

Interaction within the Civil-Military Nexus: An Enduring Dilemma for Professional Officers

**A Monograph
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Abstract

INTERACTON WITHIN THE CIVIL-MILITARY NEXUS: AN ENDURING DILEMMA FOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS by LTC Lance C. Varney, U.S. Army, 51 pages.

Successful civil-military relations pose an enduring dilemma for the professional officer. When civil-military relations fail, the negative implications are far reaching. Professional officers who understand their role within the structure contribute positively to their profession and enhance relations across multiple levels. Understanding the foundations of civil-military relations is an important first step for professional officers, regardless of rank or position. Various theories concerning the boundaries between the Soldier and the state combine with a rich history of interaction that frames contemporary civil-military relations.

Examining both successful and failed examples of interaction provides the context of study. During the Vietnam era, civil-military relations reflected an environment of failed communication between senior officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Executive Branch. This example highlights the importance and responsibility of maintaining professional interaction. Careless communication from General Clark during his tenure as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) not only negatively affected civil-military relations but also resulted in his dismissal. Conversely, General Shinseki's successful interaction within a problematic civil-military environment demonstrates how officers maintain professionalism regardless of the situation. Finally, the relationship between General Marshall and President Roosevelt illustrates how capable officers build on successful relationships and greatly improve all aspects of civil-military relations.

Appreciating these examples yields valuable insight to the importance of civil-military relations and the enduring dilemma that it presents. In addition, these examples provide practical insights for the professional officer.

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Review of Literature.....	6
The Context of Civil-Military Relations	9
Origins	9
Civil-Military Nexus	12
Changing Environment.....	16
Unsuccessful Interaction	19
Irresponsible Communication	19
Careless Communication.....	25
Effective Interaction	32
Responsible Communication.....	33
Successful Communication	38
Conclusion.....	44
Recommendations	45
Bibliography	49

Introduction

After a twenty-minute conversation with President Obama, General Stanley A. McChrystal's command ended in June of 2010. The top commander of American forces in Afghanistan was relieved of his command after disdainful remarks he and his staff members made about top administration officials published in the *Rolling Stone* article "The Runaway General."¹ Whether viewed as an example of poor judgment on behalf of *Rolling Stone* for publishing the article, or a simple case of unprofessionalism from the general and his staff, the results were the same. An important and highly successful commander's career is tarnished and familiar discussions concerning civil-military relations commence. Successful interaction within the civil-military environment remains an important requirement for senior officers. As General McChrystal's example demonstrates, interaction within the civil-military environment poses an enduring challenge for the professional officer.

Interactions through discourse or other forms of communication can at times be detrimental for both the officer and state. 'Speaking out' tends to provoke debate within the field of civil-military relations. At the heart of this debate is the principle of control that rests with the civilian government. Over the years, two central models of control developed with varying interpretations of each. Samuel Huntington, in 1957, introduced the idea that there are two distinct patterns of control: subjective control and objective control. In the first pattern, subjective control maximizes civilian power over the military requiring that social imperatives dominate the functional imperatives of the military. In this model, partisan competition is reflected within the officer corps, which thereby serves the interests of competing civilian groups. Objective control on the other hand, minimizes the political influence over the military because the professional

¹ Mark Lander, "Short, Tense Deliberation, Then a General Is Gone" New York Times Online. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/24/us/politics/24decide.html> (accessed 14 August, 2010).

officer corps remains politically neutral.² The notion of officers expressing their professional opinion regarding what many consider policy or political runs counter to traditional concepts of the officer and the state. It is also problematic in a Huntington conception of objective control that the military does not, or should not shape the policy that it implements.³ Even more striking is the concept that the military simply is not apolitical. Officers must demonstrate the capacity to exercise professional judgments and communicate their viewpoints “based on their understanding of military and civilian priorities within the context of democratic society.”⁴ This complicates any notions that placed professional officers firmly outside of the political process with no requirements for professional military opinion. Through trends of increased political indoctrination since World War II, the professional officer at the strategic level is becoming less and less a strictly “military technician,” and is developing more of an “explicit political ethos.”⁵ Perhaps this is why the topic of civil-military relations still sparks much interest between both the professional officer and the elected official.

Interacting within this political sphere poses an enduring dilemma for the professional military officer. What happens when opinions clash between the officer and the elected official? How should the professional officer respond? More importantly, how does that response affect civil-military relations and culture of the military? Initial civil-military ideas from Samuel Huntington placed a clear advisory responsibility on the professional officer. Officers recommend

² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), 80-85.

³ Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 19-20.

⁴ Sam C. Sarkesian, *Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism* (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1981), 261.

⁵ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1960), 12. Advances in technology, managerial enterprise, and increased political responsibilities are all points that Janowitz offers in support of his view. Worth noting is that political responsibilities in this sense are characterized as influencing actions affecting national security policies and international affairs. Janowitz uses World War II as the starting point for the U.S. Army based on the social and political pattern changes within that timeframe.

military solutions to problems presented by civilian authorities and execute policy even if it “runs violently counter” to the officer’s judgment.⁶ There are numerous examples of successful and failed interaction between officers and civilian superiors. When civil-military relations fail, the implications are far reaching. This study demonstrates that maintaining successful civil-military relations pose an enduring dilemma for the professional officer. Officers who understand their role within the structure contribute positively to their profession and enhance civil-military relations. The problem lies within how and when officers interact within the blurring lines of an ever-changing environment.

This study first sets the context of civil-military relations by reviewing the foundations of the field. Understanding the framework for how interaction/communication occurs at senior levels is important within the structure of civil-military relations.⁷ Throughout the section, various ideas build toward an understanding of how professional officers interact with civilian officials and how the military culture plays a role in defining how officers express their professional viewpoints.⁸ This section suggests that relations are not as simple as depicted in early theory. Relationships defined in the context of this study are the interactions between top military officials and civilian leaders or the “civil-military nexus.”⁹ Within these interactions, discourse over policy issues and disagreements on the application of strategy have at times shattered important partnerships between civilian leaders and military professionals.¹⁰ The section

⁶ Huntington, 72.

⁷ Throughout the course of this monograph, the use of the term interaction includes the various forms of communication that take place between individuals within the civil-military nexus.

⁸ This study does not address the implications or affects of retired senior officers speaking out. See MAJ Christopher P. Taylor, “Military Pundits: Retired but Still Serving,” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2006). MAJ Taylor addresses how retired personnel factored into civil-military relations through their influence as military pundits.

⁹ Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds., *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in the New Era* (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009), 3.

¹⁰ Nielsen and Snider, 2-5.

links the dynamics of the civil-military nexus to the current context of the environment and illustrates that civil-military interactions now apply at much lower levels within the military.

The next section examines two case studies in failed interaction between senior military officers and their civilian superiors. Often there is a predictive logic within these failures that trace back to decisions rooted in values and individual motivations. The significance for the professional officer lies in the fact that once identified, these attributes are avoidable.¹¹ The first case study in this section examines the interactions between senior officials during the Vietnam War. Interactions between the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States highlight the consequences of poor civil-military relations. This example looks at the discussions between Secretary McNamara, his staff and the senior military officials. Specifically, this section explores what happens when senior military officials fail to communicate their professional opinions.¹² The second case study explores the case of General Wesley Clark during his tenure as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). This example illustrates a senior officer expressing professional opinion but with negative consequences.¹³ These examples provide an understanding as to the boundaries of professional responsibilities within the civil-military structure.

In addition to reviewing instances of failed interaction, this study also takes a close look at two successful examples. The first explores the relationship between General Eric Shinseki and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The “poisoned relationship between the two” created a

¹¹ Dietrich Dorner, *The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), 6-10.

¹² H.R. McMaster, *Derelection of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam* (New York, NY: HarperPerennial, 1998), 330-331.

¹³ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2002), 453-456.

tension between the military, executive and legislative branches within the United States.¹⁴ This example highlights the instance of an officer effectively expressing professional opinions in a challenged civil-military environment. The second example outlines the relationship and interactions between General George C. Marshall and President Roosevelt. In this case, we see where the right officer and the right environment combine to achieve a cohesive productive civil-military relationship.¹⁵ Each example illustrates instances of great tension at the personal, institutional and national level. The specific actions that the officers took in maintaining both their ethical requirements to the military profession and to the framework of civil-military relations demonstrate points of practical application for the professional officer.

This study concludes with the observations from each of the examples and the implications for the professional military officer. Though each example focuses at the senior leader level, officers of all ranks benefit from their experiences. Constructive civil-military relations depend on healthy interactions based on effective discourse between the officer and the political leader.¹⁶ The section suggests how officers can effectively interact within the contemporary environment. Lessons drawn expose points of learning and adaptation required for the professional officer: when and how to speak out, responsibilities for speaking, and guidelines for remaining silent. This section highlights the leadership skills and the required understanding of the political context that enables the contemporary officer to articulate professional perspective.

¹⁴ Matthew Moten, "A Broken Dialogue: Rumsfeld, Shinseki, and Civil-Military Tension," in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 53.

¹⁵ Robert Payne, *The Marshall Story: A Biography of General George C. Marshall* (New York, NY: Prentice Hall, 1951) 240.

¹⁶ Sarkesian, 260-262.

Review of Literature

Over the past five decades, the study of civil-military relations has greatly expanded. The growing role of military officers in national affairs led some to question whether the military voice had grown too strong in shaping national policy. Thus, the appropriate balance between civil and military authority becomes increasingly important. A multitude of authors and theories currently populate the field. It is therefore useful to review some specific literature that influenced this study. This review considers civil-military literature drawn from three main segments in U.S. history: World War II, Cold War/Vietnam era and present day.

No civil-military conversation is complete without first discussing the contributions from Samuel Huntington. In his 1957 book titled *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington defined the structure and evolution of the U.S. military system while also setting the terms for the study of civil-military relations.¹⁷ Over sixty years later, his work still stands as the departure point for understanding civil-military relations. He provides functional and societal “imperatives” that define degrees of conflict within civil-military relations and then suggests objective and subjective measures for controlling the military. He defines the focus of civil-military relations as pertaining to a highly professional officer corps who is both subordinate and accountable to the political state.¹⁸ Huntington traces, U.S. military culture from its roots in history to just touching the Cold War Era. Morris Janowitz, a sociologist, provided the next major contribution to civil-military relations. His book, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* published in 1960, offers a slightly different perspective on where the balance between the military and the state exists. Janowitz’s approach blurs the line separating society and the Soldier through a rich

¹⁷ Edward M. Coffman, “The Long Shadow of the Soldier and the State,” *The Journal of Military History* 55, 1 (January 1991): 69-70. Edward Coffman presents useful information that sets the academic context during the time that Samuel Huntington completed his book *The Soldier and the State*. Even though Huntington’s work has withstood the test of time, others like Edward Coffman presented early criticisms to his framework and it is clear that others were also working on what we now term civil-military relations.

¹⁸ Huntington, 1-18.

depiction of the social aspects of the military profession. As opposed to Huntington, Janowitz argued that the military and the state should maintain a close interdependent relationship.¹⁹ Interesting to note is that while these two authors developed their models, retired senior military officers began influencing the civil-military discussion through their published memoirs.²⁰ Also influencing the discussion at the time was S.E. Finer's book *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. His work brings a response to Samuel Huntington through widening examples to the larger international context.²¹

Sam C. Sarkesian expanded civil-military relations theory into the Cold War era in his book, *Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism*, published in 1981. He contends that the Vietnam War era changed the "political dimensions" of the military establishment. Important are his contentions that military professionals should increase political awareness and activity.²² These arguments not only speak to the evolution of civil-military relations but also serve to support the position taken within the second section of this study. H.R. McMaster, currently serving as an advisor to General Petraeus, specifically addressed civil-military relations during the Vietnam War, in his work titled *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam*. This book renders sharp criticism at the failures of both the politician and their military advisors. Beyond other civil-military lessons, the book illustrates failed discourse, and defective interaction between the

¹⁹ Janowitz, 418.

²⁰ In 1956, Matthew Ridgway published *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* and in 1959, Maxwell Taylor published *The Uncertain Trumpet*. Both authors published their books after their retirement from active duty. Both sources provide insight and at times critical assessment of civil-military relations. Authors like Huntington and Janowitz would have been aware of these books and their influence within civil-military relations.

²¹ Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 4th ed. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 25.

²² Sarkesian, 143. He also offers that the concept of politics includes understanding that disagreements over values, interests or desires are resolved through relationships determined by the application of power through legitimate procedures with our system of government.

military officer and civilian official. The book highlights actions by senior military officials that apply to both patterns of effective and destructive discourse.²³

Eliot Cohen continues down the path and offers a contemporary model. In *Supreme Command*, Cohen employs examples of public officials who successfully managed their military subordinates. He arrives at the conclusion that effective interaction and discourse is critical to effective civil-military relations. His depiction of “discourse among un-equals” provides the starting point for a practical model for consideration within this study.²⁴ Dale Herspring’s work, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush*, well augments observations throughout this study as he examines the interactions of multiple civil-military relationships through U.S. history. He argues that senior military officers are no longer apolitical and therefore aspects of civilian control have changed.²⁵ The final literary civil-military resource of note is *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in the New Era*. This resource provides the link between Huntington’s 1957 work to present day, through the compilation of twelve essays from relevant authors/political scientists who continue to examine, debate and further the field of civil-military relations. Each essay originates from an aspect of Huntington’s theory and either offers a new claim to an old perception, or continues an old perception into contemporary meaning. Interestingly enough is that each author ultimately concludes that Huntington’s objective control theory (with modifications or amendments) still has relevance.²⁶

²³ H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam* (New York, NY: HarperPerennial, 1998), 11-15.

²⁴ Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 208-209.

²⁵ Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush* (Lawrence, KS: University Free Press of Kansas, 2005), 2. Throughout his book, Herspring observed that the more the president works within the military culture when dealing with senior officers, the less conflict there is within civil-military relations.

²⁶ Nielsen and Snider, 291.

The Context of Civil-Military Relations

This section examines the context of civil-military relations as it pertains to the foundations of military culture and how this culture influenced the professional officer's worldview regarding expressing professional opinion. This sets the stage for defining how interactions between military subordinates and civilian leaders occur at the senior level. Through understanding the origins, evolution and interactions of civil-military relations, this section concludes, suggesting that in today's environment interaction/discourse between senior military and civilian officials occurs at much lower levels.

Origins

The subject of civil-military relations is as old as the development of the state and its military forces. When the framers of the U.S. Constitution designed the structure of the U.S. government, effective civilian control over the military was of great concern. Alexander Hamilton advocated that the federal government should have the power to levy troops, build and equip fleets and provide for the formation of an army and a navy in Federalist No. 23. In subsequent Federalist papers, civilian control over the military was a paramount concern.²⁷ The U.S. Constitution delineates the lines of authority between Congress and the President within Articles I and II. Article I gives Congress the power to “declare war” and sets the legislative branch with the responsibility to “raise and support armies, maintain navies” along with approving all military related budget proposals submitted by the executive branch. Article II assigns the powers of Commander-in-Chief to the President who then directs military forces to achieve required objectives as well as commanding the militia and appointing commissioned officers.²⁸ The U.S. form of democracy has thus far successfully maintained civil control over the military. The civil-

²⁷ Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Gary Wills (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1982), 151-153.

²⁸ U.S. Constitution, art.1, sec. 8, cl. 11-16 and art 2, sec.2.

military debate here is not about preventing a military coup but of achieving the right balance of relations, structure, policy and use of force over the years.²⁹

Huntington's model of the U.S. system of civilian control has been very influential in the study of civil-military relations. His framework maximizes military professionalism under the "objective control" model. Objective control separates political power away from the military and focuses its end on "militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state."³⁰ A key aspect within this model is the notion that the military operates best when not micromanaged by civilian authorities. The officer exists to serve the state; the more professional the officer corps is the less likely it is liable to question the policy or its implementation from the civilian authority. Since professional officers are not political, observations, advice, and other forms of feedback are not contentious in this model.³¹ Objective control keeps military matters with the military professionals and political matters squarely with civilian organizations.

That is not to say that the military does not have some advantages based on organizational structure. A military based on professional competencies, high levels of discipline, effective use of centralized command structure creates a professional officer who is well regarded within the state. The question, therefore, is why does the military obey its "civilian masters"?³² Clearly, the answer within the U.S. military community lies in the concept of professionalism and obedience. The concept of loyalty and obedience to the state remain among the highest virtues of the officer. Professionalism and obedience are thus good starting points for understanding the origins of how officers think, act, and interact with political leaders.

²⁹ Cohen, 241-242.

³⁰ Huntington, 83.

³¹ Huntington, 80-83.

³² Finer, 6.

In an objective control environment, there are clear limits to how professional officers interact. Strictly speaking, officers do not render opinions that pertain to policy. They have the responsibility to comment on matters of implementation. They may comment on their ability to perform tasks assigned by the state. Officers may also provide feedback as to how the armed forces can best support state decisions.³³ Senior military leaders while operating in a complicated environment in which strategy and policy intertwine must at the end of the day understand the hierarchy of obedience. Military professionalism can cause a natural tension between the officer and the political leader. At the root of this tension lie the different viewpoints of the officer and the political leader. On one hand, the military professional sees the problem in terms of what is possible given military strength while at the same time achieving directed goals. On the other hand, the political leader sees the world in terms of interest groups, political parties that shape the balance of power and uses of force and diplomacy.³⁴ Thus, the concept of speaking out within the professional officer corps has roots in the perception of control between the state and the Soldier. In addition, there are concerns as to what extent the military shapes or influences policy. This places increased importance in how skillful the officer is at understanding what to say, when to speak, and who to speak to.³⁵ Officers perceived as too political through either verbal or written statements have negatively influenced civil-military relations. A simple case, often referenced, is the example of General Douglas MacArthur. The manner in which he voiced his opinion of how to prosecute the war in Korea led to a loss of trust and ultimately his retirement/removal by

³³ Huntington, 72-73.

³⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1961), 1.

³⁵ There are two important Department of Defense directives that provide guidelines for speaking out for members of the military. DoD Directive 1325.6 addresses dissent and protest activities and Directive 1344.10 outlines appropriate political activity for active duty service members. This monograph focuses on professional dialogue within the civil-military nexus and not freedom of speech considerations. For a detailed view of prohibited activities within the directives that shape the manner in which service members may speak out see John L. Kiel Jr., "When Soldiers Speak Out: A Survey of Provisions Limiting Freedom of Speech in the Military," *Parameters*, 37, 3 (Autumn 2007) 69-82.

President Truman. Whether classified as a lack of trust, or a matter of control, examples such as these shape the military culture and thus civil-military relations.³⁶

Civil-Military Nexus

When the officer and the state come together at the most senior levels, those relationships constitute what is referred to in this paper as the civil-military nexus. Within the nexus, the President, Secretary of Defense and senior military leadership dominate interaction. The nexus also includes internal components of civilian and military interactions. The National Security Act of 1947 merged the Department of War and the Department of the Navy and introduced important legal guidance that defined the relationships within the nexus. It subordinated the War Department, the Department of the Navy as well as the newly created Department of the Air Force under a single civilian Secretary of Defense. It also provided for the National Security Council, Service Secretaries, Joint Chiefs of Staff and other required personnel structures within the nexus. Most important, it prescribed the hierarchy and interaction responsibilities between members.³⁷ This initial national guidance has been refined and amended over the years and continues to affect the dynamics of the nexus as it changes to meet the needs of our government.³⁸

At the civil-military nexus, military strategy and political objectives come together along with the Soldier and the state.³⁹ Within the nexus, interaction between senior civilian and military leadership through unequaled discourse cause the line between the Soldier and the state to become vague. The civil-military nexus encompasses all aspects of military policy, defense

³⁶ Richard H. Kohn, "Building Trust," in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 273.

³⁷ Gene M. Lyons, "The New Civil-Military Relations," in *The American Political Science Review* 55, no.1 (March 1961):54-56.

³⁸ For an overview with associated documents, see Alice C. Cole, et. al., eds. *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization 1944-1978* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 1978).

³⁹ Nielsen and Snider, 3.

programs, national security interests, and ongoing plans or operations under the “constitutionally empowered civilian authorities.”⁴⁰ Outside of the nexus, the line remains solid as hierarchies extend down to the American public and individual formations or Soldiers.




Figure 1. The Civil-Military Nexus⁴¹

Discourse and interaction are key aspects at the civil-military nexus, and therefore require a more refined model for civil-military relations. As military leaders make operational decisions

⁴⁰ Christopher P. Gibson, *Securing the State: Reforming the National Security Decisionmaking Process at the Civil-Military Nexus* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), 6.

⁴¹ Interactions within the civil-military nexus may vary based on specific situations in addition to the dynamics of the participants. This figure depicts in general the participants within the senior levels of civil-military relations showing that the line between the officer and the state blurs, increasing the need for discourse within this level. Interactions are not restricted to strictly civil to military. Internal civilian and military interactions also effect civil-military relations.

that have political ramifications, and politicians create policies with security implications, the need for discourse becomes greater.⁴² This need to increase discourse underpins Eliot Cohen's model of "dialogue of unequals" in which civil-military relations rely on increased communication.⁴³ This concept builds on Huntington's view that civilian control over the military comes first but accommodates the insight that it is not possible to separate politics from military matters at the civil-military nexus.⁴⁴

Perhaps more useful in the contemporary context is Richard Betts' concept of equal dialogue among unequals. The point is that inequality rightly exists between the military and elected officials and therefore also requires an increased level of dialogue between the military and the state.⁴⁵ Successful dialogue of this nature inherently builds trust between institutions. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates demonstrated this concept early in his tenure. He developed trust through listening and constant dialogue with military officials. This is not to say that he simply defers to their judgment. Rather his interactions with the military enhance his judgment.⁴⁶

Some argue that this concept also possesses its own shortcomings. Increased dialogue at the civil-military nexus may lead to flawed policy decisions. However, since human understanding of the situation provides the basis for policy decisions, there is never any true assurance for complete success. Where no one model provides all the answers, the common tie that binds in the end is mutual trust.⁴⁷

⁴² Moten, 70.

⁴³ Cohen, 241-242.

⁴⁴ Nielsen and Snider, 293.

⁴⁵ Richard K. Betts, "Are Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem?," in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 39.

⁴⁶ Kohn, 284-285.

⁴⁷ Moten, 70.

When the Senate confirmed General Colin Powell as National Security Advisor to the President, General Powell clearly entered the civil-military nexus. He was “now expected to give...my own national security judgments.”⁴⁸ Perceptions play an important role within the culture of the military, both internal to the services and externally from public opinion. At the most senior levels of the civil-military arena, the lines between the Soldier and the state blur or vanish completely. At the civil-military nexus there is a balance of institutional power between the two for a specific purpose or period of interaction.⁴⁹ Colin Powell’s position does not necessarily fit well within a Huntington’s view of objective control. As Senator Nunn (D-GA) explained, “assignment of a military officer to this senior, sensitive position also raises serious questions about the civilian control over the military.”⁵⁰ The civil-military nexus has been at the heart of many debates concerning the evolution of civil-military affairs. The level of influence military officers possess toward their civilian superiors depends largely on their ability to effectively communicate and interact within the political environment.

Senator Nunn supported Colin Powell’s nomination in large part due to his ability to interact effectively at the senior level. How much of a factor was Colin Powell’s communication and interpersonal skills during this position? During Colin Powell’s tenure at the civil-military nexus, he communicated openly with the President about his personal views toward various policies.⁵¹ He even wrote what some called a controversial op-ed to the *New York Times* outlying his viewpoints concerning the perceived lack of troop commitments to match political objectives during the conflict in the Balkans.⁵² Despite what some deemed a period of civil-military tension

⁴⁸ Colin Powell and Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1996), 340.

⁴⁹ Herspring, 19.

⁵⁰ Powell and Persico, 339.

⁵¹ Betts, 31.

⁵² Colin Powell, “Why Generals Get Nervous” *New York Times Online*, October 8, 1992. <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/08/opinion/why-generals-get-nervous.html> (accessed 27 July, 2010).

between President Clinton and his senior military officers, President Clinton still asked him to serve in a myriad of foreign policy matters and ultimately as Secretary of State after his retirement from active duty.⁵³ These and other examples of interactions at the civil-military nexus underline the point that the military culture has changed over time. The military has moved past the simple service oriented institution requiring objective control to an organization that civil authorities will seek discourse in matters policy.⁵⁴ With increased discourse come new models to accommodate interactions at the civil-military nexus.

Changing Environment

Examining interactions and discourse from the senior levels of civil and military leadership provides insights into military culture. It also illustrates the importance of applying effective communication skills to achieve effective civil-military relations. Communication at the civil-military nexus has changed over the decades and along with it, military culture. The current environment is no longer restricted to just the top leadership within the civil-military nexus. Leaders at various levels now operate in an environment dominated by current affairs, national interests and continuous media coverage.⁵⁵ Increasingly complex situations now present the need for officers to possess proactive, innovative, adaptive and sustainable communication skills and “embrace the culture of engagement.”⁵⁶ From the ‘silent’ Soldiers of the 1960’s and 1970’s there is a definite change in post-Cold War era communications. Expanding technology within the global information environment has changed the manner in which the military communicates to

⁵³ Powell and Persico, 586-587.

⁵⁴ Herspring, 19.

⁵⁵ United States Department of Defense, *United States Army Field Manual 6-22: Army Leadership* (Washington D.C: US Government Printing Office, October 2006), 6-7.

⁵⁶ Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, Lt. Col. Shawn Stroud and Anton Menning, “Fostering a Culture of Engagement,” *Military Review*, 89, 5 (September-October 2009) 13-17. The authors trace the evolution of media-military relations and argue that leaders have an obligation to inform and communicate the actions of the military to the American Public. They define proactive, innovative, adaptive, leader driven and sustainable as attributes required within the current “culture of engagement”.

the civilian populace. The desire for real-time information, during times of crisis, has significantly changed how the military interacts within the information environment.⁵⁷ It has never been satisfactory for leaders not to communicate within their environment. Sentiments such as “Ours is not to reason why, ours is to do and die” while possibly enduring are not acceptable.⁵⁸ This familiar quote by Alfred Lord Tennyson may describe the personal belief of many officers over the years but is not necessarily in line with the traditional objective control model. Another attitude that speaks toward the aspect of responsibility comes from Shakespeare’s *Henry V*, Act IV: “for we know enough if we know that we are the King’s subjects: if his cause be wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us.”⁵⁹ The notion of blind obedience still faintly echoes within the ranks in today’s military. Secretary Gates presented a simple message for all officers who may still be hesitant in expressing their professional opinion: “I encourage you to take on the mantle of fearless, thoughtful, but loyal dissent whenever the situation calls for it.”⁶⁰ This message clearly illustrates that officers should not remain silent and that candid, professional communication is now a required quality of the professional Soldier. It also illustrates a shift in mindset from how Huntington defined military obedience.⁶¹

If officers are now more than ever encouraged to speak out and express professional opinion, what bearing does this discourse among unequals have on civil-military relations? Messages sent to and received by civilian authorities and the general population directly bears on the level of trust between the military and the state. These messages, although not originating

⁵⁷ United States Department of Defense, *United States Joint Publication 3-61: Public Affairs* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, May 2009) I-2.

⁵⁸ Alfred Lord Tennyson, *Poems*, ed. Hallam Lord Tennyson (London: Macmillan, 1908), 369.

⁵⁹ William Shakespeare, *The Life of Henry V*, ed. John R. Brown (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 1988), 115-116.

⁶⁰ Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Remarks, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, May 7, 2010.

⁶¹ Huntington, 74-75. Samuel Huntington described military obedience in terms of officers only expressing their views in cases of “military disaster”, or in cases where officers are justified in disobeying orders due to issues of morality.

from the civil-military nexus still shape civil-military relations. Sources of mistrust between civilian authorities and the military exist within the various motivations, perspectives and agendas. These factors are less about obedience and the formal roles between the institutions and more about the personal interactions within civil-military relationships.⁶² Taking steps to foster effective communication and building cohesiveness are critical elements in establishing trust within military organizations.⁶³ These principles are also applicable to civil-military relations. General Ridgway serves as a good case in point within the contemporary environment. Not only did he have the ability to re-build the fragmented U.S. Forces during the Korean War, he also possessed the ability to build trust within the international community while serving as Supreme Commander, Far East. Through applying the same values he used within military formations, he also “developed a close, friendly, respective and mutual relationship of trust and confidence” with international civilian leaders.⁶⁴ In addition, when he found that he did not possess the resources to achieve military objectives in Korea from President Truman and the Joints Chiefs, he skillfully articulated the problem in a way that led to a refined end state that his forces could achieve.⁶⁵ It is worth noting that after General Ridgway’s selection as the Chairman of the JCS in 1953, he voiced strong opposition to President Eisenhower’s New Look military force structure cuts. His efforts, however, resulted in a level of unhealthy tension within the civil-military nexus of that time.⁶⁶

⁶² Kohn, 265.

⁶³ United States Department of Defense, *United States Army Field Manual 6-0: Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, August 2003), 4-19-4-20.

⁶⁴ George C. Mitchell, *Matthew B. Ridgway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar, Citizen* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books 2002), 97-101.

⁶⁵ James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1992), 385-395.

⁶⁶ Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control,” *The Journal of Military History*, 61, 2 (April 1997) 311-314.

Developing trust through personal interactions within civil-military relations is just as important in the contemporary environment and remains a critical ability for the professional officer. Through the context of civil-military relations there are numerous examples of success and failure. The next section explores in depth the consequences when officers do not effectively communicate, causing high levels of mistrust and tension in civil-military relations.

Unsuccessful Interaction

When military professionals fail within their interaction at the civil-military nexus, the results can produce broad ranging effects. This section returns to the civil-military nexus and examines two examples of failure interaction. The first illustrates an example in which a group of senior military officers ceased communicating their professional opinions during the Vietnam War and examines their interactions at the civil-military nexus. The second example highlights General Clark's tenure as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and the problems that developed within the civil-military nexus due to his level of interaction. These examples highlight the importance of effective communication within the civil-military nexus and provide practical insight to the professional responsibilities for officers regardless of position or rank.

Irresponsible Communication

Regardless of how officers and senior civilian officials interpreted the notion of objective control as described by Samuel Huntington, there is a clear need for officers to provide clear, candid counsel to their civilian leaders.⁶⁷ Within the bounds of the obedience, especially at the senior levels, officers are required to prevent actions that could lead to disaster. This charge comes through their ability to convey their views successfully with senior leaders and is valued as

⁶⁷ Huntington, 75.

an aspect of professional competence.⁶⁸ Therefore, when officers did not adequately provide input, they do not hold true to the concepts of professionalism described above. Such was a case within the JCS at the height of U.S. involvement during the Vietnam War. Prior to examining this case, it is first useful to describe events that contributed to the environment within the Johnson Administration from 1963 to 1965.⁶⁹

The Vietnam War era was without a question a time of turmoil for the U.S. from 1965 onward. It was also a time of high tensions within the civil-military community. Prior to the war, during the Eisenhower Administration, the U.S. reevaluated foreign policy with regard to the containment of Communism. The National Security Council (NSC) paper 5429 of 12 August 1954 provided the initial framework for understanding U.S. policy toward Vietnam. In section III, the paper specified that if requested, the Executive Branch could with permission from Congress; take military action to assist the state defeat the Communist threat.⁷⁰ Since the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, the U.S. remained committed to supporting a non-Communist state in South Vietnam. After the Eisenhower Administration, President Kennedy also continued this support in the form of increased aid and military assistance. As instability grew within South Vietnam so did the number of U.S. military advisors. As the possibility of U.S. military action in Vietnam grew, generals such as Ridgway, Gavin and Shoup began to reject the implications of

⁶⁸ Huntington, 72-77. Samuel Huntington describes the officer's professional responsibilities that consist of a representation function to include keeping civilian authorities apprised of military capabilities, an advisory function to report the military view regarding state assigned objectives and an executive function to implement state decisions. When state decisions run counter to military advice the officer has the "right and duty" to present his views to civilian authorities.

⁶⁹ This study focuses on the Johnson Administration with references to specific conditions set prior to 1963 as required to set the context for the environment that the JCS operated within the civil-military nexus. This timeframe provides useful insights for civil-military relations due to the interactions and interpersonal dynamics of those within the civil-military nexus at the time.

⁷⁰ Willard J. Webb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The Prelude to the War in Vietnam: 1954-1959* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2007) 10-13.

emerging policy.⁷¹ Growing hostility in South Vietnam culminating in the November 1963 military coup, which deposed President Ngo Dinh Diem, served as a catalyst for further escalation of U.S. commitment to Vietnam in the Johnson Administration. When President Johnson took office later that same month, he found himself in a delicate position. On one hand, he was compelled to safeguard President Kennedy's policies while on the other hand avoid the appearance of losing a U.S. ally in Asia to Communist aggression. President Johnson also had to balance the lack of American resolve and anti-war sentiment from 1963 through the end of the war.⁷² These and other events between 1954 and 1963 set the context for civil-military relations during the Johnson Administration.⁷³ President Johnson's approach of escalation and subsequent prosecution of the war created a divergence between him and his senior military officials. This divergence considerably strained relationships at the civil-military nexus. Between domestic and foreign policy issues, inter-service rivalries, and dissenters the JCS during the Johnson Administration found themselves in a challenging civil-military environment. With over half a million U.S. troops deployed to Vietnam at the peak of the American commitment, the stakes of civil-military disagreements over strategy were considerable.

In the first three years of the major U.S. forces commitment to South Vietnam (1965-1968) 30,614 Americans had lost their lives. After three years and \$52.2 billion spent it seemed that the U.S. was no nearer to achieving the objectives than it was from the start of the war.⁷⁴ For the purposes of this study, individuals within the civil-military nexus that influenced this outcome from the civilian side include Lyndon B. Johnson (President of the United States) and Robert S.

⁷¹ Robert Buzzanco, *Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 9.

⁷² Larry Berman, *Lyndon Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989) 36-37.

⁷³ Buzzanco, 4-10.

⁷⁴ Willard J. Webb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The War in Vietnam: 1969-1970*. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002) 1.

McNamara (Secretary of Defense). The military side of the nexus includes General Earle Wheeler (USA, Chairman, JCS), General John McConnell (Air Force Chief of Staff), General Harold Johnson (Army Chief of Staff), Admiral David McDonald (Chief of Naval Operations) and General Wallace Greene (Marine Corps Commandant).⁷⁵ While there are many other important individuals within this time period, focusing on the interactions of the above individuals prove useful for the points required within this study.

Of interest within these interactions was the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the President. Robert McNamara was a year older than President John Kennedy, and had the reputation of a highly skillful organizer. Given his wide range of credentials ranging from Harvard Business School, to success from his time at the Ford Motor Company, he was the right fit for President Kennedy's choice for Secretary of Defense.⁷⁶ McNamara earned full trust within the Kennedy Administration for his actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy held McNamara's judgment higher than his military advisors and felt he was correct in not entering the country into "a third world war" as he believed his military advisors advocated.⁷⁷ Given President Kennedy's strong level of approval, Secretary McNamara's level of influence within the Executive Branch increased dramatically after the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Johnson held an even higher regard for Secretary McNamara believing that he was the best within the members of the administration he inherited from President Kennedy. President Johnson had so much faith in Secretary McNamara that he was comfortable making military decisions without including the JCS based entirely on McNamara's viewpoint.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ David M. Barrett, ed., *Lyndon B. Johnson's Vietnam Papers*. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1997) XX-XXXIV.

⁷⁶ Moya A. Ball, *Vietnam-On-The-Potomac* (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1992) 15. This book examines how the creation of small group communication and rhetoric of both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations influenced key decisions during the Vietnam War from 1961 to 1965.

⁷⁷ Herspring, 148.

⁷⁸ McMaster, 48.

The JCS did not enjoy the same level of closeness with President Johnson, as did Secretary McNamara. President Johnson's management style was somewhat secretive and he tended to insulate himself from those that did not agree with his views.⁷⁹ President Johnson like President Kennedy was less inclined to utilize the formal NSC structure than President Eisenhower had been. Meetings at the executive level designed to provide structured debate regarding Vietnam often became one-way lectures from McNamara with little or no input from the JCS.⁸⁰ The view within the JCS was "It was well known among the JCS staff that the president...mistrusted the high command, an attitude that wasn't lost on JCS officers."⁸¹ In a 1965 session with President Johnson and the JCS, President Johnson "screamed obscenities...cursed them personally...and stated that he did not care for their advice."⁸² For effective interactions at the civil-military nexus, a level of mutual trust and respect must exist. Perhaps understandably due to the inter-service rivalries that occurred from the 1940's through the 1960's, along with the dynamics of Johnson's style within White House were why the JCS were unable to effectively collaborate.⁸³ Regardless the cause of tensions, this environment created a breakdown of professional discourse between the JCS and Secretary McNamara, and the Chairman of the JCS to President Johnson. This loss of discourse contributed to a loss of mutual trust, which in turn negatively affected civil-military relations.

Given this environment, what approach did the JCS take in communicating with the Secretary of Defense and the President? How did they provide feedback, and how did civilian

⁷⁹ Herspring, 148-151.

⁸⁰ Herspring, 150-152.

⁸¹ Mark Perry, *Four Stars* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1989) 133.

⁸² Charles G. Cooper, and Richard E. Goodspeed, *Cheers and Tears: A Marine's Story of Combat in Peace and War* (Victoria, BC: Trafford Publishing, 2002) 4-5. The memoirs of retired General Cooper include his experiences while working for Admiral McDonald in 1965. He witnessed the session between President Johnson and the JCS mentioned above.

⁸³ Kohn, 270-275.

responses to their feedback affect how they communicated to the senior civilian leaders? During the early months of 1965, the JCS well understood the President's desire to pursue a "gradual intensification" approach to the Vietnam War. Given the perceived lack of support from the population, the president was very hesitant to deploy large forces to Vietnam. Instead, he pressed the military to win the war with what they had and frequently asked for reports on how many Viet Cong U.S. forces had killed.⁸⁴ The JCS strongly recommended that significant ground forces were necessary to achieve the president's objectives and avoid disaster in Vietnam⁸⁵ General Westmoreland surmised the situation in Vietnam and requested a minimum of forty-four battalions, over the existing force structure of 3,500 Marines sent in March of 1965.⁸⁶

General Harold Johnson, after a personal visit to Vietnam in April of 1965 concurred with General Westmoreland's assessment. Army planners also recommended deploying a minimum of five divisions. General Johnson however chose not make this recommendation to the president. Despite the professional advice from his staff, he recommended adding only one division because he felt that this would be more palatable to the president.⁸⁷ On July 27, 1965 in a national security session with the JCS, the president outlined what he thought was adequate to meet the force requirements in Vietnam. When he finished laying out his ideas, he turned to the JCS and asked if there were any questions. Despite their professional opinion that the war required a larger ground force, they did not speak up and remained silent.⁸⁸ Whether the projections from the JCS would have proven correct is not the focus of this study. What is important to note is that the JCS chose not to voice their concern despite their professional

⁸⁴ Ball, 149.

⁸⁵ McMaster, 247.

⁸⁶ William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1976) 140-141.

⁸⁷ McMaster, 247.

⁸⁸ James Burk, "Responsible Obedience by Military Professionals," in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 158.

misgivings. Their decision to stay silent was an abrogation of their professional responsibilities. It could be argued that these senior military officials were only maintaining what they felt the appropriate level of obedience. After all, the military does not have the determining role in policy development, they merely advise the civilian authorities.⁸⁹ To say that this is why the JCS did not speak up is incorrect. Referring back to the purpose of their existence, Joint Chiefs had the obligation of communicating their professional opinions. The fact that President Johnson relied on General Wheeler's silence to support his policy of limiting troop deployments to Vietnam runs directly counter to the notion of obedience the state. Obedience to the president does not require purposefully misrepresenting professional opinion. This does not define obedience it illustrates irresponsibility.⁹⁰ It also undermines trust within the larger civil-military community.

To say that civil-military relations were tense during the Vietnam War Era is an understatement. Interactions between the services and the services and the civilian authorities were often unproductive at the cost of Soldiers fighting the War in Vietnam. The fact remains that interaction between senior members of the military and the President and the Secretary of Defense failed during this timeframe. This failure created a level of mistrust between civilians, the military and the government. It was not until the first Gulf War that trust was reestablished.⁹¹

Careless Communication

Not expressing professional opinions can be irresponsible as noted in the example from Vietnam. General Wesley Clark serves as an example of what happens when senior military officers interact in such a manner that their communication becomes counterproductive, ultimately resulting in tensions within the civil-military nexus and his early retirement. During his

⁸⁹ Andrew J. Goodpastor, "Educational Aspects of Civil-Military Relations," in *Civil-Military Relations*, Andrew J. Goodpastor and Samuel P. Huntington (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977) 33.

⁹⁰ Burk, 158.

⁹¹ Kohn, 273.

tenure as both Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Commander of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), General Clark faced a challenging civil-military environment.⁹² On one hand, he maintained responsibilities back to the CJCS General Shelton, Secretary of Defense Cohen, Secretary of State Albright, and President Clinton. On the other hand, his post required him to maintain a very close relationship with NATO Secretary General Javier Solano, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other members of NATO.⁹³ These relationships were critical to the success of General Clark's mission and put him very clearly within the civil-military nexus, with the added pressure of international actors.

General Clark was in many ways an excellent candidate for this position. As a Major, he had worked at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) during the Cold War. General Clark had a personal relationship with President Clinton, which dated back to 1965 where they met at a student conference at Georgetown University.⁹⁴ In addition, he served as the Director for Strategic Plans and Policies on the Joint Staff (J5) under General Shalikashvili, and played a role in shaping the national strategic policy concerning NATO and the Balkans.⁹⁵ As the J5, he not only oversaw the planning effort, he accompanied his superiors to meetings held at the White House and the State Department. From this vantage point, he had an excellent opportunity to observe effective interaction at the civil-military nexus. As the J5, he served as the senior military official during the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this capacity, he worked closely with Ambassador Holbrooke, Ambassador Albright and a host of international senior officials including Yugoslav President Milosevic. General Shalikashvili believed that

⁹² For a detailed background on the complicated role of the SACEUR, see Robert S. Jordan, *Generals in International Politics* (Lexington, KY: the University Press of Kentucky, 1987). The contributors within this book describe the development of SHAPE through General Haig's tenure as SACEUR with an emphasis on the complicated nature of NATO and the role of SACEUR.

⁹³ Clark, 81-90.

⁹⁴ Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2005), 112.

⁹⁵ Clark, 26-46.

General Clark had performed his duties exceptionally well and selected General Clark first to Southern Command, and later to SACUER. Not everyone shared General Shalikashvili's opinion of General Clark. Specifically, General Reimer, Chief of Staff of the Army during this period, opposed both appointments. General Reimer did not place General Clark on his list of potential candidates for either position because he did not believe General Clark was a good fit for the positions.⁹⁶ President Clinton, however, approved General Clark for the position based his talents and believed him to be the ideal successor to General Joulwan based on his previous experience.⁹⁷ General Clark practiced the art of negotiation and became well aware of the personalities within this challenging environment.⁹⁸ The Clinton Administration saw the potential for a positive alliance between Secretary of State Albright and General Clark, due to her belief that U.S. military force was ultimately required to resolve the situation in the Balkans.⁹⁹ Despite this preparation, the seventy-eight day war in Kosovo would prove otherwise.

As SACEUR, General Clark was aware of the Kosovo issue from his days working with President Milosevic during the coordination of the Dayton Agreement. When the situation in Kosovo deteriorated to the point that NATO member countries pushed for direct NATO military involvement, General Clark developed Operation Allied Force. NATO members required a response to the attacks against ethnic Albanians by President Milosevic. General Clark had the problem of interpreting what he termed was a lack of political consensus toward the application of Allied military force. As the planning effort continued, significant disagreements existed within both the U.S. and NATO leadership over what constituted the right strategic targeting

⁹⁶ David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York, NY: Touchstone Books, 2002), 392-393. The author outlines also that there is a myth that the Clinton Administration also strongly supported General Clark for the position of SACEUR. The author notes that this was not the case and that President Clinton relied largely upon General Shalikashvili's endorsement.

⁹⁷ Clinton, 752.

⁹⁸ Clark, 70.

⁹⁹ Herspring, 365.

plan.¹⁰⁰ The plan called for three phases, each one increasing level of military action against President Milosevic. The hope was that after the first forty-eight hours of striking the initial targets that President Milosevic would yield and withdraw his forces. U.S. and international officials both shared this opinion. When the first phase did not achieve the desired effects, General Clark and his team continued through the additional targets approved during phase two of the operation. Despite the highly scrutinized success of the air campaign, there was a growing opinion within the U.S. and international community that ground forces were required for a Yugoslav withdraw of forces.¹⁰¹ The coalition environment of the Kosovo War created many tensions within General Clark's command. Great Britain and many coalition partners preferred a more aggressive course than the U.S. stance. The U.S. contributed more than three-quarters of the effective forces during the Kosovo War and therefore steered much of the decision-making during the phases of the operation.¹⁰² General Clark caught between two perspectives had to balance the coalition effort as part of the larger aspect of the war.

All sides wanted success, but in different ways. General Clark believed that he worked for two bosses, President Clinton and NATO Secretary General Solana. His inability to accommodate both views and synchronize efforts frustrated his position. General Clark professionally sided with Secretary Solana and made many attempts to persuade Washington of the need for a more aggressive ground force option.¹⁰³ After receiving guidance from General Shelton or Secretary Cohen, General Clark would then contact NATO allies or Secretary Albright and derive a slightly different plan that did not align with the intent of his earlier instructions.

¹⁰⁰ William M. Arkin, "Operation Allied Force: The Most Precise Application of Air Power in History," in *War Over Kosovo*, by Andrew A. Bacevich and Eliot Cohen. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 1-4.

¹⁰¹ Arkin, 19.

¹⁰² Eliot A. Cohen, "Kosovo and the New American Way of War," in *War Over Kosovo*, by Andrew A. Bacevich and Eliot Cohen. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 57.

¹⁰³ Clark, 425.

Because of his role as SACEUR and CDR, USEUCOM, he believed that he was well within his rights to carry out separate sets of instructions.

This problem came to a head when General Shelton stated that General Clark was to vacate his post three months early in April of 2000, due to “integrity and character issues.” This decision greatly surprised General Clark. It was not that General Clark was simply not communicating with the CJCS or the Secretary of Defense. Problems arose over the manner in which he communicated. After outlining a plan to the JCS, General Clark would often refine the plan based on NATO input and fail to update the JCS to the changes prior to execution. This frustrated General Shelton and the JCS, increasing the level of friction in their future interactions.¹⁰⁴ In fairness to General Clark, it did not help that at times General Shelton and Secretary Cohen’s views differed widely at times. A view formed within the JCS that when General Clark did not receive the answer he wanted, he would go around the chain of command to the State Department.¹⁰⁵ General Clark also demonstrated poor judgment by forwarding a copy of his Limited Air Plan to senior White House officials prior to transmitting it to General Shelton or Secretary Cohen for review.¹⁰⁶ Actions of this nature did more to divide General Clark from the Pentagon than foster the level of mutual trust required in an already complicated civil-military environment. General Clark interacted with his civilian counterparts to the extent that there was fear within the Pentagon that he was becoming too close to high-ranking civilians.¹⁰⁷ Whereas he did inform the CJCS of his intention to visit the White House or the State Department, he at times failed to brief and gain concurrence from his superiors first. Communication between General Clark and officials in Washington occurred at times without input or refinement from the military

¹⁰⁴ Evan Thomas and T. Trent Gegax, “The General: Did Clark Fail to Salute?” in *Newsweek Campaign* 2004. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4052506/> (accessed 1 July, 2010).

¹⁰⁵ Jim Geraghty, “Why Wes Clark’s Coworkers Hated Him,” *National Review Online*. <http://old.nationalreview.com/geraghty/geraghty200402020857.asp> (accessed 1 July, 2010).

¹⁰⁶ Clark, 127.

¹⁰⁷ Herspring, 361.

channels of the JCS.¹⁰⁸ Unlike the Gulf War, in which a dominant General Powell controlled communications from General Schwarzkopf, General Clark communicated directly to the President and other key Department of State officials. This allowed for a level of centralization within General Clark's headquarters that precluded the type of discussion and debate between senior military officials. Without this structured discourse, the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense were not able to participate as necessary. General Clark as seen through the lens of the JCS was executing policy that he created.¹⁰⁹ General Clark's communication with the press was equally troubling for his superiors.

General Clark well understood the role that the media played during his tenure as SACEUR. As his position required, he interacted with the press almost daily during the Kosovo War and news services like *CNN* quickly broadcasted all breaking developments. Given the political sensitivities surrounding the Dayton Agreement, it did not take long within his command before the first instance of careless communication occurred. Secretary Cohen asked General Clark to conduct a press conference in the winter of 1997. The purpose of the press conference was to highlight NATO's resolve toward Serbian aggression and counter a growing international perception of NATO's weakness within the region. During his remarks, General Clark stated, "We will not be intimidated by threats to our troops."

Shortly afterwards, he received guidance to fly back to the U.S. Upon his arrival, he received sharp criticism from the Secretary of Defense. This statement drew criticism because within the context of the conference, members of the press drew assumptions that the U.S. was prepared to commit a significant military effort within the region. What seemed like a correct statement, and a sentiment that international officials embraced opened the door to potential

¹⁰⁸ Clark, 127-130.

¹⁰⁹ Eliot A. Cohen, "Kosovo and the New American Way of War," in *War Over Kosovo*, by Andrew A. Bacevich and Eliot Cohen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 57.

commitments that the U.S. was not prepared to make at that time. Secretary Cohen was disturbed that General Clark did not choose his words more carefully.¹¹⁰

On 27 April 1999, General Clark conducted another press conference upon his return to Brussels after attending the 50th Anniversary of NATO Summit in Washington. The substance of the press conference was much the same message as he had delivered in Washington the day prior. He focused on the positive aspects of the summit in Washington and reviewed the tactical situation in Bosnia and Kosovo to include the effects of the air campaign. John Dugberg from the *Los Angeles Times* asked him to comment further as to the battle losses of the Yugoslav Army and Air Forces. General Clark reinforced his earlier statements about battle losses and remarked that the Yugoslav military were still sending reinforcements into Kosovo. General Clark stated, “He [President Milosevic] is bringing in reinforcements continually from the Second Army and others... He has strengthened his forces in there and that's going to be a phenomenon until we can further cut the lines of supply and go more intensively against his forces.”¹¹¹ The press was quick in reporting that the situation in Kosovo was not as positive as the White House had reported thus far. This less than positive report from General Clark also troubled his superiors. In short, his message did not align with the intent from Washington. General Shelton called and informed him that there had been much discussion at the White House over his comments. In addition, General Shelton had received verbatim guidance from the Secretary Cohen “Get your f.....g face off the TV. No more briefings period. That’s it. I just wanted to give it to you like he said it. Do you have any questions?”¹¹²

The *Los Angeles Times* reports General Clark was quoted in more newspapers and other media outlets more than any other officer between the 1998 and 2000. In addition, he appeared in

¹¹⁰ Clark, 90.

¹¹¹ Online News Hour, “NATO Military Briefing, April 27, 1999,” PBS News Hour, http://www.pbs.org/newhour/bb/europe/jan-jun99/nato_briefing_4-27.html (accessed July 1, 2010).

¹¹² Clark, 273.

over 300 *New York Times* articles while other senior military officers like General Shelton appeared in only twenty-four.¹¹³ General Clark's interactions with the media did not foster a healthy civil-military environment. His excessive communications created increased tensions between not only his military superiors but also of his civilian officials. When in disagreement with U.S. positions regarding the Kosovo War, he chose to lean toward his SACEUR role and side with coalition partners in whom he found agreement. These decisions resulted in a failed civil-military relationship that affected both the officer and the state. General Clark did not come home to a warm hero's welcome but to early retirement.¹¹⁴

Effective Interaction

As the last section focused on unsuccessful examples, this section introduces successful instances of interaction between senior military officers and civilian officials at the civil-military nexus. This section explores two examples. The first highlights the actions of General Shinseki as he interacted with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. This example demonstrates responsible discourse from a professional officer in a less than healthy civil-military environment. The second example reviews the relationship between General Marshall and President Roosevelt. Reviewing their interactions illustrates how General Marshall effectively used communication and created an environment that was professionally constructive for both the military and political elements of his time. Both generals operated in a time of uncertainty under stressful conditions. These leaders also executed their duties with a high level of professionalism within the bounds of civil-military relations.

¹¹³ Jim Geraghty, "Why Wes Clark's Coworkers Hated Him," National Review Online. <http://old.nationalreview.com/geraghty/geraghty200402020857.asp> (accessed 1 July, 2010).

¹¹⁴ Andrew J. Bacevich, "Neglected Trinity," in *War Over Kosovo*, by Andrew A. Bacevich and Eliot Cohen. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 159-160.

Responsible Communication

On 25 February 2003, General Eric Shinseki in his role as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (CSA), provided testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the posture of the United States Army. During General Shinseki's opening statement, he outlined the current progress of transformation within the U.S. Army. He spoke of manning, equipping initiatives, strategic readiness and a host of other programs within the transition plan.¹¹⁵ Whereas these comments were insightful to the members of the committee, the question and answer period after his prepared comments sparked the most interest. During this session, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), at the time Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, asked General Shinseki what he thought the right force requirements were for success in Iraq post invasion. Drawing from his experiences in post war Bosnia, General Shinseki reported, "Something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably...a figure that would be required." This comment brought tensions between him and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to a heated level.¹¹⁶

The civil-military relationship between Secretary Rumsfeld and General Shinseki began well prior to the general's testimony. Before Secretary Rumsfeld's appointment, General Shinseki set out to transform the Army to meet what he saw were the challenges of the future. Secretary Rumsfeld believed early on that General Shinseki's initiatives toward a lighter, more agile force were in line with his own observations. Once in office, however, their relationship became strained and deteriorated rapidly.¹¹⁷ Their relationship now serves as classic study in failed civil-military relationships that has some parallels to the Vietnam War case study but with different

¹¹⁵ General Eric Shinseki, speaking on the Posture of the United States Army, on February 25, 2003, to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 108th Cong., 1st sess. General Shinseki became CSA in June of 1999.

¹¹⁶ Thom Shanker, "New Strategy vindicates Ex-Army Chief Shinseki," New York Times Online. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/12/washington/12shinseki.html> (accessed 3 July, 2010).

¹¹⁷ Bradley Graham, *By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld* (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2009), 253-254.

outcomes. Like Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rumsfeld had his own style of managing the military. He quickly developed a reputation for showing less deference to senior military officials and at times regarded them as lacking vision. He also had a reputation for treating them with a level of contempt and pursued his own courses of action.¹¹⁸ Secretary Rumsfeld was considered difficult to get along with. Based on his previous experiences, Secretary Rumsfeld believed that his civilian advisors better understood “military strategy, doctrine, structure, and weapons systems better than the generals and admirals he encountered.”¹¹⁹ Unlike the example of the JCS and McNamara, General Shinseki did not remain silent and maintained his professional stance on many issues.

The first clash between General Shinseki and Secretary Rumsfeld occurred over the black beret issue. As part of General Shinseki’s larger transformation plan, the black beret became the standard headgear for the Army at large. Despite heated controversy within the U.S. Army Ranger community and urging by Secretary Rumsfeld, General Shinseki held firm to his decision. Secretary Rumsfeld lost confidence with General Shinseki over this issue and their relationship worsened over time.¹²⁰ With still fifteen months left to serve as the Chairman of the JCS, General Shinseki did not speak out against the Secretary of Defense and continued pressing Army transformation programs. Another dividing point between the two was the argument over the eighty-ton Crusader artillery gun initiative. Secretary Rumsfeld effectively terminated the program due to the high costs associated with the system. During testimony before a Senate Armed Services Committee in May of 2002, General Shinseki acknowledged the decision and

¹¹⁸ Michael C. Desch, “Hartz, Huntington, and the Liberal Tradition in America,” in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 104.

¹¹⁹ Herspring, 380-381.

¹²⁰ Graham, 255.

provided his candid professional opinion against the decision.¹²¹ The merits of the black beret, Crusader program, and other issues created much debate within the civil-military nexus. This debate in and of itself should not be considered negative. The overall affects of the civil-military relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the CSA were.

At this point, General Shinseki had a several options. Given this challenging civil-military environment, he could acquiesce to Secretary Rumsfeld, modify his message, and regain favor. He could speak out and lobby his opinions to media outlets and other political entities, or he could simply give up and retire. General Shinseki chose to stay his course, complete his assignment and continue providing his candid professional advice, despite the fallout that came. Unlike the generals during the Vietnam era, General Shinseki operated under the guidance and spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. General Shinseki provided military advice, enabled the authority of combatant commanders, worked for the efficient use of defense resources and never questioned the authority of the civilian chain of command.¹²²

Despite some perceptions, Secretary Rumsfeld never fired General Shinseki. General Shinseki completed his assignment and retired according to his plan. Secretary Rumsfeld did do something just as effective in a very public fashion. Early in 2002, the *Washington Post* reported, “Rumsfeld let it be known in April that he had decided to name Gen. John M. Keane, the Army's

¹²¹ Vernon Loeb, “Rumsfeld Untracks Crusader,” *Washington Post*, May 9, 2002, A01.

¹²² One of the major goals of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act was to ensure clear responsibility within the civil-military chain of command. Some critics say that the Chairman’s role has undermined civilian authority. Although the act increased the role of the chairman, it ensures that the Secretary of Defense has complete control of the senior military official. The act also provides for testimony before congress so that Congress receives an independent military perspective that had been lacking prior to this legislation. See James R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 13 (Autumn 1996): 10-13. For a more in depth study on how military reform has shaped civil-military relations see also MAJ Michael J. Baim, “A Test of U.S. Civil-Military Relations: Structural Influences of Military Reform on the Conflict between Presidents and Senior Military Commanders during times of War,” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009).

vice chief of staff, as its next chief, fifteen months before its current chief, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, was scheduled to retire.”¹²³ This broke with the normal custom of naming the new chairman within a few months of the outgoing officer’s scheduled exit. In fairness to Secretary Rumsfeld, he did have the agenda of bringing in fresh leaders to top positions as part of his concept of transformation.¹²⁴ Essentially, the announcement made General Shinseki a lame duck and sent clear indications to other officers that Secretary Rumsfeld did not tolerate dissenters in his ranks. Officers who spoke out contrary to their civilian leaders were not favored and dismissed.

For some the situation looked no better than the days of McNamara when he was at the Pentagon.¹²⁵ This was the situation as General Shinseki testified to Congress on 25 February 2003. Some argue General Shinseki’s testimony was not accurate enough and was not respectful of civilian control. Some believe that he should have chosen a more discreet closed session to disclose his opinions for force requirements. In addition, critics argue that at the time General Shinseki provided his recommendations, there were debates regarding the negative consequences of deploying a high number of troops to Iraq. Some civilian staff members within the Office of the Secretary of Defense along with the combatant commander General Franks believed that high troop levels would actually inflate the cost of the campaign by giving the enemy more time to react and prepare mass destruction attacks.¹²⁶

While it is true that General Shinseki could have asked for a closed session (without media involvement), he was simply responding to a direct question asked. Had he delayed or not responded then, critics would say that he avoided the subject, or was derelict in his duties to

¹²³ Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, “Rumsfeld’s Style, Goals Strain Ties in Pentagon,” Washington Post Online. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A32170-2002Oct15?> (accessed 5 August, 2010).

¹²⁴ Graham, 329-331.

¹²⁵ Gibson, 99.

¹²⁶ Damon Coletta, “Courage in the Service of Virtue: The Case of General Shinseki’s Testimony before the Iraq War,” *Armed Forces & Society* 34, no.1 (October 2007): 109-121.

respond to Congress. He also ultimately deferred the estimate to the commander closest to the situation, General Franks. General Shinseki discussed force requirements and deployment issues with General Franks and his staff, based on his lessons learned in Bosnia.¹²⁷ General Shinseki provided what he believed was a non-political response to the situation. He did not challenge the subsequent public remarks made by Secretary Rumsfeld or Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz who stated that General Shinseki was “wildly off the mark.”¹²⁸

What is telling and why General Shinseki serves as a model for effective communication is what did not happen after his retirement. General Shinseki did not criticize the decisions of Secretary Rumsfeld. At his retirement speech, he only warned, “Beware the 12-division strategy for 10-division Army.”¹²⁹ He also did not join in the “revolt of the generals” calling for the resignation of Secretary Rumsfeld. It is interesting to note that President Bush acknowledged in 2007 that there were not enough Soldiers deployed to Iraq. As a result, President Bush approved a force structure roughly the same size as General Shinseki recommended back in 2003. General Shinseki also did not comment on what many said was his vindication over Secretary Rumsfeld.¹³⁰ Even more interesting is the recommendation President Bush made to Secretary Rumsfeld’s replacement. He counseled, “The new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an environment in which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to

¹²⁷ Michael C. Desch, “Bush and the Generals,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2007) <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62616/michael-c-desch-/bush-and-the-generals> (accessed 3 August, 2010). See also the responses to Michael Desch’s essay from Richard B. Myers, Richard H. Kohn, Mackubin Thomas Owens, and Lawrence J. Korb. These writers provide useful civil-military counter arguments to Desch’s essay within the same web page.

¹²⁸ Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force’s Size,” *New York Times*, February 28, 2003.

¹²⁹ Richard Halloran, *My Name Is Shinseki...and I am a Soldier* (Honolulu: Hawaii Army Museum Society, 2004), 66.

¹³⁰ Thom Shanker, “New Strategy vindicates Ex-Army Chief Shinseki,” *New York Times Online*. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/12/washington/12shinseki.html> (accessed 3 July, 2010).

the President and the National Security Council.”¹³¹ General Shinseki serves as a model for officers to follow in his interactions within a tense civil-military environment. Regardless of the situation, General Shinseki adhered to the principles of his profession without stepping over the line between the Soldier and the state.

Successful Communication

General George Marshall and President Franklin Roosevelt are two individuals who hold an honored place within U.S. history and represent one of the best examples of positive civil-military relations.¹³² Based on the high level of mutual respect, loyalty and cooperation these leaders developed an outstanding relationship that was very productive during their era and serves as an example for others to follow.¹³³ This section explores the leadership and personal styles of both individuals and illustrates how their interactions created healthy relations within the civil-military nexus. This era also marks a time when the line between the Soldier and the state blurred because of their successful interaction. Whereas previous sections outlined either unsuccessful communication by officers within a permissive civil-military environment, or successful communication from a professional officer within a non-permissive environment, this section highlights successful communication within an optimal civil-military environment.

In describing General Marshall, biographers report that he had little in common with generals of his time and even less in common with great generals of the past. General Marshall was one who did not easily conform to the standard model and went somewhat against the

¹³¹ Michael C. Desch, “Bush and the Generals,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2007) <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62616/michael-c-desch-/bush-and-the-generals> (accessed 3 August, 2010).

¹³² This section focuses on the interaction between the President and General Marshall. Though Secretary of War Henry Stimson played an important role in the civil-military nexus, this section focuses on the unique relationship between President Roosevelt and General Marshall.

¹³³ Herspring, 23.

common grain.¹³⁴ Though not commonly thought of as a flamboyant general of his time, he did win the trust and admiration of his subordinates, peers and supervisors. Graduating from the Virginia Military Institute instead of West Point, performing routine tours of duty in the Philippines and later in China early in his career may have indicated that he would be an average officer of his time. This was not the case as his superiors frequently remarked that he possessed a remarkable aptitude for field problems in strategy and tactics.¹³⁵

Just as General Marshall developed a strong record as a proficient officer, he also developed a reputation as an officer who candidly expressed his professional opinion. As a major during the First World War, he had an early chance encounter with General Pershing that did much to foreshadow his career. During an intense preliminary training exercise in 1917, General Pershing paid a visit to the First Expeditionary Division. Not liking the outcome of the maneuvers, General Pershing's comments to the division staff were harsh. Major Marshall detained General Pershing and remarked that the unit only learned of the maneuvers the day prior and should have had at least two weeks to prepare. At the time, this must have seemed a very bold move and while the rest of the staff waited for what was surely the end of Major Marshall's career, General Pershing paused and remarked that Major Marshall was in fact correct.¹³⁶

General Pershing appreciated the candidness of Marshall and often took him aside during the early stages of the war to gain better understanding of the division's situation. In the end, despite Marshall's desire for line duty, his talents earned him the division chief of staff position. After the war, General Pershing appointed Marshall as his aid.¹³⁷ This position exposed Marshall to the civil-military nexus where he continued to provide expert advice to General Pershing.

¹³⁴ Payne, xi.

¹³⁵ William Frye, *Marshall: Citizen Soldier* (New York, NY: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1947), 95.

¹³⁶ Payne, 45-46.

¹³⁷ Thomas Parrish, *Roosevelt and Marshall: Partners in Politics and War, The Personal Story* (New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989), 32-37.

General Pershing expected Marshall to speak out, to advise and if necessary criticize. Marshall founded many strong relationships with senior military officers but held General Pershing as a primary role model.¹³⁸

Marshall's great talent as a staff officer coupled with his communication skills within the senior ranks earned him a unique reputation. During the interwar years Marshall gained the reputation of a highly sophisticated officer who could expertly lead complex military planning while at the same time exude executive and diplomatic qualities.¹³⁹ During his tenure at the War Department, he continued a pattern of open frank communication both inside military channels and with civilian authorities. He believed in a strict policy of military loyalty to the government but also believed that a responsible officer had the obligation to question policies that he felt were in error. He believed that officers owed professional discourse within the civil-military nexus to arrive at the best decision.

As testament to this notion General Marshall's early interaction with President Roosevelt were in matters of disagreement. Prior to his selection as Chief of Staff, General Marshall, still a brigadier general, believed in measures that allowed a more balanced ground force. When asked by President Roosevelt if he agreed with increasing the production of an air fleet to ten thousand planes a year, General Marshall replied simply that he did not because developing an air fleet of such size would restrain the development of balanced land forces. Whereas many in the room believed that General Marshall's response spelled the end of his tenure, they were wrong. General Marshall did not make a grave error; he simply and honestly provided his professional opinion to the president. Five months later President Roosevelt selected General Marshall to serve as the next Chief of Staff of the Army over thirty-four other names on the list of potential candidates,

¹³⁸ Ed Cray, *General of the Army* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990), 84-89.

¹³⁹ Parrish, 36-37.

many of which senior to him in rank.¹⁴⁰ It is clear that President Roosevelt did not interpret General Marshall as insubordinate. Rather General Marshall's professionalism established a level of respect and trust that President Roosevelt would come to rely on throughout the war.

In many aspects, President Roosevelt's reaction to General Marshall was indicative of his personal style of leadership. President Roosevelt's prior experience as Assistant Secretary of the Navy provided him with an early appreciation of the military. He understood the value of choosing the right officers to serve in key positions. His personal style included encouraging his senior military advisors to express their professional opinions and voice disagreement when needed.¹⁴¹ President Roosevelt created the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to the need to coordinate with the British Chief of Staff. Although the staff did not take form until after U.S. entry into World War II in February of 1942, the move streamlined coordination processes while also creating much needed direct access to the President. His intent was not to marginalize the authority of the Secretary of War; rather he preferred to foster increased discourse between himself and chiefs.¹⁴² General Marshall understood that even though he could go around Secretary Stimson, it was not a wise choice. General Marshall instead chose to work through his civilian secretary in such a way that fostered mutual respect and trust. Secretary Stimson and General Marshall had their own disagreements but due to their high level of partnership, they professionally resolved issues and combined effectively to serve President Roosevelt. This open, honest dialogue provided a strong framework for relations at the civil-military nexus.¹⁴³

Memorandums from General Marshall to President Roosevelt show clear examples of open dialogue between the two leaders. They range from addressing specific questions or

¹⁴⁰ Herspring, 29.

¹⁴¹ Herspring, 24.

¹⁴² Parrish, 110-111.

¹⁴³ Christopher P. Gibson, "National Security and Civilian Control of the Military," in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, ed. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 248-249.

concerns from the president, relaying important war information to providing numerous suggestions for the proper employment of forces during the war. The frequency and tone of the correspondence suggests a high level of respect that General Marshall held for President Roosevelt in addition to a high level of comfort in relaying various types of information. From highly classified messages to administrative recommendations, it is clear that General Marshall and President Roosevelt maintained open healthy interactions throughout the course of their tenure.¹⁴⁴ In correspondence from President Roosevelt to General Marshall, there is clear evidence their strong relationship. One example illustrates a response to General Marshall's concern for improving troop morale. Early in the war, troop morale had withstood debates within Congress and the press but General Marshall recommended mobilizing increased support to the war effort from the general population. As typical in his response to General Marshall, President Roosevelt acknowledged the problem and asked for the general's advice.¹⁴⁵

Throughout General Marshall's interaction with President Roosevelt, he never lost sight of his professionalism. President Roosevelt made many attempts in cultivating an informal personal relationship with his chief of staff. General Marshall although polite and respectful maintained a professional distance from the president so that he remained a proper level of objectivity.¹⁴⁶ Despite General Marshall's strictly business attitude, President Roosevelt's opinion of General Marshall only increased. President Roosevelt sensed that General Marshall was

¹⁴⁴ Larry I. Bland, ed. *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: Volume 3, The Right Man for the Job, December 7, 1941-May 31, 1943* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). This selection of correspondence from General Marshall contains numerous memorandums to President Roosevelt. Within this selection, there is also ample constructive communication between General Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson. The depth of General Marshall's correspondence illustrates a highly effective ability to serve as a conduit of information between the President Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson, Congress and military leaders both at home and abroad during the war.

¹⁴⁵ Elliot Roosevelt, *F.D.R., His Personal Letters: 1928-1945* (New York, NY: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), 1211. Like General Marshall's personal papers, there are numerous instances of correspondence from President Roosevelt to General Marshall. In a vast majority of the letters, President Roosevelt after offering his opinion asks General Marshall for his perspective prior to making his decision.

¹⁴⁶ Stanley Weintraub, *15 Stars: Eisenhower, MacArthur, Marshall, Three Generals Who Saved the American Century* (New York, NY: Free Press, 2007), 105-106.

perhaps a man of strong emotions by nature who had tempered himself for successful execution of his duties. The president viewed him as a man of great integrity who was selfless and above all objective in his opinions.¹⁴⁷

The relationship between General Marshall and President Roosevelt serves as an example for others to follow when faced with the dilemma of interacting within the civil-military nexus. General Marshall understood his role regardless how blurred the lines between the Soldier and the State became within the civil-military nexus. He maintained a level of professionalism and objectivity that increased President Roosevelt's trust and confidence in his abilities. Unlike General Shinseki who operated in a strained civil-military environment, General Marshall took a positive environment and made it even better. President Roosevelt for his part fostered and encouraged the relationship based on his style of leadership. Even though he gave the military a high level of autonomy during the war, he maintained his civil authority over the military and intervened in strategic matters when necessary.¹⁴⁸

General Marshall also used how he interacted with others to form important partnerships. He developed a level of interpersonal communication that allowed him to resolve inter-service rivalry while at the same time maintain an almost statesman like reputation with the civilian leadership. General Marshall was so effective that when it came time to appoint the supreme commander for the invasion of Normandy, President Roosevelt was compelled to keep General Marshall with him in Washington D.C. Even though the president strongly desired to award General Marshall with the supreme command, he was more afraid of losing the officer who kept the overall military machine running smoothly.¹⁴⁹ During his tenure, General Marshall maintained

¹⁴⁷ Kenneth S. Davis, *FDR, The War President 1940-1943: A History* (New York, NY: Random House, 2000), 432.

¹⁴⁸ Herspring, 31.

¹⁴⁹ Carlo D'Este, *Decision in Normandy: 50th Anniversary Edition* (New York, NY: Harper-Perennial, 1994), 41-43.

a consistent style of frankness and at times was confrontational in matters of importance. At the same time, he displayed a cooperative manner and always acceded to the president's decision. He was not prone to arguing over small matters with the president, and under no circumstances took any measures to undermine decisions from the president or other civilian leaders. When faced with a contentious matter he used his reputation as a well-established member of the team to work behind the scenes to resolve issues or gain agreement when needed in a private manner.¹⁵⁰

Conclusion

This study outlined the enduring dilemma that civil-military relations pose for the professional officer. By first describing the origins and progression of civil-military relations, this paper defined the civil-military nexus and explored the conditions for successful relations. The basic theories presented help frame the logic and importance of civil-military relations. The examples within this paper highlight how interaction within the civil-military nexus shaped and affected civil-military relations.

The cases of the JCS during the Vietnam era and General Clark in his role of SACEUR in the late 1990's illustrate the costs of failed interaction. Both not communicating and expressing professional opinion to such an extent that it becomes detrimental negatively affects civil-military relations. Generals Shinseki and Marshall, in their roles within the nexus, served as examples of effective communication. They demonstrated through their positive contributions that regardless of the situation, successful interaction within the civil-military nexus is possible. In addition, this study provided practical insights that apply beyond the civil-military nexus to all professional officers regardless of rank.

Studying these examples provides the military professional useful understanding of one of the aspects of civil-military relations Samuel Huntington explored in his classic *The Soldier*

¹⁵⁰ Kohn, 288.

and the State. As the recent case of General McChrystal has demonstrated, the proper role of officers in the civil-military nexus is a matter of ongoing interest for all professional officers. It is important for a vibrant discourse on appropriate civil-military relations to continue. There are measures that the military can take to improve this discourse.

Recommendations

Interactions within the civil-military nexus will continue to shape the future of civil-military relations. It is likely that these interactions will also continue to produce broad ranging affects on the nation at large. Senior military leaders remain engaged in challenging problems that affect civil-military relations. Increasing demands on senior leaders to be cultural ambassadors, city managers, public relations experts all while dealing with allied nations, and elected officials have blurred the lines between the Soldier and the state.¹⁵¹ The case studies within this paper infer that there are measures that can either improve or damage relations within the civil-military nexus. Both the officer and the overall military establishment have a clear responsibility to promote healthy interaction. This section outlines recommendations for both based on this responsibility.

At the individual level, officers must understand their role within the nexus, communicate responsibly and maintain effective interpersonal skills. Officers who do not understand the importance of their role within the civil-military nexus risk damaging both their careers and the institution by their actions. Officers who place value on understanding the actors and their roles within the nexus are more likely to achieve an accurate appreciation for how the system operates both officially and informally. Effective officers also recognize, despite any personal opinions they may have, that they are subordinate to the civilian authority and that their actions may have implications outside the nexus. Personal leadership is a key ingredient to successful interaction as

¹⁵¹ Thom Shanker, "Win Wars? Today's Generals Must Also Politick And Do P.R." New York Times Online. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/world/13generals.html> (accessed 14 August, 2010).

General Marshall's example illustrates. When presenting his opinions to civilian leadership there was never a question of trust, professionalism or objectivity within his actions. He faced the dilemma of interacting within the civil-military nexus with a clear understanding of his role within the system and the knowledge of how his interactions shaped events.

Effective communication is a critical, required skill for the successful senior officer. This attribute at times can be more important than the officer's level of professional knowledge or expertise. The problem within the civil-military nexus lies with how and when officers communicate within the blurred lines between the Soldier and the state. Not speaking out is simply not an option for officers. Professional officers have the requirement to provide candid professional advice to their civilian counterparts. Regardless of perceived negative effects, the officer has the professional obligation for responsible interaction. Officers must speak in a manner that is clear and congenial to both elected officials and senior military peers. Failing to do so can result in more than a dereliction of duty. It can have significant negative impacts to the military and political communities as noted in the Vietnam War example. Officers must exercise personal courage in expressing their professional opinion when it differs from their superiors. Likewise, officers must understand that there are boundaries between personal and professional opinion. In cases where officers cross over the line of control and communicate their opinions to such an extent that runs counter to civilian authority, as in the case of General Clark, the bonds of trust are broken. Officers have the charge of responsible communication that aligns within their superior's overall intent. Once the officer has provided their opinion, they must adhere to and support the final decision from the higher authority, military or otherwise.

Given the never-ending demand for information, officers must increase their capacity to think beyond their immediate situation to the potential larger impact of their communication outside their chain of command. In the aftermath of General McChrystal's dismissal, General Petraeus serves as an example of a professional officer who based in part on past successful interactions was selected to do what others could not. Despite the magnifying glass of a twenty-

four hour news cycle, he has thus far effectively faced the enduring dilemma of communicating within the civil-military nexus.

As senior officers understand their environment and make effective use of communication, they must simultaneously hone their interpersonal skills. Maintaining the capacity to understand and effectively communicate the situation is not enough for the senior officer. The officer must also understand how to build and maintain appropriate relationships within the nexus. Mutual respect and trust between members of the nexus is important. Officers who do not objectively seek to strengthen relationships risk creating dissension or discord within the system. In instances where there is a confrontational or negative environment between officers and civilians, officers still have a choice of how they interact. As illustrated by General Shinseki's example, officers and their civilian superiors may not always see eye to eye. It is possible, however, for the officer to stay true to their profession and effectively interact. Through thorough understanding of the facts bearing on the situation and professional objectivity, officers maintain personal integrity while also building trust with the members of the organization. At times, the professional officer must carefully weigh personal preferences against professional responsibilities. Like the often remarked golden rule, U.S. Army values of honor, loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, integrity and personal courage apply at all levels and at every occasion.¹⁵²

Thus far, the professional officer has carried much of the burden for successful civil military relations, because it is the senior officer interacting within the nexus. There are, however, actions that the service components can do to assist the effort. As senior military officers set the course for future relations, the institution can improve both the education and selection processes to produce officers best suited for roles within the nexus.

¹⁵² DoD, *United States Army Field Manual 6-22: Army Leadership* 2-2.

Communication and interaction capabilities are critical for the most junior of officers. As officers transition from company grade to field grade these skills become even more important. It is at the field grade level that officers have the increased potential to interact outside their military formations. As such, service component academic institutions can increase focus on building communication and interaction skills within their current curriculum priorities. Instruction does not have to differ between military and civilian academic institutions and can include formal interpersonal skills training. Military academic schools may integrate enhanced communication training early in the officer's career. Going beyond simple written and oral presentation skills benefit not only the military establishment but also set conditions for the officer's future success.

In addition to the education process, service components can give priority for advancement on officers who demonstrate the skills required for successful interaction at senior levels. Tactical/Technical proficiencies in key developmental positions in addition to a myriad of other skills are central to an officer's advancement. As the officer becomes more senior in rank, the service component must look increasingly past the officer's tactical and technical abilities and select officers who can also interact well with others. An officer's ability to gain consensus, build trust, and establish relationships at various levels are important factors at the senior level. Service components can place an increased priority of these attributes when promoting officers. This measure would increase the potential for effective senior officers within the civil-military nexus. Specifically, selection for positions within the nexus should rely on the officer's ability to interact within and contribute to the civil-military environment.

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