

THE POLITICS OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS: COALITION
BUILDING IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

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General Studies

by
MARIO FERLAND, MAJOR, CANADIAN FORCES
B.S., University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, 2004

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Mario Ferland

Thesis Title: The Politics of Military Interventions: Coalition Building in the Post Cold War Era

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Nicholas H. Riegg, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Michael Berry, M.S.

_____, Member
Matthew T. Fuhrer, M.A.

Accepted this 10th day of December 2010 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

THE POLITICS OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS: COALITION BUILDING IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA, by Major Mario Ferland, 92 pages.

This thesis explores a possible model to help predict the participation of countries in coalitions aimed at military interventions. The model is composed of six factors drawn from modern political science and international relations theories, as well as recognized states responsibilities. The six factors are: legitimacy, national interests, capabilities, internal political context, international responsibility, and public opinion.

This model is assessed against five modern democratic states and their participation in three different conflicts of the past 20 years. The decisions to participate, or not, in the interventions in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and the second War in Iraq are evaluated through the model from the perspective of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, and Australia. The assessment recognizes that each of the factors is often perceived differently by each of the countries of interest. By acknowledging the different perceptions of each country, the model acquires more precision in assessing and predicting decisions.

The model works reasonably well in explaining and predicting why specific countries decided to participate in military interventions, but its subjective quality may lack the consistency required for wider application. It successfully predicted participation when all six factors were positive. In the end, this model has demonstrated that, at least for the five countries studied, the decision to participate in a coalition aimed at military intervention remains a complex political decision, centered on the specific country's unique perception of its own advantages and interests within the international system.

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ACRONYMS

ANZUS	Australian, New-Zealand and United States alliance
GDP	Gross Domestic Products
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In responding to situations requiring a multinational response, nations pick and choose if, when and where they will expend their national blood and treasure. Nations also choose the manner and extent of their foreign involvement for reasons both known and unknown to other nations. The only constant is that a decision to “join in” is, in every case, a calculated political decision by each potential member of a coalition or alliance.

— Department of Defense
Joint Publication 3-16, *Multinational Operation*

Western Democratic States and Their Taste for Intervention

Over the last 20 years, conflicts have arisen all around the earth and have required leading nations to intervene militarily in order to limit their spread or even to re-establish the international security environment. The preferred method of military intervention employed during this period has been through the formation of coalitions. These partnerships have often drawn their legitimacy from United Nation Security Council resolutions, recognized international alliances or even through likeminded national understandings of the requirement to act.

Primary Research Question

The purpose of this paper was to identify recurring factors that influence decision making. More specifically, can recurring factors be used to develop a model to better understand modern western democratic countries’ decision to participate as part of a coalition in future military interventions? In order to answer this question, a detailed analysis of six factors relevant to the political decision making processes of five modern western democratic states was conducted over three different conflicts or military

interventions that have occurred in the past 20 years. The five countries that have been analyzed were the following: the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, Canada and Australia. Their stated reasons, when available, to participate or not to partake in the following three conflicts have helped to identify convergent and divergent factors: the former Republic of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and the second Iraq war.

The identification of recurrent critical factors in the decision of different states to participate in coalitions should provide a level of understanding in the relevant powers that are at play when the time comes to decide to take part in a military intervention. As critical factors are likely to be qualitative, once identified, can they be weighted to provide greater clarity or quantifiable operators for a working model? A further issue for the development of a working model would be the exceptions; these particular values that impose themselves and render most of the other factors irrelevant.

Secondary Research Questions

From there, a logical secondary inquiry inevitably occurs. Knowing that democratic governments are easily swayed by public opinion in their decision making, does the individual political self interests of the leaders, the public opinion or the media trump the objective consideration of national interest when the country is requested to commit troops? The answer to this question should also shed light on a further important aspect. Understanding the vulnerability of democratic government leaders when it comes to winning elections and maintaining power; perception of illegitimate actions by the population or the media may force decisions that are not necessarily the best course of action. It may also introduce further considerations in the decision making process. This

is why legitimacy must be addressed as its own factor in this research. Is legitimacy of the particular intervention absolutely necessary?

In the three conflicts, once the legitimacy of each military intervention was established, the leading members of the coalitions gathered support from other nations and secured their participation in the endeavor. The reasons to participate greatly varied for each contributor nation, but regardless of the diversity of their self-interests, a sense of common responsibility towards the establishment of global security appeared to have been present. While appreciating the engagement towards the common good, one cannot fail to wonder about its origin and true purpose. Benevolence has never really been a catalyst for action when sons and daughters shed their blood on the battlefield. On the other hand, it may also be argued that the continued involvement of leading western powers in Iraq and Afghanistan is no longer motivated by self-interest but by a sentiment of international responsibility.

What, then, truly motivates modern democratic states to participate in military interventions where they do not necessarily foresee a tangible and palpable advantage? What factors other than self-interest are at play in the decision making process of these states when it comes to commitment in military interventions? Identification of some of these factors may provide the foundation for building a model to explain the dynamics of national decision making.

Leading nations or international institutions may be able to employ this model in their own decision making process when contemplating the formation of a coalition for a given military intervention. They could use it to assess the possibilities of building the coalition and how to convince each of its prospective partners to participate in its

undertakings. They could also use it to develop courses of actions, before engaging possible partners, focused on ensuring that the perceptions towards the proposed intervention would be assessed as positive.

Military Interventions after the Cold War

Since the end of the Cold War military forces have been deployed to provide humanitarian assistance, stability and security, to impose or maintain cease fires between antagonists, cause regime changes, or to assist in disarmament and reintegration of guerrilla style soldiers after political solutions have been reached. Military forces have frequently been employed to impose or enforce the will of international organizations like the UN on belligerent states. The first Iraq war and the Yugoslavia intervention are examples of this concept. Furthermore, soldiers also deploy for counter insurgency operations in failed or weak states, usually at the request of their destitute governments, to help with the establishment of the security conditions that are intended to lead to the establishment of the rule of law and prosperity.

Although not new, these multiple types of intervention can be differentiated from Cold War procedures because the purpose of intervening is no longer oriented towards the struggle between democracy and communism. It could be argued that the purposes have evolved. They have shifted from an ideological power struggle towards international security building. Although this shift of purpose sounds noble in intent, the actual physical labor of intervening in conflicts remains brutish and bloody. Soldiers are still the ultimate instrument for imposing national will. Deciding on their commitment to conflicts thus remains one of the most important considerations for any government.

The implications of decisions to go to war or fight are always deeply felt by the political elites of every nation. Politicians from modern democratic states are probably the most vulnerable when they elect to participate in these wars away from home. Opposition parties, the media and the internal population may galvanize into a resentful resilience and cost them their positions. Yet, even though sometimes unpopular, commitment of troops abroad remains frequent. The risk-analysis process of the political elites appears to be able to reach a sort of consensus between tolerability and responsibility. If this truly is a process, then defining a model may be possible.

Significance

Unlike conventional theories of international relations (realism, constructivism and liberalism) which focus on the product of relations between states, striving to explain the broad if complex interactions between nations, this research was concentrated uniquely on the political, decision-making processes within nations when they were considering military interventions as part of coalitions. Its significance is twofold; first, by analyzing the fundamental reasons why the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada and Australia have decided to participate or not to participate in the three conflicts identified above, a better understanding of the dynamics has emerged. From this better understanding, commonalities among the dominant factors were discovered the proposed model was developed. The second reason why this research is important is that if a model can be developed and functions properly, it can then be utilized either to predict or (for the lead nation) to promote future participation of countries in coalitions for military interventions. And the broader the array of partners and the deeper the resources, the stronger will be the courses of actions that can be developed.

The understanding of the political processes that lead to the commitment of forces in a conflict will enable better strategic assessment in the future and it may ultimately provide a new tool in conflict avoidance. Knowing where to pressure a system is often as important as physical action. The simple fact of having better tools to solicit or garner support may act as deterrence on would be antagonists.

Assumptions

Global peace will probably not be achieved in the next few years. Regional instability fueled by small conflicts is likely to continue to develop in many places on earth. Leading nations of the world will continue to be depended upon to intervene militarily in a number of these probable future conflicts. The acknowledged modern western democratic states' preferred method of intervention will likely remain to be as a partner of a legitimate international coalition. Thus, military coalition building should continue to be an important aspect of international relations for the foreseeable future.

Definitions of Key Terms

The following terms were used throughout this research paper and it is important that they be defined in the manner that they were employed:

Mature Democratic state: Mature democratic states are Western style democratic countries that have relatively high per capita Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) and are stable and functional.

Military intervention: For the purpose of this research, military intervention was defined as the deployment of combat-ready units to participate in a conflict, including the main types of intervention like stability operations, security sector reform, the imposition

or maintenance of cease fires between antagonists, the defense of international treaties, the UN sanctioned regime changes, or to assist in disarmament and reintegration of guerrilla style soldiers after political solutions have been reached.

Limitations

Given the limited time available to conduct this research and the immense amount of information available on conflicts in the last 20 years, limitations are necessary. Only three conflicts were studied. They were the former Republic of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Within this field, only five countries have been analyzed; the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada, and Australia. Although this limited field of view was not encompassing of different regimes than western democracies, it is believed that the conclusions derived from this study were of a general enough nature to provide a basic understanding of the problem. It must also be understood that the five countries assessed have different parliamentary systems, different modes for distributing executive power, and differing decision making procedures for committing military resources.

The United States, with its very significant military forces, also has an influence on most of the decisions of other states when it comes to international relations. It is, however, more frequently the leader, rather than the “joiner” of coalitions so it was not selected as one of the countries of interest. Its influence in the decision making process of the five countries of interest however was considered throughout. This paper did not seek to explain how or why each war has begun but was an attempt to understand the dynamics of political decision making when a country is faced with the decision to join or refrain to participate in a coalition intended at military intervention.

Delimitations

This research was not undertaken to discover a new theory of international relations. It has remained strictly within the field of the limitations and has focused exclusively on the political decision making process, not the conflicts by themselves. It was not biased by the accomplishments of the units deployed or even the final results of particular military actions. Although the strategic desires or aims of each participating state were considered, the research itself did not dwell or attempt to reach conclusions on any specific conflicts outcomes or final dispositions.

In conclusion, the political decision to commit blood and treasure in a coalition determined on military intervention in a conflict represent a significant risk to political elites of western democracies. Their unrelenting willingness to continue to accept this risk, as demonstrated by the significant number of multinational interventions of the last 20 years, exemplifies the requirement for the development of a better understanding of the factors at play in the decision making process. It also demonstrates the need of the international system for improvement in security and stability matters. The simple fact that conflicts continue to occur and that interventions are still required to maintain peace and stability is in itself an acknowledgement of the importance of better understanding the factors contributing in coalition building and the buy-in of potential partners. This is where this research was most significant.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The development of this paper has required a fair understanding of the theories of international relations, the political systems of the specified countries as well as the media and debate surrounding the issues. In order to draw relevant conclusions, these have all been undertaken independently. The literature review also had to be divided into three different areas: international relations theories, the five countries' political debates in the three conflicts and, of course, the media discourse. This structured approach has been helpful in getting a better understanding of the theoretical framework for international relations and of the impact of popular opinion in relation to the countries' decision to participate or not.

International Relations

First, a very general review of the current theories of international relations is in order. Realism, liberalism and constructivism are the main focus of this first part but it is acknowledged that other theoretical frameworks may also have significant importance. In the sake of brevity however, they have not been overly defined within this paper. Numerous authors have written within the field of international relations and the literature is widely available. Although it may not be directly relevant to the limited scope of this research, understanding this field does provide tools to achieve a familiarity with coalition building and some principles affecting foreign policy formulation. It also helps in the assessment of the relative weight of international institutions in the determination of some of the factors, including the sources of legitimacy and it is

important for the development of the predicting model. Finally, a new concept developing in the last few years, “the responsibility to protect”¹ as explained in the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and further defined as “Responsible Sovereignty”² in Jones, Pascual, and Stedman will be introduced in the next chapter to emphasize the aspect of morality within the construct of today’s or tomorrow’s military intervention.

Realism

The school of Realism finds its roots in man’s struggle for survival. It argues that self interests is the driving factor in the development of conflicts and that power is the main tool of the states to ensure both their survival and future. While the school traces its origins to Thomas Hobbes in the 16th century, Hans Morgenthau was perhaps the leading proponent of realism in the second half of the 20th century.³ His convincing arguments have been embraced and further refined by multiple scholars. Among them, Kenneth Waltz advanced the theory to better explain the balance of power and bipolarity of the Cold War⁴ and its applicability in modern times. If the Realists are right, then “National Interests” and “Military Capabilities” should both be significant factors in the decision making process of countries when they are to engage in military interventions. For this reason, both of these factors were included in the model developed within this paper.

Liberalism

Liberalism, often dubbed as Idealism, traces its roots back to Rousseau. While liberal philosophy was fundamental to the establishment of democracy in the Western world, it had little impact on international relations until the founding of the international

court of justice in Hague in the late 19th century and the creation of the League of Nations after World War I. Its most famous proponent was Woodrow Wilson. Liberal concepts also were behind the foundation of the UN and its specialized agencies, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, but such concepts were not used much as a guide for bilateral relations among states until the 1950s. In 1955, Edward Hallett Carr began to apply liberal concepts to national foreign policy formulation, as a counter to Realism.⁵ Carr's arguments reinvigorated the school of Liberalism around three central ideas: (1) ideas have a power of their own which can contribute to peace; (2) as mankind progresses and societies become ever more civilized through the development of culture and ideas, the rending of war tends to become unbearable; and (3) interdependence within the international system has a diluting effect on the importance of "power politics" and generates a space for dialogue in the resolution of conflict without resorting to war.⁶ The Liberal school also acknowledges and emphasizes the importance of liberal economic practices within the international system. These economic practices are to strengthen cooperation and interdependence between states and render war this much more difficult to undertake.

From the Liberal school of thought, two factors appear to be relevant to this study. Since Liberalism recognizes cooperation between states as being a foundation for peace and stability in the world, it also advances the concept of interdependence. Through this concept, States have a level of responsibility in maintaining world order. Once a State enters international agreements and treaties, it accepts certain levels of responsibility in its actions. These responsibilities may be viewed as collective defense as shown in Chapter 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or even in article 51 of the

UN Charter. For these reasons, the first factor drawn from the school of Liberalism and added to the model was “international responsibility” because of adherence of nations to collective international institutions. The second factor extracted from the school of Liberalism was “Legitimacy.” Since the creation of the UN, it has become more and more accepted that one of the most legitimate form of coalition building would be through decisions and Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). For this reason, and understanding that the school of Liberalism is one of the founding forces in the institutionalization of the UN, it seemed appropriate to draw this factor from the Liberal theory.

Constructivism

The Constructivist approach to international relations is an outgrowth, extension or variation of Liberalism and emphasizes the importance of culture and ideas on the political agenda. It stresses the importance of identities within political systems and the power of socially constructed realities on the interplay among nations. Constructivists recognize both the self interest aspect of international relations as well as the importance of institutions in the international system and their effects on the development of states identities. They argue however that the definitions of interests are to be tempered by constructed realities and that the collective recognition of these new interests contributes to security. At the heart of their argument is the fact that within a culture, a unique perception of reality is constructed and it is this perceived reality which defines interests. Within western liberal democracies for example, there is a desire for peace, prosperity and good governance. Constructivist scholars argue in favor of dialogue, emphasizing

that through shared understanding of a situation, nations can better define what is right and find solutions to problems without necessarily resorting to the use of force.

Alexander Wendt explains that “State interests can be collectively transformed within an anarchic context by many factors--individual, domestic, systemic, or transnational--and as such are an important dependent variable.”⁷ If it is agreed that interests may be shaped by these other variables, each of these variables may express varying levels of power in the shaping of states relations with each other. They form the basis for the dialogue and help in shaping the discourse. Furthermore, they enhance the power of individuals and ideas in the determination of political decision within the states. For example, when polls are highly in favor of a course of action, political leaders often decide to embrace it, and by doing so, augment their popularity and strengthen their political position.

Within the international relations context, elected political leaders recognize the importance of satisfying their electorate when etching policies. They understand that a lack of internal support for foreign policy actions may spell vulnerability for their next election or even defeat within their specific parliamentary system. This understanding recognizes that sometimes, individuals’ ideas have the power to influence systems. In this regard, “public opinion” and “internal political context” have been added as factors to the model. The “public opinion” factor was selected because of its potential effect in the shaping of political decisions. The “internal political context” factor is meant to highlight the vulnerability of democratic governance to political forces, processes and ideas.

The internal politics of a Nation may determine various options for international policy making, especially for a minority government holding to power through a coalition

of parties or political maneuvering. The factors of “public opinion” and “internal political context” have the power to set the stage for the discourse of the state when confronted with a request to join a coalition. Within the constructivist approach, it is recognized that the power of ideas, opinions and discourses will largely shape decision making. These two factors were selected as part of the model because of their relative importance in the political analysis of state leaders, and their impact on the decision to participate in a coalition.

Popular Opinion

The main source of information used to get a general understanding of popular opinion about specific conflicts was media archives from each of the five countries and polls. The archives are available both on the web and at the library. Except in the case of Germany where only one news source could be consulted, two mainstream national newspapers have been selected for each of the five countries studied. The two newspapers selected for each of the countries were chosen for their opposing views of issues. Left and right of center leaning was one of the defining factors in their selection. For France and Canada, French language newspapers were selected to better understand the issues and limit the bias of translation to English. The selection of all the newspapers took into account the editorial political views and leaning as well as the seriousness and popular recognition of legitimate reporting.

The newspaper selected for each countries were as follow: for Australia: the Australian and The Age; for Canada: CTV, the Gazette and Le Devoir; for France: Le Point and L'Express; for the United Kingdom: The Guardian and the Telegraph; and finally for Germany: Spiegel. The main reason why there is only one newspaper accessed

for Germany is that the author does not speak German and that English publications are more limited and less available for German media than from the other countries studied.

This study also recognized, after much research in media sources, that the population of modern democratic states are usually well informed about the situation in conflict areas and that this understanding of issues offer political incentive to the Nation's leaders who are familiar with popular demands and peoples voices. Polls have consistently shown a fair level of situational awareness and some willingness from the political elite to listen and promote popular opinion on issues regarding intervention.

In conclusion, the perceptions of academics and policy makers as well as the internal workings of international relations have continued to steadily evolve since the end of the Cold War. The main schools of political thought persist in their search for a scientific approach to better understand world security issues.

The evolution of political thought has also demonstrated that a new consensus towards responsible governance is starting to emerge and that this new direction may influence future international organization. Both existing organizations and emerging ones appear to accept the precepts of responsible governance. This normative development, addressed in the next chapter, tends to suggests that the constructivist theory may provide light in the complex inter-relations between states, international organizations and citizenries. The next section of this paper will define the methodology that was employed for the research.

¹International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, <http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp> (accessed 12 November 2010).

²Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, and Stephen John Stedman, *Power and Responsibility: Building international Order in an era of Transnational Threats* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 9.

³Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973).

⁴Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

⁵Edward Hallet Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan Ltd., 1955).

⁶Richard K. Betts, *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, 3rd ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008), 120.

⁷Alexander Wendt, *Anarchy Is What States Make of It*, in Richard K. Betts, *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, 3rd ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008), 217.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS

Researchers in Political Science often use the past as a prologue. Over the last 20 years, military interventions have frequently taken the shape of coalitions aimed at resolving international issues challenging the security and stability of the international system. This thesis is an attempt to identify a simple model to predict the participation of countries in future coalitions or to help leading nations or organizations in their efforts to generate support for interventions in conflict areas. For this purposes, three significant interventions which have occurred since the end of the Cold War were studied in an attempt to identify some of the possible reasons why states have decided to participate in coalition efforts or simply declined the call for assistance.

This effort, aimed at identifying some of the forces at play when countries commit forces, could only be done by examining the recent events and then, subsequently compare these events with the known facts, decisions and actions undertaken by the selected countries. To facilitate this comparison, a simple model composed from six factors was designed and employed to structure the research.

This chapter explains the approach that has been undertaken for the analysis of the political decision making of the five selected countries for the three conflicts and identifies the main issues of the debate taking place within their specific political systems. It also introduces the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty¹ as well as the principle of “Responsible Governance” as exposed by Jones, Pascual and Stedman in their recent book “Power and Responsibility.”² These two analyses on responsibilities of the states when interventions are required in the post Cold

War era provide some perspective about the approach undertaken in the assessment of events and perceptions of responsibility in the views of the five countries. It also helps in understanding the definition of the six factors.

This chapter also defines the six specific factors selected for the model. It explains how they are contributing to decision making in order to provide a basis on which analysis can be conducted consistently for each one of them. Those six factors are discussed below, but they consist of legitimacy, national interests, capabilities, internal political context, international responsibility, and public opinion. Central to this research is an acknowledgement that the interpretation of each of the six factors does vary both from the perspective of the countries as well as from their perception of world events leading to the conflicts. This variation of perception was one of the most challenging aspects of this research since it has required the author to achieve a firm understanding of each country's perspective as well as their political and social realities during the time leading to the interventions. This is why each of the conflicts first had to be firmly grounded within their specific historical perspective of the time before being analyzed within the model.

Responsible Governance

Responsible governance is a fairly new approach to international relations. It has initially drawn its roots from the multiple failures of the international community to effectively intervene, after the Cold War, when challenges were posed to stability. The last ten years of the 20th century saw multiple conflicts erupting. Although some were between states, the vast majority of them were intra-state affairs concerning ethnic tensions, or the desire for self determination. Too often the conflicts degenerated into

genocide and ethnic cleansing. The United Nation's response to these multiple security challenges were often criticized as unsuccessful. The United Nation Security Council (UNSC) efforts to curtail security issues were often perceived as ineffective because of its five veto holding members' commitment to adhere to article 2 of the UN charter which prevents interventions within the internal affairs of states.³ It can be argued that this policy of non interference by the UNSC was one of the reasons that led to the unilateral NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999.

Although the intervention in Kosovo was justified by NATO as being mostly humanitarian in nature, it was not legitimized by the UNSC. Following this intervention, UN "Secretary-General Kofi Anan made compelling pleas to the international community to try to find, once and for all, a new consensus on how to approach these issues."⁴ These dramatic cases of internal security issues in countries like Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, and finally Kosovo, eventually led him, during his address to the 54th session of the UN General Assembly in September 1999 to "challenged the member states of the UN to find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defense of our common humanity."⁵ He further restated this challenge in his Millennium report to the General Assembly one year later, "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violations of human rights?"⁶ This second iteration of the request from the Secretary-General acted as a catalyst for the Canadian government reaction and, in "September 2000, the Government of Canada responded to the Secretary-General's challenge by announcing the establishment of the ICISS."⁷

The commission was composed of twelve distinguished commissioners from around the world, representing “an enormously diverse range of regional backgrounds, views and perspectives, and experiences, and eminently able to address the complex array of legal, moral, political and operational issues the commission had to confront.”⁸ Its mandate was to “build a broader understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and sovereignty”⁹ and “to try to develop a global political consensus on how to move from polemics--and often paralysis--towards action within the international system, particularly through the United Nations.”¹⁰

The main findings of the ICISS were that the UNSC should remain the only legitimate authority to authorize intervention for humanitarian reason within the borders of a state. The Commissioners also agreed, however, that authorization from the UNSC should always be sought prior to launching a military intervention and that the UNSC should deal promptly to requests from States to intervene in humanitarian conflicts.¹¹ The commission even went further by suggesting that each of the veto holding five permanent members of the UNSC “in matters where its vital national interests were not claimed to be involved, would not use its veto to obstruct the passage of what would otherwise be a majority resolution. The expression ‘constructive abstention’ has been used in this context in the past.”¹²

The ICISS thus recognized the requirement to sometimes promote international security and alleviate human suffering even within a sovereign nation’s border when gross violations of human rights and loss of lives occur in cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide. It also emphasizes that states have a responsibility of good governance within their border and responsible governance within the international community. Finally it

suggested a list of six criteria for Military interventions: “Right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.”¹³ These six criteria revolve around one of the main factors of the model being developed in this thesis, “legitimacy.” They will later help in shaping the definition of what is considered legitimate within the international relation framework when a coalition is being formed with the purpose of military intervention in a foreign State.

More recently, Jones, Pascual and Stedman also developed a compelling argument towards Responsible Governance. They are representative of scholars who wish to go beyond the usual framing of the liberal-realist debate and emphasize Responsible Governance. The formulation of their arguments has been informed by various conflicts in the late 20th century and early 21st. In their recently published book “Power and Responsibility,”¹⁴ they argue that “responsible sovereignty requires all states to be accountable for their actions that have impacts beyond their borders, and makes such reciprocity a core principle in restoring international order and for providing for the welfare of one’s own citizens.”¹⁵ In this case, states have a responsibility towards their own citizenships as well as the impact of their governance beyond their borders. The word sovereignty implies responsibility and states that do not govern responsibly warrant intervention from the international community.

Their argument also calls for a strengthening of the international system by the creation of a G16 type of organization that would include and acknowledge the emerging regional powers of South America, Asia and North Africa.¹⁶ This G16 would serve as a forum for discussion on security and economic issues and should eventually give rise to more regional organizations aimed at maintaining security.

They also recognize that “popular expectations about what international actors should do to stop civil violence have increased.”¹⁷ This expectation of results may even lead to pre-emptive actions legitimized by the UNSC to ensure that human security is not threatened.

From these two collaborative works on sovereign responsibility, the main themes of legitimacy and the requirement for the international community to protect human dignity and rights even within the border of a rogue or failed state are clearly enunciated. They also offer an indication that post Cold War international relations are evolving toward a more liberalist and constructivist approach because of the requirement to recognize the reality of the World we live in. This tends to further reaffirm the selection of the six main factors that were used in this paper: Legitimacy, National interest, International responsibility, Capability, internal political context and public opinion. These factors are further defined as well as their individual function as part of the model in a later part of this chapter.

Political Systems

The five countries that were studied are all mature democratic states. Their specific modes of political functioning are all different however. France for example directly elects its chief executive, the president, but Canada and Australia do not. Each of the later has a prime minister as their chief executors, detailed internally by parliaments. Germany, with an indirectly chosen chancellor has a bicameral legislature. Its lower house has 600 elected members and the upper house, representing its 16 states, is composed of a further three to six elected representatives from each, depending on their respective population.¹⁸

These countries were selected for both practical and analytical reasons. The practical aspect is that they all publish and make available information in either English or French. They also share a certain level of similarity by being mature modern democracies while at the same time holding different levels of power within the international system. For example, Germany, France, and England have relatively large populations and may be qualified as European economic powerhouses, while Canada and Australia have more dependant economic systems based on the production of natural resources. France and England both hold permanent seats on the UNSC and, accordingly, have more weight than the other three countries in debates on UN policy toward any given conflict. It is hoped that the similarities between the five nations political systems help provide for consistency of results while their differences assist in demonstrating the diverging importance for each factor studied within this research.

The Three Conflicts within the Five Political Debates

To glance at the issues of political debate it has been necessary to access some of the specific country's political archives, web based libraries as well as media archives for the period in question. This has been the main research focus of this paper. Also, to better specify the political decision making process of the countries, they have had to be studied separately with an emphasis on their specific perceptions of issues. These perceptions often varied significantly among the countries, reinforcing the idea that no common set of rules directs the commitment of forces to military intervention. On the other hand, it appears that some recognized set of influences exists in the shaping of the decision making process to engage in a conflict on foreign soil.

The three conflicts selected also involved different types of interventions. The intervention in the former Republic of Yugoslavia was primarily humanitarian in nature when it was first authorized by the UNSC; the NATO intervention in Afghanistan was intended to assist reconstruction, security and governance; while the second war in Iraq was initially aimed at regime change and the dismantling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). These divergent aims have also contributed to the depth of this study.

Each one of these interventions has drawn international attention as well as debate at the UNSC and UN General Assembly. Each one of them has also been the recipient of UNSC Resolutions. In the study of these three conflicts, the debate that has taken place at the UN, the UNSC Resolutions and the international responses have been evaluated and compared. The result of these comparisons forms the basis of the argument for the use of a model to either assess possible participation in future coalitions or assist in the development of course of actions aimed at building support for interventions.

Historical Perspective

The three interventions studied have their own specific historical perspective. They have come to be undertaken within explicit chains of events that have both caused and warranted their execution. The first task prior to analyzing the conflicts and countries' decisions is thus a review, in a few simple paragraphs, of the main international events that have occurred in relations to each intervention. These reviews, presented in chapter 4, always include UN argumentation and debate as well as the condition of global security for each period. This approach was required to help in identifying the reasons why military interventions were necessary; who were the leaders in the specific coalition building efforts to intervene; what were the conflict's

significance to international security; and what types of intervention were called for. Once the historical perspectives have been identified, an argument for each of the factors, highlighting the perception of each country, has been developed to identify each country's perception and populate the model. These arguments are based on objectives, commonly accepted historical facts as well as interpretations and perceptions of issues by each nation. It is understood however that the short historical perspectives presented in this paper are not too comprehensive or encompassing of all the aspects of global politics occurring during each period, but they provide sufficient knowledge to orient the reader towards the discussion. Once this orientation has taken place, the next effort was to analyze each country's decision in participating or avoiding participation in the specific intervention within the strict confines of the model. The six factors of the model were acting at defining and structuring the discussion in order to avoid getting lost in useless verbiage unrelated to the subject.

Country Decisions

Each of the six factors of interest has been analyzed separately. The order employed for the analysis of the factors has remained the same throughout to facilitate reading and maintain consistency. Legitimacy is always discussed first, followed by national interests, capabilities, internal political context, international responsibilities and finally public opinion. This Cartesian structural approach facilitates the argumentation for each country since some of them often share similar perceptions concerning specific factors.

As far as the countries are concerned, they often were assessed in this order: the UK, France, Germany, followed by Canada and finally Australia. This specific order

recognizes the relative economic and military power of each state and also facilitates the understanding of the situation when it comes to allegiance and alliance. Again, simplicity was paramount and most of the arguments have been written to achieve the simplest possible explanation in the countries' perception of their relative position relative to each factor.

The first step of this analysis has been to determine, for each of the six factors individually, the relative adherence to, or importance of the factor in the decision of each country to participate or to restrain from intervening in the conflict. The countries perceptions have been assessed from a wide ranging number of sources including formal political statements by heads of states, official government documents, media coverage, polls, political debates, scholarly articles, books and UN statements and resolutions. This approach has facilitated adherence to the criteria of simplicity and has also served as justification for the qualitative aspect of deciding if a country was leaning towards or away from the correlated factor. In this way, it both gives weight and a certain level of accuracy to the research.

Finally, a brief analysis of the presented facts and perceptions was conducted before closing the argument for each of the specific conflicts and proceeding to the next. The short analysis is further represented by a simple visual model displayed graphically at the end of each conflict subdivision.

Analysis

Once each of the interventions has been thoroughly presented, and the decision of the five countries to participate or not has been effectively explained, a final analysis of the results and their meaning for the modeling approach has been conducted and

presented in the conclusion in order to either refute or promote the effectiveness of the proposed model. The final analysis is based on the assumption that the six proposed factors all have a certain level of importance in the decision making process, while still recognizing that there may be other factors helping to drive decisions.

The second part of the conclusion identifies possible trends or relative differing importance of each of the factors individually. This qualitative assessment of the factors helped to determine if they can be weighted and conclude with a proposition to either design a more precise model attributing varying levels of importance to the factors or, if simplicity is more important, to maintain their relative equality as was the case in this research.

The Six Factors Defined

In order to set the understanding and provide for a consistent analysis of the factors within the context of inconsistent perceptions, historical events and the differing cultures of each of the countries, it is important at this point to accurately define each of the factors that were used as the engine of this study.

Legitimacy

The first factor was legitimacy. It is widely recognized by the international community, scholars and heads of states that the main apparatus providing legitimacy for military intervention within the boundaries of another country is the UNSC through its resolutions. Countries perceiving a significant threat to their national security may also have a legitimate claim in intervening beyond their borders in order to secure their citizenry. Observers of events of the past two decades, however, have witnessed a

number of coalitions formed as well as interventions executed without the specific authorization of the UNSC or even a direct and clearly defined threat against the coalition's partners. Kosovo and the second Iraq war were prime examples of this fact. In defense of their decisions to intervene, countries participating in these two conflicts have suggested that a sufficient number of likeminded actors from the international community were sufficient to legitimize intervention, especially when it was aimed at protecting suffering populations. It thus appears that legitimacy really remains a question of perception. For the purpose of this study, when considering the perception of legitimacy in the eyes of a specific country, the rule has been to acknowledge public statements from the head of state calling the intervention legitimate when there was absence of a UNSC mandate. If the government of a country has publicly stated that it considered the intervention legitimate, even if it went against the will or without a specific mandate from UNSC, then it can only be assumed that they really perceived the intervention as being legitimate. In the assessment of legitimacy, the country's perception has been both of primal value when no mandate was granted by the UNSC and assumed as positive when a clear mandate through a UNSC resolution was provided.

National Interests

The second factor assessed was national interests. By conventional definition, national interests should be understood as being concerned with the future well being, sovereignty, security, and the survival of a country. Within this study however, a broader range of national interests were assessed as being within the confines of the factor. This enlarged understanding of possible meaning has included economical, geo-political and security aspects. In order for this factor to be determined as positive for a country's

decision to participate, the intervention itself had to either appear as significant for this country's security, future, relative placement on the global political arena or to be clearly identified through statements from political representatives or government publications as being within the confines of the country's national interests. In some cases, national interests were conflicting with the intervention and were thus assessed as being opposed to it.

Capabilities

The third factor of the assessed model was national military capabilities. This purely quantitative factor simply identified if the country possessed the required military Forces for intervention and if those Forces were available as well as sustainable for a prolonged period of time. Some of the countries studied within this paper had and have relatively limited military capabilities. In order to be assessed as having the capability to participate in a coalition, a country had to be able to send combat ready forces of at least company size. That said, on the subject of economical capabilities, the five countries concerned within this paper displayed robust enough economies to have been able to join in each of the three coalitions without incurring a significant drain on their prosperity. This is the reason why the focus of this factor has remained strictly oriented towards military capabilities and not economic capacity.

Internal Political Context

The internal political context factor was intended to help in identifying vulnerabilities of the political elite and sitting governments when it came to making decisions to participate in an international coalition. It is understood that over time,

western democratic countries inevitably change elected leaders. The broad timeframe of the three selected conflicts meant that different governments made decisions for their countries concerning intervention in at least two cases. Accordingly, various differences in political factors such as changes in ruling parties, coalition or minority governments, as well as major social or economic pressures could help to explain diverse outcomes at different times in the decision process. The factor of internal political context was also intended to gauge, primarily, the difficulties for minority government to reach consensus, vulnerabilities during electoral periods, the orientation of the political debate towards the intervention, and the importance of each of these aspects on the final decision of the executive authority. In order for the internal political context to be assessed as a positive contributor in favor of intervention, a country had to be in a stable political and social position when required to make a decision. The level of opposition was also considered to be a means for the quantification of this factor.

International Responsibilities

The factor considering international responsibilities was both encompassing of the countries participation to formal alliances like NATO, OSCE, and even membership to the UN, as well as the country's own perception of its responsibility in the solution of the conflict. The responsibilities drawn from collective security alliances toward a specific intervention had to be identified either from the leading agency of the coalition or from the country itself in order to be assessed as positive. The broader perception of responsibility towards international stability and peace had to be assessed through official statements, declaration of political elites and documents extracted from governmental archives. It has also been seen that some former imperial states felt a certain level of

responsibility towards the security and good governance of their old colonies, so this aspect was included as well within this factor.

Public Opinion

Lastly, the public opinion factor was drawn from the public perception of participating in the intervention. News media and polls usually provided a fair understanding of the leaning of the populous and were accessed to help in determining the importance of this factor in the decision to participate. In order to be construed as positive, a demonstration of favorable public opinion towards the specific intervention had to be identified.

Each of the three school of political thought presented earlier has contributed to the development of the factor based model which was used to assess the buy-in of countries in coalition entertaining military intervention outside their boundaries. Furthermore, these schools have provided the basic six factors that were used within this study for the framing of research.

This very general definition of each of the factors provides the main arguments for the working template of the model. Each factor was only given a positive or a negative value in order to maintain their relative independence and importance towards the final decisions. It is argued that it should be a combination of factor that will have an impact on decision and not specific ones.

Finally, it is recognized that this research has studied a very limited sample of conflicts for both reasons of time and research requirements. As an international officer at Command and General Staff College, the author had only a limited time to conduct the research. The limited sample of conflict is the main weakness of this paper. A somewhat

broader sample could either augment or disprove the veracity of the arguments. On the other hand, one of the strengths of this paper is its simplicity.

¹International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, <http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp> (accessed 12 November 2010).

²Bruce Jones, Carlos Pascual, and Stephen John Stedman, *Power and Responsibility: Building international Order in an era of Transnational Threats* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009).

³Nations Unies, *Charte des Nations Unies et Statut de la Cour internationale de justice* (New-York: Département de l'information des Nations Unies, 1998), 7.

⁴International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.

⁵*Ibid.*, 8.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*, 69.

⁹*Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹*Ibid.*, 45.

¹²*Ibid.*, 46.

¹³*Ibid.*, 31.

¹⁴Jones, Pascual, and Stedman.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 52-64.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 171.

¹⁸DW-World.DE, Germany's Political System: Complicated but Reliable, 11 February 2009, <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3871421,00.html> (accessed 15 March 2010).

CHAPTER 4

CONFLICT COMPARISON

Yugoslavia

Historical Perspective

The fall of the Berlin wall and the emancipation of former communist states acted as a catalyst for many nationalities to strive towards self determination and independence. Between 1989 and 1993, most of the former soviet satellites succeeded in securing their independence and establishing self governance. Most of them maintained the same political identities while some, like Czechoslovakia, decided to further split their polity in recognition of their perceived national identities. This process led to the peaceful separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but other states had anything but peaceful separation processes. Nagorno-Karabakh had to fight for independence from Azerbaijan, Abkhazia and South Ossetia fought to separate from Georgia, Kosovo was parted from Serbia by NATO intervention, Transnistria remains reluctantly bound within Moldova, and Serbs within Bosnia-Herzegovina have fought a long and as yet unsuccessful campaign to win either independence or a new union with Serbia.

In the former Republic of Yugoslavia, requests from both the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia for the reformation of the state into a democratic federation with weak central powers were disregarded and opposed by the central government in Belgrade. This lack of agreement eventually led both republics to declare themselves independent in June 1991,¹ leading to 14 days of combat in Slovenia before they were successful in securing their borders and to very serious fighting in the summer of 1991 in Croatia. The main difference between the two self declared independent states was that

within Croatia, numerous settlements of ethnic Serbs were established and the former Yugoslav authorities used this reality to entrench its military forces in defense of these ethnic Serbs enclaves. Eventually, ethnic divisions also spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina and a bitter conflict erupted there between Muslims, Croats and Serbs.

The fighting, initially in Croatia, was considered a serious threat to international security when the first reports were presented to the UN on 25 September 1991.² It led the UNSC to unanimously adopt resolution 713 (1991), “expressing deep concern at the fighting in that country.”³ The former Republic of Yugoslavia was considered a cultural fault line since it was geographically located at the convergence of three major religions while still being on the European continent. It was also understood by the international community that natural historic alliances could come to play in this emerging conflict if it was to be left unrestrained.

UNSC resolution 713 (1991) also led to the appointment⁴ of Mr. Cyrus Vance as personal envoy of the secretary general in October of the same year. Eventually, on 23 November 1991, the Presidents of Serbia and Croatia met with the Mr. Vance in Geneva and both parties agreed to an immediate cease fire and requested the speedy establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation.⁵ This negotiated agreement was reinforced by UNSC resolutions 721 (1991) and 724 (1991) that would provide the legal basis and lead to the formation and eventual deployment of a United Nations Security Force operating under a chapter VII mandate.

The initially agreed upon cease fire between the Serbs and the Croats eventually broke down before a multinational force could be deployed, however. The deteriorating situation led the UNSC to approve the report of the Secretary-General calling for the

creation and establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on 21 February 1992 regardless of its acceptance by all parties.⁶ UNPROFOR was eventually deployed under UNSC resolution 749 (1992) in April 1992⁷ and operated under a Chapter VII mandate, at first within Croatia, and eventually expanding to include Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Legitimacy

UNPROFOR's mission legitimacy was drawn from UNSC resolutions 743 and 745 of 1992. Those two resolutions mandated the creation and subsequently the deployment of a force for intervention in the conflict and provided a mandate to the UNPROFOR mission to establish the force, demilitarize the UN Protected Areas and protect the minorities within them. The mandate was initially focused only in Croatia but it subsequently was extended to the Muslim populated enclaves in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the city of Sarajevo where the mission headquarter was to be established.

Prior UN deployments for peace keeping operations were usually conducted only once all belligerents had agreed to a cease fire and negotiated a settlement. In this case, the Serbs, represented by President Milosevic, did not recognize the deployment as legitimate and were still pursuing their strategic objective of establishing a greater Serbia and re-establishing their boundaries to include all Serbs living in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Croatia. They criticized the deployment of UNPROFOR but did not directly interfere militarily against UN troops to prevent it. The five countries of interest in this study however, all recognized the legitimacy of the mission. From their perspective, the

deployment of troops could proceed within the confines of international laws and recognized standards, even if one of the parties involved in the fighting objected.

National Interest

British National Interest has always been linked with events on the European continent. An argument could be made that an enduring element of the UK's foreign policy was that instability inside Europe threatened the UK's own security.⁸ In the introduction of the strategic defense review in 1998, then Secretary of Defence, the Rt. Hon. George Robertson, described the people of the UK as follows: "The British are, by instinct, an internationalist people. We believe that as well as defending our rights, we should discharge our responsibilities in the world. We do not want to stand idly by and watch humanitarian disasters or the aggression of dictators go unchecked. We want to give a lead, we want to be a force for good."⁹ This powerful statement, although made several years after the intervention in former Yugoslavia started, is a strong example of British conception of their place in the international arena when it comes to enforcing security and stability in the world, especially on the European continent. It shows that they link their own national security interests to the stability of Europe and their ability to help in the management of international crisis. Unrestricted fighting on the European continent threatened the security of the UK. Yugoslavia had been a catalyst for World War I. It was of course widely understood that the real causes of that war were much more complex than the assassination of the Archduke but still, events of the past still held a powerful image in the modern psyche. Furthermore, the complexity of the modern Yugoslav conflict, with its potential for numerous cultural, religious, historic or even

interested alliances from both state and non-state actors coming to help any of the three antagonists, was a real cause of concern.

Regardless of all these previously stated concerns, the UK did not really consider the war in Yugoslavia as being a real threat to its national interests if the term was to be strictly employed as defined by the Realists. Its attitude at the UNSC however tends to demonstrate a significant enough concern for international security as being part of UK's interests since it voted in favor of the intervention. Finally, the strong UK participation to UNPROFOR, with the second largest contingent of military forces, France being the first, is also a testament to their perception that even if no clearly defined vital interests were at stakes, some national interests were still important enough to warrant the intervention.

France also considered this intervention to be within the confines of its national interests. Just like the UK, they voted in favor of the intervention at the UNSC and further demonstrated their commitment to the mission when they contributed the largest contingent to UNPROFOR. The proximity of the fighting to its own national borders as well as the dangerous potential for escalation were also powerful concerns as it was further defined in their white paper on defense of 1994. This white paper assessed that regional conflicts were the primary threat to national security. "le principal risque pour la sécurité réside désormais dans des conflits régionaux susceptibles de mettre en péril la recherche de la stabilité internationale."¹⁰ France appears to have felt that it should assume a leadership role in the settlement of this conflict. Yugoslavia had been a traditional trading partner and there were numerous economic relations between the two

countries in the past. As the events progressed, France did take the lead on multiple aspects of the coalition, including the common user logistic distribution.

For Germany however, it was the past that acted as a powerful incentive to restrain its quest for intervening. Even though Germany could claim the same reasons of proximity, economic links or the danger of escalation to rationalize its participation as France and the UK did, it could not reconcile this rationalization against the potentially devastating image of once again deploying combat troops on the continent. German military officers, while on a visit to Sector South Headquarter in Knin, Croatia, during the fall of 1993 explained to the author that although Germany was concerned about the conflict, it was even more concerned about deploying forces outside its own borders and the negative perception that such an act could represent. The country was also still entangled in the process of re-unification which could have been a further reason why it did not consider this intervention to be within the confines of its national interest. Finally, enshrined within their constitution, German defense forces were not supposed to operate outside the borders of the country.

The Canadian Forces were not restrained by such limitations. Over the previous 40 years, Canada had prided itself on actively participating to most UN missions around the world. Pride however is not defined as a national interest. Canada had no specific national interest in participating in an intervention in Yugoslavia. It may be argued that the maintenance of good relations with two important allies and economic partners like the UK and France could be perceived as national interest but realistically, regardless of its participation in this conflict, the relations between the countries would have been maintained since they were not threatened. For these reasons, it will be understood that

Canada had no clear and specific national interests in participating in this intervention and for much of the same reasons, neither did Australia.

Capability

Three of the five countries considered in this study possessed formidable military capabilities in 1992. France, the UK and Germany maintained powerful, modern and well trained military forces capable of significant accomplishments. The end of the Cold War of course led to some reduction in military spending and some reorganization of the forces to account for the peace dividend, but back in 1992, this process of downsizing was not yet fully implemented and the residual military might was maintained kicking and screaming, ready for action. France and the UK had forces committed to numerous other missions around the world but still retained enough capability to intervene in Yugoslavia.

Germany however, even though endowed with significant capabilities, had restrained its use of military forces to the defense of its own territory. The constitutional restriction on the use of German defense forces was only further delineated by a judgment of the Federal Constitution Court in 1994, recognizing that the term defense could also be applied towards international interventions when they were aimed at protecting German interests. This new interventionism was only introduced in their white paper of 1994.¹¹ Within this white paper on defense, a new capability requirement was given to the German Forces, “The capability to participate in an appropriate manner in operations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and the CSCE on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and the Basic Law.”¹² Back in 1992 however, the German Forces were not allowed to operate outside of the territory defended by NATO.

For these reasons and, as explained previously, their capability for intervention in this particular conflict will be regarded as non capable.

Less capable countries like Canada and Australia must choose where and to what extent they deploy their limited assets. In the case of Canada, the Canadian Forces were still holding the line in Cyprus and a second unit was committed in Somalia while a company had just returned from the first Gulf War. This left the Canadian government with enough uncommitted forces to participate if it desired to. Australia also had enough forces in reserve to participate but their commitment of combat forces would have been extremely difficult to re-supply from the home country and would have required a significant logistic effort. Furthermore, Australian defense forces were already committed to UNTAC with over 1,200 troops as well as the UN mission in Somalia where a 1,500 strong battle group was deployed in 1992.¹³ For these reasons, Australia will be regarded as not having enough capabilities for this particular intervention.

Internal Political Context

Following the elections of April 1992 in the UK, the conservative party maintained a majority government that it had enjoyed since 1979 and Prime Minister John Major was head of Government. Economically, the UK was still enjoying strong trading relationships with its partners around the world and their prospect for future economic stability was not in jeopardy. Both of these observations suggest that the UK was both politically and economically stable during this period. The ability of the government to execute its executive power of deploying troops was not restrained by political impediments.¹⁴

France national politics of 1992 were also very stable. The President of the Republic, Francois Mitterrand, had been in power since 1981 and would not face the ballots again until May 1995.¹⁵ The end of the Cold War had brought a lot of hope for security and stability in Europe so the politicians had more or less free rein to deploy their military forces in trouble spots around the world without interference from the opposition. France was also in the process of downsizing its army but not to the level where it would no longer be in a position to undertake expeditionary missions.

In Germany, since the treaty on final settlement with respect to Germany was signed on 12 September 1990 in Moscow,¹⁶ entering into force on 15 March 1991, the process of reintegration of East and West Germany was under way. The head of Government, Chancellor Dr. Helmut Kohl, had been in power since 4 October 1982 and was not expected to go into another election in the immediate future. The unification process however had slowed Germany's growth to 3.1 percent and it would take years to bring East Germany to the level of prosperity enjoyed by their Western partners.¹⁷ Furthermore, German defense forces were still limited to homeland operations as stated within their constitution. For these reasons, the internal political climate for an intervention in the Former Yugoslavia will be assessed as non favorable.

Canada was undergoing some political turmoil in 1992 but the majority Conservative government under the leadership of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was still unrestrained to act and employ the Canadian Forces where it decided. Constant reminders from television broadcasts of atrocity being committed in Yugoslavia were a powerful incentive for the government to act decisively, and both the party in power as well as the opposition supported the deployment of troops to the UN mission.

Australia was also enjoying a stable political context in 1992. The labor party of Prime Minister John Keating held a majority government in the lower house and was not going to face the electorate until November 1993.¹⁸ The war in Yugoslavia, however, was far removed from local political debate and intervention was not on the agenda. For this reason, the internal political context will still be assessed as positive but its influence on the decision to participate in the intervention will remain insignificant.

From this short analysis of internal political forces in play during the year of 1992, it can be argued that the UK, France, Canada and Australia had positive inclination and little impediment in the process of deciding to participate in the intervention while Germany was focused on internal problems of reintegration and limited in its employment of its strictly defensive forces.

International Responsibility

Aside from their memberships in the UN and Article 51 of the United Nation Charter, none of the five countries had specific treaty responsibility towards Yugoslavia. Earlier arguments, however, suggested that the UK, Germany, and France were viewing the conflict as a threat and felt a certain level of responsibility for the maintenance of security on the European continent. In the case of Germany however, given the limitation in the employment of their military forces, this responsibility would be exercised more in a diplomatic manner than in the deployment of forces. For these reasons, they will be assessed as positively perceiving this factor in regard to intervening in the internal war of Yugoslavia. Canada, for its part, also felt some level of responsibility since, up to this point; it had participated in most of the UN interventions around the world and wanted to maintain its record of leadership for peace keeping operations. Australia was neither

bound by treaties or alliances nor was it overly concerned about the possibility of escalation. It supported the establishment of the mission but did not deploy combat forces to assist in its operations, so it will be assessed as not having direct international responsibility towards the intervention.

Public Opinion

Television has acted as a powerful catalyst to generate public support for intervention in Yugoslavia. The ever present reports from CNN about atrocities being committed in the country were presented everyday in the living room of the citizens of the five countries studied and helped conjugate a general feeling of resentment towards the antagonists fighting with what seemed to be very little restraint and much barbarism. As Michael Ignatieff explained, “television has become the principal mediation between the suffering of strangers and the consciences of those in the world’s few remaining zones of safety.”¹⁹ This broadcasting of the horrors of the war in the living rooms of the world helped create a feeling of proximity and eventually of responsibility by the citizens of many countries. From this feeling, they requested their governments to act to help alleviate the suffering. The public of the UK, France, Canada, and Australia were favorable to intervention. In Germany, the same favorable feeling existed but the public understood the limitations imposed by their constitution for the deployment of military forces, and they also remembered that the last time they sent military forces in Yugoslavia they were the aggressor. For these reasons, it will be assessed that the German public was not in favor of sending troops to intervene.

Analysis

In the final analysis, only the UK, France and Canada sent combat troops to intervene in the conflict in Yugoslavia. Australia sent a few military observers as well as staff officers but no combat troops. From this posteriori observation, it can be said that each of the three countries which decided to participate had more than four positive factors acting as incentives to secure their participation. The two countries that chose not to participate had only three and two respectively. This would tend to lead towards a correlation between the factors and the actual participation in an intervention. Table 1 below illustrates graphically this relation between each country and the factors assessed.

Table 1. Intervention in Yugoslavia

	UK	France	Germany	Canada	Australia
Legitimacy					
National Interests					
Capabilities					
Internal political context					
International responsibility					
Public Opinion					

Source: Created by author.

Afghanistan

Historical Perspective

The Soviet fighting in Afghanistan lasted for almost a decade. It gave rise to the Mujahidin who were eventually successful in securing the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The power vacuum left behind by the former invaders however was soon to be filled by warlords who did not hesitate to secure control of vast areas of the country and impose their rule over an already disenfranchised population. With the nation divided, violence

and injustice were rampant as the warlords ruled by harsh force. The division of the nation, the violence and what was viewed as excessive or unethical taxation eventually became so unbearable that young men, students of Islam in the country's (and Pakistan's) numerous Madrassas, decided to intervene. Their initial motives seemed honorable as reported by Ahmed Rashid in his book "Taliban" written in 2000. He emphasized that: "These young men named themselves Talibs, which means religious students who seek justice and knowledge. They chalked out a minimum agenda: to restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia, or Islamic law, and defend Islam in Afghanistan."²⁰ With their agenda set on restoring the country, they established their power base in Kandahar and set upon fighting the warlords. They eventually gained control of most of the country and established the Taliban regime under the leadership of Mullah Omar, a former Mujahidin fighter and religious scholar from the region. Mr. Rashid reports that Mullah Omar was selected as head of the Taliban "not for his political or military ability, but for his piety and his unswerving belief in Islam."²¹ He further reports an explanation given by Mullah Omar to a Pakistani journalist, Rahimullah Yousufzai, about the rise of the regime and his appointment to power stating that the Taliban "took up arms to achieve the aims of the Afghan jihad and save our people from further suffering at the hands of the so-called Mujahidin."²²

Mullah Omar, a severe, observant, charismatic cleric, was initially chosen as head of the movement because he did not seem to have any political aspirations. He was seen by many Afghans as a fair, highly religious and just man who would help in restoring security to the people. The rule of the Taliban regime however was as brutal and barbaric as the warlords had been. Under a strict application of the Sharia law, individual liberties

were non-existent and a reign of terror was set in place. This experiment of Islamic law eventually attracted outsiders such as Osama Bin Laden, who befriended Taliban authorities and established his Al Qaeda training camps within the borders of Afghanistan.

In these training camps, new terrorists could be safely prepared for future action throughout the world. Eventually, Al Qaeda attacked the United States of America on 11 September 2001. The resulting devastation and tragic loss of thousands of lives on American soil focused attention on Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime.

The Taliban were requested to surrender terrorists operating in Afghanistan, including Osama Bin Laden, to the US so they could be brought to justice. After multiple demands and the tacit refusal of the Taliban regime to acquiesce to the US desire for justice, special operation forces and the CIA mounted a campaign to remove the regime from power and hunt the Al Qaeda operatives in the country.

The campaign, conducted largely by local fighters from the Northern Alliance and some Pashtu tribes from the South, went superbly. The Taliban regime collapsed and President Ahmid Karzai was elected to power by a Loya Jirga. The task of rebuilding institutions and providing security was eventually transferred to the UN which secured the help of NATO to establish the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan under UNSC resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001 and further reemphasized by resolution 1390 of 16 January 2002²³. These two resolutions would provide the legal basis for this new coalition built for intervention in Afghanistan.

Legitimacy

The five countries covered by this study recognized the legitimacy of the intervention. The UNSC resolutions provided the legal framework for intervention. The wide ranging, international acknowledgement of legitimacy led to significant participation by each of the five countries and a contribution of combat troops to the mission. Although some national caveats were put in place, each of the five countries contributed combat forces capable of undergoing significant operations within their mandate.

National Interest

The incidents of 11 September 2001 acted as a powerful reminder to all countries that terrorism, left unchecked, could threaten each one of them on their own soil. The unprecedented pledges of support offered to the US from most countries around the world helped further demonstrate the extent of commonly felt trauma left by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Every nation condemned the terrorist acts and most followed the UNSC demands to establish anti-terrorist legislation to help prevent future attacks. Once the US had completed the removal of the Taliban regime, which was also deemed as illegitimate by the international community, significant support was offered for the reconstruction and nation building of Afghanistan.

This pledged support was eventually called upon and the UK, France, Germany, Canada, and Australia contributed combat troops to assist ISAF in its effort. The general consensus as far as national interests were concerned was that it was in the interest of every country to help reestablish security and governance in Afghanistan in order to prevent events like 9 September 2001 to happen again. The terrorism threat of a resurging

Taliban regime with ties to Al Qaeda was a concern for each of the five countries as they expressed it in their subsequent white papers and defense policy statements.

In its assessment of threat in 2003 and policy guidelines for the German Defense Forces, Dr Peter Struck explained that “the attacks of 11 September 2001 have shaken the civilized world to its very foundations. Subsequent terrorist attacks have heightened the awareness of asymmetric threats that may occur anywhere in the world and may be directed against anyone.”²⁴ France also shared the same opinion as expressed in its 2003 to 2008 Military program Bill of Law, “These attacks have opened the way to different types of conflicts, without battlefields and without clearly defined armies, where the enemy, ready to use weapons of mass destruction, clearly aims at civilian populations. France is a highly developed open society with a high level of technology. France is, therefore, particularly vulnerable to these new kind of threats.”²⁵ The UK, in its 2003 White Paper also identified terrorism as a significant threat to its national interests, “International terrorism and the proliferation of WMD represent the most direct threats to our peace and security.”²⁶ Australia also articulated a similar concern in its 2003 Defense Update, “A critical strategic and security dimension for Australia is that militant extremists in Southeast Asia are prepared to take up the Al Qaida cause and that Australia has been identified as a target.”²⁷ Canada did not publish any White Paper on defense between 1994 and 2005 but in its Policy Statement on Defense of 2005 it also acknowledges that the prevention of terrorism was a national interest concern. It explains that “The attacks since September 11--in Madrid, Istanbul, Bali, Mombasa and elsewhere--have shown that all states and societies, including Canada, are a potential target”²⁸ A general understanding was developing that interests of nations would be better

served in preventing terrorist acts abroad than reacting to them at home. This is why all five countries in this study considered it a national interest to help secure Afghanistan.

Capability

It has already been established that the German Defence Forces were no longer limited to operate exclusively within the territory of NATO since the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994. Thus German forces were both capable and legally available to undertake action in Afghanistan. France and the UK also had significant forces available for the deployment as it can be witnessed by the many thousand soldiers deployed. Canada, within its limited resources contributed one infantry battle group with logistical support. At the time, this constituted half of the available forces for international intervention since the country could only muster two battle groups, roughly equal to half of a US Striker Brigade Combat Team, on a sustainable rhythm. Finally, Australia provided 1550 soldiers to the ISAF mission.

Internal Political Context

The internal politics of the five countries were fairly stable in 2002 and 2003. All of them enjoyed majority governments and stable governance. Canada, it might be argued was starting to experience some difficulties within its polity as Prime Minister Jean Chretien was facing substantial challenges to his leadership by his former Finance Minister, Paul Martin, for succession as head of the party. These challenges eventually led to the retirement of Prime Minister Chretien but not before he had committed troops to Afghanistan. For these reasons, all five countries internal political context will be assessed as favorable to the intervention.

International Responsibility

The UN requested that NATO head its intervention in support of the Afghan government. Contributor nations to NATO included the UK, France, Germany and Canada. These four countries thus had some clearly defined international responsibility due to their allegiance to NATO and the UN. Once the organization accepted the mandate, in consultations among all of its members, it was up to its participating nations to provide the troops required to carry on the mission. Australia however was not a member of NATO and had no particular responsibilities towards the reconstruction of Afghanistan. It had however invoked article 4 of the ANZUS treaty to promise help to the US in 2002²⁹ and considered itself as a potential target for terrorist organization as previously stated. Its international responsibility towards Afghanistan was, like all members of the UN, to help in the maintenance of international stability and security. Indeed, its commitment to global and regional security over the decades had been unrelenting. It recognized the threat to both, its own territory and the rest of the world. Accordingly, it contributed a significant portion of its defense forces to the operation in Afghanistan and maintained, through the years, its efforts. This is why their perception of international responsibility will be assessed as positive for the purpose of this study.

Public Opinion

The UK could very often be qualified as a favorite ally of the US. Back in 2002, a PEW report indicated that 69 percent of the UK population was favorable toward US anti-terrorist efforts. The same report showed similar results ranging from 68 percent to 75 percent in favor for the other four countries in this study.³⁰ Domestically, each of the five countries enjoyed significant support for the intervention in Afghanistan. The

mission was understood to be humanitarian in nature and would focus on providing security for the international aid agencies in their effort to rebuild the country. This positive presentation of the mission generated unprecedented support for each of the five countries to deploy forces. This is why the public opinion for the intervention will be assessed as positive for the five countries of interest.

Analysis

The intervention in Afghanistan was widely supported. All five countries participated and deployed a significant number of troops to help in securing and reconstructing the country. The model shows that each factor was perceived as positive by the participating countries. This display of support for the coalition indicates that all the conditions were right to secure the participation of the five countries. It also strongly suggests or indicates that when all six factors are perceived as positive, countries will join a coalition aimed at intervention. This offers a strong argument that when a country or an international organization attempts to secure participation in a coalition aimed at military intervention, it should try to ensure that all six factors are positively perceived by potential participants.

The model, in this case, appears to be working appropriately. It demonstrated that when all six factors are perceived positively, countries participate. An argument could also be made that some other political factors were at play in securing participation. For example, as the possibility of a war in Iraq escalated and the US approach towards Iraq was highly criticized, other countries may have seen participation in Afghanistan as a less controversial means of supporting the war on terror than in joining in the Iraq adventure.

Regardless of the possibility of political mingling, the model, in this case, was accurate and could probably have predicted the participation of the five nations.

Table 2. Participation in Afghanistan

	UK	France	Germany	Canada	Australia
Legitimacy					
National Interests					
Capabilities					
Internal political context					
International responsibility					
Public Opinion					

Source: Created by author.

Iraq

Historical Perspective

The escalation of events that eventually led to the second war in Iraq were significantly debated by the UNSC over a period of 12 years. Since the first war in Iraq had ended in 1992, a number of UNSC resolutions had been voted in order to disarm and abolish Iraq's WMD capabilities. These resolutions called for international supervision in the disarmament process and inspections of compliance by a UN body. Dr Hans Blix was designated head of the UN weapons inspection team. The lack of cooperation of President Saddam Hussein's government with international observers eventually enflamed the international community and more pressures were applied to ensure that Iraq respected its obligations. Additionally, the events of 11 September 2001 further polarized the requirement for transparency in the control, identification and removal of

possible threats from WMD and their potential leakage to terrorist groups. Iraq's lack of cooperation led the UNSC to adopt Resolution 1441 (2002) on 8 November 2002.³¹

In their letter to Iraqi General Al-Saadi dated 8 October 2002, Dr Blix the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and Mohamed ElBaradei the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requested confirmation from the General that the agreement reached in the Vienna conference of 3 October 2002 would be respected and that free access to all sites identified by the commissions would be granted. This letter was then posted in appendix to the UNSC resolution 1441 (2002).³² UNSC resolution 1441 (2002) further endorsed the letter as "binding upon Iraq"³³ and established additional rules to facilitate the work of the commissions.³⁴ Following the adoption of this resolution, UNMOVIC and IAEA were still impeded and Iraq's apparent lack of transparency led to an escalation of diplomatic efforts in the UN. The US and other allies became so concerned with the purported lack of progress and results that President Bush sent a representative to the UNSC with the aim of securing a chapter VII mandate for a pre-emptive intervention in Iraq.

In his address to the UNSC on 5 February 2003, then US secretary of State Collin Powell explained that "Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its obligations stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years."³⁵ He also further emphasized that "Resolution 1441 (2002) was not dealing with an innocent party, but with a regime that the Council had repeatedly convicted over the years. Resolution 1441 (2002) gave Iraq one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences."³⁶ This Resolution called for Iraq to assist inspectors from the UNMOVIC

as well as IAEA in their work to confirm compliance with the disarmament of Iraq's Weapon of Mass Destruction program.

Secretary Powell presented evidences of non-compliance with Resolution 1441 (2002) and requested that the Security Council curtail Saddam Hussein's program of weapons of mass destruction. He concluded his appeal by highlighting the "duty and responsibility to the citizens of the countries that are represented by this body"³⁷ and remarking that they should not "shrink from whatever is ahead of us."³⁸ The presentation of evidence was then discussed by Security Council members as well as the representative of Iraq. It resulted in the council reaffirming its commitment to Resolution 1441 (2002) but not in the imposition of a new, firmer resolution, imposing a Chapter VII intervention, to further force Iraq into compliance.

The situation of non-compliance of Iraq with the inspectors of UNMOVIC and IAEA continued to escalate over the following months. Under the leadership of the US, military preparations had already begun January 2003 to eventually invade Iraq if judged necessary and force its compliance with the disarmament. Additional efforts to secure a Security Council mandate to go to war were attempted but did not result in the adoption of a new resolution or Chapter VII mandate.

The Security Council was divided over the actions to be taken. France argued against invading Iraq and even threatened, on 10 March 2010 to employ its veto if a vote was to be made by the UNSC in favor of a military intervention.³⁹ The UK and the US, for their part, were in favor of the more robust approach and continued their preparation for pre-emptive action against Iraq aimed at a regime change and the securing of WMD. Their respective diplomatic efforts attempted persistently to secure more international

support for the intervention and the military participation of likeminded countries. In the end, only Australia sent combat troops to assist the US and UK in the action against Iraq.

After much effort and patience on the part of the international community, Iraq's non-compliance with UNSC Resolution 1441 (2002) became unacceptable to the US and its allies and resulted in a coalition intervention on 20 March 2003. The coalition was only composed of US, UK and Australian combat troops and did not secure a mandate from the UN. Many other countries also expressed their support for preventive military action against Iraq but did not immediately contribute combat forces.

Legitimacy

The previous two cases discussed in this research drew their legitimacy from UNSC resolutions. The military intervention in Iraq however was not sanctioned by the UNSC. Both the UK and Australian governments argued that the intervention was legitimate since Iraq's WMD program was a threat to their national security.

For the UK, then defense secretary Geoff Hoon explained to the public, when the forces were ordered to deploy in preparation for an intervention against Iraq early in December 2002, that the UK did "not require the specific agreement of the Security Council."⁴⁰ He also emphasized that further discussion about a possible failure of Iraq to adhere to UNSC Resolution 1441 (2002) would have to take place within the UNSC but explained that the UK could intervene without a mandate from the UN. In the same vein, Peter Mandelson, a Member of Parliament for the Labour Party, also emphasized the legitimacy of the proposed military actions in a speech to the University of Kent on 4 March 2002. He explains, "In my view, now that the civilized world is faced with terrorists potentially armed with WMD, it is legitimate in certain circumstances to

anticipate attacks through the use of pre-emptive military force where there is a clear and compelling case on self-defense grounds and where every non-violent approach has failed.”⁴¹ These two statements give clear indication that the UK government considered the intervention of a military coalition against a possible threat to its own national security interests was legitimate and could be undertaken legally within the international law.

Australia’ perception of the legality of intervening to dismantle Iraq’s WMD program was very similar to the UK. Then Prime Minister John Howard explained on a televised interview on 21 March 2003 his government had committed “Australian forces to action to disarm Iraq because we believe it is right, it’s lawful and it’s in Australia’s national interest.”⁴² Alexander Downer who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs also justified the intervention as legitimate later in March 2004, saying that it was important because it “secured the future of the ANZUS alliance.”⁴³ He further emphasized that if Australia was “to walk away from the American alliance it would leave us as a country very vulnerable and very open, particularly given the environment we have with terrorism in South-East Asia, the North Korean issue.”⁴⁴ These public statements from both the UK and Australia tend to emphasize that they really perceived the war in Iraq as legitimate because it was a matter of self defense, in their national interests, within the international coalition led by the US, and their duty to secure the WMD program of Saddam Hussein’s government. The fact that no WMD were discovered in the years following the invasion does not invalidate their initial assessment of the legitimacy of their actions. In their perception, the coalition had the right to take action against Iraq.

France and Germany did not share that perception. They were certainly concerned about the possible WMD and even offered support to the US but only within a clear mandate from the UNSC. As the situation escalated, during the winter of 2003, France even became ostracized by the US because they insisted that the inspection teams be given more time to finalize their work in Iraq. When President Jacques Chirac explained in March 2003 that “rien ne justifie aujourd’hui une guerre contre l’Irak,”⁴⁵ he wanted to continue to try, through the inspection teams, to develop a better understanding and to pressure Saddam Hussein’s government into compliance with UNSC 1441 (2002) through diplomatic means. He was convinced that the diplomatic solution had not yet been fully explored and that it was premature to go to war. He even succeeded to secure a joint declaration with Germany and Russia against the war in Iraq on 5 March 2010. The nine paragraph statement was reported by Spiegel Online as a means to “set up a final confrontation at the Security Council over a resolution authorizing war in Iraq, a step that increasingly looks as if it could be forsaken for lack of majority support among the 15 members.”⁴⁶ This confrontation resulted with no mandate from the UNSC for the conduct of an intervention against Iraq. Both France and Germany had expressed prior to the beginning of hostilities that they would only participate in the conflict with the sanction of a legitimate UN mandate. President Chirac even explained to his troops earlier in the year that he maintained all options open, and he expressed to international ambassadors that Paris would indeed participate in a conflict with Iraq but only within a clear mandate from the UN.⁴⁷

Canada adopted a similar approach to establish the legitimacy of an intervention in Iraq. Prime Minister Jean Chretien observed in October 2002 that, “We believe in

international institutions and if the United Nations were to come to the conclusion that we have to go to destroy the armaments of massive destruction that (Iraqi President Saddam Hussein) might have, we will go there.”⁴⁸ He also further emphasized that Canadians “ask questions, we believe in international institutions.”⁴⁹ This clarification also serves to demonstrate the generalized understanding, in Canada, that to be legitimate, a military intervention in Iraq would have to be sanctioned by a UNSC resolution. The debate continued throughout the year up to March 2003 when, during a question period in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister was asked to explain the position of the Canadian Government about the possibility of war with Iraq. He explained that “the Security Council has been unable to agree on a new resolution authorizing military action. Canada worked very hard to find a compromise to bridge the gap in the Security Council. Unfortunately, we were not successful. If military action proceeds without a new resolution of the Security Council, Canada will not participate.”⁵⁰ This rare, clear answer offered in parliament further demonstrates that Canada did not see the coalition intervention as legitimate.

The legitimacy of the war in Iraq has been perceived differently between the five countries relevant to this study. Some would only find a UNSC sanctioned intervention as legitimate while others considered a multilateral coalition acting to protect its interests as legitimate, regardless of UNSC resolutions. This divide will not be further debated within this study since it is not part of its aim and no judgment will be offered on who was right or wrong. Countries have simply perceived the legitimacy of the action differently.

National Interest

A country's national interest may also be perceived differently as situations evolve. It is clear, from the preceding arguments that both the UK and Australia had significant reasons to join the coalition. The two Prime Ministers, Tony Blair and John Howard, argued that the disarmament of Iraq and the dismantlement of its WMD program was clearly of utmost importance for their continued security as nations and thus important for their respective national interests.

France and Germany, in their opposition and diplomatic efforts at the UN, also considered the Iraq question as a national interest, as well as a legitimacy issue. Their perception was one that emphasized the importance and respect for international institutions. They jointly operated their diplomatic campaign against the war in Iraq in an effort to affirm their international influence. A news analysis from Spiegel Online explains this fact in these words "German and French diplomats said today they were simply declaring their independence."⁵¹ It also explained the deep concern in Europe that the US should work through international institutions and not use them for its own purposes. Karsten D. Voigt, a German diplomat, explained this perception of US unilateralism towards international security issues that is perceived on the old continent, he argued that "the Europeans are not needed, that they reflect something old and that, at best, they are irrelevant."⁵² This concern about international institutions may have been part of both French and German national interests, but Iraq itself was not. There was a real conviction in Paris that Iraq did not represent an immediate threat. Maya Szymanowska, a writer for the news-paper Le Point explains that Paris had never believed that Iraq was a menace in the short term. France was satisfied with the status

quo and even estimated that a war would risk provoking more terrorism and instability.⁵³

Both Germany and France held the same assessment about the threat of Iraq to their security. They believed that this threat was not a challenge to their national interests or the future prosperity of their states. For them, the weakening of international institutions represented a more important threat than any one possibly posed by Iraq.

Canada had a very similar assessment of the threat. It did not perceived Saddam Hussein's regime as a national security challenge and it did not really feel there was a terrorist connection with Iraq. Geopolitically however, its proximity to the US and its economic dependence on its bigger neighbor were significantly different than those of France and Germany. Canada's biggest trading partner was the US with 80 percent of Canadian exports going to its neighbor. This simple economic fact required a careful assessment of what was really in Canada's interests. When the US urged Prime Minister Chretien to support the war with Iraq, there was a clear and present risk to the country's economic stability and prosperity. Even though Iraq did not offer a significant threat in Canada's perception, the risk of offending its biggest trading partner and of hurting bilateral relations was a powerful incentive to offer support for the intervention. Prime Minister Jean Chretien thus immediately offered his support to a possible US led war with Iraq in October 2002 but with the caveat that it should be mandated by the UN.⁵⁴ This subtle approach was designed to both assuage the US and reiterate Canada's endorsement of international institutions.

Capability

The year 2003 was marked by a major commitment of troops from each of the five countries in this study. France had forces deployed in Africa, Afghanistan, Kosovo

and multiple other areas. It still, however, possessed enough capability to send a significant number of troops to Iraq. Germany also had the possibility to offer a sizeable contingent if it had chosen to do so. Australia and Canada were stretched to the limit. The participation of both countries' small military forces to the stabilization efforts in Afghanistan represented a huge drag on their limited resources. Even if Defense Minister John McCallum of Canada had offered back in October 2002 a sizable commitment, up to 2000 soldiers, the Conference of Defense Associations warned the following week that Canada's Armed Forces were stretched to the limit and would not be able to take part in a sustained military campaign in Iraq.⁵⁵ Australia participated in the intervention but only with 200 Special Forces troops. Its military situation was also critically involved in other contingencies and could not sustain prolonged operation of significant forces in Iraq. For these reasons, both countries will be assessed as not possessing the military capability for a sustained intervention.

Internal Political Context

The internal political context of the five countries, as previously observed in the Afghanistan section of this paper, was fairly stable between 2002 and 2003. Australia was led by a coalition government composed of the Liberal and National Party since 2001. This coalition held both the Senate and the House of Representatives and would last through one more election in November 2004. The Opposition, the Labor Party, only achieved a majority government during the election of 2007.⁵⁶ Both the UK and France had majority governments which were able to navigate the executive decision making aspect of governance without being too impeded by the opposition when the time came to commit forces to international operations. Germany's election of September 2002

resulted in the same ruling coalition of the Social Democratic Party and Alliance 90/The Green, which had led the government for the previous four years, losing a few seats but retaining a majority none the less. Canada, it might be argued was starting to experience some difficulties as far as political stability was concerned because Prime Minister Jean Chretien was facing a substantial challenge to his leadership by his former Finance Minister, Paul Martin.

Martin was trying to disenfranchise the Prime Minister and gather support for his succession as head of the Liberal Party. These challenges eventually led to the retirement of Prime Minister Chretien, but not until February 2004. Martin then became Prime Minister and managed to secure a minority government in June 2004. For these reasons, all five countries internal political context will be assessed as favorable in their ability to decide to commit forces to the intervention. All of them enjoyed either a strong majority government like the UK, France, and Canada or at least a working majority government through well established and stable coalitions as demonstrated by Germany and Australia.

International Responsibility

The US led coalition to impose a regime change in Iraq did not come out of a formally sponsored international institution. It has already been established that France, Germany and Canada did not perceived the intervention as legitimate and in the same state of mind, did not view the war as part of their international responsibilities. The UNSC did not sanction the action and NATO did not invoke an article five aggression clause. Even if the US was successful in gathering substantial support for the action from likeminded countries around the world, France, Germany, and Canada, among many

others, were not convinced that it was within their international security duties to join the coalition to invade Iraq.

In stark opposition to the perceptions in those three countries, the UK and Australia were far more concerned about their responsibilities as allies of the US. The Australian government considered its participation as essential to secure the future of the ANZUS treaty with the US, arguing that “the ANZUS alliance was central to Australia’s strategic policy”⁵⁷ and that within this alliance, it was their responsibility to assist their ally, the US, in its efforts against Iraq.

The UK shared a similar perception when it came to its NATO duties towards the US. Then Secretary General of NATO, British Lord Robertson, explained to news reporters in December 2002 that “Britain and its NATO partners had a moral obligation to support the US in a war against Iraq.”⁵⁸ He further emphasized that he would even support an intervention without UNSC sanction. Mr. Watt quotes him in his article as saying that even though “NATO is very, very supportive of the UN process and if that breaks down then clearly there is a moral obligation by NATO to give whatever support is required.”⁵⁹ This public declaration from a high UK representative serving as head of NATO offers a clear indication of the perception of responsibility that the UK felt towards its commitment to Iraq. It also shows that the UK did not only support the US in its efforts to enforce a regime change in Iraq but that it actually felt responsible, as a nation striving for international security, to ensure that the Iraqi government was not in possession of WMD or in a position to threaten the stability and security of other nations.

Public Opinion

Public support for the war in Iraq was also highly different for each country. In the UK, demonstrations against the war in the streets of major cities grew more insistent as the preparations to go to war and the indication of its inevitability started to be felt by the population. It culminated on 16 February 2003 when “an estimated one million protesters took to the streets of London to oppose the looming war against Iraq.”⁶⁰ Even the Reverend Jesse Jackson participated in the demonstration and was quoted in the same article as saying “I am here to show support for the British people, most of whom recognize that war is not the way to relieve the Iraqi people of their suffering.”⁶¹ This general attitude against armed conflict in Iraq was also captured by a PEW report from December 2002. When asked the question if they were in favor or opposed the removal of Saddam Hussein, 47 percent of UK citizen surveyed opposed the action while France had 64 percent against and Germany topped the opposition chart with a resounding 71 percent in opposition.⁶² A further report from the same research center, released only a few days before the assault on Bagdad on 18 March 2003, sees the trend of public opinion against the action polarizing. The UK opposition to the war augmented to 51 percent while France and Germany’s numbers also increased to 75 and 69 percent respectively.⁶³

In Australia some opposition against military action in Iraq was raised. “In mid-February 2003 hundreds of thousands of anti-war protesters marched in Australian cities, and the Australian Senate gave Prime Minister Howard a vote of no confidence on his decision to send military forces to the Persian Gulf.”⁶⁴ These demonstrations did not impede the commitment of forces to the war effort but ended up securing a quick draw

down of the deployed Special Forces soldiers as soon as 15 July 2003 when operations were declared over.⁶⁵

Canadians demonstrated a completely different attitude. A poll conducted between 25 and 27 February 2003 showed that 51 percent of Canadians were convinced that the UNSC had enough evidence to authorize military action against Iraq.⁶⁶ This percentage however was not indicative of their support for an attack without the consent of the UNSC since in the same poll, 62 percent said that “Canada should only provide military assistance for an Iraq action if the United Nations, not just the United States, decides action is required.”⁶⁷ This caveat clearly demonstrated that even though a majority of Canadians believed that something should be done to prevent the spread of WMD from Iraq, the actions taken should only be under the legitimizing authority of the UN. For these reasons, just like the UK, France and Germany, neither Australia nor Canada will be assessed as having enjoyed a favorable public opinion about the intervention in Iraq.

Analysis

The intervention in Iraq challenged the very foundation of accepted international security institutions. When the coalition decided to proceed with the attack on 20 March 2003 without the formal sanctioning of the UNSC, it polarized traditionally accepted forms of legitimacy and divided nations’ opinion on the question of preventive action to improve international stability and security.

The case of Iraq’s threat to international security was perceived differently by the government of the five countries subjected to this study. Some regarded the threat as a challenge to all and readily joined the coalition to act against a possible challenge coming

from Iraq's possible spread of WMD to terrorists or uses regionally in an already unstable area. Others however would have preferred to explore more peaceful solutions to curtail the problem through the UN. They did not completely discount the eventual possibility of military action against Iraq but argued that the time had not yet come to revert to such an extreme solution.

This dichotomy is well represented in the model studied in this paper. The UK and Australia participated in the initial assault in Iraq and both had four or more factors in favor of the intervention. France, Germany and Canada would have preferred a more traditional approach, through the UN, and ended up only having one or two positive factors. For them, it may be argued, the perception of lack of legitimacy was the driving factor in their decision not to participate. This perception led them to consider a very different perspective of what were their national interests and their responsibility towards international security in these circumstances.

Table 3. The War in Iraq

	UK	France	Germany	Canada	Australia
Legitimacy					
National Interests					
Capabilities					
Internal political context					
International responsibility					
Public Opinion					

Source: Created by author.

¹United Nations, UNPROFOR, Former Yugoslavia–UNPROFOR, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/mission/past/unprofor_b.htm (accessed 17 August 2010), 1.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

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⁷Ibid.

⁸Secretary of State for Defense, *United Kingdom Strategic Defense Review*, July 1998, [http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/United Kingdom1998.pdf](http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/United%20Kingdom1998.pdf) (accessed 18 September 2010).

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¹³Australian Peacekeeper & Peacemaker Veterans' Association (APPVA), Table of Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Operations (with Police) Since 1947 to the Present, [http://www.peacekeepers.asn.au/operations/TablePKO 2009-5 Jan 2010.pdf](http://www.peacekeepers.asn.au/operations/TablePKO%202009-5%20Jan%202010.pdf) (accessed 15 November 2010).

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³²*Ibid.*, 6-8.

³³*Ibid.*, 3.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 4.

³⁵United Nation, 4701st UN Security Council Meeting, S/PM.4701, <http://UN.Org/> (accessed 25 August 2010), 2.

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³⁷*Ibid.*, 17.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

The international security infrastructure established for the Cold War has often been challenged since the demise of the Soviet Union. International organizations and alliances like the UN, NATO, the European Union, and even the ANZUS have striven to respond effectively to post Cold War challenges. One of the most effective and widely accepted responses during the last 20 years has been the formation of military coalitions aimed at intervening in conflict areas in order to restore stability and peace. In some cases, these interventions have intended to implement regime changes, in others they have been focused towards peace keeping or the resolution of deep-seated political or nationalist divisions. Finally, in other military deployments around the world, humanitarian assistance or the protection of innocents were the main reasons justifying intervention.

Regardless of the aim of these coalition-based military interventions, many countries were given the choice to join in the efforts if they desired. Their decisions to expend blood and treasure outside of their own territory were always taken by their own governments' considerations of the political weight attached to the actions.

This thesis has explored, post facto, the decisions of five western democratic countries to join or decline participation in coalition efforts in the interventions in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. It compared these observations to six co-regulating factors derived from theories of international relations, in an attempt to test a simple model for predicting future participation from the perspective of a possible coalition building organization. The model may also be employed to build possible course of

action when a country or an international organization decides to engage probable participating countries and requests their support.

The Model and the Factors

The model employed to assess the participation of the five countries in the interventions in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq tends to show that no single specific factor can predict accurately a nation's decision to join a coalition with the aim of deploying combat troops in response to international security challenges. Each of the factors, assessed separately, would not form an accurate predictor for participation. When combined together and assessed as contributors to the model, however, they assist in identifying the political forces contributing to a country's decision in joining a coalition.

As presented in this study, when a combination of at least four of the six factors are perceived positively, including legitimacy, the likeliness of participation is increased, and five of the six will generally assure participation. When all six factors are positive, the likelihood of deploying combat troops is virtually assured. This relationship was particularly obvious in the case of Afghanistan, where all five countries were judged as being positive on all six factors and offered significant contributions of combat forces to ISAF. The relationship was also partially demonstrated by the intervention in Yugoslavia. Both France and the UK perceived all six factors as positive and were the two most important contributors of troops to the intervention.

Impact of Legitimacy

When only four or five of the factors were perceived as positive, participation did take place, but only if the factor of legitimacy was one of the positively viewed factors.

Quite clearly, when a nation deems a proposed intervention to lack legitimacy, it will not join a coalition or participate in military action. Moreover, when a specific country considers the intervention as non-legitimate, its consideration and perception of each of the other factors also appears to be negatively swayed. Thus, when the governments of France, Germany, and Canada were considering participation in the war on Iraq, their perception that it lacked legitimacy appeared to reinforce public opposition to the spectre of war, influenced their expression of what was and was not their international responsibility, and even challenged their perception of their national interests in the looming conflict. Therefore, when building a coalition, securing legitimacy should be viewed as critical, positives on an additional three factors should be a priority, and positives on all six factors would be the ideal.

Limits of Capability

A second suggestion, if not a firm conclusion, of the full model involves the factor of capability. Clearly, logic would suggest that a country not possessing enough capability to participate would also not entertain the possibility of joining. The intervention in Yugoslavia for example demonstrated that Germany, even if legally limited by its constitution on the employment of troops abroad, did not participate mainly due to its lack of capability to deploy its forces outside of its own territory.

The participation of Australia in the war in Iraq however challenges this assertion. Australia at the time did not possess significant capabilities to contribute and sustain troops in the war because they were otherwise heavily engaged in other missions. It still decided to participate, however, and sent a contingent of 200 special operation forces. Their contribution may have been small in comparison to the forces deployed by the US

and the UK but still represented firm support for the intervention. The fact that they had to withdraw their forces as early as July 2003 attested to their lack of capability to maintain their level of participation. This suggests that a limited or weak of capability is not a fully decisive factor in the decision to not participate in a coalition.

Weight of the Factors

The six factors constituting the model were only assessed as positive or negative. They were not scaled over a range from low to high probability. It was also understood that each country would assess each situation from their own perspectives and may have granted different weights or levels of importance to each of the factors. It could be argued that study should have developed a more comprehensive model, where each factor has a relative numerical importance, in order to attain more accuracy in predicting outcomes. However, as this study progressed, the simplicity of the positive versus negative approach was found to provide sufficient clarity to achieve the model's basic intent.

Looking to the Future

This paper has been intended only as an initial foray into the subject. Only five very specific countries were analyzed. All were highly developed, endowed with stable, western-style, democratic governments, and interested in contributing to international stability and security. While the model worked well within the confines of this very limited sample of similar countries, the inherent complexity of international relations and the far greater diversity of the whole global community, demands not just refinement but a widening of the model.

Even for the model as it is to be more rigorously tested, countries with other types of polity, levels of development and different international interests should also be analyzed. The realities of economic instability, different political regimes or social norms may provide a completely different perception of each the factors and their relative importance in the model. A wider sample could either enhance the accuracy of the model or even disprove its usefulness.

Along the lines of widening the scope of research, it would also be useful in the future to be able to access a larger variety of material in a larger number of languages. This paper has attempted to minimize bias in analyzing public opinion in different countries by looking at two publications, one from the right and one from the left, but looking at more than two would have been preferable. The study has also only been able to acquire material in French and English. A more rigorous study should include material in many languages.

Conclusion

Coalition building will probably remain a significant aspect of international relations in the near future. Broad coalitions allow more resources to be applied to a crisis and help to substantiate the legitimacy of a given intervention. Achieving a better understanding of the factors perceived as important by possible partners is clearly important and has been the focus of the model. The six factors were highly useful in organizing the research and helped in understanding and assessing each country's perception of international events. None of the six factors is inherently quantifiable, but each one addresses a specific aspect of the decision-making process, which assists in better understanding a country's decision to commit forces. In this fashion, the model is

useful in enhancing ones understanding of why particular decisions were taken. It may also be helpful in providing a structure for assessing the probable decisions which actors will make in future international security crises.

Finally, even if the model demonstrates that when all the conditions are in place to warrant an intervention, and when a country perceives the six factors as positive, its participation in a coalition effort may be secured, but the level of participation or the number of troops to be contributed, cannot be pre-determined by this model. Nations may decide to offer only token commitment or insignificant combat forces even if the six factors are positive. They may also decide to impose caveats on the employment of troops, rendering them less useful to the coalition efforts. This leads to the conclusion that even though the model is accurate in predicting participation, it does not offer any indication to the level of commitment that will be obtained or the number of troops to be deployed. This area will continue to have to be negotiated between participating countries.

GLOSSARY

Coalition. An amalgamation of likeminded countries cooperating militarily in a conflict zone.

Mature democratic states. Mature democratic states are Western style democratic countries that are stable and functional.

Military intervention. For the purpose of this research, military intervention will be defined as the deployment of combat ready units to participate in a conflict ranging from full fledge war to stability operations, security sector reform, the imposition or maintenance of cease fires between antagonists, the defense of international treaties, the UN sanctioned regime changes, or to assist in disarmament and reintegration of guerrilla style soldiers after political solutions have been reached..

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Dr. Nicholas H. Riegg
DJIMO
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr Michael Berry
DTAC
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. Matthew T. Fuhrer
DLRO
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301