detail see Verse 85.

²¹ <http://images.muxlim.com/hsindi/prophet-lineage-adam-to-muhammad/> (accessed on October 17, 2010).

Therefore, it is further argued that Islam becomes the religion of every human child that is born.²² Islam was the religion also practiced by the Prophet Muhammad fourteen centuries ago in the Arabian Peninsula called Saudi Arabia today. Islam is sometimes also called “*Muhammdanism*” in the Western literature, because some people believe Prophet Muhammad to be its originator.²³ However, Prophet Muhammad is the latest promoter of that divine system, made perfect through his preaching. The name Islam was not invented; in fact, it is mentioned in the Qur’an that Allah Himself, chose the name of religion, “This day have I (Allah) perfected for you your religion and completed My favor on you and chosen for you Islam as a religion...”²⁴

The religion of Islam signifies “making of peace” and according to the Qur’an, a true Muslim is one who has made peace with Allah and fellow human beings. Here peace with Allah entails submissions to His wills, i.e., purity and goodness, and peace with human beings entails doing good deeds with fellow human beings. As the Qur’an says, “....whoever submits himself/herself entirely to Allah and he is the doer of good (to others) he has his reward from his Lord...”²⁵ The importance of peace and security to all humankind is described in clear words in the Qur’an. Islam represents that in paradise there shall be only one word, which will spread all over, i.e., “peace,” and the Qur’an says, “They shall not hear therein vain or sinful discourse, except the word peace, peace.”²⁶

After examining these verses from the Qur’an, the following logical question arises: how can Muslims (the followers of Islam—religion of peace) misinterpret the Qur’anic verses to portray Islam as a violent religion, which teaches violence in the form of Jihad? The issue of Jihad is discussed separately in further sections of this chapter.

²² Jaferhusein. I. Laliwala, *Islamic Philosophy of religion: Synthesis of Science Religion and Philosophy* (New Delhi: Sarup & Sons, 2005), 89.

²³ Radhey Sham Chaurasia, *History of Middle East* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 2005), 134.

²⁴ Al-Qur’an, Chapter 5, Verse 3, for further details see Chapter 3, Verse 19.

²⁵ Al-Qur’an, Chapter 2, Verse 112, for further details see Chapter 10, Verse 10.

²⁶ Al-Qur’an, Chapter 56, Verses 25-26, for further details see Chapter 10, Verse 25.

B. HOW, WHEN AND WHERE IT ALL STARTED

Almighty Allah started the revelation of the Qur'an—the divine book of Islam—on Prophet Muhammad in 610 A.D. Before the revelation of the Qur'an and preaching of Prophet Muhammad, the Arabs were living in an era called “*Jahiliyya*” meaning “age of ignorance.” According to Professor John L. Esposito:

Arabian religion and society reflected the tribal realities of the Peninsula. Arabia's one million square miles (nearly one-third the size of the United States and Europe) was dominated by desert and steppe areas. Bedouin tribes pursuing a pastoral and nomadic lifestyle traveled from one area to another, seeking water and pasture for their flocks of sheep and camels. The landscape was dotted with oasis towns and cities. Among the more prominent were Mecca, a center of trade and commerce, and Yathrib (Medina), an important agricultural settlement. Intertribal warfare was a long-established activity governed by clear guidelines and rules. The religion of Arabia reflected its tribal nature and social structure. Gods and goddesses served as protectors of individual tribes, and their spirits were associated with sacred objects—trees, stones, springs, and wells. Mecca possessed a central shrine of the gods, the Kaa'ba, a cube-shaped building that housed the 360 idols of tribal patron deities, and was the site of a great annual pilgrimage and fair. While these deities were primary religious actors and objects of worship, beyond this tribal polytheism was a shared belief in Allah (“the god”). Allah the supreme high god, was the creator and sustainer of life but remote from everyday concerns and thus not the object of cult or rituals.²⁷

Just like every people (nation) were sent a prophet from Allah for the guidance of the right path, Saudi Arabia too was sent a prophet, Muhammad ibn Abdullah who was born in 570 A.D. in the tribe of Qureish. According to history, his father was a trader who died before Prophet Muhammad was born and his mother, Amina, died when he was only six years old. As a young man, he was employed in Mecca's thriving caravan trade.²⁸ As he was well known for his trustworthiness among other traders, he was given the nickname al-Amin, the trusted one. Due to his character abilities, he became business manager for the caravans of a wealthy widow, Khadija, whom he married at the age of twenty-five while she was forty years old. He was a rightly guided man who used to

²⁷ John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 4–5.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 7–8.

contemplate his life and ills of society at Mount Hira, located a few miles north of Mecca.²⁹ It was this place where Prophet Muhammad at the age of forty received the first divine revelations through Archangel Gabriel in the ninth lunar month, *Ramadan*, of 610 A.D.³⁰

These revelations continued until his death in 632 A.D., and were recorded during and after his lifetime, officially collected in the form of the Qur'an (from Arabic verb "*qara'a*," meaning to recite, read, or transmit).³¹ Islam as a religion was already present, but Islam as a community or polity began in the latter phase of the Qur'anic revelations; thus became the divine book (the infallible word of Allah) of Islam and is considered the law book to practice religion in a true sense. The prophetic mission for Prophet Muhammad was not just his hobby or profession, but his entire life,³² as described in the Qur'an. "Say, [O, Muhammad!] Surely my prayer and my sacrifice and my life and my death are (all) for Allah, the Lord of the worlds."³³

Prophet Muhammad's early preaching was private, as he only preached to his family, clan and close friends. His followers ranged from deprived classes to well-to-do merchants. Approximately two years later, when Prophet Muhammad's mission was launched publicly, there was active opposition to the religion because the Arabs regarded it as a threat to their two fundamental vested interests: idol worship and socioeconomic privilege.³⁴ This opposition rose in the form of persecution to Prophet Muhammad's followers so much that they had to migrate from Mecca to Medina in the year 622 A.D. This historic emigration, known as the *hijra*, marked the beginning of the Islamic calendar and the founding of the Islamic community.³⁵ Within one year of *hijra*, the

²⁹ Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, 7–8.

³⁰ Vartan Gregorian, *Islam: A mosaic, Not a Monolith* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 5–6.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Fazlur Rehman, "The Message and the Messenger," in *Islam: The Religious and Political Life of a World Community*, ed. Marjorie Kelly (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 32.

³³ Al-Qur'an, Chapter 6, Verses 162.

³⁴ Rehman, "The Message and the Messenger," 34.

³⁵ Ibid., 36.

Ka'ba at Mecca was declared by the Qur'an to be the object of Islamic pilgrimage, and about six months later, it was declared as the direction for prayer, replacing Jerusalem.³⁶ Even after the migration, Meccans treated Prophet Muhammad and his followers as fugitive and traitors and resultantly managed to wage a number of battles (Badr, Uhud, Trench) in a quest to destroy him. Within eight years of hijra, Islam had enough followers to take over Mecca without bloodshed, followed by the embracing of Islam by Meccans and delegations from all over Arabia. Prophet Muhammad remained the leader of the political community for the next twelve years, where political aspects of Islamic belief were extensively elaborated.³⁷

The Muslim community has a collective responsibility towards public life and the Qur'an provides regulations in that context. Another important aspect of the Muslim community is the "*sunna*" of the Prophet Muhammad. The word "*sunna*" means customary practice established by the example of Prophet Muhammad and his closest companions. The recorded collection of "*sunna*" for the aim of knowledge to the later generations is known as "*Hadith*," which means "tradition." Hadith is explained as the sayings or actions of Prophet Muhammad, including what he said and did and what was done in his presence and not forbidden by him. Hadith actually gives the Islamic community a means of extending the teachings of Islam.³⁸ In the light of the Qur'an and Sunna, there are few imperatives on a Muslim in the form of the "*Pillars of Islam*," which are briefly explained in the next section.

³⁶ Rehman, "The Message and the Messenger," 37–38.

³⁷ Roy Mottahedeh, "The Foundation of State and Society," in *Islam: The Religious and Political Life of a World Community*, ed. Marjorie Kelly (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 56.

³⁸ Ibid., 58.

C. PILLARS OF ISLAM

Islam is based on five pillars: 1) to testify that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah and Muhammad is Allah's Apostle; 2) to offer the (compulsory congregational) prayers dutifully and perfectly; 3) to pay Zakat (i.e., obligatory charity); 4) to perform Hajj (i.e., Pilgrimage to Mecca); and 5) to observe fast during the month of Ramadan.

Sahih Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 2, No. 7

There are “five pillars” of Islam and they are considered the foundation of Muslim life both as a person and as a community. These pillars are five basic concepts for accepting and practicing the religion for Muslims. Central to faith and practice, these five pillars are outlined in the Hadith recorded in “*Sahih Muslim*” (one of the books of Hadith collections) and further described by Karen Armstrong:

All the Muslims who follow Islamic discipline observes the five ‘pillars’ (rukun) or essential practices of Islam. They all agree fully with the ‘shahadah’ the brief Muslim confession of faith: “There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his prophet.” They perform the ‘salat’ prayer five times daily, pay the ‘zakat’ alms, ‘sawm’ fast during the month of Ramadan, and, if circumstances permit, perform ‘hajj’ pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in their lifetime. Anybody who remains faithful to these pillars is a true Muslim.³⁹

The declaration of faith “*shahadah*” that marks entrance into the Muslim community of believers “*ummah*” is intended to be expressed through adherence to the other four pillars.⁴⁰ Although all of the pillars are required of an individual Muslim, they also have a collective dimension, thus demonstrating Islam’s emphasis on individual responsibility and accountability on the one hand, and community building and solidarity on the other.⁴¹ Now, a brief description about these five pillars of Islam for better understanding is presented.

³⁹ Karen Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History* (New York: Random House of Canada Limited, 2000), 67.

⁴⁰ Natana Delong-Bas, *The Five Pillars of Islam: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research Guide*, http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=lxnvehj44CQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA2&dq=There+are+%E2%80%9Dfive+pillars%E2%80%9Dof+Islam+and+they+are+considered+the+foundation+of+Muslim+life+as+a+person+and+as+a+community+both&ots=XALNwD2KOE&sig=W8xOYyOQM84FOoIkGqzT8cgxW_o#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed on October 19, 2010).

⁴¹ Ibid.

1. Shahadah (Faith)

The first pillar is “*shahadah*,” the profession of faith by which a Muslim acknowledges his allegiance to Allah and Prophet Muhammad. “I testify that there is no God but Allah, and I testify that Prophet Muhammad is the messenger of Allah.”⁴² Utterance of the “*shahadah*” before witnesses is sufficient for full conversion to Islam but it should be a genuine belief from one’s heart.

2. Salat (Prayer)

The second pillar is “*salat*” or prayer; a basic duty performed both individually and publicly. It is a means of reinforcing group consciousness and expressing social solidarity.⁴³ In prayer, every muscle and bone of the body joins the soul and mind in the worship and glory of Allah.⁴⁴ It is performed five times a day, and is a direct link between the worshipper and Allah.⁴⁵ There is no hierarchical authority in Islam and there are no priests.

3. Zakat (Alms)

The social obligations of Islam are made most explicit in “*zakat*” or the alms tax, which is the third of the five pillars.⁴⁶ It originally means “self-purification” and “growth” is not just a charitable act but is considered a “loan to Allah.”⁴⁷ Also purified

⁴² Malise Ruthven, *Islam in the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 60.

⁴³ Ruthven, *Islam in the World*, 60.

⁴⁴ Muslimah’s Homepage on Islam, “5 Pillars of Islam and Application of Faith,” at http://www.themodernreligion.com/basic/islam_pillars.htm (accessed on October 19, 2010).

⁴⁵ Islam 101, “Five Pillars of Islam.” at <http://www.islam101.com/dawah/pillars.html> (accessed on October 19, 2010).

⁴⁶ Ruthven, *Islam in the World*, 61.

⁴⁷ Annemarie Schimmel, *Islam: An Introduction* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992), 35.

are the possessions of an individual, by setting aside a proportion (2.5% per year of earnings and savings) for those in need and for society to rectify social inequality, distrust and corruption.⁴⁸

4. Sawm (Fasting)

The fourth pillar of Islam is “*sawm*,” the annual fast of Ramadan that occurs in the ninth month in the lunar calendar, during which all food, drink and sexual activity are forbidden between dawn and dusk.⁴⁹ Fasting during this time is obligatory for every Muslim adult if he is mentally and physically fit and not on a journey.⁵⁰ Women are allowed to skip a fasting day due to menstruation, and while nursing a baby. It is mainly a method of self-purification and self-restraint and is beneficial to health.⁵¹

5. Hajj (Pilgrimage)

Finally, the fifth pillar of Islam is the pilgrimage to Mecca or “*Hajj*,” which is to be performed once in a lifetime of those who can afford it. The rite of the Hajj are of Abrahamic origin and includes going around the Ka’ba seven times, and going seven times between the hills of “*Safa*” and “*Marwa*” as did Hagar (Prophet Abraham’s wife) during her search for water.⁵² It is performed once a year on the tenth day of “*Zul-Hajjah*,” which is the tenth month of the lunar calendar.⁵³

⁴⁸ Saba Rasheed Ali, William Ming Liu and Majeda Humedian, “Islam 101: Understanding the Religion and Therapy Implications,” *Professional Psychology: Research and Practice*, Vol. 35, No. 6, 2004, 635–642.

⁴⁹ Ali, Liu and Humedian, “Islam 101: Understanding the Religion and Therapy Implications,” 635–642.

⁵⁰ Muslimah’s Homepage on Islam, “5 Pillars of Islam and Application of Faith,” at http://www.themodernreligion.com/basic/islam_pillars.htm (accessed on October 19, 2010).

⁵¹ Islam 101, “Five Pillars of Islam.” at <http://www.islam101.com/dawah/pillars.html> (accessed on October 19, 2010).

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ali, “Islam 101: Understanding the Religion and Therapy Implications,” 635–642.

D. TEACHINGS OF ISLAM

The messenger believes in what has been revealed to him from his Lord, and (so do) the believers; they all believe in Allah and His angels and His books and His messengers; We make no difference between any of His messengers; and they say: We hear and obey, our Lord! Thy forgiveness (do we crave), and to Thee is the eventual course.

The Qur'an, 2:285

Islam sets up certain principles according to the Qur'an and Hadith that constitute, when followed, solid ground for the achievement of peace among various peoples of the world. These principles include the following.⁵⁴

1. Equality of Mankind Before Allah

All human beings are equal in the sight of Allah. Piety is the criteria on which Allah judges one. This equality is an important basis for mutual respect and understanding and consequently peace among individuals and communities. The Qur'an says, "...Verily, the most honorable of you with Allah is that (believer) who has At-Taqua (the Piety)..."⁵⁵

2. Justice In all Circumstances

Meaningful peace cannot be achieved without justice. Injustice leads to wickedness and anarchy, as can be seen today. The Islamic sense of justice demands that people should love for others what they love for themselves and treat others as they would like to be treated. The Qur'an says, "...stand out firmly for God, as witness to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is next to piety."⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Rachida El Diwani, "Some Western Misconceptions about Islam," (Fulbright Scholar, Chatham College, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA, January 2003).

⁵⁵ Al-Quran, Chapter 49, Verse 13.

⁵⁶ Al-Quran, Chapter 5, Verse 8.

3. Defense Readiness

Those who are inclined to peace become an object of attack by the wicked ones if they fail to plan for their self-defense. Islam has taken this into consideration and urged Muslims to equip themselves and to improve their capabilities in defense of peace and justice and to eradicate oppression and injustice. However, Islam has balanced this by prohibiting aggression, hostility and reckless destruction of lives and properties. The Qur'an says, "And prepare against them what force you can and horses tied at the frontier, to frighten thereby the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them, whom you do not know (but) Allah knows..."⁵⁷

4. Peaceful Disposition to Others

Muslims are commended to stretch the hand of friendship to others among humankind and are forbidden to open hostilities or start aggression. The way for peace should be kept open and whenever the enemy inclines toward peace, the opportunity must be seized. The Qur'an says, "And if they incline to peace, then incline to it and trust in Allah; surely He is the Hearing, the Knowing."⁵⁸

5. Cooperation With Others for the Good of Mankind

Islam recognizes the need of cooperation among nations and cultures for the good of all. One of the Hadith of Prophet Muhammad explains, "Whenever a person is murdered unjustly, there is a share from the burden of the crime on the first son of Adam for he was the first to start the tradition of murdering."⁵⁹

These are some of the Islamic principles for the achievement of world peace. Unfortunately, the Islamic world today is full of tension, because of the lack of almost all the above points that are sometimes due to Muslims and sometimes due to others.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the fact is that Muslim people are not really living according to Islamic

⁵⁷ Al-Quran, Chapter 8, Verse 60.

⁵⁸ Al-Quran, Chapter 8, Verse 61.

⁵⁹ Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol. 4, Book 55, Hadith 552.

⁶⁰ Diwani, "Some Western Misconceptions about Islam," January 2003.

principles.⁶¹ The wars amongst Muslim-populated countries ruled by Muslim rulers have been a source of invitation to other countries and nations to wage war against Muslims. One of the reasons being that their unity became doubtful over decades after the death of Prophet Muhammad when Muslims started getting divided into what is called today the different sects of Islam; Sunni (Hanbali, Maliki, Shaafi, Hanafi) and Shia (Twelvers, Ismaili, Zaidi). The Muslim world is not homogenous and unified, which goes against the teachings of Islam. The division of religion into different sects is prohibited as the Qur'an says, "Surely they who divided their religion into parts and became sects, you have no concern with them; their affair is only with Allah, then He will inform them of what they did."⁶²

From "First Fitna" (the first Islamic Civil War that brought about the split between Shiites and Sunnis viewed as ultimate religious horror)⁶³ and "Second Fitna" (the second Islamic Civil War that permanently separated the Shiites and the Sunnis)⁶⁴ to the modern day Iran-Iraq War and Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, Islamic history is full of examples where Muslims have been aggressed, killed and assassinated by other Muslims on political matters. Per David Whittaker in his book published in 2002, "Muslims are fighting Muslims in two out of three of the world's present thirty-two conflicts."⁶⁵ Whereas, the stance of Islamic teachings on this matter is clear from the Hadith of Prophet Muhammad when some people asked him, "Whose Islam is the best? He replied, one who avoids harming the Muslims with his tongue and hands."⁶⁶

It is a fact that in the Islamic world the majority of the population is Muslim; however, very few have governments that exist and rule according to the true Islamic

⁶¹ Diwani, "Some Western Misconceptions about Islam," January 2003.

⁶² Al-Quran, Chapter 6, Verse 159.

⁶³ Avishai Margalit, *On Compromise and Rotten Compromises* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 166.

⁶⁴ John L. Esposito, ed., *The Oxford History of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.

⁶⁵ David J. Whittaker, *Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat* (London, Pearson Education Limited, 2002), 95.

⁶⁶ Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 2, Hadith 10.

principles and allow an authentic Islamic life.⁶⁷ The Islamist movements call for an Islamic way of life. Governments with secular tendencies, which often are backed by the West which fears Islam, repress them. Some of the repressed Islamists resort to “terrorism,” to express themselves.⁶⁸ This has always been the case in Islam and with Muslims historically criticizing Islam.

E. MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT ISLAM

Muslims do not “hate our freedom,” but rather, they hate our policies.⁶⁹

Is Islam a threat to the West?⁷⁰ Many in the West believe so.⁷¹ At the same time, many in the Muslim world distrust the West.⁷² The author argues it is not only the West that thinks of Islam as a threat to their community. Current violence in the name of Islam is an equal threat to Muslim countries like Pakistan, where terrorism acts are a daily occurrence. In the West, as well as in most Muslim countries, it is a common notion to label those who adhere to the tenets of Islam as part of a radical fringe, while those who have become more assimilated are given approval.⁷³ As a result, even today’s Muslims remain in a constant state of confusion as to what is right and what is wrong.⁷⁴ This image has been developed due to nothing other than stereotyping and problems of perception between both spheres. Here, the mass media portray many erroneous or one-sided images that misrepresent the West in the Islamic world and the Islamic world in the

⁶⁷ Diwani, “Some Western Misconceptions about Islam,” January 2003.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, September 2004 (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, D.C.), <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA428770.pdf>, (accessed on November 8, 2010), 40.

⁷⁰ John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* 3rd ed. (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1999).

⁷¹ Robert Spencer, ed., *The Myth of Islamic Tolerance: How Islamic Law Treats Non-Muslims* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2005).

⁷² Craig Charney and Nicole Yakatan, *A New Beginning: Strategies for a Fruitful Dialogue with the Muslim World* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005).

⁷³ Ahmad Yousif, review of *Islamic Values in the United States: A Comparative Study*, by Yvonne Yazbek Haddad and Adair T. Lummis, *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 10:2, 260.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

West.⁷⁵ Islam and Muslims are depicted as peaceful if the following words are used: ally, understanding, friend, legitimate, peace, sympathy and moral. Islam and Muslims are depicted as violent if they threaten war or if the following words are used: terrorist, extremist, enemy, guerilla, immoral, oppress, and violence.⁷⁶

These are the actions of others, which go against Islam or the West, but there are certain actions of Muslims themselves that go against Islam or downgrade the image of Islam globally. The most important amongst them is the lack of knowledge about religion in terms of understanding the Qur'an and Hadith correctly. In addition to this, other misperceptions present on both sides create difficulties between the Muslim world and the West. On the Muslims side, they contend that the Western countries are comprised of mostly hard-line Christians and that they practice no other religion than Christianity. In addition, Western policies are perceived as seeking to exploit the region's resources to dominate the Middle East through armed conflict.⁷⁷ On the Western side, the most common misconception includes the belief that all Muslims are the same, including extremists. This was obvious when the United States and the European Union refused to negotiate with the newly elected Hamas leaders because the Hamas party is largely perceived as a terrorist group in the West.⁷⁸ Meanwhile, Palestinians perceive Americans to be anti-democratic in light of their refusal to accept the result of free elections. Another all too common misperception about Islam is the image of the typical Muslim woman wearing the veil, forced to stay home, and forbidden to drive. Although some Muslim countries may have laws that oppress women, this

⁷⁵ Kai Hafez, "The West and Islam in the Mass Media: Cornerstones for a New International Culture of Communication in the 21st Century," (Discussion Paper presented at the Center for European Integration Studies, Bonn, Germany, 2000).

⁷⁶ Robert Stone, "Race, Faith and Fear: General Press and Black Press Coverage of Arabs, Muslims and the Stigma of Terrorism in the United States," (Master's thesis, May 2006), 44–45.

⁷⁷ Dr. Mathieu Gudere and Dr. Newton Howard, "The Clash of Perceptions," *Center for Advanced Defense Studies*, March 2006, 7.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

should not be seen as coming from Islam as a whole.⁷⁹ Many of these countries do not rule by any kind of “*Shari'ah*” (Islamic law), as they introduce their own cultural standpoints on the issue of gender equity.⁸⁰

Whether in Palestine, Afghanistan or Iraq, considering these misperceptions requires integrating Muslim percepts and concepts in the contemporary principles of democratic governance.⁸¹ For the source of deadlocks in the Muslim world are not so much the very principles of liberty or democratic participation, but rather the lack of an adaptation of these principles to the perception of local populations. Islam’s “*shura*” (counsel) concept, for example, began in the times of Prophet Muhammad and is perceived by Muslims as the equivalent to democratic counsel (elections).⁸²

Today, one of the most influential misconceptions about Islam is the concept about Jihad and the spreading of Islam by the sword, which has given roots to the rising terrorism across the globe. Islam has always given respect and freedom of religion to all faiths. Quranic misperceptions begin with reading and trying to understand verses in a stand-alone position instead of the whole context and reason of revelation of a particular verse on a particular occasion. Moreover, for any given verse in the Qur'an, one can find thousands of different interpretations according to the mindset of the person applying it. Whereas, the interpretation must be in accordance to the complete context of the revealed verse and applied with logic and knowledge in contrast to the present day. Not knowing the “*Asbab-ul-Nazool*,” reason of revelation of a particular verse and applying it in a correct form to a specific situation may alter the true picture of Islam, which is the case today where verses about “*Jihad*” are easily misinterpreted by extremists in order to continue with their agenda.

As discussed earlier, one knows there are only “*five pillars of Islam*” and their importance. Although not in the list of pillars of Islam, some religious authorities have

⁷⁹ Huma Ahmad, “Top Ten Misconceptions About Islam,” at <http://www.jannah.org/articles/misc.html> (accessed on October 22, 2010).

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Dr. Gudiere and Dr. Howard, “The Clash of Perceptions,” 8.

⁸² Dr. Gudiere and Dr. Howard, “The Clash of Perceptions,” 8.

given an unofficial status to “*Jihad*” as virtually being the “*sixth pillar*.”⁸³ This word has become well known in English because of the contemporary political situation and the focus of the media on violence.⁸⁴ Hence, a bit more attention has to be paid to it than would be warranted if one was simply looking at the role that Jihad plays in Islam (discussed in the next section in detail).⁸⁵ The Qur’anic usage of the term “Jihad” is far broader than the political use of the term might imply.

The information society today is overburdened with massive, simultaneous data circulating in several languages on the same critical subjects, in this case Islam and terrorism. These data often contains strategic information and reflect perceptions relevant on both the local and global levels.⁸⁶ However, the vast amount of information transferred hinders real-time evaluation of the data and evolution of the perceptions they contain. Therefore, trivial information must be distinguished from essential information for better decision making in winning the hearts and minds of the people.⁸⁷

F. CONCEPT OF JIHAD IN ISLAM

But if the enemy inclines towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in Allah: for He is One that heareth and knoweth (all things).

The Qur'an, 8:61

Jihad should be practiced in Islam. The question is what kind of “*Jihad*” should Muslims practice? While Islam in general is misunderstood in the Western world, perhaps no other Islamic term evokes such strong reactions as the word *Jihad*.⁸⁸ The definition of Jihad in Encyclopedia Britannica is unfortunately negative because it states

⁸³ Reuven Firestone, *An Introduction to Islam for Jews* (Philadelphia, The Jewish Publication Society, 2008), 176.

⁸⁴ Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittck, *The Vision of Islam* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2006), 20.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Dr. Gudiere and Dr. Howard, “The Clash of Perceptions,” 9.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Islamic Concept of Jihad, Holy War?
<http://www.whyyislam.org/Jihad/JihadFAQs/IslamicConceptofJihadHolyWar/tabid/115/Default.aspx>
(accessed on October 17, 2010).

Jihad as a “struggle” or “battle,” a religious duty imposed on Muslims to spread Islam by waging war.⁸⁹ The word *Jihad* is mistranslated as “*Holy War*”; however, in Arabic the equivalent of “*Holy War*” is “*harb-u-muqadasah*.”⁹⁰ This term is not found in any verse of the Qur’an. Nothing in Islamic sources permits a Muslim to fight against non-Muslims solely based on them being non-Muslims. The word Jihad comes from the root word “*juhd*,” which means “to struggle” or “to strive.”⁹¹ At the individual level, Jihad primarily refers to the inner struggle of being a person of virtue and submitting to God in all aspects of life.⁹² According to Islamic scholars, the meaning of Jihad is also to exert and spend energy, effort and strength to attain success and excellence as well as to overcome obstacles and challenges that threaten peace and harmony needed in order to glorify Allah’s religion—Islam.⁹³ The word “*Jihad*” from the language point of view means “utmost striving to achieve a desired goal or to abstain from despicable acts.” Jihad can also mean a particular effort to achieve goodness and avoid evil. In his article Ustaz Haji Ali Haji mentions:

“Imam Raghīb Al-Asfahani, an expert Islamic scholar on the Qur’anic interpretation, in his dictionary of the Qur’an, *Mu’jan Mufradat Alfadzh Al-Qur’an*, categorizes Jihad as mentioned in the Qur’an into three meanings:

- 1) Struggle against a clear enemy,
- 2) Struggle against Satan, and
- 3) Struggle against Nafs (Oneself)”⁹⁴

⁸⁹ Encyclopedia Britannica, “Islam,” <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/303857/jihad> (accessed on October 21, 2010).

⁹⁰ Michael G. Knapp, “The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam,” *Parameters* (Spring 2003): 82–94.

⁹¹ Yoginder Sikand, “The Concept of Jihad in Islam,” *Indian Muslims*, (October 9, 2008), <http://indianmuslims.in/the-concept-of-jihad-in-islam/> (accessed on October 17, 2010).

⁹² T Husayn, *Islam: A Religion of Terror?* (Birmingham: Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith, 2007).

⁹³ Ustaz Haji Ali Haji Mohammad, “Understanding Jihad.” http://www.rrg.sg/edisi/data/Understanding_jihad.pdf (accessed on October 18, 2010).

⁹⁴ Ibid.

There are many kinds of “*Jihad*,” and most have nothing to do with warfare. For example, “*Jihad of heart*” denotes a struggle against one’s own sinful inclinations, while “*Jihad of the tongue*” requires speaking on behalf of good and forbidding evil.⁹⁵ According to a Hadith of Prophet Muhammad, “The best *Jihad* is (speaking) a word of justice to a tyrannical ruler.”⁹⁶ Once, a man came to the Prophet Muhammad asking his permission to take part in Jihad and the Prophet Muhammad asked him, “Are your parents alive?” He replied in the affirmative. The Prophet Muhammad said to him, “Then exert yourself in their service.”⁹⁷

1. Types of Jihad

Jihad is divided into two types, i.e., the “*lesser Jihad*” and the “*greater Jihad*.” Jihad on the battlefield is in reality the “*lesser Jihad*.” The Qur’an has decreed those governments or those with the highest authority and not individuals can only declare defensive wars. In history, defensive wars only took place after the Prophet Muhammad had already established a government in Medina. In the Prophet Muhammad’s time, defensive wars were only launched on disbelievers or hypocrites who openly showed their animosity towards Muslims. Jihad against one’s lower self is a huge struggle for every Muslim. The Prophet Muhammad was sent by Allah to be a “mercy for all the worlds” and his mission was to perfect the human character. Hence, the “*greater Jihad*” is to strive to better ourselves with virtuous deeds and to avoid evil ones.⁹⁸

In Islam “*rules of engagement*” for Jihad in the battlefield are very clear. The Qur’an cautions Muslims to observe these rules strictly: “Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors.”⁹⁹ In the same context, the Prophet Muhammad said, “Do not kill women or children or aged, infirm person. Do not cut down fruit bearing trees. Do not destroy an inhabited

⁹⁵ Reuven Firestone, *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.

⁹⁶ Sunan Abudawud, Book 37, Hadith 4330.

⁹⁷ Sahih Al-Bukhari, Book 52, Hadith 248.

⁹⁸ Ustaz Haji Ali Haji Mohammed, “Understanding Jihad,” 3.

⁹⁹ Al Qur’an, Chapter 2, Verse 190.

place...”¹⁰⁰ Now, one can contemplate the fact that if Allah has given such rules for the “lesser Jihad” then how specific would the rules for “greater Jihad” be?

2. Categories of Jihad

Imam Ibnul Qayyim has mentioned in his book *Zad Al-Ma’ad* that there are thirteen kinds of Jihad, which are categorized into four categories.¹⁰¹

a. Jihad An-Nafs

This stage requires a Muslim to make efforts to educate and mold himself/herself to become a person who is disciplined, well bred and able to serve and contribute to self, family, community, nation and religion. *Jihad* against oneself is divided into four steps:

- (1) Learn–Study Islam and all other knowledge linked to it.
- (2) Practice–After learning with conviction, the knowledge should be applied.
- (3) Perform Missionary Work–The struggle to spread the knowledge to the rest of the community.
- (4) Sincerity and Patience–Jihad in being patient with the difficulties in performing missionary work and doing it sincerely only for the sake of Allah.

b. Jihad Against Satan

This type of *Jihad* is of the following two levels/categories:

- (1) Jihad to reject the call of Satan who incites one to commit sins and instills doubt in the faith.
- (2) Jihad to reject evil desires, temptations and lust.

¹⁰⁰ Al Muwatta Hadith, Book 21, Hadith 21.3.10.

¹⁰¹ Ustaz Haji Ali Haji Mohammed, “Understanding Jihad,” 5.

c. *Jihad Against Oppressors, Evil-Doers*

This type of Jihad is of the following three levels/categories:

- (1) Jihad with the hand, if one is not able;
- (2) Jihad with the tongue, if one is not able;
- (3) Jihad with the heart.

d. *Jihad Against Disbelievers*

Struggle to fight those who reject God and make clear enemies of Muslims. It can be done via four ways:

- (1) Fortification of the Heart (Spirit)–To fortify their faith from being easily swayed by charm and charisma of disbelievers.
- (2) Virtue of Tongue–To engage in meaningful debates or dialogue sessions to eradicate ignorance and address accusations.
- (3) Wealth–To stabilize the wealth and economy of Muslims so that poverty cannot be used as a tool for disbelievers to manipulate their faiths.
- (4) Pursuit of Knowledge–To gain knowledge as a lifelong effort to upgrade the knowledge and technological capabilities of Muslims.

3. Jihad–The Misconceptions

There are a number of misconceptions about Jihad prevailing amongst Muslims as well as nonMuslims. A few are mentioned below as described by Zamir Akhtar Khan:¹⁰²

- a. The most common misconception regarding “Jihad” has been created by Muslims themselves as many Muslim scholars have erroneously declared “Jihad” synonymous with “Qital” (war) which has provided an opportunity to radical Muslims as well as nonMuslims (West) to exploit the sacred term of “Jihad” and associate it with violence only.
- b. The point to ponder is that there is a basic principle of linguistics that no two words of a language are the same. Further, “Jihad” and “Qital” are two independent terms that are frequently being used in the Qur’an, and it is wrong to consider both as synonymous to each other, as the Qur’an says in Chapter 61 (As-Saff [The Ranks, Battle Array]): “Surely Allah loves those who fight in His way in ranks as if they were a firm compact wall.”¹⁰³

¹⁰² Zamir Akhtar Khan, “Concept of Jihad in Islam,” *The Dialogue*, Vol. III, Number 2, 168–190.

¹⁰³ Al-Qur’an, Chapter 61, Verses 4, for further details see Verse 11.

- c. Another misconception regarding “Jihad” has been developed with reference to its position in “*Sharia*” (Islamic Law). It has been declared as “Farz-e-Kifayah” (nonobligatory duty) whereas it is “Farz-e-Ayn” (an obligatory duty—as discussed earlier in this section of the chapter about types and categories of Jihad). Actually, it is Qital, which is “Farz-e-Kifayah.” When a Muslim government openly declares war and urges all Muslims to join it then Qital becomes “Farz-e-Ayn” (similar to most European countries where temporary military service after WW-II was obligatory for all citizens). Under normal circumstances, Qital is not imperative duty (Farz-e-Ayn). During the rule of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, volunteers were required to participate in a battle. After the required number had reported to the battlefield, the rest were absolved of this responsibility.
- d. Considering “Jihad” and “Qital” as identical concepts resulted in confusion and one of the basic terms of Islam was totally distorted and lost its significance in the entire system of Islam. Misinterpretation of “Jihad” ultimately blurred the most sacred duty towards Allah. The tyrant Muslim rulers known as monarchs indulged in futile wars just to extort revenue or expand their empires. These too were considered “Jihad Fe Sabilillah” (an integral part of real faith and a pressing need for salvation in the life hereafter). The Muslim monarchs had nothing to do with a just Islamic system. They waged wars only for worldly gains. Consequently, the most sacred term “Jihad” was badly profound.

During the course of research, it becomes evident that there is a wide gap of understanding about Islam as a whole between many Muslim countries. As different sects of Islam historically had interpreted laws, beliefs and teachings to suit their agendas, in the same way so-called religious scholars today from respective countries continue to mold young and fresh minds with misconceptions about Islamic teachings in general and Jihad in particular, causing the uproar of incumbent terrorism in the world. As commented by Noman Benotman (leader of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group—or LIFG) in an interview after issuing the *Corrective Studies*:

Muslims should theorize and understand Jihad (war and peace) based on the contemporary phase. That is why I believe the departure point is international relations studies, so we can utilize the knowledge compilation developed by humanity to discuss how to regulate, control, and establish laws and rules for war.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ Frank J. Cilluffo and F. Jordan Evert, “Reflections on Jihad: A Former Leader’s Perspective,” *Homeland Security Institute*, (October 16, 2009).

According to Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, there are clear verses that clarify the Qur’anic versions of war and argue for a rational exchange of ideas, freedom of choice in worship, leaving the judgment of others to Allah.¹⁰⁵ However, the stereotype of some Westerners is that the goal of Muslims is to convert the entire world through “*Jihad*,” which is actually far from the truth. Conversion to Islam by the sword is not a reasonable expectation; instead, the acceptance of Islam should be the result of free will.¹⁰⁶ As the Qur’an says, “Invite (mankind, O Muhammad) to the way of your Lord with wisdom, reason and clear intentions...”¹⁰⁷

G. ISLAM IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA

Islamic attitudes towards state and society has always been in the main religious teachings of the Qur’an of monotheism “*tauhid*”; Prophet Muhammad “*risalah*” and life after death “*akhirah*”; and the related moral values and social principles of mercy “*rahmah*,” justice “*adl*,” fraternity “*ikhwah*” and community “*ummah*,” and have been interpreted and applied variedly in history.¹⁰⁸ Prophet Muhammad explained all the rules “*ahkam*” or information that would be applicable to all kinds of life styles and scientific and technical changes and circumstances, which would emerge until the end of the world.¹⁰⁹ The scholars who understand these teachings and pass on to other generations are the “*mujtahids*.” Scholars who came later learned how these teachings could be applied to new circumstances and wrote them in their books of “*tafsir*” (exegesis of the Qur’an) and “*fiqh*” (branch of Islamic knowledge teaching Islam’s tenets on practices).¹¹⁰ Therefore, an argument in the scholarly world exists about people who

¹⁰⁵ Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, “Islamic Rulings on Warfare,” *US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute*, (October 2004).

¹⁰⁶ Mahmud Shaltut, “The Koran and Fighting,” as translated by Rudolph Peters from *al-Qur’an wa-al-qital*, Cairo: Matba’at al-Nasr and Maktab Ittihad al-Sharq, 1948; and Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-‘Arabi, 1951, in Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam*, Princeton: Markus Weiner, 1996, 69, 70, 79.

¹⁰⁷ Al-Qur’an, Chapter 16, Verses 125.

¹⁰⁸ Imtiyaz Yusuf, “Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand,” *Working Paper East-West Center*, Washington, (March 2007), 2.

¹⁰⁹ Muhammad Hadimi, *Ethics of Islam* (Istanbul, Waqf Ikhlas Publications, 2001), 45.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

propose the necessity of modifying the religion by adding new things are enemies of Islam.¹¹¹ However, it is quite possible that sometimes the Qur'an and Hadith will not offer solutions to the evolving complex problems of society with the passage of time. In such cases, Muslim leaders and scholars have the option of "*ijtihad*" (independent thinking) to resolve the emerging problems of societies, but within the parameters of Islamic values regarding equality, justice, compassion, honesty, sincerity, integrity, truth, transparency, accountability, impartiality, chastity and modesty as enjoined in the Qur'an.¹¹²

Following the teachings of Islam is like a balancing act about how Muslims themselves understand their religion in contemporary as well as historical times. As Carl W. Ernst focuses on two critical issues; first, the erroneous Western tendency of assuming that fundamentalists are the "true" representatives of Islam, and, second, the importance of recognizing the part colonialism has played in shaping contemporary developments in the Muslim world.¹¹³ He also gives his view of how Islam might be reimagined in the twenty-first century to create a dialogue between Muslims and nonMuslims and disempower those on both sides who wish to promote the idea of a clash of civilizations.¹¹⁴ Past solutions are implemented to address contemporary problems with the consensus of people of the same faith, based on the authority of tradition.¹¹⁵

Islam as a total way of life is also a culture that has developed over the centuries as an elaborate system of laws and customs by which Muslims are expected to abide.¹¹⁶ Besides the religious laws, legislation includes all areas of political, social, economic and personal life down to the minutest detail. These laws are seen by most as divinely

¹¹¹ Muhammad Hadimi, *Ethics of Islam* (Istanbul, Waqf Ikhlas Publications, 2001), 45.

¹¹² Shah Manzoor Alam, "Challenges to Islam in the Contemporary Period," (Edinburgh), at <http://www.ummulkitab.com/images/ctip.pdf> (accessed on October 22, 2010).

¹¹³ Amira K. Bennison, review of *Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World*, by Carl W. Ernst, *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 21, Issue 3, 155–156.

¹¹⁴ Bennison, review of *Following Muhammad: Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World*, 155–156.

¹¹⁵ Sherko Kirmanj, "The Relationship between Traditional and Contemporary Islamist Political Thought," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 2008), 70.

¹¹⁶ Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, "Muslims in Canada: A Preliminary Study," in *Religion and Ethnicity*, eds. Harold Coward and Leslie Kawamura (Ontario, Canada, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1978), 76.

revealed; therefore, they remain valid for all Muslims at all times in all places.¹¹⁷ Presently, Islam is transiting through a vital period in history where its application in today's world is challenged every day.¹¹⁸

Inspired by Quranic vision Muslim scientists made phenomenal contributions to the advancement of knowledge in mainly science and technology from the ninth to the thirteenth century.¹¹⁹ Muslim scientists established hospitals, astronomical observatories and scientific laboratories, and introduced new technologies such as paper, gunpowder, and glass production.¹²⁰ They also made discoveries in the fields of optics, blood circulation and human embryology, and furthermore, transferred these technologies, institutions, and scientific discoveries to the West and laid the foundation for the scientific and technological revolution in Western Europe.¹²¹

The scientific research by Islamic scholars had an opposing effect with the destruction of an astronomical observatory (established by astronomer Taqi al-Din) in Istanbul by Muslim extremists in the early sixteenth century.¹²² Islamic scientific research during Muslim empires of that period was severely affected by these violent extremist activities; hence, further research and development by Islamic scientists could not be progressed.¹²³ Therefore, educational institutions as well as “*madrasas*” in the Muslim world, which were the centers of scientific research, started losing their status and credibility. This may be considered the turning point where progress of Islamic realm started to preclude and shut the door on “*ijtihad*,” which was the means to the continuation of progressive Islamic character.¹²⁴ It is through the institution of “*ijtihad*”

¹¹⁷ Haddad, “Muslims in Canada,” 76

¹¹⁸ Alam, “Challenges to Islam in the Contemporary Period,” (Edinburgh).

¹¹⁹ Manzoor Alam, *War on Terrorism or American Strategy for Global Dominance: Islamic Perspective on the Afghan-Iraq War* (New York, Vantage Press Inc., 2009), 386.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Alam, “Challenges to Islam in the Contemporary Period,” (Edinburgh).

¹²² H. J. J. Winter, “Persian Sciences in Safavid Times,” in *The Cambridge History of Iran Volume 6*, eds. Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986), 589–91.

¹²³ Alam, “Challenges to Islam in the Contemporary Period,” (Edinburgh).

¹²⁴ Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, *Ijtihad: Meanings, Application and Scope* (Lahore, Minhaj-ul-Quran Publications, 2007), 21–22.

that attainment of aims of Islam is not only possible but is also actualized.¹²⁵ “*Madrasas*” however continued, exclusively as institutes for religious education.¹²⁶

Islamic teachings were and are not only about religious education; instead, they also deal with complete code of conduct of every individual for the prosperity and development of a better society governed by the best people.¹²⁷ It is a historical fact that Islam is compatible with democracy. The real question is not whether Islam is compatible with democracy, but what kind of democracy will serve better for prosperity and welfare of the people?¹²⁸ John L. Esposito argues that “Islamic movements have internalized the democratic discourse through the concepts of “*shura*” the consultation, “*ijma*” the consensus and “*ijtihad*” independent interpretive judgment.”¹²⁹ Today, in the West this is commonly known as democracy and has been a feature of the Quranic injunctions and prophetic traditions “*Hadith*” since the Qur’an and Prophet Muhammad do not stipulate any specific form of government or political system.¹³⁰ However, norms of good governance outlined in Islam are applicable to all forms of government starting from monarchical, “*Khilafat*,” dictatorship or democracy.¹³¹ This clearly demonstrates the universality of Islamic values and today can be seen in Malaysia and Turkey.

The supremacy of colonial powers over Muslim countries after the demise of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War (1914–18) is also a contributing factor to why

¹²⁵ Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, *Ijtihad: Meanings, Application and Scope* (Lahore, Minhaj-ul-Quran Publications, 2007), 21–22.

¹²⁶ Jamal Malik, *Madrasas in South Asia: Teaching Terror?* (New York, Routledge Publishers, 2008), 7.

¹²⁷ Khurshid Ahmad, “Islam: Basic Principles and Characteristics,” available at <http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Articles/ageedah/bpsc.html> (accessed on November 2, 2010).

¹²⁸ Dipankar Banerjee, D. Suba Chandran and Sonali Huria, ed., “Radical Islam & Democracy: Indian and Southeast Asian Experiences,” conference report organized by IPCS & KAS, available at http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/GoaConf-Report-Edited.pdf (accessed on November 1, 2010).

¹²⁹ John O. Voll and John L. Esposito, “Islam’s Democratic Essence,” *Middle East Quarterly*, September 1994, 7–8.

¹³⁰ Dr. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, *The Islamic State: True Concepts and Eradicating Misconceptions* (Lahore, Minhaj-ul-Quran Publications, 2006), 1.

¹³¹ Alam, “Challenges to Islam in the Contemporary Period,” (Edinburgh).

Muslims have fallen back today.¹³² After gaining independence, in the post-colonial era (1945 onward), Muslim countries continued with the dichotomy of religious and secular institutions, and until to date could not bring into alignment the revealed and coherent sources of knowledge, eventually losing their uniqueness and originality. Instead, they resorted to follow the West and became dependent on the borrowed knowledge. These effects were snowballed when ruling elites in most Muslim countries failed to invest sufficiently in the advancements of science and technology.

Today, the world seems to see some of the Muslim countries, especially the Middle East, with enormous oil wealth but not utilizing it to the benefit of human capital by investing in or promoting science and technology. Moreover, the notion of being oil-producing countries has indulged these countries in luxuries including imported goods. They also invest in developing pleasure resorts, high-rise luxury hotels, and appear to be more interested in breeding horses for races than in establishing research institutes in science and technology.¹³³ They are thus pursuing an investment policy exactly opposite to what Arab rulers and nobles did from the ninth century to the thirteenth century. Due to such acts of Muslims today, Mumtaz Kazi describes the future challenges faced by Islam and Muslim countries:

In redefining the priorities for the future, Muslim intellectuals have great responsibility because it is only through the power and potential of knowledge, wisdom and skill and by no other method or means that they would be able to regain the right for Muslim community to live as a self-reliant, equal and truly sovereign people, masters of their resources and destiny.¹³⁴

¹³² William J. Bernstein, *The Birth of Plenty: How the Prosperity of the Modern World was Created* (USA, McGraw-Hill Companies Inc., 2004), 274–75.

¹³³ Alam, “Challenges to Islam in the Contemporary Period,” (Edinburgh).

¹³⁴ Mumtaz A. Kazi, “The Challenge Facing the World of Islam for the Twenty First Century,” *Journal of Islamic Academy of Sciences*, vol. 7, No. 1, 1994, 1.

III. DEFINING TERRORISM

Terrorism is the war of the poor and war is the terrorism of the rich.

Sir Peter Ustinov (1921–2004)

A. FOCUSING ON THE TERM AND ACT OF “TERRORISM”

In the previous chapter, an endeavor was made to explain in detail an understanding of the religion of Islam. In this chapter, however, the author will examine one of the most written and spoken about terms in every facet of life today—“*terrorism*.” The word terrorism, placed alphabetically towards the end of a dictionary, has jumped today to the first sentence of every article, newspaper, thesis and speech. Terrorism as a term and act both never was so dynamic and significant as it is today due to its impact, which is so great that it has changed the history and geography of the world at the same time. Ripples of its effect have even reached international relations, politics, world policies and the domestically controlled environment of many countries including security issues across the globe.

The term terrorism has given new meaning to illegal acts and trickled the minds of criminals in a way that they come up with new strategies and tactics with every passing day. Acts of terrorism are so compatible that they attach or combine with personal grievances, national rage, daily life, ever-advancing technology and even religion. As put by Glenn Greenwald:

Terrorism is simultaneously the single most meaningless and most manipulated word in the American political lexicon. The term now has virtually nothing to do with the act itself and everything to do with the identity of the actor, especially his or her religious identity.¹³⁵

1. Evolution of the Term “Terrorism”

Terrorism as a phenomenon has existed since centuries. In the first century A.D., the Roman province of Judaea was plagued by the hit-and-run terrorism of the Zealots

¹³⁵ Glenn Greenwald, *Terrorism: The Most Meaningless and Manipulated Word*, http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/02/19/terrorism (accessed November 4, 2010).

who had nationalistic and religious elements in their activities.¹³⁶ The modern day term “terrorism” comes from the French word “terrorisme” in the eighteenth century based on the Latin word language verbs “terrere” (to frighten) and “deterrene” (to frighten from).¹³⁷ It dates to 1795 and originally used to describe the actions of Jacobins in their rule of post-revolutionary France, the so-called “reign of terror.”¹³⁸ Systematic terrorism began in the second half of the nineteenth century and there were several quite distinct categories of it from the very beginning.¹³⁹ The term “terrorism” was apparently used for the first time in an international penal instrument at the Third (Brussels) International Conference for the Unification of Penal Law held on June 26–30, 1930, a reflection of an increase in terrorist activity following World War I.¹⁴⁰

It was not until 1934, following the assassination of French statesmen Jean-Louis Barthou and King Alexander of Yugoslavia, that terrorism entered the international agenda.¹⁴¹ This event persuaded the League of Nations, comprised of twenty-four states, in 1937 to adopt the first convention on terrorism—the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (CPPT).¹⁴² During World War II, terrorism was more often deployed in a supporting role for certain resistance movements.¹⁴³ A few decades later, terrorism incidents, methods and intensity grew with the passage of time, and a number of incidents marked their position in the history of terrorism. In 1968, Latin American insurgents launched their so-called urban guerilla strategy. The kidnapping

¹³⁶ Whittaker, *Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat*, 13.

¹³⁷ Edward Halibozeck, Gerald L. Kovacich and Andrew Jones, *The Corporate Security Professional's Handbook on Terrorism* (Oxford, Elsevier Inc. 2008), 3.

¹³⁸ John F. Murphy, “Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out of the Quagmire,” in *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights Volume 19, 1989*, ed. Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory (Norwell, MA, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 14.

¹³⁹ Walter Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism* (New Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 2009), 11.

¹⁴⁰ Thomas M. Franck and Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., “Preliminary Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism,” *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 68, No. 1 (January, 1974), 69–90.

¹⁴¹ Joel Cavicchia, “The Prospects for an International Criminal Court in the 1990s,” *Dickinson Journal of International Law*, 223, 225 (1992).

¹⁴² *Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism*, (1938) 19 League of Nations Official Journal 23.

¹⁴³ Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda* (Los Angeles, California, University of California Press, 2007), 97.

and killing of eleven Olympic competitors at Munich in 1972 resulted in a more narrowly focused approach towards terrorism by the United States.¹⁴⁴ In 1983, suicide bombings in Beirut became the cause of a significant development in international terrorism at the time. In 1991, there was the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a suicide bomber, and the first attack on the World Trade Center occurred in 1993. In the year 2000, there was a suicide attack against the United State Navy destroyer *USS Cole*. The World Trade Center attack in 2001 that brought down both the towers is considered as the final evolutionary stage of classical terrorism.¹⁴⁵ In 2002 and 2005, there were the Bali bombings and over a thousand terrorist incidents in Pakistan alone since 2001 speaks for the evolution of terrorism.¹⁴⁶ The last two decades of the twentieth century and the beginning years of a new century reveal more than ever the difficulty of trying to define terrorism.¹⁴⁷

2. Defining Terrorism

Unfortunately, defining “modern” terrorism is not quite as easy as demarcating its origins. No definition of terrorism can possibly cover all the varieties of terrorism that have appeared throughout history.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, the search for an adequate definition of terrorism is still on. The technical difficulty plaguing the actual definition of this concept is because most terrorists’ activities are often times cloaked in religious or political façade.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, to compound the confusion further, some guerillas and freedom fighters are called terrorists, if they deliberately and specifically select civilians as targets of violence in pursuit of their religious and political intentions.¹⁵⁰ The standard dictionary definition for terrorism is the use of force or violence to accomplish political motives of change, often against an authority, or the state of fear from the use of

¹⁴⁴ Murphy, “Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out of the Quagmire,” 15.

¹⁴⁵ Chaliand and Blin, *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda*, 223.

¹⁴⁶ RAND Corporation, “Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents,” A RAND National Defense Research Institute Project, <http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search.php> (accessed on November 6, 2010).

¹⁴⁷ Whittaker, *Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat*, 20.

¹⁴⁸ Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism*, 7.

¹⁴⁹ Eluma Lkemefuna Sylls, *Terrorism: A Global Scourge* (Bloomington: Author House, 2007), 10.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

terrorism. However, the definition takes its toll on the fact that it is widely used by terrorists groups, media, politicians, military and law enforcement agencies, and everybody considers the definition according to their environment and perspective.

The difficulty of providing a precise definition is greatly compounded by the fact that the word is politically and emotionally charged.¹⁵¹ There is a considerable debate among scholars over how terrorism is to be defined and distinguished from other forms of violence, such as armed robbery or nation-state warfare.¹⁵² A number of different definitions exist in different countries and departments and their respective counterterrorism policies are shaped based on these definitions. Even inside the U.S. government, different departments and agencies use different definitions reflecting different professional perspectives on the subject.¹⁵³

Terrorism expert Walter Laqueur has counted over 100 definitions and concludes that the “only general characteristic generally agreed upon is that terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence;”¹⁵⁴ for the purposes of this thesis, it is relevant to highlight a few of them. The current U.S. national security strategy defines terrorism as simply “premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocents.”¹⁵⁵ The Defense Department officially defines terrorism as the “calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹ Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto and Gwynn MacCarrick, “Typology of Conflict: Terrorism and the Ambiguation of the Laws of War,” <https://lawlib.wlu.edu/works/72-1.pdf> (accessed on November 6, 2010).

¹⁵² Edward Elgar, *Terrorism, Protest, and Power*, ed. Martin Warner and Roger Crisp (Aldershot Hants, England, Gower Publishing, 1990), 45.

¹⁵³ Bruce Hoffman, “Defining Terrorism,” in Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, eds., *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment* (Guilford, CT: McGraw Hill, 2003), 22.

¹⁵⁴ Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 6.

¹⁵⁵ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), 5.

¹⁵⁶ *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2001), 428.

The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism places similar emphasis on terrorism as a nonstate phenomenon directed against the state and society; terrorism is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents.”¹⁵⁷ A more specific definition can be found in Title 22 of the U.S. Code: “the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”¹⁵⁸ Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu (1987) has favored the following more simplistic but perhaps also more apt definition, “the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.”

The European Union defines terrorism for legal/official purposes in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002). It states that terrorist offences are certain criminal offences set out in a list comprised largely of serious offences against persons and property, which:

given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or to abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.¹⁵⁹

Whereas, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States, “terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”¹⁶⁰ However, going through many different logical and scholarly definitions explaining terrorism, the following definition is considered as covering all aspects. According to Professor Jeffrey Bale:

¹⁵⁷ *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, DC: The White House), February 2003, 1.

¹⁵⁸ Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656 f (d).

¹⁵⁹ Article 1 of the political agreement on the framework of decisions on combating terrorism, <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/dec/07terrdef.htm> (accessed on November 6, 2010).

¹⁶⁰ Schmid and Jongman, *Political Terrorism*, 32, for more definitions see pages 32–39.

The use or threaten the use of violence directed against victims selected for their symbolic or representative value, as a means of instilling anxiety in transmitting one of more messages to, and thereby manipulating the perceptions and behavior of wider target audiences.¹⁶¹

Extensive research by Alex Schmid originally in 1984 and updated in 2008 counted 109 definitions of terrorism that covered 22 different word categories or definitional elements.¹⁶² In this research, he extracted the frequency of the words used to define terrorism as shown in Table 1.

S No.	Element / Word	Frequency (%)
1	Violence, Force	83.5
2	Political	65
3	Fear, terror emphasized	51
4	Threat	47
5	(Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions	41.5
6	Victim-target differentiation	37.5
7	Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32
8	Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5

Table 1. Frequencies of Definitional Elements in 109 Definitions of Terrorism.¹⁶³

Even though there is no agreed-upon definition of terrorism, upon analyzing the Table 1 two common elements appear most frequently in the definitions: use of violence and political aim, which top the chart. Most scholarly and government definitions include the elements of violence and political agenda, which is sufficient to understand the causes of terrorism.

¹⁶¹ Jeffrey Bale, Professor at Naval Postgraduate School, "Introduction to Terrorism," January 2010.

¹⁶² Alex Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature* (New Brunswick, USA, Transaction Publishers, 2008), 5–6.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

Regardless of how difficult it is to define terrorism because it is influenced by the perspective and situations of the parties involved, in today's world, terrorism is real, present, and ever growing in terms of impact and magnitude. Prevailing definitions do not distinguish between terrorism and legitimate/internationally recognized freedom struggles, even when these are aimed at obtaining independence from foreign occupation. Palestine and Kashmir are glaring examples. Lack of definitional consensus impedes the study of terrorism, which is a necessary component of dealing with the phenomenon itself. According to Schmid and Jongman in their book *Political Terrorism*, certain issues in the definition of terrorism remain unresolved, such as:¹⁶⁴

1. The boundary between terrorism and other forms of political violence.
2. Whether terrorism can be defined without specifying the intent.
3. Whether government terrorism and resistance are part of the same phenomenon.
4. Separating terrorism from simple criminal acts, from open war between "consenting" groups, and from acts that clearly arise out of mental illness.
5. Political versus other types of terrorism.
6. Is terrorism a sub-category of coercion? Violence? Power? Influence?
7. Can terrorism be legitimate? What gains justify its use?
8. The relationship between guerilla warfare and terrorism.
9. The relationship between crime and terrorism.
10. The difference between terrorism and freedom struggle.

B. CAUSES OF TERRORISM

*The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the cause for which each fights.*¹⁶⁵

Yassir Arafat (1929–2004)

Experts have been studying terrorists and terrorist groups for a long time.¹⁶⁶ Though the results of their many studies are certainly interesting, no one has yet been

¹⁶⁴ Schmid and Jongman, *Political Terrorism*, (2008), 29–31.

¹⁶⁵ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 16.

¹⁶⁶ Kenneth M. Pollack, *A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for American in the Middle East* (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2009), 173.

able to develop a sophisticated psychological profile of the average terrorist.¹⁶⁷ Nor is there a consensus about the common traits terrorists follow.¹⁶⁸ The number of terrorists whom the experts have been able to observe is comparatively small.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, as they operate in secrecy and many prefer to die than be captured,¹⁷⁰ little opportunity is available to get much information that is able to pursue the answer to the question: what are the root causes of terrorism? What all is known is mostly based on very little first-hand information and the rest is either analyses of incidents or assumptions by the experts.

Terrorism has occurred throughout history for a variety of reasons and today there is a multitude of situations capable of provoking and continuing terrorism in the future. Its causes can be historical, cultural, political, social, psychological, economic, or religious or any combination of these.¹⁷¹ Terrorism, according to the Forsvarets Forsknings Institutt (FFI) Norwegian Defense Research Establishment survey:

can be found among deprived and uneducated people, and among the affluent and well educated; and also among psychotic and 'normal' healthy people; and among people of both sexes and of all ages. Terrorism occurs in rich as well as in poor countries; in the modern industrialized world and in less developed areas; during a process of transition and development, prior to or after such a process; in former colonial states and in independent ones; and, in established democracies as well as in less democratic regimes.¹⁷²

Most of the causes behind terrorism today remain unresolved and most of these causes have never been studied for understanding. Unfortunately, most of the strategies to fight against terrorism lack long-term solutions, such as trying to find out the root causes of terrorism and going after those causes in order to eliminate the justifications of

¹⁶⁷ Jerrold M. Post, "The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism," in *The Roots of Terrorism*, ed. Louise Richardson (New York: Routledge, 2006), 17.

¹⁶⁸ Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," *Foreign Policy* (September-October 2000), 68–69.

¹⁶⁹ Pollack, *A Path Out of the Desert*, 173.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ Harry Kawilarang, *Quotations on Terrorism* (Victoria, Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2004) iv.

¹⁷² Lia Brynjar and Skjølberg Katja, "Why Terrorism Occurs: A Survey of Theories and Hypotheses on the Causes of Terrorism," *Forsvarets Forsknings Institutt (FFI), Norwegian Defense Research Establishment* (May 30, 2000), 8.

terrorist organizations. Therefore, it is obvious that to eradicate a network of terrorists, their causes of violence need to be well known. According to the UN resolution of 1972, “measures to prevent international terrorism require study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievances and despair.”¹⁷³

Louis Richardson, a Harvard Professor, claims that there are two reasons why it is very difficult to explain the causes of terrorism. First, because there are so many terrorists: belonging to different nations, countries, religions, cultures and background that no single explanation fits all. Second, because there are so few terrorists: one cannot convincingly use meta explanations for micro phenomena. If poverty caused terrorism then there would be far more terrorists in poor countries than the actual number.¹⁷⁴ However, studying the literature one comes across multiple accounts of the causes of terrorism, as tabulated by Alex Schmid in his article “*Root Causes of Terrorism*.” However, for the purpose of this thesis only a few will be summarized.

1. Relative Deprivation and Inequality

The necessary precondition for violent civil conflict is perception of relative deprivation or inequality, which serves as the basic condition for participation in violence and can be defined as an actor’s perception of discrepancy between the value expectations and their environment’s apparent capabilities.¹⁷⁵ Structured inequalities within countries are breeding grounds for violent political movements in general and terrorism specifically.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ Charles W. Kegley, Jr., *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (Boston, Thomson Wadsworth, 2008), 438.

¹⁷⁴ Louise Richardson, “What Terrorists Want,” *Renner Institute* (July 4, 2007).

¹⁷⁵ Ted Robert Gurr, “Psychological Factors in Civil Violence,” *World Politics*, Vol. 20 (1968), 245–278.

¹⁷⁶ Ted Robert Gurr, “Economic Factor,” (paper presented at The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, Madrid, Spain, March 8–11, 2005), 20.

2. The Contagion Theory

The occurrence of terrorism in one country often leads directly or indirectly to more terrorism in neighboring countries with the mechanics of the diffusion process. Terrorists learn from one another, and new tactics are usually quickly emulated. Spillover across borders occurs in a variety of ways.¹⁷⁷

3. Democratization

It has been noted that totalitarian regimes rarely experience terrorism because of pervasive state control. Instead, states in democratic transition are more exposed to armed conflict and terrorism than democracies and autocracies. Increased democratization does not lead to a reduction in terrorism.¹⁷⁸

4. Political Regime and Legitimacy

Terrorism is known to be closely linked to a set of core legitimacy problems. Lack of continuity of the political system and a lack of integration of political fringes tend to encourage ideological terrorism. Ethnic diversity increases the potential for ethnic terrorism. A terrorist is more likely than a nonterrorist to be an individual who sees politics as highly relevant.¹⁷⁹ Usually a terrorist's aim is to call for radical change in the distribution of power in society or challenge the legitimacy of existing political and social elites.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Edward Heyman and Edward Mickolus, "Imitation by Terrorists: Quantitative Approaches to the Study of Diffusion Patterns in Transnational Terrorism," in Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason, eds. *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism* (New York: Pergamon, 1981), 175–228.

¹⁷⁸ Abdullah Yousef Sahar Mohammad, "Roots of Terrorism in the Middle East Internal Pressure and International Constraints," in Tore Bjorgo, ed. *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* (New York, Routledge Publisher, 2005), 110.

¹⁷⁹ R. Fried, "The Psychology of the Terrorist," in B. M. Jenkins, ed. *Terrorism and Beyond: An International Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1982), 119–124.

¹⁸⁰ Martha Crenshaw, "An Organizational Political Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism," *Orbis*, Vol. 29, No. 3, (1985), 465–489.

5. Poverty or Weakness of States

Although not a root cause of terrorism, poverty is a social evil that should be fought for its own reasons. There is a broad consensus that there is only a weak and indirect relationship between poverty and terrorism. However, poor societies with weak state structures are much more exposed to civil wars and terrorism than wealthy countries because this cause is not addressed in developing nations as compared to developed nations.¹⁸¹

6. Occupation by Foreign Forces

While terrorism in some cases is an armed conflict in its own right, terrorists' motivations are often rooted in ongoing or past wars in one way or another usually to end foreign occupation, which has given rise to many national liberation movements.¹⁸²

7. Recognition and Attention

According to Martha Crenshaw:

the most basic reason for terrorism is to gain recognition or attention. Violence and bloodshed always excite human curiosity, and the theatricality, suspense, and threat of danger inherent in terrorism enhance its attention-getting qualities. In fact, publicity may be the highest goal of some groups.¹⁸³

8. Religion

Most scholars agree that while religion has been a major factor in recent acts of terrorism, it is seldom the only one. Religious ideologies, goals, and motivations are often interwoven with those that are economical, social, and political. None of the

¹⁸¹ A. J. Marsella, "Terrorism: Reflections on issues, concepts, and directions," in F. M. Moghaddam, & A. J. Marsella, eds. *Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003), 11–48.

¹⁸² Tore Bjorgo, *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* (New York, Routledge Publisher, 2005), 259.

¹⁸³ Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 1981), 379–399.

religions actually teaches terrorism as John Esposito explains, as usually “political and economic grievances are primary causes or catalysts, and religion becomes a means to legitimate and mobilize.”¹⁸⁴

According to Brian Jenkins, the list is lengthy, as the potential causes of terrorism include:

rising population; increased poverty and scarcity; racial tension; inflation and unemployment; increased tension between the have and have-not nations; waves of refugees shoved about by wars and repression; immigrants moving from poorer states to wealthier ones, often bringing them the conflicts of their home country, sometimes causing resentment among native citizens; rapid urbanization; the disintegration of traditional authority structures; the emergence of single-issue groups, the rise of aggressive fundamentalist religions groups or religious cults.¹⁸⁵

Therefore, the causes of terrorism summarized above are not the only reasons to encourage somebody to pick up a weapon or adopt a violent course. However, this list provides the reader with a fair idea that religion is not the only cause of terrorism, and thus cannot necessarily be blamed for any violent act, even those committed by people claiming to be the followers of any particular faith. Literature is full of examples about terrorism and its causes, explaining the types and categories of terrorism. It is however important to consider each type in its own political, historical and cultural context because terrorism is a product of its own place and time that is an attractive strategy to a diverse array of groups, which have little else in common.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ Mark Juergensmeyer, “Religion” (paper presented at The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, Madrid, Spain, March 8–11, 2005), 27.

¹⁸⁵ Brian Jenkins, “Future Trends in International Terrorism,” in *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*, ed. Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 249.

¹⁸⁶ Jerrold M. Post, “Psychology” (paper presented at The International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, Madrid, Spain, March 8–11, 2005), 7.

C. TYPES OF TERRORISM

*It is not the bullet with my name on it that worries me. It is the one that says 'To Whom It May Concern.'*¹⁸⁷

(Anonymous Belfast resident,
quoted in *Guardian*, London,
October 16, 1991)

Currently, the world faces various types of terrorist activities, which have been going on historically as well. These terrorism acts are usually classified depending on factors such as objectives, source of motivation, intentions, funding or perpetrators. Experts usually classify the types of terrorism according to their interest of study; therefore, in literature one finds different classifications of the types of terrorism. According to Aref Al-Khattar, there are two major types of terrorism: international and domestic.¹⁸⁸ However, according to Eluma Sylas, there are many types: cyber terrorism, narco terrorism, bio terrorism, punishment terrorism, religiously motivated terrorism, political or nationalist terrorism, suicide terrorism, local terrorism, international terrorism, right or neo-fascist terrorism, left-wing terrorism, aqua or marine terrorism and anarchist terrorism,¹⁸⁹ and the list can be much more exhaustive. As Chalmers Johnson noted in 1978, “there are almost as many types of terrorism as there are analysts.”¹⁹⁰ Therefore, examining the existing terrorism trends one sees that the acts of violence are not just limited to any particular faith, religion or social group. A selection of these types of terrorism illustrated in subsequent paragraphs give a fair idea that there are various factors other than religion, which influence violence in the world.

1. State Terrorism

State terrorism is a form of coercion, which involves the use of violence by states against an individual or group to alter the behavior of a wider target audience than the

¹⁸⁷ Robert Andrews, *The Columbia Dictionary of Quotations* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), 901.

¹⁸⁸ Aref M. Al-Khattar, *Religion and Terrorism: An Interfaith Perspective* (Connecticut: Praeger Publishing, 2003), 19.

¹⁸⁹ Sylas, *Terrorism: A Global Scourge*, 11.

¹⁹⁰ Chalmers Johnson, “Perspective on Terrorism,” in *The Terrorism Reader*, ed. W. Laqueur, (New York: American Library, 1978), 276.

direct victim for the pursuance of political objectives.¹⁹¹ This type of terrorism is usually committed by state agencies, such as secret societies or dissident groups in order to suppress their own citizens, political opponents, and minorities.

2. State-Sponsored Terrorism

This is the type of terrorism in which terrorist groups are purposely used by radical states as foreign policy tools.¹⁹² Bruce Hoffman describes this type of terrorism elaborately, “some governments have now come to embrace terrorism as a deliberate instrument of foreign policy: a cost effective means of waging war covertly, through the use of surrogate warriors or “guns for hire”—terrorists.”¹⁹³ State-sponsored terrorism includes acts of terrorism sponsored by one country against another using violence and lethal force with a view to achieving long-term political or strategic objectives. The aim of the country that sponsors and supports terrorism can range from destabilization and weakening of a government or a central authority to the break up of the existing social and political order in the targeted country.¹⁹⁴

3. Nationalist Terrorism

Forming a separate state for their own national group is the main agenda of nationalist terrorists. They draw attention to a fight for “national liberation” that they think the world has ignored.¹⁹⁵ Nationalist terrorism can be difficult to define, since many groups accused of the practice insist that they are not terrorists but freedom

¹⁹¹ Ruth Blakeley, *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South* (New York, Routledge, 2009), 4.

¹⁹² Ramesh Chandra, *Global Terrorism: Potentials of World Terrorism* (New Delhi, India, Kalpaz Publications, 2003), 11.

¹⁹³ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 258.

¹⁹⁴ Omer Y. Elagab, *International Law Documents Relating to Terrorism* (London: Cavendish Publishing, 1995), 685.

¹⁹⁵ Michael Ronczkowski, *Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime: Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and Investigations* (Florida: CRC Press, 2004), 43.

fighters.¹⁹⁶ Nationalist terrorist groups commonly include the Palestine Liberation Organization (as per Israel). Others are the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which seeks to create an independent Kurdish state apart from Turkey. Once it was the Sikh Movement for the land of Khalistan in Indian Punjab. Arab nationalism helps fuel Al-Qaeda, just as Pashtun nationalism provides a good deal of support for the Taliban.¹⁹⁷

4. Left-Wing Terrorism

This type of terrorism is an effort to wipe out capitalism and substitute it with a communist or socialist regime.¹⁹⁸ The Baader-Meinhof Group (Germany), the Japanese Red Army, the Weathermen (United States in the 1970s), and the Red Brigades (Italy) are examples of left-wing terrorist groups.¹⁹⁹

5. Right-Wing Terrorism

These groups seek to do away with liberal democratic governments and create fascist states in their place.²⁰⁰ Right-wing terrorism normally does not threaten the population at large but represents a political and psychological hazard to the stability of democratic societies.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁶ Edin Jahic, "Development of Events in Bosnia and Herzegovina Following the 11th September 2001," working paper for *HUMSEC Project of European Commission*, http://www.etc-graz.at/cms/fileadmin/user_upload/humsec/Workin_Paper_Series/Working_Paper_Jahic.pdf (accessed on November 9, 2010), 2.

¹⁹⁷ Anatol Lieven, "Fighting Terrorism: Lessons from the Cold War," *Policy Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (October 7, 2001) <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Lieven-7.pdf> (accessed on November 9, 2010).

¹⁹⁸ Brian S. Amador, "The Federal Republic of Germany and Left Wing Terrorism," (Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, December 2003), 4.

¹⁹⁹ Sarafa Ogundiya and Jimoh Amzat, "Nigeria and the Threats of Terrorism: Myth or Reality," *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, Vol. 10, No. 2, (2008), 165–189.

²⁰⁰ William M. Kramer, *Disaster Planning and Control* (Oklahoma: Penn Well Corporation, 2009), 274.

²⁰¹ Case Study, Work Package 3, "20th Century Right Wing Groups in Europe," *Transnational Terrorism, Security & The Rule of Law* (July 4, 2008), <http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Rightwing%20terrorism.pdf> (accessed on November 9, 2010).

6. Anarchist Terrorism

This type of terrorism usually aims at rejecting the formal laws and legal institutions in an effort to force the government to change its policy on particular issues.²⁰² From the 1870s until about 1920, revolutionaries seeking to overthrow established governments launched a wave of bombings and assassinated a series of heads of state; one such victim was President William McKinley, killed in 1901 by a young Hungarian refugee influenced by anarchist sentiments.²⁰³

7. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Terrorism

An NBC terrorist attack is an incident in which a terrorist organization uses a nuclear device or chemical/biological weapons to cause mass murder and devastation.²⁰⁴ Nuclear terrorism also includes the use, or threat of use, of fissionable radioactive materials in an attack. An example would be an assault on a nuclear power plant for the purpose of causing extensive and/or irreversible environmental damage.²⁰⁵

8. Cyber Terrorism

Cyber terrorism is defined as the use of computing resources to intimidate or coerce others. An example of cyber terrorism could be hacking into the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) computer system and making modifications that could cause havoc with air transportation.²⁰⁶

9. Religious Terrorism

This is the most dangerous and prevalent type of terrorism. Religious terrorists seek to use violence to further what they see as divinely commanded purposes, often

²⁰² Sylls, *Terrorism: A Global Scourge*, 33.

²⁰³ Ibid., 34.

²⁰⁴ Robert J. Heyer, "Introduction to CBRNE Terrorism: An Awareness Primer and Preparedness Guide for Emergency Responders," *The Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Response Association*, (January 10, 2006), <http://www.disasters.org/dera/library/Heyer%20WMD.pdf> (accessed on November 9, 2010).

²⁰⁵ L. R. Reddy, *The Worst of Global Terrorism* (New Delhi: A.P.H Publishing, 2002), 124.

²⁰⁶ Robert C. Newman, *Computer Security: Protecting Digital Resources* (London: Jones and Bartlett, 2010), 13.

targeting broad categories of foes in an attempt to bring about sweeping changes.²⁰⁷ Religious terrorists can use limitless violence against an open-ended category of targets; that is, anyone who is not a member of the terrorists' religion or religious sects.²⁰⁸ Current incidents carried out by Islamists groups in the name of religion are regarded as religious terrorism, though these may be motivated by factors other than religion also.

10. The Extreme Type—"Suicide Terrorism"

Suicide terrorism is defined as a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual who actively and purposely causes his or her own death through blowing himself or herself up along with the chosen target.²⁰⁹ Suicide terrorism includes a diversity of violent actions perpetrated by people who are aware that the odds they will return alive are close to zero.²¹⁰ The rationale or motive for suicide terrorism may be diverse, ranging from hate, incitement, revenge, ease of delivery, religious or ideological zeal and perhaps desperation.²¹¹ Notwithstanding the underlying reason behind suicide terrorism, it is most common today and, on average, suicide attacks inflict four times more fatalities and twenty-six times more casualties than other conventional terrorist attacks.²¹² Recent terrorism incidents making headlines everyday in Pakistan and Afghanistan are almost completely all examples of suicide terrorism.

²⁰⁷ Ronczkowski, *Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime*, 45.

²⁰⁸ Bruce Hoffman, "Revival of Religious Terrorism Begg for Broader U.S. Policy," *RAND* <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.winter98.9/methods.html> (accessed on November 9, 2010).

²⁰⁹ Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, *Suicide as a Weapon* (Lancaster: IOS Press, 2007), 39.

²¹⁰ Ami Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 8.

²¹¹ Ophir Falk, "The Suicide Attack Phenomenon," International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (January 10, 2005) <http://www.riskmanagement.lesliesparks.com/library/VirtualLibrary/suicide%5B1%5D.pdf> (accessed on November 10, 2010).

²¹² Ibid.

D. MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT TERRORISM

It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so.

Mark Twain (1835–1910)

Terrorism is not an ideology but a strategy that may be used by individuals, groups, or states for different purposes. It is often confused with other violent political measures such as guerilla warfare or genocide.²¹³ In order to counter the effect of any type of violence it is necessary to understand the problem first. On the same note, the difference between terrorism and guerilla warfare is indispensable to understand. Although unconventional means is a common attribute between terrorism and guerilla warfare, both are different in their strategy in that guerilla warfare is rural in character unlike terrorism, which is mainly about publicity and is an urban phenomenon.²¹⁴

Clearing misperceptions about terrorism today remains one grey area without which the efforts and sources to counter terrorism may be ineffective. As one analyst has remarked, “The nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act....can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance.”²¹⁵ This quote is backed up by PIPA/KN polls, and as noted by Steven Kull, Americans have a misperceived world public opinion on the United States decision to go to war (with Iraq) and on the way that the United States is generally dealing with the problem of terrorism (GWOT).²¹⁶

It is commonly believed that terrorism results from pathological psychology or abnormal behavior of individuals, but analysis reveals that pathological psychology is no

²¹³ Leonard B. Weinberg and Paul B. Davis, *Introduction to Political Terrorism* (New York: McGraw Hill Publishing, 1989), 6.

²¹⁴ Weinberg and Davis, *Introduction to Political Terrorism*, 6–7.

²¹⁵ Schmid and Jongman, *Political Terrorism*, (1988), 101.

²¹⁶ Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay and Evan Lewis, “Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 118, No. 4 (Winter, 2003/2004), 569–598.

more prevalent among terrorist groups than among others.²¹⁷ Rather, research shows that one is most likely to become a terrorist not because of psychological factors, but because of one's involvement with organizations influenced by external factors (political, economic, religious, social, etc.) leading to politically motivated strategic decisions.²¹⁸ Analysis has also shown that the causes of terrorism are much more than economic depression, individual and cultural despair and hopelessness. It is not caused by religious, ethnic, or national oppression, social upheaval or revolution, although these factors may feed terrorism, but terrorism happens because it works for those who choose to exercise it.²¹⁹

Different scholars have presented different theories based on their research and analysis as to what the causes of terrorism are. When these researches differ from each other, it means that one's research is a misperception for the other and vice versa. To an ordinary man it is next to impossible to distinguish the correct reasons of terrorism when scholars do not agree on one common theory. As discussed earlier, terrorism threat today is enabled to some degree by poverty and social injustice—as advocated by James Piazza based on statistical data on terrorist incidents in ninety-six countries from 1986–2002²²⁰—grievances over Western policies, and the authoritarian political cultures of the Muslim world. However, Adam Garfinkle presents a different theory that terrorism is not caused by any of these reasons; instead, its underlying cause is the inability of most Muslim societies to effectively adapt to the growing pressure of modernization.²²¹ This can be

²¹⁷ Clayton G. Holland, "Causality-based Counterterrorism," *Missing Link Security* <http://www.missinglinksecurity.com/data/files/causality-based%20counterterrorism.pdf> (accessed on November 10, 2010).

²¹⁸ A. K. Cronin and J. M. Ludes, *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004).

²¹⁹ Holland, "Causality-based Counterterrorism," (accessed on November 10, 2010).

²²⁰ James A. Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 18, (2006), 159–177.

²²¹ Adam Garfinkle, "How We Misunderstood Terrorism," Foreign Policy Research Institute, <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20080911.garfinkle.wemisunderstandterrorism.html> (accessed on November 10, 2010).

related to the fact that Muslims ruled the world for more than six centuries, and with the fall of the Ottoman Empire they lost the power over the world, which can be a source of embarrassment.

On the other hand, Robert Pape debunks several misconceptions regarding suicide terrorism in his book *Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. He argues that suicide terrorism is not aberrant or senseless but it is logical and effective given certain political and psychological conditions, and suicide terrorism possesses a secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from a territory that the terrorists consider as being their homeland.²²² While many advocate causes and their misperceptions to be the reason that let loose the menace of terrorism, John Mueller stresses that there is a trend at the international level to exaggerate the threat of terrorism.²²³ He also asserts that most of the harm caused by terrorism arises from over-reactive policies designed to deal with it.

The reality is that it really does not matter what the definition of terrorism includes, what the causes of terrorism are, how many types of terrorism there are, and how many more are to come in future. Careless assumptions about root causes that serve as justifications for terrorism must be seen as root causes of terrorism because they make terrorism seem less outrageous, which makes terrorism seem more rational, more likely to succeed and, most significantly, more likely to be utilized again and again.²²⁴ What really matters is that follies of terrorism be understood worldwide and misperceptions be cleared to wage appropriate preventative measures at the right time and in the right direction for the betterment of all human beings. The next chapter focuses on some misperceptions prevailing today about terrorism and its relation with religious teachings.

²²² Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), 4.

²²³ John Mueller, "Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration," paper presented at *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Washington D.C. (September 1–4, 2005).

²²⁴ Fredric Smoler, "The Root Causes of Terrorism: Dispelling the Myths," *The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies* (January 9, 2002), http://www.defenddemocracy.org/images/stories/file/Root_Causes_of_Terrorism_2.pdf (accessed on November 10, 2010).

IV. RELATION BETWEEN ISLAM AND TERRORISM– PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS

The good deed and evil deed cannot be equal. Repel (the evil) with one which is better, then verily! He, between whom and you there was enmity, (will become) as though he was a close friend.

The Qur'an, 41:34

A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

There is no doubt that the rise of terrorism is a sign indicating the existence of a serious deterioration in the social and moral values within society.²²⁵ It is important to remember that individuals are the central issue of terrorism, and individuals are social creatures who are influenced by social and economic circumstances, as well as religious values prevailing in their respective society.²²⁶ The first controversy in Islamic history can be traced back as early as after the demise of Prophet Muhammad over the proper line of succession to Caliphate (leader of the Ummah—the community of Muslim faithful, a position combining both spiritual and temporal authority).²²⁷ Disputes among Muslims for legitimacy of political leadership (i.e., Caliphate) were also a constant cause of violence in early Islamic history and during times of *Khulafa-e-Rashideen* (the Rightly Guided Caliphs).

Incidents of violence picked up when a group of Muslims refused to pay *Zakat* and the Islamic state had to use force against them. Wars of *Siffeen*, *Jammal* and *Nerawan* are some examples where thousands of Muslims killed each other. Of the first four caliphs of Islam, three were assassinated. A disgruntled Christian slave killed the second caliph, while the third and fourth caliphs were assassinated by pious Muslim

²²⁵ Muhammad A.H.Qudah and Hayel A. Dawoud, "Wasael Mu'alajat al-Erhab min Manthor Shar'i" [Means to treat Terrorism from a Shari'a Perspective], *Dirasat, Shari'a and Law*, Volume 31, Issue 2, 2004, 488.

²²⁶ Ibrahim Mashhour Aljazy, "Countering Terrorism and Protecting Human Rights: An Islamic and Arab Legal Dimension," *European Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2010).

²²⁷ Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (Norton: New York and London, 2003), 147.

rebels who saw themselves as executioners of the will of Allah.²²⁸ After the demise of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the Muslim community split into two major denominations of Isla: Shi'a—who argued that the Caliphate should remain in the hands of Muhammad's lineal descendants—and Sunni—who contended that any man meeting the standards of faith and learning could hold a position in the Caliphate.²²⁹

The first of a succession of civil wars was fought over the question of whether the killers were fulfilling or defying Allah's commandment.²³⁰ Since Islam makes it compulsory for all Muslims to follow their Muslim leader or ruler, the Muslims who murdered the third and fourth caliphs did so by following two sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. One says, "There is no obedience in sin." The other says, "Do not obey a creature against the Creator."²³¹ If a ruler orders something that is contrary to the law of Allah, then the duty of obedience is replaced by a duty of disobedience.²³² Throughout history, the followers of organized religions have repeatedly resorted to methods that today may be considered as terrorism. Islam has not been immune to this; an allegedly Islamic group called the "Assassins" (a name that literally means hashish eater) that was part of the Shi'a Muslim sect known as the Ismailis who used to stab their victims in broad daylight. Their victims were politicians and clerics who rejected the adoption of their own version of Islam, which they were spreading by force.²³³ These events form a historical basis that helps to explain incidents of violence not only against enemies of Islam but among Muslims as well. Later towards modern times, a political dimension was also added to religious reasons, and things became more complicated when the Islamic world became powerless in world affairs.

²²⁸ Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (New York: Random House Trade, 2004), 143.

²²⁹ William F. Shughart, "An Analytical History of Terrorism: 1945-2000," *Public Choice*, Vol. 128, No. 1-2, (2006), 7-39.

²³⁰ Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam*, 144.

²³¹ Bernard Lewis, *Faith and Power: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 136.

²³² Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam*, 144.

²³³ Jeffrey Simon, *The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience with Terrorism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 26-7.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Muslim reform movements were seen in the Middle East with the arrival of European imperialism.²³⁴ These reforms were accompanied by massive social changes and the simultaneous introduction of new ideas that were alien to classical Islamic tradition—such as nationalism, popular sovereignty—and actually disrupted traditional ways of life and caused traumatic dislocations in these societies.²³⁵ During the twentieth century, this was further exacerbated with the colonization of the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia at the end of the First World War and the problem in Palestine by creating the state of Israel.²³⁶ The main reason for these changes can be attributed to the end of colonialism and the acquisition of independence by most Muslim countries after World War II.²³⁷

The grievances motivating modern Muslim extremist terrorism are though to have roots in certain political events of the twentieth century. In 1979, the Iranian Revolution caused tumult, particularly in Central Asia, which was exacerbated by the collapse of the Soviet Union.²³⁸ Grievances in the Middle East often stem from animus toward American support for Israel. Throughout the Muslim world, dreams of uniting fundamentalist Muslims under a pan-Islamic Caliphate with Shar'ia (Islamic law) have motivated fundamentalists from Algeria to Chechnya, Kashmir, the Philippines, Indonesia and beyond.²³⁹

In addition, the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), with their divisive and socially disruptive structural adjustment policies, broke the backbone of many countries in the post World War II era, enhancing global wealth inequality.²⁴⁰ A decade-long Soviet-Afghan War in 1979 and the financing of a ten-year war between Iran and Iraq by the superpowers at the time—for no reason other

²³⁴ Michael Knapp, "The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam," *Parameters*, (Spring 2003), 82–94.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Dr. Muhammad Malkawi, "Islamic View on Terrorism," (November 14, 2001), http://www.igraa.org/islamic_view.htm (accessed on August 22, 2010).

²³⁷ Knapp, "The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam," (2003).

²³⁸ Shughart, "An Analytical History of Terrorism: 1945–2000," 3.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Dr. Malkawi, Islamic View on Terrorism, (2001).

than to sustain control over the oil fields in the Arabian/Persian Gulf—paved the way for global terrorism and violence in the name of Islam due to involvement of mostly Muslim countries.²⁴¹ Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are the result of such complex historical, political and social situations in the Muslim world today.

B. RELIGION AND TERRORISM

*Religiously, Islam proved a more tolerant religion, providing greater religious freedom for Jews and indigenous Christians.*²⁴²

John L. Esposito

The geopolitical landscape has always been a combination of different religions and ideologies organized into governments and political organizations.²⁴³ Some regimes tends to force the population to worship as they deem fit because the issue of separation of church and state is not resolved (e.g., State of Islamic Republic of Pakistan during President General Zia-ul-Haq's era from 1977–88;—the Soviet-Afghan War was also during this period—and will be discussed in next chapter).²⁴⁴ Within such countries, there are religious groups with extremists who usually are the deadliest of all the parishioners. Religiously motivated extremism—whether targeting people of a particular faith, or those not of a particular faith, has existed as long as organized religion. Historical examples include incidents in which Romans fed Christians to lions for practicing their religion, and pharaohs terrorized and enslaved Jews. Christians terrorized native populations during the crusades. In recent times, Jews were targeted during the Holocaust.

In the age of Empires, imperial powers were known to have levied religious reasoning to influence people to use terror against their neighbors as one of the many

²⁴¹ Dr. Malkawi, *Islamic View on Terrorism*, (2001).

²⁴² John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 39.

²⁴³ Religion and Terrorism, *OPPPapers*, posted by Killpatty, in the *OPPPapers*, <http://www.oppapers.com/essays/Religion-Terrorism/34759> (accessed October 1, 2010).

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

tools to keep and enhance their power.²⁴⁵ In recent years, there has been a disturbing trend towards fundamentalism among political leaders and within major religious groups all over the world, and these fundamentalist groups have become increasingly intertwined.²⁴⁶ Networking and communications technologies have only made it easier for fringe groups to solidify their identity and tactics by finding similar groups. This networking and recruitment, particularly if not countered by moderate narratives, can make fundamentalist viewpoints and actions seem reasonable (or at least popular), helping to recruit new members and proliferate attacks.

Religious extremists are responsible for terrorism as they commit dreadful acts in the name of many different religions. While many terrorist actions are committed in the name of religion there is not one religion that is responsible for all spiritual acts of terrorism.²⁴⁷ The current rash of religiously motivated acts of terrorism started in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War. At this time, several divisive forces came into play on the global stage, including religious and ethnic conflicts, an ever-widening North-South gap and religious fundamentalism.²⁴⁸ Religion's importance in contemporary terrorism is a means of communication because it really shows how religion can be twisted to support a nonspiritual goal.²⁴⁹

The following section examines the religions of Christianity and Judaism to clarify their approach to terrorism. Christianity—a monotheist religion—is chosen because it is the leading religion of the world in terms of population (33.32% of the world's population).²⁵⁰ Judaism, which is also a monotheist religion, is still important

²⁴⁵ Jake George, comment on "Terrorism and Religion" Authors Den blog, comment posted September 1, 2006, <http://www.authorsden.com/visit/viewArticle.asp?id=23987> (accessed on September 30, 2010).

²⁴⁶ Jimmy Carter, *Our Endangered Values* (New York: Rockefeller Center, 2005), 31.

²⁴⁷ Religion and Terrorism, *OPPapers*, posted by Killpatty.

²⁴⁸ John Shattuck, "Religion, Rights, and Terrorism," *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, Vol. 16, (Spring 2003), 183–188.

²⁴⁹ Religioscope Archives, "Religion and Terrorism: Interview with Dr. Bruce Hoffman, November 21, 2001," http://www.religioscope.com/info/articles/003_Hoffman_terrorism.htm (accessed on September 30, 2010).

²⁵⁰ CIA, "The World Factbook," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html> (accessed on October 1, 2010).

because of the volatile issue between Israel and Palestine, even though it is not in any ranking in terms of population. The section that follows the discussion on Christianity and Judaism explains the stance of Islam, which is the fastest growing religion in the world (growth rate of 1.84%), on the field of terrorism as it is being used frequently by many terrorist organizations to justify their acts of terrorism.²⁵¹

1. Judaism

Judaism is the oldest monotheist religion, and though it does not compete for strength in numbers (membership is based on ethnic claims, rather than being open to anyone agreeing with its philosophy), it is historically very important, and particularly important to the questions at hand because of its relevance in the salient grievances of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In Judaism, believers are ordered to exhibit morality by avoiding theft, corruption, evil, and murder. Killing innocent people is considered to be sinful in Torah Law. According to Jewish belief in the Ten Commandments—spoken by God to the people of Israel from the mountain referred to as Mount Sinai—murdering or killing a human being that claims the blood of an innocent is a capital sin and avoiding killing other human beings is the law of nature, as stated below:

You shall not commit murder. You shall not commit adultery. You shall not steal. You shall not witness falsely against your neighbor. (Exodus 20, 13–16)²⁵²

According to Judaism and Torah Law, not only murdering of innocent is forbidden but also the religious text openly warns the murderers. In addition, Judaism instructs believers to refrain from evil and evil people because it is the cause of all the violence in the world.²⁵³

²⁵¹ Foreign Policy, “The List: The World’s Fastest-Growing Religions,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/05/13/the_list_the_worlds_fastest_growing_religions (accessed on October 2, 2010).

²⁵² Amplified Bible (AMP), <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Exodus+20%3A13-17%2CLeviticus+19%3A18&version=AMP> (accessed on October 3, 2010), for further detail see Genesis Chapter 9, Verses 5–6.

²⁵³ For further details see, Proverbs Chapter 24, Verses 1–2 and 11–12.

2. Christianity

Many scholars articulate that Christianity is a religion of love. To examine the teachings of Christianity, the author referred to the Christian founding text, the Bible, which explains the importance of love and compassion on multiple occasions. The importance of love to humanity is emphasized in the Bible to an extent that neighbors and even enemies are ordered to be loved by all. In fact, the Bible in more than a few verses orders loving other fellowmen:

A new command I give you: Love one another. As I have loved you, so you must love one another. By this all men will know that you are my disciples, if you love one another. (John 13, 34-35)²⁵⁴

Moreover, Christianity is a promoter of peace, persuades forgiveness, and strongly exhibits teachings to avoid evil. The Bible also expects Christians to avoid the path of violence—even if others attack them—and promotes peaceful communities for humankind.²⁵⁵ Studying the teachings of different versions of the Bible, the author argues that Christianity is a religion of love and peace. The teachings of the Bible are clearly against violence and terrorism or hatred in any form—because they are sins—and Christians are to stay away from all kinds of sins. As Pope John Paul has said, “Love must defeat terrorism.”²⁵⁶

C. WHAT DOES ISLAM SAY ABOUT TERRORISM?

...if any one slew a person—unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land—it would be as if he slew the whole people: and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people.

The Qur'an, 5:32

²⁵⁴ The Bible, New International Version, <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John+13%3A34-35&version=NIV> (accessed on October 2, 2010), for further detail see Mathews Chapter 5, Verses 43–44, Romans Chapter 12, Verse 20, Romans Chapter 13, Verses 8–10.

²⁵⁵ For further details see, Romans Chapter 12, Verses 18–19, James Chapter 4, Verses 1–4, Ephesians Chapter 4, Verses 31–32.

²⁵⁶ News 10, “Pope: Love Must Defeat Terrorism,” posted April 11, 2004, available at <http://www.kttl.com/news/-3992--.html> (accessed on October 2, 2010).

The above verse of the Qur'an explains the value of a single human life, that the Qur'an equates the taking of even one human life unjustly with killing of all humanity. Thus, the Qur'an prohibits homicide in clear terms. Therefore, Islam and terrorism would seem at extreme odds. The religion of Islam, like Christianity and Judaism, does not contain any inherent program of militancy. However, like other religions, Islam may be instrumentalized in support of a higher level of (perceived) security or in response to a higher level of (perceived) threat.²⁵⁷ Islam can thus be seen as a salient aspect of an individual's identity, which can be singled-out and utilized as a motivation for action.

Terrorism is the calculated, targeted and indiscriminate use of intimidatory violence to achieve an objective that could be political, economic, social or religious, or to vent grievance arising from political, economic, social or religious reasons.²⁵⁸ There is no obvious or hidden correlation between Islam and terrorism—there is only the fortuitous way in which the Islamic-terrorist connection fits into the salient clash-of-civilizations narrative. The vague definition of terrorism, which places blame on the objectives and not the tactics, along with the divisive themes of the global media that has caused Muslims to be associated with acts of destruction and terror, and as a result, to become victims of hate, violence and terror themselves.²⁵⁹ Sometimes the religion of Islam is held responsible for the acts of a handful of Muslims, and often for the acts of nonMuslims. Could it be possible that Islam, the same faith whose light ended the Dark Ages in Europe, now propounds the advent of an age of terror and maiming of innocent people? Could Islam, whose name itself stands for “peace” and “submission to Allah,” encourage its adherents to promote death and destruction?²⁶⁰

The taking of a criminal's life by a state in order to administer justice is required to uphold the rule of law, as well as the peace and security of the state. Only a proper and

²⁵⁷ Petra Weyland, “Islam-Islamism-Islamist Terrorism? A Proposal to come to Terms with the Nexus of Islam and Security,” *The Quarterly Journal*, Vol. III, No. 3 (September 2004): 81.

²⁵⁸ B. Raman, “Global Counter-Terrorism & the Role of Democracies,” *South Asian Analysis Group*, no. 912 (2004), <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers10/paper912.html> (accessed on August 24, 2010).

²⁵⁹ ICNA Project, “What does Islam say about Terrorism?” Why Islam, <http://www.whylislam.org/SocialOrder/BrochureIslamonTerrorism/tabid/125/Default.aspx> (accessed on August 26, 2010).

²⁶⁰ ICNA Project, “What does Islam say about Terrorism?” Why Islam?

competent court can decide whether an individual has forfeited his right to life by disregarding the right to life and peace of other human beings. In Islam, use of force is allowed only in special situations, particularly when hostile forces threaten the Muslim community as Allah has said in the Qur'an, "...those who fought against you on account of religion, and have driven you out of your homes, and helped to drive you out...."²⁶¹ In addition, Prophet Muhammad declared to his companions that he would accept any condition that would prevent bloodshed; he used to prohibit soldiers from killing women and children. Moreover, he said, "Whoever has killed a person having a treaty with the Muslims shall not smell the fragrance of Paradise."²⁶²

Many around the world are sharing these sentiments today. The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, adopted by the League of the Arab States and dated April 1998 confirms the commitments of states' parties to human rights as defined in International Human Rights Law. Moreover, with regard to moral and religious principles, the preamble of the Convention provides that is:

Arab Nation rejects all forms of violence and terrorism and advocates the protection of human rights, with which precepts the principles of international law conform...²⁶³

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, President Bush moved quickly to dismiss al-Qaeda operatives as part of the lunatic fringe, religious usurpers bent on misrepresenting and "hijacking" Islam to serve terrorism.²⁶⁴ This characterization was echoed in the Muslim world, where an assortment of government officials, religious scholars and opposition figures fervidly denounced the killing of civilians as un-Islamic.²⁶⁵ Shaikh Yussuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent Islamic scholar and television personality from Qatar emphasized, "Islam, the religion of tolerance, holds the human

²⁶¹ Al-Qur'an, Chapter 60, Verse 9.

²⁶² Sahih Al-Bukhari, Book 53, Hadith 391, for further details see Book 83, Hadith 10.

²⁶³ The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, Report by Amnesty International, AI Index: IOR 51/001/2002, 1-4.

²⁶⁴ Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, "Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. X, No. 2, Summer 2003, 76-92.

²⁶⁵ Wiktorowicz and Kaltner, "Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11," 76-92.

soul in high esteem, and considers the attack against innocent human beings a grave sin.”²⁶⁶ Abdulaziz bin Abdullah al-Ashaykh, the mufti of Saudi Arabia, argued that “hijacking planes, terrorizing innocent people and shedding blood constitute a form of injustice that cannot be tolerated by Islam, which views them as gross crimes and sinful acts.”²⁶⁷ Even Islamic fundamentalist groups issued sharp denunciations. Forty-six leaders representing an assortment of Islamist movements and groups signed a letter opposed to the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States:

We condemn, in the strongest terms, the incidents, which are against all human and Islamic norms. This is grounded in the Noble Laws of Islam, which forbid all forms of attacks on innocents.²⁶⁸

The International Islamic Fiqh Academy, a subsidiary of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, also held its seventeenth session in Amman in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan from June 24–28, 2006. The topic under discussion was “Islam's Position on Extremism, Radicalism, and Terrorism.” Scholars at the academy adopted Resolution 154, which states the following:

1. All acts, forms, and practices of terrorism are forbidden and it is a criminal act classifiable as a war crime wherever it occurs and whoever perpetrates it. Anyone who participates in terrorist acts directly or indirectly, through funding or support, individually or as a group or a state, is considered a terrorist. Terrorism can also occur between states.
2. There is a distinction between terrorism and legitimate resistance to occupation through legally accepted means, because the latter is for the purposes of removing tyranny and reclaiming lost rights. This is a right recognized by law and by reason, and is affirmed by international treaties.
3. The reasons leading to terror—and their precursors such as extremism, radicalism and tribalism; ignorance of the rulings of the *Shari'ah*; disregarding the rights of human beings as well as their political and intellectual freedom; dispossession and poor economic, societal, and political conditions—must be addressed.

²⁶⁶ Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi Condemns Attacks Against Civilians: Forbidden in Islam, <http://www.islamonline.net/English/News/2001-09/13/article25.shtml> (accessed August 20, 2010).

²⁶⁷ “Saudi Arabia: An active Partner in the Fight against Terrorism,” *Saudi Arabia*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2002.

²⁶⁸ MSA News, September 14, 2001, <http://msanews.mynet.net/MSANEWS/200109/20010917.15.html> (accessed on August 28, 2010).

4. We reaffirm what has already been mentioned above in this resolution, namely that struggle (*Jihad*) to defend Islamic belief, and to protect or liberate one's country from foreign occupation is not terrorism, so long as that struggle follows the rulings of Islamic law.²⁶⁹

Given this broad rejection by many Muslim scholars—who play a critical role as intermediaries between the sacred texts and everyday religious rituals and practices²⁷⁰ — from all over the world, how could al-Qaeda defend killing thousands of innocent civilians in the name of Islam? Al-Qaeda had yet to articulate its religious rationale for attacks against innocent civilian populations.²⁷¹ Bernard Lewis, an eminent authority in Middle East history, has said “The question is not what Islam has done to the Muslims? But what the Muslims have done to Islam?”²⁷²

D. TERRORISM AND JIHAD ARE NOT THE SAME

*Islam is not the enemy. It is not synonymous with terror. Nor does Islam teach terror.*²⁷³

9/11 Commission Report

In the previous chapters, the author has examined the definitions of Jihad and terrorism separately. However, it is prudent here to look into the relation between these two as many terrorist organizations, states and media are relating them today. The terms “Islamic terrorists” and “Islamic extremists” coined by the West are controversial phrases, although their usage today is widespread throughout the English-speaking

²⁶⁹ “Resolution 154 of Islamic Fiqh Academy”, http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=37&Itemid=34 (accessed on August 28, 2010).

²⁷⁰ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam rising: Muslim extremism in the West* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 25.

²⁷¹ Quintan and John, “Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda’s Justification for September 11,” 77.

²⁷² Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong: The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 156.

²⁷³ What to Do? A Global Strategy, Chapter 12, 9/11 Commission Report, available http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/911report/documents/911Report_Ch12.pdf (accessed on November 7, 2010).

world.²⁷⁴ These terms refer to terrorists and extremists who claim to be motivated primarily by their interpretation of Islam. However, most Muslims scholars and Muslim states object to these terms as they contradict the spirit of Islam.²⁷⁵ Therefore, the question asked is, “Is Jihad Terrorism?” Terrorism is usually defined as ideologically motivated indiscriminate violence that targets civilians with the intention of inspiring terror in order to achieve political ends. Although this definition ignores the reality of state terrorism, it is clear that terrorism has no place in the noble concept of Jihad. Even Jihad that involves physical conflict is the very antithesis of terrorism, as is clear from the following differences:

1. Jihad can be launched only by an established authority as a policy in order to deter aggression. Individuals or groups that have no legitimacy to speak for the majority, on the other hand, commit terrorism. When terrorism is committed by states, it usually depends on misleading the masses.
2. Jihad is limited to combatants while terrorism involves indiscriminate killing of civilians.
3. Jihad, when the need arises, is declared openly while terrorism is committed secretly.
4. Jihad is bound by strict rules of engagement while terrorism is not bound by any rules.
5. Jihad is a fight for truth and justice while terrorism is for materialistic and personal gains.²⁷⁶

The concept of military conflict is only against combatants and not against civilians, women, and innocent children. As we have seen, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all promote peace and tolerance, not violence. Attacking innocent civilians is terrorism, not jihad. Jihad is about honor and defense in the face of threat—terrorism

²⁷⁴ Yasmeen Ali, comment on “Jihad and Terrorism: Are both Synonymous?” Opinion Maker blog, comment posted May 30, 2010, <http://www.opinion-maker.org/2010/05/jihad-and-terrorism-are-both-synonymous/> (accessed on September 30, 2010).

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Islamic Concept of Jihad, Holy War? <http://www.whyyislam.org/SocialOrder/Jihad/IslamicConceptofJihadHolyWar/tabid/115/Default.aspx>. (accessed on September 10, 2010).

dishonors the concept of jihad.²⁷⁷ Muslim radicals use Jihad to justify their terrorist strategies and tactics. As such, they have tended to blur the distinction between combatant and noncombatant and have employed extraordinary methods in pursuit of their goals²⁷⁸. Suicide bombing has been one such method. To the vast majority of Muslims, Islamic terrorism is a contradiction in terms²⁷⁹. Muslim traditions clearly condemn killing of innocent civilians.

E. MEDIA LINKS ISLAM WITH TERRORISM

Without mass media, there can be no modern propaganda.

Jacques Ellul (1912–1994)

The traditional role of mass media as defined by the media gurus' are—to inform, educate, entertain, and to persuade the people.²⁸⁰ The media can bring change in behavior and attitude of the people by emphasizing certain issues. However, propaganda does more than change opinion; it leads men to action.²⁸¹ Questioning the relationship between the media and propaganda about terrorism is not new. The relationship is symbiotic; both parties are dependent on each other.²⁸² The media depends on terrorists to provide newsworthy items and terrorists depend on the media to publicize their actions and causes. There is an intuitive assumption that as the media provides terrorists a natural platform from which to espouse their (often extremist and/or marginalized) viewpoints, terrorists provide the media with gripping images of violence and catastrophe.²⁸³ In the months and years following the attacks on the World Trade Center

²⁷⁷ Yasmeen Ali, comment on “Jihad and Terrorism: Are both Synonymous?”

²⁷⁸ George W. Gawrych, “Jihad, War, and Terrorism” (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), 13–14.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Faatin Haque, “Global Media, Islamophobia and its Impact on Conflict Resolution,” at <http://www.ihmsaw.org/resourcefiles/1260034024.pdf> (accessed on June 10, 2010), 7.

²⁸¹ Jack G. Shaheen, “The Arab Stereotype on Television,” *The Link: American for Middle East Understanding*, Vol. 13, No. 2, April/May 1980.

²⁸² Adam Lockyer, “The Relationship between the Media and Terrorism,” *Strategic and Defense Studies Centre: The Australian National University*, 2003, 1–6.

²⁸³ Schmid, A., de Graaf, J., *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media* (London: Sage Publications, Inc, 1982).

and the Pentagon, the U.S. public was witness to the development of a media vocabulary and stylization for dealing with the subject of terrorism.²⁸⁴

An examination of the mainstream U.S. news reporting in the weeks following 9/11 shows that the American news media degenerated into an irresponsible organ of patriotic propaganda.²⁸⁵ One must also reckon with the downside of a privatized media: it is inherently driven by profit—even over the pursuit of truth. The link between television and terrorism has long been recognized; in fact, it seems that whole history of terrorism has been intimately bound up with the development of television.²⁸⁶ As a form of signaling, terrorism requires an audience, and television is the perfect medium to deliver shocking and spectacular images of violence to inculcate an audience with fear.

Statistics show that terrorist attacks have been on the rise for decades with a sharp increase in recent years. Since 9/11, terrorist attacks have commonly been portrayed and perceived as being on the rise. However, it has been pointed out that much of the data fueling this belief includes civilian casualties in Iraq (civilian deaths in active war zones do not typically count as terrorist fatalities).²⁸⁷ Further statistics reveal that the media (specifically the U.S. media) is more likely to label violence as terrorism if it involves American victims.²⁸⁸ Viewed in another dimension, in an empirical study applying game theory to the relationship between terrorism and the media, it is found that Western media tend to cover incidents of terrorism in developing countries only when large amounts of fatalities are involved, incentivizing terrorists to commit high-fatality attacks.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁴ Lockyer, “The Relationship between the Media and Terrorism,” 2003.

²⁸⁵ Mahan, Sue. And Pamala L. Griset, *Terrorism in Perspective* (Minneapolis: Sage Publications, Inc, 2007), 219.

²⁸⁶ Simon Finch, “Mixed Messages of Terror and Media,” *Financial Times* (London), December 8, 2001.

²⁸⁷ Fareed Zakaria, “The Only Thing we Have to Fear...” *Newsweek*, June 2, 2008.

²⁸⁸ Brigitte Nacos, *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 95.

²⁸⁹ Bruno S. Frey and Dominik Rohner, “Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-Game between Terrorists and the Media,” working paper No. 285, *Institute for Empirical Research in Economics University of Zurich*, April 2006.

The events of 11 September 2001 thus served to cement a link between Islam and terrorism in Western media.²⁹⁰ The Western media is more often than not, awash with the details of so-called “Jihadists” who commit dreadful acts in the name of religion.²⁹¹ The historical events discussed in the beginning of this chapter, today, Islam is portrayed as a violent religion and Muslims as intolerant people. Both the electronic and print media perpetually fuel this wrong perception, while violators do not depict the true religion of Islam. While moderate views of Islam are few and far between in media coverage, the frequency of stories on Islamic terrorism serves to highlight a public cognitive bias in which people perceive a connection and a probability because they hear about it so often, regardless of the reality of the situation.

Samuel P. Huntington expects a clash of civilizations between the Arabs/Muslims of the East and the Christian democracies of the West. The Western news networks, for their part, keep playing to the same tune. Highlighting minor local issues as major and neglecting to cover incidents perceived as injustices to Muslims by the West. When the news of the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995 went around, many American media outlets immediately suspected Muslims to be behind this act of terrorism.²⁹² Those who hold responsible positions started issuing decrees over television, radio and in the press. However, without any evidence, they talked about beards and black hair of the accused.²⁹³ Political leaders and media have promulgated such a strong connection between terrorism and those born in the Middle East, Arabs, and Islamic fundamentalists, that many assume only such people could commit such acts.²⁹⁴ For example, Time magazine published a photograph where Muslim soldiers were shown performing prayers with guns. The caption on the bottom of the picture said, “Guns and prayer go together

²⁹⁰ Mahmood Mamdani, “Good Muslims, Bad Muslims: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism,” *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 104, No. 3, 2002, 766–775.

²⁹¹ Yasmeen Ali, comment on “Jihad and Terrorism: Are both Synonymous?”

²⁹² Khuram Murad, “Islam and the West: Who is the Terrorist?”
http://www.themodernreligion.com/terror/terrorism_who.html (accessed on August 20, 2010).

²⁹³ Murad, “Islam and the West: Who is the Terrorist?”

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

in the fundamentalist battle.”²⁹⁵ The part that the Magazine omitted or failed to state was that the Muslim soldiers were praying on a battlefield in Afghanistan. Common sense of the situation meant that the soldiers had to remain armed at all times in case of an ambush at any time.²⁹⁶ Samuel P Huntington’s book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, sends out the following frightening message:

The underlying problem of the West is not Islamic fundamentalism, it is Islam. A different civilization, whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The problem for Islam is not CIA or the US Department of Defense. It is the West, different civilizations whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe their superior, though declining; power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world.²⁹⁷

Under this paradigm, exceptions notwithstanding, most of the activities associated with terrorism are identified as belonging to the domain of Islam and the Muslim world. Once this assumption is accepted, there is hardly any difficulty in legitimizing the logic of an inevitable confrontation between Islam and the West.²⁹⁸ In the recent wars fought by the United States and its allies, it has become obvious that whoever controlled the media could project how the wars are being fought and won. More importantly, they could project *why* the war was being fought, as the other side was simply not given a voice. Even untrue stories could be cooked up or true stories be presented in a manner that blurred reality.²⁹⁹

It was in 1991 during the first Gulf War that the media for the first time was used as a weapon in the true sense. Not only Iraqis but also Arabs by extension of this media

²⁹⁵ Faatin Haque, “Global Media, Islamophobia and its Impact on Conflict Resolution,” *Institute of Hazrat Muhammad (SAW)*, <http://www.ihmsaw.org/resourcefiles/1260034024.pdf> (accessed on July 21, 2010).

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order*, (London: Penguin, 1996), 217.

²⁹⁸ G Gopa Kumar, *International Terrorism and Global Order in 21st Century*, (New Delhi: Kanishka, 2003), 89.

²⁹⁹ Akbar S Ahmed, *Islam Today: A Short Introduction to Muslim World*, (London: I B Tauris, 1999), 223.

attack became the enemy and it became a war of the West against Muslims.³⁰⁰ The Western media built up the war as a major conflict between two large, balanced forces, and hence it was difficult to separate reality from illusion by offering completely one-sided commentary and analysis.³⁰¹ Given the robust symbiosis between the two, it would seem that mass media is a necessary condition for modern terrorism, as Margaret Thatcher once famously called media the “oxygen” of terrorism.³⁰²

One emerging area of importance is terrorism’s intersection with the new forms of mass media, particularly the Internet, whose virtues of freedom and openness also provide valuable advantages to terrorist groups.³⁰³ Like all academic bodies, most religious institutions and figures have developed their presence on the Internet. In the same way, terrorist organizations all over the world are using the Internet as a primary means of propaganda. The Internet is the technology largely responsible for evening the playing field in the highly asymmetric GWOT. Underground terrorist organizations lack direct access to mainstream media, and aside from attacks and signaling maneuvers public outreach must be conducted independently.³⁰⁴ The online medium offers terrorist organizations a public diplomacy platform on a scale previously only available to states and corporations.³⁰⁵

Moreover, the freedom of expression offered by the Internet remains unequalled. Even if some governments keep its use under strict surveillance—for instance, by banning access to certain websites—the Internet remains the largest available platform of

³⁰⁰ Akbar S Ahmed, *Islam Today: A Short Introduction to Muslim World*, (London: I B Tauris, 1999, 221–222.

³⁰¹ Akbar S Ahmed, “Islam in the Age of Western Media.” <http://muslimcanada.org/livingislam2.html> (accessed on September 28, 2010).

³⁰² European Commission. Sixth Framework Program. “Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law” *Terrorism and the Media*. July 23, 2008.

³⁰³ Gabriel Weinmann, *How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2004).

³⁰⁴ Wael Adhami, “The Strategic Importance of the Internet for Armed Insurgent Groups in Modern Warfare,” *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 89, No. 868, (December 2007), 857–878.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

expression throughout the world.³⁰⁶ In 1998, the U.S. Department of State counted no more than fifteen websites maintained by groups labeled by the U.S. governments as “terrorists”; however, by 2005, there were more than 4,000 such websites supporting terrorist groups and activities.³⁰⁷

The “war on terror,” driven as much by U.S. strategy to reconfigure the Middle East as by the events of 9/11, serves as the perfect backdrop for film industry productions of violent high-tech spectacles, now a major staple of media culture.³⁰⁸ Hollywood’s fascination with terrorism actually goes back several decades, as many movies in the post World War II era featured terrorists of Nazi origin or figures trying to gain power. The trend changed towards sci-fi and nuclear apocalypse films with the emergence of a cycle of the Cold War in the 1950s to 1970s. However, Middle Eastern Arab/Muslims replaced the villains during the 1980s and 1990s as the Cold War faded away.³⁰⁹

Although political terrorism is centuries old and spans virtually every ideological, national, religious, and ethnic group, recent Hollywood cinema prefers to focus on Arabs and Muslims.³¹⁰ Hollywood films of recent times, such as *Iron Eagle*, *True Lies*, and *The Siege*, have “Islamic terrorism” as the popular plot theme. In the 1996 film “Executive Decision,” a group of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists hijack a passenger airliner to transport a chemical weapon in the United States. The title of the film refers to the presidential order to shoot down a hostile passenger jet, an order put in operation after 9/11.³¹¹ Hollywood stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims as wild-eyed Qur’an-waving fanatics enforce the perception that Muslims are only there to be hated and despised.³¹²

³⁰⁶ Adhami, “The Strategic Importance of the Internet for Armed Insurgent Groups in Modern Warfare,” 857–878.

³⁰⁷ Gabriel Weinmann, “Terror on the Internet: The new Arena, the new Challenges,” *United States Institute of Peace Press*, Washington, DC, 2006, 5.

³⁰⁸ Carl Boggs and Tom Pollard, “Hollywood and the Spectacle of Terrorism,” *New Political Science*, Vol. 28, No. 3, (September 2006), 335.

³⁰⁹ Boggs and Pollard, “Hollywood and the Spectacle of Terrorism,” 338.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 347.

³¹¹ Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, *Why do People Hate America?* (Islamabad: Alhamra Publishing, 2003), 56.

³¹² *Ibid.*, 62.

According to film critic Michael Medved pointed out in 1992, Hollywood in the past 25 years has morphed from being the main advertiser of the “American Dream” to being the main promoter of the “American Nightmare.”³¹³

³¹³ Tony Corn, “From Info Ops to Edu Ops: Strategic Communication in the Age of the Long War,” paper presented at *Intersessional Conference on Strategic Communications: Managing Knowledge to Win Wars*, Newport, March 6–7, 2006.

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V. NONMILITARY STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM

Jaw-Jaw is better than War-War

Sir Winston Churchill

(White House Luncheon, June 26, 1954)

A. ISLAMIC NONVIOLENT APPROACH

A manifestation of the religion of Islam in Chapter II of this thesis gives a lucid understanding that Islam is a religion of peace (i.e., nonviolence) and tolerance. As Islam grew, it used to accommodate and reconcile with the existing traditions and values that the culture of a particular region practiced.³¹⁴ This gesture has always been a source of showing the tolerance and patience in the best of Islamic traditions. The religious traditions portrayed by Islamic terrorist groups today that are used to justify violence and war have also been and can still be sources of motivation for nonviolent, active resistance and peace building.³¹⁵

Using religious percepts and involvement of religious actors to resolve conflicts is not a new phenomenon.³¹⁶ Religions and institutions with which groups identify with have been widely used by different communities to promote peace and reconciliation.³¹⁷ According to Ayse Kadayifci, “nonviolent resistance is the preferred method for fighting injustice and resolving conflicts according to Islamic teachings based on the Qur’an and the Hadith.”³¹⁸ Some Muslim scholars argue that the Islamic teachings, which incorporate conflict resolution, include, but are not limited to, justice (*adl*), helping the poor (*ishan*), wisdom (*hikmah*), forgiveness (*afu*), and compassion (*rahma*).³¹⁹

³¹⁴ Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, “Forging and Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, Issue 2, (Spring 2002), 161–176.

³¹⁵ Ayse Kadayifci Orellana, “Religion, Violence and the Islamic Tradition of Nonviolence,” *The Turkish Yearbook on International Relations*, Vol. XXXIV, (2003), 24–62.

³¹⁶ Mohammed Abu-Nimer, “Conflict Resolution, Culture, and Religion: Toward a Training Model of Interreligious Peace Building,” *Peace Research*, vol. 38, No. 6, (2001), 685–704.

³¹⁷ Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*, (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2000), 71.

³¹⁸ Orellana, “Religion, Violence and the Islamic Tradition of Nonviolence,” 24–62.

³¹⁹ Mohammed Abu-Nimer, *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam* (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2003), 37.

It can be asserted that the Islamic nonviolent paradigm is based on justice for all, forgiveness, power (accumulates to people through unarmed struggles),³²⁰ deed of tolerance and patience (implies peaceful response or reaction), equality among humankind, respect for each other, and is an authentic component of the Islamic peace discourse, which creates the possibility for establishing justice.³²¹ Numerous Quranic verses relevant in this regard have already been referred to in earlier chapters. According to Wahiduddin Khan, the Qur'an is not a sword or a gun, but a book of ideology, and performing Jihad could only mean an ideological struggle to conquer people's hearts and minds through Islam's superior philosophy.³²²

He further argues that all of the greatest successes of Islam were achieved by nonviolent methods. His primary example is the Prophet Muhammad's life in Mecca, which had thirteen years in nonviolence out of a total of a twenty-three year period of his prophet-hood.³²³ Even when the Meccans waged war against him, the Prophet Muhammad chose to immigrate to Medina, which is a form of nonviolent activism. When the Meccans unilaterally waged war against him, the battles of *Badr* and *Uhud* took place, but the Prophet Muhammad made a ten-year treaty called the *Sulh al-Hudaybiyah*, accepting all the conditions of the opponents of Islam. This peace treaty paved the way for peaceful, constructive activities.³²⁴

In the contemporary era, the explanation of Islamic teachings about peace has been influenced by confused social, political and economical events of the twentieth century that have taken place in the Muslim world.³²⁵ It is vital for Muslims to recognize

³²⁰ Rabia Terri-Harris, "Nonviolence in Islam: The Alternative Community" in Daniel L. Smith-Christopher, eds., *Subverting Hatred: The Challenge of Nonviolence in Religious Traditions* (Boston: Boston Research Center for the 21st Century, 1998), 95–113.

³²¹ Orellana, "Religion, Violence and the Islamic Tradition of Nonviolence," 24–62.

³²² Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, "Non- Violence and Islam," paper prepared for the Symposium *Islam and Peace in the 21st Century*, Washington D.C. (February 6–7, 1998).

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ Sezai Ozcelik and Ayse Dilek Ogretir, "Islamic Peace Paradigm and Islamic Peace Education: The Study of Islamic Nonviolence in Post-September 11 World," *Journal of Globalization for the Common Good*, <http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/cca/jgcg/2007/fa07/jgcg-fa07-ozcelik-ogretir.htm> (accessed on November 13, 2010).

that they have a duty and responsibility to implement the highest values of their religion. Therefore, it is necessary to employ strategies to support Muslim groups whose function is to bring peace through nonviolent means. According to Ayse Kadayifci, it is an obligation of Muslim theologians, scholars, and activists to propagate Islamic traditions of nonviolence for exploring ways to resolve conflict and restore justice and harmony.³²⁶

B. CLASH OF RELIGION AND TERRORISM—CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN

We are fighting the menace and we will continue to fight. But this is the fight for the peace of the world. This is the fight for the future of generations to come. The fight against extremism is a fight for the hearts and minds of people. It cannot be won by guns and bombs only. The fight must be multifaceted.

Asif Ali Zardari, President of Pakistan
UN General Assembly, New York City
(September 25, 2008)

Even within the Islamic world, great disparities exist in socio-economic conditions, traditions, and behavior. Some countries are wealthy enough with national income guaranteed by natural resources and business development, and some are so poor that their very survival as political entities is at risk.³²⁷ Out of 47 Muslim countries, Pakistan ranks second after Indonesia in terms of population, which is 184 million with 95% Muslim population as of July 2010.³²⁸

Pakistan's selection for the case study is because connections between Islamic extremism and terrorist organizations in South Asia appear to be more extensive than they are in Southeast Asia.³²⁹ In addition, Pakistan is a Muslim country not only in terms of population but also declared as an Islamic State and terrorism incidents are currently on the rise. Whether it is a true Islamic State or not with “*Sharia*” as the law, is out of the scope of this study.

³²⁶ Orellana, “Religion, Violence and the Islamic Tradition of Nonviolence,” 24–62.

³²⁷ Michael J. Metrisko, “The American Military Advisor: Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials in the Islamic World,” *Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute*, August 2008, 4.

³²⁸ CIA World Fact Book, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html> (accessed on November 13, 2010).

³²⁹ Vaughn, “Islam in South and Southeast Asia,” 4.

Pakistan is a country that was created on the pretext of housing the Muslims of a subcontinent in a separate state. Therefore, the world's second largest Muslim country (in terms of population) "ought to be a model to the rest of the world of what Islam can be and should be."³³⁰ As a result, according to the Islamic teachings studied in earlier chapters, the Muslim population should have adopted the right path of Islam where every Muslim should have been under protection by his fellow Muslim brother.

On the contrary, currently Pakistan is considered the "hotbed region of terrorism,"³³¹ where killing of innocent Muslim men, women and children by the hands of fellow Muslims on a daily basis is a normal routine. Although not all of Pakistan is under such threats, this menace is growing like ripples in the pond, starting from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). These regions lie between Pakistan and Afghanistan on either side of the Durand Line (a border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which Afghanistan does not recognize until to date and is considered porous).

The following data table (Table 2) verifies the human losses in Pakistan due to terrorism incidents as an overview of the rising terrorism. In 2003, the total fatalities in terrorism-related violence amounted to just 189. By 2004, this number had risen to 863, slid marginally to 648 in 2005, but rose dramatically thereafter. In 2009, at least 11,585 persons, including 2,307 civilians and 1,011 security force (SF) personnel and 8,267 terrorist/insurgents, were killed in different attacks.

³³⁰ Desker and Ramakrishna, "Forging and Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia," 161–176.

³³¹ National Post, "Pakistan A 'Hotbed' for Terror," February 15, 2008, <http://www.canada.com/globaltv/national/story.html?id=6afd2fff-d4e4-4584-90ef-ef5fff3184d3> (accessed on November 13, 2010).

Years	Civilians	SF Personnel	Terrorists /Insurgents	Total
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1523	597	1479	3599
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2307	1011	8267	11585
2010*	119	14	126	259
Total	7747	2890	14712	25329

Table 2. Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan, 2003–2009.³³²

As mentioned in earlier chapters, one of the root causes of today's terrorism is the foreign occupation of Muslim-populated countries. This might be true for Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan or Chechnya. However, Pakistan does not fall into this category because Pakistan holds its sovereignty and there is no foreign foot soldiering in Pakistan. Therefore, this root cause is not applicable in Pakistan's case and the focus is on other causes. These causes include relative deprivation or inequality; poverty and meager economic opportunities; question of legitimacy of government; lawlessness in some regions such as FATA and NWFP;³³³ law and order situations including justice in the country and most important of all lack of correct religious education. As a result, the subject under study is why there is a severe clash between religion and terrorism in Pakistan—due to which terrorism is on the rise—and how this clash can be defunct.

Religious education in Islam since the beginning was acquired through “*Madrasa*,” where secular education was also formalized. While maintaining a firm religious base, Madrasas from Andalusia (the southern region of Spain) to the Indian

³³² Arshad Ali, “Socio Economic Cost of Terrorism: A Case Study of Pakistan,” *Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) Brief Number 57*, (April 11, 2010), 12.

³³³ Shuja Nawaz, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, (January 2009), 22.

subcontinent trained many great thinkers in science, math, philosophy and medicine.³³⁴ During these times, Madrasas were considered legitimate for the conception of *Ijtihad* (independent reasoning).³³⁵ Pakistan since its creation has been based on various tribal, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic identities, not to mention numerous variations of Islam being practiced by different sects.

Therefore, the Madrasas of Pakistan instead of teaching Islamic and secular education became the opposite and under such a diverse population developed into a tool to reinforce group identity for religious sects only. As Stephen Cohen argues, “the most important conflict in Pakistan is a clash between different concepts of Islam.”³³⁶ More so, during the first six years of the Zia period (1979–1982), growth in the Madrasas was modest with the founding of 151 new seminaries. During the subsequent six years as the U.S.-backed “*Mujahedeen*” effort in Afghanistan continued to gather momentum, 1,000 new Madrasas were established,³³⁷ due to the requirement of more so-called “*Jihadis*.” As put by Jeffrey Goldberg, “Madrassa is, in fact, a Jihad factory...”³³⁸

It is argued by many that radical Islamism is a byproduct of modernization itself, arising from the loss of identity that accompanies the transition to a modern, pluralist society.³³⁹ On the other hand, Tony Corn asserts that it is global Jihad, which is the byproduct of Pakistan government’s overt program of Islamization during the 1970s and 1980s,³⁴⁰ along with countering the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan with the help of

³³⁴ Daniel Billquist and Jason Colbert, “Pakistan, Madrasas, and Militancy,” (Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2006), 35–36.

³³⁵ Saleem Ali, *Islamic Education and Conflict: Understanding the Madrasas of Pakistan* (Oxford University Press, 2005), 16–17.

³³⁶ Stephen Cohen, “The Nation and the State of Pakistan,” *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 25, Issue 3, (Summer 2002), 109–122.

³³⁷ Angel M. Rabasa et al., “The Muslim World After 911,” *RAND Corporation* (2004), 275.

³³⁸ Jeffrey Goldberg cited in *Secrets of the Koran: Revealing Insights into Islam’s Holy Book* by Don Richardson (Ventura, California: Regal Books, 1999), 70.

³³⁹ Francis Fukuyama, “After Neoconservation,” *The New York Time Magazine*, February 19, 2006.

³⁴⁰ Corn, “From Info Ops to Edu Ops: Strategic Communication in the Age of the Long War,” 2006.

Mujahedeen. The Afghan/Soviet War produced six million refugees, many of which now reside in Pakistan's tribal regions. This area therefore serves as an ideal terrorist recruiting ground.³⁴¹

Moreover, removal of registration requirements in the 1990s resulted in the Madrasas moving beyond the control of the state.³⁴² Daniel Billquist and Jason Colbert as rightly analyze the crux of the situation:

the use of Madrasas to institutionalize the sectarian identities became troubling, especially given the lack of government oversight. Perpetuation of sectarian doctrine by religious schools legitimized sectarianism, and created conditions favorable to the development of militancy and violence commonly known as terrorism.³⁴³

C. ACTIONS FOR MUSLIM WORLD

I am a Muslim by faith...a Christian by spirit...a Jew by heart...and above all, I am a human being.

Dr. Tawfik Hamid

Islam is a complete code of conduct, which has been already discussed in earlier chapters. Then what seems to be the problem that has created the vacuum that has been filled by hatred and criticism against Islam? A critical analysis by Dr. Tawfik Hamid suggests that it is the double standards amongst the Muslim world which enunciates opposing messages against Islam. Therefore, Muslims need to admit their internal problems and face them boldly. Muslim rulers and religious scholars have to assert a clear and strong stand against terrorism and declaring wars on nonMuslims to spread Islam. Therefore, "the time has come that Muslims have to Change."³⁴⁴

In most of the countries with a majority Muslim population and where terrorism is on the rise these days the one thing noted is that, there is a cloud of injustice, relative

³⁴¹ Katie Minor, "U.S. Policy Options to Counter Terrorism in Pakistan," *Asia-Pacific Homeland Security Summit Fellows Program*, October 31, 2008, 10.

³⁴² Corn, "From Info Ops to Edu Ops: Strategic Communication in the Age of the Long War," 2006.

³⁴³ Billquist and Colbert, "Pakistan, Madrasas, and Militancy," 35–36.

³⁴⁴ Tawfik Hamid, "From the Heart of a Muslim," April 20, 2010 <http://cplash.com/post/From-the-heart-of-a-Muslim---Tawfik-Hamid901.html> (accessed on November 14, 2010).

deprivation and lawlessness including misguided youth on the name of religion. Hence, the author conforms to the argument made by Albert Bandura, "...when power holders willfully disregard legitimate grievances concerning maltreatment then terrorists can easily persuade themselves that their actions are motivated by self-protection or desperation."³⁴⁵

According to October 2009 Pew research there are 1.57 billion Muslims in the world that makes up 23% of the world's population.³⁴⁶ The number of violent extremists is not known to be exact, but according to different analyses of scholars and world institutions, it is estimated that they are between 6% and 15% of the total Muslim population.³⁴⁷ Therefore, it would be easier to promote peace by engaging moderate Muslims to counter the effect of radicals. Use of speeches, conferences, mosques, Internet, and the media are all means to promote the, correct teachings, condemn the actions of the radicals and isolate them from the world. Moreover, Muslims need to be realistic in accepting the fact that Muslims today are away from right track, religiously, economically, and even ethically. Therefore, Muslims need to make an effort to progress in development, trade and accept the world order as it is today, and compete it with patience and peace by integrating with the rest of the progressing world.

Moderate Muslim voices must begin to reclaim ideological ground that has been lost.³⁴⁸ Ulil Abshar Abdallah, an official of the moderate Nadlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, conceded that, rather than "mulling over religious paradoxes and disputes about the lives of long-dead saints," moderate intellectuals must match the radical Muslims in "presenting a simple yet comprehensive ideology that can be grasped

³⁴⁵ Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement." in Walter Reich ed. *Origins of Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998).

³⁴⁶ "Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population," *PEW Research Center*, October 2009, 1.

³⁴⁷ Danios, "All Terrorists are Muslims...Except the 94% that Aren't," January 20, 2010 <http://www.loonwatch.com/2010/01/not-all-terrorists-are-muslims/> (accessed on November 14, 2010), and see also, Shannon Clark, "Muslim Culture: Center of Gravity for Global War on Terror," *US Navy War College*, Newport, May 2007.

³⁴⁸ Desker and Ramakrishna, "Forging and Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia," 161–176.

by common people.”³⁴⁹ While radical Islamists are a minority almost everywhere, in many areas they hold the advantage because they have developed extensive networks that span the Muslim world.³⁵⁰ Moderate and liberal Muslims, although a majority in most Muslim countries and communities, have not created similar networks. Moderate Muslim networks and institutions would provide a platform to amplify the message of moderates as well as some measure of protection from violence and intimidation.³⁵¹

The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) can play the strongest and most influential role in collaboration with United Nations (UN) to enhance the efforts of Muslim countries in this regard. Although the OIC and the UN are already undertaking projects to configure solutions to counterterrorism, there is a view that much more is required by the member states of respective organizations to participate openly using all available means. In view of the above critics, it is necessary for Muslims to come to terms with Western society; otherwise, it will be impossible for the religion that was so necessary for their spiritual well being to flourish.³⁵² However, according to Karen Armstrong, “Christianity and the West also suffer from a fundamental weakness that is an inability to recognize that they share the planet not with inferiors but with equals.” If this impasse continues then Muslims and Westerners would both fail the crucial test of the twenty-first century.³⁵³

³⁴⁹ Peter Ford, “Listening for Islam’s Silent Majority,” *Christian Science Monitor*, November 5, 2001, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1105/p1s2-wogi.html> (accessed November 14, 2010).

³⁵⁰ Angel Rabasa et al., “Moderate Muslim Networks,” *RAND Corporation*, 2007, iii.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² Karen Armstrong, “The Meaning of Dialogue,” in *Islam and the West: Annual Report on the State of Dialogue*, *World Economic Forum*, January 2008, 12.

³⁵³ Ibid.

1. Recantation of Extremist Groups

Everybody is worried about stopping terrorism. Well, there is an easy way: Stop participating in it.

Noam Chomsky

It is a consensus among counterterrorism experts that just as there are conditions, through which an individual becomes an extremist, there can also be created conditions through which an extremist comes to renounce violence, leaves a group or movement, or even rejects a radical worldview.³⁵⁴ The recantation of prominent radicals poses a credible challenge to the movement. For example, the recantation written by former Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) ideologue Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (also known as Dr. Fadl) resonates with radicals because nobody can challenge the legitimacy of an ex-militant.³⁵⁵ Not only individuals have recanted from extremist views in past but also extremist group has shown example of recanting from extreme violent practices.

In September 2009, the imprisoned leadership of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a prominent Jihadist group allied with al-Qaeda, wrote and released a revision document over 400 pages long, in which they renounce the “use of violence to change political situations.”³⁵⁶ These revisions are the result of a reported two years of consultations with the Libyan government. These consultations have facilitated the release of the document authored by top leadership of the group, “*Corrective Studies in Understanding Jihad, Accountability and the Judgment of People*,” which deals with varying issues including Jihad, religious extremism and the judgment of people’s beliefs.³⁵⁷

It seems like the above quotation from Professor Chomsky has been a great source of encouragement for the leaders of the LIFG in the efforts of this act. LIFG has been a key ally for al-Qaeda therefore, their revision document is critically important as a

³⁵⁴ Angel Rabasa et al., “Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists,” *RAND Corporation*, 2010, iii.

³⁵⁵ Angel Rabasa et al., “Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists,” *RAND Corporation*, 2010, 30.

³⁵⁶ Mohammad Ali Musawi, *A Selected Translation of the LIFG Recantation Document*, (Quilliam, 2009), 4.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

message to other violent extremist groups and the Muslim world simultaneously. This document reveals some bitter truth about Muslims, how they misunderstood and misinterpreted the word of Allah to create the menace of terrorism in the world. Muslims today agree that salvation from their weakness will not be possible without the same thing that advanced their ancestors who liberated the hearts of people before liberating countries.³⁵⁸

In the LIFG corrective study document, authors openly accept the fact that they lacked religious guidance. Therefore, it is imperative upon every individual who discovers these errors and shortcomings either in himself/herself or in others to fix them and reform. They further declare that this document “is guidance for every zealous Muslim who has been pained by the state of his battered “*ummah*” (Muslim community) and whose lands have been plundered from Palestine to Iraq to Afghanistan.”³⁵⁹ After reviewing the document, the main theme extracted is that it was the absence of “*ulama*” (scholars of religion) and adequate methods to spread religious knowledge and scarcity of guides that played a role in making the wrong choices.

This document places clear guidelines for anyone who wants to take a path toward serving his religion and “*ummah*,” but in a nonviolent way by serving the *ummah* instead of killing Muslim brothers and sisters. Now it is the duty of the Muslim world to promote this revision document and create conditions for proper education for other terrorist groups. According to Camille Tawil,

despite many shortcomings of this experiment, it undoubtedly remains one of the pioneering approaches that deserve examination, in order to measure the extent of its success in turning the page of struggles between Muslim world in general and Arab governments in particular and armed Islamist groups.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁸ Mohammad Ali Musawi, *A Selected Translation of the LIFG Recantation Document*, (Quilliam, 2009), 4.

³⁵⁹ Musawi, *A Selected Translation of the LIFG Recantation Document*, 8.

³⁶⁰ Camille Tawil, “The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s Revisions: One Year Later,” July 23, 2010, http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2010/07/23/feature-02 (accessed on November 14, 2010).

However, it is noteworthy that after the publication of the revision in its complete version, there has been no Islamic legal reasoning from any terrorist group rejecting what the LIFG presented. This clearly indicates that critics have not found any Islamic jurisprudential deficiencies in the principles on which the LIFG leaders based their conclusions.³⁶¹ The hope is when enough ex-militants renounce radical Islamism, the ideology and the organizations that adhere to it are fatally discredited and as greater numbers of militants renounce extremism, radical Islamist organizations will experience greater hurdles in attracting adherents and sympathizers within the Muslim community.³⁶²

2. Quest for Proper Education

As the example of the LIFG depicts that it was lack of proper religious education that led to the creation of this terrorist group and the creation of many other terrorist groups around the world. Therefore, the need of the hour is an extensive “information operations” campaign by both moderate Muslims and the United States that consists of televising moderate imams on respective networks of the countries who are affected by terrorism. Radio commentaries and print articles in local newspapers are also necessary for the success of any campaign against militant Islam.³⁶³

This quest for proper education, obviously, is unlikely to happen overnight but it should be clear, since the problem is not so much “mis-information” as it is “mis-education.”³⁶⁴ Having said that, Islamic education is to be used or modified to bring about greater social and societal changes in the Muslim world.³⁶⁵ Therefore, the goal

³⁶¹ I Camille Tawil, “The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group’s Revisions: One Year Later,” July 23, 2010, http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2010/07/23/feature-02 (accessed on November 14, 2010).

³⁶² Rabasa et al., “Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists,” 31.

³⁶³ Shannon Clark, “Muslim Culture: Center of Gravity for Global War on Terror,” *US Navy War College*, Newport, May 2007.

³⁶⁴ Corn, “From Info Ops to Edu Ops: Strategic Communication in the Age of the Long War,” 2006.

³⁶⁵ Uzma Anzar, “Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrasas with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices,” March 2003, <http://schools.nashua.edu/myclass/fenlonm/block1/Lists/DueDates/Attachments/10/madrassah-history.pdf> (accessed on November 14, 2010), 21.

should be to advance Muslim nations through Islamic education systems in combination with scientific interventions.³⁶⁶ More initiatives that are educational—especially religious—are needed to weaken support and sympathy for terrorist activities and groups.³⁶⁷

For advanced and scientific learning through higher levels of Islamic education systems in Madrasas, major changes compatible with the prevailing political, religious, human rights, and women right realities that surround the Muslim world today would be required.³⁶⁸ Thus, bringing back Madrasas to the point where they lead the debate on *Ijtihad*—independent reasoning—and pave the way for advancement in Muslim societies.³⁶⁹ Only if Islamic leaders and scholars are able to articulate these measures and are willing to adapt and change, the world could witness another Islamic renaissance.³⁷⁰

D. ACTIONS FOR THE WESTERN WORLD

I think the more we learned over this period of several years, the more we began to realize the limits of what we knew...

Tom Dowse, Chief of the Assessments Staff,
London Terrorist Attacks of July 2005

The present situation as discussed in previous chapters show there is an element of rift existing between some of the Islamic countries and the West. After an analysis, it is felt that there is a need for both to revisit their policies towards each other. In the same context as actions for the Muslim world were argued in the previous section, this section will deal with the actions the author thinks are required by the Western world in order to

³⁶⁶ Uzma Anzar, “Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrasas with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices,” March 2003, <http://schools.nashua.edu/myclass/fenlonm/block1/Lists/DueDates/Attachments/10/madrassah-history.pdf> (accessed on November 14, 2010), 21.

³⁶⁷ “Implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy,” 42nd Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade, Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation, June 8–13, 2007.

³⁶⁸ Anzar, “Islamic Education: A Brief History of Madrasas with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices,” 21.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

defeat the nuisance of terrorism in a peaceful way. Fulfilling this requirement needs to plug the gap between how civil society in the United States and the Muslim world view one other. Building support within civil society across the U.S.-Muslim world divide is valuable to both communities in that it can strengthen international security through mutual understanding, and open communication channels that can be used to solve shared challenges.³⁷¹

Muslim-West dialogue is critical in today's world because peace and stability are critical for the economic growth and opportunity necessary to meet human needs in a sustainable fashion on a global scale.³⁷² Counterterrorism efforts, the U.S. occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan, the enduring Israeli-Palestinian conflict, European Union efforts to integrate a growing Muslim minority, and the prospects for democracy in the Middle East—these issues demonstrate the importance of dialogue together with greater understanding, mutual respect, and sustained cooperation in the service of peace.³⁷³

Majorities in Muslim countries believe that the Muslim world is committed to better relations with the West, but that the West does not share the same goal. On the contrary, most in non-Muslim majority countries reach opposite conclusions; they see the West, but not the Muslim world, committed to better relations.³⁷⁴ In 2005, the Gallup Organization asked Muslims around the world, from Morocco to Indonesia, to explain in their own words what the West could do to improve relations with the Muslim world. The most frequent response was, “greater respect for Islam and to stop regarding Muslims as inferior.”³⁷⁵

³⁷¹ Hady Amr, “The Opportunity of the Obama Era: Can Civil Society Help Bridge Divides between the United States and a Diverse Muslim World?” *Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper*, Number 1, November 2009, 1.

³⁷² Lord Carey of Clifton, “West-Muslim Dialogue: A Critical Challenge,” in *Islam and the West: Annual Report on the State of Dialogue*, *World Economic Forum*, January 2008, 11.

³⁷³ “Islam and the West: Annual Report on the State of Dialogue,” *World Economic Forum*, January 2008, 8.

³⁷⁴ Dalia Mogahed and Ahmed Younis, “Public Opinion on the State of Muslim-West Dialogue” in *Islam and the West: Annual Report on the State of Dialogue*, *World Economic Forum*, Annex 1, January 2008, 130.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 131.

Post 9/11, the UN, World Economic Forum, OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) and many governments have been conducting interreligious and intercivilizational dialogues globally. Such attention signals a new, more comprehensive role for religion in international affairs: in war and peace, democratization, civil society, educational and economic development.³⁷⁶ Even after so much effort the GWOT is already entering its tenth year; therefore, the West needs to take a step further in order to develop a strategy to counterterrorism not by increasing military power but developing a nonmilitary strategy—an understanding of Islam as religion, ideology and culture.

This can be accomplished by isolating the radical population via having dialogue with moderate Muslims around the world and taking them onboard in order to use the correct tenet of Islam against the misinterpreted ones as exploited by the terrorist organizations. Fyodor Dostoevsky, a Russian scholar and writer of the nineteenth century comments about this type of situation, “While nothing is easier than to denounce the evildoer, nothing is more difficult than to understand him.” American Muslims should be encouraged to act as a bridge between Americans and Muslims and between the United States and the Muslim World.³⁷⁷ American Muslims should actively participate as citizens of the United States, not merely as members of the Ummah, so that Muslims and the Muslim world will view their country, America, more favorably.³⁷⁸

³⁷⁶ John L. Esposito, “A Dialogue for Result,” in *Islam and the West: Annual Report on the State of Dialogue*, *World Economic Forum*, January 2008, 18.

³⁷⁷ Waqas A. Sulehri, “American’s Views of the Muslim World: Realities and Fallacies,” Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2006, 62.

³⁷⁸ Sulehri, “American’s Views of the Muslim World: Realities and Fallacies,” 62.

1. Understanding Islamic Ideology and Culture—Building Positive Relations with the Muslim World

*The links between these two worlds matter more today than ever before, because the degree of misunderstanding between the Islamic and Western worlds remains dangerously high, and because the need for the two to live and work together in our increasingly interdependent world has never been greater.*³⁷⁹

HRH Prince Charles

The world's perception of the United States has become increasingly negative since 2002.³⁸⁰ From 2002 to 2008, America's standing across a diverse Muslim world suffered a deep and rapid drop, as according to the 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll, 83 percent of the public in predominantly Muslim countries have an unfavorable view of the United States, and 70 percent express no confidence in the United States.³⁸¹ Even in Kuwait, the country that United States liberated from Iraq in 1991, American favorability dropped to 17 percent, and the unfavorability rating of the United States reached 66 percent.³⁸²

On the other hand, Americans have also come to hold negative views about Islam and Muslims.³⁸³ Studies show that only 59 percent of Americans held a favorable rating of Muslims in 2001 right after 9/11.³⁸⁴ However, in 2007, a Pew survey showed that only 43 percent of Americans held favorable views of Muslims, while 53 percent held

³⁷⁹ A Speech by HRH The Prince of Wales, "Islam and the West," *Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies*, The Sheldonian Theatre, Oxford, October 27, 1993, http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/speechesandarticles/a_speech_by_hrh_the_prince_of_wales_titled_islam_and_the_wes_425873846.html (accessed on November 19, 2010).

³⁸⁰ Amr, "The Opportunity of the Obama Era," 15.

³⁸¹ Shibley Telhami, "2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey," February 2008, <http://sadat.umd.edu/surveys/index.htm> (accessed on November 18, 2010).

³⁸² Richard Burkholder, "Kuwaiti Impressions of U.S. Have Soured Since 2001" February 28, 2007 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/26728/kuwaiti-impressions-us-soured-since-2001.aspx> (accessed on November 18, 2010).

³⁸³ Amr, "The Opportunity of the Obama Era," 15.

³⁸⁴ "Americans See Religion as Gaining Clout in Public Life," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 7, 2001. Poll conducted on 1500 American adults in November 2001.

favorable views of American Muslims.³⁸⁵ The United States has been losing credibility with the Islamic world slowly and steadily with the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and the principal justification for the invasion can be considered as a major contributor to this decline in credibility.³⁸⁶ According to Robert Pape, “extensive research into the causes of suicide terrorism proves Islam isn’t to blame—the root of the problem is foreign military occupations.”³⁸⁷

The data from the above studies depicts that there is a dire need of understanding the religion of Islam in the Western world. It has also been observed that U.S. counterterrorism policy “tends to conflate political Islam and terrorism worldwide.”³⁸⁸ According to Karen Armstrong, fear feeds extremism; therefore, the war against terror should include a better appreciation of Islam in the West.³⁸⁹ Some even argue that cultural identity differs from political identity; hence, an Islamic revival that finds its expression through cultural or religious means is not necessarily a threat.³⁹⁰ Therefore, the only way of isolating individual terrorists is to do so politically, by addressing the issues in which terrorists “wrap themselves up,” because without addressing the issues, there is no way of shifting the terrain of conflict from the military to the political and drying up support for political terror.³⁹¹

In August 2008, the U.S. government published a document prepared by Michael Mentriko of the Strategic Studies Institute titled *The American Military Advisor: Dealing*

³⁸⁵ The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “Public Expresses Mixed Views of Islam and Mormonism,” 25 September 2007, <http://pewforum.org/Public-Expresses-Mixed-Views-of-Islam-Mormonism.aspx> (accessed on November 18, 2010).

³⁸⁶ Lawrence Andrew Dobrot, “The Global War on Terrorism: A Religious War?” *US Army War College*, November 2007, 14.

³⁸⁷ Robert A. Pape, “It’s the Occupation, Stupid,” *Foreign Policy* (online), October 18, 2010 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/18/its_the_occupation_stupid (accessed on November 14, 2010).

³⁸⁸ The Stanley Foundation, “Political Islam and Counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia: An Agenda for U.S. Policy,” *Policy Bulletin*, October 16, 2003.

³⁸⁹ Vaughn, “Islam in South and Southeast Asia,” 5.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Mamdani, “Good Muslims, Bad Muslims,” 766–775.

*with Senior Foreign Officials in the Islamic World.*³⁹² This document provides a clear and detailed insight of dealing with Islamic traditions and cultures in the Islamic countries. The irony is that this document is advice for only military personnel who, when deployed in a country, are actually and physically exposed to people, religion and culture of that country. It is generally noted that U.S. military officers in the capacity of being advisors to other countries have done well even they were not exposed to such documents or formal training. Examples of T.E. Lawrence in Saudi Arabia, Geary Lansdale in Southeast Asia, Col. Ben Malcom in North Korea and Glubb Pasha in Jordan are notable. However, the need to advise senior government officials in the same context is still a missing link. As former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara mentioned in 1998:

We in this country...don't understand the Muslim fundamentalists today...In any event, the fact is that at the senior levels of the Governments we did not have a deep understanding of the peoples we are involved with (during the Vietnam War); we didn't know their history, their culture, their politics, their personalities. And that ignorance was reflected in the national intelligence estimates (NIE), which were the bible by which the Secretaries of State, Defense, National Security Advisors and the Presidents behaved.³⁹³

³⁹² Metrisko, "The American Military Advisor," August 2008.

³⁹³ Scott Atran, "The Strategic Threat from Suicide Terror," *AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies*, December 2003.

2. Marshall Plan³⁹⁴ (for Poor Muslim Countries in General and Pakistan in Particular)

[T]he world of suffering people looks to us for leadership. Their thoughts, however, are not concentrated alone on this problem. They have immediate and terribly pressing concerns where the mouthful of food will come from, where they will find shelter tonight, and where they will find warmth. Along with the great problem of maintaining the peace, we must solve the problem of the pittance of food, of clothing and coal and homes. Neither of these problems can be solved alone.

George C. Marshall (November 1945)

“Only 19 suicide attackers and a financial input of probably US \$ 500,000 killed more than 3,000 civilians and caused a material damage of at least US \$ 40 Billion.”³⁹⁵ This was the snowball of expenditures on the U.S. taxpayers, which according to the National Priorities Project (NPP) has reached an estimate of more than \$ 1.1 trillion since 2001 in the name of the war on terror. The breakdown is \$ 742 billion and \$ 366 billion in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively.³⁹⁶ There are mixed assumptions and opinions of scholars across the globe whether there is a causal connection between poverty and rising terrorism, yet this debate is open for discussion because there is no control answer for this. Assuming there is no direct connection of poverty in under developing countries who are victims of terrorism, it is still indirectly linked to the social-economic sector of those countries, which ultimately has some effects on the decent living of the citizens who then would not indulge in unlawful acts including terrorism. Therefore, investment in education is critical for economic growth, improved health, and social progress is

³⁹⁴ The Marshall Plan was a rational effort by the United States aimed at reducing the hunger, homelessness, sickness, unemployment, and political restlessness of the 270 million people in sixteen nations in West Europe after World War - II from 1947-51. It was not mainly directed toward feeding individuals or building individual houses, schools, or factories, but at strengthening the economic superstructure.

³⁹⁵ Ambassador Georg Witschel, “Global Terrorism: Trends and Response (keynote address at the Kathmandu International Conference),” *Newsletter: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies*, Colombo, vol. 9, No. 1 (January 2003).

³⁹⁶ The National Priorities Project (NPP) is a think tank and advocacy group that provides research designed to influence U.S. federal spending priorities, <http://www.costofwar.com/> (accessed on November 19, 2010).

beyond question, and poverty as a scourge that the international aid community and industrialized countries should work to eradicate is also beyond question.³⁹⁷

On the other hand, it is historically proven that in development economics between the second half of the 1940s and the first half of the 1960s, there was a shared dichotomous worldview that the economic structure of developing countries is of a different nature from that of developed countries, and that supply-side rigidities hinder the industrialization of developing countries.³⁹⁸ Therefore, there are three reasons why developing countries cannot be freed from poverty: 1) the dependence of their economic structure on primary product exports; 2) bottlenecks on the supply side; and 3) *insufficient capital*. Because of these factors, developing countries cannot escape from “low-level equilibrium.”³⁹⁹

It is also asserted that in addition to reforming the international trade and monetary system (the so-called “free trade system” under the IMF and GATT), which unfavorably affects developing countries, it is essential to proceed with an “inward-looking” development strategy (or import- substitution- industrialization strategy) to expand the economy and eliminate poverty.⁴⁰⁰ In 1996, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) proposed a new strategy for development cooperation in which it stated its goal to halve the number of people who are living in extreme poverty before the year 2015.⁴⁰¹ The success of these strategies is in question--on the one hand, terrorism is on the rise in lesser-developed Muslim countries, while on the other hand spending on counterterrorism continues to spiral upward. Regardless of which strategies have been pursued thus far, it is clear they deserve revision.

³⁹⁷ Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection,” *Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics*, April 18, 2002, 1.

³⁹⁸ Hideki Esho, “Development Economics and Some Issues on Poverty,” *Technology and Development*, Japan International Cooperation Agency, No. 12, January 1999, 5–10.

³⁹⁹ Esho, “Development Economics and Some Issues on Poverty,” 5–10.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁰¹ OECD and DAC, *Shaping the 21st Century, The Contribution of Development Cooperation* (Paris: OECD, 1996).

Drawing a connection between poverty and terrorism if it is not justified is potentially quite dangerous as the international aid community may lose interest in providing support to developing nations when the imminent threat of terrorism recedes, much like support for development waned in the aftermath of the Cold War.⁴⁰² Certain risks are always associated with aid being given to countries, as connecting foreign aid with terrorism risks the possibility of humiliating many in less developed countries who are implicitly told they only receive aid to prevent them from committing criminal acts of terror. Furthermore, premising foreign aid on the threat of terrorism could create perverse incentives in which some groups are induced to engage in terrorism to increase their prospect of receiving aid.⁴⁰³

On the contrary, the author argues here that if the international aid community backs off after the nuisance of terrorism is weakened then be it, because in the first place, help in the form of money should not be in terms of aid. Aid is very less an amount to put a country or a nation on the track of self-sustenance and development. Aid to a nation is just like feeding poor people only enough for a day and then every other day if it continues. Moreover, insufficient capital is adjudged as one of the important factors for poor countries to remain poor. The table below shows the amount of aid given by the United States to Pakistan since the start of the war on terror, and the total U.S. aid to Pakistan since its independence to the year 2006 is summed up to U.S. \$ 42.5 billion and estimated to be less than \$ 50 billion by December 2010.⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰² Krueger and Maleckova, "Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection."

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁴ "US Aid to Pakistan and Democracy," *Policy Perspectives*, vol. 6, No. 2, July-December 2009, <http://www.ips.org.pk/pakistanaffairs/security-a-foreign-policy/1080.html> (accessed on November 19, 2010).

Program or Account	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008 (est.)	FY2002- FY2008 Total	FY2009 (req.)
I206	—	—	—	—	23	14	53	90	^a
CN	—	—	—	8	29	39	55	131	^a
CSF ^b	1,169 ^c	1,247	705	964	862	731	920 ^d	6,599	200 ^e
FC	—	—	—	—	—	—	75	75	25 ^a
FMF	75	225	75	299	297	297	298	1,566	300
IMET	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	11	2
INCLE	91	31	32	32	38	21	22	267	47
NADR ^f	10	1	5	8	9	10	10	53	11
Total Security-Related	1,346	1,505	818	1,313	1,260	1,115	1,435	8,792	585
CSH	14	16	26	21	28	22	30	157	28
DA	10	35	49	29	38	95	30	286	—
ESF ^g	615	188	200	298	337	389	347	2,374	588 ^h
Food Aid	5	28	13	32	55	—	42	175	37
HRDF	1	—	2	2	1	11	—	17	—
MRA	9	7	6	6	10	4	—	42	—
Total Economic-Related	654	274	296	388	539	521	449	3,121	653
Grand Total	2,000	1,779	1,114	1,701	1,799	1,636	1,884	11,913	1,238

Table 3. Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursement to Pakistan, FY 2002–FY 2009.⁴⁰⁵

Therefore, the target of the international aid community or the developed countries in association with the UN and OIC should be that a large sum of funds be planned for under-developed and under-educated countries of the world to the extent of the “Marshall Plan.” In this connection, those Islamic countries that fall in this category and are having the problem of rising terrorism must be on the forefront. Although there is no direct connection established between poverty and terrorism, this step is considered necessary along with other steps mentioned in previous sections of this chapter that are required by the Muslim and Western world simultaneously.

Therefore, here the author examines the Marshall Plan and its effects on Europe after World War II. How can it be applicable in countering the current rising terrorism threat? Based on the historical facts the author makes a case to implement a Marshall Plan for the poor Muslim countries, especially Pakistan in the contemporary era. The Marshall Plan was the response of the United States to Europe’s rapidly developing dollar shortage in 1947. At the end of World War II Britain was the world’s leading debtor country with more than £ 3,000 million owed to wartime creditors. In 1946, the consolidated deficit of all European countries in their trade and other transactions with

⁴⁰⁵ K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” *CRS Report for Congress*, February 6, 2009, 94.

the rest of the world amounted to \$5.8 billion, rising to \$7.5 billion in 1947. The deficits with the United States only in both years were, respectively, \$4.2 billion and \$5.4 billion, which represented over 70 percent of the total.⁴⁰⁶

Money transferred to Europe after WWII through the Marshall Plan was in two phases: (1) Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) 1946–48 and (2) Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas (EROA) 1949–51. According to this plan, a total sum of U.S. \$ 13.2 billion was transferred in aid to 270 million people from sixteen European countries, including Germany after the fall of Nazis.⁴⁰⁷ The Marshall Plan played a key role in inaugurating the post-war era of prosperity and political stability in Western Europe.

According to the CRS Report for Congress, the inflated value of \$ 13 billion in 1946 would amount to approximately \$ 137 billion in 2007.⁴⁰⁸ Therefore, it is argued by the author that by December 2010 it would not cross the figure of \$ 150 billion. The analysis of the data gives a picture that almost twice of the WWII deficit was transferred to European countries over a period of four years. In the same context, if Pakistan is transferred an amount twice of its \$ 50 billion deficit (i.e., \$ 100 billion) in 2010, it will still only be two-thirds of the inflated value of the actual amount transferred in the Marshall Plan (i.e., \$ 150 billion in 2010).

Moreover, this amount was for betterment of 270 million people of Europe, whereas Pakistan in 2010 is estimated to have a population of 190 million, making it 80 million less. The point to ponder here is that since 2001 the United States has expended a total sum of \$ 1.1 trillion militarily for the war on terror, which is almost nine times the projected value of original Marshall Plan in 2010. If only a quarter of the already expended money was transferred to any of the poor, Muslim countries including Pakistan a decade ago as a nonmilitary developmental package—even under same conditions as

⁴⁰⁶ C. C. S. Newton, “The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan,” *The Economic History Review*, New Series, vol. 37, No. 3. (August 1984), 391–408.

⁴⁰⁷ J. Bradford De Long and Barry Eichengreen, “The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program, October 1991.

⁴⁰⁸ Connie Veillette, “Foreign Aid Reform: Issue for Congress and Policy Options,” *CRS Report for Congress*, November 7, 2007.

the Marshall Plan—their developmental and economic conditions would have been on the rise. Ultimately, the socio-economic conditions and infrastructure would have seen better governments and education systems, which in return would have prevented a huge percentage of people joining the radicals and creating violence in the form of terrorism.

The biggest issue is still not the amount of money discussed above but the number of soldiers and civilians who have lost their lives during combat and as a part of collateral damage. Members of the U.S. military, NATO forces, other local agencies and a number of innocent civilians on both sides of the borders have died, which no amount of money can repay the families of the individuals.

Although there were many constraints in the execution of the Marshall Plan, where Europe stands today—speaks for itself that they worked out the constraints and crossed the hurdles in the way of self-sustenance and development. In similar fashion, if a Marshall Plan is developed for Pakistan in addition with other measures taken, the region of South Asia can come out of the poverty zone and the next generation would not see the menace of terrorism.

E. PEACEFUL NONMILITARY SOLUTIONS TO COUNTERTERRORISM

*Until we understand the sources of terrorism and do something about them, we can arm ourselves to the teeth, rampage across the planet with our militaries, suspend many of our civil liberties and still not protect ourselves from this menace.*⁴⁰⁹

Thomas Homer-Dixon (Professor at University of Waterloo)

Though the immediate invocation of the war metaphor was unfortunate and perhaps uncalled for, the global war on terror nonetheless rather quickly developed two “hot” fronts. Perhaps baffled by how to attack the al-Qaida network, or compelled by a need to respond to the symbolic 9/11 attacks with a grand demonstration of might, the United States engaged with state actors. First in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, the United States pursued a strategy of rooting out regimes supporting terrorism, beginning

⁴⁰⁹ Thomas Homer-Dixon, “Why Root Causes are Important,” *Pugwash* (online), Conference on Science and World Affairs, September 26, 2001 <http://www.pugwash.org/september11/letter-homerdixon.htm> (accessed on November 19, 2010).

conventional military campaigns in both places. Though successes in supplanting local governance seemed resounding at first, insurgencies developed in both places, following an inability to replace those regimes with legitimate and efficient democratic structures that would miraculously both protect the interests of local populaces and the United States. The global war on terror sees the United States as asymmetrically matched by would-be opponents across the globe, largely to their advantage. Failure to anticipate the consequences of ill-planned invasions and fundamental misunderstandings of local cultures and customs have forced a lengthy and arduous, though hardly very bloody, struggle.

The global war on terror is an ideological battle but only from the enemy's side. The enemies in this case are the terrorist organizations who claim to be Islamists who are violent religious extremists. The nature and circumstances of this war make it one that the United States cannot win militarily.⁴¹⁰ The current policies and actions of the United States may in fact be creating more, not fewer, extremists as the war prolongs.⁴¹¹ Therefore, the West must convince Muslims that the West is a friend of Islam and must assist moderate, progressive Muslim leaders and intellectuals who want Islam to make a successful transition to modernity.⁴¹² In this way, the efforts of the West can enable the Muslim masses to coexist peacefully with other creeds while enjoying personal freedom and prosperity.⁴¹³

Even after a decade, the United States still does not seem to be near the endgame in both Iraq and Afghanistan; however, there exists a timely opportunity to re-examine the GWOT strategy from an informational standpoint. The military response to the current extremist threat has so far consumed the lion's share of government resourcing and attention. In light of limited military successes toward the ultimate end-goal (reducing the internal and external threat of anti-American violent extremism), there is a need for a compelling alternative to the military approach. Using a nonmilitary strategy

⁴¹⁰ Dobrot, "The Global War on Terrorism: A Religious War?" 14.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² Desker and Ramakrishna, "Forging and Indirect Strategy in Southeast Asia," 161–176.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

against these terrorist groups would not be even complicated because al-Qaida is continuously losing support among Muslims, whom they slaughter more than any other group.⁴¹⁴ Many fewer Muslims support terrorist tactics today than when the GWOT began.⁴¹⁵ Unfortunately, the United States has not done nearly enough to exacerbate this serious weak spot in al-Qaida's global influence. On the contrary, unfortunately a narrow focus on Afghanistan with the strategy of large-scale invasion and the development of the hiders-finders dynamic has pushed the problem into Pakistan.

Winning the GWOT will take decades, not years, to accomplish. The ability to achieve that victory will depend fundamentally on the ability of American strategy to adjust and adapt to changes as seen in the nature and character of the adversaries.⁴¹⁶ The National Commission on the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks emphasized that; significant progress against terrorism cannot be achieved exclusively using military force; therefore, the U.S. government must carefully reformulate its strategy and work closely with the Muslim world to win the "battle of ideas" and promote mainstream Islam over terrorist ideology.⁴¹⁷ Islam must be employed as the strongest repellent to terrorism because there is nothing more convincing to Muslims than Islam. If the global coalition to stop Al-Qaeda and other terrorists groups is to succeed, they must convince potential terrorists that Islam requires them to reject terrorism.⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁴ Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Confidence in Osama bin Laden," *Pew Research Center*, <http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=20&survey=12&response=Confidence&mode=table> (accessed on November 19, 2010).

⁴¹⁵ Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Obama More Popular Abroad Than at Home, Global Image of US Continues to Benefit," June 17, 2010, *Pew Research Center*, <http://pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/obama-more-popular-abroad-than-at-home/> (accessed on November 19, 2010).

⁴¹⁶ Bruce Hoffman, "Does Out Counter-Terrorism Strategy Match the Threat," *RAND Corporation* (September 2005), 10.

⁴¹⁷ Rashad Hussain and al-Husein N. Madhany, "Reforming the Battle of Ideas: Understanding the Role of Islam in Counterterrorism Policy," *Saban Center at Brookings*, Number 13, August 2008, ix.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

VI. CONCLUSION

In the current global war on terror, military responses have so far failed to produce a significant reduction in the global extremist threat. Attacks attributed to jihad and other grievances of middle-eastern origin are regularly planned and/or thwarted in the United States and Europe. Neither is the Muslim world immune to these threats—though terrorist tactics are ultimately counterproductive (particularly when enacted against the supposedly aggrieved population); the perfect storm of globalization, global media, and foreign policy between Muslim and the Western states has combined to produce a self-fulfilling prophecy of a “clash of civilizations.” This thesis seeks to reframe this cultural interaction and suggests several nonviolent approaches to counterterrorism that may ultimately find much more success than military interventions.

The alleged clash of civilizations between hegemonic Western culture and the Muslim world, which is typically seen as more conservative and resistant to Western modernizing influences, has been underscored by mass media serving both populations. This divisive discourse has produced polarizing effects, both socially and politically. In the security realm, macro-misunderstandings between the two has led to an impasse, in which U.S. military approaches are well-intentioned from the Western perspective but lead to mass grievance in the Muslim world, providing fuel for insurgencies and terrorist actors. To begin to combat these misunderstandings, this thesis first took the approach of examining the religion of Islam, which is so often conflated in Western media with its minority fundamentalist extremist factions.

Surveying the teachings of Islam, it becomes clear that like Christianity and Judaism, its monotheistic counterparts, the Qur’an emphasizes peace and equality of humankind. However, also like other monotheistic faiths, in instances throughout history Islam has been leveraged as a fundamental aspect of individual identity to compel actors to commit deeds including terrorism. In Islam, concepts such as jihad are meant as ideological struggles; however, extremist groups to compel violent action, which Islam

expressly forbids, have effectively redefined these terms. Therefore, though terrorism and Islam are fundamentally ideologically at odds, the expression of grievances within the clash of civilizations by extremist actors has created a situation in which the Western media easily conflates Islam and terrorism, and extremist groups find some support among even moderate segments of the Muslim world.

Rather than promoting an open dialogue between the Muslim world and the Western culture, international media tends to underscore divisive narratives. It is not in the media's interest to promote international common good; stories on terrorist plots and thwarted attacks are much more likely to sell newspapers than feel-good instances of cultural understanding. However, moderate narratives do exist. Occasionally, such narratives can come from unlikely places, such as the revisionist document produced by the leadership of Libya's LIFG, which renounces terrorist tactics as counterproductive within the Islamic faith. Such examples are particularly relevant to Pakistan, whose border areas have become "hotbeds" of terrorist activity in spite of its predominantly Muslim population. The historical narratives and political grievances of the region have taken on their own life, in which the pacifist teachings of Qur'an pale in comparison to a vicious cycle of violence.

The vicious cycle of misunderstandings highlighted by this thesis will not find relief through military approaches or through intelligence-based counterterrorism. A proactive approach to counterterrorism requires reframing the narrative away from the divisive clash of civilizations paradigm toward mutual understanding and respect. On the part of the Muslim world, this means accepting the world order as it stands in order to progress as it showed the potential to do so for hundreds of years. Muslims must have access to right religious education, so that religious reasoning is not so easily co-opted in service of political grievance. The Western world, for its part, must highlight moderate Muslim narratives to promote understanding of Islam and long-term peace. In terms of policy recommendations, in addition to a domestic public diplomacy campaign, the

United States should model its interactions with the Middle East after the highly successful Marshall Plan. As opposed to aid, which can entrap developing countries in a cycle of dependency, and military intervention, which ultimately reinforces the grievances contributing to terrorism in the first place, an alliance and structural adjustment program such as the Marshall Plan could help to usher in a new era of increased understanding and sensitivity between the Western and Muslim world.

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