Thinking the Unthinkable: Civil War in Afghanistan
Abstract
The purpose of this monograph is to explore the operational impacts of differentiating between an insurgency and a civil war. At first glance, the distinction between the two is just a matter of scale, but there are other differences as well. Comparing and contrasting civil war with insurgency focuses on the purpose behind the violence and less on the methods employed in the fighting. Using Afghanistan as a case study, including the Taliban to account for the incumbent and challenger in the conflict, this monograph shows that Afghanistan is currently in a state of civil war. The delineation between an insurgency and a civil war is vital to assessing the violence in Afghanistan. Proper classification and management of the violence is the key to success for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. While the U.S. classifies the conflict in Afghanistan as an insurgency, in reality it is a civil war. This failure to properly identify and classify the violence is impeding U.S. efforts at managing the conflict. This monograph develops benchmarks that signify a civil war and then applies them to Afghanistan to further support the hypothesis that Afghanistan is experiencing a civil war. The benchmarks for civil war developed here include a minimum of 1,000 war-related deaths, specifically, both civilian and combatant casualties from physical attacks. The second criteria is validates that state sovereignty is challenged by the rebels. A necessary condition for these criteria is that the violence is occurring within the territory of the state in question. The third benchmark specifies that the State and its security apparatus is one of the principal agents conducting the fighting. The last three benchmarks clearly delineate a civil war from an insurgency.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 02, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA536459
Entities
People
- Ryan M. Leigh
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College