



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**DE-RADICALIZATION: YOU CAN CHECK OUT ANYTIME
YOU LIKE, BUT WHAT WILL MAKE YOU LEAVE?**

by

Michael Arndt
Donald Greene
Michael Maksimowicz

December 2010

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Heather Gregg
Glenn E. Robinson

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LIKE, BUT WHAT WILL MAKE YOU LEAVE?**

Michael C. Arndt
Major, United States Air Force
B.S., Auburn University, 1995

Donald R. Green
Major, United States Air Force
B.S., Emory Riddle University, 1997

Michael S. Maksimowicz
Major, United States Air Force
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1997

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2010**

Author: Michael C. Arndt
Donald R. Greene
Michael S. Maksimowicz

Approved by: Dr. Heather Gregg
Thesis Advisor

Dr. Glenn E. Robinson
Second Reader

Gordon McCormick
Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis

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De-radicalization programs for captured jihadi fighters have had mixed success in the Arab world. The Saudi Arabian and U.S. effort in Iraq serve as examples of effective de-radicalization programs, while the Yemeni program serves as an example of what not to do. In this thesis, we find that the successful programs utilize a combination of proper assessment, informed segregation of the participants, and rehabilitation. The assessment process enables programs to better focus their resources on individuals who can be de-radicalized while screening out those who cannot be de-radicalized under current conditions. Once assessed, segregation minimizes detainee networking, and further recruitment and radicalization. Finally, rehabilitation provides a detainee the proper resources and support necessary to allow reintegration into society. By utilizing the knowledge of what characterizes an effective de-radicalization effort, the United States and its allies will have additional means to combat radical Islam and prevent further acts of terror.

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I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

Immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and the rest of the Western world began formulating strategies to respond to the new face of terrorism. The wide range of measures that were developed served primarily to destroy terrorism rather than undermine its appeal. However, this approach has proved to be more difficult than was first anticipated. As General David Petraeus, then head of the U.S. Central Command, noted, the United States “cannot kill its way to victory.”¹ This realization led to a shift towards understanding and dealing with the question of *why* individuals become terrorists. In addition, as prisons began to fill with terror suspects, the prisons themselves became breeding grounds for more radicalization and recruitment. To counter this trend, several nations implemented programs to reduce militancy, change attitudes, counter ideology, and eventually integrate former terrorists back into society.

Because of the current ideological conflict, the United States needs to become far more sophisticated in its understanding of Islam and in the categorization of Islam’s radical elements. This understanding may lead to more effective ways of dealing with radical groups and individuals. The ultimate goal is to decrease the number of terrorists and number of terrorist attacks. De-radicalization programs designed to alter the behavior and ideology of extremists can do precisely this. These programs are intended to disengage, reeducate, and de-radicalize extremists. Unfortunately, relatively little systematic analysis has been done on de-radicalization programs. Many countries that have de-radicalization programs have detailed descriptions of their program; however, they lack analytical frameworks and measurable data to effectively evaluate the program’s success. There is also no standard of evaluation that applies across countries.²

¹ Jessica Stern, “Mind Over Martyr,” *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 1 (January 2010), 95–108.

² Tore Bjorgo et al., eds., *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 307.

How are these programs structured? Whom do they target? How is effectiveness measured? What can the United States government and our allies learn from these programs?

Using Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs theory to examine de-radicalization programs, we illustrate effective components of each program and suggest ways these same components can be applied in different settings. We propose that proper assessment of the individual and an understanding of the environment they will return to upon release, coupled with a program capable of providing for the individual's needs, determine the effectiveness of a de-radicalization effort.

The thesis evaluates three de-radicalization programs using Maslow's framework. First, we examine the Yemeni Religious Dialogue Committee, which was one of the first de-radicalization programs implemented; Saudi Arabia's Counseling Program, one of the best-funded and well-known programs in existence; and the U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, which represent the most current and promising de-radicalization programs. For the U.S. program, we interviewed several U.S. military officers involved with creating and implementing the program, including the program's architect, Maj. Gen Stone.

After examining the Yemeni, Saudi Arabian, and U.S. de-radicalization efforts, several findings became evident. These findings included the importance of assessment, the need for segregation, and a focus on rehabilitation versus retribution. The assessment process enables a program to better focus resources on individuals who can be de-radicalized while screening out those who cannot be de-radicalized under current conditions. Once proper assessments are conducted, effective segregation of hard-core radicals from more moderate prisoners can be accomplished, thereby creating a safer environment and reducing the chance for further radicalization or recruitment. Finally, a focus on rehabilitation versus retribution is a more successful means to eventually reintegrate detained individuals back into society.

The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II discusses some of the origins of terrorism and reasons why individuals may become radicalized. It identifies key areas

that must be addressed in order to effectively de-radicalize an individual. The chapter then introduces a framework based on Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory, which includes actions to effectively de-radicalize an individual.

Chapter III examines how radical groups entice individuals into playing active parts in furthering the group's cause. This chapter asserts that there is more than one path to radicalization. Understanding these different paths offers insight into the most effective methods to de-radicalize an individual.

Chapter IV investigates Yemen's Religious Dialogue Committee. Yemen was one of the first states to utilize a de-radicalization component in its counter-terrorism strategy, yet its program ended in failure in 2005. Our framework is used to analyze why the Yemeni program did not succeed.

Chapter V analyzes the Saudi Counseling Program, which was created after a series of deadly domestic terrorist attacks in the kingdom in 2003. This chapter examines the program's background history, organization, structure, and process for de-radicalization.

Chapter VI examines the United States' de-radicalization efforts in its Theater Internment Facilities (TIF) in Iraq and Afghanistan, a new program initiated by Major General Douglas Stone following the failures that led to the Abu Ghraib scandal.

Chapter VII offers concluding thoughts on the effectiveness of the de-radicalization programs studied. Findings include the importance of assessment, the need for segregation, and a focus on rehabilitation rather than retribution. Finally, we offer implications and areas for future research.

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II. ORIGINS OF TERRORISM

A. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we will discuss some of the origins of terrorism and reasons why individuals may become radicalized. In turn, we then identify key areas that must be addressed in order to effectively de-radicalize an individual. We present a framework based on Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory to systematically analyze the specific needs that must be addressed in order to understand the different motivations for radicalization and how to counter these motives and de-radicalize an individual. Critiques of Maslow's Theory are also incorporated to show that the theory does in fact provide a solid foundation to analyze the success of a de-radicalization program. Using Maslow's theory, we produce a specific framework that includes ingredients to effectively de-radicalize an individual. The chapter concludes with a discussion our methodology and an in-depth examination of each level of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs.

B. MOTIVATIONS: THE PATH TO RADICALIZATION

Terrorist acts are carried out by individuals who are driven to take action due to many different motivations. Existing explanations for terrorism point to a long list of issues such poverty, ideology, identity, or a lack of democracy and political freedom as possible causes. The emergence of terrorism, however, cannot be narrowed down to one single cause. Therefore, a framework that covers a broad range of issues must be used to analyze its development. Also, most theories describe the terrorist's environment without fully describing the individual's motivations; individual motivations play an extremely important part in the decision-making process of a person who has become radicalized. We argue that satisfying these same motivations is the key to de-radicalizing a person once they have been radicalized

When it comes to describing individual motivations, Abraham Maslow captures the essence of the issue in a 1943 paper entitled *A Theory of Human Motivation*. His

fundamental yet operationally elegant theory offers a time-tested explanation as to why people act in certain ways across a range of cultures and environments.




Figure 2-1. Maslow Hierarchy of Needs³

As seen in the Figure 2-1, Maslow defines the most basic needs of humans as physiological needs. These physiological needs compose the lowest level required for human survival and include breathing, food, sexual activity, and the maintenance of homeostasis. Humans continually strive to maintain homeostasis consisting of both psychological consistency and physiological stability. Breathing, drinking, eating, sleeping and excreting are essential in maintaining physical homeostasis. Just as important, behaviors that seek to satisfy these physiological needs supply a sense of predictability and balance for people. These needs and the corresponding requirement to fulfill these needs are not separate from the person, as the entire person is motivated to fill the need, not just a part of him. As illustrated by Maslow, “the whole individual is motivated rather than just part of him... It is John Smith who wants food, not John Smith’s stomach... Food satisfies John Smith’s hunger, not John Smith’s stomach’s hunger.”⁴ Physiological needs are different from other needs since they generally tend to take over human behavior until they are fulfilled to a basic degree.

³ Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," 1943, York University. 370.

⁴ Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," 370.

Once physiological needs are quenched, the need for safety rises to become the primary motivation in human behavior. As defined by Maslow, the security of the body, employment, resources, morality, family, health and property make up the needs for safety.⁵ Furthermore, safety needs entail the desire for predictability and order, where unfamiliar and unexpected events are the exception rather than the rule. When a person's safety is threatened, he or she becomes increasingly focused on restoring a refuge, and even more focused on avoiding danger. In many cases, even intense physiological needs are overcome by the overwhelming desire to maintain safety and security. As an example, a person may have an intense desire to eat while driving through a questionable area of a city. Even though that person is extremely hungry, they are unwilling to compromise the need for safety for the immediate satisfaction of quenching the physical discomfort caused by hunger or thirst.⁶ Just like physiological needs, safety needs cease to dominate behavior when they are continually satisfied and give way to other needs, such as the need for love and belongingness.

With the advent of modern technology and developed societies that typically satisfy the lower physiological and safety needs, social needs tend to create the largest void in society. Social needs involve feelings of belongingness, consisting of friendship, family, and sexual intimacy.⁷ Seeking significance and bonds with other people represents the foundation of social needs. An assortment of different types of relationships is required to fully gratify the social needs. The need to fulfill these needs comes from the primitive existence of humans as pack animals who were dependant on the tribe or clan for survival. Although humans have evolved and technology has diminished the requirement to live in packs in order to survive, the need for belongingness still dominates human behavior. Perhaps, even more so today than in prehistoric times, people are driven to be part of something or some group larger than

⁵ Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," 370.

⁶ A. R. Reid-Cunningham, "Maslow's Theory of Motivation and Hierarchy of Human Needs: A Critical Analysis" (Doctorate, University of California - Berkeley).

⁷ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.

themselves as evident in the continuation of marriages, clubs, teams, and even society at large. Inside these groups, the need for self-esteem tends to rise which leads directly to the next level of motivation.

As social needs are met, the desire for esteem increases or, as Maslow describes, esteem presents the normal human desire to be accepted and valued by others.⁸ People in a society generally wish for others to think highly of them and want to be viewed with esteem rather than contempt. Humans also want to think of themselves as worthy of esteem through an accurate estimation of self-worth and value. The development of self-esteem leads to feelings of confidence, strength, worth, and capability to continue to meet lower level needs. Humans who satisfy their esteem needs tend to be more productive and well adjusted to fitting in with society. Evidence suggests that upsetting self-esteem needs can result in psychopathic behavior, insecurity, feelings of helplessness, and feelings of inferiority. Maslow argues that those who do not have their esteem needs met tend to withdraw to the fringes of society and become increasingly discouraged.

The final and arguably the most controversial level of needs is self-actualization, which ensures a person is capable of meeting their full potential. As defined by Maslow, self-actualization means achieving morality, creativity, spontaneity, problem solving, lack of prejudice, and acceptance of facts. Edward Hoffman, in *The Right to be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow*, succinctly described the premise of self-actualization, “In the core of our being we each carry the seed of our becoming, of our latent potential.”⁹ However, Maslow’s self-actualization research forms the premise that “each of us harbors an innate human nature of vast potential that usually becomes blocked or thwarted through the deprivation of lower needs.”¹⁰ Maslow describes a case where a promising former student had graduated with a bachelor’s degree only to take a dull yet secure job during the Great Depression in order to fulfill her family’s basic needs. As Maslow reflects, “she was not using her intelligence” and “this might be a major reason

⁸ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.

⁹ Edward Hoffman, *The Right to be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow* (Los Angeles: Jeremy B. Tarcher Inc, 1988), 254.

¹⁰ Hoffman, *The Right to be Human*, 156.

for her boredom with...the normal pleasures of life.”¹¹ Maslow counseled the former student to enroll in graduate studies during her time off. Once the former student heeded his advice she “became more alive, more happy and zestful, and most of her physical symptoms had disappeared.”¹²

In order to truly understand Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and address the criticisms of the theory, the five basic assumptions that were influential in the establishment of the theory must be understood. The first assumption is that the complete person is motivated to action: this assumption requires a holistic approach to understanding motivations. Secondly, motivations are normally multifaceted and require a number of sources of satisfaction or dissatisfaction before corresponding actions occur. Motivations may be conscious, such as the desire for water to quench an unrelenting thirst, or unconscious, such as using a cell phone as a way to feel connected to a loved one while driving. The third assumption is that people are constantly motivated by their requirement to fulfill their needs and the satisfaction of one need creates the desire to fill other less fulfilled needs. The fourth assumption is that humans across the world are motivated to fill the same basic needs although they may realize satisfaction in different culturally defined forms. The fifth and final assumption claims that needs can be arranged in a hierarchy, where fundamental needs must be satisfied before attention can be given to higher-level needs.¹³

C. CRITICISMS OF MASLOW’S THEORY

Abraham Maslow was open to criticism of his theory and even invited critiques when he wrote, “My fellow scientists can proceed with less passion, personal involvement, and heat—in the cool manner of science—to check whether I was right or not.”¹⁴ Almost seventy years since its formulation, Maslow’s Theory of Motivations has held up to criticism by clinical practitioners, social scientists, and even an onslaught of

¹¹ Edward Hoffman, ed., *Future Visions: The Unpublished Papers of Abraham Maslow*. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc., 1996).

¹² Hoffman, *The Right to be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow*, 145.

¹³ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.

¹⁴ Hoffman, *Future Visions: The Unpublished Papers of Abraham Maslow*, 30.

armchair philosophers.¹⁵ The three main criticisms of Maslow's theory are discussed below.

The first criticism is centered on the argument of "The Chronically Hungry Person." These critics make the argument that, according to Maslow's own illustration, a chronically hungry person would crave food above all other needs and would have no other motivation other than that of finding food. As the critics point out, Maslow's theory assumes that values such as community, freedom, and even love may be set aside or as Maslow stated "waved aside as fripperies which are useless since they fail to fill the stomach."¹⁶ Taking this criticism one step further, to the chronically hungry person a utopia would be simply a place with an abundance of food. As with many of the other criticisms, this overly simplified explanation does not take into account an assortment of factors that are constantly interacting at different levels.¹⁷

These critics tend to overlook Maslow's statement concerning a starving person, "as soon as he is able to provide for his physiological needs, he will no longer trade his self-respect for food."¹⁸ Maslow also understood that people who are accustomed to prolonged hunger are able to withstand a scarcity of food better than those who have plenty and then find themselves without. Furthermore, Maslow acknowledges his theory may not explain well individuals with psychological disorders: his theory was meant for the general population. Just as the hungry man example over exaggerates, many other critics use extreme cases to define an argument against Maslow's theory by creating lopsided arguments based off of observations in extreme circumstances. Recognizing this potential problem, Maslow criticized theories that rest solely on observations taken under unusual conditions by noting, "behavior during extreme physiological deprivation is certainly being blind to many things."¹⁹ He favored instead observations based under

¹⁵ Reid-Cunningham, *Maslow's Theory of Motivation and Hierarchy of Human Needs: A Critical Analysis*.

¹⁶ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.

¹⁷ Reid-Cunningham, *Maslow's Theory of Motivation and Hierarchy of Human Needs: A Critical Analysis*.

¹⁸ Hoffman, *The Right to be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow*, 154.

¹⁹ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.

more typical circumstances to better understand general human behavior and not those distorted by the extremes.²⁰

The second criticism concerns the methodological limitations of Maslow's theory. Since many of the motivations presented by Maslow occur at the subconscious level of thought, it is extremely difficult to accurately report or rank motivations about which a person is consciously unaware. Furthermore, critics point out that some conscious desires may be in direct conflict with motivations that are occurring simultaneously in the subconscious. Maslow attempted to overcome this obstacle by using both self-reporting and direct observation of behavior to reinforce or refute the cause of motivations. Since the development of Maslow's theory, several studies have been undertaken to attempt to bring more clarity to motivation theory. Most of the studies, however, were not designed to account for multi-motivated behavior. Another problem with recent studies is that they tend to use a group as a unit of analysis when Maslow's theory was derived using the individual as the unit of analysis. Even so, some studies tend to reinforce Maslow's theory, but others have resulted in contradictory results. Until more concise methodology can be created, the best test for Maslow's Motivation Theory remains testing and refining his theory under the conditions he created in the theory.²¹

The third and probably most relevant criticism of Maslow, as it concerns our application to de-radicalization, is cultural relativity and universal application of motivations across cultures. Many critics of Maslow contend that people of other cultures have different values and therefore no universal human needs theory could ever predict the nuances of different cultures. Early in his career, Maslow too shared these views but his opinion changed when he undertook anthropological fieldwork, studying the Blackfoot Indians.²² Maslow used this experience to shape the view that fundamental desires of all human beings do not vary as widely as everyday conscious desires that are more dependent on circumstances and culture. Even so, he was well aware that his

²⁰ Reid-Cunningham, *Maslow's Theory of Motivation and Hierarchy of Human Needs: A Critical Analysis*.

²¹ Reid-Cunningham, *Maslow's Theory of Motivation and Hierarchy of Human Needs: A Critical Analysis*.

²² Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.

theory was not a one size fits all solution for all cultures: “no claim is made that it is ultimate or universal for all cultures.”²³ Instead, he balanced an overwhelming logic of universalism concerned with basic human needs, with a firm acceptance of how social experiences, coupled with culture, would shape the needs and eventual actions stemming from human motivations. As Maslow understood, “Certain drives there are, and satisfied they will be in one way or another, regardless of the governmental, economic, and social taboos extant at the time.”²⁴

Understanding that Maslow’s Theory of Motivation, while commonly applied to broad populations, may not be entirely universally useful or valid in this context. In order to answer group motivation, it is necessary to create a model that is flexible enough to take cultural factors into account while maintaining broad applicability to the human condition.²⁵

D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the course of our study, we examine programs that aim to de-radicalize an individual. Specifically, we look at Islamically motivated terrorists. De-radicalization has two end goals: produce a repentant individual, and contribute to a reduction in ideological support for the terrorist organization’s cause. As we dive into the de-radicalization process, several intervening variables are important for understanding individual motivations for joining and leaving terrorists groups. The first is the level of involvement of a terrorist. Was the terrorist a lower echelon participant, a key planner/organizer for the cause, or does the terrorist actually have blood on their hands? The second is the detainee’s religious education level. Is the detainee an illiterate person who relies on others to understand Islam, a well-educated religious scholar, or maybe somewhere in between these two extremes? Third, an assessment of the predicted economic conditions of the detainee upon release must also be examined. Is the economy

²³ Hoffman, *The Right to be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow*, 73.

²⁴ Hoffman, *The Right to be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow*, 73.

²⁵ Reid-Cunningham, *Maslow’s Theory of Motivation and Hierarchy of Human Needs: A Critical Analysis*.

going to be such that the detained person can use the skills and knowledge gained during the de-radicalization process to make a new life, or will he return to a situation where he still is unable to find employment?

The sponsor of the de-radicalization program, which is usually a country's government, must effectively evaluate the individual based on these variables along with an assessment of his motivations for joining the radical element in the first place. An effective evaluation will determine at what motivation level the de-radicalization program will focus on and whether or not the detainee could be de-radicalized within the means of the existing program. The relationship is shown in the following figures.




Figure 2-2. Theoretical Framework

As seen in Figure 2-2, a captured terrorist is placed in the de-radicalization program. Immediately the first two intervening variables must be assessed: the level of the detainee's involvement in the organization, and the level of the detainee's education. Figure 2-3 describes this relationship.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS			
INT VAR		RELIGIOUS EDUCATION	
		LOW	HIGH
LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT	LOW	LOW	MED/HIGH
	HIGH	LOW/MED	HIGH

Figure 2-3. Religious Education and Level of Terrorist Involvement

If, for example, a captured individual has a low religious education level and had a low level of involvement inside of the terrorist organization, one would have to satisfy a lower amount of motivational needs to de-radicalize that individual. On the other extreme, if that person had a high education level and had a high level of involvement in the group, a de-radicalization program would need to address a greater number, probably all of their motivational needs.

The next intervening variable to investigate is the predicted environmental and economic conditions the detainee would face when released from the program. Figure 2-4 illustrates this relationship.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS			
INT VAR		ECONOMY	
		BAD	GOOD
ENVIRONMENT	MOVEMENT	HIGH	MED/HIGH
	NO MOVEMENT	LOW/MED	LOW

Figure 2-4. Environmental and Economic Conditions Upon Release

After an individual is capture and placed in the program, a predictive estimate must be made as to what the status of their terrorist group will be. Is the terrorist group

on the edge of extinction or is the group on the rise and expected to be even more virulent upon the detainee's release? Likewise, what is the predicted economic condition in their country will be in upon their release. Figure 2-4 shows that, if the individual's organization is no longer active and the economy is doing well, a lower degree of their motivational needs will need to be met. However, if their organization is still active and the economy is bad, once again a greater number of the individual's motivational needs must be met by the government. An additional option here would be to keep this individual detained until one or both of these variables change.

The results are seen in the dependent variable, program effectiveness, which is measured by the individual's needs being both properly assessed and properly met. This relationship is shown in Figure 2-5.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATION			
DV: EFFECTIVENESS		PROPERLY MET	
		YES	NO
PROPERLY ASSESSED	YES	HIGH	MED
	NO	MED/LOW	LOW

Figure 2-5. Program Effectiveness

Figure 2-5 illustrates that if the individual and post-incarceration conditions are properly assessed when an individual is placed in the de-radicalization program and if their motivational needs are properly met, the program effectiveness will be high and the individual should be de-radicalized. Conversely, if the individual and post-incarceration conditions were not properly assessed and or their motivational needs were not met, the program will not be effective.

E. METHODOLOGY

It is our hypothesis that how well a program provides for Maslow's hierarchy of needs determines the outcome of the program. Specifically, proper assessment of an individual's needs and an understanding the environment they will return to upon release, coupled with a program capable of providing for those needs, will determine the effectiveness of a de-radicalization effort. By comparing each program in question using a framework based on Maslow's hierarchy, the estimated effectiveness of each program can be measured.

While we agree wholeheartedly with the elements contained within Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory, we believe that when it comes to motivations relating to radicalization and de-radicalization these elements do not necessarily follow a hierarchy. Our research has pointed to many of the elements contained within Maslow's theory interacting simultaneously versus serially as indicated in Figure 2-6.




Figure 2-6. Simultaneous Effects of the Elements of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs

For the purposes of this study, we will investigate several countries that have de-radicalization programs. Specifically the country's programs we will analyze include Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the U.S. Theater Internment Facility (TIF) Program in Iraq. This will allow an in depth examination of each level of Maslow's hierarchy. These cases provide a broad spectrum of cultures and a possibility to discover varied and unique methods that satisfy Maslow's needs. Analyzing these programs will help determine what is effective and what is not effective. In our examination of each country, we will investigate how well the existing program measures up against meeting the demands of physiological, safety, social, esteem and self-actualization needs as defined in Maslow. In our estimation, a country does not have to fill all of the levels, but at a minimum must devote enough attention to overcome the competing radical interest of the detained person. By determining what programs are moving in the proper direction, but lacking resource, the U.S. may be able to provide additional incentives to aid these programs. U.S. support could enable resource deficient programs to meet required levels of Maslow's hierarchy of needs based on competing interest.

Moving forward, the subsequent chapters will analyze through case studies, the programs of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and U.S. TIF Program in Iraq. This will be accomplished with a discussion of the radical elements within each country, a basic description of each countries program and finally an analysis of the country's program based on the theoretical framework that has been presented earlier.

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III. A PATH TO RADICALIZATION

A. INTRODUCTION

How do radical Islamist groups entice individuals into accepting their agenda and eventually playing active parts in furthering the radical Islamist groups' cause? This chapter will describe several paths to radicalization based on the case studies explored in the thesis using the levels of needs found in Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory. Maslow's theory provides a foundational understanding of the different paths to radicalization. Understanding these motivations can offer insight into the most effective methods to counter these instilled passions, and de-radicalize an individual.

B. RADICAL GROUP'S SATISFACTION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL NEEDS

As discussed in the previous chapter, Maslow's lowest level of needs consists of physiological needs. Catering to these lowest level needs provides the cheapest and most efficient way for radical Islamist groups to motivate individuals to join their cause. Economic incentives tend to open the door for more radical involvement.²⁶ For example, radical Islamist groups, such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, have effectively used economic incentives to entice former Iraqi soldiers, who were out of work, to join their cause of Jihad against the United States. An anonymous detainee in an Iraqi detention facility made the following statement of why economic incentives are effective, "Uneducated people join militias for money; if there were jobs, fewer people would join and this would also deter future fighters from turning towards the militias."²⁷ This detainee was not alone; when questioned about their reasons for joining the insurgency 31% cited the desire for more money as the primary or secondary motivations.²⁸ Without this economic assistance from Al-Qaeda, many of these former soldiers were unable to provide basic

²⁶ Chuck Crossett, *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II - 1962-2009* (Johns Hopkins University: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory National Security Analysis Department [2010]).

²⁷ Douglas Stone, "Detainee Aspects of Transition" (National Defense University, 2009).

²⁸ Stone, "Detainee Aspects of Transition."

needs of food, water and, in some cases, shelter for their families. The situation in Yemen provides yet another example of this approach to radicalization, where recruits were paid to join Al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) cause.²⁹

Another example of physiological needs being used as enticement can be found in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where madrassas—religious schools, some of which teach radical Islam—fulfill children's basic needs, including food, shelter and clothing, while also providing an Islamic education. In certain situations, families may be sending their kids to madrassas as a means of providing the most basic needs for their children; the education they are receiving is secondary.

C. RADICAL GROUPS' SATISFACTION OF SAFETY NEEDS

Safety needs make up Maslow's next level. Radical Islamist groups meet this need by, first, focusing on the plight of suffering Muslims worldwide, caused by foreign forces such as the United States, and arguing that suffering will continue without individual involvement to counter this threat. As described by a former radical, Maajid Nawaz, in a recent interview with CBS's "60 Minutes," feeling threatened is expressed in the radical elements' use of the "Narrative," which claims that, "America is waging a war against Islam, invaded Iraq because it hates Muslims, invaded Afghanistan because it hates Muslims."³⁰ The individual perception of vulnerability is caused by perceived persecution, thereby driving motivations to join a movement aimed at ending persecution. These motivations, in turn, incite acts to overcome these unsafe feelings. As outlined by the National Counterterrorism Center, precipitant feelings of "state violence," alienation, blocked social mobility, racism, humiliation, and/or the recent untimely death of a family member, can create a sense of crisis for the individual.³¹

Radical groups use several techniques to reinforce a sense of vulnerability in individuals. In previously cited cases, individuals who felt relatively safe before

²⁹ Kathy Gannon, "Yemen Employs New Terror Approach," *The Washington Post*, July 4, 2007.

³⁰ Leslie Stahl, "Jihadist and 'the Narrative,'" *60 Minutes* (2010).

³¹ *Radicalization: Motives, Process, and Possible Disengagement* (Washington, D.C.: National Counterterrorism Center [2007]).

encountering radical groups—once exposed to jihadist videos and religious education—then felt unsafe and needed the safety of the group.³² Unsafe feelings are grounded in the notion that the entire Islamic faith is on the defensive and the individual must “pay now” by joining the Jihad or “pay later” in the next life. As bin Laden declared, “If you don’t fight you will be punished by God.”³³ These recruitment tactics are typically led by radical imams, and serve to create more fear and anger in the individual. Within this new environmental, isolation from society, extreme peer pressure, sensory overload, sleep deprivation, coupled with a constant barrage of “doom and gloom” can provide a feeling of insecurity necessary to persuade the individual to move to seek ways to overcome his/her safety concerns.³⁴

These same techniques are described by Omar Nasiri in his book *Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda, A Spy's Story*. As Nasiri outlines, Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada who were both radical Islamist Imams at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London during the mid 1990’s, used these techniques to convince disenfranchised European Muslims to join the global jihad. Moreover, Omar Nasiri described how Al Qaeda used these same techniques to produce tens of thousands of well-trained terrorist at Kalden, Darunta and other terrorist training sites in Afghanistan during the 1990s.³⁵

Once becoming an active member of the radical group, the driving motivation for safety is further filled by the perceived protection the group offers from the “state,” and even the group itself, as long as the individual element continues to further the group’s agenda. These safety concerns are best summed up by an anonymous Iraqi detainee, “Most Al Qaeda members would like to leave the organization, but fear doing so because they will be hunted down and will not be accepted back into Iraqi society.”³⁶

³² Omar Nasiri, *Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda, A Spy's Story* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2008).

³³ Daniel L. Byman, "Review: Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?" *World Politics* 56, no. 1 (2003), 139.

³⁴ Jeffery Bale, Introduction to Terrorism Lecture Notes, 2010.

³⁵ Nasiri, *Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda, A Spy's Story*.

³⁶ Stone, *Detainee Aspects of Transition*.

D. RADICAL GROUPS' SATISFACTION OF SOCIAL NEEDS

According to counterterrorism expert Madeline Morris, "If any area of terrorism studies can be said to have reached a level of consensus, it is the role of social networks in contributing to both recruitment and radicalization."³⁷ Marc Sageman takes this point one step further by arguing, "terrorism is predominantly a social phenomenon: that people become terrorists not because they are aggrieved or devout or politically conscious, but because, essentially, their friends are doing it."³⁸

To truly understand the social element of radicalization, one must understand the methods of recruitment that are prevalent among terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda. A RAND study identifies four different methods of recruitment: "The Net," "The Funnel," "The Infection," and "The Seed Crystal."³⁹ The names come from the various shapes as depicted in Figures 3-1 to 3-4. Any effective de-radicalization effort should, at a minimum, address the various methods of recruitment, with the goal of being tailored to the specific method that resulted in radicalization.




Figure 3-1. The Net⁴⁰

³⁷ Madeline Morris and others, *Deradicalization: A Review of the Literature with Comparison to Findings in the Literatures on Degang and Deprograming* (Duke University: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions [2010]).

³⁸ Drake Bennett, "How to Defuse a Human Bomb," *The Boston Globe*, April 13, 2008.

³⁹ Sara A. Daly and Scott Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," in *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook*, ed. David G. Kamien (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2006), 73–88.

⁴⁰ Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," 73–78.

“The Net” comprises the first recruitment method as depicted in Figure 3-1. In this approach, the radical recruiter casts a wide net of influence across an entire segment of the population. Some of the targeted population will respond positively to the recruiter while others will resist his or her efforts. Daly and Gerwehr argue that the “Net” approach is the easiest for a radical organization to use when it is operating in an uncontested environment such as Somalia, Yemen, or any other area where the territory is largely uncontrolled by a local or federal government, and the majority of the population accepts the message of the radical group.⁴¹




Figure 3-2. The Funnel⁴²

The second recruitment type is the funnel. Daly and Gerwehr describe:

A recruiter may use an incremental or phased approach when he or she believes a target population is ripe for recruitment yet requires a significant transformation in identity and motivation.⁴³

As seen in Figure 3-2, the recruitment process begins at one end with those who enter either being converted into viable radicals or being rejected back into the population. Just like the process used to transform a raw U.S. military recruit from a civilian into a hardened soldier, the radical group uses team building exercises, hazing, and other methods to ensure that the individual is committed to their radical agenda.

⁴¹ Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," 73–78

⁴² Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," 77.

⁴³ Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," 77.

There are many benefits to the “Funnel” method of recruitment. Primarily, this method has been well studied with proven results to affect the psychology of recruits.⁴⁴ Secondly, even the recruits who are not accepted can still bear positive effects for the radical group by “serving as intermediaries for further recruitment.”⁴⁵ The “Funnel” is the method of choice in areas where the government has some control within its borders, but where funneling apparatuses such as radical madarassas are allowed to operate with impunity due to either governmental fear of upsetting the population like the Mosque at Finsberry Park in London, or in areas like Yemen where the government has little to no control.




Figure 3-3. The Infection⁴⁶

When a targeted populace is decidedly difficult to influence, a more effective method is “The Infection.”⁴⁷ As depicted in Figure 3-3, just like the spread of a virus in a population, some individuals will be immune to the “infection” while others fall victim as the radical agents make their way through a targeted population. This method has the advantage of being selective in application and affords the radical group secrecy in a contested environment. States that have a firm control on their population through strong security forces are most likely to experience this recruitment method.⁴⁸ Countries like

⁴⁴ Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," 77.

⁴⁵ Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," 78.

⁴⁶ Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," 78.

⁴⁷ Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," 78.

⁴⁸ Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," 78.

Kenya or Tanzania provide excellent examples of where the “infection” technique may be used against a population that is not necessarily sensitive to radical groups such as Al-Qaeda’s agenda. Within such a given populace, some disgruntled individuals may be vulnerable to being recruited to carry out operations.⁴⁹




Figure 3-4. The Seed Crystal⁵⁰

The fifth pattern that is prevalent among radical recruitment is called “The Seed Crystal.”⁵¹ As indicated in Figure 3-4 the radical must self-recruit because it is difficult to use other methods of recruitment due to tight governmental oversight of radical activity. Once an individual makes the choice to radicalize within the population via self-recruitment a “seed” is formed. After the seed is formed, the process is similar to “The Infection” in spreading to other individuals. This was the method of recruitment used to gain influence in the Hamburg cell that constituted the plotters of the September 11 attacks.⁵²

⁴⁹ Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," 79.

⁵⁰ Sara A. Daly and Scott Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," in *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook*, 79.

⁵¹ Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," 79.

⁵² Nasiri, *Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda, A Spy's Story*.




Figure 3-5. Social Engagement

After being recruited, radical groups use a process of social engagement to solidify the individual's ties to the group. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), social engagement is a four-stage process consisting of pre-radicalization, identification, indoctrination, and finally, action.⁵³ See Figure 3-5. These processes are instrumental in turning the raw recruit into a radicalized individual element who is willing to give up his or her life for the radical group's cause. Pre-radicalization is the first stage of social engagement, involving a shared belief system such as the Islamic faith combined with a feeling of being disenfranchised or dissatisfied with the status quo. Radical groups, such as Al Qaeda, use established social institutions like the mosque, internet, school, job site, boardinghouses, and prisons to take advantage of existing social networks to establish links required for pre-radicalization of individuals who are influenced by social motivations.⁵⁴ Once this condition is established, the stimulus to make a change is combined with the opportunity presented by a close friend or relative who already has established relations with a radical group. The individual's likelihood of

⁵³ *The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad* (Washington D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation [2006]).

⁵⁴ Crossett, *Casebook on Insurgency* 9, 1–619.

moving to the next stage of identification is heavily influenced by the power of the social bond between him or her, and the friend or family member, who is already a member of the radical group.⁵⁵

Assuming the individual continues his or her movement toward radicalization, the next step is identification with the cause. In this stage, the individual aligns himself/herself with the extremist cause and justifies or encourages violence against the existing power structure.⁵⁶ During this stage, the individual becomes progressively more secluded from their former life and social circles. This separation creates a social vacuum filled by other individuals who are either already radicals or within the process of becoming radicals. This new social circle creates a self-reinforcing motivation to become even more deeply involved in the radical group's agenda. While in this new social circle, the individual is typically exposed to more jihadist videos and continued religious education by extremist imams.⁵⁷ This constant barrage of radical ideology associated with the identification stage, along with a reinforcing social structure of people with common beliefs and goals, propels the individual into the next stage consisting of indoctrination.

As Jessica Stern argues in an interview with the National Public Radio, many individuals "get their identities from being part of this exciting, illegal, immoral, and violent group."⁵⁸ Indoctrination finds the individual fully embracing the radical ideology, but unsure of exactly what he/she can do to further the cause. During this stage, the individual is educated by other radical elements as to how to best promote the radical agenda by receiving additional training and religious education. In the interim, the individual's former social relations atrophy as he or she gains more confidence in his or her new skills and trusts in the group's colleagues and beliefs. At this juncture, the individual is ready for the next stage consisting of "action" in support of the cause.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ *The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad*, 1.

⁵⁶ *The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad*.

⁵⁷ Nasiri, *Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda, A Spy's Story*.

⁵⁸ Michel Martin, "Globally, Nations Grapple with Deradicalization," *National Public Radio*, Tell Me More (2010).

⁵⁹ *The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad*, 1.

“Action” is the final stage of psycho-social engagement. This phase does not have to be violent, but it is always performed with the intent of damaging the perceived enemy. Some of these actions could include carrying out terrorist acts, facilitating operations, recruiting more like-minded individuals, or obtaining financial support for continued radical efforts. This is the defining point for the newly radicalized person’s experience with the radical group. As the radicalized individual progresses higher on the ever-narrowing road from recruitment to ideological buy-in, indoctrination, and action, they begin to realize that the radical group becomes increasingly consuming, “with no exceptions or exits permitted.”⁶⁰

The individual may decide to opt out of participation in the activity at any point, but he must consider the cost of doing so. For example, if the individual questions the group’s judgment, he or she must consider the wrath of the group.⁶¹ Tantamount, at this stage, the individual may be seen as a threat to the organization, and may face death for not performing the required action. As Jerrold Post, the founder and former director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior, argues: “The way to get rid of doubt is to get rid of doubters.”⁶² In many cases, the vow to carry through with action is cemented with the recording of a “commitment” videotape. These tapes serve as an irrevocable contract between the radical group and the radicalized individual, who may be asked to carry out a suicide attack as a final act in support of the group’s cause.⁶³ Even in the absence of commitment videos, as Martha Crenshaw, a pioneer in terrorism studies, states, “Small group dynamics may propel the mission beyond any individual’s commitment.”⁶⁴ Upon close consideration, it would

⁶⁰ Fathali M. Moghaddam and Anthony J. Marsella, eds., *Understanding Terrorism: Psychological Roots, Consequences, and Interventions* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2005), 116.

⁶¹ Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,” in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. Walter Reich (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 25–40.

⁶² Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic,” 33.

⁶³ Martin F. Piechot, “Who were the Fifteen Saudis?” (Master of Arts in National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School), 1–75.

⁶⁴ Jodi Wilgoren, “A Terrorist Profile Emerges that Confounds the Experts,” *New York Times*, September 15, 2001.

seem that the same motivations that work in the U.S. military are “alive and well” with radical organizations. According to Dr. Crenshaw, "What keeps them fighting is what keeps soldiers in a platoon fighting...they don't want to let their buddies down."⁶⁵

E. RADICAL GROUP'S SATISFACTION OF SELF-ESTEEM AND SELF-ACTUALIZATION NEEDS

Even the highest levels of needs can be filled by the radical group as the individual experiences heightened self-esteem, and in some cases self-actualization. Before becoming part of a radical group, the individual typically suffers from low self-esteem, coupled with a feeling of social impotence.⁶⁶ These feelings are not in line with Islamic societal norms that place great emphasis on personal honor and respect. Radical groups such as al-Qaeda offer examples of martyrs and other heroic figures who have earned enormous respect in their neighborhood. The individual is also exposed to older Muslims who offer tales of when they fought in distant lands for the cause of Islam. At this point, the many individuals see the only path toward reaching self-esteem and self-actualization is through joining a radical group such as al-Qaeda in the global jihad.⁶⁷

Once part of the radical group, the individual is thrust into participation in a “cosmic good versus evil” struggle against the establishment. The individual is fighting on. In this struggle, many individuals achieve a mantle of self-importance, and self-worth beyond their wildest dreams. Radical groups, such as al-Qaeda, are also adept at using the media to bolster the self-esteem of radicals by widely publicizing successful terrorist attacks.⁶⁸ In some cases, the individual’s photo may be on the FBI or CIA’s “most wanted” list with the leader’s names widely recognized across the globe. As Post notes, “Within certain circles, he is lionized as a hero. He travels first class and his family is provided for should his acts of heroism lead to his death as martyr to the

⁶⁵ Wilgoren, “A Terrorist Profile Emerges.”

⁶⁶ Nasiri, *Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda, A Spy's Story*.

⁶⁷ John M. Venhaus, *Why Youth Join Al-Qaeda* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace [2010]).

⁶⁸ Crossett, *Casebook on Insurgency*, 501.

cause.”⁶⁹ For the individual, who came from a position of relative insignificance, the lure of achieving these highest levels of self-esteem, and self-actualization, is not easily abandoned even by the best de-radicalization effort.

F. SUMMARY

Although many other elements may ultimately influence individuals’ decisions to radicalize, the elements contained in Maslow’s theory account for the majority of the motivations for radicalization. As noted, the various influences and paths to radicalization may deviate from those that are described in this chapter. However, from our research, the influences and paths we have outlined tend to be the most widely accepted. With a firm understanding of how individuals may become radicalized, the remaining chapters will outline specific attempts by governments to use the power of the same influences to effectively de-radicalize individuals.

⁶⁹ Post, *Terrorist Psycho-Logic*, 36.

IV. YEMEN'S RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE COMMITTEE

A. INTRODUCTION

Yemen, one of the first countries to introduce de-radicalization programs into the fight against Islamist movements, is no stranger to violent elements within its population. The country has had to contend with Marxist inspired insurgents in the south and Islamists propagating a militant interpretation of the faith. Yemen is of particular importance to the United States because, beginning in 2008, U.S. born Anwar al Alwaki, leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has directed and influenced terrorist attacks in the United States.⁷⁰ One of the most publicized attempts occurred on Christmas Day, 2009, when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian who is suspected to have received training and direction in Yemen, attempted to detonate a bomb on a U.S. airliner bound for Detroit.⁷¹ Even more recently, in May of 2010, Faisal Shahzad, influenced by online lectures of al Alwaki, attempted to detonate a car bomb in New York City's Times Square.⁷²

These recent events represent only a small fraction of Yemen's radicalism and demonstrate the importance of an effective de-radicalization program in Yemen. However, an effective program was not the case with Yemen's Religious Dialogue Committee (RDC), which began in 2002 and was terminated in 2005 and is widely regarded as a failure. In order to understand and accurately evaluate Yemen's de-radicalization effort, a deeper understanding and a brief history of the radical groups within Yemen must first be discussed. Additionally, in order to understand the challenges the programs faced, Yemen's socio-economic environment needs to be considered before closely examining the Religious Dialogue Committee (RDC), which headed the de-radicalization program.

⁷⁰ Scott Shane and Souad Mekhennet, "Imam's Path from Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad," *The New York Times*, May 8, 2010.

⁷¹ Mohammed al Qadhi, "Detroit Bomb Suspect 'smart but Introverted' Says Yemen Classmate," *The National*, December 30, 2009.

⁷² Shane and Mekhennet, *Imam's Path from Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad*, 1.

Radicalism in Yemen can be traced back to the early 1980s, when as many as 7,000 Yemeni nationals traveled to Afghanistan to join the Beit al Ansar, which later became Al Qaeda, and fight against the Soviet Union. After the Soviet's defeat in the Afghan conflict, the Yemeni government welcomed home its returning jihadis, as well as encouraged jihadists from other countries to settle in Yemen.⁷³

In 1990, North and South Yemen were unified into a republic with deep divides between socialists in the south and republicans in the North. The hardened jihadi fighters were incorporated into the Northern Yemeni Political Security Organization (PSO) forces by President Saleh. The PSO made many attempts to eradicate the Yemen Socialist Party by assassinating several Aden-based politicians aligned with that movement.⁷⁴ These same fighters would then go on to support President Ali Abdullah Saleh in the country's 1994 civil war against Southern Yemen's Socialist attempt at secession.⁷⁵ Once the fighters realized that they were being used by President Saleh and that he had no intention of creating an Islamic state, the relationship between the Yemeni government and the formerly victorious jihadists quickly dissolved.

The influx of returning jihadis was also associated with an increase in terrorist attacks in Yemen. In 1992, Al-Qaeda bombed two hotels in Aden where U.S. soldiers en route to Somalia were believed to be staying. The attacks resulted in the deaths of two tourists. In 1998, terrorists kidnapped 16 western tourists, resulting in the murder of four tourists and the murder of several hostage takers in a failed rescue attempt. Radical Islamist-based violence continued to escalate in Yemen when, in 2000, a small group of Al-Qaeda supported terrorists attacked the USS Cole in the Aden harbor, killing 17 U.S. servicemen.⁷⁶ Two years later, Al-Qaeda attacked the French vessel, MV Limburg, killing one crew member and causing the spill of almost 90,000 tons of crude oil into the Gulf of Aden. Because of these events, along with the presence of Al-Qaeda training

⁷³ Bjorgo et al., *Leaving Terrorism Behind*.

⁷⁴ Michael Knights, "Internal Politics Complicate Counterterrorism in Yemen," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 8, no. 2 (February 1, 2006), 14–18.

⁷⁵ Bjorgo et al., *Leaving Terrorism Behind*.

⁷⁶ Ane Skov Birk, "Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in Yemen," *Developments in Radicalization and Political Violence* (April 2009), 1–21.

camps, Yemen has come to be known as a “safe haven for Islamist terrorists”⁷⁷ and considered to be “where extremists come to play.”⁷⁸ So what makes Yemen such a fertile breeding and recruiting ground for Islamist terrorists groups? These questions are best answered with a discussion of the socio-economic environment in Yemen.

Yemen’s has a population of approximately 23 million, with almost 15 million under the age 24. The country’s population continues to grow at a rate of 3% annually, one of the highest rates in the world, and is expected to exceed 40 million by 2030. To make matters worse, the country maintains a rampant unemployment rate of 35%, an average per capita annual income of \$900 (U.S.) and an illiteracy rate over 50%.⁷⁹ Combine these dire socio-economic factors and it becomes very clear why Yemen was highlighted at number 28 of the 2006 U.N. Human Development Index’s Top 30 “least livable” countries.⁸⁰ In addition to being considered one of the least developed countries in the world, Yemen has earned the title of least developed country in the Arab region.⁸¹ Currently the Yemeni government is engaged in three insurgency battles against Houthi Shiite rebels in Northern Yemen; secessionists in Southern Yemen; and Al Qaeda throughout Yemen, causing grave security and stability concerns. In addition, the government lacks credibility with its populace due to massive corruption, hard-line crackdowns on terror suspects, and its inability to provide basic necessities such as dependable water supplies.⁸²

B. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM

Following the 2001 attack on the USS Cole and the 9/11 attacks, the country feared that “the U.S. government would take matters into its own hands to protect its

⁷⁷ Birk, “Incredible Dialogues,” 6.

⁷⁸ Michelle Shephard, “Where Extremist Come to Play,” *The Toronto Star*, September 19, 2009.

⁷⁹ Christopher Boucek, “Yemen’s Deteriorating Security, Economy could Fuel Terrorism,” *The Washington Post*, January 2, 2010.

⁸⁰ Gannon, *Yemen Employs New Terror Approach*, 1–3.

⁸¹ Boucek, *Yemen’s Deteriorating Security*, 1–3.

⁸² Boucek, *Yemen’s Deteriorating Security*, 1–3.

interest.”⁸³ With these concerns in mind, the Yemeni government set out to establish its de-radicalization program, the Religious Dialogue Committee (RDC), in 2002.⁸⁴

The RDC, which functioned as a means to combat and disengage radical ideologies in Yemen was led by former Yemeni Supreme Court Justice Hamoud al-Hitar from 2002 until its dissolution in 2005.⁸⁵ The program did not contain respected religious leaders and consisted of only al-Hitar and three ulama. Many other recognized religious figures in Yemen feared joining the dialogue with imprisoned radicals. Their fear was based on previous attempts of similar dialogues in Egypt that resulted in the death of a senior cleric.⁸⁶

With the exception of the first group of five, the detainees that participated in the dialogues were not “among the big ideologues of any Islamist movements.”⁸⁷ The first group of five detainees, however, was, according to al-Hitar, “the most intellectual and the most extremist al-Qaeda prisoners.”⁸⁸ The average participants were age 18 to 40 and were generally individuals considered not to have blood on their hands.⁸⁹ Almost 90% of the detainees that participated in the dialogues were born outside of Yemen to Yemeni parents. Most had belonged to radical Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda, al-Jihad, and al-Hijrah wa-I-Takfir. Additionally, according to various human rights organizations, some of the participants were incarcerated not because of actions they had taken, but in order to pressure suspected family members and other individuals who were suspected of participation in the USS Cole bombing or believed to be affiliated with al-Qaeda.⁹⁰ The ultimate goals of the program were, “the rejection of violence, respect for the rights of

⁸³ John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs,” *Terrorism & Political Violence* 22 (March 2010), 267–291.

⁸⁴ Horgan and Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?”

⁸⁵ Bjorgo et al., *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, 307.

⁸⁶ Bjorgo et al., *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, 307.

⁸⁷ Birk, *Incredible Dialogues*, 8.

⁸⁸ Bjorgo et al., *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, 185.

⁸⁹ Bjorgo et al., *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, 307.

⁹⁰ Birk, *Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in Yemen*, 1–21.

non-Muslims (Dhimmi), protection of foreign interests when they were protected by treaties or agreements sanctioned by the president (Wali al-Amr) and finally respect for the constitution and laws of the country.”⁹¹

With these goals in mind, Hamoud al-Hitar began the sessions with a group of five to seven detainees. The dialogues were considered to be an “all or nothing endeavor”—either the committee would convince the detainees that their interpretations of Islam were incorrect or the detainees would convince the committee that their interpretation of Islam was in fact correct. In the later case, the committee would be obliged to follow the detainee’s beliefs.⁹² Before entering into these discussions, both parties agreed that the Qur’an and the Sunnah would be the foundation for these dialogues and each party would seek truth and respect the other’s opinion.⁹³

With these ground rules in place, al-Hitar began the discussions by attempting to establish the credibility of the Yemeni government by convincing the detainees that the Yemen government was legitimate, and the country’s constitution and laws did not contradict sharia, (Islamic law). Furthermore, al-Hitar stressed that Yemen’s treaty obligations with Western non-Muslim nations, were not un-Islamic. Finally, the RDC entered into discussions centered on whether or not the killing of non-Muslims was justified. Each of these issues was discussed at length and the prisoners were given ample time to search through the Qur’an and Sunnah to make their case. According to al-Hitar, most were unable find justification for their reasoning and thus accepted the committee’s point of view. Once these fundamental issues of religious interpretation were resolved, the dialogues continued and participants were made eligible for the government’s amnesty program, if he agreed to sign a pledge renouncing violence. Those participants who had been convicted of killing were supposedly barred from participating

⁹¹ Birk, *Incredible Dialogues*, 10.

⁹² Bjorgo et al., *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, 307.

⁹³ Bjorgo et al., *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, 307.

in the amnesty program and were required to complete their sentences before being released. It has since been determined that some of these individuals may have actually been given amnesty contrary to stated policy.⁹⁴

The RDC continued for three years with 364 detainees participating in the program and Hamoud al-Hitar claiming “that 98 per cent of graduates from the programme have remained non-violent.”⁹⁵ This statistic remains largely unsubstantiated and became even more questionable when, in 2005, two former dialogue participants were discovered fighting in Iraq against American forces. More recently, in 2009, an additional three Yemeni dialogue participants were part of a suicide attack in Iraq.⁹⁶ The RDC was terminated in 2005 after criticism mounted concerning the effectiveness of the program.⁹⁷

Throughout the RDC’s three-year history, and since its termination, the Yemeni program has continued to receive criticism. Human rights violations, for example, have been connected to the program. According to a Yemeni Parliament report, and confirmed by Amnesty International, many of the detainees that participated in the dialogue program had been held in prison for over two years without ever being charged or allowed to speak to an attorney. Moreover, if the individual’s arrest was not witnessed by a family member or friend, it sometimes would take several months for a family to track down the individual’s whereabouts.⁹⁸ Further adding to the long list of human rights issues, some participants complained of beatings, torture and other abuses, while many of their family members were threatened “if they [the detainees] did not confess to the accusations made against them.”⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Bjorgo et al., *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, 307.

⁹⁵ Bjorgo et al., *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, 181.

⁹⁶ "Religious Dialogue Committee in Question," *Yemen Times*, December 8, 2009, <http://www.yementimes.com/DefaultDET.aspx?i=902&p=local&a=1> (accessed July 24, 2010).

⁹⁷ Birk, *Incredible Dialogues*, 1–21.

⁹⁸ Birk, *Incredible Dialogues*, 1–21.

⁹⁹ Birk, *Incredible Dialogues*, 12.

Furthermore, many of the program's participants felt they were unjustly arrested and then forced to participate in the program in order to gain their freedom. Many of these untried individuals were arrested following the attacks in on the USS Cole in 2000 and the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Once released, the RDC participants were promised employment and other assistance that never transpired, compromising the legitimacy the Yemeni government gained as part of their program.

Human rights violation aside, the dialogue program was also criticized for the fact that it was never truly a dialogue, "but more to build a platform for a state-monologue from where the state could persuade and convert the individuals who held erroneous views."¹⁰⁰ The state sought to have the detainees recognize and observe Yemen's constitution and laws as legitimate, while the government failed to recognize this same constitution and set of laws.¹⁰¹

The program's lack of structure, post-release support, follow-up supervision and its failure to address continuing engagement in violence and terrorist activities outside of Yemen, combined with the RDC's blatant human and civil rights violations, ultimately lead to the termination of the de-radicalization effort.

But, to what degree can the program be considered ineffective?

C. PROGRAM ANALYSIS

It is our hypothesis that adequately assessing an individual prior to the start of the de-radicalization program and properly meeting the individual's needs throughout the program will lead to an effective de-radicalization program. Using the theoretical framework established in Chapter 2 as the basis for evaluation, Yemen's de-radicalization program can now be taken apart and examined to determine in which ways it was effective, and where it was not.

Our analysis starts by examining the first theoretical expectation--the detainee's level of terrorist involvement and level of religious education. Assessing these two

¹⁰⁰ Birk, *Incredible Dialogues*, 14.

¹⁰¹ Birk, *Incredible Dialogues*, 14.

variables is a critical part of an effective de-radicalization program. By understanding an individual's level of involvement, a program can determine to what degree his needs must be met in order to de-radicalize him. An individual with a high level of involvement within a radical organization is highly indoctrinated to the cause and would require a high degree of his needs to be met for there to be any hope of de-radicalization to occur.

Additionally, assessing the individual's religious education will also determine the level of needs that must be met by the program. Whereas an individual with a low level of religious education may have been misguided or misled, making religious reeducation relatively easy, an individual that has a high level of religious education may require more sophisticated de-radicalization.

It appears that the RDC conducted no assessment of the detainee's involvement in the Islamist organization, or his level of religious education. Only the first five participants of the program were considered "the most intellectual and the most extremist al-Qaeda prisoners."¹⁰² After these first five participants, the level of terrorist involvement and religious education appears to have been significantly lower. Taking this into account, the average detainee was in the LOW category for level of involvement. Similarly the average detainee was also in the LOW category for level of religious education. These two factors place the overall category rating at LOW, meaning the RDC would have to meet the detainee's needs at a low degree, giving the program a sufficient margin of error. This rating is illustrated in Figure 4-1.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS			
INTVAR		LEVEL ED	
		LOW	HIGH
LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT	LOW	 LOW	MED/HIGH
	HIGH	LOW/MED	HIGH

Figure 4-1. Religious Education and Level of Terrorist Involvement

¹⁰² Bjorgo et al., *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, 185.

The second set of variables examined is the environmental and economic conditions that the individual will face upon his release. Again, these variables should be assessed prior to the individual starting the program. By assessing the environmental conditions, and whether the individual's organization will or will not be active upon his release, the program can determine the degree an individual's needs must be met. We hypothesize that an individual whose organization will still be active upon his release would require his needs to be more closely met than an individual that will no longer have an organization to pull him back into. An organization still in existence could potentially provide for the individual's physiological and social needs upon release, forcing the government to meet and possibly exceed the organizations resources.

The economic environment the individual is likely to be released into must also be assessed. We hypothesize, that an individual facing harsh economic conditions may be more likely to fall back to his radical past than an individual released into more promising economic conditions. With this in mind, a program would more closely have to meet the individual's economic needs of the detainee returning to a harsh economic environment. By accomplishing this assessment, the program can gauge the likelihood of the individual returning to his radical past.

It can be safely forecasted that Yemen's economic outlook is poor, falling squarely in the BAD category. With limited opportunities for employment in a poor economic environment, a detainee may likely return to his radical ways. Additionally, given that the environment in Yemen's weak political and security environment continues to be conducive for radical organizations to develop and sustain themselves, a detainee's organization would still be operating within Yemen upon the individual's release. This would place the detainee in the ORGANIZATION category. Based on these inputs, the average detainee would fall under the HIGH category, meaning that the RDC would have to meet a detainee's needs at a high degree. This would give the RDC no margin of error and is illustrated in Figure 4-2.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS			
INTVAR		ECONOMY	
		BAD	GOOD
ENVIRONMENT	ORGANIZATION	HIGH	MED/HIGH
	NO ORGANIZATION	LOW/MED	LOW

Figure 4-2. Environment and Economic Conditions Upon Release

Taking into account the economic and environmental conditions, we can assign an overall requirement of MED/HIGH, meaning that the Yemeni de-radicalization program, in order to be effective, would have to meet at a medium to high degree, the detainee's needs. With this initial assessment complete, the extent to which the individual detainee's needs were met by the competing radical affiliation or by the RDC can now be examined.

As mentioned in Chapter III, radical organizations can fulfill almost every level of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. In the case of Yemen, radical groups were able to provide for the safety and, to some extent, esteem needs of the members. Safety needs were the main focus of radical groups and were met by providing financial security by recruiting many, "would-be militants" with approximately \$1,300 to go to Iraq.¹⁰³ Additionally, many jihadist returning from Afghanistan were received as heroes by the Yemeni government and the populace. Finally, members were active participants in a sacred battle to defend their faith against infidels. These benefits contributed to radical movements indirectly being able to provide for the Esteem needs of potential recruits.¹⁰⁴

D. MASLOW'S FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS

The RDC's fulfillment of Maslow's hierarchy of needs can now be evaluated and then compared to those of the competing radical organization. Beginning with Maslow's

¹⁰³ Gannon, *Yemen Employs New Terror Approach*, 1–3.

¹⁰⁴ Sudarsan Raghavan, "Yemen's Alliance with Radical Sunnis in Internal War Poses Complication for U.S." *Washington Post*, February 11, 2010.

initial need, physiological, the Yemen government simply provided the basics. Prisoners were given just enough food and water for basic sustenance while they were detained and did not receive any additional amenities. In addition, there have been several reports of “blindfolding, solitary confinement in a small cell with very little ventilation and without regular access to toilets and drinking water.”¹⁰⁵ Failing to provide for the lowest level of needs made it extremely difficult for the program to meet any other of the individual’s needs throughout the program, undermining the program from the onset.

Moving to the next need, safety, the RDC clearly falls short of the mark. In the Yemeni program, the prisoners were labeled guilty upon arrival. As previously mentioned, many individuals had been arrested and imprisoned only due to “suspicions” of involvement with extremists. Most had not committed any crimes or been formally charged with any offenses.¹⁰⁶ This arbitrary repression created feelings that detainees had been imprisoned unjustly and forced to participate in the de-radicalization program in order to obtain their freedom, thus creating the opposite of the safety need, insecurity. Adding to these feelings of insecurity, many detainees had complained of beatings by their guards, shackling of their hands and legs, and threatening of their family members. Again, the RDC did not provide an environment conducive to meeting the detainee’s safety needs during and after incarceration.¹⁰⁷

Continuing to the social needs, another missed opportunity for the RDC is evident. No attempt was made to make families part of the process. This left the detainees with a social void during and after the de-radicalization process that potentially could be filled by radical elements during incarceration and after release. At the same time, the RDC made no attempt to develop a relationship with the individual. The program strictly focused on changing the individual’s internal beliefs and not attempting to provide a social network to support these corrected beliefs. Again, the RDC left a social void potentially filled by radical elements.

¹⁰⁵ Birk, *Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in Yemen*, 12.

¹⁰⁶ Christopher Boucek, "Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia," *Terrorism Monitor* 5, no. 16 (2007).

¹⁰⁷ Boucek, "Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia."

After release, little effort was made to reintegrate detainees back into society; the Yemeni government, for example, did not provide any social or financial support to detainees. Many of the prisoners were promised employment and other government assistance upon release but, in actuality, they received nothing.¹⁰⁸ It is not surprising that upon completion of the program, the esteem of the individual was not high. No sense of achievement was ever obtained, just a feeling of government oppression and betrayal.

Another aspect missing from the Yemen program was the inclusion of respected religious figures. The Yemen government claimed its de-radicalization program consisted of many respected Islamic scholars, but the head of the dialogue committee, Judge al-Hitar was the focus of much criticism. Judge al-Hitar appeared to be the sole public representative of the program and no true cleric took an active role. The absence of credible religious scholars is most likely because of fear of retribution and because of differences in opinion with al-Hitar.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, Yemen did not include former repentant radicals in their de-radicalization effort, which was another missed opportunity for the RDC. Including former radical shows the individual coming full circle and helps to attain self-actualization for the reformed radical. This aspect has proven beneficial in the Saudi Arabian program. As shown in Figure 4-3, it is clear that the RDC failed to meet the holistic needs of the participating detainees by only meeting the lowest level of needs.

¹⁰⁸ Boucek, "Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia."

¹⁰⁹ Birk, *Incredible Dialogues*, 1–21.



Figure 4-3. RDC's Ability to Meet Needs

The inability of the RDC to meet detainees' needs alone does not make the program ineffective. However, the fact that the participants were not assessed prior to beginning the program on their involvement, education, economic and environmental conditions presented problems for measurement of progress. In addition to not assessing the detainee prior to entering the program, the program did not properly meet the participant's needs while in detention and once released, again placing the program in the NO category for Properly Met criteria. Based on these criteria, the RDC would fall under the category of LOW EFFECTIVENESS as seen in Figure 4-4. The framework reveals where the Yemeni program failed in its efforts to de-radicalize and disengage radical Islamist. The Yemeni RDC falls on the low end of the effectiveness spectrum, making it the polar opposite of the next case study to be discussed, the Saudi Arabian program.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATION			
DV: EFFECTIVENESS		PROPERLY MET	
		YES	NO
PROPERLY ASSESSED	YES	HIGH	MED
	NO	MED/LOW	LOW

Figure 4-4. Program Effectiveness

Figure 4-5 confirms the ineffectiveness of the program as shown in Figure 4. This is illustrated by examining the pre-program assessment of level of involvement and religious education of RDC participants determined as being LOW. At the same time, predictive environment and economic conditions upon release were determined as HIGH, requiring the RDC to meet a MEDIUM level of needs. As seen, the RDC failed to meet more than the basic of needs, leading the program to being designated as ineffective.




Figure 4-5. Yemen De-radicalization Program Overview

V. SAUDI ARABIA'S COUNSELING PROGRAM

A. INTRODUCTION

Religious fanaticism and extremism are not new concepts; they have existed since the beginning of history. Recently, however, extremism has reached dangerous new levels. The magnitude of extremism has caused political, social, and economic instability, as well as religious turmoil. Following a series of domestic terrorist attacks, Saudi Arabia began a very aggressive and wide-ranging counterterrorism campaign. In addition to efforts to kill and capture terrorists, the campaign now involves countering ideological justifications for terrorism within the kingdom. Rehabilitation and counseling programs encourage radicals to renounce their violent ways and attempts to reintegrate them back into Saudi society.¹¹⁰

In 1991, the Saudi government accepted U.S. military support, rather than Osama bin Laden's mujahideen forces to protect against an invasion from Saddam Hussein. This decision created a rift between bin Laden and the Saudi government. Bin Laden viewed the actions as unforgivable and vowed to take down the government. After the first Gulf War, radical Islamists in Saudi Arabia shifted their focus to fighting the growing presence of U.S. forces in the Middle East. U.S. based troops in Saudi Arabia soon inspired attacks against the foreign presence. The Saudi government further became the target of radical Islamists who accused leaders of being non-Muslims. Leaders were perceived as religiously and politically corrupt and hypocritical in their religious beliefs and claims to be guardian of Islamic holy places. Radical Islamists felt the government was leading Saudi society away from the true practice of the faith of Islam.¹¹¹ Al-Qaeda also strongly opposed the U.S. presence in the kingdom and charged Saudi rulers of betrayal and treason. In 1994, bin Laden was expatriated from Saudi Arabia and left the country. In

¹¹⁰ Christopher Boucek, "Counter-Terrorism From Within: Assessing Saudi Arabia's Religious Rehabilitation and Disengagement Programme," *RUSI Journal* 153, no. 6 (December 2008), 60.

¹¹¹ Abdullah F. Ansary, "Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach," *Middle East Policy*, (Summer 2008).

early 2002, from his refuge, Osama bin Laden ordered Saudi fighters in Afghanistan to return home and start preparing for a campaign in the Arabian Peninsula.¹¹² Jihadists who had returned from Afghanistan began to recruit and radicalize Saudi citizens to take action against the government. To justify its violent campaign, Al-Qaeda used the U.S. presence in the kingdom and the invasion of Iraq as proof the Saudi government was being driven by non-Islamic or Western values. To fix this problem, Al-Qaeda first had to expel the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula and then topple other infidel governments in the Muslim world. A Caliphate would then be restored to rule under sacred Islamic law.¹¹³

In 2003, the Saudi Arabian branch of Al-Qaeda launched a series of deadly domestic terrorist attacks within Saudi Arabia. Attacks against foreign interests had been occurring since 1995; however, attacks against Saudi interests were new. Shootouts with local police began to increase in frequency, driving the need for a new course of action to deal with the new domestic threat. This created a turning point in Saudi Arabia's fight against terrorism. Following the attacks, the Saudi government realized that traditional security and law enforcement efforts were insufficient and recognized the vital role of radical ideology in motivating terrorists.¹¹⁴ To counter this, a new strategy was created to combat the ideological justifications for violent radicalism in the kingdom. The counter-radicalization strategy was made up of three components: prevention programs to deter people from getting involved with violent extremism; rehabilitation programs designed to encourage supporters and sympathizers to renounce violence; and aftercare programs to prevent recidivism and to reintegrate people back into society.¹¹⁵ Because of its very positive results and success, the Saudi program continues to operate today.

¹¹² T. Hegghammer, "Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia," *International Affairs* 84, no. 4 (July 2008), 701.

¹¹³ Ansary, *Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach*.

¹¹⁴ Boucek, *Counter-Terrorism from within: Assessing Saudi Arabia's Religious Rehabilitation and Disengagement Programme*, 60.

¹¹⁵ Boucek, *Counter-Terrorism From Within*.

B. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM

One of the main strategies Saudi Arabia uses to fight radicalism is through advocacy and advising. Based on the realization that only targeting terrorists was unwise and counterproductive, the Saudi government adopted a campaign to confront ideas with ideas and to attack the appeal of the jihadist ideology by presenting alternative interpretations of Islam.¹¹⁶ One of the primary notions of the program is that the terrorists are seen as ‘victims,’ whose religious ideas are based on misinformation and lack of proper knowledge about Islam. This assumption makes re-education both necessary and possible. The Saudi government frames the issue by centering on the radicals’ lack of authority and understanding of religious doctrine.¹¹⁷ To counter ignorance on Islam, the Ministry of the Interior has implemented an intense religious reeducation, rehabilitation, and counseling program for jihadi prisoners. The goal is to inspire prisoners to renounce their radical ideology by providing them with psychological and sociological counseling and by engaging them in religious dialogue.¹¹⁸

The de-radicalization program is administered by a group within the Saudi Ministry of Interior known as the Advisory Committee. The committee is composed of four subparts: the Religious Subcommittee, the Psychological and Social Subcommittee, the Security Subcommittee, and the Media Subcommittee. Members of each subcommittee are located in different districts throughout Saudi Arabia.¹¹⁹

The Religious Subcommittee is the largest of the four subcommittees. It is comprised of about 150 clerics, scholars and university professors, and is the group that directly engages in prisoner dialogues and the counseling process.¹²⁰ A primary factor in selecting scholars is their ability to effectively communicate with prisoners.

¹¹⁶ Ansary, *Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia’s Approach*.

¹¹⁷ Ansary, *Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia’s Approach*.

¹¹⁸ Ansary, *Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia’s Approach*.

¹¹⁹ Christopher Boucek, "Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, no. 97 (2008), 60.

¹²⁰ Boucek, "Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’ Counterterrorism Strategy."

Successful scholars must be able to speak with the detainee like “his own brother” and must be motivated by love, compassion, and a drive to help the prisoner.¹²¹

The Psychological and Social Subcommittee is composed of approximately fifty psychologists, psychiatrists, social scientists, and researchers.¹²² These individuals are responsible for assessing and diagnosing prisoner psychological problems and behavior. They continually interact with detainees to assess their development and status in the program. Close attention is paid to ensure the prisoner’s rehabilitation is genuine. The subcommittee also facilitates family visits, supplies family housing and transportation needs, as well as provides educational opportunities for the prisoner and their family. Upon release the subcommittee assists with healthcare and employment demands.¹²³

The main function of the Security Subcommittee is to evaluate detainees for security risks and make release recommendations.¹²⁴ The subcommittee also provides prisoners advice on how to behave upon release so they will not return to jail. The former radicals are reminded that their freedom is dependent on remaining clear from old associates and behaviors. Another function of the Security Subcommittee is to monitor detainees after their release from prison. Freed participants are required to check in regularly with the subcommittee.¹²⁵

The Media Subcommittee focuses on outreach and education. It produces materials used in the program and other educational resources used in Saudi schools and mosques.¹²⁶ The materials target young Saudi males, who are the most vulnerable to recruitment by radicals. Much of the committee’s work is channeled out through mosques and events such as lectures and study circles.¹²⁷

¹²¹ Boucek, *Counter-Terrorism From Within*, 60.

¹²² Boucek, *Counter-Terrorism From Within*, 60.

¹²³ Boucek, *Counter-Terrorism From Within*, 60.

¹²⁴ Boucek, *Counter-Terrorism From Within*, 62.

¹²⁵ Boucek, *Counter-Terrorism From Within*, 62.

¹²⁶ Boucek, *Counter-Terrorism From Within*, 63.

¹²⁷ Boucek, *Counter-Terrorism From Within*, 63.

Not all captured terrorists are eligible for the de-radicalization program. Following incarceration, radical prisoners are placed into one of three categories. The first is for those who planned, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts. Next are sympathizers who did not physically aid terrorists but may have publicly supported them. The third category are those who are passive sympathizers and uncooperative with the authorities. These individuals may have provided limited services to terrorists, but only because they are believed to have been deceived.¹²⁸ The entire counseling program, including reintegration into society, is only offered to prisoners who have not been directly involved in terrorist acts. However, those who have committed terrorist acts can participate in the program but are not eligible for release.

The initial counseling begins with one-on-one meetings between the prisoner and a cleric. During the first session the cleric clarifies that he is “an independent and righteous scholar” and not employed by the Saudi government.¹²⁹ The Saudi government believes that radical ideologies can only be successfully countered by someone not only knowledgeable about Islam, but also someone legitimate in the eyes of a radical. Therefore, detainees do not meet with religious figures that lack credibility with fundamentalists.

Serving on the Advisory Committee are former militant figures and regime critics.¹³⁰ The initial conversations allow for discussions and dialogue on religion and attempt to determine the prisoner’s understanding of Islam. After this evaluation, an explanation of a more mainstream interpretation of the faith is presented. After completing these classes, longer dialogue sessions of six weeks complete the individual’s religious re-education.¹³¹ Following the completion of the sessions, the prisoner is evaluated for release. Released detainees are initially cared for at a halfway house, where

¹²⁸ Boucek, *Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia*, January 20, 2010.

¹²⁹ Boucek, *Extremist Reeducation and Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia*, January 20, 2010.

¹³⁰ Boucek, *Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*.

¹³¹ Boucek, *Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*.

they receive further counseling and are then reintegrated back into society. The government also helps find a job and an apartment, as well as provides a stipend to the freed detainee.¹³²

Since Saudi Arabia's rehabilitation program was created approximately, 3,000 prisoners have participated in some part of the counseling program.¹³³ To date, the program has produced promising results; Saudi Arabia claims a success rate of 80 to 90 percent.¹³⁴ Included in this number are prisoners who refused to participate in the program as well as those who failed the program. According to the Saudi government only 35 individuals have been rearrested since their release, which equates to a recidivism rate of only 1 to 2 percent.¹³⁵ The Saudi program is definitely the most expansive and best funded counter-radicalization program but is this the only reason for its success?

C. PROGRAM ANALYSIS

The theoretical framework established in Chapter II is a useful basis for evaluating Saudi Arabia's de-radicalization program. The efforts of the Counseling Program can now be broken up and examined to determine on which levels it is effective.

The first theoretical expectation analyzed was a detainee's level of terrorist involvement and level of religious education prior to incarceration. The Saudi program targeted this problem by evaluating each prisoner to determine their level of involvement and the role that religious education could play to remedy the problem. The Saudi government determined that 10 percent of the prisoners were hardcore radical Islamists with such entrenched beliefs that they could not be reached.¹³⁶ The rest were seen merely as sympathizers and followers that had a low religious education level. For

¹³² Boucek, *Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*.

¹³³ Ansary, *Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach*.

¹³⁴ Ansary, *Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach*.

¹³⁵ Ansary, *Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach*.

¹³⁶ Ansary, *Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach*.

individuals who might benefit from religious reeducation, the program was offered to prisoners not directly involved in terrorist acts. This can be examined using Figure 5-1.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS			
INT VAR		RELIGIOUS EDUCATION	
		LOW	HIGH
LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT	LOW	LOW	MED/HIGH
	HIGH	LOW/MED	HIGH

Figure 5-1. Religious Education and Level of Involvement

The detainees in the program thus had a low level of involvement and a low religious education level. Using these two theoretical expectations we can assign a requirement of LOW, meaning that, in order for the Saudi de-radicalization program to be successful, it would have to meet at least a low degree of the detainee's needs.

The next hypothesis is based on the detainee's environmental and economic conditions once released and whether or not the individual's organization still existed. This can be examined using Figure 5-2.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS			
INTVAR		ECONOMY	
		BAD	GOOD
ENVIRONMENT	ORGANIZATION	HIGH	MED/HIGH
	NO ORGANIZATION	LOW/MED	LOW

Figure 5-2. Environment vs. Economic Conditions Upon Release.

Given Saudi Arabia's oil based economy the individual will face relatively favorable economic conditions. However, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) vow to restore the Caliphate and its ability to survive a decade of targeted attacks by various governments suggests that the terrorist organization will most likely still be active upon the individual's release. Using Figure 5-2, the environment is "Organization" and the economy is "Good." Based on these assumptions, the Saudi program must meet a MED/HIGH level of the detainee's needs in order to be effective. Since the organization is still active, it presents a threat to lure the freed detainee back in by providing for the needs of the individual. However, a strong economy also provides for needs not addressed in the program and helps keep the individual from needing to rejoin the organization. With this initial assessment complete, the extent the Counseling Program meets the detainee's needs can now be analyzed.

D. MASLOW'S FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS

As discussed in Chapter II, Maslow defined the most basic needs of humans as physiological needs. These needs compose the lowest level required for human survival and include; breathing, food, sexual activity, and the maintenance of homeostasis.¹³⁷ Examining the Saudi program, all of these needs are met and in some cases exceeded. By operating a facility where detainees are afforded individual cells with an adequate supply of sleep, food, water, and private excretions, individuals are able to maintain a constant, normal state of the body. The program also addresses the need for sexual activity, as sexual frustration has historically been linked to increased radicalization.¹³⁸ To counter this issue, married detainees are allowed conjugal visits. Health care is also provided to both the detainee and his immediate family, which ensures everyone is healthy enough to participate in the reeducation process.

The next element in Maslow's theory centers on one's personal safety. As defined by Maslow, the security of the body, employment, resources, morality, family,

¹³⁷ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.

¹³⁸ Y. Yehoushua, "Reeducation of Extremists in Saudi Arabia," Middle East Media Research Institute.

health and property make up the needs for safety.¹³⁹ Unsafe prisons precipitate the conditions that make prisoners vulnerable to radicalism. Because of this, the Saudi program holds safety in very high regard. A critical aspect of their program is that the detainee is viewed as a victim of perverted interpretations of Islam, rather than as a criminal. Taking this notion a step further, the Saudis segregate men who are a part of the de-radicalization process from the regular prisoners and, even more importantly, from hard core radicals who are not part of the program. With these precautions, enrolled individuals do not have to fear retribution for taking part in the program. Furthermore, each prison is manned with well-trained staff and all cells are also equipped with security cameras to ensure the prisoners do not fear abuse by guards. Additionally, as detainees progress through the Saudi program, they are convinced that an improper understanding of Islam is a major safety concern on a spiritual level because they have been running the risk of damnation. Finally, during this entire process the Saudi government is actively involved in ensuring the detainee's family is protected and cared for.

To fulfill the next level in Maslow's theory, social needs, the Saudi program establishes specific guidelines for family participation in a social context. According to Maslow, social needs involve feelings of belongingness consisting of friendship, family, and sexual intimacy.¹⁴⁰ Social needs are arguably the most important to fill because they form the largest void created by the arrest of the detainee and the subsequent removal of the radical social elements that have previously filled his social needs. In order to meet these needs, the Saudi program involves the detainee's family early on in de-radicalization efforts. In the end, the Saudi government holds the detainee's family responsible for the continued good behavior of the released individual. This responsibility will give them motivation to continue providing for the detainee's social needs.

To ensure the detainee is not overwhelmed upon release, the Saudi government continues social support to help former radicals reintegrate back into society. Assistance is provided in locating a job and receiving other benefits such as a car, an apartment, and government stipends. Since the Saudi government treats the former radical as victims

¹³⁹ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.

¹⁴⁰ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*.

instead of criminals, Saudi society is more open to take in the former detainee. In some cases, the Saudi government will help fill a detainee's social void even further by helping the former radical find a wife.¹⁴¹

An important element of the Saudi de-radicalization program is its focus on self-esteem. Understanding reintegration back into society is easier when a detainee can hold his head up high with a correct understanding of Islam and jobs skills that will provide the former radical with the ability to be a productive member of society. Establishing these feelings is an essential part of ensuring that the program addresses the detainee's need for self-esteem. As defined by Maslow, esteem presents the normal human desire to be accepted and valued by others.¹⁴² The rigorous six-week program provides an excellent example of addressing the esteem needs. A religious examination at the end of the program provides proof that the former radical sincerely grasps the true principals of Islam.

As important to religious reeducation, the Saudi program recognizes that the old job of performing terrorist acts has been replaced by the option for legitimate employment. The Saudis offer a job training course to give needed skills in a trade that will allow the former radical to be a successful earner for his family and a productive member of society. By being an effective earner the detainee will have the ability to fill his family's lower needs and in doing so earn their respect.

The final element in Maslow's theory consists of ensuring a person is capable of meeting their full potential, this is called self-actualization. As defined by Maslow, self-actualization means achieving morality, creativity, spontaneity, problem solving, lack of prejudice, and acceptance of facts.¹⁴³ The Saudi program fills this need by ensuring that the detainee has a correct understanding of Islam. More importantly, the former radical will be armed with information that will allow him to counter problems created by chance encounters with radical elements that would otherwise pull them back into their social

¹⁴¹ Boucek, *Saudi Arabia's 'Soft' Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, 60.

¹⁴² Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*.

¹⁴³ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*.

circle. In the government's interest, the former radical will not hold the same level of prejudice against the state since the government has worked extremely diligently to fill all of the detainee's lower needs through the de-radicalization process, producing gratitude towards the state. Additionally, former detainees are also used in the program to share the errors of their ways. This demonstrates to current detainees the moment of coming full circle and shows that change is possible and that the change will produce positive results.

Figure 5-3 demonstrates that the Saudi program is able meet the needs of each element in Maslow's theory.



Figure 5-3. Saudi De-radicalization Program's Ability to Meet Needs

Figure 5-4 shows the relationship between properly assessing a detainee and meeting their needs as well.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATION			
DV: EFFECTIVENESS		PROPERLY MET	
		YES	NO
PROPERLY ASSESSED	YES	HIGH	MED
	NO	MED/LOW	LOW

Figure 5-4. Program Effectiveness

In the case of Saudi Arabia, detainees are properly assessed and their needs are properly met. This places the effectiveness of the program as “High.”

Figure 5-5 summarizes the entire flow of the Saudi program. Once in the program detainees are first properly assessed according to their level of terrorist involvement and religious education level. Next, predictions on environmental and economic conditions show that the detainee’s terrorist organization most likely will still be active upon release, while the economy should be strong. Finally, each element in Maslow’s theory is addressed and all needs are met. This produces an effective program.



Figure 5-5. Saudi De-radicalization Program Overview

The Saudi government has realized the importance ideology plays in the motivation of radical Islamists. To counter this radical ideology, they have created a program that focuses on counseling and reeducation with the goal of rehabilitating detainees and reintegrating them back into society. By properly assessing detainees, successfully predicting their environment upon release, and addressing each appropriate level of their needs, the Saudi government has produced an overall effective de-radicalization program. Conversely, in the next chapter we examine a Yemen, a country that did not assess individuals or provide for their needs, resulting in an ineffective de-radicalization program.

VI. U.S. THEATER INTERNMENT FACILITY (TIF) PROGRAM

A. INTRODUCTION

Images often play a prominent role in shaping public perceptions. This was definitely the case during the United States' invasion of Iraq during the spring of 2003. After a quick march into Baghdad, the first image widely celebrated was the toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein. Not long after came the spectacle of President Bush landing on the deck of the USS Lincoln, where he delivered a 'victory' speech, with a banner behind him proclaiming "Mission Accomplished." However, just a year later a new set of images surfaced that questioned the fabled representations of the Iraqi invasion. Hundreds of gruesome photographs and videos documenting the torture of Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison were released. The bright beacon of light that was represented by the United States now grew dim with sadistic images of U.S. soldiers mistreating Iraqi prisoners. Photographs included soldiers giving a thumbs-up behind a pyramid of naked detainees, a terrified inmate trying to fend off an attack dog, a U.S. soldier grinning next to the body of a dead inmate packed in ice, and a hooded inmate standing on a box with his arms outstretched in a Christ-like fashion and electric wires attached to his body.¹⁴⁴ These images represented the U.S. led detention operations and severely damaged U.S. efforts to win Iraqis hearts and minds. Additionally, when combined with the questionable operations taking place at the Guantanamo Bay detention center, the events provided rich propaganda to radical Islamist enemies in Iraq.

After a thorough investigation by the U.S. military and civilians, it became evident that the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib were extensive, systemic, and part of a larger failure that had also taken place at other prisons in both Iraq and Afghanistan,

¹⁴⁴ Henry A. Giroux, "Education After Abu Ghraib," *Cultural Studies* 18, no. 6 (2004), 779.

as well as detention efforts at Guantanamo Bay.¹⁴⁵ The U.S. Department of Defense knew that a drastic overhaul was needed and set about creating a model prison system.

B. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM IN IRAQ

Based on an interview with the architect of U.S. prison reform in Iraq, Major General Douglas Stone, and interviews with former U.S. military officers who served as detainee guards inside of detention facilities in Iraq, this chapter tells the virtually unknown story of how the U.S. military introduced a de-radicalization program in Iraq's and Afghanistan's detention centers. Eager to move on from the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, the United States transferred all its detainees from that facility and turned it back over to the Iraqi government in 2006. The U.S. primarily sent its prisoners to one of two main detention centers in Iraq, Camp Cropper or Camp Bucca. Camp Cropper, which is near Baghdad, contained around 3,000 prisoners, including high-value detainees.¹⁴⁶ More moderate individuals were sent to Camp Bucca in southern Iraq, where nearly 18,000 prisoners were detained.¹⁴⁷ In the spring of 2007, Major General Stone was given the reigns of Task Force 134. This task force was responsible for detainee command and control, ensuring due process, and assisting Iraq rebuild its judicial, correctional, and law enforcement system.¹⁴⁸ Immediately after beginning his tour, he outlined a plan not only to expand the detention facilities, but also to attempt a large-scale rehabilitation program aimed at de-radicalizing prisoners before returning them to their communities.

Major General Stone continued to pursue an ambitious set of initiatives to restructure the system of detention centers in Iraq. First, once a person was in custody, a considerable amount of time was spent learning about them, studying their motivations, understanding why they were fighting, and for whom they were fighting.¹⁴⁹ The first 72 hours was an assessment phase, which included multiple evaluations conducted by Iraqis

¹⁴⁵ Giroux, "Education After Abu Ghraib."

¹⁴⁶ Alissa J. Rubin, "U.S. Remakes Jails in Iraq, but Gains are at Risk," *New York Times*, June 2, 2008.

¹⁴⁷ Rubin, "U.S. Remakes Jails in Iraq."

¹⁴⁸ Stone, *Detainee Aspects of Transition*.

¹⁴⁹ Walter Pincus, "Iraq's 'Battlefield of the Mind,'" *The Washington Post*, December 10, 2007.

Imams, religious clerics, to determine the prisoner's religious beliefs. Furthermore, each detainee was assessed to determine what category they would be assigned based on age, religious sect, threat level, and insurgent group affiliation.¹⁵⁰

Detainees were also assigned a specific location in the segregation plan. Prior to General Stone's arrival, moderate and radical Islamist detainees were routinely mixed, turning the detention facilities into a "jihadi university."¹⁵¹ Therefore, one of General Stone's first priorities was to isolate the radical Islamists, who were a minority of the population, from the more moderate prisoners. Once this segregation was complete, an attempt could be made to persuade the moderate detainees that their lives would be better off if they stayed away from those who preached violent jihad.

Second, a structured process by which interested detainees could begin a personal reform program was set up. The program provided basic education, vocational training, and religious education. Since approximately 60 percent of the detainees had not completed high school, General Stone seized on the opportunity to begin a focused education program that included basic education.¹⁵² Education was critical to assist detainees in the de-radicalization process: they needed to be armed with the ability to read and analyze information on their own. Detainees were provided an education plan tailored to their personal needs. The curriculum was based on a core of six subjects: Arabic, English, math, science, civics, and geography.¹⁵³ Religious courses were also offered to give prisoners a chance to study the Qur'an under the tutelage of one of over 40 clerics working for the program. Vocational programs were also offered to instill employment skills and work habits to provide detainees a better opportunity to reintegrate into society. Lower-risk detainees were allowed to put their skills to use in brick factories or textile plants and earn money for their families while they were in prison.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ Pincus, *Iraq's 'Battlefield of the Mind,'* A.17.

¹⁵¹ Pincus, *Iraq's 'Battlefield of the Mind,'* A.17.

¹⁵² Stone, *Detainee Aspects of Transition.*

¹⁵³ Stone, *Detainee Aspects of Transition.*

¹⁵⁴ Pincus, *Iraq's 'Battlefield of the Mind,'* A.17.

Another important aspect to the program that General Stone emphasized was the inclusion of family. Following Abu Ghraib, the U.S. immediately placed family and community involvement as a top priority. In 2007, then U.S. Central Command Commander Admiral William Fallon stated, “The family structures are very strong in this country [Iraq]. We want families to be accountable.”¹⁵⁵ In Iraq, approximately 85 percent of U.S.-held detainees were Sunni, but prisoners were held in the Shiite south, far from their communities. Therefore, Admiral Fallon approved a plan to build new detention facilities that allowed selected detainees to be closer to home.¹⁵⁶ The primary means to reach families was through a visitation program that enabled families to remain in contact with a detainee. Engagement with the families was a means to reach the most disenfranchised population in the country and to show them the government’s commitment to the wellness of its people.

After Major General Stone took command and revamped detention operations in Iraq the results of his programs were positive. Riots, which once occurred regularly in the facilities, vanished. Violence among the detainees, including beatings and killings, went down as well.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, unlike other programs studied, the United States took comprehensive biometric information on detainees. From this information, the U.S. military and Iraqi officials could confirm that, of the thousands of prisoners that were released from the detention centers, recidivism rates remained astoundingly low, around one to two percent.¹⁵⁸

Because of the success in Iraq, the U.S. has tried to incorporate some of the successful measures in Iraq into detention facilities in Afghanistan.

C. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN

After the U.S. and their allies ousted the Taliban in Afghanistan, they took command of a former Soviet airbase in Bagram. The airfield included a large number of

¹⁵⁵ Elaine Grossman, "Rehabilitating Iraqi Insurgents," *National Journal* (2007).

¹⁵⁶ Grossman, "Rehabilitating Iraqi Insurgents."

¹⁵⁷ Grossman, "Rehabilitating Iraqi Insurgents."

¹⁵⁸ Rubin, *U.S. Remakes Jails in Iraq, but Gains are at Risk*, A.1.

hangars, some of which became a detention facility. Similar to the facilities at Guantanamo Bay, the cells were built of wire mesh and captives shared large open cells with other captives. Each prisoner was only given a blanket and a small mat. The prisoners also shared buckets to use as toilets and did not have access to running water.¹⁵⁹ However, after lessons learned from operations in Iraq, a new detention facility was built at Bagram to address the needs of the Afghan detainee population. To date, the new facility easily holds the nearly 700 detainees, but could hold as many as 1,100 prisoners.¹⁶⁰ The new facility also includes classrooms, vocational training and recreational areas, a family visitation center, as well as a fully equipped medical unit. The programs of the detention center borrow from practices in Iraq designed to rehabilitate detainees by teaching them basic education, moderate Islam, vocation skills, and the importance of family involvement.¹⁶¹ The robust academic programs are in tune with the Afghan culture and include basic and secondary education. Local Mullahs facilitate discussion of key topics such as prohibitions against violence in the Qur'an, the role of prayer and spiritual disciplines, Islamic etiquette, and culturally appropriate civic norms.¹⁶² The vocational training programs instill employment skill sets and work habits to provide detainees with opportunities that will allow them to reintegrate into society. Family visitation positively influences villages and tribes by strengthening family ties and permitting families to see that detainees are safe. As in Iraq, the goal is to change how the detainees see the world and provide them the skills necessary to become functioning members of society.

The changes brought about by General Stone seem to be making a difference, but what is it about these changes that have produced these results?

¹⁵⁹ Tim Golden, "Defying U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan," *New York Times*. January 7, 2008.

¹⁶⁰ Gordon Lubold, "U.S. Builds New Detention Center in Afghanistan," *The Christian Science Monitor*. August 26, 2008.

¹⁶¹ Stone, *Detainee Aspects of Transition*.

¹⁶² Stone, *Detainee Aspects of Transition*.

D. PROGRAM ANALYSIS

The theoretical framework established in Chapter II is a useful basis for evaluating the United States' de-radicalization programs inside of Theater Internment Facilities (TIF) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The efforts inside of the TIF can now be broken up and examined to determine on which levels it is effective. The programs inside Iraq and Afghanistan are nearly identical, which produces the same results when examining the first set of intervening variables. However, the second set of environmental intervening variables alters the outcomes slightly. Therefore, when the second set is examined, each program is analyzed separately, isolating the conditions inside each country.

The first theoretical expectation analyzed was a detainee's level of terrorist involvement and level of religious education. Each program targeted this problem by evaluating prisoners to determine their level of involvement and the role that religious education could offer to solve the problem. In Iraq and Afghanistan, detainees are put through multiple levels of assessments to determine where in the camp they should be housed. Hardcore radicals are separated from the rest of the more moderate prison population. Furthermore, only the moderates are able to participate in the program. Also, religious education levels of detainees are low in both locations, with data suggesting that 70 percent of detainees do not attend mosque on a regular basis.¹⁶³ This dynamic can be examined using Figure 6-1.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS			
INT VAR		RELIGIOUS EDUCATION	
		LOW	HIGH
LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT	LOW	LOW	MED/HIGH
	HIGH	LOW/MED	HIGH

Figure 6-1. Religious Education and Level of Terrorist Involvement

¹⁶³ Stone, *Detainee Aspects of Transition*.

The detainees in the program thus had a low level of involvement and a low religious education level. Using these two theoretical expectations we can assign a requirement of LOW, meaning that in order for the programs in Iraq and Afghanistan to be successful, it would have to meet at least a low degree of the detainee's needs.

The next hypothesis is based on the detainee's environmental and economic conditions once released and whether or not the individual's organization still existed. The case of Iraq can be examined using Figure 6-2.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS			
INTVAR		ECONOMY	
		BAD	GOOD
ENVIRONMENT	ORGANIZATION	HIGH	MED/HIGH
	NO ORGANIZATION	LOW/MED	LOW

Figure 6-2. Environment and Economic Conditions in Iraq Upon Release

Iraq's unemployment has stabilized at around 15 percent, down 44 percent since 2007.¹⁶⁴ Given this trend and Iraq's oil based economy, the individual should encounter somewhat favorable economic conditions. However, with the continued presence of AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq), the terrorist organization will most likely still be active upon the individual's release. Using Figure 6-2, the environment is "Organization" and the economy is "Good." Based on these assumptions, the Iraqi program must meet a MED/HIGH level of the detainee's needs in order to be effective. If an organization is still active, it poses a threat to lure the released individual back in by providing for the needs of the individual. However, a stronger economy also provides for needs not addressed in the program and shields the individual from the need to rejoin the organization. Next, Afghanistan is examined using Figure 6-3.

¹⁶⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Background Notes on Iraq* [2010], <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm>.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS			
INTVAR		ECONOMY	
		BAD	GOOD
ENVIRONMENT	ORGANIZATION	 HIGH	MED/HIGH
	NO ORGANIZATION	LOW/MED	LOW

Figure 6-3. Environment and Economic Condition in Afghanistan Upon Release

The major difference with Afghanistan is that it does not provide a sustainable economy. Afghanistan's unemployment rate is currently 35 percent, more than double of Iraq's, and is not forecasted to improve in the near future.¹⁶⁵ Compounding the problem, the Taliban and Al Qaeda will most likely still be active upon the detainee's release. Using Figure 6-3, the projected environment is "Organization" and the economy is "Bad." Based on this, the Afghan program must meet a HIGH level of the detainee's needs in order to be effective. Because the poor economy will not provide for any additional needs, the de-radicalization program must ensure that when the individual is released, they are equipped with the proper tools to maintain an honest lifestyle. With this initial assessment complete, the extent the de-radicalization programs in Iraq and Afghanistan meet the detainee's needs can now be analyzed.

E. MASLOW'S FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS

The most basic element in Maslow's needs theory focuses on physiological needs. Physiological needs compose the lowest level required for human survival and include breathing, food, sexual activity, and the maintenance of homeostasis.¹⁶⁶ In analyzing the U.S. detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan post 2006, it is evident that sufficient

¹⁶⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Background Notes on Afghanistan* [2010], <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm>.

¹⁶⁶ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.

attention was given to prisoner's physiological needs. In Iraq, prisoners were moved from open area overcrowded cells and were kept in Modular Detainee Housing Units (MDHU). Approximately six inmates shared a separate housing unit that was equipped with a bathroom. Similarly, the new detention facility in Afghanistan contains private cells with their own beds and no longer requires prisoners to use a bucket for a toilet: the new bathrooms now include modern toilets and plumbing. Addressing each of these physiological needs allows the detainee to maintain a proper homeostasis and stay engaged in the de-radicalization program.

Personal safety is the next element in Maslow's theory. Again, safety involves the security of the body, health, employment, resources, morality, and family.¹⁶⁷ Prisons are often associated with violent extremism and are often hotbeds of terrorism. American criminologist Harvey Kushner argues that prisons are one of the main recruitment grounds for Al-Qaeda.¹⁶⁸ To help counter this and to promote a safer environment in the detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, hard core radical Islamists are segregated from the rest of the more moderate prison population. The aim of the segregation is to minimize detainee networking, which leads to less chance of rioting or violent behavior instigating trouble in the camp. By breaking up big corrals of hundreds of people, it makes the facility more secure. Additionally, training and educating the frontline staff is a top priority. Prison staffs are taught to ensure that detainees are treated humanely at all times. The International Red Cross (IRC) and Human Rights Watch also provide oversight on prisoner safety. After General Stone turned around the Iraqi and Afghan detention facilities, he ushered in a new era of openness and transparency. The IRC and Human Rights Watch provide oversight on prisoner safety. The IRC and Human Rights Watch often visit detainees to evaluate the treatment they receive while in custody. Furthermore, detainees are provided the same healthcare, and are seen by the same doctors, at the same facility as the guard personnel.¹⁶⁹ In fact, some of the detainees felt

¹⁶⁷ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.

¹⁶⁸ Peter R. Neumann, *Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation in 15 Countries* (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence [2010]).

¹⁶⁹ Neumann, *Prisons and Terrorisms*.

safer in the detention facility than they did back at home and, occasionally, an individual eligible for release requested to remain in detention to continue receiving the benefits and safety the facility offers.¹⁷⁰

The next element in Maslow's theory involves social needs. Maslow defines social needs primarily as feelings of belongingness consisting of friendship and family.¹⁷¹ Addressing these needs is a central focus of the programs inside of Iraq's and Afghanistan's detention facilities. As discussed in Chapter III, violent Islamists recruit prisoners by isolating them from their families, communities, and government. To counter this, the U.S. placed family and community involvement as a top concern. New family visitation centers were built at existing detention facilities to allow prisoners to remain connected and keep familial bonds strong. Also, because families of detainees have lost a primary wage earner, they often are destitute. As mentioned earlier, the detention facilities allow some of the low-risk detainees the privilege of venturing outside of the camp gates daily to work in brick factories or textile plants in order to earn money for their families.¹⁷² Additionally, families are prepared for the reintegration of their detainee and gain an appreciation for their perspectives as a result of journeying with them through the process of de-radicalization. These same social bonds with the family and community are also used to ensure that once released the individual remains monitored and does not return to their radical ways.

The next element in Maslow's theory is self-esteem. Maslow defines this as the normal human desire to be accepted and valued by others.¹⁷³ A cornerstone of the programs in U.S. detention facilities is rehabilitation. The program stresses preparing prisoners for their release and facilitating their transition back into society so that they will be less vulnerable to once again conducting radical activities. Detainee initiatives totaling more than \$250 million, including education, religious studies, and vocational

¹⁷⁰ Michael S. Maksimowicz, Michael Arndt and Donald Greene, Interview With Former Detainee Guard, 2010.

¹⁷¹ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.

¹⁷² Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.

¹⁷³ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.

training have been instituted throughout the facilities. Civics courses cover “why you should get an education” and “why you should try to have a job.”¹⁷⁴ Other courses include how to control anger, the oath of peace, and the sacredness of life and prosperity. One of the goals of this education is to shift the institutional experience from retribution to rehabilitation. It also enables the detainees to achieve their full potential and gives them the power to have a better future.¹⁷⁵ Religious courses taught by one of nearly 50 local Imams in the program empower detainees to understand more accepted interpretations of the Qur’an and allow them to question violent radical ideology. Religious education classes increase individual awareness and moderation and strive to demonstrate that knowledge is the path to enlightenment.¹⁷⁶ Vocational training provides detainees the necessary skills for career employment opportunities and thus enhances reintegration and reduces recidivism. General Stone states, “What we’re trying to do, obviously, is impress upon the [detained] population that there is a mechanism by which their behavior and the things they do can influence their release and can influence the society.”¹⁷⁷

The last element in Maslow’s theory is self-actualization. Maslow defined this as achieving morality, creativity, spontaneity, problem solving, lack of prejudice, and acceptance of facts.¹⁷⁸ Programs in U.S. detention facilities fill this need by allowing detainees to study the Qur’an under the tutelage of moderate clerics. The objective is aimed at producing “religious enlightenment.” The exposure to what is actually contained in the Qur’an allows detainees to reject radical interpretations of Islam. Additionally, armed with education and the correct interpretation of Islam, the individual can take on the responsibility of influencing others not to follow violent radical ideology.

Figure 6-4 demonstrates that the U.S. efforts at de-radicalization programs in Iraq and Afghanistan are able meet the needs of each element in Maslow’s theory.

¹⁷⁴ Pincus, *Iraq's 'Battlefield of the Mind,'* A.17.

¹⁷⁵ Stone, *Detainee Aspects of Transition.*

¹⁷⁶ Stone, *Detainee Aspects of Transition.*

¹⁷⁷ Grossman, *Rehabilitating Iraqi Insurgents.*

¹⁷⁸ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 1.



Figure 6-4. U.S. Run De-radicalization Programs Ability to Meet Needs

Figure 6-5 shows the relationship between properly assessing a detainee and meeting their needs as well.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATION			
DV: EFFECTIVENESS		PROPERLY MET	
		YES	NO
PROPERLY ASSESSED	YES	HIGH	MED
	NO	MED/LOW	LOW

Figure 6-5. Program Effectiveness

In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, detainees are properly assessed and their needs are properly met. This places the effectiveness of the program as “High.”

Figure 6-6 summarizes the entire flow of the U.S. programs. Once in the program detainees are first properly assessed according to their level of terrorist involvement and religious education level. Next, predictions on environmental and economic conditions show that the detainee’s terrorist organization most likely will still be active upon release, while the economy should be strong. Finally, each element in Maslow’s theory is addressed and all needs are met. This produces an effective program.



Figure 6-6. U.S. De-radicalization Programs Overview

Following a rough start and after suffering a black eye from early efforts at detention in Iraq, the U.S. quickly searched for a new model to handle detained prisoners. As the commander of Task Force 134 General Douglas Stone created a new system that changed detention to rehabilitation. The program focuses on reeducating individuals and giving them a set of marketable skills that will enable them to reintegrate into society. By properly assessing detainees, successfully predicting their environment upon release, and then addressing each appropriate level of their needs, an overall effective de-radicalization program was produced. The final chapter in this thesis offers implications of these findings and proposes a way ahead for the future of de-radicalization efforts.

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VII. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

The programs we have examined in this thesis were intended to disengage, reeducate, and de-radicalize extremists. Despite the purported success of many programs, little systematic analysis exists on de-radicalization as an effort to end radical Islamist motivated terrorism. The de-radicalization programs we examined are descriptively rich but lack empirical data to each program's effectiveness. There is also no standard of measurement to apply across specific countries' programs. This thesis has aimed to fill this gap by providing a basic framework to analyze and compare de-radicalization programs.¹⁷⁹ Specifically, it used Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory to evaluate the different paths to radicalization and the requirement for programs to effectively meet the same needs of detainees and counter the desire to return to radicalism.

What can the United States government and military learn from these programs? "Why are there different degrees of effectiveness among de-radicalization programs?"

B. FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS

Our framework was based, loosely, on Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. The components of Maslow's theory include physiological, safety, social, self-esteem, and self-actualization needs. Our examination of three case studies demonstrated how each of these individual components was effectively or ineffectively applied in de-radicalization efforts in the countries we examined. The research found that a proper assessment of an individual's needs and an understanding of the environment they will return to upon release, coupled with a program capable of providing for those needs, determine the effectiveness of a de-radicalization effort.

¹⁷⁹ Bjorgo ET AL., *Leaving Terrorism Behind*, 307.

Building off of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs theory, our research reveals several key factors that are important for understanding individual motivations for joining and leaving terrorists groups. The first factor was the level of involvement of a terrorist. Was the terrorist a lower echelon participant, a key planner/organizer for the cause, or did the individual actually have blood on their hands? The second factor evaluated was the detainee's religious education level. Was the detainee religiously illiterate and dependent on others for their interpretation of Islam, a well-educated religious scholar, or maybe somewhere in between these two extremes? The third factor, the economic conditions that detainees might face upon release, played a critical role in countering Islamic radicalism. Will the economy allow the individual to use the skills and knowledge gained during the de-radicalization process to make a new life, or will he return to unemployment? Finally, the likelihood of the terrorist organization's persistence was considered. If the group still exists, the government will have to fill the social void that may draw the individual back to the organization once released.

Our research also found that the sponsor of the de-radicalization program, which is usually a country's government, must effectively evaluate the individual based on these variables along with assessing of his motivations for joining the radical element in the first place. A comprehensive evaluation determines to what degree a de-radicalization program must operate in order to overcome competing radical interests. If an adequate number of these competing needs are not able to be met by the existing program, the best option may be to keep an individual detained until some of the external variables change or the program gains additional resource to better compete with the radical organization.

C. FINDINGS

Several findings emerged from this research, including the importance of assessment, the need for segregating prisoners in detention centers, and a focus on rehabilitation versus retribution. First and foremost, an assessment is important in creating a successful de-radicalization effort. An effective program cannot be developed without knowing the individual and the social, religious, and economic environment the program will be up against. As discussed in Chapter IV, Yemen did not have an

assessment program. This lack of assessment led to many extreme radicals participating in the program who should have been excluded. The lack of assessment created a major stumbling block for Yemen's efforts when combined with their limited resources. In contrast, the Saudi and U.S. programs had an extensive assessment effort, as discussed in Chapter V and Chapter VI. The assessment process enabled these programs to better focus their resources on individuals who could be de-radicalized while screening out those who could not be de-radicalized under current conditions.

Second, proper assessment allowed for effective segregation of those who were hardcore radicals from those who were more moderate. Segregation minimizes detainee networking and further recruitment and radicalization. Additionally, segregation has been proven to reduce violent behavior in detention centers such as rioting. Segregation also prevents detainees from being exposed to retribution for taking part in the program thereby, creating a safer environment. Finally, segregation allows for the separation of different ethnic groups that may be in turmoil with one another, thereby further improving the safety of the detention facility. In both Yemen and the pre-General Stone U.S. detention program in Iraq, the environment was unsafe and provided the potential for radical individuals to recruit more moderate detainees. Conversely, the Saudi program immediately implemented segregation to ensure that more radical elements were not able to influence others in the program, and were able to create a safer environment for participants to flourish. Once taking over the detention centers in Iraq, Major General Stone segregated the radicals from the moderates and ethnic groups in turmoil with similar success to the Saudi program.

Moving into the core of the de-radicalization process, a focus on rehabilitation rather than retribution was important for lasting success of the programs studied. In conventional battles, captured combatants are removed from the battlefield and held until the end of the conflict. However, in ideological warfare, the battlefield is in the mind of the individual and there is no easily determined end of hostilities. Furthermore, the goal of de-radicalization programs is to eventually reintegrate the individual back into society. The most effective way to accomplish this goal is to promote rehabilitation rather than retribution. Our research showed that rehabilitation is best accomplished through the

inclusion of family, education, vocational training, and by providing an alternative way of life. The Saudi program and the U.S. program in Iraq confirmed the value of rehabilitation in their de-radicalization efforts by including religious and basic education courses to ensure that the individuals had a better understanding of their religion. This increased religious understanding should prevent them from being persuaded to perform actions that were in conflict with religious scriptures once released. Additionally, job training provided marketable skills that enabled an individual to be a better provider for their family once reintegrated back into society. Finally, the strengthening of family bonds while the individual was in the de-radicalization program served two purposes. First, it ensured that the individual would have a strong social circle to replace the radical social influences. Secondly, it included the family in the de-radicalization effort. The family was also influenced by the positive aspects of the program, thereby widening the de-radicalization programs effects.

D. IMPLICATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

From the results of our research, two implications are evident. First, the need for a framework by which to evaluate and compare de-radicalization programs and reliable data are essential for understanding the success of de-radicalization efforts. The framework proposed in this thesis is a useful starting point for U.S. efforts to assist other countries in their de-radicalization efforts. For example, in Yemen, the U.S. could have offered insight into the importance of assessment thereby allowing the Yemini government to better identify individuals who were not suitable for the program. This simple act would have saved time, money and effort. Additionally, the U.S. government could help other countries identify missing resources that prevent successful rehabilitation and reintegration of suitable individuals. The U.S. government could also supplement programs such as the one in Yemen with additional funding and expertise to offset the extremely challenging environment.

Second, the U.S. can continue to develop effective de-radicalization efforts and avoid costly failures that will help prevent further acts of terror. For example, the U.S. never instituted a de-radicalization program for terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay; it

was constructed to keep dangerous enemy combatants off of the battlefield with no efforts to de-radicalize them.¹⁸⁰ The shortsightedness of the Guantanamo effort is best summed up by a report from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency; it states that at least sixty-one of individuals released from Guantanamo returned to practicing terrorism.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, the Saudi Ministry of Interior recently announced that eleven former Guantanamo detainees are on the Saudi government's most wanted list for terrorism.¹⁸²

Finally, several areas for additional research have emerged from this study. First, what are the current U.S. and international laws that need to be modified to support detention and de-radicalization as part of its overseas operations? Second, how can the U.S. lawfully implement de-radicalization programs in U.S. prisons? Finally, but perhaps most critically, how can the U.S. encourage the moderate Ummah to engage radical Islam? Future researchers, hopefully, can identify the missing pieces of the puzzle needed to defeat a virulent radical Islamist ideology that continues to undermine stability throughout the world.

Unfortunately, the battle against radical extremists is not going to be won quickly or purely by military means alone. The heuristic framework in this thesis helps delineate the keys to a successful de-radicalization program. In addition, by addressing each individual's circumstances that shape their motivations, an effective program can be tailored to meet the individual's needs. By utilizing the knowledge of what defines an effective de-radicalization effort, the United States and its allies will have another means to combat radical Islam and prevent further acts of terror.

¹⁸⁰ Christopher Boucek, "After Guantanamo: How Effective Are Rehabilitation Programs in the Muslim World?" *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (2009).

¹⁸¹ Boucek, "After Guantanamo."

¹⁸² Boucek, "After Guantanamo."

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