



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

SUCCESS IN COIN: ALIGNING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE WITH STRATEGY

by

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December 2010

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 2010	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Success in COIN: Aligning Organizational Structure With Strategy			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Patrick M. Flood, William J. Marm, Christopher T. Young				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number _____.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Currently, there is no organization specifically designed to accomplish the U.S. military strategy in counterinsurgency. This thesis uses organizational theory to assess the qualities and structure of the Organization for Community Engagement (OCE), an organization designed to accomplish the key tenets of counterinsurgency. It presents an analysis of counterinsurgency doctrine, classic and contemporary counterinsurgency theorists, current U.S. military strategy, and the environment and its application to Afghanistan as a case study. Based on that emerging strategy, the authors develop an organizational design heuristic for establishing an organization focused on the fulfillment of that strategy. They then apply the heuristic to identify and measure the contingency factors of the OCE. Applying these contingency factors to the structural configuration of the OCE, the authors propose an organizational configuration that can successfully accomplish the COIN aspects of the military strategy in Afghanistan. The authors propose that specially trained and selected teams focused on long-term socio-cultural relations will fill a critical void in the military's current community engagement efforts and would lead to a more efficient use of military force and U.S. resources.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Organizational Design, Community Engagement, Counterinsurgency, Afghanistan, International Security and Assistance Force			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 157	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

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MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

Currently, there is no organization specifically designed to accomplish the U.S. military strategy in counterinsurgency. This thesis uses organizational theory to assess the qualities and structure of the Organization for Community Engagement (OCE), an organization designed to accomplish the key tenets of counterinsurgency. It presents an analysis of counterinsurgency doctrine, classic and contemporary counterinsurgency theorists, current U.S. military strategy, and the environment and its application to Afghanistan as a case study. Based on that emerging strategy, the authors develop an organizational design heuristic for establishing an organization focused on the fulfillment of that strategy. They then apply the heuristic to identify and measure the contingency factors of the OCE. Applying these contingency factors to the structural configuration of the OCE, the authors propose an organizational configuration that can successfully accomplish the COIN aspects of the military strategy in Afghanistan. The authors propose that specially trained and selected teams focused on long-term socio-cultural relations will fill a critical void in the military's current community engagement efforts and would lead to a more efficient use of military force and U.S. resources.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	THESIS RELEVANCE	1
B.	IMPORTANCE	2
C.	PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS	4
D.	METHODS AND SOURCES	5
E.	THESIS OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION	5
II.	COIN BACKGROUND AND STRATEGY	7
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	7
B.	CLASSIC DEFINITIONS APPLIED TO THE CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENT	7
C.	COIN BACKGROUND AND DOCTRINE.....	8
D.	THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY STRATEGY	13
E.	CURRENT ISAF COIN ORGANIZATIONS AND EFFORTS	18
III.	ORGANIZATION DESIGN THEORY	21
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	21
B.	ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN BACKGROUND	22
C.	LEARNING ORGANIZATION	24
D.	DIAGNOSIS AND STRATEGIC FIT DOMAINS.....	25
E.	LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT STYLE DOMAIN.....	25
	1. Preference for Delegation	26
	2. Level of Detail in Decision Making	26
	3. Reactive or Proactive Decision Making	26
	4. Decision-Making Time Horizon.....	26
	5. Risk Preference.....	27
	6. Motivation.....	27
	7. Categorizing the Leadership Domain	27
F.	ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY DOMAIN	28
	1. Product Innovation	29
	2. Process Innovation.....	29
	3. Product and Market Breadth.....	30
	4. Concern for Quality	30
	5. Price Level.....	30
	6. Control Level.....	30
	7. Technology.....	30
	8. Barrier to Entry	31
	9. Categorizing Organizational Strategy	31
	10. Interplay between Strategy and Structure	32
G.	ENVIRONMENTAL DOMAIN.....	32
	1. Equivocality.....	32
	2. Uncertainty	32
	3. Complexity	33

	4.	Hostility	33
H.		ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE DOMAIN.....	33
	1.	Trust.....	34
	2.	Conflict	35
	3.	Morale	35
	4.	Rewards Equitability	35
	5.	Resistance to Change	35
	6.	Leader Credibility	36
	7.	Scapegoating	36
	8.	Categorizing Climate	36
I.		SIZE AND SKILL CAPABILITIES DOMAIN	37
J.		TECHNOLOGY DOMAIN.....	41
K.		ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT	42
IV.		CONTINGENCY FACTORS	45
	A.	INTRODUCTION.....	45
	B.	ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS	45
	C.	ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY.....	47
	D.	FORMALIZATION.....	48
	E.	CENTRALIZATION	49
	F.	INCENTIVES.....	52
	G.	COORDINATION AND CONTROL	53
	H.	ORGCN ANALYSIS	55
	1.	Strategic Misfit.....	56
	2.	Contingency Misfit.....	56
	3.	OrgCon Recommendations	56
V.		CONCLUSION	59
	A.	LIMITATIONS OF ORGCN	59
	B.	POLICY RECOMMENDATION	61
	C.	A CRITICAL AREA FOR FURTHER STUDY	62
	D.	SUMMARY	64
		APPENDIX A. MINZTBERG ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN THEORY	65
	A.	ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN THEORY—MINTZBERG.....	65
	B.	BOUNDARY SPANNING ROLES.....	67
	C.	BUFFERING ROLES	67
	D.	COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE.....	67
	E.	DYNAMIC TENSION.....	68
	F.	OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES.....	68
		APPENDIX B. COMPLETE ORGCN QUESTIONNAIRE	71
		APPENDIX C. AFGHANISTAN'S STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS	83
	A.	STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS	83
	1.	U.S. Population	84
	2.	Afghan Population.....	84
	3.	U.S. Government.....	85

4.	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.....	85
5.	Border Nations.....	86
6.	Enemy Forces	86
APPENDIX D. TEMPORAL DEPICTION OF UNIFIED JOINT TASK LIST FOR OCE		87
APPENDIX E. ORGCON —DIAGNOSIS AND STRATEGIC FIT INPUTS.....		89
APPENDIX F. ORGCON—DIAGNOSIS AND STRATEGIC FIT OUTPUT ANALYSIS		103
APPENDIX G. ORGCON—DESIGN FIT INPUTS		111
APPENDIX H. ORGCON —DESIGN FIT OUTPUT ANALYSIS.....		125
LIST OF REFERENCES.....		133
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST		139

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Burton and Obel's Contingency Fit Model	22
Figure 2.	Graphic of Mintzberg Configurations and Key Organizational Design Definitions.....	66
Figure 3.	Depiction of Stakeholders in the Central Asian States	83

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAF	Anti-Afghan Forces
AI	Areas of Interest
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AO	Areas of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
C2	Command and Control
CDF	Civil Defense Forces
CDI	Community Defense Initiative
CET	Cultural Engagement Team
CF	Coalition Forces
CFSOCC-A	Combined Forces Special Operations Command Cell— Afghanistan
CJSOTF-A	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force— Afghanistan
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMISAF	Commander of International Security Assistance Force
CONOP	Concept of the Operation
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
DoD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DST	District Support Team
FET	Female Engagement Team
FM	Field Manual
FOB	Forward Operating Bases
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's
GPF	General Purpose Forces
HTS	Human Terrain System
HTT	Human Terrain Team
IO	Information Operations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IW	Irregular Warfare

JP	Joint Publication
MITT	Military Transition Teams
NGO	Non Governmental Organizations
OCE	Organization for Cultural Engagement
ODA	Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alphas
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OrgCon	Organization Consultant Computer Program
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SF	Special Forces
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SOTF	Special Operations Task Forces
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USG	United States Government
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare
WOG	Whole of Government

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank our thesis advisors Professors Erik Jansen and Carl Jones for having faith and confidence in our concept, and for their support and guidance in the development of this thesis. Their mentorship and insight for teaching made this thesis possible.

We would also like to express our deepest appreciation to our second reader Professor Heather Gregg for her guidance, direction, and enthusiasm during the infancy of our concept.

We would like to thank the staff of the Naval Postgraduate School who provided us with truly exceptional educational experience.

Finally, we would like to thank our families, both personal and professional, for their support and patience throughout the thesis process.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THESIS RELEVANCE

President Obama raised serious questions December 1, 2009 regarding the current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan by announcing that the country would be sending 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan and, furthermore, would begin withdrawing troops 18 months later.¹ As military academic and retired Special Forces officer Dr. Hy Rothstein points out, more is not always better and the addition of troops alone is not sufficient to prevent defeat in Afghanistan.² Analysis of successful counterinsurgencies indicates the need for an explicit strategy to win the trust and confidence of the local population in respect to the state attempting to counter an insurgency. The greatest difficulty in counterinsurgency is recognizing the importance of understanding and securing the population to increase their support of the incumbent government.³ To ensure the success of President Obama's objective, a change needs to occur in strategy that focuses on improving the relationship with the Afghan population, strengthening Afghan security forces (particularly their police forces), and legitimizing the Afghan government.⁴

Since the successful invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban regime, the United States and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have failed to prevent the Taliban resurgence. The progression of

¹ President Barack Obama, "Remarks on U.S. Military and Diplomatic Strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents* (March 27, 2009), 1, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1677819061&Fmt=7&clientid=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

² Hy S. Rothstein, "Less is More: The Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an Era of Collapsing States," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2007): 275.

³ See David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 143; Kalev Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, May/June 2005; Robert Taber, *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare* (Washington, D.C: Brassey's, 2002), 199.

⁴ Seth Jones, *COIN in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study* (Santa Barbara, CA: RAND, 2008), 176.

the war has seen the conflict transition from regular to irregular warfare. While small numbers of decentralized Special Operation Forces (SOF) operating by, with, and through indigenous forces were the initial boots on the ground, over the course of the last nine years, centralized conventional forces operating along the Afghan National Army (ANA) have become the primary effort in this counterinsurgency (COIN). During each subsequent rotation to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), conventional forces eventually replaced U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) as the battle space owners, and replaced the unconventional and then irregular warfare strategy with an increasingly conventional and attrition-based one. Recent discussions among both active and retired Special Forces commanders propose that the branch refine its mission in Afghanistan and its approach to wars by refocusing on its historical mission of unconventional warfare. Therefore, to not only restore its strategic utility overall, but also help achieve success in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army and its Special Forces must adapt itself to remain capable of providing effective economy of force, embracing greater risk, and improving its ability to employ irregular forces.⁵

B. IMPORTANCE

After the Taliban resurgence, several military strategists proposed various ways ahead for Afghanistan. The authors of this thesis have spent a combined total of 38 months in Afghanistan as both conventional and Special Forces officers in tactical and operational units. As students of unconventional warfare who will likely return to Afghanistan, the authors seized upon the idea that a possible solution could be found to correct the U.S. lack of success if the authors attempted to reframe the problem. They started with the following statement: "if it is accepted that a problem of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan is the inability to control the villages, a logical conclusion would be that the formation of village

⁵ John D. Litchfield, "Unconventional Counterinsurgency: Leveraging Traditional Social Networks and Irregular Forces in Remote and Ungoverned Areas," *Small Wars Journal*, 2010, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/litchfieldsamsmonograph.pdf>.

militias is a necessity.”⁶ U.S. Army Special Forces Major Jim Gant offered a persuasive argument in his essay, “One Tribe at a Time” for greater emphasis on utilizing tribes and irregular forces to achieve security in Afghanistan.⁷ Gant’s essay served as a building block that initiated discussion. In a continuation of his argument, Gant states that tribes are the key to stability in Afghanistan. Therefore, for a strategy to be successful in Afghanistan, it must focus on not only gaining a tribe’s allegiance but also utilizing them in the fight against the Taliban.⁸

From March 24–25, 2009, the authors attended the Tribal Engagement Workshop, cosponsored by Small Wars Foundation, the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Irregular Warfare Center, the U.S. Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare, the U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, and Noetic Group in Fredericksburg, Virginia. The objectives of the Tribal Engagement Workshop were to evaluate the value and feasibility of a tribal engagement approach in Afghanistan, assess what secondary effects the adoption of a tribal engagement strategy would have on the political and military situation, and identify the operational components of a tribal engagement approach in Afghanistan.⁹ The authors contributed their initial research and assessments to the workshop, many of which are highlighted in the Tribal Engagement Workshop Summary made available on the *Small Wars Journal* website.¹⁰

⁶ Antonio Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency In Afghanistan* (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 173.

⁷ Jim Gant, “One Tribe At A Time,” *Steven Pressfield Online*, December 2, 2009, http://www.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/one_tribe_at_a_time_ed2.pdf.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Litchfield, “Unconventional Counterinsurgency: Leveraging Traditional Social Networks and Irregular Forces in Remote and Ungoverned Areas.”

¹⁰ *Small Wars Journal: Tribal Engagement Workshop*, March 25, 2010, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/events/tew/>. The authors of this thesis and the original Organizational Design project were dispersed among three separate working groups at the Tribal Engagement Workshop. Among their contributions was the term “Community Engagement” as a more appropriate term than those of Tribal or Village due to its applicability to populations structured in ways dissimilar to Afghanistan or Iraq.

Seth Jones and Arturo Munoz also investigated the viability of establishing local defense forces in Afghanistan to complement Afghan National Security Forces, and conclude that utilizing local defense forces organized around tribal history/organizations are vital to achieve security in Afghanistan. This complementary step is necessary along with reintegrating insurgents, countering corruption, and improving governance.¹¹

As Jones and Munoz argued, “successful efforts to protect the population need to include better understanding of local communities.”¹² Arguably, this lack of understanding of local communities contributes to the current challenges in successfully conducting COIN in Afghanistan. Therefore, this thesis carefully considers this notion, as well as Ben Connable’s admonition that an “effective solution to the cultural intelligence gap” is to retrain leaders, units, staffs to not only collect, but analyze cultural data and to include this data in all-source intelligence products.¹³ Therefore, this thesis utilizes organizational theory to design an organization to accomplish key parts of the military strategy. Generically named the Organization for Cultural Engagement (OCE), the concept operationalizes an organization designed to engage with the population at the lowest level.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

How can organizational theory assist with designing an organization created to accomplish a military strategy? Furthermore, would a new military organization with a better strategy-structure fit more efficiently and effectively engage the population at the lowest level and stabilize areas of conflict, including counterinsurgencies?

¹¹ Seth G. Jones and Arturo Munoz, *Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local Defense Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010).

¹² Ibid., xi.

¹³ Ben Connable, “All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Competence,” *Military Review* (March–April 2009): 63.

It is the authors' belief that, in all Areas of Responsibility (AORs), specially trained and selected teams focused on long-term socio-cultural relations would fill a critical void in the military's current community engagement efforts and lead to a more efficient use of military force and U.S. resources.

As an organization designed to address engagement with the population as its first priority, Community Engagement Concept, can efficiently and effectively assist the Department of Defense and enable host nation governments to stabilize areas of conflict.

D. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis offers a heuristic based on organizational design theory for designing a military organization that accomplishes a military strategy. The authors chose Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel's *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design—The Dynamics of Fit* (3rd ed.) and its supporting computer-based interactive analysis program Organizational Consultant Version—8 (OrgCon8) as an expert system and the main source for organizational design analysis. Burton and Obel's text includes many of the previously recognized organizational theorists, such as Henry Mintzberg, Richard Daft, and David Hanna in a comprehensive and step-by-step analysis formatted for diagnosing and designing businesses in the civilian sector.

Although this thesis primarily focuses on the current operations in Afghanistan, it is possible to utilize this heuristic to design units that can deploy in support of U.S. interests throughout the world without major changes to current manning, budget, or force levels.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION

This thesis presents an analysis of current and proposed COIN strategy and its application to Afghanistan. It recommends, based on that emerging strategy, a heuristic for establishing an organization focused on the fulfillment of that strategy. This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I is a basic

introduction to the research question, hypothesis and its relevance. Chapter II provides a background on counterinsurgency and military strategy. Chapter III utilizes organization design theory to define the contingency factors of the proposed organization, the Organization for Community Engagement (OCE). Chapter IV incorporates these contingency factors with the structural configuration of the OCE to achieve the best configuration (or 'fit') that can successfully accomplish the military strategy in Afghanistan. Chapter V concludes this thesis and offers recommendations for continued research.

II. COIN BACKGROUND AND STRATEGY

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a background on counterinsurgency (COIN), military strategy, and the status of the fight in Afghanistan. After comparing and contrasting classic and contemporary COIN theorists, this chapter suggests that a key component of military strategy is missing in the current International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) strategy in Afghanistan and is contributing to the challenges the ISAF organization faces in the fight against the Taliban. Following a description of a number of different organizations conducting COIN in Afghanistan, this chapter concludes that none of these organizations can successfully engage the entire Afghan population, empower and legitimize the local Afghan government, and integrate a multi-gender and multiagency effort capable of achieving success in the Afghan environment.

B. CLASSIC DEFINITIONS APPLIED TO THE CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENT

To discuss the Community Engagement Concept effectively, it is first necessary to define the following terms and understand that COIN as a subset of Irregular Warfare. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines these terms as follows:¹⁴

- *Counterinsurgency (COIN)*: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.
- *Irregular Warfare (IW)*: A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).

According to these definitions, while ISAF is attempting to counter a Taliban insurgency, the organization ultimately finds itself conducting irregular warfare in which the primary objective is legitimizing the Afghan government

¹⁴ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 2009.

while simultaneously securing the Afghan population.¹⁵ The issue, however, with a direct implication that utilizes the classic definitions of the environment and enemy, is the realization that Afghanistan is much more complex than is able to be defined by JP 1-02's classic counterinsurgency doctrine.¹⁶ The complex environment of Afghanistan—and indeed the global struggle against radical Islam—demands an effective application of classic COIN theory updated to counter the changes in the contemporary, globalized environment. The Community Engagement Concept offers ISAF a flexible means for securing and stabilizing this complex and dynamic environment.

C. COIN BACKGROUND AND DOCTRINE

For over 100 years, authors have grappled with operational techniques to fight and win a counterinsurgency. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the focus was on Maoist or Marxist revolutionary warfare with the major theorists being David Galula, Frank Kitson, Robert Taber, and Bernard Fall. Many experts consider David Galula's, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, the flagship volume on COIN and the intellectual bedrock for the U.S. military's *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*.

In a succinct set of principles involved in counterinsurgency warfare, Galula's thesis attests that the ultimate goal of a counterinsurgency force is to foster the support of the affected population rather than to control territory. The main contribution of the book are the imperatives and principles in the COIN environment. Galula provides advice for engaging in the full spectrum of counterinsurgency covering a variety of topics including: sequencing of operations, patterns of insurgency, mobilizing causes, geography, and leader and organizational structure to name a few.

¹⁵ Mark Grdovic, "Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of Irregular Warfare," *Special Warfare* 22, no. 5 (September/October 2009): 15.

¹⁶ Chris North, "Redefining Insurgency," *Military Review* (2008): 2.

Bernard Fall wrote that revolutionary warfare is simply guerrilla warfare plus political action (RW=G+P).¹⁷ Fall claims that any small unit can counter guerrilla warfare; however, no small unit can counter guerrilla warfare combined with a political cause. Fall, having conducted unconventional warfare in France in WWII, understood the power of revolutionary warfare. He argues that the strength and power of revolutionary warfare is the political, doctrinal, or ideological roots behind the action. Having been a scholar of communist insurgencies, Bernard Fall would perhaps claim that the radical Islamic ideology has replaced communism in his revolutionary warfare paradigm.

Contemporary COIN theorists apply classic COIN theory to the contemporary environment. Instead of a grounding in communist ideology, the contemporary environment combines the radical Islamic ideology with new technologies to create a markedly complex global environment. Currently, David Kilcullen, Seth Jones, and John Nagl are the leading COIN theorists who explore these new complexities.

David Kilcullen provides a helpful perspective on COIN in understanding the influence of globalization and its impacts on the Islamist. In *The Accidental Guerrilla*, Kilcullen defines an Islamist as a regional local fighter who organizes against outsiders perceived as intruding on the physical and cultural space of traditional society. Kilcullen asserts that local wars are primarily guerrilla conflicts within societies, often sponsored or inspired by transnational extremists. Therefore, the interaction between accidental guerrillas and ideological terrorists makes both traditional counterterrorism and classical counterinsurgency models inadequate for developing strategies to counter insurgents within the COIN landscape. Kilcullen suggests the development of a more pertinent COIN model.

Kilcullen argues that it is possible to counter insurgents through aggressive government programs that stress effective governance, population security, and the development of favorable economic conditions. Kilcullen arrives

¹⁷ Bernard Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," *Naval War College Review*, April 1965.

at several conclusions, considered “best practices” in counterinsurgency operations. First, he recommends that a political strategy be developed that builds government effectiveness and legitimacy. Second, a need exists to develop a strictly adhered to and comprehensive approach to COIN that integrates civil and military efforts. Third, continuity of key personnel and policies must be attained to provide stability and normalization. Fourth, a strategy of population-centric security needs to be enacted. Fifth, a cueing and synchronization of development, governance, and security efforts must exist. Sixth, a multilateral environment of cooperation needs to be developed, relying on a close and genuine partnership that puts the host nation forces in the lead. Seventh, a strong emphasis needs to be placed on building effective and legitimate local security forces. Lastly, a region-wide approach should be developed to disrupt safe-havens, control borders and frontier regions, and undermine terrorist infrastructure in neighboring countries.

In *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan*, Seth Jones identifies the capabilities that the U.S. military should consider developing to improve its ability to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. Beginning with an analysis of COIN theory using the classic standard-bearers, such as Galula and Kitson, Jones operationalizes the population-centric approach in respect to Afghanistan. Jones’ COIN model shows the indigenous government, insurgent groups, and external actors all in direct competition for the center of gravity: the population.

Jones claims that the capacities of the indigenous security forces, local governance, and external support for insurgents are the hallmarks of success or failure of counterinsurgency efforts. He asserts that the United States and ISAF should focus their resources to help improve the capacity of the indigenous government (and its security forces) to wage counterinsurgency warfare, which thereby, would improve their competency and legitimacy. Jones highlights many preferred operational and tactical techniques for Afghanistan. He asserts that the Afghan National Police should be the primary focus of the coalition’s training efforts. He identifies the undermining issues preventing good governance in

Afghanistan as its ineffective justice system, government corruption, unchecked power of warlords and tribal militias, and the drug trade. Jones recommends that command and control of the counter-insurgent forces be decentralized down to the smallest unit possible. Finally, he claims that the best way to win over the population and isolate the insurgents is to live with the population, similar to the CAPs or CORDs programs of the Vietnam War.

The U.S. Army published *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* in an attempt to capture the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan in a common language using classical counterinsurgency terms. The manual adjusts the thinking and practices of U.S. conventionally-oriented, attrition-based ground forces by clearly describing COIN as a political, cultural, and sociological struggle that needs to be focused on the population. The FM acknowledges that COIN is complex and demands “draw[ing] heavily on a broad range of the joint force’s capabilities and require[ing] a . . . mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations.”¹⁸

Bernard Fall famously stated, “if it works, it is obsolete.”¹⁹ His statement infers that the military bureaucratic machine is comfortable with routine procedures and tasks that do not deviate from a standard mold. Fall argues that if an organization is comfortable, then it probably is not changing and adapting to the changing enemy. Supporting this idea is a recurrent theory in the FM: “the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly- the better learning organization- usually wins.”²⁰ This identifies an imperative of success for U.S. forces in this low-intensity and dynamic fight. Leaders and soldiers must prepare prior to a deployment by studying insurgency and counterinsurgency. They must continue to learn downrange while they attempt to defeat these irregular enemies. *FM 3-24* states, “a learning organization that can accurately identify the weaknesses of

¹⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency* (Washington D.C., 2005), p. 2–5.

¹⁹ Bernard Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” *Naval War College Review* (April 1965).

²⁰ *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, p. ix.

the external environment of war and reconfigure its own capability to exploit those weaknesses will defeat an insurgency; a bureaucratic hierarchy that is inward focused on administration and operations will not.”²¹

Like David Galula and Seth Jones, *FM 3-24* concludes that the focus of counterinsurgency is the people. The manual asserts that “contact with the people is critical to the local COIN effort’s success” and that “people who do not believe they are secure from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals will not risk overtly supporting COIN efforts.”²² COIN forces must provide for the people, protect the people, and convince the people that their incumbent government is legitimate. The FM argues that efforts to collect information about the insurgency and the population are equally important. The more rapidly COIN forces can enable legitimacy, the sooner they can end the population’s active and passive support to the insurgency. Since this struggle is not just a military one, *FM 3-24* argues that effective COIN operations require a balanced application and unity of effort between military and civil efforts and organizations.

The common theme recurring in Galula, Kilcullen, Jones, and *FM 3-24* is one of a population-centric approach focused on security and legitimacy executed at the local level. While *FM 3-24* is grounded in classic COIN theory, the manual suggests merging traditional approaches with “the realities of a new world shaped by globalization and the spread of extremist ideologies . . . [in what can be described as] neo-classical counterinsurgency.”²³ Therefore, if the United States is going to employ a COIN approach capable of achieving stability and security in Afghanistan or other unstable regions, a paradigm shift away from conventional priorities and the emphasis on massive weapons systems toward the enhancement of capabilities for stability operations must occur within the U.S. military and ISAF.

²¹ Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” *Parameters* XIII, no. 4 (1983); *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006.

²² *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency*, 5–21.

²³ Frank G. Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?,” *Parameters* (Summer 2007): 73.

D. THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY STRATEGY

The topic of military strategy has and continues to be loosely defined by politicians and military leaders.²⁴ However, strategy continues to be “the essential ingredient for making war either politically effective or morally tenable . . . Without strategy, there is no rationale for how force will achieve purposes worth the price in blood and treasure.”²⁵ With the war in Afghanistan now America’s longest war, many “have seriously questioned whether the U.S. has a coherent over strategy for the war and, if so, what it is.”²⁶ Strategy is defined as “a set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”²⁷ As an easier way to discuss military strategy, the U.S. Army War College utilizes General Maxwell Taylor’s characterization of “strategy as consisting of objectives [ends], ways and means.”²⁸ Using this concept, “strategy equals ends plus ways plus means.”²⁹ For a military strategy to be able to achieve success, the U.S. armed forces must utilize a sequenced approach to achieve a balance between the ways, means, and ends.³⁰

While the initial military strategy of the United States was to defeat the Taliban to prevent them from providing safe haven to Al Qaeda, this strategy has slowly morphed into defeating the Taliban insurgency to stabilize Afghanistan. U.S. forces decisively defeated the Taliban government in 2001 in the first few months of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) by using a well-balanced military strategy in ways, ends, and means. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

²⁴ Arthur F. Lykke, “Defining Military Strategy,” *Military Review* (January/February 1997).

²⁵ Richard Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?,” *International Security* 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 5–50.

²⁶ David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 4 (August 2005): 608.

²⁷ *Joint Publication (JP) 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (2009): 524.

²⁸ Lykke, “Defining Military Strategy,” 183.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?”

finds themselves, nine years later, battling a resurgent Taliban that is destabilizing Afghanistan with a successful insurgency. An analysis of the U.S. strategy reveals that, other than an increase in deployed forces, the United States has done very little to adapt to the evolving conflict in terms of the means of achieving a successful strategy.³¹ Unfortunately, as military strategist Dr. John Arquilla points out, militaries are reluctant to change:

America's armed forces have failed, as militaries so often do, to adapt sufficiently to changed conditions, finding out the hard way that their enemies often remain a step ahead. The U.S. military floundered for years in Iraq, then proved itself unable to grasp the point, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that old-school surges of ground troops do not offer enduring solutions to new-style conflicts with networked adversaries.³²

Dr. Arquilla concludes that reliance on the strategies of "shock and awe" and the Powell doctrine of "overwhelming force" have handicapped the United States in its fight while killing civilians and enraging their survivors.³³ Often times, this outrage can lead to the creation of additional enemies.³⁴

The United States needs to attack the Taliban's indirect strategy—which is winning the support of the population—to defeat the Taliban. Unfortunately, the United States faces challenges in Afghanistan because its strategy is diametrically opposed to the insurgents' strategy. Military academic Dr. Ivan Arreguín-Toft argues that a "weak actor's strategy can make a strong actor's power irrelevant" when the weak actor fights an indirect strategy of guerrilla warfare against the direct attack strategy of a strong actor.³⁵ By definition, weak actors cannot directly oppose strong actors. Therefore, a weak actor is best served by using an indirect strategy. The "opposite-approach interaction" allows

³¹ John Arquilla, "The New Rules of War," *Foreign Policy* (March/April 2010).

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 346.

³⁵ Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (July 2001): 95.

the weak actor to deflect and dodge the technological and tactical power of the strong actor.³⁶ In time, the opposite-approach interaction between strong and weak actors favors the weak actors. They will eventually win or tie in the conflict. The strong actors are, of course, the United States and ISAF, while the weak actors are the various Afghan insurgent groups, principally the Taliban, and Al-Qaeda. Sun Tzu theorized that a vital offensive strategy is to attack your enemy's strategy.³⁷

By focusing on current U.S. direct, enemy-centric ways of destroying the Taliban's capacity to fight as opposed to an indirect, population-centric approach to stabilize Afghanistan, the United States and ISAF are facing a possible defeat as the war continues to drag on and the American public's support of the conflict wanes.³⁸ The United States and ISAF need to adapt their "means" in the military strategy equation to employ an indirect strategy that focuses on the population as the center of gravity.

Military theoretician Dr. Edward Luttwak offers evidence of the need for an organized and focused force focused on low-intensity conflicts, such as irregular warfare. Arguing that armed forces operate on a strategy spectrum with attrition on one end and relational-maneuver on the other, Luttwak explains that the United States designs its conventional forces to be organizationally and operationally focused for attrition warfare. Conventional forces are suitable and well equipped to fight the high intensity type of warfare where attrition usually guarantees victory. However, the United States currently finds itself in low-intensity warfare where attrition will not guarantee victory. Luttwak argues that focusing on the relational-maneuver end of the strategy spectrum is better suited for the low-intensity warfare.

³⁶ Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," 105.

³⁷ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 77.

³⁸ Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big*, xv.

Low-intensity warfare is not merely a “lesser-included case of ‘real’ war,” but is instead complex, ill defined, and ambiguous.³⁹ Victory in this type of warfare requires armed forces to use a relational-maneuver strategy that identifies the weaknesses of the external environment of war and reconfigures its “own capability to exploit those weaknesses.”⁴⁰ However, the United States continues to fight attrition warfare based on a focus on “internal administration and operations, being less responsive to the external environment comprising the enemy [and] the terrain.”⁴¹ The doctrine (ways), as well as the internal administration and bureaucratic mechanisms (means) of the U.S. armed forces, are inherently inefficient, inflexible, and unresponsive to the rapidly changing and complex environment.⁴²

The attrition/direct approach strategy utilized by the United States worked well in the beginning of the war. However, as the intensity of the conflict decreased and Taliban targets became less defined, the United States discovered that its reliance on firepower did not achieve the same level of success against the more widely dispersed insurgents. As fighting among the population in Afghanistan proves, the “pursuit of attrition efficiencies...processed to generate firepower, the more the results are likely to be counterproductive by antagonizing the local population.”⁴³ Therefore, to attack the enemy’s strategy and best match the approach, it is necessary to transform the armed forces’ means of the Afghan strategy and develop an organization that can effectively utilize a relational-maneuver and indirect approach. An organization that maximizes internal efficiencies, sets optimal organizational structure, and can

³⁹ Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” *Parameters* XIII, no. 4 (1983): 335.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 336.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Deborah D. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994).

⁴³ Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*, 337.

continually reconfigure and adapt based on the external environment. A new organization with a relational-maneuver and indirect strategy should be decentralized and focused on stabilization at the local level.⁴⁴

The current U.S. and ISAF strategy in Afghanistan attempts to create a legitimate, democratic, strong central government. However, "Afghanistan has a long history of decentralized governance."⁴⁵ In the absence of a strong, central government, the local village councils (shuras) of elders hold the true power and have developed informal legal systems based on Islamic and customary laws. Due to the lack of electricity and television and the distance from Kabul, politics in the villages and valleys of Afghanistan is truly local. Therefore, some argue that, "stabilization needs to increasingly come from the bottom up, not the top down."⁴⁶

In operationalizing counterinsurgency, both David Galula and Colonel Eric Wendt argue that to defeat the insurgency, U.S. forces need to have both static and mobile forces.⁴⁷ Wendt argues that these static, "constabulary" forces are those trained in unconventional warfare who can embed "in a local population for long periods of time and develop local human intelligence."⁴⁸ The static forces that live and operate inside targeted areas of active insurgent activity need to be the main effort in the counterinsurgency efforts. By living among the population and achieving consistent access, the static force gains an unparalleled knowledge of local human intelligence, including insurgent leaders and the flow of insurgent support.⁴⁹ The static force knows much of what is occurring in that

⁴⁴ Jones, *COIN in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study*, 176.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Seth G. Jones, *Stabilization from the Bottom Up* (paper presented before the Commission on Wartime Contracting, Washington, D.C. , February 22, 2010, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT340/>).

⁴⁷ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 143; Eric P. Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," *Special Warfare* 18, no. 2 (September 2005): 7.

⁴⁸ Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," 3.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

village or district and can apply the appropriate mix of rewards and punishments to achieve stability. On the other hand, the maneuver forces, or mobile forces, would comprise conventional units “trained, organized, and equipped to attack insurgent output.”⁵⁰ The maneuver force is the supporting effort in counterinsurgency and focuses its effort on securing lines of communication and conducting movement to contact when it encounters insurgent forces.⁵¹

E. CURRENT ISAF COIN ORGANIZATIONS AND EFFORTS

Although a variety of recently developed organizations in Afghanistan attempt to use a decentralized, population-centric approach that can synchronize both civic and military rewards and punishments, these organizations have not adequately secured the center or gravity of Afghanistan, built capacity in their partner local defense forces/ANSF, or help legitimize the GIRoA. The entities and initiatives currently operating with an attempt at an indirect approach are:

- The Community Defense Initiative (CDI): a small-scale initiative supported by the Combined Forces Special Operations Command Cell —Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) and executed by the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force —Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A).⁵² The CDI focuses on local security by organizing and training the Civil Defense Forces (CDF).
- The Civil Defense Forces (CDF): a program that has been established by, and whose partner is, the (CJSOTF-A) Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alphas (ODAs), select military-aged males from the local population and organize, train, and equip these personnel into a local security force that provides support and security to the local village or district in a neighbor watch-style fashion.

⁵⁰ Wendt, "Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling," 3.

⁵¹ Ibid., 8.

⁵² Robert Wilson, "13 NOV Pak-Af Fed Forum Summary—PACC—Blog—Pakistan Afghanistan Coordination Cell (PACC) —Community Defense Initiative (CDI)," <http://community.apan.org/pacc/b/weblog/archive/2009/11/16/13-nov-pak-af-fed-forum-summary.aspx>.

- Military Training Teams (MITT): conventional or general-purpose armed forces selected and trained to train and support Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).⁵³
- Human Terrain Team (HTT): A sub-element under the Human Terrain System (HTS). The program is run by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and serves the joint community. The focus of the HTS program is to improve the military's ability to understand the highly complex local socio-cultural environment in the areas where they are deployed. In the long term, HTS endeavors to assist the U.S. government in understanding foreign countries and regions prior to an engagement within that region.⁵⁴
- Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT): Military organizations conceived in Afghanistan to extend the reach and enhance the legitimacy of the central government. PRTs have a broad mandate covering the following areas: engaging key government, military, tribal, village, and religious leaders in the provinces, while monitoring and reporting on important political, military and reconstruction developments; working with Afghan authorities to provide security; assisting in the deployment and mentoring of Afghan national army and police units assigned to the provinces; in partnership with the Afghan Government, the U.N., other donors and NGOs, PRTs also provide needed development and humanitarian assistance.⁵⁵
- District Support Team (DST): sub-elements of the PRT that consist of local teams with on-site development personnel: "District Development Teams" that project PRT presence down to the district level.⁵⁶
- Female Engagement Team (FET): units comprised of female Marines with various operational specialties who conduct liaison work with Afghan women in remote villages. Their assignments

⁵³ "Roles and Responsibilities of Transition Teams," *U.S. Army*, <https://forums.bcks.army.mil/secure/communitybrowser.aspx?id=571009&lang=en-US>.

⁵⁴ "Human Terrain System," <http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/>.

⁵⁵ "USAID/Afghanistan: Provincial Reconstruction Teams," <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Page.PRT.aspx>.

⁵⁶ T. Johnson and M. Mason, "All Counterinsurgency is Local," *The Atlantic Monthly* 302, no. 3 (October 2008): 36, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1566221651&Fmt=7&clientid=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

range from searching women at checkpoints, distributing aid, and running medical clinics, to their core mission of engaging rural Pashtun women, often in their homes.⁵⁷

The current efforts of the myriad of organizations are not synchronized and have not they been successful in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan population. These organizations either focus on reconstruction efforts, enabling Afghan security forces, or gaining an understanding of the human terrain. While these efforts are important, they are inherently inefficient because the organizations are separately and singularly focused on their own specialty. The authors argue that these current efforts have a flawed strategic and operational approach; they do not adequately prioritize the population.

The military strategist, classic and contemporary COIN theorists, as well as FM 3-24, provide the adequate ways of succeeding in Afghanistan. What continues to be lacking in the military strategy equation is the means. Therefore, the U.S. military would benefit from applying the ways of its COIN doctrine to an organization designed to be the means to accomplish the ends in Afghanistan. As a way of addressing President Obama's intent in Afghanistan, an organization should be designed to be the means of the military strategy that can establish and maintain continual engagement with the Afghan population; thereby, assisting in U.S. eventual withdrawal of conventional forces. The actions of this newly organized team would also support General Petraeus' directive to "engage with the population."⁵⁸ Although there has been much discussion about how to best "operationalize" this directive, adequate discussion has not occurred, up to this point, about how to organize, resource, and employ a force that would meet these needs.

⁵⁷ Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, "Woman to Woman: A New Strategy in Afghanistan: NPR," <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=112606206>.

⁵⁸ David H. Petraeus, "COMISAF 's COIN Guidance", <http://www.isaf.nato.int/the-afghan-hands-blog/commanders-blog/comisaf-guidance-01-aug-2010.html>.

III. ORGANIZATION DESIGN THEORY

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter combines the analysis of the counterinsurgency theory and military strategy in the previous chapter with organizational theory to design an organization that has an appropriate configuration (or ‘fit’) to accomplish the military strategy in Afghanistan. The authors’ process for designing this new organization is to first analyze the military strategy (Chapter II), identify and measure the organizational strategic fit (Chapter III), and then explore the design properties (Chapter IV). Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, the final step in the organizational design is to develop the actual architecture of the organization.

In addition to re-examining doctrine and tactics to remain a step ahead of the enemy a need also exists to adapt, add, or change organizations to be efficient and effective in today’s complex and demanding conflicts. Overall, the purpose of the Community Engagement Concept is to accomplish the military strategy in Afghanistan with a smaller footprint of troops. The Organization for Community Engagement (OCE) prioritizes the engagement of the local population at the lowest level possible—usually the village or tribal level. This chapter applies the model proposed by Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel in *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*. The authors use the model to measure and categorize the Strategic Fit domains, which then suggest properties of the structural design of the OCE.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004).

B. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN BACKGROUND

Organizational design is the method by which organizations are structured to best accomplish their mission and strategy.⁶⁰ In their book, Burton and Obel propose a model for prescribing how an organization can be most effective, efficient, and viable.




Figure 1. Burton and Obel's Contingency Fit Model⁶¹

The model consists of matching the diagnosis and strategic fits—leadership and management style, organizational climate, capabilities, environment, technology, and organizational strategy—with the design fits—complexity, formalization, centralization, incentives, and coordination and control—to determine the best strategy and structure fit.⁶² This chapter analyzes the

⁶⁰ It is assumed that the reader has a base of knowledge in organizational design theory. If the reader does not, then it is recommended that he review works from Richard L. Daft, David P. Hannah, Henry Mintzberg, and Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel.

⁶¹ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 20.

⁶² Ibid.

diagnosis and strategic fit domains for the OCE and then uses the expert system provided by Burton and Obel to analyze and recommend a structural configuration.

The Organizational Consultant program developed by Burton and Obel is an expert system that aids in the diagnosis and design of organizations,⁶³ which is an inherently qualitative program that gathers data entered by the user via a series of simple diagnostic questions. These questions are modeled around the organization's goals, environment and strategy, structure, process and people, size and age, and coordination and control. It then analyzes the data through a series of if-then statements to determine the strategic fit of an organization.⁶⁴ The Organizational Consultant program (OrgCon 8) processes the answers to the questions and returns an analysis of the organization.

Short of designing the architecture of the organization, the authors made some basic assumptions about the OCE. First, we assumed that the organization is hierarchically structured with at least three levels. The bottom layer focuses on the local community, which are the teams that live with the population and are the operating core of the OCE. This bottom layer enables the local leadership to organize, train, and equip a local security force. Additionally, this layer will interact with the community elements, develop rapport, and leverage U.S. and coalition programs for development, stability, and security. The middle layer serves a buffering role to resource, synchronize, and coordinate the operations of the lower level with the strategy of the upper level. The middle layer provides command and control, targeting and analysis, psychological operations, information operations, operational coordination and deconfliction, administrative support, and medical support to civil-military operations. The upper level is the strategic apex of the organization and serves to coordinate and deconflict with all outside departments, agencies, or organizations.

⁶³ This thesis utilizes the OrgCon 8 version included in Burton and Obel's 3rd edition.

⁶⁴ See Appendix B for the complete OrgCon questionnaire.

C. LEARNING ORGANIZATION

The concept of a learning organization better addresses the managerial issues that arise in the chaotic and competitive environment of the 21st century. Organizational behavior and design theorist Richard L. Daft synthesized the definition of a learning organization as “one in which everyone is engaged in identifying and solving problems, enabling the organization to continuously experiment, change, improve, and thus increase its capacity to grow, learn, and achieve its purposes.”⁶⁵ A learning organization can be broken down into six critical components: leadership, structure, empowerment, communications and information sharing, participative strategy, and adaptive culture.

In a learning organization, the most important of these factors is leadership. Daft states, “the only means through which a company can change into a learning organization [is through its leadership].”⁶⁶ Whereas most large organizations view leaders as managers who have “control over” the people and processes within the organization, a learning organization requires a leader who takes a more “control with” approach, assisting the other members of the organization by helping to create a “shared vision” of the organizations overarching goals.⁶⁷ Once the members of an organization understand the desired long-term outcomes, members are free and encouraged to identify and solve problems to achieve that vision without direct or constant supervision from above.

As the U.S. Army’s COIN manual FM 3-24 states, “[in a COIN environment] the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly, the better learning organization usually wins.”⁶⁸ This thesis uses the concept of a learning organization in the organizational design of the OCE.

⁶⁵ Richard L. Daft and Dorothy Marcic, *Understanding Management*, 3rd ed. (Mason, OH: South-Western Thomas Learning, 2001), 17.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 18.

⁶⁸ FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, ix.

D. DIAGNOSIS AND STRATEGIC FIT DOMAINS

This section defines and explains Burton and Obel's diagnosis and strategic fit domains of the community engagement concept. Since it is developed against the backdrop of Afghanistan, the diagnosis and strategic fit domains are applied to the organization for community engagement operating in this environment. Where possible, a two-stage process explains the domain. The domain is described, applied to the OCE, and then measured generally on a scale of low, medium, or high. The resulting measure of the domain leads to a suggested organizational structural property from which helps design the OCE.

E. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT STYLE DOMAIN

Leadership and management style is an important domain of organizational design and critical to a learning organization. Whether leadership style determines the organizational design or vice versa, it is important that the leadership style fit with the strategy of the OCE. As Burton and Obel claim, "for an organization to function well, there should be a fit between what the organization wants to do; how it wants to do it; and the people who have to do it."⁶⁹

Many dimensions of leadership and management styles exist. Each leader possesses strengths and weaknesses that, in turn, affect the efficiency and effectiveness of an organization. As a result of the organization's complexity, formalization, and centralization, there are leadership styles that best fit the organization. This section defines leadership dimensions and identifies the level of those dimensions that are ideal for the OCE. Similar to measuring and categorizing the organizational climate, measuring the leadership dimensions will help suggest a leadership style that best fits the OCE. The best fit of the leadership style will therefore identify the structural properties necessary to implement the community engagement concept as the organization for community engagement and establish a viable organizational design. The

⁶⁹ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 92.

leadership and management style is primarily a measure of psychological dimensions. It includes delegation preferences, decision-making preferences, planning preferences, risk preferences, and motivation and control preferences.

1. Preference for Delegation

The OCE's focus on the lowest level of the population. To engage with the lowest level, the leadership preference would be one focused on delegation and decentralization rather than control and centralization. The effective OCE leader would most likely delegate authority, tasks, and mission to the lowest level of the organization possible because it would be more efficient and supportive of the organizational strategy.

2. Level of Detail in Decision Making

The OCE leadership will show a preference for gaining a high level of information prior to making decisions due to the complexity of the environment and the repercussions of the decisions among the local population. However, when a requirement exists to make time-sensitive decisions, the OCE leadership will show a preference for maintaining flexibility in decision making.

3. Reactive or Proactive Decision Making

Through assimilation of the myriad of intelligence and local information sources, the OCE leadership will desire a focus on anticipating changes in the environment. When those changes happen to outpace anticipation, the OCE needs to maintain sufficient flexibility and agility to react to those changes.

4. Decision-Making Time Horizon

Leaders at the upper levels of the OCE will tend to make decisions more focused on the long term, whereas the leaders at the lower level of the OCE will generally focus on making decisions with short- and medium-term time horizons.

As a whole, the organization should be focused on long-term organizational strategy, and thus, have a long-term time horizon with a similar focus on decision making.

5. Risk Preference

Risk preference is the level of risk that a leader is willing to assume. The leader analyzes the risks to the mission, to the OCE members, and to the local citizens. Due to the need to develop an ability to adapt to a divergent, rapidly changing, and hostile environment, the OCE leadership will tend to prefer innovation and be subject to accepting a high degree of risk.

6. Motivation

Since the leadership within the OCE will be focused on a cooperative approach with fellow members, they will tend to motivate instead of explicitly controlling the individuals in the organization. Therefore, the OCE leadership will be adept at motivating and encouraging the members.

7. Categorizing the Leadership Domain

The measures of the leadership domain operationalize the best corresponding leadership style. Burton and Obel use four possible leadership styles: *leader*, *producer*, *entrepreneur*, and *manager*.⁷⁰ Resulting from the analysis of the dimensions above, the best fit of leadership style for the OCE is the leader. A *leader* is an “individual with a high preference for delegation, a long-term horizon, aggregate information, general decision-making, a proactive approach, risk taking, and motivation by inspiration.”⁷¹

⁷⁰ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 109.

⁷¹ Ibid.

Substantial interaction occurs between a leadership style and the configuration of an organization and the aspects of each affect the other. Although the *leader* style of leadership fits within any organization, the different attributes of the *leader* style are more or less emphasized to maintain the fit.

A medium to large organization like a mature OCE with a *leader* style will tend to maintain its flexibility on decision making. The OCE leader will make decisions on one matter while allowing or delegating decisions on other matters. The organizational structure will generally have low formalization, medium complexity, and a results-based incentive structure. The *leader* style of leadership proposes that the OCE conducts coordination and control through general oversight and review, loose coordination, meetings, and liaisons combined with rich information processing.

F. ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY DOMAIN

The OCE is designed for the successful accomplishment of this military strategy as outlined in Chapter II through the nesting of its organizational strategy. Organizational strategy is the “plan for interacting with the competitive environment to achieve the organizational goals.”⁷² The commander of ISAF, General Petraeus, provided the organizational goals, or the “desired state of affairs” of the Community Engagement Concept in his recently published COIN Guidance.⁷³ These goals are to secure and serve the population, enable Afghans to build legitimate governance, pursue the enemy relentlessly, foster lasting solutions, promote local integration, empower subordinates, and exercise initiative.⁷⁴

The mission, or overall goal, for the Organization for Community Engagement is to assist the local Afghan government and security forces by

⁷² Richard L. Daft, *Organizational Theory and Design*, 10th ed. (Mason, OH: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2010); Daft and Marcic, *Understanding Management*, 65.

⁷³ Ibid., 58.

⁷⁴ Petraeus, “COMISAF’s COIN Guidance.”

building their capacity to promote security and stability. The OCE will have effective interagency and inter-organizational collaboration to build the capacity of the Afghan security forces to defeat Anti-Afghan Shadow Government Forces (AAF), assist with the establishment of a secure environment, and aid the indigenous security and government forces with supporting the legitimacy of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA).

What is effective for one particular OCE element in the Pashtun tribal areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan may not be successful for an OCE element operating among the non-tribal Tajiks or Uzbeks of northern Afghanistan. Although the OCE is inherently a defensive organization that builds the capacity on the local community element to provide their own security, it will have the capability to influence coalition military operations against enemy targets.

Following the two-stage process, Burton and Obel use eight dimensions to explain and then categorize the organizational strategy domain.

1 Product Innovation

The OCE will have a high product innovation level because of the demand to develop solutions (i.e., products) that solve the unique problems encountered at the tribal or village level.

2. Process Innovation

The OCE will have a medium to high level of process innovation. The organization will have medium process innovation for routine tasks, such as liaisons or coordination with outside military organizations. However, the various other unique tasks that demand flexibility and responsiveness will require a high level of process innovation.

3. Product and Market Breadth

The OCE will have a few to a moderate amount of products. At the lowest level, the OCE will engage with the community and enable them to create a local defense force. Also, the OCE will leverage the many different stability assistance programs. Since the OCE will target the many subcultures in Afghanistan, the Community Engagement Concept will have a wide market breadth (Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, etc.).

4. Concern for Quality

The OCE will have a medium to high concern for quality. It is important to note that concern for quality is relative to the customer, environment, and timeline associated with receiving it. The OCE will be concerned to deliver a product that is high quality in the eyes of the customer. However, because the concern for quality is dependent on the timeliness of actually receiving a product, the concern for quality will tend to be medium to provide the product in a more timely fashion. When the timeline of receiving the product is unaffected by the quality, the OCE will be concerned for the highest quality.

5. Price Level

Price level is also relative to the competing organizations. Within the CEC, the price level is low because the organization will cost significantly less than other military organizations.

6. Control Level

The OCE will have a low level of control at the lower organizational level and a higher level of control at the upper organizational level.

7. Technology

The OCE will have a non-routine technology to have a multiplicative effect on the complex and uncertain environment.

8. Barrier to Entry

Due to the difficulty for the OCE to enter a targeted population, a very high barrier to entry into the environment exists. Once the appropriate analysis is complete, the OCE will be better prepared to enter into that market and begin to conduct its mission. Also, simply due to the bureaucracy of the U.S. military, a high barrier to entry exists because the level of oversight and authority necessary to create a new organization is formidable.

9. Categorizing Organizational Strategy

Burton and Obel identify five types of organizational strategy that incorporate these measures to determine the best structural configuration. These categories of strategy are prospector, analyzer with innovation, analyzer without innovation, defender, and reactor.⁷⁵ Reviewing the above measures, the Organization for Community Engagement strategy is a mix of the prospector strategy and the defender strategy.⁷⁶ Like the prospector strategy, the OCE has a similar preference for high product innovation, a high barrier to entry, non-routine technology, concern of high quality, and a low preferred level of control. However, similar to the defender strategy, the OCE has a high process innovation, few products, and low relative cost when compared to the conventional military, or existing, equivalent. Since the OCE does not follow all the measurements of the first four strategies, the strategy is therefore hybrid, or reactor. An organization has a reactor strategy when some strategy measurements lead to a prospector strategy and the remaining measurements lead to the defender strategy.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 284–293.

⁷⁶ Burton and Obel write on page 285 that Nicholson Rees and Bookers-Rooney (1990) write that a defender strategy is to produce efficiently a limited set of products directed at a narrow segment of the total potential market. A prospector strategy is to find and exploit new products and market opportunities.

⁷⁷ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 307.

10. Interplay between Strategy and Structure

It is necessary to appreciate the interplay between an organization's strategy and structure. No organization has a static strategy and structure relationship. That is, as the strategy continues to develop, the structure also changes. Likewise, for the structure, as the organizational structure changes, the strategy also adapts. The interplay between strategy and structure is important to understand because as the relationship changes, so do the strategy measures, and therefore, the strategic category changes to maintain the best fit for the organization.

G. ENVIRONMENTAL DOMAIN

Four dimensions measure the OCE's environment: equivocality, uncertainty, complexity, and hostility.

1. Equivocality

Equivocality is the organization's ignorance, confusion, or lack of understanding in the environment. This factor can be related to the military's use of regulations and standard operating procedures. The elements of the OCE will operate in an environment that has a high degree of equivocality because of the cultural bias that the OCE will inherently bring to their mission. No matter how much study is done prior to execution, the OCE's existence in the environment is an artificiality that is difficult for a non-native to overcome.

2. Uncertainty

Uncertainty is an organization's inability to predict outcomes due to a lack of knowledge of environmental variables and relationships. Uncertainty is in most cases related to issues that the organization has experienced previously. The OCE will function in an environment with a moderate level of uncertainty because, as individual and organizational experience grows, situations can become somewhat predictable; the organization's actions will have a predictable and causal relationship to the reaction among the population it is addressing.

3. Complexity

Complexity is the number of variables in the environment and their interdependency. Managing interdependent variables is more complex than managing independent variables. Therefore, an interdependent environment is more complex than one in which variables vary independently. The environment will have a high level of complexity. One of the contributing factors to the complexity of the environment in Afghanistan is the many interdependent stakeholders and their divergent agendas. An analysis of the stakeholders in Afghanistan shows that a myriad of interested parties exist that wield significant influence. As an example, the population of Afghanistan consists of five different ethnic groups. Most local environments are heterogeneous depending on the composition and ratios of ethnic groups that comprise geographic areas. Additional stakeholders consist of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), U.S. Government, U.S. population, border nations, and enemy forces.

4. Hostility

Hostility is the measure of how benign or malevolent the environment is. Hostility can vary from a supporting environment to one that is predatory and out to destroy the organization.⁷⁸ The environment will have a high level of hostility due to the Anti-Afghan or Taliban forces who maintain significant influence over the local population. In addition to hostility from actors with competing interests in the Afghan environment, the military and political organizations from which the OCE members will originate will also be considered hostile, as they are competitors for the same national resources.

H. ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE DOMAIN

Like all the strategic factors, it is necessary to define the organizational climate of the Organization for Community Engagement to determine the

⁷⁸ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*.

necessary structural design. With an understanding of the organizational climate, the design elements become apparent and prioritized. Organizational climate is a “prevailing condition or atmosphere in an organization” that is a measure of the organization rather than the individuals.⁷⁹ However, to arrive at a measure of the climate, it is necessary to “capture how individuals feel about the organization.”⁸⁰ Therefore, although climate is a quality of the organization, it must be explained by analyzing inputs from the individuals of the organization.

Burton and Obel use seven characteristics to measure an organization’s climate: trust, conflict, morale, rewards equitability, change resistance, leader credibility, and scapegoating. These measures are then applied to four categories of climate: group climate, developmental climate, rational goal climate, and internal process climate.⁸¹ The results of the various measures will predict the climate of that organization.⁸² Those measures are as follow.

1. Trust

At the bottom level, the Organization for Community Engagement, individuals should be bonded and have a high degree of trust among the other team members because they will live with the Afghan population, which is a relatively hostile and austere environment. It will be required for the team to be highly dependent upon each other for issues safety and security. They will also have to build trusting relationships within the environment and among the associated stakeholders. In the middle and top levels of the organization, there will be a high to medium level of trust. Although they will be living in more secure

⁷⁹ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 161.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 130.

⁸¹ Ibid., 146.

⁸² The results of these measures, when applied to the Organization for Community Engagement, are subjective and predictive because the organization has not been developed or field tested. Therefore, the results of the measures of the organization’s climate are the best guess based on the authors’ experience.

and safe locations on a nearby base, the individuals will have a high to medium level of trust because they are working together for a common goal in a new organization.

2. Conflict

The OCE will have a medium to low level of conflict because the multiple levels of the organization and the individuals are all unified on the organizational goals and beliefs. However, it is unavoidable that there will be friction and disagreement, and therefore, the sporadic disunity will contribute to a sporadic amount of medium conflict.

3. Morale

The OCE will have a medium to high level of individual morale because the individuals are confident and enthusiastic about the organization and mission. The morale will be higher at the lower level because the individuals can see the immediate impact of their efforts.

4. Rewards Equitability

Rewards are focused on how well the individuals and units meet the goals of the organization. They are awarded either based on consummation of service or due to a specific action. Consequently, rewards will be moderately equitable because individuals will be rewarded based off individual performance and the organizational results. Chapter IV explains in greater depth the incentive structure of the OCE.

5. Resistance to Change

The OCE will have varying degrees of resistance to change. The lowest level that interacts with the local community will have a low resistance to change because of the local population, enemy forces, and the dynamics of the environment. The highest level will have a medium resistance to change because of the strain it places on the relationships with the various outside agencies.

6. Leader Credibility

Leader credibility is high because the individuals in the OCE will accept the legitimacy of the leader.

7. Scapegoating

The level of scapegoating is low because the individual duty descriptions will delineate who has responsibility for what actions and individuals believe that individuals will accept responsibility for the failure of actions.⁸³

8. Categorizing Climate

Burton and Obel then process the results of the measures of climate into four categories: group climate, developmental climate, rational goal climate, and internal process climate. Each category is distinct and has a best fit for the type of structure of the organization.

With the above measures, the Organization for Community Engagement has a developmental climate. A developmental climate is characterized by high to medium levels of trust, low levels of conflict, high to medium levels of morale, high to moderate equity in giving rewards, low resistance to change, high to medium credibility of the leaders, and a medium level of scapegoating.⁸⁴ Except for the difference in scapegoating, the OCE is initially determined to have a developmental climate.

Burton and Obel suggest that an organization with a developmental climate lends to either a matrix configuration or an adhocracy. The organization will have a medium to low complexity in the vertical differentiation, low formalization, low to medium centralization, and medium span of control.

⁸³ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 142–143.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 150–151.

Additionally, the organization will conduct coordination and control through planning, integrators, and meetings. Finally, the organization with a developmental climate will have a high degree of information flow.⁸⁵

Like the previous strategic measures, identifying the climate category is a predictive step that helps to develop the organizational structure. After completion of the strategic factors analysis, the authors will input the results into the Organizational Consultant program. The program will analyze the results and suggest the structural properties that create a best fit for the Organization for Community Engagement.

I. SIZE AND SKILL CAPABILITIES DOMAIN

Size and skill capabilities play a significant role in the determination of the organization's structure, the ability of the organization to collaborate and process information, as well as the cost to operate the organization.⁸⁶ With military units in Afghanistan, the requirements of force protection, required capabilities, and size of battle space determine the size of units. Despite an increased sophistication, strength, and capability of the Taliban, the size or skill capabilities of many of the units conducting COIN operations in Afghanistan have not changed over the course of nine years of conflict. To reduce the amount of forces deployed in Afghanistan, it is necessary to use military units that have not only an increased information processing capability, but also improved professionalization/skill capabilities that can adequately deal with the complexities of the environment.⁸⁷

The size of the OCE must be adequate enough to deploy detachments and teams throughout all of Afghanistan. The lack of size and capability to cover down on all of Afghanistan's 397 districts and 34 provinces severely hampers the

⁸⁵ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 152.

⁸⁶ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

ability to achieve security and legitimate local governments.⁸⁸ Assuming one community engagement team in each district, one community engagement detachment per province, and a staff at the headquarter level, an initial estimate of the size of the OCE would be roughly 7225 personnel (based on an initial assumption of 15 personnel/team, 30 personnel/ detachment, and a 250 person CSE).

The positions in the OCE will be manned by personnel who possess the correct skill set and requirements for that specific job and not based purely on U.S. Army personnel. It is more important to gather the correct mix of personnel than to stay within the confines of the U.S. Army Military Occupation Specialty system. Therefore, the positions will be joint and can be filled by any service. Additionally, the positions in the OCE can be filled by civilians from other U.S. governmental agencies, especially at the middle and top layer of the organization. The intent of such joint and interagency personnel is to find the right person for the job regardless of branch of service or department.

The skill capabilities of both the members and the leaders of an organization play an important role in the ability of the organization to achieve both effectiveness and efficiency. Not only do these skill capabilities affect the selection of members into the organization, but they also affect the training, as well as technologies necessary to contribute to the success of the organization. The Joint Staff provides a useful way to develop the skill capabilities of an organization with the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The UJTL “serves as the foundation for capabilities-based planning across the range of military operations” and allow a military organization to identify the required capabilities to meet operational requirements and achieve mission success.⁸⁹ Directly nested

⁸⁸ *Afghanistan Overview*, accessed September 16, 2010, http://www.aims.org.af/afg/overview/afg_overview.html.

⁸⁹ Joint Staff, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)* (Washington D.C., 2005), A-1.

to the U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan, the organizational mission and strategy of the OCE “establishes the requirement to perform tasks and provides the context for each task performance.”⁹⁰

For an organization to be successful in the complex and dynamic environment of COIN, it must organize and structure to accomplish a broad variety of not only military tasks, but additional tasks in the areas of political, economic, and physical development.⁹¹ Utilizing tasks outlined in UJTL, the OCE must be able to accomplish the following to stabilize Afghanistan successfully.

- *Provide politico-military support to other nations, groups, and government agencies:* The OCE must be able to “provide assistance to other nations, groups, or government agencies that support strategic and operational goals” in Afghanistan.⁹² “This task includes security assistance, civil-military operations support . . . and other assistance from military forces to civilian authorities and population.”⁹³ To accomplish this task, it is imperative that the lower levels of the OCE integrate with local leaders and establish continuous presence.⁹⁴ Living among the local population in the village will accomplish this continuous presence. The lower levels of the OCE will not live and operate out of the Forward Operating Base (FOB). Rather, they will live among the local population in the village. What is good for the OCE in terms of security and basic services (food, water, sanitation) is also good for the village.
- *Provide security assistance and conduct civil military operations:* The United States will not conduct COIN in Afghanistan forever. Therefore, it is necessary to “integrate and synchronize host-nation police, military internal security forces, communications infrastructure, and penal institutions into the [ISAF] security plan for the operational area.”⁹⁵ Without building capacity in Afghan national security forces, ISAF will never achieve lasting security after pulling out of Afghanistan. In addition to building capacity in the ANSF, the OCE will also assist with the mobilization, training, equipping, and advising of the Civil Defense Force (CDF). The CDF will consist of

⁹⁰ Joint Staff, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*, A–7.

⁹¹ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964).

⁹² Joint Staff, *Universal Joint Task List*, B–C–C–92.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Petraeus, “COIN Guidance.”

⁹⁵ Joint Staff, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*, B–C–C–156.

military-aged males from within that village. Unlike the Afghan National Army (ANA) and most of the Afghan National Police (ANP), the members of the CDF have the most at stake in creating a functioning community.⁹⁶ Through this training, equipping, and advising, the OCE will emphasize the empowerment of the ANSF and CDF to plan and conduct direct action, raids, and other offensive operations targeting the Taliban.

- *Conduct Information Operations (IO) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)*: This task comprises “operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, in order to deny information, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary information, information-based processes, and information systems.”⁹⁷ This combat multiplier is often both overlooked and under-resourced by friendly forces. Additionally, insurgent forces capitalize on this weakness because they can produce better products that reach the Afghan population faster.⁹⁸ The OCE will attempt to correct this inefficiency and ineffectiveness by integrating soldiers and leaders trained in IO and PSYOP into all levels of the organization to not only support GIRoA, ISAF, and ANSF operations, but also exploit Taliban weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
- Coordinate plans with non-DoD/inter-agency organizations and synchronize and integrate local operations: COIN requires the successful arrangement of all operations with respect to time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point. This activity includes the vertical and the horizontal integration of tasks in time and space to maximize combat output. Synchronization ensures all elements of the operational force, including supported agencies’ and nations’ forces are efficiently and safely employed to maximize their combined effects beyond the sum of their individual capabilities.⁹⁹

The OCE will work through its higher headquarters to coordinate and synchronize outside organizations (USAID, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), NGOs, IO, and PSYOPs) depending on the needs of each particular village/district. Additionally, the outside organizations will have liaisons in the

⁹⁶ Alia Jalali, "Winning in Afghanistan," *Parameters* 39, no. 1 (Spring 2009).

⁹⁷ Joint Staff, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*, B–C–C–123.

⁹⁸ Christopher J. Lamb, "Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience," *National Defense University Press* (September 2005): 220.

⁹⁹ Joint Staff, *Universal Joint Task List*, B–C–C–116.

OCE to synchronize efforts from the OCE and the outside organizations. The CET will nest, coordinate, and de-conflict local operations and objectives with that of the higher district/ provincial/central government, as well as ISAF and USG objectives. The OCE will serve as the focal point for all kinetic and non-kinetic operations taking place inside the village.

J. TECHNOLOGY DOMAIN

Technology is the “information, equipment, techniques, and processes required to transform inputs into outputs.”¹⁰⁰ The skill level, training, and capacity of both the members and leaders of the organization must be directly related to the technology and information processing to be able to meet organizational goals. To measure technology, it is necessary to define the type of area the organization operates. The OCE is a service organization that serves not only U.S. government, but also a host nation client.

The type of production in which the OCE will use is highly dependent on the location and the environment this location presents. The OCE must possess the ability to adjust the services necessary to build capacity where these services are lacking in the local community.

Due to the uncertainty and the dynamic nature of the environment, the OCE must be able to use non-routine technology to counter problems difficult to resolve in the environment.

The final way to define technology is by the divisibility, or the “the degree in which tasks can be divided into smaller, relatively independent tasks.”¹⁰¹ The tasks associated with defeating an insurgency are highly interdependent in that security can only come with the support of the population.¹⁰² While some divisibility exists in the tasks associated with OCE, these tasks remain highly

¹⁰⁰ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 186.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 198.

¹⁰² Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*.

interdependent on each other. As such, the OCE must be able to conduct both continuous and efficient information-processing utilizing available technologies to transform these inputs into outputs.¹⁰³

K. ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT

As explained in Chapter II, no organization currently exists designed to accomplish the key counterinsurgency principles in U.S. military strategy for Afghanistan. The authors use OrgCon in an iterative manner to suggest a structure for such an organization using first the diagnosis and strategic fit domains as explored in this chapter.¹⁰⁴ The resulting OrgCon analysis identifies possible strategic misfits and recommends a structural configuration for the Organization for Community Engagement.¹⁰⁵ Chapter IV further explores the structural configuration of the Organization for Community Engagement.

The results of the analysis of the diagnosis and strategic fit domains show that the initial recommendation for the best-fit structure is that of a simple organization, which is based solely on analysis of the strategic factors. To continue the design of the organization in the next chapter, the thesis authors had to assume an initial structure. The authors assume a matrix structure for the OCE because of the highly complex environment and the requirement for decentralization and collaboration.

Further results of the analysis show that a strategic misfit exists in the organizational strategy. When measuring the strategy the OCE was identified as a mix of defender and prospector strategy. The OCE has five measures characterized by a prospector strategy and three measures characterized by a

¹⁰³ Luttwak, "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare."

¹⁰⁴ See Appendix E for the OrgCon input report based off the Diagnosis and Strategic Fit measures as discussed in Chapter III.

¹⁰⁵ See Appendix F for the OrgCon output analysis based off input from the Diagnosis and Strategic Fit measures.

defender strategy. In their book, Burton and Obel show that the combination of a defender and prospector strategy is an organization with a reactor strategy.¹⁰⁶

After conducting the initial iteration of the OrgCon analysis, the reactor strategy is not apparent. Thus, a disconnect seems to exist between Burton and Obel's text and OrgCon because the text recommends a reactor strategy (given the strategy measures) and the program simply identifies a strategic misfit and does not recommend a reactor strategy.¹⁰⁷ Regardless, valuable insights can be gleaned from the analysis.

The analysis shows that a defender strategy is not appropriate because the organization cannot anticipate changes in the environment—it is not innovative or adaptive. The Community Engagement Concept is innovative and adaptable, and thus, the OrgCon analysis recommends adjusting the strategy to an analyzer or prospector. Due to the many environmental factors that affect the OCE, the analysis also recommends a possible analyzer strategy to seek out opportunities in the complex environment. Finally, the OrgCon initial analysis of the diagnosis and strategic fit domains concludes that the OCE has a developmental climate, which does not match with a defender strategy. Rather, a flexible and externally oriented developmental climate is a better fit with a prospector or analyzer strategy.

In summary, the three measures of organizational strategy that supported a defender strategy caused an unbalanced situation between the diagnosis and strategic fit domains. In later analysis, the authors recommend the critical examination of the three measures. If there continues to be a strategic misfit, then it is recommended that an adjustment be made to the organizational strategy to support a fit between the contingency factors.

¹⁰⁶ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 307.

¹⁰⁷ See Appendix F for the OrgCon output analysis based off input from the Diagnosis and Strategic Fit measures.

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IV. CONTINGENCY FACTORS

A. INTRODUCTION

As Burton and Obel state, “organizational design is the specification of configuration, complexity, formalization, centralization, incentives and coordination and control mechanisms.”¹⁰⁸ This chapter continues with the organization design of the Organization for Community Engagement (OCE) by suggesting the possible structural configuration properties. These properties are based on the strategic factors as defined in the previous chapter. By creating the best possible strategy-structure fit for the OCE, this organization will be more effective, efficient, and viable in its attempt to accomplish the military strategy in Afghanistan successfully. This “correct balance between centralization and decentralization, discipline and initiative, and authority and individual responsibility is essential for military success.”¹⁰⁹

B. ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS

Organizational configuration is a useful way to represent an organization visually. Often times, an organizational chart accomplishes this representation by specifying the various levels of the organization, division of labor, as well as the coordination between these levels of the organization.¹¹⁰ OrgCon recommends structuring the OCE as a simple configuration, yet it also recommends that a

¹⁰⁸ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 45.

¹⁰⁹ Hy S. Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 103.

¹¹⁰ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*.

matrix configuration is possible.¹¹¹ However, the thesis authors assumed that the OCE is a matrix organization because of the hostility, complexity, and dynamic nature of the environment.¹¹²

Organizations with a matrix configuration consist of divisional and functional hierarchies and have the customer as their primary focus.¹¹³ A matrix organization has the advantage of lateral and hierarchical relationships, which allows the organization to respond to changing and uncertain environments. Applied to the OCE, it has lateral relationships to the various military, nongovernmental, and inter-governmental organizations. Although a weakness of a matrix configuration is the heavy reliance on coordination and management time, the OCE attempts to reduce this weakness through the established coordination processes and delegating decision making to the lowest level. Sufficient personnel trained in tasks necessary in COIN increases the information capability of the leaders in the OCE, preventing them from becoming inundated with the demands of information processing and decision making.

Virtualization is a measure of the geographical dispersion of the organization. The virtualization in the OCE is high because the various elements are geographically dispersed and thus have a high degree of spatial differentiation. Although each of the smaller elements in the OCE is asynchronously operating in remote locations with the population, they are networked together and share information.

The OCE is designed around social boundaries within regions and populations groups rather than national boundaries. Regions and cultural groups are not necessarily bound by national borders, such as the tribal regions in

¹¹¹ Refer to Appendix F, OrgCon Ch III Output Analysis, for a more complete analysis of the Diagnosis and Strategic Fits inputs.

¹¹² See Appendix F for the complete analysis for the first iteration of OrgCon based only on the organizational strategic factors measured in Chapter III.

¹¹³ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 64.

Afghanistan and Pakistan. The OCE has assets and capabilities designed to engage with cultural and community groups (i.e., tribes, clans) that are dispersed, interdependent, and specialized.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY

While organizational configurations deal with the organization's division of activities, organizational complexity deals with vertical and horizontal differentiation and the organization's dispersion. Both the number of levels of authority in the lowest level of the organization, as well as the overall number of fundamentally different levels in the entire organization measure vertical differentiation. Horizontal differentiation is measured by the specialization across the organization in terms of education, experience, and training. Diffusion (or spatial differentiation) is measured in terms of number of geographic locations, their distance from their headquarters, and the proportion of dispersed personnel (versus those who remain at the headquarters).¹¹⁴

An organization that has a high degree of complexity, based on those factors, will also have a high need for coordination and information dissemination, which is designed to lead to members of organizations functioning in a variety of roles based on the organization's size and dispersion. As an example, a small organization, such as the lower level of the OCE, will require many specially educated, trained, and experienced personnel. It will be geographically distant from its headquarters, but it will have a flat organizational structure where leaders are functioning in a "control with" manner. Since the lower level of the OCE will need to interface and integrate the efforts with the Afghan people, Afghan governmental organizations, and U.S. or allied organizations, OCE members will be required to serve as liaison personnel with affiliated organizations, which will call for much coordination and information dissemination among the various stakeholders within the environment. For example, at the lowest level, the organization is not vertically diverse, but due to

¹¹⁴ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*.

the highly diverse horizontal differentiation and spatial dispersion, the organization is very complex. Considering this inherent complexity, the organization would benefit from fewer temporal restrictions based on existing rotation lengths (typically a maximum of one year). While the authors do not propose specific rotation durations, it is a given that an organization that is very complex should be assisted in any way with increased stability; longer durations of exposure to the environment and its factors, as well as a system that would provide for less than complete replacement of members at rotation's end would assist the stability of the organization and ensure continuity within and without the organization.

D. FORMALIZATION

Formalization is the written rules in an organization. These rules allow an organization to achieve not only standardized behavior, but also more efficient operations in a specific and stable environment.¹¹⁵ As the fight in Afghanistan became a protracted engagement, the strategy and the units (including Special Operations Forces) have become more conventional and formalized.¹¹⁶ In the author's opinion, this conventionalization has led to an increase in formalization (force protection policies, CONOP approval process) that is preventing small units from effectively engaging the population and building a sustainable indigenous solution. Military units in war operate in accordance with formally stated standard operating procedures (SOPs), rules of engagement (ROE), and the law of land warfare. However, leaders must afford military units in COIN the latitude to not only embrace greater risk but also apply unorthodox methods that comply with these stated rules and laws.

The OCE is no different from other COIN forces operating in Afghanistan, which are attempting to secure the population and create not only social

¹¹⁵ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*.

¹¹⁶ See Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*; Litchfield, "Unconventional Counterinsurgency: Leveraging Traditional Social Networks and Irregular Forces in Remote and Ungoverned Areas."

equilibrium but also a stable government. Although it will operate in compliance with these standards and subsequent formalization, the OCE is designed to operate with increased initiative and freedom of action. In his recent COIN guidance, General Petraeus acknowledged the importance of freedom of action by stating that “in the absence of guidance or orders, figure out what the orders should have been and execute them.” The OCE will have skilled and experienced members and allow them the freedom to utilize judgment and intuition to “adapt to changing circumstances, exploit fleeting opportunities, respond to developing problems, modify schemes, or redirect efforts.”¹¹⁷

E. CENTRALIZATION

Centralization is the “degree to which formal authority to make discretionary choices is concentrated in an individual, unit, or level.”¹¹⁸ This structural property is measured by the amount of direct involvement by the top leadership in gathering and interpreting information.

Historically, units in the U.S. military operate with very high centralization. Commanders issue guidance to their subordinates and approve their unit’s operations. Unfortunately, insurgents maintain the operational initiative, which thereby, causes the environment to be highly uncertain and complex.¹¹⁹ Several countries learned through their COIN experiences that this centralized decision-making and approval of operations makes it difficult to counter the elusive insurgent. The British in Malaysia, French in Indochina, and the Portuguese in Mozambique all recognized this organizational weakness when trying to defeat an insurgency, and they adjusted their organizational structure to have small-units trained and equipped for COIN conducting decentralized operations.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, 103.

¹¹⁸ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 80.

¹¹⁹ See FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*; Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*.

¹²⁰ John P. Cann, *Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War 1961–1974* (St. Petersburg, Florida: Hailer Publishing, 2005).

Despite these historical lessons learned in countering an insurgency, the U.S. military continues to operate in Afghanistan with centralized decision-making, as well as a concept of the operation (CONOP) approval process.¹²¹ “U.S. military operations may be more likely to succeed when leaders at the small-unit level have enough leeway, specialized assets, and firepower to engage the population.”¹²² The commander of ISAF (COMISAF), General Petraeus, recently published his counterinsurgency guidance to “flatten reporting chains (while maintaining hierarchical decision chains).”¹²³ Additionally, COMISAF recommended to his leaders that they “enable decentralized action” and “push assets and authorities down to those who most need them and can actually use them.”¹²⁴ Despite this guidance, ISAF still requires general officer approval and at least 48 hours of notice to conduct any operation targeting the Taliban insurgency or taking place at night.¹²⁵ This level of approval and amount of notice is not appropriate in a war where the insurgent chooses where and when to engage its opponent. Therefore, ISAF and the U.S. military require additional organizational and cultural change to decentralize decision making. As RAND’s Seth Jones points out, organizational configuration in COIN works well when it is “flattened out from a hierarchical to a more horizontal level. The shorter links are from sensor-to-shooter, the better they work. Quicker and more responsive arrangements for command and control provide flexibility for forces on the battlefield.”¹²⁶

Another factor contributing to centralization in units in Afghanistan is risk aversion and force protection. Journalist Mark Moyer has argued that “in the late

¹²¹ Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*.

¹²² Jones, *COIN in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study*, 126.

¹²³ Petraeus, “COIN Guidance,” *International Security Assistance Force*, August 1, 2010, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html>, 4.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Based off authors’ combat experience in conducting operations in Afghanistan and as discussed in Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*.

¹²⁶ Jones, *COIN in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study*, 127.

20th century, the Army gravitated toward standardization, as peacetime militaries often do, and consequently rewarded the ... officers who are now the Army's generals and colonels. But this personality type functions less well in activities that change frequently or demand regular risk-taking, like technological development or counterinsurgency."¹²⁷ Unfortunately, "the American military's conventional mindset, magnified by misperceptions of the American public's casualty intolerance, has allowed force-protection to trump mission accomplishment in the execution of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan."¹²⁸ The result is that military leaders at higher levels are preventing the initiative of their junior officers through centralization, micromanagement and policies to reduce risk and casualties.¹²⁹ While this centralization and the corresponding risk-averse and force protection policies (requiring up-armored vehicles, operating from FOBs, and use of heavy firepower) prevent the loss of friendly forces, they separate the counterinsurgent "physically or psychologically from the populace that they are supposed to be engaging and protecting" and limit their prospects of success in COIN.¹³⁰

For the OCE to be successful in the dynamic and uncertain conditions of COIN, it must adopt a decentralized organizational configuration. Thus, the OCE would empower its "leaders to deal with the challenges encountered during counterinsurgency operations, including the authority to make routinely decisions

¹²⁷ Mark Moyer, "New York Times Opinion," *New York Times*, December 20, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/opinion/20moyar.html?ref=opinion>.

¹²⁸ Trent Gibson, "Hell-Bent On Force Protection: Confusing Troop Welfare With Mission Accomplishment In Counterinsurgency," *Defense Technical Information Center*, April 8, 2009, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA508083&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.

¹²⁹ Robert T. Ault, "Encouraging Risk and Embracing Uncertainty: The Need to Change U.S. Army Culture" (Master's diss., School of Advanced Military Studies, 2003), <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415687&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.

¹³⁰ Gibson, "Hell-Bent On Force Protection: Confusing Troop Welfare With Mission Accomplishment In Counterinsurgency."

currently made by battalion and brigade combat team commanders.”¹³¹ Although a change to more decentralized decision-making is at first painful in terms of casualties, “in the long run it will save lives and shorten wars.”¹³²

F. INCENTIVES

Incentives are the way in which the organization evaluates and compensates its members. All organizations use systems of rewards to ensure a positive relationship between member behaviour and organization strategy. Burton and Obel indicate that organizations can choose incentive strategies based on individual behaviour, individual results, group behaviour, or group results. Few organizations have a pure incentive strategy. Instead; they use a mixture of strategies with a tendency to emphasize one incentive strategy overall. For an organization that has a matrix structure and reactor strategy (a combination of defender and prospector) one would tend to provide incentives to members in the three following ways.¹³³

First, members would receive incentives based on two factors: the development of the individual skills that have been identified as being crucial to the success of the organization; and the member’s performance of prescribed tasks associated with their specific role or job. Members of the OCE would continue to be evaluated using the current military evaluation systems while being given rewards, either in associated monetary compensation or certifications and educational degrees, based on advancement in skills that would benefit the organizations goals, such as language, cultural studies, written communications, or the use of information technology.

Second, members would be promoted based on their ability to interact with the environment, instead of solely on rank or temporal seniority. For the

¹³¹ Jones, *COIN in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study*, 127.

¹³² Moyer, "New York Times Opinion."

¹³³ Robert L. Heneman, ed. *Strategic Reward Management: Design, Implementation, and Evaluation* (Charlotte: Information Age Publishing 2002), 249.

OCE, members would be promoted to positions of leadership based not only on seniority or rank, but also on their abilities to interact with the population and perform tasks in support of the OCE's goals. Those members who have succeeded because of their abilities to understand the cultural subtleties needed to be successful would be promoted to positions of higher responsibility regardless of military rank. While rapport is difficult to measure, leaders must make constant assessments of their team members' abilities to successfully interact with their counterparts.

Lastly, although individual performance and evaluations are the basis for the incentives and rewards, rewards based on organizational performance would be emphasized over those of individual performance. The various elements of the OCE could be rewarded based on external measures of effectiveness that would be derived from their ability to achieve the national goals. Members would be provided with opportunities for military rewards, education, or temporary pay incentives. The organization would tend toward incentives based on group results as this would foster a team environment and a desire to place group achievements over individual achievements.

Overall, the implementation of an organization's incentives should align with its organizational goals, strategy, and structure. When a misfit exists between these elements and the incentives within an organization, an emphasis on the individual can develop as opposed to the team with internal competitiveness that could lead to disunity and the failure of meeting the organization's goals. The OCE requires an incentive structure "...that allows for initiative at the lowest level is likely [as it is more likely] to be superior to one that does not."¹³⁴

G. COORDINATION AND CONTROL

Coordination and control is the way an organization integrates its operations to achieve its common goals. All of the organizational configurations

¹³⁴ Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, 103.

discussed in the proceeding paragraphs all contribute towards the organization obtaining coordination and control. Military organizations utilize the term command and control (C2), to define this very important function. C2 is an “interactive process . . . to ensure that the force as a whole can adapt continuously to changing requirements.”¹³⁵ A related component of C2 is unity of effort. Unity of effort is “coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action.”¹³⁶ General Petraeus understands the importance of unity of effort on the success in Afghanistan by recognizing that addressing the challenges and threats in Afghanistan “requires a comprehensive, whole of government approach that fully integrates our military and non-military efforts and those of our allies and partners. This approach puts a premium on unity of effort at all levels and with all participants.”¹³⁷ In this type of multination, multiagency fight, “no single activity . . . is more important than command and control” and unity of effort.¹³⁸ The COIN efforts in Afghanistan require “getting the multiple international organizations, dozens of nations, numerous development organizations, myriad U.S. departments and agencies, and even diverse U.S. military units to pull in the same direction is a monumental challenge.”¹³⁹ Unfortunately, this type of synchronization and cooperation is not taking place.¹⁴⁰ “International aid organizations, global media, non-government organizations and religious leaders are critical for success,” yet operate on their own agenda outside of ISAF’s control.¹⁴¹ Even between ISAF and the U.S.

¹³⁵ Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, 104.

¹³⁶ *Joint Publication (JP) 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (2009), 576.

¹³⁷ David Petraeus, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategic Review,” *Senate Armed Services Committee*, April 1, 2009, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/April/Petraeus%2004-01-09.pdf>.

¹³⁸ Rothstein, *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, 103.

¹³⁹ Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond, “Unity of Effort,” *Strategic Forum* 248 (October 2009): 2.

¹⁴⁰ Based off authors’ experience in Afghanistan with organizational competition between not only conventional and SOF units, but also within SOF.

¹⁴¹ David Kilcullen, “Counter-insurgency Redux,” *Survival* 48, no. 4 (2006): 113.

military, a lack of unity of effort occurs due to lack of coordination, conflicting missions (counterterrorism vs. counterinsurgency), a competition for resources, and confusing chains of command.¹⁴²

Due to the high equivocality, complexity, and uncertainty in the environment in Afghanistan, the command and control of the OCE should comprise a combination of planning and forecasting, combined with integrators (liaisons) to maximize the coordination and synchronization of operations.¹⁴³ By enabling the local leaders to develop the local security forces, the OCE will help the community to provide a safe and secure environment for reconstruction and development.¹⁴⁴ The OCE will help coordinate and synchronize reconstruction and development, as well as leverage available assets and programs and, while the OCE does not formally own the battle space, operations from other organizations will be deconflicted to ensure unity of effort.

H. ORGCON ANALYSIS

The above design fit measures were designed into the organizational consultant program.¹⁴⁵ The measures are built upon the diagnosis and strategic fit domains measures from Chapter III. This second iteration of OrgCon allowed the authors to analyze the development of the OCE further. In addition to a general analysis, OrgCon identifies the strategic misfits, the contingency misfits, and shows the organizational characteristics. Additionally, the analysis provides recommendations on removing the misfits.

¹⁴² Lamb and Cinnamond, "Unity of Effort."

¹⁴³ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*.

¹⁴⁴ Jones, *COIN in Afghanistan: RAND Counterinsurgency Study*.

¹⁴⁵ See Appendix G for the OrgCon input report based on the Design Fit measures as discussed in Chapter IV. This input builds on the measures from Appendix E, Diagnosis and Strategic Fit input report.

1. Strategic Misfit

As identified in the analysis of the strategic factors, the OCE continues to have a reactor strategy. However, OrgCon is limited in the analysis because it is not designed to take into account a reactor strategy, and instead shows a strategic misfit with the partial defender strategy.¹⁴⁶

2. Contingency Misfit

Because of its external focus and flexibility, the OCE has a developmental climate. OrgCon indicates that the developmental climate is a misfit with the defender strategy. As stated previously, the OCE has a combination of the defender and prospector strategies. This combination creates a reactor strategy. As the developmental climate is a misfit with the defender strategy, the prospector strategy should be emphasized more in the design. Additionally, the developmental climate is a misfit with a large organization because a large organization tends to be complex and formalized. As such, during the design of the OCE, it is important to keep the complexity and formalization measures low.¹⁴⁷

3. OrgCon Recommendations

With a certainty factor of 82%, OrgCon recommends a simple configuration. However, it also recommends a matrix configuration with a certainty factor of 67 percent. It shows that it does not have a divisional configuration because the organization has tasks and technology that are not divisible.¹⁴⁸ Also, it does not have a machine bureaucracy configuration because the organization operates in a hostile environment.

The recommended organizational characteristics are low horizontal and vertical differentiations, low formalization, and high centralization. Finally, it is

¹⁴⁶ See Appendix H for the OrgCon Design Fit output report.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

recommended that incentives be based on group and individual results. The majority of the current misfits are created because the OrgCon program does not combine the defender and prospector strategies into a reactor strategy. Thus, it defaults to the recommended defender strategy, and therefore, determines several inaccurate misfits.

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V. CONCLUSION

President Obama has laid out the goals for the United States in Afghanistan. Those goals have been impacted by the duration the United States has been involved in the conflict, the nation's expenditure of blood and treasure, and the seeming lack of success of U.S. and coalition efforts in Afghanistan since 2001. The question remains: can the United States succeed in Afghanistan [and elsewhere] by making structural adaptations to the existing organizations within the Department of Defense or by creating new organizations whose structure is a better fit to the nation's security strategy?

A potential answer can be derived from the authors' analysis of the current military strategy in Afghanistan, its goals, and the recommended structural fit of an organization that would match those strategies and goals. Within this analysis, the authors identify that the Organization for Community Engagement (OCE) should be either a simple or matrix configuration. The simple configuration has a relatively flat hierarchy and can be the best fit for a hostile environment. However, the simple organization is not as functionally capable as a matrix configuration, which has two interconnected levels—one level manages functions of the OCE and the other level manages the partitions of the OCE. After analyzing the OrgCon outputs, the matrix configuration presents the best fit configuration for the OCE because of the many different functions required and the many different divisions focused on the various cultural elements.¹⁴⁹

A. LIMITATIONS OF ORGCON

While providing a substantial amount of insight and analysis into the suggested organizational design of the OCE, the OrgCon program has several limitations.¹⁵⁰ The first is that the program is unable to recommend a reactor

¹⁴⁹ Refer to Appendix H for a more complete OrgCon output analysis on the design of the OCE.

¹⁵⁰ The OrgCon program the authors used was the 8th edition. A 9th edition has since been released and the highlighted limitations of OrgCon 8 may or may not have been addressed.

strategy for an organization. Burton and Obel's text explains that a combination of the defender strategy and the prospector strategy is a reactor strategy.¹⁵¹ Of the eight measures described in Burton and Obel's book, five were categorized as defender strategy and three as prospector. Consequently, the analysis derived from the text recommends a reactor strategy while maintaining more characteristics of a defender strategy than a prospector strategy. After conducting the computer-based analysis, OrgCon identified the OCE as having an organizational strategy misfit between a defender and a prospector strategy. It was unable to account for the reactor strategy, and thus, the analysis was biased due an inability to include recommendations based on the reactor strategy.

A second limitation of OrgCon is that it analyzes an organization at a single point in time and does not account for temporal variables, such as a changing environment, political dynamics, and so forth. Though it is a less obvious limitation, this single point in time analysis, if improperly understood, can yield conflicting results due to its inability to analyze the OCE as it becomes more effective in the local communities and the environment subsequently becomes less uncertain and less hostile. Out of necessity, the OCE will require the flexibility in design that enables it to adjust its structure for the changing environment and continued temporal factors. OrgCon is unable to predict a structural evolution of the organization as it adapts to the environment.

A third limitation is that the program was primarily designed to analyze business organizations. The authors translated the input questions to adapt it to a military organization. Justifications were provided for input questions and answers they felt required more clarification. A possible error in the OrgCon analysis may stem from inaccurate translations of input questions from business to military terminology.

A final limitation of OrgCon is the program's inability to analyze different levels of an organization. It assumes that each level of the organization shares

¹⁵¹ Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 307.

the same qualities, such as complexity, formalization, or centralization. The OrgCon model is adept at analyzing organizations at one level. However, there are no rules specified in OrgCon with respect to misfits between dimensions or the configurations at different organizational levels. OrgCon was designed to analyze whole, and generally, larger, organizations and not parts of organizations, therefore the program is unable to analyze the top, middle and bottom layers of an organization simultaneously. The program's assumption is that the entire organization shares the same qualities. This makes design of the OCE additionally complex because the various layers may have different configurations. The authors recommend the use of future versions of OrgCon that may allow for concurrent analysis of the nested levels of the organization in order to determine a refined solution.

B. POLICY RECOMMENDATION

As Burton and Obel state through the use of a quote by Herbert A. Simon, Nobel Laureate on artificial intelligence: "organizational diagnoses and design is a normative science that focuses on creating an organization to obtain given goals. Design 'is concerned with how things ought to be, with devising structures to attain goals.'"¹⁵²

When attempting to create an organization whose structure is derived from the organization's intended goals and, therefore, provides the best fit among the organization's goals, strategy, and structure, it can be helpful to remove the restraints of using only existing organizational structures. When using the latter as a basis for a new organization's design, the best that can be achieved is the industry average while attempting to force-fit that legacy structure with a changed environment or goals. As R. L. Heneman argues in reference to rewards or incentives and their impact on an organization's ability to achieve above the industry standard:

¹⁵² Burton and Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 16.

Reward system design is most often guided by best practice surveys or normative models established by the compensation profession. [However,] this practice of imitating reward systems of other organizations benefits those organizations that intend to use reward system practices to move [organization] performance from below average to average performance. On the other hand,, companies need to create unique reward systems (and Human Resource practices) in order to use reward systems to drive company performance to above the industry average.¹⁵³

Like Burton and Obel, R. L. Heneman continues to conclude, “in order for organizations to perform successfully, the business strategy, organizational structure, and reward systems must align with one another.”¹⁵⁴ It can be simply stated that the internally focused bureaucratic tendencies of government organizations may not have the best fit in the COIN environment, and are therefore, less effective than would be a matrix structured organization formed to address the unique issue. If all insurgency is local and all locales are unique, the organizations utilized to address those problems may benefit from refined internal systems and a less cumbersome, centralized, and formalized organizational structure. The matrix organization creates the context that allows leaders of decentralized organizations the flexibility that then empowers them as decision makers. The current, centralized military bureaucracy is inherently cumbersome and thus it is recommended that the OCE has a matrix configuration. Therefore, the overall policy recommendation is to match the organization's structure and reward systems with the intended goals and strategy.

C. A CRITICAL AREA FOR FURTHER STUDY

The following questions address important factors that affect the implementation of a community engagement concept not explored in this thesis.

¹⁵³ Heneman, ed. *Strategic Reward Management: Design, Implementation, and Evaluation*. 233.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

They suggest further study to better explore options for dealing with the mismatch of a dynamic, decentralized, matrix organization that could currently reside within a more static, centralized, bureaucracy.

- Can a matrix organization fit within, or be subordinate to, a military bureaucracy?

Examples of organizations with bureaucratic structures and defender strategies exist that have sub organizations with matrix structures and prospector or analyzer strategies. Heneman uses the example of the State of Ohio School System and its Information Technology (IT) sub-organization.¹⁵⁵ To give the IT organization the flexibility to install and then best use the emerging technology, legislation was passed that gave it freedom from the typical bureaucratic constraints present within the remainder of the school system's organizations. The IT organization was allowed to pursue a prospector strategy that was less risk averse and more open to innovation as long as the school system determined it was still serving the organization's goals.

This example could find parallels in the Department of Defense structure where, as long as the OCE was pursuing the nation's military strategy, it would be able to have unique internal structures, reward systems, and strategies. However, this may necessitate an eighth uniformed service able to create structures not required to be mirrored within the existing seven services as are the present reward systems and structures. This organization could reward collaboration with other governmental and non-governmental agencies through non-traditional incentive structures and promotion systems, establish a unique assessment and selection program for the individual skills and personality traits that would fit best with the organization's goals, and continue to adapt to the environments it was created to address.

¹⁵⁵ Heneman, ed. *Strategic Reward Management: Design, Implementation, and Evaluation*, 235.

D. SUMMARY

The authors have attempted to develop a better means with which the U.S. Government and its military can develop organizations based on its stated national security goals and military strategy. Although this thesis primarily focuses on the current operations in Afghanistan, it is possible to utilize this design heuristic to design units that can deploy in support of U.S. interests throughout the world without major changes to current manning, budget, or force levels.

The following quote indicates that the U.S. defense establishment is beginning to realize it needs to adapt its thinking. However, based on the authors' analysis, the reoccurring error is the use of existing "formations" to address a changed environment for which those organizations were not originally designed.

...as commander of the 1st Armored Division in 1999 to 2001, [I] thought that if a division could handle conventional war it could handle anything below it on the scale of conflict. After 32 months in Iraq, I don't believe that anymore. [I now] believe the Army has to posture itself and train to operate across the spectrum. In 2008, the Army came out with a new full-spectrum doctrine that said [existing] Army formations will simultaneously "apply offense, defense and stability operations to seize the initiative and achieve the desired results. —General George W. Casey Jr. (May 7, 2010)¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service: "Casey Says Army Needs Counterinsurgency Capabilities," *Defense.gov*, 2010, no. 10/21/20, <http://www.defense.gov//News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=59067>.

APPENDIX A. MINZTBERG ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN THEORY

A. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN THEORY—MINTZBERG

Combat conditions create an inherently complex-unstable environment, which is especially true of the current situation of Afghanistan. Conventional military units have to react at a moment's notice to the changing environment. Congruent with organizational contingency theory, the organization must change its structure to meet uncertainty. During peacetime, military elements operate as machine bureaucracies; when operating in the simple-stable environment, the military relies on centralization and standardization of work processes to establish base-line procedures. As demonstrated by the development of doctrine, policy, and guidelines, standardization allows the operating core at the bottom of the organization to transition easily to de-centralized operations when the environment changes from simple-stable to complex-unstable.

Mintzberg's configurational models are valuable for analyzing military organizations. Military organizations in combat tend to change their structure and modes of coordination by task organizing for specific missions, whereas machine bureaucracies tend to resist organizational change. The OCE, by contrast, is designed to adapt to its relevant environment. As such, while the upper level of this organization will remain in Mintzberg's "divisional" configuration, the lower level of the organization can conduct steady state operations as a "machine bureaucracy," rapidly task organize for a specific mission as an "adhocracy," then quickly return to a "machine bureaucracy." This design agility is a necessary capability of a military organization in a complex-unstable combat environment.




Figure 2. Graphic of Mintzberg Configurations and Key Organizational Design Definitions

B. BOUNDARY SPANNING ROLES

Due to the complexity and instability of the environment, the organizational design demands roles that span various boundaries. As such, organic to the design are roles with links and coordination to many external organizations. The primary concern of boundary spanning roles is with the exchange of information. The individuals on the community engagement detachments and teams will utilize their boundary spanning roles to leverage all pertinent organizations, both in the WOG and in the GIRoA. A secondary concern is with the exchange of physical support (money, equipment, supplies, etc.). This second order effect of the boundary spanning roles encourages organizational momentum, which is critical for new organizations in a highly bureaucratized military machine. Further horizontal and vertical spanning will occur at every level with other elements conducting the same type of missions. These informal relationships will develop communities of practice and will serve as a medium for exchanging task, techniques, and procedures for successfully executing the community engagement mission.

C. BUFFERING ROLES

A few buffering roles exist in the organizational design of the OCEs. Some job positions serve as buffers to the external environment in the highest level (strategic apex) and the mid-level. Built into the organic structure, these buffering roles are designed to absorb uncertainty from the general environment and the military organizational culture writ large. In time, at the lowest level, the OCE becomes in tune with the village leaders, and thus, the environmental uncertainty eventually declines.

D. COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE

Communities of practice are essentially similar groups of people who are engaged in similar work. These groups, although separate and distinct, share insights, lessons learned, and experiences to better learn and develop their situations. Although organized and focused on a different customer base (i.e.,

Pashtun, Uzbek, Tajik, etc.), OCEs share the same organizational strategy and mission. This leads to the necessity of communities of practice. Through communication with each other, the OCEs will learn from each other's experiences and collectively develop their organization to impact their environment better.

E. DYNAMIC TENSION

Due to the constantly evolving tasks, technology, and people, an underlying current of dynamic tension exists between the organizational structure and the environment. Schoonhoven and Jelinek, in their article, "Dynamic Tension in Innovative, High Technology Firms," explore the interaction between organizational efficiency and flexibility.¹⁵⁷ The OCE is designed at the highest level to have continuity, control, and integration while at the bottom level to have flexibility and adaptability. It is designed to manage the dynamic tension between systemic structure with clear responsibilities and the ability to be flexible and reorganize according to environmental changes.

F. OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES

The OCE will produce numerous benefits. The organization will demonstrate to the local populace America's resolve and commitment because they will be living with the tribe or village. The OCE will be able to provide real time information in previously denied areas. Providing a long-term presence capability and professional development mechanism will be the cornerstone for operations conducted by the CEC.

As the OCE develops and matures, measurable effects to evaluate stability will occur. These effects will come in the form of increased services provided to the community or an increase in the number of jobs within the district.

¹⁵⁷ Claudia Bird Schoonhoven and Marian Jelinek, "Dynamic Tension in Innovative, High Technology Firms: Managing Rapid Technological Change Through Organizational Structure," in *Managing Complexity in High Technology Organizations*, ed. Mary Ann Glinow and Susan Alberse Mohrman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 99.

Overall, the most important measurable effect will be the change in security of the local population. This change of security can be determined simply by measuring the interaction of the AAF with the local population.

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APPENDIX B. COMPLETE ORGCON QUESTIONNAIRE¹⁵⁸



The Complete OrgCon® Questionnaire

Effectiveness and Efficiency

Is the degree of efficiency high, medium or low ?

high
medium
low

Is the degree of effectiveness high, medium or low ?

high
medium
low

Exploitation and Exploration

Does the organization have a high or low product innovation?

high
medium
low

Does the organization have a high or low process innovation?

high
medium
low

Does the organization have a high or low concern for quality?

high
medium
low

How does the organization's price level compare to its competitors?

high
medium
low

Does the organization operate in an industry with high or low capital requirements?

¹⁵⁸ Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit, 3rd ed. (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004).

high
medium
low

Diversity

Does the organization have many different products ?

many
some
few

Does organization operate in many or few different markets ?

many
some
few

Does the organization operate in more than one country? If yes, is the activity level abroad greater than 25%?

yes - activity level greater than 25%
yes - activity level lower than 25%
no

Does the organization have many different products in the foreign market ?

many
some
few
none

Environment

Is the organizational environment simple or complex ?

simple
complex
highly complex

What is the level of uncertainty of the environment?

low
medium
high

Is the equivocality of the environment low or high?

low
medium
high

Is the organizational environment hostile - how tough is the competition?

extreme
high
medium
low

Current Configuration

What is the organization's current organizational configuration?

simple
functional
divisional
matrix
adhocracy
other

Is the current organizational configuration a bureaucracy?

machine bureaucracy
professional bureaucracy
not a bureaucracy

What is the current degree of virtualization?

high
medium
low

What is the current configuration's degree of internationalization?

multinational
global
international
transnational
not an international configuration

Current Complexity

How many different job titles are there ?

very few
small number
moderate number
large number
great number

What proportion of employees hold advanced degrees or have many years of specialized training ?

0 to 10 %
11 to 20 %
21 to 50 %
51 to 75 %
76 to 100 %

How many vertical levels separate the chief executive from those employees working at the bottom of the organization ?

1 or 2
3 to 5
6 to 8
9 to 12
more than 12

What is the average number of vertical levels for the organization ?

1 or 2
3 to 5
6 to 8
9 to 12
more than 12

Including the main center, how many geographic locations are there where organization members are employed?

1 or 2
3 to 5
6 to 15
16 to 30
more than 30

What is the average distance of these outlying units from the organization's main center?

less than 10 miles
11 to 100 miles
101 to 500 miles
501 to 3500 miles
more than 3500 miles

one site

What proportion of the organization's total work force is located at these outlying units ?

less than 10 %
11 to 25 %
26 to 60 %
61 to 90 %
more than 90 %
one site

Age/Ownership

How old is the organization ?

young
mature
old

What kind of ownership does the organization have ?

private/controlled by owner
incorporated/controlled by board
public sector/controlled by bureaucracy
subsidiary/tied to other units

Technology

What is the major activity of the organization ?

production
service
retail
wholesale

What kind of technology does the organization have ?

a mass production
a process production
a unit production

Does the organization have a routine technology?

no
some
yes

Is the technology divisible?

highly
somewhat
little

Does the organization have a strong or weak dominant technology?

weak
average
strong

Does the organization use or plan to use an advanced information system?

yes
no

Size

How many employees does the organization have?

Leadership Style

With respect to centralization/decentralization. What kind of decisions does the top management prefer to make?

policy and general decisions
both general and some operating decisions
both general and operating decisions

Does the management prefer to make long-term decisions or short-term decisions?

long-term decisions
long-term and short-term decisions
short-time decisions

Does top management prefer to use very detailed or very aggregate information when making decisions?

very detailed information
medium detailed information
very aggregate information

Are management proactive or reactive on taking action?

proactive/anticipating future events
some proactive and some reactive
reactive to events as they occur

What is top management's attitude towards risk?

risk propensity
risk neutral
risk averse

What kind of motivation and control does top management prefer?

motivation through inspiration
a combination of motivation and control
using control techniques

Climate

The level of trust - sharing, openness, confidence - is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of conflict - disagreement, friction - in this organization is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The employee morale - confidence, enthusiasm - in this organization is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

Rewards are given in an equitable fashion:

highly equitable
medium to highly equitable
moderately equitable
medium to inequitably

inequitably

The organization's resistance to change is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The leadership credibility - respect, inspiration, acceptance - is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of scapegoating - shifting of responsibility for actions which fail - is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

National Culture

The power distance is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of uncertainty avoidance is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of masculinity is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of individualism is:

high
medium to high
medium
medium low
low

Current Centralization

How much direct involvement does top management have in gathering the information they use in making decisions?

none
little
some
a great deal
a very great deal

To what degree does top management participate in the interpretation of the information input?

less than 20 %
21 to 40 %
41 to 60 %
61 to 80 %
more than 80 %

To what degree does the top management directly control the execution of decisions?

0 to 20 %
21 to 40 %
41 to 60 %
61 to 80 %
more than 80 %

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have in establishing his or her budget?

very high
high
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have in determining how his or her unit will be evaluated?

very high
high
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have in hiring and firing personnel?

very high
high
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over personnel rewards - (i.e., salary increases and promotions)?

very great
great
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over purchasing equipment and supplies?

very high
high
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over establishing a new project or program?

very high
high
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over how work exceptions are to be handled?

very high
high
some
little
none

Current Formalization

Written job descriptions are available for ?

none
opera. employees or top management
opera. employ. & first-line supervisors
opera. employees, lower and middle mgmt
all employees, excl. senior management
all employees, incl. senior management

Where written job descriptions exist, how closely are employees supervised to ensure compliance with standards set in the job description ?

very loosely
loosely
moderately closely
closely
very closely

How much latitude are employees allowed from the standards ?

a great deal
large amount
a moderate amount
very little
none

What percentage of non-managerial employees are given written operating instructions or procedures for their job?

0 to 20 %
21 to 40 %
41 to 60 %
61 to 80 %
81 to 100 %

Of those managerial employees given written instructions or procedures to what extent are they followed ?

none
little
some
a great deal
a very great deal
no written instructions

To what extent are supervisors and middle

managers free from rules procedures, and policies when they make decisions ?

very frequently
frequently
some
little
none

What percentage of all the rules and procedures that exist within the organization is in writing ?

less than 20 %
21 to 40 %
41 to 60 %
61 to 80 %
more than 80 %

Current Incentives

What is the basis for designing incentives?

Individual behavior
Individual results
Group based behavior
Group based results
No principles

APPENDIX C. AFGHANISTAN'S STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

A. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

A large number of stakeholders with competing goals operate in Afghanistan. Therefore, a stakeholder approach is useful to analyze the complexity of the environment.¹⁵⁹



Figure 3. Depiction of Stakeholders in the Central Asian States¹⁶⁰

Examining the stakeholders in Afghanistan shows that a myriad of interested parties exist that wield significant influence. Most importantly, the success of any population centric military operation relies heavily on the support of the population.

¹⁵⁹ Richard L. Daft, *Essentials of Organization Theory and Design*. 8th ed. (Mason, Ohio: Thompson South-Western, 1997), 204.

¹⁶⁰ Task Force Phoenix, *Ethnolinguistic Map of Afghanistan*, http://web.mit.edu/cis/fpi_afghanistan.html#Maps.

1. U.S. Population

For long-term, continual engagement by the CEC elements, the U.S. population must be supportive of the COIN struggle in Afghanistan.¹⁶¹ Support from the U.S. population is relative; it is likely that they will not be decisively supportive or unsupportive of the OCE unless catastrophic success or failure occurs, which can be influenced by strategic communications. In real terms, since the lowest level of the OCE is, by design, living with the local population and making minimal overt impact, they are not going to be highlighted by U.S. media outlets. The opposite is equally true. If the OCE became publicly highlighted, the U.S. public opinion would be impacted; strategic communications play an important and continual role in stakeholder analysis. The U.S. population is an important stakeholder because they indirectly have the power to 'pull the plug' on any community engagement initiative.

2. Afghan Population

The Afghan population is the key stakeholder. A community will ultimately decide whether to support the OCE. If the community supports the OCE and a relationship develops, then the community, as a stakeholder, allows—passively or actively—the OCE to accomplish its mission. Trust, past experiences, or influence of Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) are a few examples of variables that could affect the tribal sheikhs, village elders, or mullahs' decision to support the OCE. If the community chooses not to support the OCE, it may prevent the OCE from accomplishing its mission; the OCE would not be able to live with the population, develop relationships with the community elders, develop and enable a Civil Defense Force (CDF), or leverage coalition and GIRoA support and representation. The OCE would be forced to reengage in another manner, redesign their approach, or choose a different community with which to partner;

¹⁶¹ *Afghanistan: Country Outlook*, July 1, 2009, <http://viewswire.eiu.com>.

the targeted local community is the customer. As the customer, the community element is the critical stakeholder and has the final decision on whether or not to support the OCE.

3. U.S. Government

The U.S. Government (USG) is responsible to the U.S. population. The international legitimacy of the USG's war on terror is at stake. The USG is inherently interested in succeeding. The community engagement concept will assist in the accomplishment of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.¹⁶² Internal to the USG are the stakeholders that comprise the Whole of Government (WOG).¹⁶³ The WOG provides the OCEs with various non-DoD personnel while using the OCE as a conduit to provide the Afghan population with support and resources. The WOG will be encouraged to provide expert personnel to the Community Engagement Detachments/ Teams.¹⁶⁴

4. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Two additional stakeholders are the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and the U.S. Government. The GIROA is attempting to establish itself as the legitimate government in Afghanistan. The GIROA is a stakeholder in any level of community engagement. It will use any and all efforts to build inroads into local level communities and establish legitimacy. On the other hand, some members of the GIROA are corrupt and possibly allied with enemy elements. ¹⁶⁵ These members could use the community engagement concept as another means to further their corruption.

¹⁶² This claim is based on assumptions that the Community Engagement Concept will be adequately resourced and implemented and accomplishes the key success factors.

¹⁶³ The term Whole of Government is used to refer to all agencies under the United States Government. To name a few, it is used to refer to the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

¹⁶⁴ *United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative (ICI)*, 2009, <http://www.usgcoin.org/index.cfm>.

¹⁶⁵ Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance Security, and U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2009).


5. Border Nations

The community engagement concept employs a regionally based organization designed to be tailored for worldwide environments. Applied to Afghanistan, the various border nations, such as Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, India, and China, are also stakeholders. These border countries have a stake in the establishment of a functioning state in Afghanistan. Historically, communities in Afghanistan do not adhere to district, provincial, or national boundaries. The ethnic groups, super tribes, and tribal elements flow throughout the porous regional borders. This creates complexity when ISAF, USG, and ANSF are organized by provincial boundaries. Currently, it is necessary to gain permission from various battle space owners to conduct reconstruction projects or key leader engagements focusing on a tribe or ethnic group that lives close to a provincial boundary. There is a high cost of coordination, which creates additional bureaucracy and limits organizational flexibility.

6. Enemy Forces

Finally, the Anti-Afghan Forces are an undeniable stakeholder in the community engagement concept. The AAF is fighting for its survival. Although the forces that compose the AAF are diverse and complex, the AAF is fighting as a neo-classical insurgency. They are fighting primarily an indirect strategy against the Coalition Forces (CF). Their goal is to gain and maintain control over the population. The community engagement concept counters the indirect strategy of the AAF with an indirect strategy of community engagement.


APPENDIX D. TEMPORAL DEPICTION OF UNIFIED JOINT TASK LIST FOR OCE¹⁶⁶



¹⁶⁶ Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004).

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APPENDIX E. ORGCON —DIAGNOSIS AND STRATEGIC FIT INPUTS¹⁶⁷



Input Report for Organization for Community Engagement

Date: 9/30/2010
Time: 2:30 PM
Scenario: Chapter 3 iteration

Effectiveness and Efficiency

Is the degree of efficiency high, medium or low ?

high
medium
low

Is the degree of effectiveness high, medium or low ?

high
medium
low

Strategic Exploitation and Exploration

Does the organization have a high or low product innovation?

high (cf 100%)
medium
low

Remark

The OCE will have a high product innovation level because of the demand to develop solutions (i.e. products) that solve the unique problems encountered at the tribal or village level.

Does the organization have a high or low process innovation?

high (cf 85%)
medium
low

Remark

It will have high to medium process innovation for routine tasks such as liaisons or coordinations with outside military organizations. The other unique tasks that demand flexibility and responsiveness will require a high level of process innovation.

Does the organization have a high or low concern for quality?

high
medium (cf 85%)
low

Remark

The OCE will have a medium to high concern for quality. Because the concern for quality is dependent on the timeliness of actually receiving a product, the concern for quality will tend to be medium in order to provide the product in a timely

¹⁶⁷ Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit, 3rd ed. (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004).

fashion.

How does the organization's price level compare to its competitors?

high
medium
low (cf 100%)

Remark

'Competitors' are defined as other ISAF or US initiatives.

Does the organization operate in an industry with high or low capital requirements?

high (cf 85%)
medium
low

Remark

The OCE will require high human and regulatory capital and medium to low material capital prior to operating. This is translated into an overall high capital requirement with an 85% CF.

Diversity

Does the organization have many different products ?

many
some
few

Does organization operate in many or few different markets ?

many
some
few

Does the organization operate in more than one country? If yes, is the activity level abroad greater than 25%?

yes - activity level greater than 25%
yes - activity level lower than 25%
no

Does the organization have many different products in the foreign market ?

many
some
few
none

Environment

Is the organizational environment simple or complex ?

simple
complex
highly complex (cf 100%)

What is the level of uncertainty of the environment?

low
medium (cf 100%)
high

Remark

The OCE will function in an environment with a medium level of uncertainty. As organizational experience grows, situations become somewhat predictable; the organization's actions will have a predictable and causal relationship to the population.

Is the equivocality of the environment low or high?

low
medium
high (cf 100%)

Remark

The elements of the OCE will operate in an environment that has a high degree of equivocality because of the cultural bias that the OCE will inherently bring to their mission.

Is the organizational environment hostile - how tough is the competition?

extreme (cf 100%)
high
medium
low

Current Configuration

What is the organization's current organizational configuration?

simple
functional
divisional
matrix
adhocracy
other

Is the current organizational configuration a bureaucracy?

machine bureaucracy
professional bureaucracy
not a bureaucracy

What is the current degree of virtualization?

high
medium
low

What is the current configuration's degree of internationalization?

multinational
global
international
transnational
not an international configuration

Current Complexity

How many different job titles are there ?

very few
small number
moderate number
large number
great number

What proportion of employees hold advanced degrees or have many years of specialized training ?

0 to 10 %
11 to 20 %
21 to 50 %
51 to 75 %
76 to 100 %

How many vertical levels separate the chief executive from those employees working at the bottom of the organization ?

1 or 2
3 to 5
6 to 8
9 to 12

more than 12

What is the average number of vertical levels for the organization ?

1 or 2
3 to 5
6 to 8
9 to 12
more than 12

Including the main center, how many geographic locations are there where organization members are employed?

1 or 2
3 to 5
6 to 15
16 to 30
more than 30

What is the average distance of these outlying units from the organization's main center?

less than 10 miles
11 to 100 miles
101 to 500 miles
501 to 3500 miles
more than 3500 miles
one site

What proportion of the organization's total work force is located at these outlying units ?

less than 10 %
11 to 25 %
26 to 60 %
61 to 90 %
more than 90 %
one site

Age/Ownership

How old is the organization ?

young
mature (cf 85%)
old

Remark

The analysis of this organizational design assumes a mature organization relative to other organizations in the U.S. military.
--

What kind of ownership does the organization have ?

private/controlled by owner
incorporated/controlled by board
public sector/controlled by bureaucracy (cf 100%)
subsidiary/tied to other units

Technology

What is the major activity of the organization ?

production
service (cf 100%)
retail
wholesale

Remark

The OCE's primary activity is to deliver a service (i.e. enable local security through village defense forces and enhancing stability by leveraging existing programs).

What kind of technology does the organization have ?

a mass production
a process production
a unit production (cf 100%)

Does the organization have a routine technology?

no
some (cf 100%)
yes

Is the technology divisible?

highly
somewhat
little (cf 85%)

Remark

While there is some divisibility in the tasks associated with OCE, these tasks remain highly interdependent on each other.

Does the organization have a strong or weak dominant technology?

weak
average (cf 85%)
strong

Remark

There are many tools, techniques, and procedures used by the OCE to accomplish their goals. While there is some routinization of the common military technology, the numerous ways the technology is employed lends itself to an average dominance.

Does the organization use or plan to use an advanced information system? **Remark**

yes (cf 100%)
no

The OCE will use several forms of electronic information systems: encrypted and unencrypted line of sight and satellite radios, satellite NIPR and SIPR communications, etc.

Size

How many employees does the organization have? **Remark**

7225 (cf 100%)

Assuming an established organization.

Leadership Style

With respect to centralization/decentralization. What kind of decisions does the top management prefer to make?

policy and general decisions
both general and some operating decisions (cf 100%)
both general and operating decisions

Does the management prefer to make long-term decisions or short-term decisions? **Remark**

long-term decisions (cf 100%)
long-term and short-term decisions
short-time decisions

Decentralization requires leaders to delegate command and control, decisions, and operations.

Does top management prefer to use very detailed or very aggregate information when making decisions?

very detailed information
medium detailed information (cf 85%)
very aggregate information

Are management proactive or reactive on taking action?

proactive/anticipating future events
some proactive and some reactive (cf 100%)

reactive to events as they occur

What is top management's attitude towards risk? Remark

risk propensity (cf 100%)

risk neutral
risk averse

Due to the need to develop an ability to adapt to a divergent, rapidly changing, and hostile environment; the OCE leadership will tend to prefer innovation and be subject to accepting a high degree of risk.

What kind of motivation and control does top management prefer?

motivation through inspiration (cf 100%)

a combination of motivation and control
using control techniques

Organizational Climate

The level of trust - sharing, openness, confidence - is:

high (cf 100%)

medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of conflict - disagreement, friction - in this organization is: Remark

high
medium high
medium
medium low (cf 100%)
low

The organization inherently should have a low level of conflict because there is harmony in goals and beliefs resulting in job cooperation.

The employee morale - confidence, enthusiasm - in this organization is:

high (cf 100%)

medium high
medium
medium low
low

Remark

The OCE should be an all-volunteer organization that selects its personnel on their motivation to serve, deploy, their qualities, interests, and experiences.

Rewards are given in an equitable fashion: Remark

highly equitable
medium to highly equitable
moderately equitable (cf 100%)
medium to inequitably
inequitably

Rewards will be moderately equitable because individuals will be rewarded based off of individual performance and the organizational results.

The organization's resistance to change is:

Remark

high
medium high
medium
medium low (cf 100%)
low

At the lowest level, the OCE will have a low resistance to change as the local population, the enemy forces, and the environment constantly changes. The highest level will have a medium resistance to change because of the strain it places on relationships

The leadership credibility - respect, inspiration, acceptance - is:

high (cf 100%)
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of scapegoating - shifting of responsibility for actions which fail - is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low (cf 100%)

National Culture

The power distance is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of uncertainty avoidance is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low

low

The level of masculinity is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of individualism is:

high
medium to high
medium
medium low
low

Current Centralization

How much direct involvement does top management have in gathering the information they use in making decisions?

none
little
some
a great deal
a very great deal

To what degree does top management participate in the interpretation of the information input?

less than 20 %
21 to 40 %
41 to 60 %
61 to 80 %
more than 80 %

To what degree does the top management directly control the execution of decisions?

0 to 20 %
21 to 40 %
41 to 60 %
61 to 80 %
more than 80 %

How much discretion does the typical middle

manager have in establishing his or her budget?

very high
high
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have in determining how his or her unit will be evaluated?

very high
high
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have in hiring and firing personnel?

very high
high
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over personnel rewards - (i.e., salary increases and promotions)?

very great
great
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over purchasing equipment and supplies?

very high
high
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over establishing a new project or program?

very high
high
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over how work exceptions are to be handled?

very high
high
some
little
none

Current Formalization

Written job descriptions are available for ?

none
opera. employees or top management
opera. employ. & first-line supervisors
opera. employees, lower and middle mgmt
all employees, excl. senior management
all employees, incl. senior management

Where written job descriptions exist, how closely are employees supervised to ensure compliance with standards set in the job description ?

very loosely
loosely
moderately closely
closely
very closely

How much latitude are employees allowed from the standards ?

a great deal
large amount
a moderate amount
very little
none

What percentage of non-managerial employees are given written operating instructions or procedures for their job?

0 to 20 %
21 to 40 %
41 to 60 %
61 to 80 %
81 to 100 %

Of those managerial employees given written instructions or procedures to what extent are they followed ?

none
little
some
a great deal
a very great deal
no written instructions

To what extent are supervisors and middle managers free from rules procedures, and policies when they make decisions ?

very frequently
frequently
some
little
none

What percentage of all the rules and procedures that exist within the organization is in writing ?

less than 20 %
21 to 40 %
41 to 60 %
61 to 80 %
more than 80 %

Current Incentives

What is the basis for designing incentives?

Individual behavior
Individual results
Group based behavior
Group based results
No principles

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APPENDIX F. ORGCON—DIAGNOSIS AND STRATEGIC FIT OUTPUT ANALYSIS¹⁶⁸



Total analysis of Organization for Community Engagement

Date: 9/30/2010
Time: 2:30 PM
Scenario: Chapter 3 iteration

Strategic Misfits

A Strategic misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of management style, size, environment, technology, climate, and strategy.

► The following misfits are present: (cf 100%)

When the environment is not well defined - that is, when the organization cannot anticipate the important environmental factors - the defender strategy is not appropriate! A defender strategy is not innovative or adaptive. In an ill-defined environment, adaptation will be required to survive as new situations and issues will emerge. Here the organization should change its strategy to an analyzer or prospector to adapt to the evolving and changing environment.

When many factors in the environment affect the organization, it may make it difficult for a defender like Organization for Community Engagement to protect what it does and also difficult to protect its established market position. Therefore, the defender strategy is not appropriate! An analyzer strategy is more appropriate for this complex environment. Here the analyzer should seek out opportunities in the complex environment.

Organization for Community Engagement has a developmental climate. This is a mismatch with a defender strategy! A developmental climate is flexible and externally oriented. A defender strategy focuses on the status quo and its continuation. A developmental climate is more compatible with an analyzer or prospector strategy.

A manager or an entrepreneur is a misfit with a large organization. The entrepreneur is involved in everything in the organization and abhors the formality that is needed for a large organization. The large organization needs formalization and decentralization for control and timely decisionmaking. The entrepreneur is likely to become overloaded and not be able to deal with large information processing demands which can lead to a decision backlog or ill considered choices. The manager may cause an information overload by focusing on the short term and being very details oriented

Contingency Misfits

A contingency misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of management style, size, environment, technology, climate, and strategy and the organization structure.

► There are no contingency misfits (cf 100%)

No contingency misfits encountered.

¹⁶⁸ Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit, 3rd ed. (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004).

The Size

The size of the organization - large, medium, or small - is based upon the number of employees, adjusted for their level of education or technical skills.

- ▶ Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's size is large (cf 100%)

Educational level of the people employed by Organization for Community Engagement has not been specified. No adjustments for educational level are made. The adjusted number of employees is greater than 2,000 and Organization for Community Engagement is categorized as large.

The Climate

The organizational climate effect is the summary measure of people and behavior.

- ▶ Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that the organizational climate is a developmental climate (cf 83%)
- ▶ It is not a internal process climate (cf -41%)

The developmental climate is characterized as a dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative place to work. People stick their necks out and take risks. The leaders are considered to be innovators and risk takers. The glue that holds organizations together is commitment to experimentation and innovation. The emphasis is on being on the leading edge. Readiness for change and meeting new challenges are important. The organization's long-term emphasis is on growth and acquiring new resources. Success means having unique and new products or services and being a product or service leader is important. The organization encourages individual initiative and freedom. When the organization has a high to medium level of trust it is likely that the organization has a developmental climate. An organization with medium to low level of conflict can be categorized to have a developmental climate. Employees with a medium to high morale is frequently one element of a developmental climate. Moderately to high equitable rewards in the organization drives the climate towards a developmental climate. Medium to low resistance to change is normally present in a developmental climate. Medium to high leader credibility characterizes an organization with a developmental climate. An organization with a low to medium level of scapegoating may have a developmental climate.

The internal process climate is a formalized and structured place to work. Procedures govern what people do. The leaders pride themselves on being good coordinators and organizers. Maintaining a smooth running organization is important. The long-term concerns are stability, predictability, and efficiency. Formal rules and policies hold the organization together. Medium to inequitable rewards in the organization drives the climate towards an internal process climate.

The Leadership Style

The leadership style of the management is categorized as either a leader, producer, entrepreneur, or manager. This categorization is based the managements preference for delegation, detail in decision making, risk profile, time perspective proactivity, and motivation.

- ▶ Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your leadership style is an entrepreneurial type (cf 81%)
- ▶ It could also be that your leadership style is a leader type (cf 81%)

An entrepreneur is characterized as an individual who has a low preference for delegation and low

uncertainty avoidance. Management has a long-term horizon when making decisions, which characterizes a leadership style of the entrepreneurial type. Management has a preference for taking risks. This is one of the characteristics of a manager with a leadership style as an entrepreneur. Management has a preference for motivating people and not using control which will lead toward a leadership style as an entrepreneur. The management of Organization for Community Engagement has a medium preference for delegating decisions and are thus letting some decisions be made by other managers. This will lead toward a entrepreneurial leadership style. The management of Organization for Community Engagement has a preference for taking actions on some decisions and being reactive toward others. This is consistent with an entrepreneur. Since the management has a preference for making decisions on the basis of both detailed and aggregate information a characterization of the leadership style as entrepreneurial is appropriate.

A leader is characterized as an individual who has a high preference for delegation and a low level of uncertainty avoidance. Management has a long-term horizon when making decisions, which characterizes a leadership style of the leader type. Management has a preference for taking risks. This is one of the characteristics of a manager with a leadership style as a leader. Management has a preference for motivating people and not using control which will lead toward a leadership style as a leader. The management of Organization for Community Engagement has a medium preference for delegating decisions and are thus letting some decisions be made by other managers. This will lead toward a leadership style of the leader type. The management of Organization for Community Engagement has a preference for taking actions on some decisions and being reactive toward others. This is consistent with a leader. Since the management has a preference for making decisions on the basis of both detailed and aggregate information a leader characterization of the leadership style is appropriate.

The Strategy

The organization's strategy is categorized as one of either prospector, analyzer with innovation, analyzer without innovation, defender, or reactor. These categories follow Miles and Snow's typology. Based on your answers, the organization has been assigned to a strategy category. This is a statement of the current strategy; it is not an analysis of what is the best or preferred strategy for the organization.

- ▶ Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's strategy is a defender strategy (cf 64%)
- ▶ It could also be: a prospector strategy (cf 56%)

An organization with a defender strategy is an organization that has a narrow product market domain. Top managers in this type of organization are expert in their organization's limited area of operation but do not tend to search outside their domains for new opportunities. As a result of this narrow focus, these organizations seldom need to make major adjustments in their technology, structure, or methods of operation. Instead, they devote primary attention to improving the efficiency of their existing operations. When the prices are low, the organization must be cost effective in order to survive. The defender strategy focuses primarily on current markets, customers and products and protects that position. For a company with a high capital investment, the ability to adjust its capital base quickly is not likely. Thus, it needs to protect and defend its position; a defender strategy and technology protection is appropriate.

An organization with a prospector strategy is an organization that continually searches for market opportunities and regularly experiments with potential responses to emerging environmental trends. Thus, the organization is often the creator of change and uncertainty to which its competitors must respond. However, because of its strong concern for product and market innovation, a prospector usually is not completely efficient. For a prospector strategy to be aggressive in product development or market opportunities exploitation, it requires a high capital investment.

The Current Organizational Characteristics

Based on your answers, the organization's complexity, formalization, and centralization have been calculated. This is the current organization. Later in this report, there will be recommendations for the organization.

- ▶ The current organizational complexity is not determined (cf 100%)
- ▶ The current horizontal differentiation is not determined (cf 100%)
- ▶ The current vertical differentiation is not determined (cf 100%)
- ▶ The current spatial differentiation is not determined (cf 100%)
- ▶ The current centralization is not determined (cf 100%)
- ▶ The current formalization is not determined (cf 100%)

The current organization has been categorized with respect to formalization, centralization, and complexity. The categorization is based on the input you gave and does not take missing information into account.

OrgCon[®] Recommendations

Based on your answers about the organization, its situation, and the conclusions with the greatest certainty factor from the analyses above OrgCon[®] has derived recommendations for the organization's configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization. There are also recommendations for coordination and control, the appropriate media richness for communications, and incentives. More detailed recommendations for possible changes in the current organization are also provided.

Organizational Configurations

- ▶ The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been estimated to be a simple configuration (cf 82%)
- ▶ It could also be: a matrix configuration (cf 67%)
- ▶ It is certainly not: a divisional configuration (cf -62%)
- ▶ It is certainly not: a machine bureaucracy configuration (cf -100%)

A simple organization has a flat hierarchy and a singular head for control and decision making. The primary reason for recommending a simple configuration is that the organization has extreme environmental hostility. Extreme environmental hostility requires that the organization can respond consistently and rapid to unforeseen challenges. Therefore, it must have a simple configuration. An entrepreneurial leadership style makes a simple configuration possible and likely.

Because the technology is not divisible, the configuration cannot be divisional.

When the organization is confronted with hostility, it cannot be a machine bureaucracy. A machine bureaucracy cannot act appropriately when unexpected events occur.

Organizational Characteristics

- ▶ The recommended degree of organizational complexity is low (cf 60%)
- ▶ It, too, could be: medium (cf 58%)

When the environmental hostility of Organization for Community Engagement is high, organizational complexity should be low.

Organization for Community Engagement has a defender strategy, which generally leads towards a medium to high organizational complexity. A defender needs cost efficiency, and that can be obtained through specialization. Large public organizations should have medium to high organizational complexity. Organization for Community Engagement has a technology that is somewhat routine, which implies that the organizational complexity should be medium. The environmental uncertainty of Organization for Community Engagement is medium. Therefore the organizational complexity should be medium. There is no need for an elaborate reporting and control hierarchy or high vertical differentiation. But there may be a requirement for work specialization and high horizontal differentiation. Because Organization for Community Engagement has an advanced information system, organizational complexity can be greater than it could otherwise. A developmental climate in the organization requires a medium level of complexity.

- ▶ The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is low (cf 60%)
- ▶ The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is low (cf 84%)
- ▶ The recommended degree of formalization is low (cf 64%)

When environmental hostility is high formalization should be low. A developmental climate in the organization requires a low level of formalization.

- ▶ The recommended degree of centralization is high (cf 79%)

Organization for Community Engagement has a defender strategy, which generally leads to high centralization. A defender needs cost efficiency, and that can be obtained through centralized coordination. When the environment is extremely hostile, top management must take prompt action and centralization must be high. Because Organization for Community Engagement has an advanced information system, centralization can be greater than it could otherwise.

- ▶ Organization for Community Engagement's span of control should be moderate (cf 56%)

Since Organization for Community Engagement has some technology routineness, it should have a moderate span of control.

- ▶ Incentives should be based on individual results (cf 65%)
- ▶ It should also be based on group results (cf 65%)

With high equivocality, medium uncertainty, and high environmental complexity incentives should be results based. When the organization has a developmental climate incentives could be results based with an individual orientation. Incentives could be results based with a group orientation with an entrepreneurial management.

With high equivocality, medium uncertainty, and high environmental complexity incentives should be results based.

- ▶ Organization for Community Engagement should use media with high media richness (cf 85%)
- ▶ The information media that Organization for Community Engagement uses should provide a moderate amount of information (cf 70%)
- ▶ The media used should also provide a large amount of information (cf 50%)
- ▶ Organization for Community Engagement should use meetings as means for coordination and control (cf 94%)
- ▶ It should also use planning as means for coordination and control (cf 88%)
- ▶ It should also use integrators as means for coordination and control (cf 76%)

Top management should play the central role in coordinating and controlling the activities of the organization as well as making strategic and operating decisions.

When the environment of Organization for Community Engagement can be described by high equivocality, medium uncertainty, and high complexity coordination should be based on planning, integrators and group meetings. Media with high richness and moderate amount of information are required.

If the management has an entrepreneurial leadership style then the management will prefer coordinating and controlling using direct supervision and meetings.

When the organization has a developmental climate, coordination should be obtained using planning, integrators and meetings. An organization with a developmental climate will likely have to process a large amount of information and will need information media with high richness.

When the organization has a defender strategy, coordination should be obtained using planning and budgeting.

Top management should make many decisions. However, many individuals should be involved in gathering information and implementing those decisions.

Top management should gather information, make decisions, and manage implementation. Top management should give direct orders to achieve the required coordination among the operations and activities.

Organizational Misfits

Organizational misfits compares the recommended organization with the current organization.

- ▶ The following organizational misfits are present: (cf 100%)
 - Current and prescribed configuration do not match.
 - Current and prescribed complexity do not match.
 - Current and prescribed centralization do not match.
 - Current and prescribed formalization do not match.

Recommendations on Removing Organizational Misfits

- ▶ No detailed recommendations present (cf 100%)
 - Based on the present input OrgCon was not able to make any detailed recommendations.



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APPENDIX G. ORGCON—DESIGN FIT INPUTS¹⁶⁹



Input Report for Organization for Community Engagement

Date: 10/5/2010
Time: 1:01 PM
Scenario: Chapter 4 iteration

Effectiveness and Efficiency

Is the degree of efficiency high, medium or low ?

high
medium
low

Is the degree of effectiveness high, medium or low ?

high
medium
low

Strategic Exploitation and Exploration

<i>Does the organization have a high or low product innovation?</i>	Remark
high (cf 100%) medium low	The OCE will have a high product innovation level because of the demand to develop solutions (i.e. products) that solve the unique problems encountered at the tribal or village level.
<i>Does the organization have a high or low process innovation?</i>	Remark
high (cf 85%) medium low	It will have high to medium process innovation for routine tasks such as liaisons or coordinations with outside military organizations. The other unique tasks that demand flexibility and responsiveness will require a high level of process innovation.
<i>Does the organization have a high or low concern for quality?</i>	Remark
high medium (cf 85%) low	The OCE will have a medium to high concern for quality. Because the concern for quality is dependent on the timeliness of actually receiving a product, the concern for quality will tend to be medium in order to provide the product in a timely

¹⁶⁹ Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel, *Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004).

fashion.

How does the organization's price level compare to its competitors?

high
medium
low (cf 100%)

Remark

'Competitors' are defined as other ISAF or US initiatives.

Does the organization operate in an industry with high or low capital requirements?

high (cf 85%)
medium
low

Remark

The OCE will require high human and regulatory capital and medium to low material capital prior to operating. This is translated into an overall high capital requirement with an 85% CF.

Diversity

Does the organization have many different products ?

many
some
few

Does organization operate in many or few different markets ?

many
some
few

Does the organization operate in more than one country? If yes, is the activity level abroad greater than 25%?

yes - activity level greater than 25%
yes - activity level lower than 25%
no (cf 100%)

Does the organization have many different products in the foreign market ?

many
some
few
none

Environment

Is the organizational environment simple or complex ?

simple
complex
highly complex (cf 100%)

What is the level of uncertainty of the environment?

low
medium (cf 100%)
high

Remark

The OCE will function in an environment with a medium level of uncertainty. As organizational experience grows, situations become somewhat predictable; the organization's actions will have a predictable and causal relationship to the population.

Is the equivocality of the environment low or high?

low
medium
high (cf 100%)

Remark

The elements of the OCE will operate in an environment that has a high degree of equivocality because of the cultural bias that the OCE will inherently bring to their mission.

Is the organizational environment hostile - how tough is the competition?

extreme (cf 100%)
high
medium
low

Current Configuration

What is the organization's current organizational configuration?

simple
functional
divisional
matrix (cf 100%)
adhocracy
other

Remark

The thesis authors assume a matrix structure for the OCE due to the highly complex environment and the requirement for decentralization and collaboration. The OrgCon analysis for Chapter 3 showed that the OCE could be a Simple or Matrix organization.

Is the current organizational configuration a bureaucracy? Remark

machine bureaucracy
professional bureaucracy
not a bureaucracy (cf 70%)

According to OrgCon Ch 3 output file, the OCE is not a machine bureaucracy. Because the environment is unstable, the OCE is overall not going to be any type of bureaucracy.

What is the current degree of virtualization? Remark

high (cf 100%)
medium
low

The OCE will have smaller teams deployed in a distributed geographic manner. The teams will be operating as an asynchronous network.

What is the current configuration's degree of internationalization? Remark

multinational
global
international
transnational (cf 100%)
not an international configuration

The OCE is transnational because the cultural and community groups (i.e. tribes, clans, etc) span national borders.

Current Complexity

How many different job titles are there ?

Remark

very few
small number
moderate number
large number (cf 100%)
great number

A large number is generally between 16-25 job titles.

What proportion of employees hold advanced degrees or have many years of specialized training ? Remark

0 to 10 %
11 to 20 %
21 to 50 %
51 to 75 %
76 to 100 % (cf 85%)

Most of the personnel will have advanced degrees and specialized training. All personnel will have language and cultural training specific to the targeted population, as well as specialized skills.

How many vertical levels separate the chief executive from those employees working at the bottom of the organization ?

1 or 2

3 to 5 (cf 100%)

6 to 8

9 to 12

more than 12

What is the average number of vertical levels for the organization ?

1 or 2

3 to 5 (cf 100%)

6 to 8

9 to 12

more than 12

Including the main center, how many geographic locations are there where organization members are employed?

1 or 2

3 to 5

6 to 15

16 to 30

more than 30 (cf 100%)

What is the average distance of these outlying units from the organization's main center?

less than 10 miles

11 to 100 miles

101 to 500 miles (cf 70%)

501 to 3500 miles

more than 3500 miles

one site

What proportion of the organization's total work force is located at these outlying units ?

less than 10 %

11 to 25 %

26 to 60 %

61 to 90 % (cf 100%)

more than 90 %

one site

Remark

Assuming a mature organization, this accounts for the provinces and districts if the OCE were fully employed throughout Afghanistan.

Remark

As a mature organization, the OCE for the Afghanistan region could be quite spatially differentiated. The main center of the OCE could be the top of the organization or the second level.

Remark

The intent of the Community Engagement Concept is to maximize engagement with the population with as many smaller elements as possible. This means less staff and headquarters personnel.

Age/Ownership

How old is the organization ?

young

Remark

The analysis of this organizational design assumes

mature (cf 85%)
old

a mature organization relative to other
organizations in the U.S. military.

***What kind of ownership does the
organization have ?***

private/controlled by owner
incorporated/controlled by board
**public sector/controlled by bureaucracy (cf
100%)**
subsidiary/tied to other units

Technology

***What is the major activity of the
organization ?***

production
service (cf 100%)
retail
wholesale

Remark

The OCE's primary activity is to deliver a service
(i.e. enable local security through village defense
forces and enhancing stability by leveraging
existing programs).

***What kind of technology does the
organization have ?***

a mass production
a process production
a unit production (cf 100%)

***Does the organization have a routine
technology?***

no
some (cf 100%)
yes

Is the technology divisible?

highly
somewhat
little (cf 85%)

Remark

While there is some divisibility in the tasks
associated with OCE, these tasks remain highly
interdependent on each other.

***Does the organization have a strong or weak
dominant technology?***

weak

Remark

There are many tools, techniques, and procedures
used by the OCE to accomplish their goals. While

average (cf 85%)
strong

there is some routinization of the common military technology, the numerous ways the technology is employed lends itself to an average dominance.

Does the organization use or plan to use an advanced information system?

Remark

yes (cf 100%)
no

The OCE will use several forms of electronic information systems: encrypted and unencrypted line of sight and satellite radios, satellite NIPR and SIPR communications, etc.

Size

How many employees does the organization have?

Remark

7225 (cf 100%)

Assuming an established organization.

Leadership Style

With respect to centralization/decentralization. What kind of decisions does the top management prefer to make?

policy and general decisions
both general and some operating decisions (cf 100%)
both general and operating decisions

Does the management prefer to make long-term decisions or short-term decisions?

Remark

long-term decisions (cf 100%)
long-term and short-term decisions
short-time decisions

Decentralization requires leaders to delegate command and control, decisions, and operations.

Does top management prefer to use very detailed or very aggregate information when making decisions?

very detailed information
medium detailed information (cf 85%)
very aggregate information

Are management proactive or reactive on

taking action?

proactive/anticipating future events
some proactive and some reactive (cf 100%)
reactive to events as they occur

What is top management's attitude towards risk? **Remark**

risk propensity (cf 100%)
risk neutral
risk averse

Due to the need to develop an ability to adapt to a divergent, rapidly changing, and hostile environment; the OCE leadership will tend to prefer innovation and be subject to accepting a high degree of risk.

What kind of motivation and control does top management prefer?

motivation through inspiration (cf 100%)
a combination of motivation and control
using control techniques

Organizational Climate

The level of trust - sharing, openness, confidence - is:

high (cf 100%)
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of conflict - disagreement, friction - in this organization is: **Remark**

high
medium high
medium
medium low (cf 100%)
low

The organization inherently should have a low level of conflict because there is harmony in goals and beliefs resulting in job cooperation.

The employee morale - confidence, enthusiasm - in this organization is:

high (cf 100%)
medium high
medium
medium low

Remark

The OCE should be an all-volunteer organization that selects its personnel on their motivation to serve, deploy, their qualities, interests, and experiences.

low

Rewards are given in an equitable fashion:

Remark

highly equitable
medium to highly equitable
moderately equitable (cf 100%)
medium to inequitably
inequitably

Rewards will be moderately equitable because individuals will be rewarded based off of individual performance and the organizational results.

The organization's resistance to change is:

Remark

high
medium high
medium
medium low (cf 100%)
low

At the lowest level, the OCE will have a low resistance to change as the local population, the enemy forces, and the environment constantly changes. The highest level will have a medium resistance to change because of the strain it places on relationships

The leadership credibility - respect, inspiration, acceptance - is:

high (cf 100%)
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of scapegoating - shifting of responsibility for actions which fail - is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low (cf 100%)

National Culture

The power distance is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of uncertainty avoidance is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of masculinity is:

high
medium high
medium
medium low
low

The level of individualism is:

high
medium to high
medium
medium low
low

Current Centralization

How much direct involvement does top management have in gathering the information they use in making decisions?

none
little (cf 100%)
some
a great deal
a very great deal

To what degree does top management participate in the interpretation of the information input?

less than 20 % (cf 100%)
21 to 40 %
41 to 60 %
61 to 80 %
more than 80 %

To what degree does the top management directly control the execution of decisions?

0 to 20 % (cf 100%)
21 to 40 %
41 to 60 %

61 to 80 %
more than 80 %

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have in establishing his or her budget?

very high
high
some (cf 100%)
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have in determining how his or her unit will be evaluated? **Remark**

very high
high (cf 85%)
some
little
none

The intent of the CEC is to allow the middle management the flexibility to evaluate there units and personnel in order to best interact with the complexities in the environment.

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have in hiring and firing personnel?

very high
high (cf 100%)
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over personnel rewards - (i.e., salary increases and promotions)? **Remark**

very great
great (cf 100%)
some
little
none

Promotions and salary increases are dictated by existing human resources policies. Middle managers will have a high degree to offer other rewards such as certification, awards, accreditations, advanced degrees, etc.

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over purchasing equipment and supplies? **Remark**

very high
high (cf 85%)
some
little
none

Middle managers will have a high discretion to purchase supplies, but not equipment.

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over establishing a new project or program?

very high
high (cf 100%)
some
little
none

How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over how work exceptions are to be handled?

very high
high (cf 100%)
some
little
none

Current Formalization

Written job descriptions are available for ?

none
opera. employees or top management
opera. employ. & first-line supervisors
opera. employees, lower and middle mgmt
all employees, excl. senior management
all employees, incl. senior management (cf 100%)

Where written job descriptions exist, how closely are employees supervised to ensure compliance with standards set in the job description ?

very loosely
loosely
moderately closely (cf 100%)
closely
very closely

How much latitude are employees allowed from the standards ?

a great deal
large amount (cf 100%)
a moderate amount

very little
none

What percentage of non-managerial employees are given written operating instructions or procedures for their job?

0 to 20 %
21 to 40 % (cf 100%)
41 to 60 %
61 to 80 %
81 to 100 %

Remark

There are written job descriptions and training, and the common and most important standard operating procedures are written.

Of those managerial employees given written instructions or procedures to what extent are they followed ?

none
little
some (cf 100%)
a great deal
a very great deal
no written instructions

To what extent are supervisors and middle managers free from rules procedures, and policies when they make decisions ?

very frequently
frequently
some (cf 100%)
little
none

What percentage of all the rules and procedures that exist within the organization is in writing ?

less than 20 %
21 to 40 % (cf 100%)
41 to 60 %
61 to 80 %
more than 80 %

Current Incentives

What is the basis for designing incentives?

Individual behavior
Individual results

Group based behavior
Group based results (cf 85%)
No principles



APPENDIX H. ORGCON —DESIGN FIT OUTPUT ANALYSIS¹⁷⁰



Total analysis of Organization for Community Engagement

Date: 10/5/2010
Time: 1:01 PM
Scenario: Chapter 4 iteration

Strategic Misfits

A Strategic misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of management style, size, environment, technology, climate, and strategy.

► The following misfits are present: (cf 100%)

When the environment is not well defined - that is, when the organization cannot anticipate the important environmental factors - the defender strategy is not appropriate! A defender strategy is not innovative or adaptive. In an ill-defined environment, adaptation will be required to survive as new situations and issues will emerge. Here the organization should change its strategy to an analyzer or prospector to adapt to the evolving and changing environment.

When many factors in the environment affect the organization, it may make it difficult for a defender like Organization for Community Engagement to protect what it does and also difficult to protect its established market position. Therefore, the defender strategy is not appropriate! An analyzer strategy is more appropriate for this complex environment. Here the analyzer should seek out opportunities in the complex environment.

Organization for Community Engagement has a developmental climate. This is a mismatch with a defender strategy! A developmental climate is flexible and externally oriented. A defender strategy focuses on the status quo and its continuation. A developmental climate is more compatible with an analyzer or prospector strategy.

A manager or an entrepreneur is a misfit with a large organization. The entrepreneur is involved in everything in the organization and abhors the formality that is needed for a large organization. The large organization needs formalization and decentralization for control and timely decisionmaking. The entrepreneur is likely to become overloaded and not be able to deal with large information processing demands which can lead to a decision backlog or ill considered choices. The manager may cause an information overload by focusing on the short term and being very details oriented

Contingency Misfits

A contingency misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of management style, size, environment, technology, climate, and strategy and the organization structure.

► The following misfits are present: (cf 100%)

A manager is a misfit with low formalization and lack of standards. The manager wants to avoid uncertainty to control and predict what will occur in the organization. A low formalization may not provide

¹⁷⁰ Richard M. Burton and Børge Obel, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The Dynamics of Fit, 3rd ed. (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004).

enough control, particularly if the organization is large.

A developmental climate is misfit with a high degree of complexity. A developmental climate demands not to be restricted by a rigid hierarchy and job specialization so that everyone can react quickly to new situations.

A matrix organization is probably too expensive for an organization with a defender strategy.

The required focus on quality and efficiency for the defender suggests that the management should not delegate and should be involved in control of operations.

The Size

The size of the organization - large, medium, or small - is based upon the number of employees, adjusted for their level of education or technical skills.

- ▶ Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's size is large (cf 100%)

More than 75 % of the people employed by Organization for Community Engagement have a high level of education. Adjustments are made to this effect. The adjusted number of employees is greater than 2,000 and Organization for Community Engagement is categorized as large.

The Climate

The organizational climate effect is the summary measure of people and behavior.

- ▶ Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that the organizational climate is a developmental climate (cf 83%)
- ▶ It is not a internal process climate (cf -41%)

The developmental climate is characterized as a dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative place to work. People stick their necks out and take risks. The leaders are considered to be innovators and risk takers. The glue that holds organizations together is commitment to experimentation and innovation. The emphasis is on being on the leading edge. Readiness for change and meeting new challenges are important. The organization's long-term emphasis is on growth and acquiring new resources. Success means having unique and new products or services and being a product or service leader is important. The organization encourages individual initiative and freedom. When the organization has a high to medium level of trust it is likely that the organization has a developmental climate. An organization with medium to low level of conflict can be categorized to have a developmental climate. Employees with a medium to high morale is frequently one element of a developmental climate. Moderately to high equitable rewards in the organization drives the climate towards a developmental climate. Medium to low resistance to change is normally present in a developmental climate. Medium to high leader credibility characterizes an organization with a developmental climate. An organization with a low to medium level of scapegoating may have a developmental climate.

The internal process climate is a formalized and structured place to work. Procedures govern what people do. The leaders pride themselves on being good coordinators and organizers. Maintaining a smooth running organization is important. The long-term concerns are stability, predictability, and efficiency. Formal rules and policies hold the organization together. Medium to inequitable rewards in the organization drives the climate towards an internal process climate.

The Leadership Style

The leadership style of the management is categorized as either a leader, producer, entrepreneur, or manager. This categorization is based on the management's preference for delegation, detail in decision making, risk profile, time perspective proactivity, and motivation.

- ▶ Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your leadership style is an entrepreneurial type (cf 81%)
- ▶ It could also be that your leadership style is a leader type (cf 81%)

An entrepreneur is characterized as an individual who has a low preference for delegation and low uncertainty avoidance. Management has a long-term horizon when making decisions, which characterizes a leadership style of the entrepreneurial type. Management has a preference for taking risks. This is one of the characteristics of a manager with a leadership style as an entrepreneur. Management has a preference for motivating people and not using control which will lead toward a leadership style as an entrepreneur. The management of Organization for Community Engagement has a medium preference for delegating decisions and are thus letting some decisions be made by other managers. This will lead toward an entrepreneurial leadership style. The management of Organization for Community Engagement has a preference for taking actions on some decisions and being reactive toward others. This is consistent with an entrepreneur. Since the management has a preference for making decisions on the basis of both detailed and aggregate information a characterization of the leadership style as entrepreneurial is appropriate.

A leader is characterized as an individual who has a high preference for delegation and a low level of uncertainty avoidance. Management has a long-term horizon when making decisions, which characterizes a leadership style of the leader type. Management has a preference for taking risks. This is one of the characteristics of a manager with a leadership style as a leader. Management has a preference for motivating people and not using control which will lead toward a leadership style as a leader. The management of Organization for Community Engagement has a medium preference for delegating decisions and are thus letting some decisions be made by other managers. This will lead toward a leadership style of the leader type. The management of Organization for Community Engagement has a preference for taking actions on some decisions and being reactive toward others. This is consistent with a leader. Since the management has a preference for making decisions on the basis of both detailed and aggregate information a leader characterization of the leadership style is appropriate.

The Strategy

The organization's strategy is categorized as one of either prospector, analyzer with innovation, analyzer without innovation, defender, or reactor. These categories follow Miles and Snow's typology. Based on your answers, the organization has been assigned to a strategy category. This is a statement of the current strategy; it is not an analysis of what is the best or preferred strategy for the organization.

- ▶ Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's strategy is a defender strategy (cf 64%)
- ▶ It could also be: a prospector strategy (cf 56%)

An organization with a defender strategy is an organization that has a narrow product market domain. Top managers in this type of organization are expert in their organization's limited area of operation but do not tend to search outside their domains for new opportunities. As a result of this narrow focus, these organizations seldom need to make major adjustments in their technology, structure, or methods of operation. Instead, they devote primary attention to improving the efficiency of their existing operations. When the prices are low, the organization must be cost effective in order to survive. The

defender strategy focuses primarily on current markets, customers and products and protects that position. For a company with a high capital investment, the ability to adjust its capital base quickly is not likely. Thus, it needs to protect and defend its position; a defender strategy and technology protection is appropriate.

An organization with a prospector strategy is an organization that continually searches for market opportunities and regularly experiments with potential responses to emerging environmental trends. Thus, the organization is often the creator of change and uncertainty to which its competitors must respond. However, because of its strong concern for product and market innovation, a prospector usually is not completely efficient. For a prospector strategy to be aggressive in product development or market opportunities exploitation, it requires a high capital investment.

The Current Organizational Characteristics

Based on your answers, the organization's complexity, formalization, and centralization have been calculated. This is the current organization. Later in this report, there will be recommendations for the organization.

- ▶ The current organizational complexity is high (cf 93%)
- ▶ The current horizontal differentiation is high (cf 100%)
- ▶ The current vertical differentiation is low (cf 100%)
- ▶ The current spatial differentiation is high (cf 100%)
- ▶ The current centralization is low (cf 97%)
- ▶ The current formalization is medium (cf 100%)

The current organization has been categorized with respect to formalization, centralization, and complexity. The categorization is based on the input you gave and does not take missing information into account.

OrgCon® Recommendations

Based on your answers about the organization, its situation, and the conclusions with the greatest certainty factor from the analyses above **OrgCon®** has derived recommendations for the organization's configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization. There are also recommendations for coordination and control, the appropriate media richness for communications, and incentives. More detailed recommendations for possible changes in the current organization are also provided.

Organizational Configurations

- ▶ The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been estimated to be a simple configuration (cf 82%)
- ▶ It could also be: a matrix configuration (cf 67%)
- ▶ It is certainly not: a divisional configuration (cf -62%)
- ▶ It is certainly not: a machine bureaucracy configuration (cf -100%)

A simple organization has a flat hierarchy and a singular head for control and decision making. The primary reason for recommending a simple configuration is that the organization has extreme environmental hostility. Extreme environmental hostility requires that the organization can respond consistently and rapidly to unforeseen challenges. Therefore, it must have a simple configuration. An entrepreneurial leadership style makes a simple configuration possible and likely.

Because the technology is not divisible, the configuration cannot be divisional.

When the organization is confronted with hostility, it cannot be a machine bureaucracy. A machine bureaucracy cannot act appropriately when unexpected events occur.

Organizational Characteristics

- ▶ The recommended degree of organizational complexity is low (cf 60%)
- ▶ It, too, could be: medium (cf 58%)

When the environmental hostility of Organization for Community Engagement is high, organizational complexity should be low.

Organization for Community Engagement has a defender strategy, which generally leads towards a medium to high organizational complexity. A defender needs cost efficiency, and that can be obtained through specialization. Large public organizations should have medium to high organizational complexity. Organization for Community Engagement has a technology that is somewhat routine, which implies that the organizational complexity should be medium. The environmental uncertainty of Organization for Community Engagement is medium. Therefore the organizational complexity should be medium. There is no need for an elaborate reporting and control hierarchy or high vertical differentiation. But there may be a requirement for work specialization and high horizontal differentiation. Because Organization for Community Engagement has an advanced information system, organizational complexity can be greater than it could otherwise. A developmental climate in the organization requires a medium level of complexity.

- ▶ The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is low (cf 60%)
- ▶ The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is low (cf 84%)
- ▶ The recommended degree of formalization is low (cf 64%)

When environmental hostility is high formalization should be low. A developmental climate in the organization requires a low level of formalization.

- ▶ The recommended degree of centralization is high (cf 79%)

Organization for Community Engagement has a defender strategy, which generally leads to high centralization. A defender needs cost efficiency, and that can be obtained through centralized coordination. When the environment is extremely hostile, top management must take prompt action and centralization must be high. Because Organization for Community Engagement has an advanced information system, centralization can be greater than it could otherwise.

- ▶ Organization for Community Engagement's span of control should be moderate (cf 64%)

Since Organization for Community Engagement has some technology routineness, it should have a

moderate span of control.

- ▶ Incentives should be based on individual results (cf 73%)
- ▶ It should also be based on group results (cf 73%)

With high equivocality, medium uncertainty, and high environmental complexity incentives should be results based. When the organization has a developmental climate incentives could be results based with an individual orientation. Incentives could be results based with a group orientation with an entrepreneurial management. Incentives should be based on an individual results orientation when the general skill-level of the employees is high.

With high equivocality, medium uncertainty, and high environmental complexity incentives should be results based.

- ▶ Organization for Community Engagement should use media with high media richness (cf 85%)
- ▶ The information media that Organization for Community Engagement uses should provide a moderate amount of information (cf 70%)
- ▶ The media used should also provide a large amount of information (cf 50%)
- ▶ Organization for Community Engagement should use meetings as means for coordination and control (cf 94%)
- ▶ It should also use planning as means for coordination and control (cf 88%)
- ▶ It should also use integrators as means for coordination and control (cf 76%)

Top management should play the central role in coordinating and controlling the activities of the organization as well as making strategic and operating decisions.

When the environment of Organization for Community Engagement can be described by high equivocality, medium uncertainty, and high complexity coordination should be based on planning, integrators and group meetings. Media with high richness and moderate amount of information are required.

If the management has an entrepreneurial leadership style then the management will prefer coordinating and controlling using direct supervision and meetings.

When the organization has a developmental climate, coordination should be obtained using planning, integrators and meetings. An organization with a developmental climate will likely have to process a large amount of information and will need information media with high richness.

When the organization has a defender strategy, coordination should be obtained using planning and budgeting.

Top management should make many decisions. However, many individuals should be involved in gathering information and implementing those decisions.

Top management should gather information, make decisions, and manage implementation. Top management should give direct orders to achieve the required coordination among the operations and activities.

Organizational Misfits

Organizational misfits compares the recommended organization with the current organization.

► The following organizational misfits are present: (cf 100%)

- Current and prescribed configuration do not match.
- Current and prescribed formalization do not match.
- Current and prescribed centralization do not match.
- Current and prescribed complexity do not match.

Recommendations on Removing Organizational Misfits

► There following more detailed recommendations are suggested: (cf 100%)

- Consider decreasing the number of positions for which job descriptions are available.
- Top management should consider gathering the information needed for decision making themselves.
- Top management should interpret and analyze more information itself.
- Top management should consider to control the execution of decisions more actively.
- Consider giving middle managers less discretion on hiring and firing personnel.
- Consider giving the typical middle manager less discretion over personnel rewards.
- Consider giving the typical middle manager less discretion over establishing a new program or project.
- Consider giving the typical middle manager less discretion over how work exceptions are to be handled.
- Consider giving the middle managers less discretion over evaluations.
- Consider giving the typical middle manager less discretion over purchasing equipment and supplies.



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