

Anticipating the Gap

The Reality between the Aim and the Object

**A Monograph
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Abstract

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The ownership of vast quantities of military power and the ability to project that power globally does not ensure the achievement of the 'ends' desired from a war. Since 1945, the United States and her Western allies increasingly fail to realize a 'utility of force' that achieves the political purposes of conflict. How can the massive outlays for a modern military not produce adequate returns on investment? The billions spent, the energy expended, the lives lost produce not victory but frustration. These indecisive results are peculiar because Western military power, compared to its enemies' strength, generally results in massive overmatch. Initial phases of a campaign usually produce stunning military victories. Unfortunately, these military victories are not producing favorable political settlements. Western citizens and their political and military leadership ask, "What's the story here?" Why cannot the West, with its immense military power, win a war? Why does this paradoxical problem between ownership of immense force and force utility currently confront Western nations?

Western military traditions place great emphasis on decisive battles and campaigns and unfortunately assume victorious battle will instantly gain the political goal. The West designs battles and campaigns in which Clausewitzian 'absolute war' is the ideal and assumes by corollary absolute victory will follow. The conceptual 'absolute war' is just that, conceptual and unachievable. Limited war is the reality. Within limited war a gap between the 'aim' and 'object' must exist. Prior to 1945, the extension of battlefield violence upon a recalcitrant enemy society was the normal way to cross the gap. Since 1945, humanitarian and moral considerations in the conduct of war have gained an ever-higher level of acceptance in the West. When the 'absolute victory' expectation runs smack into an obstinate enemy population and humane limitations, a near insurmountable dilemma will exist for the West. Americans in particular have a hard time dealing with the frustration of having ample means but limited ways in which to pursue political victory after overwhelming military success.

This paper examines why our utility of force is on the decline in Iraq and Afghanistan and why in past wars military force achieved utility. Understanding this decline will better inform decisions for war based on the potential or lack thereof to achieve the required 'utility of force' level. Better-informed decisions by national level leadership will increase the probability that military end states will more closely align with a war's political purpose so that future commanders will easily connect the combat to the strategy.

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Introduction

At approximately 1400 on 23 January 1991, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell informed the world of the military 'aim' of the coalition taking part in the Gulf War. General Powell stated, in a way that left little room for misapprehension, "Our strategy in going after this army is very simple, first we are going to cut it off, and then we are going to kill it."¹ Military force's 'aim' clearly supported the 'object' of the war, which was the liberation of Kuwait from the physical occupation of Iraqi forces.² General Powell's statement was a culmination of strategic level debate about what the United States was trying to accomplish with its military force. During National Security Council (NSC) meetings, General Powell often delved into the political dimension of war to the consternation of Secretary Cheney who reprimanded General Powell saying, "stick to military matters."³

With the difficulty of the Vietnam War a part of his personal experience, General Powell insisted on a clear declaration of the strategic ends desired. During another meeting with Cheney immediately following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, General Powell avoided discussion about the ways and means of military force until the civilian authorities defined the desired political ends.⁴ Secretary Cheney, wanting to talk about military matters only, finally exploded on General Powell demanding, "I want some options, General."⁵ General Powell's repeated insistence for clear 'ends' adhered to the crucial advice of Clausewitz, in which he states:

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.⁶

For the United States in 1991, the choice of strategic ends was either defense of Saudi Arabia, liberation of Kuwait or potentially the conquest of Iraq. Militarily the strategic choice

¹ Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 509-510.

² U.N. resolution 661 dated 6 AUG 90 stated: the U.N. was "determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Kuwait. U.N. resolution 678, dated 29 NOV 90, authorizes the use of force or in U.N. terminology 'all necessary means.' <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm> (accessed June 20, 2010)

³ Powell, *My American Journey*, 465-466.

⁴ According to the authors of *The General's War*, this meeting took place on August 2, 1990.

⁵ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *The General's War*, (New York: Back Bay Books, 1995), 34.

⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Indexed edition, Princeton University Press, 1984), 88-89.

amounted to either offense or defense. These policy options required vastly different ways and means. One difference between the policies was the manpower requirement. The defensive option required approximately 184,000 personnel and the offensive to liberate Kuwait eventually used over 500,000.⁷ Understanding the ends allowed General Powell and the rest of the U.S. military to ensure the proper alignment of ‘ends, ways and means.’ This proper alignment enabled U.S. military force in Desert Shield and Storm to achieve utility. Beyond the proper numbers of personnel and equipment is the question of what the use of force is to achieve.

Clausewitz points out a fundamental aspect of war planning at the strategic level in his discussion of the purpose and conduct of war. To provide yet another interpretation of the master, Clausewitz is talking about war’s ‘aim’ and ‘object.’ This concept governs the conduct of war, the means and effort necessary, and “make(s) its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.”⁸ The following account of H.R. McMaster in Desert Storm and the author’s experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom help explain the importance of Clausewitz’s above point, especially how the concept has influence, both positive and negative, in the strategic, operational and down to the lowest tactical levels.

H.R. McMaster, in his account of the policy decisions that led to the adversity in Vietnam entitled *Dereliction of Duty*, describes his own experience in the Persian Gulf War. In comparison to the GEN Powell’s Vietnam generation, McMaster recounts, “the ease with which we could connect our combat mission to the strategic objectives that seemed clear and attainable contrasted starkly with combat actions in Vietnam.”⁹ The author of this paper, as a company commander in Iraq circa 2005-2006, recalls the difficulty of explaining to himself and his Soldiers the connection so easily discerned by H.R. McMaster approximately fifteen years earlier. This connection between the military mission and the strategic objective is the key to utility of military force. This connection is not always clear and when it is not, the risk of failure is severe. Tactical and operational brilliance can rarely extract a nation from ill-conceived strategies.¹⁰ We have only to recall Napoleon in Russia and ourselves in Vietnam to find clear examples of the above. While it is too early to know the complete and full record of the decisions surrounding the prosecution of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is clear that like Vietnam the utility of U.S.

⁷ Powell, *My American Journey*, 469.

⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 579.

⁹ H.R. McMaster, preface to *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), xiv.

¹⁰ Robert Heinl, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1976), 311. Quote from Alfred Thayer Mahan is clear on the effect of flawed strategy no matter the efficiency of the operational and tactical efforts, “As in a building, which, however fair and beautiful the superstructure, is radically marred and imperfect if the foundations be insecure -- so if the strategy be wrong, the skill of the general on the battlefield, the valor of the soldier, the brilliancy of victory, however otherwise decisive, fail of their effect.”

military force is now questionable. Concluding these conflicts using military force as the primary instrument remains elusive.

The ownership of vast quantities of military power and the ability to project that power globally does not ensure the achievement of the 'ends' desired from a war. Since 1945, the United States and her Western¹¹ allies increasingly fail to realize a 'utility of force' that achieves the political purposes of conflict.¹² How can the massive outlays for a modern military not produce adequate returns on investment? The billions spent, the energy expended, the lives lost produce not victory but frustration. These indecisive results are peculiar because Western military power, compared to its enemies' strength, generally results in massive overmatch. Initial phases of a campaign usually produce stunning military victories. Unfortunately, these military victories are not producing favorable political settlements. Western citizens and their political and military leadership ask, "What's the story here?" Why cannot the West, with its immense military power, win a war? Why does this paradoxical problem between ownership of immense force and force utility currently confront Western nations?

American military traditions place great emphasis on decisive battles and campaigns and unfortunately assume victorious battle will naturally gain the political goal. Americans design battles and campaigns in which Clausewitzian 'absolute war'¹³ is the ideal and assumes by corollary absolute victory will follow. The conceptual 'absolute war' is just that, conceptual and unachievable. Limited war is the reality. Within limited war a gap between the 'aim' and 'object' must exist. Prior to 1945, the extension of battlefield violence upon a recalcitrant enemy society was the normal way to cross the gap. Since 1945, humanitarian and moral considerations in the conduct of war have gained an ever-higher level of acceptance in the West. When the 'absolute

¹¹ West or Western is defined by NATO member countries (less Turkey), Austria, Australia. In using 'the west' the author does not wish to compare its concepts of war to 'the East'. 'The West' is used to frame the group of nations confronting the issue discussed in this paper.

¹² General Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: the Art of War in the Modern World* (rprt, 2005, New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 20-28. General Smith in describing the utility of force states, "Military force does not have an absolute utility, other than its basic purpose s of killing and destroying." He further goes on to describe five critical factors that will determine the utility of a particular force for an always unique situation. Those factors are forming, deploying, directing, sustaining, and recovering. Each factor must be designed specifically for the intended situation.

¹³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Indexed edition, Princeton University Press, 1984), 75-77. Absolute war is defined as only a theory defined by three interactions that cause three extremes. The extremes are: the maximum use of force, the aim to disarm the enemy, and the maximum exertion of strength (and will). Adrian R. Lewis, *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 21- 22. Lewis develops a synthesis of American way of war assessments derived from sources such as Truman, Shy, Osgood, Fehrenbach and others. The synthesis, in part, states: "Americans believe that fighting ought to produce demonstrable progress and ultimately decisive results. Compromise solutions are un-American, and do not justify the human cost of war or achieve the nation's objectives, which tend to be more absolute."

victory' expectation runs smack into an obstinate enemy population and humane limitations, a near insurmountable dilemma will exist for the West. Americans in particular have a hard time dealing with the frustration of having ample means but limited ways in which to pursue political victory after overwhelming military success.

This paper examines why our utility of force is on the decline in Iraq and Afghanistan and why in past wars military force achieved utility. Understanding this decline will better inform decisions for war based on the potential or lack thereof to achieve the required 'utility of force' level. Better-informed decisions by national level leadership will increase the probability that military end states will more closely align with a war's political purpose so that future commanders will easily connect the combat to the strategy.

Decreasing force utility is a result of a gap between the political purpose or the national strategic endstate (the object) and the military endstate (the aim). Historically, gaps between the 'aim' and the 'object' are common in war. The problem that confronts the United States and Western nations today is an inability to bridge that gap. The tools required namely high manpower levels during occupation, appropriate levels of coercive violence, or both are no longer available.

This paper will follow a methodology to allow the reader to understand the various concepts that support the author's conclusions and the recommendations. First, the paper discusses the strategic concept of the 'aim' and the 'object.' Shifts in the relationship between the 'aim' and 'object' in the Western way of war over time are key to understanding Western military frustration in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. These two essential parts of a strategy for war underpin the rest of the paper.

Second, case studies of wars in which the 'aim' and the 'object' aligned closely demonstrate favorable war conditions that lead to positive political conclusions. Conversely, wars in which significant gaps existed between the 'aim' and 'object' demonstrate the requirements to bridge the gap and the West's lack of traditional tools to cross the span. From the study of this gap and its negative effect on concluding war with a positive political outcome, the central problem of Western 'utility of force' is exposed.

Third is a discussion on the rise of humane war and the era of persistent conflict. Finally, the author presents recommendations for future policy makers and those that advise them. The key is for future decision makers to forecast at the point of achieving the 'aim' the distance left to seize the 'object.' Bridging that distance between these two concepts requires careful consideration of ways and means that are truly available within modern Western concepts of morality and war.

Understanding the Importance of the ‘Aim’ and the ‘Object’

Strategists have consistently described the interrelationship between the ‘aim’ and the ‘object’ that is critical for development of a successful war strategy. Carl von Clausewitz famously points out that war is merely a continuation of policy by other means. With that statement in mind, he goes on to indicate that the political reason for war is what should inform the military aim. These two things, the political reason and the military aim, “can never be considered in isolation” from each other.¹⁴

B.H. Liddell Hart discusses two separate but interrelated goals in war. One is ‘the object,’ which is the political goal. The other, which he calls the ‘military aim,’ helps achieve ‘the object.’ The most important point taken from Liddell Hart’s discussion on strategy, for the purposes of this paper, is “History shows that gaining military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the object of policy.”¹⁵

Thomas C. Schelling in his book *Arms and Influence* also recognizes the military aim and the ‘object’ but with a different perspective. Political leaders appreciate that military force can expel, seize, hold, disarm, obstruct, etc. These verbs, successfully executed, accomplish the military aim. Less understood or maybe less acknowledged, especially in the West, is that military force can cause hurt. To hurt requires a victim. Hurting is destroying something of value to the victim in order to coerce. Hurting is purposeful violence or the threat of purposeful violence that is used to make the victim change a behavior in order to avoid it. According to Schelling, the power to hurt is bargaining power, a sort of ‘vicious diplomacy.’¹⁶ The military aim, once achieved, provides the victor the chance to hurt unimpeded. This is the point in where the ‘object’ is now attainable. Like other strategists, Schelling reveals two distinct aspects of war, the ‘aim’ and the ‘object.’

In a more recent discussion about war, inspired by operations in Iraq, West Point professor of history Frederick Kagan describes the purpose of war. Kagan, following Clausewitz and Hart’s ideas, points out that war is not for defeating the enemy army. Winning battles and achieving military victory are not the sole purpose of war. We fight wars for “the purpose of achieving a discrete set of political objectives.”¹⁷ Here the ‘aim’ and the ‘object’ are recognized as discrete but closely related.

Field Manual 3-0, Operations, places in doctrine both the ‘aim’ and the ‘object’ in its description of the two parts of the strategic level of war. Within U.S. Army’s doctrine, the ‘aim’ is termed as the military endstate and the ‘object’ is the national strategic endstate. FM 3-0

¹⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.

¹⁵ Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, second revised edition, (New York: Meridan, 1991), 338.

¹⁶ Thomas C Schelling, *Arms and Influence: with a new preface and afterword* (1966 repr., New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 2.

¹⁷ Frederick W. Kagan, “War and Aftermath”, in *Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign*, ed. Dr. LTC Brian M De Toy, (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 37.

defines the national strategic endstate as “conditions that the President wants to exist when a campaign or major operation ends.”¹⁸ This description also points out “the strategic endstate is achieved through the integrated, collective activities of all instruments of national power, not by any single instrument applied in isolation.”¹⁹ FM 3-0 links the military endstate to the achievement of the political purpose but only as a supporter of achieving the ‘object.’

The existence of and the link between the ‘aim’ and the ‘object’ is clear from Clausewitz through influential strategists and clearly defined in modern U.S. Army doctrine. Many classic and influential strategic theorists stress the need to recognize that military victory does not automatically equate to achieving political ends. Unfortunately, political and military leaders increasingly since 1945 seem unable to understand and account for these two high level aspects of strategy in the decisions for war. Additionally, it is not clear if decision makers even recognize the difference between the two. The American cultural wartime traditions that trended toward absolute political objectives clouded the new reality of limited war.²⁰

¹⁸ Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, D.C., 27 February 2008), para 6-31.

¹⁹ Ibid., para 6-31.

²⁰ Adrian R. Lewis, *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 20-36. Lewis claims that limited war causes cultural contradictions that threaten war efforts and these cultural issues are still prevalent as of 2007.;

The Focus on Decisive Battle

Within the United States, many foreign policy traditions exist. One of those traditions dealing with the use of military force takes its name from President Andrew Jackson. While President Jackson may have accepted some limitations on war, the tradition that took his name did not. The first rule of Jacksonian military tradition is “wars must be fought with all available force” and the term ‘limited war’²¹ considered repugnant and oxymoronic.²² Since the Civil War, when the United States gained the power to pursue a strategy of annihilation and until the advent of nuclear weapons the destruction of the enemy’s military power had been the ‘object’ of war. This was the image of war for most Americans.²³ Military strategy was *the* strategy. War planners assumed that victory would secure the political object. Political ‘ends’ naturally and quickly followed what we now call the military endstate in a seamless manner. U.S. policy makers and military planners placed the traditional military ‘aim’ and the political ‘object’ in nearly the same position in both time and space.

On the eve of World War 2, U.S. Army doctrine stated in a distinct Jacksonian way the ‘object’ of military operations. Under the heading “Doctrines of Combat,” Field Manual 100-5 stated: “The ultimate *objective* of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces in battle.”²⁴ This American war making assumption, where the ‘aim’ and the ‘object’ are practically the same, works when the results desired are generally physical in nature.

By physical, we mean the action verbs described previously by Thomas Schelling such as destroy, expel, seize, hold, disarm, and obstruct that apply to a physical reality. Interestingly, the primary definition of ‘physical’ is “of body, relating to the body, rather than to the mind, the soul, or the feelings.”²⁵ Note that in its description the Encarta dictionary describes what ‘physical’ is not. ‘Physical’ is *not* related to the mind, soul, or feelings. While affecting the morale or will of

²¹ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2008) defines the term ‘Limited War’ as “Armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations.” The US Air Force in *The United States Air Force Dictionary* (1956) provides another definition with “a war looked upon by one or the other of the contestants as not involving its own sovereignty, and as being limited in one respect or another, as, for example, to a particular geographic area, to the employment of only certain resources, or to the number of contestants.”

²² Walter R. Meade, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and how It Changed the World* (New York: Rutledge, 2002), 254.

²³ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), xxi.

²⁴ War Department, *Field Service Regulations, Operations*, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1941), 22.

²⁵ Encarta® World English Dictionary[North American Edition] © & (P) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Developed for Microsoft by Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. <http://www.bing.com/Dictionary/search?q=define+physical&FORM=DTPDIA> (accessed July 27, 2010)

the enemy is a large part of war, the psychological aspect only supported the overall physical goals.

Today's version of *Operations* now numbered Field Manual 3-0 contains no definitive statement about military operations like the 1941 version. The manual in its current form describes many uses for military operations. These uses address actions called mechanisms that are both physical and non-physical or psychological in nature that achieve operational level conditions.²⁶ Comparing the 1941 *Operations* to the 2003-version, considerable ambiguity developed as to what military force was to achieve. Illustrating this ambiguity and a gap between the 'aim' and 'object' are the actions and pronouncements by the United States in the aftermath the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Modern history records in detail the destruction of military formations in quickly prosecuted battles and campaigns. Americans will support longer military campaigns but they expect the destruction of the enemy's military as a sign of a war's successful termination.²⁷ Indeed, when President George Bush declared major combat operations over in 2003, with a banner of "Mission Accomplished" behind him, most Western people would have agreed.²⁸ The conventional Iraqi military could no longer resist. President Bush confidently declared the achievement of the 'aim.' Less understood was the fact that the 'object' remained unsecured. While in many cases the destruction of an enemy's military occurs just prior to the end of war, this destruction though is not the primary reason for the end of war. The end comes with the securing of an advantageous political outcome. President Bush states as much when, in the same speech just after declaring major combat operations over, he said:

²⁶ FM 3-0, *Operations*, para 6-42.

²⁷ Richard C. Eichenberg, "Victory has many Friends: US Public Opinion and the Use of Force, 1981-2005, in *International Security*, Vol 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), 140-177. After analysis of historical polling data Eichenburg concludes, "Restraining adversaries is popular, but intervention in civil wars (or peacekeeping in their aftermath) is generally not. In addition, it seems likely that one reason for the public's reticence is the estimate that intervention in civil wars offers uncertain prospects for success. Civil wars are particularly intractable because of their zero-sum nature, and reconciliation of competing factions requires a *political solution* rather than a *military victory*. (monograph author's emphasis); Jodie T. Allen, "Polling Wars: Hawks vs. Doves," Pew Research Center, posted November 23, 2009.

<http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1420/american-opinions-of-war-iraq--iran-afghanistan-vietnam-somalia> (accessed 8 October 2010). This analysis of polls of wartime American opinions suggests that American generally support wars in the initial stages as military victory is deemed possible. If the termination of the war is inclining away from military victory to a political solution, as suggested by Eichenburg, then public support drops; Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2009), x. In discussing the American way of war, Record states, "America has both a distinctive approach to strategy and a distinctive way of war rooted in its history, culture, political values, and geopolitical circumstances. All of these influences have combined to produce, among other things, not only an apolitical view of war, which encourages the pursuit of military victory for its own sake, but also a profound military aversion to counterinsurgency, which hands insurgent enemies a major strategic advantage."

²⁸ President Bush's "Mission Accomplished" speech was given aboard the aircraft carrier USS Lincoln on May 1st, 2003.

In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed. And now our coalition is engaged in securing and reconstructing that country... the transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done and then we will leave and we will leave behind a free Iraq.²⁹

The United States military was now conducting tasks requiring non-physical goals such as creating a democracy. It would take many more months after this speech for policy makers to realize that the 'aim' pulled up extremely short of the 'object.' What causes Western and especially Americans to think that achieving the 'object' of war naturally flows from achieving the 'aim'?

The Culture behind the Western Quest for Decisive Battle

The past influences our present through the slow accumulation of experience and culture. This accumulation is a sort of societal DNA that affects how we think about and view the world. Russell Weigley believes that the remote past affects our actions more than what we would generally admit. More important than the recent past is the remote past. This is because we recall the remote past with less fidelity and understanding but deep customs from that time remain. Therefore, the remote past will "cut deeper grooves of custom into our minds."³⁰ If we accept Mr. Weigley's claim then ancient Greece is a good place to start looking at our Western view of war. Military force's purpose and utility have drifted far from the original Western concept, a concept developed by the ancient Greek Hoplite soldiers

Greek hoplite warfare's tenants described by Victor Hanson are "notification of intent, mutual acknowledgement of the upcoming collision of forces, and obedience to the decision of the battlefield dead."³¹ The decision of battle is what military force seeks. This decision though requires the actors in the drama of war to accept the resulting decision. The reason the Greeks obeyed the decision of the battlefield was to prevent a prolonged war. Prolonging a war and allowing its effects to spill into civil life would have disastrous effects on a fragile agrarian society.³²

John Keegan writes of a similar notion to Greek acceptance of the battlefield decision. In his discussion of primitive war, Keegan describes how primitive peoples limited the affects of the battlefield to shield their fragile societies. One technique was exemption. Exemption limited who could participate in war. Whole segments of society such as women, children, and the old did not enter the battlefield. The other restraint on war was convention. Primitives would limit the place,

²⁹ George H.W. Bush, *Bush makes historic speech on warship*, CNN.com/U.S., posted May 1st, 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/05/01/bush.transcript/> (accessed August 3rd, 2010)

³⁰ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, xx.

³¹ Victor David Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 227.

³² Geoffrey Parker, ed., *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West*, rev. ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 20.

time, season, and pretext for war. This restriction served to protect crops, provide manpower for the planting, or harvest instead of war. Within conventions was the most important requirement of ritual. With understood rituals, the conduct of combat had proscribed activities and limiting factors. Most importantly, when the ritual was completed all could agree on the decision arrived at through this controlled combat. Parties to conflict could then move onto peacemaking.³³

The United States seeks the same decisive decision agreed to by Hanson's Greeks and Keegan's primitives. This is despite the narrative of our revolution when we employed a prolonged war of attrition against the British with guerrilla frontiersmen.³⁴ Additionally, the tradition remains even though the Greek agrarian purpose has long since become a non-issue. This decision no longer occurs on a single Greek field of battle because of the industrialization of war. Clearly though, the decisive decision sought by the Hoplite farmer is represented in the overall military purpose as described in the 1941 version of *Operations*. Unfortunately, for the United States, a legacy of Greek hoplite warfare that demands obedience to the battlefield decision is less and less applicable in the warfare of the late 20th and early 21st century

Refusing the Decision of the Battlefield

Disobedience to the decision of the battlefield or the lack of agreed upon ritual is the reason why the United States and her Western allies find the current operational environment so perplexing. Like the Hoplites, we want the battle to uncover the 'object.' Since the industrialization of war, it is not the battle alone but the culmination of a victorious military campaign (whether long or short duration) that provides the decision. The sought after result whether through a single battle or decisive campaigning remains the same. More and more the antagonists confronting the United States disobey the result of the battlefield and the 'object' remains inaccessible.

When the losing society disobeys the result of the battlefield, what can the victor do? Historically when the enemy society refuses the decision on the battlefield, it accepts exposure to the violence of the battlefield. The society's acceptance of battlefield violence results from a moral strength. Bolstering this moral strength is a calculation of the victor's actions in response to continued resistance. The key question then is can the defeated society endure longer than the military victor can?

The violence of war ends when the defeated society accepts the enemy's political demands or the society absorbs the violence, resists, and forces the original battlefield victor to retreat. Ancient societies faced the unambiguous choice of enduring the violence of the battlefield or acquiescence. This is no longer the case in all the major wars fought by the United States since the Korean War. Here is where West's confusing predicament begins.

³³ John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 387.

³⁴ Hanson, *The Western Way of War*, 10.

Throughout history, military forces have fought battles and campaigns to affect a political result. Today, extracting political advantage from a military victory, when the occupation of an enemy's territory is required, is usually extremely difficult unless the enemy society accepts defeat such as the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the current environment, that faces the United States since 1945, enemy societies are accepting this battlefield violence after conventional military operations more and more. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are current examples. In both cases, insurgency followed clear military victories. These modern insurgencies are difficult for the battlefield victor to defeat. If national leaders can identify conditions that result in insurgency and conditions that result in its sustainment then these decision-makers can heed Clausewitz's most important lesson in which they must determine what kind of war they are embarking on.³⁵

Establishing what kind of war we are embarking on is key to determining the war plans feasibility, suitability, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness.³⁶ More importantly after determining what kind of war we desire is to attempt to forecast what kind of war we are likely to get. This is based on the overused but important cliché that the 'enemy gets a vote'. Ill-conceived policies and strategies will affect operations and tactics. The operational and tactical levels of war must modify actions in order to compensate for higher-level deficiencies. Specifically, does the nation have the required means and ways to obtain the ends and is there the will to use them?

What is it about modern war that societies would risk exposure to battlefield violence against the immense military power of a Western state? In the case of the U.S., the political ends of recent wars do not align with the required ways and means. What is missing is either overwhelming effort (Powell Doctrine) to control a society and/or violence levels that will force coercion. Since World War II, the U.S. military has increasingly sought to decrease the enemy society's exposure to violence. Resistance to the military victor has increased as the society's exposure to violence goes down. The U.S. has used policies that attempt to explain to a defeated society why their loss of sovereignty is really to their benefit. Attempts to make war more humane and reduce applied violence, which will be explained later in the paper, have achieved more and more acceptance in Western countries. In turn, this makes the decision to resist more probable. When persuasion overtakes coercion then the initiative passes to the enemy society. Instead of compelling the enemy, we must await his acceptance that may never come. This use of persuasion versus coercion has been a failure.

³⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 88-89.

³⁶ Department of the Army, FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, Washington, D.C., 26 March 2010, para B-75.

The Two Main Phases of War and the Gap

Lack of understanding of the period after military victory leading to the achievement of the political reason for war confounds civilian as well as senior military leadership in the West. Lack of understanding the means and ways required before, during, and after conventional combat ceases results in failed strategies and sometimes lost wars. The Western world has found it increasingly difficult to translate a successful military campaign into political advantage.

What has occurred over time is an aversion to prosecute the second phase of conflict.³⁷ The first phase consists of destroying the enemy's military forces. The most famous military theorists and practitioners of the Western world have all espoused the above as the objective. Clausewitz states, "In war, the subjugation of the enemy is the end, and the destruction of his fighting forces the means."³⁸ Jomini expresses his fundamental principal of war in *Art of War*. This principle has four maxims in which all four maxims describe defeating the opposing military.³⁹ Slightly contrasting the Western theoreticians Sun Tzu represents eastern views in his third chapter titled 'Offensive Strategy'. He purposefully deemphasizes the destruction of the enemy military. Sun Tzu would rather capture the enemy army. For Sun Tzu, the best outcome is to subdue the enemy without resort to battle.⁴⁰ Sun Tzu's capture of the enemy army looks ahead to constructing a better peace. Peace is easier when there is less animosity against the victor. In order to achieve the 'object' in Sun Tzu's campaign without battle, those captured and those that control them must still obey the decision, as if there was battle. Whether captured as in Sun Tzu or destroyed in the Western way the effect is the same, defeat opens the door to the 'object.'

Destroying the enemy's military provides access to a now seemingly defenseless population. Once the enemy military is defeated, it would seem we could "compel our enemy to do our will."⁴¹ With the first phase complete, we move to the second. In this phase, the victor exposes and exploits the break in Clausewitz's 'paradoxical trinity.'⁴² In the first phase, the victor in the military conflict has won in the play of 'chance and probability' between the two opposing armies. The enemy government must submit because it no longer possesses an army, its primary 'instrument of policy' in war. The last of the trinity to come under the victors 'will' is the

³⁷ The two main phases of war are the authors own construct and are not part of U.S. military doctrine.

³⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 526.

³⁹ Antoine Henri Jomini, "The Art of War," ed. Brig. Gen J.D. Hittle, in *Roots of Strategy: Book 2*, (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1987), 461.

⁴⁰ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77.

⁴¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.

⁴² Ibid., 89. The 'paradoxical trinity' is "composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and the probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government."

“primordial violence, hatred, and enmity ... the blind natural force” found within the people.⁴³ It is at this point that both sides must make critical choices.

When a conflict enters into the second phase, the enemy population has two major choices. The first and most desirable is compliance. The second is non-compliance. Non-compliance results in the population now bearing the burden of battlefield violence on themselves. The new burden is the result of not accepting their militaries defeat and their government’s capitulation.

The military victor must now make his own decisions. Essentially the decisions either expand the battlefield violence to the enemy’s population or acquiesce in the enemy population’s recalcitrance. Modern Western nations are extremely averse to make the decision to expand the violence to the enemy population.⁴⁴ This aversion comes from a steady and more effective attempt to make war more humane since 1945. In the late 20th and early 21st century, the ‘blind force’ within the people increasingly and effectively defied the Western military power. This increase in resistance follows the West’s increased attempts to make war more humane. The overriding policy of war in the West has changed from the Athenian’s clarity of “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept”⁴⁵ to a ironic post-material war where Western societies can only fight wars specifically designed to minimize human suffering for both the enemy and themselves.⁴⁶ The increase in population resistance comes from two sources. One source is the way the military clash is conducted and the other is the way the enemy perceives of how a Western force will pursue a conflict’s second phase.

⁴³ Ibid., 89.

⁴⁴ Record, *Beating Goliath*, 15. Record explains a modern democracies domestic constraints on the use of force. In comparison to modern democracies, Record states that insurgent “chances for victory are virtually nonexistent against a powerful and ruthless dictatorships, which are not answerable to public or parliamentary opinion and are accustomed to violence and the threat of violence in getting what they want.”

⁴⁵ Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin Books, 1954), 402.

⁴⁶ Christopher Coker, *Humane Warfare* (London: Routledge, 2001), 2.

Case Studies

The following section examines the different relationships between the ‘aim’ and ‘object’ in past conflicts using eight case studies. The case studies are Athens and the Melians, Roman warfare, the U.S. Civil War, the Korea War, the Vietnam War, the Falklands War, and Desert Storm. The case studies will show the affect that a gap or lack of it between the ‘aim’ and the ‘object’ has on the conduct of a war and specifically its conclusion. The case studies analyze what policy makers instructed the military force to accomplish (the object). Further, did the military force achieve the ‘object’ upon achieving the ‘aim’ and, if not, what follow on military activities occurred? These historical case studies will show that gaps between the ‘aim’ and ‘object’ fill with draconian violence or huge occupation forces or both. The recent past occurring after World War 2 witnessed a fundamental recalculation of what the traditional ways of bridging a gap between the ‘aim’ and the ‘object’ of war. For a clear and simple case study that takes us back to the near beginning of Western war tradition, we turn to the ancient historian Thucydides.

The Athenians

The Peloponnesian War between Sparta and her allies and the Athenian Empire is a good place to start our case studies. Thucydides account of the Melian dialogue is an excellent example where there exists a gap between ‘aim’ and the ‘object.’ What happened to Melian society by Athenian force is an example of the ways the ancient Greeks dealt with a recalcitrant population that did not submit to decision reached on the battlefield. Thucydides shows us a way to bridge the aim/object gap.

The Melian people lived on the small Aegean island of Melos. The Melians at the time of the dialogue were a colony of Sparta. Since Sparta was the main enemy of Athens, the Melians unfortunately attracted the attention of the Athenian Empire.⁴⁷ Athens deployed significant military force on the island in order to bolster its negotiating position with the Melians. The Athenians used Schelling’s compellence⁴⁸ and stated it explicitly during the dialogue.⁴⁹ In the initial negotiations, the Athenians remove all window dressing from diplomacy. The Athenians describe how justice is based on the power to compel and “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”⁵⁰ This is the basis for the entire line of Athenian debate with the Melians.

⁴⁷ Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, 400.

⁴⁸ Thomas C Schelling, *Arms and Influence: with a new preface and afterword* (1966 repr., New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 69-78. Compellence is best explained by a comparison to deterrence. Deterrence is passive and seeks to prevent an action. Successful deterrence requires neither side to move. Compellence is active and seeks to force an action. Compellence requires the enemy to move or do something and the compelling side must also move or present the movement as a definite potential.

⁴⁹ Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, 402.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 402.

Early in the dialogue, the Athenians state the ‘object’ of the military forces now deployed on Melos Island. The ‘object’ is to increase the size and security of the Athenian Empire.⁵¹ The ‘aim’ of the military force was the subjugation of the Melians into the Athenian Empire by the threat of extermination. Athens preferred acquiescence, as subjugation would bring greater profit than destruction. Never the less, refusal by the Melians would result in their destruction. Failure to destroy the Melians, based on their refusal, would constitute a threat to the Empire. Athens could not appear weak to their other colonies.⁵² This perceived weakness would cause other Athenian colonies to consider rebellion. On Melos, a physical ‘aim’ supported a larger political ‘object’ that reinforced the psychology of deterrence.

In the dialogue, the Athenians clearly demonstrated their military power on Melos Island was a complete overmatch relative to the Melians' means at hand. The Melians clearly understood this overmatch. Achievement of the ‘aim’ of Athenian military force occurred as soon as it presented what was clearly a credible threat of extermination. In his analysis of the conquest of Melos, Donald Kagan believes “the purpose of the Athenians was to convince the Melians to surrender without fighting, a goal they hoped to achieve more readily by menace than by any other device.”⁵³ The Athenian negotiators told the Melians “your actual resources are too scanty to give you a chance of survival against the forces that are opposed to you at this moment.”⁵⁴ At this point, the ‘object’ was not yet attained as the Melian leaders refused the terms offered and did not accept the foregone conclusion as described by the Athenian negotiators. In a way, the Melian leaders announced their insurgency in the face of de facto Athenian colonization. Unfortunately, for Melian society, their leaders placed their hope in the gods, the far away Spartans, and luck.⁵⁵ After some successful but inconsequential Melian raids upon the siege lines, the Athenians invigorated the siege forcing the Melians into unconditional surrender. In the end, all Melian military aged males were put to death and every women and child sold into slavery. Melian society ceased to exist.

Violence is how Athens bridged the gap between achieving the military ‘aim’ and securing the ‘object’ of the war. Over 2400 years ago, the Athenians deemed violence upon a civilian population a legitimate course of action when confronted with a recalcitrant society unyielding to military reality. The Melian Dialogue is important in that it shows us early ways in which aim/object gaps were dealt with at the beginnings of Western traditions. The situation on Melos Island also shows that resistance to military victory or supremacy, as far back as 2400 years ago, was not unusual. This resistance is remarkable given that the Melians knew the ultimate outcome. The Athenian negotiators made a wholly rational argument to the Melian

⁵¹ Ibid., 403.

⁵² Donald Kagan, *The Peloponnesian War* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 247.

⁵³ Ibid., 248.

⁵⁴ Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, 406.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 407.

leadership on why they should submit. The Melians appealed to one of Thucydides three motives of war, in this case honor.⁵⁶ Like Western powers today, the representatives of the great power Athens are “shocked” and judge the Melians as “completely deluded” in the refusal to accept the Athenian argument.⁵⁷ Rationality does not always dictate men’s decisions. In the case of the Melians, it would seem that they followed an irrational course. Today we would say the Athenians were also irrational when considering the ‘way’ they obtained the ‘object’ of war. This way, considered legitimate then, would not pass any legitimacy test in the post 1945 Western world.

The Romans

The Romans serve as an important link between the military traditions of the classical period and Western military thought and practice. Important Western military traditions founded on the ideas of Machiavelli, the Princes of Orange and Maurice de Saxe found inspiration in the legions of Rome.⁵⁸ Romans carry forward the Athenian example of Melos. Edward N. Luttwak in his book *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, states how the Romans dealt with the problem of the absence of an army to defeat and a diffuse rural population unwilling to accept Roman dominance:

Consequently, if the Romans persisted in their efforts, their only real alternative was to attack the population base itself, in a war of extermination. In the absence of a settled pattern of life that the army could control and reorganize under Roman rule, peace required that first a desert be made. Thus at the conclusion of the Domitian’s campaign against the Nasamones of North Africa, he reported to the Senate that the war had been won, and that the Nasamones had ceased to exist.⁵⁹

For the Romans, if the enemy did not completely quit then they were subject to mass extermination. The gap between the ‘aim’ and the ‘object’ in Rome’s wars again forces decisions beyond the strictly military campaign. When a Roman Army went on the march to conquer new lands, its ‘aim’ was to threaten a highly valued fixed enemy location. This threat would either cause the targeted people to acquiesce to Roman terms or fight in order to preserve that thing of value. Roman confidence in the power of its Legions was such that either course of action

⁵⁶ Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, 80.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 406-407.

⁵⁸ Jeremy Black, “The Western Way of War” in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Modern Warfare*, eds. George Kassimeris and John Buckley (Surrey, U.K.: Ashgate, 2010), 12.

⁵⁹ Edward N. Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the first century A.D. to the third*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 46.

selected by the enemy would result in attainment of the 'object.' Attacking what the enemy must defend forced the decisive battle.

The Romans targeted cities, irrigation systems, or limited arable land especially if these things constituted the source of society's strength.⁶⁰ Where the source of strength was concentrated or fixed, it was vulnerable to the Romans. Today, we might call this the enemy center of gravity. Problems surfaced when a society possessed distributed sources of strength. This diffusion, such as the Nasamones of North Africa mentioned by Luttwak, caused the Romans an 'aim' targeting problem. What shall the army threaten? In the absence of something fixed or concentrated of value to force battle, the Romans threatened the population itself directly. If we suppose that the Roman 'object' in war was the expansion or the security of the empire, not unlike the Athenian 'object' in the Melian Dialogue, then a degree of control over an area was necessary.

The 'aim' of a particular campaign was to communicate the threat of destruction to compel acquiescence or in fact destroy. Either way the Romans gained control. At Masada in A.D. 74, Santosuosso describes the Roman policy regarding insurgents, "The Romans had to destroy Masada as a lesson to every corner of the Empire: Resistance to the legions meant inevitable destruction."⁶¹ After battle, compliance was expected but not guaranteed. The problem of the gap between the 'aim' and the 'object' confronts the Romans as it confronted the Athenians. This was especially true in regions such as the forests of Germany, the vast plains of the Ukraine, and the deserts of North Africa and Arabia where the terrain and ways of life provide little in the way of suitable targets.⁶² The Romans when confronted with an inability to find a suitable 'aim' to force compliance moved their force directly at the 'object.' Rome's enemies therefore would endure a war of extermination in the absence of a Roman traditional fixed military 'aim', as the poor Nasamones found out.

These Roman and Athenian examples demonstrate what the oldest of Western military traditions did to bridge a gap between a war's 'aim' and 'object.' Western standards would not tolerate this kind of bridging today. The Athenians and the Romans methodically went about the business of bridging this gap with violence upon populations without military protection. Additionally, these examples demonstrate that coercion continued beyond the attainment of the 'aim' and in fact would increase its intensity as required until reaching the 'object.' Just as counterinsurgency⁶³ theories declare the population as the center of gravity so it has always been.⁶⁴ Both the Athenians and Romans seek compliance from the population through coercion.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 45.

⁶¹ Antonio Santosuosso, *Storming the Heavens: Soldiers, Emperors, and Civilians in the Roman Empire* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 148.
<http://books.google.com/books?id=aUhAKdntYuMC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Santosuosso,+Antonio.&cd=2#v=onepage&q&f=false> (accessed 18 September 2010).

⁶² Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, 46.

⁶³ U.S Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010). JP 1-02 defines counterinsurgency as:

The Romans can also provide an example in which the ‘aim’ and ‘object’ occupy the same location in both time and space. Rome’s wars with Carthage during the Third Punic War consisted of an ‘object’ and an ‘aim’ placed directly on top of each other.

Fear of a rising Carthage led to a desire among some of the Roman elite to permanently destroy Carthage. Cato, a member of the Roman Senate would end most of his speeches, no matter the subject, with a variation of “Carthage must be destroyed.”⁶⁵ Within this political atmosphere, a Roman ally attacked Carthage. Staying within the confines of a treaty with Rome from the end of the Second Punic War, Carthage sought redress and arbitration from Rome. Rome did nothing to sort out their ally, the Numidians, who had attacked Carthaginian territory. Carthage then prepared an army and entered into conflict with the Numidians. Making war on a Roman ally was a break in the treaty with Rome. Using this pretext, the Roman senate sent a punitive military force to Carthage. In the face of this punitive force, Carthage made major concessions to Rome to avoid punishment. Even after these major concessions, Carthage learned of the harsh declaration of the Roman Senate. The declaration declared the ‘object’ of the coming war. The Roman senate announced, “That Carthage must be destroyed, but that the inhabitants might build a new city provided it was located ten miles from the coast.”⁶⁶ For a port city reliant on sea trade, the offer to move the city inland had no effect. This declaration resulted in instant preparations for war, as the true ‘object’ of Rome was now clear. The senate’s announcement of the ‘object’ also made the ‘aim’ of the military operations quite clear. In this case, both were the same making the job of the Roman commander quite easy. There was no ambiguity when designing his campaign to support the political objective. Carthage also sealed their fate when barring the gates of the city. Although two years were to pass before the final reckoning, Roman law stated that the moment a Legion’s battering ram bounced off an enemy wall they could expect no mercy at the end.⁶⁷

“Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. Also called COIN.”

⁶⁴ For modern doctrine on the centrality of the population in COIN see: Department of the Army, FM 23-4, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington D.C.: 15December2006) chapter 5.

⁶⁵ Robert F. Pinnell, *History of Rome from the Earliest Times down to 476 A.D.* (1890, repr., Middlesey U.K.: Echo Library, 2006), 53.
<http://books.google.com/books?id=CKmrBYNNfJ8C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>
(accessed 18 September 2010)

⁶⁶ R. Bosworth Smith, *Epochs of Ancient History, Rome and Carthage: The Punic Wars*, 5th ed. (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1887), 236.
http://books.google.com/books?id=ecEVAAYAAJ&pg=PA236&dq=That+Carthage+must+be+destroyed,+but+that+the+inhabitants+might+build+a+new+city+provided+it+was+located+ten+miles+from+the+coast&hl=en&ei=YB6VTK_nJK8sAOgqs3kCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9&ved=0CEwQ6AEwCDgK#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed 18 Septmeber 2010)

⁶⁷ Adrian Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army* (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd, 2003), 197.

When examining the Greeks and the Romans it becomes clear that gaps between the ‘aim’ and the ‘object’ existed. What is different from our post-1945 experience is that it was merely a problem for the ancients rather than the near dilemma the West faces today. If a gap existed, the Romans and Greeks would carry on with the same coercive measures applied on the battlefield but now wielded against a defenseless enemy population. It simply was not an issue during the conduct of their wars. Victor David Hanson, the noted historian of ancient Greek warfare, notes the difference and its effects between the Greek and modern Western methods. The following are remarks in reference to a hypothetical improvised explosive device (IED) attack by an eight-year-old Iraqi boy on an American patrol and the likely American response. The response, according to Hanson, would most likely be nothing. Finding someone to punish, within the bounds of current Western warfare, is not likely. Hanson’s comments point to one of the core issues in our gap dilemma.

My query -- and I don't have the answer -- is are those laws of human nature, that whether we like it or not, the Iraqis and us both understand in our dark hearts that they exist, and that Iraqi won't push that button and blow up a humvee if he's scared to death that an American will blowup his house? We are not operating on that premise. This is what's very strange about this post-enlightenment, post-modern war. We'll see if we get an exemption from these age-old, primordial rules. I'm not sure we are.⁶⁸

U.S. Civil War

The case studies will now leave the ancients and the West’s earliest war making traditions. The U.S. Civil War marks the point at which American strength in population and industry facilitated the Jacksonian military concept to reach its full potential against other nation states. Previously the strength of the United States allowed for campaigns of annihilation against only American Indians. Increasing power gave Americans the notion that wars were for the “complete overthrow of the enemy.”⁶⁹

President Lincoln’s ‘object’ was to force the Confederate States back into the Union and by corollary the Southern people in order to reunite the country. Not unlike the Roman’s problem with the Numidians, the Union suffered from an ‘aim’ targeting problem. The South represented a vast territory that possessed no singular concentrated place of value representing its source of economic and political power. Richmond eventually came to symbolize such a place. It is doubtful though that early in the war its capture would have brought about Southern

⁶⁸ Victor David Hanson, interview by Harry Kreisler, *Conversations with History*, March 14th, 2006, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley
<http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people6/Hanson/hanson06-con3.html> (accessed August 11th, 2010)

⁶⁹ Weigley, *The American Way of War*, xxi.

capitulation.⁷⁰ Like Napoleon's experience in Moscow, the North would not have found victory through occupation of the enemy's capital. Weigley describes a "dearth of strategically decisive points" in the South.⁷¹

Unlike the Athenians and Romans, the Armies of the North could not simply put civilians to the sword in order to control the populace. Overwhelming occupations forces would require massive amounts of manpower that was unlikely to materialize. Northern strategists had to defeat an opposing military and control a rebellious population. From the start, a significant gap existed between the 'aim' and 'object.' The ancients would have moved instantly to fill a gap with violence against a populace to achieve control. As will be shown in this case study, Northern leadership was slow to implement just such a policy but eventually did.

The American population had many examples of how to conduct a war. Wars that stood out and influenced this generation were the Napoleonic Wars, the Mexican-American War, and the American Revolution. The influence drew upon glorious battles or, saying it another way, those activities that achieved the military 'aim'. Battles like Yorktown, Austerlitz, and Buena Vista awed the population and military practitioners alike. With a focus on the 'aim', Northern leadership expected to keep the Southern population free from the depredations of war. Mistakenly, early Northern hopes placed both the 'aim' and the 'object' together within a decisive battle. After the failure at the Battle of Bull Run, it soon became apparent that a single decisive blow could not achieve both. Soft policies toward the rebellious Southern population envisaged facilitation of their eventual political reintegration. This soft policy toward the Southern population could only work if the population stayed on the sidelines of the conflict and if the war remained a short affair requiring low amounts of resources.⁷²

The North won battles but the resiliency of the South precluded the decisive battle as a vehicle to end the war. This pushed the Union to pursue an attrition war at great cost.⁷³ This attritional war involving just the militaries eventually gave way to attritional war targeting civilians too. With an 'aim' targeting problem and a public growing tired of a lengthy and deadly war, the North moved away from applying force solely against the military 'aim' and moved to apply force directly at the people representing the 'object.' The most famous of the harsh practitioners of war is General William T. Sherman but he did not start out as a harsh practitioner.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 96.

⁷¹ Ibid., 92.

⁷² Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 20-22.

⁷³ 'War of attrition' is not an official term in U.S. military joint doctrine. The author's definition is derived from the Encarta Dictionary description of the word 'attrition.' Definition number three is particular apt, "weakening by persistent attack: the gradual wearing away of morale and the powers of resistance by persistent attacks."

After the battle of Bull Run, Sherman discovered that his men participated in relatively innocuous destruction of civilian property. Discovery of these acts set him off as he angrily described his men as “goths and vandals” that endangered the Northern cause.⁷⁴ Later, Sherman nearly killed Union Soldiers while raging against the theft of civilian horses and a carriage. The offending Soldiers were forced to hitch the carriage to themselves and pull it back to the owner nearly two miles away.⁷⁵ By 1864-1865, the intense desire to end the war pushed Grant to implement strategy beyond the ‘aim’ and directly target the ‘object.’ Grant would use a once reluctant Sherman as his sickle to devastate the interior of the South.

When Grant gained the command of all the Union Armies, he began to implement a strategy of attrition to exhaust the Confederates. Grant surmised the occupation of the enemy’s country impossible on the grounds of vulnerable logistic lines and massive manpower requirements. Furthermore, annihilation of the Southern armies so far had proved nearly impossible and costly. Grant looked elsewhere to apply pressure to the South. Keeping the example of the Vicksburg campaign in mind, Grant decided the best strategy was to destroy the war resources of the enemy, including agricultural resources, to exhaust the South.⁷⁶

This policy now went out in orders to the army. Grant instructed Sheridan to make the breadbasket of the South, the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia, a wasteland.⁷⁷ To Sherman he gave guidance that would develop into the famous ‘March to the Sea’. The final Northern campaigns and the most devastating to the South attacked not military ‘aims’ but civilians whose forced reintegration remained the ‘object’. Sherman’s campaign through Georgia and the Carolinas provides the example of how attacking the ‘object’ occurred in the mid 19th century United States.

The majority of any nation’s population does not reside in its military forces. Therefore, the horrible effects of warfare do not directly effect to the population from distant battlefields. Battlefields matter only when they effect or influence the population or are a stepping-stone to eventual influence on the population. Preceding the famous march Sherman conducted a series of battles and maneuvers “managed with the most consummate skill” against the Confederate army led by first Johnston and later Hood.⁷⁸ The success of the Atlanta campaign removed any serious obstacle to Sherman’s direct attack of the ‘object’.

General Tecumseh Sherman’s famous march to the sea, started with the burning of Atlanta. General Sherman summed up the practicality of why he was going to burn Atlanta. Essentially, it would materially help conclude the war no matter the short-term suffering. Sherman accepted that the result would justify the ways and did not shirk from the task. Below is

⁷⁴ Ibid., 62-63.

⁷⁵ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 96.

⁷⁶ Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, *How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War*, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 492.

⁷⁷ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 175.

⁷⁸ Ulysses S. Grant, *Memoirs and Selected Letters*, 10th prnt. (New York, Literary Classics of the United States, 1990), 503.

a portion of his response to the Atlanta local government who had pleaded for mercy upon learning of General Sherman's plans. It signifies his and the Union's shift from a conciliatory to a coercive policy regarding the Southern civilian populace in order to bridge the gap between the 'aim' and the 'object.'

You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices today than any of you to secure peace.⁷⁹

General Sherman goes on to implement a policy referred to today as today as 'scorched earth'. Below is an excerpt of his orders to subordinates on the conduct of the campaign while on the march from Atlanta to Savannah.

To army corps commanders alone is entrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc., and for them this general principle is laid down: In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless according to the measure of such hostility.⁸⁰

By the end of the march, General Sherman's Union Army had ripped the heart out of the confederacy not by defeat of rebel armies but by visiting an elevated level of suffering to the Southern population. Indirectly, Sherman's march cut Lee's army off from their major sources of supply and hastened the end. General Grant states the "march through Georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that State, and had completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of it."⁸¹ Confederate President Davis made a somewhat subdued remark about the effects on the people of the south but poignant nonetheless. "Sherman's campaign has produced bad effect on our people. Success against his future operations is needed to reanimate public confidence."⁸² Recent history paints Generals Sherman and Grant as early

⁷⁹ William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman*, (1875; repr., New York: Da Capo Press, 1984) 126.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 175.

⁸¹ Grant, *Memoirs and Selected Letters*, 671-672.

⁸² Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won*, 655.

practitioners of 'total war'.⁸³ General William T. Sherman's conduct of the campaign in his army's 'march to the sea' is not novel, and certainly not the first campaign designed to break civilian will. Before this, 'total war'⁸⁴ or violence directed specifically at the enemy population, had been the norm not the exception since at least the days of the ancient Greeks and Romans. In the case of the U.S. Civil War, the technique of the Roman and Greek sword remained sheathed but the sickle caused hunger and misery. General Sherman's conduct is not an aberration but indeed a validation of centuries of a style of warfare proven to bridge the gap between the military 'aim' and 'object.'

Korean War

The Korean War marks a watershed in American military tradition. Korea became an important example, arguably the first, of limited war. Coming hard on the heels of unconditional surrender in World War II it left a bitter taste in many Americans mouths. Additionally, it was the first extended large scale conflict fought without a declaration of war by the Congress.⁸⁵ For those who fought it, with the recent perspective of World War II fresh in their minds, the war aims and objectives were immensely frustrating. The tradition established and maintained by Jackson, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Pershing, and Eisenhower that called for unconditional surrender and complete victory ended in 1953. Many Korean War histories reflect this frustration and confusion in titles such as *The Wrong War*; *War in Peace*; *Korea: The First War We Lost*; *Korean War: Uncertain Victory*; *The Korean War: No Victors No Vanquished*. Ferhenbach gives his classic work the title *This Kind of War* to emphasize this war was different from others. The difference being that it was the first limited war in modern times conducted by the United States.⁸⁶

The advent of the Cold War brought on the limited nature of the Korean War. The environment of the Cold War cast a long shadow in which fear of escalation was paramount. General war between the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union required caution. Reviewing the Korean War illustrates that the advent of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the conduct of war from a World War II style to limited war in a span of under five years. Indeed

⁸³ Joseph L Harsh, "Battlesword and Rapier: Clausewitz, Jomini, and the American Civil War," in *Military Affairs*, Vol 38. No. 4 (December 1974), 133-138. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1986536> (accessed 8 October 2010)

⁸⁴ *The United States Air Force Dictionary* (1956) defines Total War as, "a war in which the total military, economic, political, and social resources of a contesting nation are utilized, or potentially utilized, affecting directly all its inhabitants." According to Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military Terms (1989,1994), the term Total War is "not to be used. See general war." Reference to Total War does not appear in the 2008 edition.

⁸⁵ J. Lawton Collins, preface to *War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969).

⁸⁶ Collins, *War in Peacetime*, 382.

the key leaders in the Korea War were the same as the ones that lead World War II. The figures of MacArthur and Truman demonstrate the how two schools of thought dealt with this changed condition.

The effect of nuclear weapons ironically would change the attitude of Truman regarding pursuit ultimate victory. President Truman gave the order for the most incredible display of the Jacksonian military tradition by vaporizing Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic weapons. Confronted with war in Korea only five years later, Truman unashamedly scaled back the ends of the Korean War and limited the ways and means of achieving them. Limited war in Korea also allowed for the buildup of forces in Western Europe against the formidable Soviet threat.⁸⁷ When North Korea invaded South Korea, in the summer of 1950, Truman again defaulted to a traditionally Jacksonian response, committing American troops to the Korean peninsula. Following Chinese intervention, however, the President found himself facing the prospects of a wider war, as advocated by GEN MacArthur, or acceptance of a limitation on the war and its aim and object.⁸⁸

GEN McArthur famously griped about the limitations on his ways and means, especially regarding the military action within China proper, which ultimately led to his relief. GEN McArthur became a victim of and symbol against the new paradigm that constrained American warfare.⁸⁹ Gen McArthur continued to advocate for total victory as opposed to limited objectives as late as a 1962 West Point speech in which he espouses the typically Jacksonian view that there can be no substitute for victory.⁹⁰ MacArthur too was quite aware of the overarching conditions confronting his president but considered them in a wholly different light. “President Truman was left with the simple conclusion that MacArthur was ready to risk general war. The President was not.”⁹¹

Once the maneuver war settled into positional war, the forward line of troops along the 38th parallel literally represented the military ‘aim’. For both sides in the Korean War this ‘aim’ could go no further and relied on other elements of national power to reach the ‘object.’ The result of the Korean War produced frustration but it still achieve the original ‘object’ of American policy. That the American Army did not have to deal with an insurgency in South Korea made defining achievement of the ‘aim’ and ‘object’ easily definable and measurable. Defined physically, the war’s ‘object’ and ‘aim’ centered along the 38th parallel.

⁸⁷ David Halberstam, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War* (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 93.

⁸⁸ Alonzo L. Hamby, *Man of the People: a life of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 551-553.

⁸⁹ Robert M. Citino, *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 118.

⁹⁰ Bevin Alexander, *Korea: The First War We Lost* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1986), 409.

⁹¹ James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction the First Year* (Washington D.C.: Center for Military History, 1992), 321.

This Korean War tension within the civilian-military structure marks the beginning of the ever-growing gap between the 'aim' and 'object' of war. In the case of the Korea War, the onset of the gap resulted in the fear of catastrophic escalation within the atomic strategic environment. Limited wars rationality, in light of the destructive power nuclear weapons, did not make the conduct of the war and the ultimate result any easier to accept for Soldiers and the American public. This gap would continue to grow during the Vietnam War. The return to alignment between 'aim' and 'object' would not return until Desert Shield/Storm

Vietnam

On June 7, 1819, the U.S. brig *Franklin* anchored off the coast of Vietnam then called Cochinchina. Lieutenant John White commanded the ship. The *Franklin* was only the second American ship to visit Cochinchina but the first military. Lieutenant White makes no mention as to his mission and purpose in Cochinchina throughout his book, *A History of a Voyage to the China Sea*. It appears from his activities that he had a commercial purpose but why a naval officer was given such a mission is not entirely clear. White's account of Cochinchina does make clear that he did not like it there and eventually left in frustration. White warns others away in describing a difficult political situation within which to conduct business.⁹² Not unlike the first U.S. military mission in Vietnam, approximately 150 years later another U.S. military mission would also end in frustration.

H.R. McMaster, while studying the large volume of works and records from the Vietnam War stated "the why and how of direct U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War remains unclear."⁹³ This lack of clarity in 1819 and all of the 1960s and early 1970s resulted in military and political failure.

What was the 'object' of the Vietnam War expressed by the President? On July 28, 1965, President Johnson held a news conference to inform the American public about his decision to increase military forces in Vietnam. The American public may not have realized it at the time but this speech represents when the U.S. fully committed itself to war in Vietnam. During the speech in the East Room President Johnson answered the question of "what are our goals in that war-strained land? First, we intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power."⁹⁴ Later, the President outlined his subsequent goal. "Second, once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable."⁹⁵

The first thing that is explicit in his first goal is the initiative belongs to the enemy. Within the 'object' statement, the President's achievement of his goal is dependent on whether the enemy decides if "we cannot be defeated." In a hearing before Congress in 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, answers a question from Senator Aiken that demonstrates where the initiative lies. The question dealt with how many men were needed in Vietnam insinuating that the level of North Vietnamese infiltration would determine our troop levels. In response, Secretary Rusk

⁹² Robert Hopkins Miller, *The United States and Vietnam 1787-1941* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1990), 6-13.

⁹³ McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, xiii.

⁹⁴ Lyndon B. Johnson, The Presidents News Conference- July 28th, 1965. The American Presidency Project <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27116> (accessed August 26th, 2010)

⁹⁵ Ibid.

explains, “Well, it is almost in the nature of aggression, Senator that the initiative lies with the aggressor (N Vietnam).”⁹⁶ Ceding the initiative to the enemy, even during guerilla war, is not a fact of history except for the losers of guerilla war.

The U.S. decided to fight a defensive war in which the enemy decided when the war would cease. Nothing physical is related to the ‘object.’ The ‘object’ of the war is psychological in nature. We cannot measure someone else’s, especially the enemy leadership’s, psychological state. Therefore, it becomes impossible to measure success. This lack of a physical measure leads to protracted war as the goliath flounders while looking for an elusive ‘object’ that does not exist.

The second goal is worse yet. In it, the President admits, “a violent solution is impossible.” Before the buildup of American military forces in Vietnam, the President announces that using violence is an unviable option. Why send military forces when you deem their success as not possible? Many of the generals in the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not have agreed with the second goal. The second goal portend the subsequent half measures of the Vietnam War.

GEN Taylor, acting as a principal military and political advisor to President Johnson as the Ambassador to Vietnam, discusses before congress the ‘object’ and the ‘aim’ in Vietnam on February 17, 1965. GEN Taylor’s testimonial gives detail to the Administration’s policy. GEN Taylor states, “Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack.”⁹⁷ He further identifies a sub-objective, which is to make Communists ‘wars of liberation’ too costly and prove their ultimate failure.⁹⁸ While this is a better statement of the ‘object’ than President Johnson gave in the East Room, his further discussion of the ‘aim’ is less than convincing.

GEN Taylor discusses the military ‘aims’ that support the stated political objectives in the same meeting. Of the two purely military portions of Taylor’s four point strategy the first is to improve the effectiveness of U.S. and South Vietnamese military operations against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army. This is to enable the protection of the South Vietnamese people against enemy forces threatening them. The use of airpower is another line of effort with three sub-aims. Of the three airpower sub-aims, two sought psychological effects and one sought to interdict infiltration of men and supplies into S. Vietnam. The infiltration aim was already beginning to yield low results other than making it more painful on North Vietnam. The psychological ‘aims’ looked to increase the moral of the South Vietnamese by directly attacking the North and remind Hanoi that they will pay and increasingly high price for supporting insurgency.⁹⁹

In summary of the strategy, GEN Taylor told Congress that the whole point was to seek an honorable *negotiated* settlement. He pointed out that everything related to the war in Vietnam

⁹⁶ *The Vietnam Hearings* (New York: Random House, 1966), 29-30.

⁹⁷ *The Vietnam Hearings*, 168.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 168-169.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 172-176.

was limited to included objectives, targets, weapons, forces employed, and geographic scope.¹⁰⁰ Everything about the Vietnam War violated the Jacksonian military tradition. Many of the senators present asked questions about victory. GEN Taylor repeatedly pointed out that victory in the traditional “Appomattox” sense was not the ‘object.’¹⁰¹

This anti-Jacksonian limited war had occurred in Korea so the U.S. military was not completely new to the concept. GEN Douglas MacArthur was the first casualty of refusing the limited war concept. His downfall heralded the beginning of working within the limited war U.S. construct.¹⁰² This construct, predicated on the threat of nuclear escalation, grew more confusing to senior U.S. military officers whose defining professional experience was World War 2. Vietnam brought this limited war dilemma to the forefront and exposed its weakness within the American system.

Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp’s book *Strategy for Defeat* contains a specific argument on the use and utility of military force during the Vietnam War. Admiral Sharp was the chief operational commander of the Vietnam War as the Pacific Commander from 1964 to 1968. Throughout the book, Admiral Sharp’s outlook is consistent as to the central problem of the Vietnam War. The problem was gradualism and equivocation in the prosecution of the war. His concluding chapter sums up this outlook when he states “Our carrot and stick strategy (more carrot than stick!) was an attempt to adopt a new, more cost-effective, more humane strategy of convincing an enemy that aggression does not pay.” He goes to state: “The application of military, war making power is an ugly thing – stark, harsh and demanding – and it cannot be made nicer by pussy-footing around with it.”¹⁰³ These statements are akin to statements made by General Sherman before he burned down Atlanta during the Civil War. They reflect an attitude about American military power and its use that advocates an all or nothing/maximum effort approach to war. Admiral Sharp and those who agree with him abhor limited measures even though they understand the concept of limited war at the political level.

The following statements show the Admiral’s frustration with the conduct of the Vietnam War.

The aims or objectives of an international political strategy may quite reasonably and legitimately be limited, as were ours in Vietnam, but the actual application of military force required to achieve those aims cannot and must not be tactically limited...Once the decision has been made to wage war, that leadership (civilian) must permit the war to be engaged expeditiously and full bore, not halfway. The marine who steps on a land mine that was not interdicted at the enemy’s supply port does not die halfway. And the pilot hit

¹⁰⁰ *The Vietnam Hearings*, 177.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 191.

¹⁰² Citino, *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm*, 118.

¹⁰³ U.S. Grant Sharp, *Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect*, (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1978), 269

by a surface-to-air missile whose site he was not permitted to bomb does not fall halfway out of the sky or spend seven years as a limited prisoner of war.”¹⁰⁴

Here we can see that tension that will always exist in an American limited war scenario. Fred Ikle points out that those tensions tend to balance out the escalation. The enemy may escalate also in response. The government fears a widening of the war that could spiral out of control. The public may react negatively to the escalation, as more burdens require bearing.¹⁰⁵ “It is these opposed effects of escalation that make it so hard to plan for limited wars and to terminate them.”¹⁰⁶ Admiral Sharp argues directly for employment of coercive force for the imposition of our will. Sharp refuses limited application of force in limited war or any war.

It is clear that the limited nature of the Vietnam War from the American side caused an ‘aim’ targeting problem. Where the Romans would have selected to attack something of great value to force battle, within the self-imposed limitation the U.S. could not find that target. Where the Athenians confronted a recalcitrant people they moved to wholesale slaughter and enslavement, the U.S. could only bomb with no lasting effect. Where Sherman moved to bring misery upon the South through hunger and cut off the supplies to Lee, the U.S. in Vietnam debated the closing of Haiphong harbor through mines or blockade. Where the Romans refused Jewish insurgents respite in their safe haven at Masada, the U.S. suffered, till to late, the Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries. All the traditional ways of direct or even indirect coercive operational approaches were unavailable or restricted. Hence, when the newly installed Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, in March 1968 grilled the Joint Chiefs on the military’s strategic plan he became increasingly frustrated. Finally, he asked the bottom line question directly to the chiefs asking for the victory plan. The Chiefs responded with “there is no plan.”¹⁰⁷

Thus, with the above JCS statement the ‘object’ may have been set but no solid ‘aim’ for the military force existed that could support it. Frustratingly, for leaders like Admiral Sharp, the perception that the ‘means’ and ways’ existed but where held back; which caused the ends to fall completely out of alignment with the other two elements of strategy.

In comparison to Desert Storm and the Falklands War, Vietnam displays many opposite conditions required for victory in limited war. Vietnam was not isolatable. The conflict, as perceived by the U.S. political leadership had the potential for massive escalation. The American public was unable to discern the war’s primary motivation. There was no fear of Vietnam as a direct threat to the United States. Sacrifice in Vietnam for our national interest increasingly became a harder sell, especially as the cost continued to rise. The military ‘aim’ was not physical

¹⁰⁴ Sharp, *Strategy for Defeat*, 270.

¹⁰⁵ Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 40.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁰⁷ Phillip B. Davidson, *Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975* (Novato, CA: Presido Press, 1988), 514.

and therefore immeasurable. Coercion against North Vietnam never approached the level required to produce compliance. The hope to convince the North Vietnamese to negotiate let the initiative reside with the enemy. The attrition strategy assumed that the North was fighting a limited war also never to realize that the 'object' of North Vietnam was total requiring the complete overthrow of Republic of South Vietnam.

The Falklands War

On April 2, 1982, Argentinean military forces invaded the British Falkland Islands. These islands are located east of the Argentinean mainland. Argentina had claimed ownership of the islands although the first record of anyone being there was Captain John Strong in 1690. During his short stay, Captain Strong noted its excellent harbors, fresh water, and lots of edible bird life. Prior to leaving, he charted the sound between the two main islands and named them after Lord Falkland, the First Lord of the Admiralty. Argentina traced ownership back through the Spanish claim formalized in the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713.¹⁰⁸

The 1713 treaty formally entrusted the Falklands to Spain, but first France and soon after Britain established small outposts on the islands. Over the better part of a century a series of events and conflicting claims of ownership involving the British, Spanish, Americans and French resulted in the continuous rule of Britain since 1833. The details of these events and claims is beyond the scope of this paper but in April 1982 the Union Jack was flying above the Falklands and the people who lived there wanted to remain British citizens.¹⁰⁹

The claims and counter-claims between the Argentineans and British intensified in the early 1980s resulting in the April 2 invasion. By the April 3, the British government understood that Prime Minister Thatcher's 'object' was clear when she stated, "to see the islands returned to British administration."¹¹⁰ With this clear 'object' in mind Admiral Woodward, commander of the task force, began to contemplate his military 'aims.'

Reflecting on all the factors influencing his war plans, Admiral Woodward impressed upon his immediate superior, Admiral Fieldhouse, the tight window of opportunity to conduct a feasible operation. It was imperative that Fieldhouse convey to the policy makers this primary consideration "To eject the Argentinians by force, we must be on the edge of the Exclusion Zone by 1 May."¹¹¹ The above statement reveals the military 'aim' as envisioned by the task force commander. Woodward's 'aim' clearly supports Mrs. Thatcher's 'object.'

¹⁰⁸ Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1983), 1-2.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 80.

¹¹¹ Sandy Woodward, *One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 93.

On 5 April, Admiral Woodward called together his staff to discuss the plan of what to do to support Mrs. Thatcher's stated 'object.' While trying to formulate his plans he asked a series of questions to himself and his staff to set the agenda for the campaign's design. The questions involved use of Special Forces, Argentinean order of battle, mines, airfield usage, and the route to the Falklands, etc.¹¹² In reviewing his questions there are none that go beyond the scope of military action. Absent are the political and civil considerations so common in Iraq and Afghanistan campaign designs. Admiral Woodward's lack of non-military considerations is not an oversight. What it demonstrates is the effect close alignment of 'aim' and 'object' has upon a commander's campaign design. Simply stating a clear 'aim' and 'object' does not in and of itself reduce the gap to negligible distances. Conditions surrounding the war facilitated the ease in which the 'aim' uncovered the 'object.'

Key conditions, for the British, described in the following paragraphs show how an aligned British 'aim' and 'object' coupled with nearly ideal conditions produced such clear cut success. Most significantly, both belligerents did not deem the war existential. This fact prevented an escalation beyond the limited goals of both parties. The Falklands War was clearly a limited war with limited ends, ways, and means.¹¹³

Of the three motivations described by Thucydides, Britain fought mainly for honor.¹¹⁴ Honor being the one motivation that a public can easily identify with and support. The British public was supportive of the naval task force but hesitant about the potential loss of life relative to the true value of the Falkland Islands. This was despite the hawkish headlines produced by the British press.¹¹⁵ Additionally, the island population's identity was British and they wished to remain British.¹¹⁶ This precluded any potential for costly and lengthy delay in achieving the 'object' because of insurgency.

The Falklands War remained localized to the islands themselves. War would not carry itself to the Argentinean and British main lands. Fundamentally, the issue was a territorial dispute that gave the conflict a physical nature. Victory's definition therefore lent itself to the easily identifiable goal of possession or occupation of land.

The British owned the means required to retake the islands, albeit not in abundance. The ways in which Operation Corporate, the military designation of the campaign, would employ were definitely in doubt. Britain had reduced her expeditionary capabilities. Additionally, as expressed by Admiral Woodward, an expeditionary mentality had faded during the Cold War and in the aftermath of the Suez debacle. The British military concentrated on anti-submarine warfare

¹¹² Ibid., 77-78.

¹¹³ Daniel K. Gibran, *The Falklands War: Britain versus the Past in the South Atlantic*, (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Co., 1998), 53.

¹¹⁴ Gibran, *The Falklands War*, 74.

¹¹⁵ Hastings and Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*, 135-137.

¹¹⁶ Lawrence Freedman, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: Volume II War and Diplomacy*, (London: Routledge, 2005), 19.

in the North Atlantic and its continental European commitments.¹¹⁷ Three Commando Brigade's commander during the conflict, now Major General Thompson, confirms Admiral Woodward's thoughts when he describes, "the low esteem in which amphibious operations were held by the MoD in general and the RN in particular."¹¹⁸ The British difficulty with ways and means coupled with time, distance, and weather considerations made the difference between British victory or defeat "a bit of a close call."¹¹⁹

That the British won on a slim margin is not necessarily important but that they believed in the eventual outcome is poignant. The clear and supporting relationship between the 'aim' and the 'object' provided British military leaders exceptional focus. This focus allowed them to make efficient use of the limited resources and capability. This is especially important when reflecting on just how much the eventual outcome was in doubt. Admiral Woodward lists the organizations who told him the operation was doomed. The list included the United States Navy, the Ministry of Defense, the British Army, the Royal Air Force, and the Secretary of State for Defence.¹²⁰ When fighting against these types of odds clarity of mission and purpose is essential.

The Falklands War provides an example of alignment in both 'aim' and 'object.' The relationship between the two minimized the gap to a point where achievement of the 'aim' uncovered the 'object' rapidly. British forces would not have to bridge a gap with violence against the population or overwhelming occupation forces. The 'aim' of "ejecting the Argentinians by force" would near simultaneously cause the return of the islands to British administration, the stated 'object.' All British military in the campaign from private to general and seaman to admiral, could easily link the combat to the strategic objectives.

Desert Storm

The United States fought Desert Storm with a clear 'aim' and 'object' as discussed on the first page of this monograph. The U.S. senior military leadership at the time were nearly all veterans of the Vietnam War. That war's unhappy experience caused GEN Powell to seek clear guidance from policy makers. To review, the 'aim' as told by GEN Powell was to destroy the Iraqi Army to achieve the 'object.' The 'object' being the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi control.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ Sir John Woodward, introduction to *The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the Future*, eds., Stephen Badsey, Rob Havers, and Mark Grove, (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 1-2.

¹¹⁸ Julian Thompson, "Force Projection and the Falklands Conflict," in *The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the Future*, eds., Stephen Badsey, Rob Havers, and Mark Grove, (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 83.

¹¹⁹ Woodward, *One Hundred Days*, xvii.

¹²⁰ Ibid., xvii.

¹²¹ Gordon and Trainor, *The General's War*, 416.

History records the liberation of Kuwait and a clear defeat of the Iraqi Army. Unfortunately, much of Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard divisions managed, although badly bludgeoned, to escape back into Iraq.¹²² The escape of the Republican Guard helped enable the Saddam regime to retain power and suppress Shia and Kurdish insurgencies. This point and the specific conditions of the wars termination remain contentious. In a rare juxtaposition, it would seem that the securing of the 'object' had come before the attainment of the stated 'aim'. This produced a disconnect between the field commanders and policy makers in Washington. Washington could clearly see that the Iraqi Army was moving out of Kuwait and commanders in the field knew that destruction of the Iraqi Army was not yet complete.¹²³

Ending the war at its 100th hour and without the complete destruction of the Iraqi military, in particular the Republican Guard divisions had long lasting effects. Additionally, the haste in which the war ended left the specifics of war termination negotiations in doubt. GEN Schwarzkopf entered the negotiation tent in the Iraqi town of Safwan unaware, unconcerned, and uninstructed about the larger implications beyond cease-fire agreements. The agreements with Iraq undermined the incredibly strong position the coalition had earned during the war.¹²⁴

One argument concerning the war's termination believes it amounted to an overall loss or at least a huge missed opportunity. Indeed, the Fouad Ajami, in the Wall Street Journal, recently insinuated, at the close of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and the beginning of OPERATION NEW DAWN (OND), that not going to Baghdad in 1991 led to 9/11 and OIF.¹²⁵ Gen Powell acknowledges this tension but maintains that the war accomplished its political objectives as defined by President Bush. Furthermore, the dismembering of Iraq from a geopolitical and coalition partner standpoint was undesirable. This logic emerged from the standpoint of who would restrain Iran with Iraq gone.¹²⁶

GEN Schwarzkopf also defends not going to Baghdad by pointing out the U.N. resolutions did not authorize it. GEN Schwarzkopf also points out that the coalition most assuredly would have fallen apart with a drive on Baghdad. All the Arab coalition members refused to operate in Iraq, restricting themselves to Kuwait only.¹²⁷

The counter-factual argument of what might have happened does not change the fact that the objective of liberating Kuwait occurred. This happened in spite of the fact that the full

¹²² Stephen A. Bourque, *Jayhawk!: The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, Dept. of the Army, 2002), 458.

¹²³ Gordon and Trainor, *The General's War*, 419-420.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 444.

¹²⁵ Fouad Ajami, "The Guns of August, 1990," *The Wall Street Journal*, August 23, 2010. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703589404575417820146420794.html> (accessed 17 September 2010)

¹²⁶ Powell, *My American Journey*, 527.

¹²⁷ H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take A Hero: The Autobiography* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 578-580.

military 'aim' remained only partially realized. Had President Bush allowed the offensive to continue for another 24 hours, the destruction of the Republican Guard's heavy equipment would have been nearly total.¹²⁸ Clearly, the complete achievement of the 'aim' was only 24 hours away if not for an expedient political decision.

Desert Storm had a clear, unambiguous, and aligned 'aim' and 'object.' Possession of a well thought out 'aim' and 'object' does not alone produce victory. Like the British in the Falklands War, the coalition required conditions that facilitated achievement of the 'aim' and 'object.'

First among the considerations was the limited nature of the war. This limited nature restricted the coalition from expanding the war beyond its capabilities for rapid and successful termination of the war. It seems that at least GEN Schwarzkopf and most likely President Bush understood moving the 'object' to the complete overthrow of Iraqi entailed huge costs. Unknowingly forecasting the future in 1992, GEN Schwarzkopf writes,

I am certain that had we taken all of Iraq, we would have been like the dinosaur in the tar pit – we would still be there, and we, not the United Nations, would be bearing the cost of the occupation. This is a burden I am sure the beleaguered American taxpayer would not have been happy to take on.¹²⁹

Holding the line on 'mission creep' firmly fixed the 'object' and minimized the potential for a gap to develop.

The United States fought based on interest. While not as powerful as fighting for honor, clearly the public and the world did not want a near monopoly of Middle Eastern oil controlled by Saddam Hussein. This interest motivation led to a strange coalition that included Arabs and Westerners, Christians and Muslims and in the case of Syria the inclusion a state normally regarded as an international pariah. This war had domestic as well as international support.

The Gulf War was the first U.S. post-Cold War conflict. The timing occurred when the constraints of the superpower confrontation had disappeared. This removed the threat of an escalation into a wider war and kept the conflict localized to the Middle East.

The United States clearly possessed the means to execute the offensive portion of the conflict. This was due in part to a reduction of worldwide responsibilities concurrent with the end of the Cold War. Units normally reserved for war in Germany against the Soviets deployed to the Persian Gulf demonstrating the effect of the end of the Cold War. GEN Powell, as previously discussed, insisted on a definitive 'object' to plan against. Armed with this defined 'object' GEN Powell along with GEN Schwarzkopf could align ways and means to secure the ends desired.

Mercifully, the ground battlefield that was the Gulf War was largely devoid of civilians. This allowed for the full application of lethal weapon systems without concern for massive

¹²⁸ Ibid., 546.

¹²⁹ Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take A Hero*, 579.

amounts of collateral damage. The press largely ignored potentially damaging civilian casualty reporting as the government stressed themes such as ‘smart bombs’, oil fires, scud missiles, and American technology.¹³⁰ Saddam graciously presented himself to the Western public as a near Hitler like figure and a truly dangerous enemy.¹³¹

Kuwaitis looked upon the conflict a true liberation. The coalition forces were ejecting a regime that had brutalized them. Since Kuwaitis viewed the conflict as legitimate, the potential for an insurgency was almost zero. Kuwait, once liberated, would regain its original government. This precluded the United States and its partners from the duties of civil administration therefore enabling a quick exit free of major reconstruction and stabilization tasks. There was no need for huge occupation forces or violence upon civilians to produce compliance. Those that needed coercion had got the message and moved out to Iraq.

Victory in 1991, like the Falklands War, defined itself through the accomplishment of a physical act. Ejecting the Iraqi Army from the territory of Kuwait provided an easily quantified measurement of success. Either the Iraqis were there or they were not. Coalition claims to military victory were unambiguous and easily proved. Political victory rapidly followed military victory. ‘Aim’ and ‘object’ achievement occurred simultaneously as soon as the last Iraqi unit left Kuwait or died within it.

Desert Storm and the Falklands War provide examples of how a clearly defined ‘object’ supported by an unambiguous and measurable ‘aim’ can produce victory. These victories in Kuwait and the South Atlantic also possessed common pre-existing conditions, which materially contributed to success. The two conflict’s outcomes swim against a recent historical current flowing in the opposite direction. This current has within it conflicts that forecasted huge gaps between the ‘aim’ and ‘object.’

¹³⁰ Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, “News Coverage of the Gulf Crises and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing,” in *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, ed. W. Lance Bennett and David L Paletz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 184.

¹³¹ David L. Paletz, “Just Deserts?” in *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, ed. W. Lance Bennett and David L Paletz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 289.

Humane War and the Era of Persistent Conflict

The overarching limitation and unavoidable consideration during the Cold War was the threat of catastrophic nuclear war. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a nuclear limitation on Western nations has thankfully withdrawn into the background of strategy. While the nuclear limitation receded, an old form of limitation, previously disregarded upon commencement of war, began to realize greater effectiveness. The Western way of war is now limited not by horrific nuclear weapons but by humanitarian and moral considerations. Indeed, as Western liberalism diverges from the traditional Western way of war some hypothesize, “the western way of war has run its course.”¹³²

General William Wallace states the operational environment of persistent conflict will be fought increasingly ‘among the people.’¹³³ War among the people means, to this author, counterinsurgency. Others call it ‘wars for empire’ or ‘small wars’. Whatever its name, it usually involves fighting an indigenous insurgency. Decisive victory is rare in any insurgency even if preceded by convincing conventional battlefield wins. Insurgencies, wars for empire, small wars, and war among the people usually devolve into a war of attrition.¹³⁴

There can be little doubt that the European wars of empire were overall successful. These wars established European political dominance over most of the world with the British Empire being the most successful. Quotes from military leaders of that colonial era sound as if an ancient Athenian or Roman could just as easily speak them. Russian General Ermolov, governor of Georgia and the Caucasus, justified his harshness “One execution saves hundreds of Russians from destruction and thousands of Muslims from treason”¹³⁵ French leaders of the colonial period believed that leniency would only encourage more rebellion, since the native population would attribute it as weakness.¹³⁶ This type of attritional warfare post-conventional battle can be termed barbarism. Jeffrey Record points out that: “Reliance on barbarism to suppress rebellion has been common to imperial states from the Roman Empire through the Third Reich, and even democratic

¹³² Andrew Bacevich, 2010. The End of (Military) History? The United States, Israel, and the Failure of the Western Way of War, *The Huffington Post.com*, July 29. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-bacevich/the-end-of-military-history_b_663548.html (accessed September 24, 2010)

¹³³ Department of the Army, Foreword by GEN William S. Wallace, in FM 3-0, *Operations*, Washington, D.C., 27 February 2008

¹³⁴ Douglas Porch, *Wars of Empire* (2000; repr., London: Smithsonian Books, 2006), 103. Porch states, “Decisive military engagements were rare in colonial combat. Prolonged periods of irregular warfare, sequences of indecisive skirmishes, might follow even the most ostensibly impressive battlefield victory. In these conditions, even the best commanders fell back on attrition strategies to bring the enemy to heel, but only at the price of incredible hardship.”

¹³⁵ Aleksei Ermolov quoted in Douglas Porch, *Wars of Empire* (2000; repr., London: Smithsonian Books, 2006), 103-104.

¹³⁶ Porch, *Wars of Empire*, 104-105.

states have employed at least some elements of the strategy.”¹³⁷ Brutal attrition warfare of the kind traditionally practiced against insurgencies is not politically palatable in the West now. This comes at a time when U.S. military leaders perceive fighting insurgency as the likely operational environment.

Ikle’s preface to *Every War Must End* reads like the Powell Doctrine. The lessons are gleamed from the Vietnam War. Ikle’s disagrees with the notion that massive use of force early on in the war would have ended the conflict “quickly and favorably.”¹³⁸ He instead cites the misuse of military force not the level of the military force used as the cause of the Vietnam debacle. Mr. Ikle’s invokes three key lessons on the employment of American military force. The first lesson: do not commit force unless there is a clear military strategy. The second lesson: American forces should not conduct demonstration strategies commonly understood today as “show of force”. The example given is the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon. The third lesson: a strategy of punishment will not work to change the behavior of an adversary. Ikle’s premise against the punishment strategy is that most enemies of the United States do not care about the punishment inflicted on their people, infrastructure, or society.¹³⁹

Gil Merom describes the dilemma of the West when fighting insurgency: “democracies fail in small wars because they find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can secure victory.”¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, insurgents see the democratic weakness to conduct war among the people or small wars. Insurgents account for that weakness and design strategies to exploit it.¹⁴¹ These strategies have been the bane of Western democracy starting with Vietnam and continuing into the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. For good reasons Western societies have aspired to become more humane and those aspirations have made warfare especially insurgency exceedingly difficult.

The difficulties of the era of ‘Persistent conflict’ are a perfect fit for the concepts found in *The Utility of Force* by General Rupert Smith. Smith explains the foundation of the problem concerning the use of force in the West. He explains that the discourse about the use of force is not about its utility but rather its morality and legality. The actual utility of force has a core reality and that reality is that it provides security and defense.¹⁴² General Smith’s argument on the use of force relates to the theme of Coker’s *Humane War* book. Smith states: “This obscuring and misunderstanding (*of the utility of force*) is equally true of the politicians who seek to both deploy

¹³⁷ Record, *Beating Goliath*, 11.

¹³⁸ Ikle, *Every War Must End*, ix

¹³⁹ Ibid., x-xi.

¹⁴⁰ Gil Merom, *How democracies lose small wars: state, society, and the failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15.

¹⁴¹ Record, *Beating Goliath*, 19.

¹⁴² Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: the Art of War in the Modern World* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 11.

and employ military forces for humanitarian and policing purposes for which they are neither trained nor intended.”¹⁴³ Smith goes on to state that “Military force does not have an absolute utility, other than its basic purposes of killing and destroying.”¹⁴⁴ Smith describes the industrial state war paradigm as the basis of the West’s construction of military forces to this day. Within that paradigm, the state would attack the individual citizen because the individual was subordinated to the state in support of national war aims and goals. Today’s dissonance of the utility of our industrial based military is on the inability to allow ourselves to attack individual people located within an enemy society. General Smith clearly falls into the camp that massive force used against civilians is counterproductive. He states, “In other words, given our changed strategic interests and the Geneva Conventions, it is no longer feasible or legitimate to unleash force on civilians.”¹⁴⁵

Christopher Coker, a British professor in International Relations at the London School of Economics, has written a book, *Humane War*, on the changing Western view of war. Coker examines NATO war making, especially in Bosnia, Serbia, and Kosovo. His thesis is the West is attempting to change the nature of war. Coker states: “For the western powers have engaged in a real, if possibly unrealistic, attempt to transform not only the character of war, but also its nature.”¹⁴⁶ Coker points out the attempted transformation started in the Gulf War of 1990-1991. The Gulf War marked the first war in which the West prosecuted a humane war but, only for its own soldiers. The U.S. lost 270 people total where as the Iraqis lost anywhere between 50,000 to 250,000 depending on whose statistics, you want to believe. The point being that the Western powers still waged war inhumanely on the enemy soldiers. The NATO war against Serbia marks the first conflict in which the West looked to wage humane war for both the enemy and our own soldiers and aviators. During the air campaign, the largest in Europe since World War II, one Western pilot died along with 1400 civilians and 400 Serbian military.¹⁴⁷ Interestingly Coker points out that while NATO was waging a humane war via precision bombing the Serbians were waging a ruthless ethnic cleansing campaign.¹⁴⁸

Humane war seeks to avoid the true nature of war. Martin Van Creveld states: “In any war, the readiness to suffer and die, as well as to kill, represents the single most important factor. Take it away, and even the most numerous, best organized, best trained, best-equipped army in the world will turn out to be a brittle instrument. This applies to all wars regardless of time, place and circumstance.”¹⁴⁹

¹⁴³ Ibid., 12.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 20.

¹⁴⁵ Smith, *The Utility of Force*, 381.

¹⁴⁶ Coker, *Humane Warfare*, 12.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 13.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 14-15.

¹⁴⁹ Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 160.

Relieving human suffering is always admirable but its cumulative effect on the ‘utility of force’ for Western powers is negative. Wars do not effectively end with the conclusion of traditional or conventional military operations. For the fighting to end and political advantages gained, an idea in the minds of the enemy must exist. That idea is the threat of continued violence from the military victor. The war truly ends and the spoils collected when the enemy society realizes, in the words of General Sherman, that continued fighting is “terrible beyond endurance.”¹⁵⁰ The victor must suppress the urge of the population for ‘primordial violence’ by clearly communicating an unambiguous threat. Resistance occurs when the violence of the battlefield has failed to convince the enemy population or segments of the population that they cannot ‘endure.’ War ends when the enemy society or those that can control that society decide that the price of continued resistance is futile.

The defeat of the enemy’s military force has exposed the society to this latent but yet leashed coercive power.¹⁵¹ Decision points for both the military victor and the now exposed society begin an intricate dance of credibility, will, defiance, and bluff. The exposed society must now decide to resist or submit. The military victor must decide whether to initiate coercive military power on civilian targets and objectives. Pre-1945, militarily defeated societies made the decision to resist at their extreme peril. The military victor took the view that applying coercion to civilians was legitimate response to a society’s decision to continue resisting.

The United States in its most recent wars displays confusion about what to do next after conventional combat operations are over. The ‘shock and awe’ of military operations against enemy conventional forces or irregular forces that stand and fight results in a hugely lopsided U.S. victory. The deployment and employment of force is sufficient to achieve Clausewitz’s ‘aim’ to render our enemy militarily defenseless¹⁵². Unfortunately, the United States’ enemies have learned that our ability to execute the second phase of a conflict is deficient. This deficiency is now become an historical pattern since 1945 and adversaries of the U.S. are adapting to this fact. The deficiency resides in the inability to communicate credible threats to the enemy population. The enemy perceives our weakness to carry on with the second phase and is willing to accept the violence of the battlefield because he knows that violence will not exceed his ability to endure.

¹⁵⁰ Henry Hitchcock, *Marching with Sherman: Passages from the Letters and Campaign Diaries of Henry Hitchcock, Major and Assistant Adjutant General of Volunteers, November 1864-May 1865*, ed. M.A. DeWolfe Howe (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 35.

¹⁵¹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 30.

¹⁵² Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.

Conclusion

This monograph identified the reason gaps exist between the military ‘aim’ and the political ‘object’ of modern Western warfare. The monograph has also shown the extreme difficulty of conducting a war without a clear articulation of the ‘object,’ leaving adrift the development of a supporting ‘aim.’ Without this clear articulation, the basic elements of strategy, ends-ways-means, will fall out of alignment. While the means may exist, the ways they are used does not make use of their full potential. Furthermore, this paper attempts to show what limits filling that gap. Gaps between ‘aim’ and ‘object’ have existed throughout history. Traditionally, as demonstrated by the Athenians and the Romans, extreme ways of utilizing means bridged the gap with draconian violence or huge occupation forces or both. The West now refuses the traditional ways to successfully bridge the gap, which results in protracted inconclusive conflict. Those tools used by the Athenians, Romans, and President Truman at the end of World War II are by and large unavailable to a Western militaries based on decreased manpower resources and moral limitations.

Delayed defeat of an army using a poorly constructed strategy through operational and tactical brilliance only masks the inevitable. Once embarked on, a bad strategy’s redeeming feature is a rare major course correction. Like Napoleon, men tend to plow forward only to be frustrated when they enter a proverbial empty Moscow. Empty and eventually burning Moscow represents an ‘aim’ devoid of value in spite of battles won and a campaign arrived at the terminus of its line of operation. When pursuit of decisive battle occurs without consideration of the strategic environment, the distance between ‘aim’ and ‘object’ begins its inevitable divergence in even greater proportions.

Well known historical examples of delayed strategic defeat abound and those who misread the historical precedence before them repeat those disasters. Repetition of the King of Sweden, Charles XII’s, terrible 1708-09 campaign disaster in Russia repeats with Napoleon, which repeats again with Hitler.¹⁵³ Over and over the quest for battle as the decisive element of war facilitates strategic blunders or disasters such as those recorded in the case studies.

Battles and campaigns are not what secure victory; they are only an enabler, albeit a key enabler. In describing the requirements for decisive battle, Brian Bond states a key factor is “the willingness of the vanquished to accept the verdict of battle.”¹⁵⁴ The end of the battle or campaign represents only the end of the first phase of war. In some wars, the next phase is nearly imperceptible as the ‘object’ aligns directly with the ‘aim’. In other wars, achievement of the ‘aim’ reveals a vast chasm to cross before the ‘object’ is secure.

The Hoplite farmer of ancient Greece did not take his war beyond phase one in order to prevent a catastrophic disruption to farming and civil life. Both sides of the clash agreed to this

¹⁵³ Russell F. Weigley, *Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 110-115.

¹⁵⁴ Brian Bond, *The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 61.

limitation. Hanson refers to this as “obedience to decision of the battlefield dead.”¹⁵⁵ Keegan explains the ancients limiting war to the battlefield as an adherence to ritual. This ritual, understood and accepted by all, proscribed and limited the violence.¹⁵⁶ In ancient Greece, battle did prove decisive as long as the belligerents agreed to the outcome. This seeking of battle would be the primary focus of Western militaries and remains the focus in our modern era. Inevitably, even in ancient Greece itself, disobedience to the battlefield dead and disregard for ritual would force actions to achieve the desired ‘object’ beyond the battlefield’s scope.

The Athenians and later the Romans provide the extreme example when a losing side disregards the battlefield decision. On the island of Melos and inside the walls of Carthage near ‘absolute war’ reigned, as the total overthrow and destruction of the enemy society became the ‘aim’ and ‘object’ of war. These are rare cases in history but we should keep these examples of near ‘absolute war’ always in mind. Clausewitz demands that the theory of war “has the duty to give priority to the absolute form of war and to make that form a general point of reference.”¹⁵⁷ Clausewitz points out that his description of absolute war is only theory. If his absolute war theory was indeed reality then there would be no need for the concept of ‘aim’ and ‘object’ as the two would always be the exact same thing. The gap between the two could not exist because they are one. Clausewitz holds fast to his absolute war as only theory and acknowledges reality. Absolute war as a theory has a corollary that absolute victory is also only theory. Therefore, absolute victory is indeed as rare as absolute war. That reality, minus the Third Punic War and few others, is that war is limited and so are the victories they produce. It is in this reality of limits that our gap emerges. It is as if the ‘aim’ moves away from the ‘object’ the moment the first limit appears. Determining the final distance between the two depends on the amount and vigor of the limits. Short of absolute war, battles and campaigns cannot secure the ‘object’ they only secure the supporting ‘aim.’ Conceptually, the goal then is to place the ‘aim’ as close as possible to the ‘object’ in order to reduce the distance between the two.

The key to placing our ‘aim’ as close to the ‘object’ then is to recognize what limits us from designing an ‘absolute war’ and back war planning off what Clausewitz’s ‘absolute’ theory demands. Those limitations in ends-ways-means must account for the particular conditions in which a war exists. Clausewitz describes how the morass of conditions retards the logic of ‘absolute war’. “Logic comes to a stop in this labyrinth.”¹⁵⁸ The case studies reviewed in this monograph point to the importance of the prevalent conditions in determining the length of the gap that must exist outside of ‘absolute war’.

¹⁵⁵ Hanson, *The Western Way of War*, 227.

¹⁵⁶ Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, 387.

¹⁵⁷ Clausewitz, *On War*, 581.

¹⁵⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 579.

The condition that facilitates successful American warfare is the ability to define the 'object' as physical in nature. This physicality provides a way to measure success and gives the military a definitive 'aim.' The U.S. Civil War demonstrates how a non-physical 'object' such as forcing the South back into the Union required more than just battlefield victories. Even if the U.S. Army vanquished the Confederate Army, that alone did not compel a rebel population back into the Union without going beyond battle. Federal commanders early in the war, including Sherman, demonstrated an apprehension to prosecute the second phase of war upon the Southern people directly or in other words to enter the gap. Only after years of battle with the resultant losses in lives and treasure did the North advocate a 'hard war' against the South. By the time of the 'march to the sea', Sherman had reduced the Southern armies before him to impotence. With the accomplishment of his 'aim,' Sherman was able to march virtually unopposed from Atlanta to Savannah.¹⁵⁹ The gap's size, based on a non-physical 'object,' required the military to bridge it with a commensurate level of direct violence on the population to force compliance. The early apprehension to enter the gap by the North demonstrates a humane response to the issue of violence against civilians in war. This apprehension slowly eroded in the West all the way through World War II, where direct attacks of civilians reached its highest point, symbolized by Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Modern total war brought us to the brink of 'absolute war.'

If World War II represents the closest the world had come to 'absolute war' since the Third Punic War, why did subsequent wars not continue on this same trajectory? After having reached the near pinnacle of 'absolute war' the world backed off and imposed limits. Fear of nuclear weapons provided the impetus to come back from the brink. Truman and his antagonist MacArthur have come to personify the debate between limited war and war pursued close to 'absolute war.' The search for a solution to the strategic problem of warfare in the nuclear age got its first test in Korea.

MacArthur could not back off from 'absolute war' theory because he felt it provided the solution to war. Ironically Truman, the author of the biggest 'absolute war' decision (use of atomic bombs), found the solutions in the limits placed on war. Korea's outcome was reprehensible to MacArthur and the Jacksonian tradition. Rather than absolute victory, Truman was satisfied with something less. Looking back sixty years and taking into account the subsequent wars fought we could label the outcome what Dr. Colin Gray calls a "strategic success."¹⁶⁰ World War II marks the high water mark of force utility for the United States. Korea marks the beginning of its slow decline. Vietnam demonstrates the utility of force at its lowest point.

¹⁵⁹ Hattaway and Jones, *How the North Won*, 649. Confederate General Bragg is quoted "I must candidly express my belief that no practicable combinations of my available men can avert disaster." Sherman called the Confederate defense of his march as "puerile."

¹⁶⁰ Colin S. Gray, *Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory*, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 10. Dr. Gray is attempting to define a victory on three different levels: decisive victory, strategic success, and strategic advantage. "These comprise a simple three-level view of relative military achievement." Recognizing the general impossibility of 'absolute victory', Dr. Gray gives us a way to define military success within a limited war context.

In Vietnam, the problem of force utility developed from a situation in which the ‘object’ sought was nearly impossible to operationalize in a limited war setting. Statements from national leadership laid out goals that gave the enemy the initiative. Goals like convincing the enemy we cannot be defeated and proving to the enemy that a violent solution is not possible made measuring success nearly impossible. This lack of a clear, measurable ‘object’ literally prevented development of a military ‘aim.’ Lacking a clear ‘object,’ adrift militarily with no discernable ‘aim,’ lacking the ability to tie success to something geographical or physical, and limited in means and especially ways the United States was doomed to failure. Indeed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted to Clark Clifford, newly appointed Secretary of Defense in 1968, that they did not even have a plan for victory.¹⁶¹ How could they, since the overall limited strategy could not possibly align ends-ways-means to produce any semblance of an internally consistent logic.

During the Falklands War and Desert Storm, the nuclear threat did not factor within the strategic context of both wars. The lack of nuclear fear gave both Britain and the United States more freedom of action in the design of their military campaigns. Additionally, the ‘object’ and ‘aim’ of both wars clearly spelled out. Most importantly, success in these wars had a geographic and physical nature. For both, the removal of an enemy military from a defined geographic area, in which the enemy was demonstrably foreign, would secure both the ‘aim’ and the ‘object’ near simultaneously. Thankfully, in both cases the near zero threat of insurgent activity precluded having to prosecute the second phase of war with violence directed at a civilian population. The limited political objectives in both wars suppressed escalation but did not impose significant restrictions on the use of force (minus nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) against the enemy military. The Falklands War and Desert Storm experienced almost perfect conditions inside the context of limited war. The British victory was complete.¹⁶² Stephan Melton’s analysis of Desert Storm claims, “Never in history had a battle been so lopsided.”¹⁶³

Interestingly, the political outcome of Desert Storm lacked completeness by many critics because of the survival of the Saddam regime. His survival in the face of such a clear military defeat indicates for some critics that President Bush threw away the military advantage gained. In stopping the war before the complete destruction of the Republican Guard divisions, President Bush enabled Saddam’s implements of repression to remain alive.

Desert Storm is famous for not only the lopsided victory but also the purposeful reduction of ‘collateral damage’ through the use of ‘smart’ or precision guided weapons. The final hours of Desert Storm dramatically show the rise of humane war limitations degrading the utility of force. Bond argues, “that President Bush called a sudden halt to the pursuit precisely because Western liberal consciences were offended by what was becoming a massacre of the beaten army - the

¹⁶¹ Davidson, *Vietnam at War*, 514.

¹⁶² Bond, *The Pursuit of Victory*, 192.

¹⁶³ Stephen L. Melton, *The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward)*, (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009), 112.

‘turkey shoot’ on the Basra road.”¹⁶⁴ Colin Powell describes part of President Bush’s humanitarian decision to end Desert Storm. President Bush stated, “We are starting to pick up some undesirable public and political baggage with all those scenes of carnage. You say we’ve accomplished the mission. Why not end it?”¹⁶⁵ Desert Storm represents the end of the nuclear limitation and the beginning of overarching humane limitations on Western war.

It is now time to apply the findings in the case studies to the present operational environment (OE) generally referred to as the era of “persistent conflict.”¹⁶⁶ The salient points of the referenced conflicts demonstrate the absolute requirement of careful consideration of both the ‘aim’ and the ‘object.’ Short of ‘absolute war’ a gap is guaranteed to exist between the two. Determining a relative conceptual distance will inform leaders whether they will have the political will to span the gap. In a country such as the United States that espouses liberal democratic values, the ways in which the gap is traditionally bridged are generally not available. Western leaders must understand the apprehension in entering the gap has grown over time to reach portions that are constraining the utility of military force within the conditions of persistent conflict.¹⁶⁷

The case studies show that since World War II, Western military power does not perform well in situations in which a physical/geographic ‘aim’ is missing. Iraq and Afghanistan after the initial invasions caused an extreme targeting problem for a military culture organized to ‘aim’ directly at another organized military and smash it. Liberal democracy does well in the first phase of any war. Should disobedience to the decision of the battlefield occur the problems of the gap become an immediate dilemma.

Western liberal democracies can fight and win a ‘war among the people’ but if appropriate levels of coercion are not available then overwhelming amounts of manpower to utterly control a populace are required. Doctrine found in the current U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual use manpower ratios ranging from 20 to 25 counterinsurgents per 1000 residents. The manual admits that the ratios required is difficult to determine but 20 to 1000 should be considered a minimum requirement.¹⁶⁸ In a country such as Iraq with a population of 28,945,567 people a 20 to 1000 ratio produces a manpower requirement of 578, 911 counterinsurgents.¹⁶⁹ The U.S. Army’s authorized endstrength for FY2011 is 547,400 Soldiers.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁴ Bond, *The Pursuit of Victory*, 196.

¹⁶⁵ Powell, *My American Journey*, 521.

¹⁶⁶ Department of the Army, Foreword by GEN William S. Wallace, in FM 3-0, *Operations*, Washington, D.C., 27 February 2008.

¹⁶⁷ Smith, *The Utility of Force*, 11

¹⁶⁸ Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington D.C.: 15 December 2006), para 1-67.

¹⁶⁹ CIA World Factbook, based on a July 2010 estimate.

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html> (accessed September 17th, 2010)

The entire active U.S. Army would not be enough to conduct counterinsurgency at the minimum manpower requirements in Iraq as expressed in doctrine. Successful counterinsurgency is not impossible. Waging counterinsurgency in places like Grenada or individual islands in the Philippines is quite possible in terms of the ratio described above. What is important is the size of the society and access to manpower be it ours or indigenous. It is unlikely that indigenous manpower will accommodate our needs in the critical early stages after achieving the 'aim'. The above 'manpower math' must receive consideration if the conditions predict the possibility of insurgency.

¹⁷⁰2010 U.S. Army posture statement, https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_armyposturestatement/2010/addenda/Addendum_D-The%20Fiscal%20Year%202011%20Presidents%20Budget.asp (accessed September 17th, 2010)

Recommendation

Since most wars are not 'absolute' we know that wars will have limitations. With limitations comes a guarantee of gap between the 'aim' and the 'object.' When considering war, policy makers should design a political 'object' that facilitates the development of a military 'aim' in which both are attained in close proximity to each other in time and space. If civilian and military planners determine that the enemy society or portions of it will disobey the decision of the battlefield then a war among the people is likely. Knowing a Western liberal democracy's weaknesses, namely the inability to raise the violence to appropriate levels and lack of a massive pool of available military manpower, policy makers should refuse war. If refusing war is not an option, then modification of the 'object' must occur until ends-ways-means fall into an alignment appropriate to the accepted risk level. To do anything less will place the country in a long, ambiguous, indecisive, costly and potentially lost war before the shooting even starts. In doing the above, policy makers can create conditions where Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines at the lowest levels understand how the combat connects directly to the strategic objectives.

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