

RADICAL ISLAM IN WEST AFRICA AND EFFECTS ON SECURITY IN THE
WEST AFRICA SUB-REGION

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by

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ABSTRACT

RADICAL ISLAM IN WEST AFRICA AND EFFECTS ON SECURITY IN THE WEST AFRICA SUB REGION, by MAJ William Kwabiah, 123 pages.

While in the past two decades, the region of West Africa has experienced various armed conflicts, a new security threat that has emerged is the growing threat of violence by radical Islamist groups. This phenomenon has assumed prominence in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States of America. Against the background of a politically unstable region, impoverished by poverty, disease, conflicts, and a high rate of illiteracy, a foothold by radical Islamist groups could destabilize the whole region.

The recent escalation of violence perpetuated by radical Islamists groups in the northern parts of Nigeria and other countries poses a grave threat to the region as Nigeria is home to approximately half the population of the region. Some measures that governments, in concert with other stakeholders can take include poverty alleviation measures, economic development of deprived areas, socio-political reforms, inter-faith dialogue and consultations, prevent institutionalization of Sharia law, promotion of good governance and inter-governmental cooperation.

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ACRONYMS

AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
CH	Collier-Hoeffler
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
HI	Horizontal Inequalities
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
TSCTP	Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership
U.S.	United States
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The region of West Africa is bound by the Atlantic Ocean in the west and south, by the Sahara desert in the north, and in the east, by an imaginary line approximately along the present eastern boundary of Nigeria. It is difficult to define the northern and eastern limits of West Africa in geographical terms because of the non-existence of natural geographical barriers marking off this part of Africa from the rest of the continent.

Two major movements influenced the West Africa region in pre-colonial era: the dispersion of the Bantu people, which led to the development of many kingdoms and empires, and the expansion and consolidation of Islam. Between the 11th and 15th century, West Africa was a major trading region, exporting goods to Europe, India, Arabia and China. In the 13th century, the Mali Empire rose under the leadership of Malinke Sundiata to become renowned throughout the Arab world for its wealth and learning. The Mali Empire rose out of the regions' feuding kingdoms. At its heights, the empire of Mali composed most of modern Mali, Senegal, and parts of Mauritania and Guinea (BBC Religious Compilation on Africa n.d.).

The Mali Empire was a multi-ethnic state with various religious and cultural groups. Muslims played a prominent role in the courts as counselors and advisors. While the empire's founder, Sundiata Keita, was not himself a Muslim, many Malian kings became Muslims. The most famous of them was Mansa Musa. He made Islam the state religion and in 1324 went on pilgrimage from Mali to Mecca (Hill 2009). A hundred years later, the kingdom fell into decline and became the target of Tuareg raids. By the

18th century, the northern part of West Africa was a patchwork of city-states and kingdoms and further south, the Ashanti kingdom (in modern Ghana) rose to preeminence. Other prominent kingdoms were the kingdoms of Dahomey, Songhai, and Tekur.

During this period, traditional religion played an important role in the lives of the people of West Africa. Although there were different varieties of traditional religious practices, almost all these religions had common characteristics; a belief in the existence of one God above a host of other lesser gods, a belief in ancestral spirits, the idea of sacrifice to induce divine protection and the need to undergo the rites of passage from childhood to adulthood (BBC Religious Compilation on Africa, n.d.).

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attack, there appears to be a rise in religious conflicts in parts of West Africa, most notably in Nigeria. This conflict appears to revolve around the perceived rise of radical Islam that was born out of the globalization of Al Qaida. Whether or not Islam, and more specifically radical Islam is becoming more prevalent in the region is the main focus of this research.

Islam is difficult to define or generalize. In one sense, it denotes a religion, a system of beliefs and worship, and in other, the civilization that grew up and flourished under the aegis of that religion. Islam therefore denotes more than fourteen centuries of history, a billion and a third people, a religion and a cultural tradition of enormous diversity (Lewis 2003). Islam is a monotheistic faith regarded as revealed through Muhammad as the Holy Prophet of Allah (Oxford Dictionary Eleventh Edition). The Holy Prophet Muhammad, who was born in Mecca in about 570AD, is credited with the origin of Islam. The Arabic word “Islam” is derived from the Arabic word “Al-Salaam”

which means peace. The root word of Islam is “al-silm” which means “submission” or “surrender.” It is understood to mean “submission to Allah” (Orlich n.d.). There are different sects and grouping of Islam such as the Wahhabism, Sufism, and Salafism.

Wahhabism is a conservative Sunni Islamic sect based on the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, an 18th century scholar from what is today known as Saudi Arabia, who advocated to purge Islam of what he considered innovations in Islam. Wahhabism is the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism has developed considerable influence in the Muslim world through the funding of mosques, schools and other means from Persian Gulf oil wealth. The primary doctrine of Wahhabi is Tawhid, or the uniqueness and unity of God (Glasse 2001).

The principal tenet of Salafism is that Islam was perfect and complete during the days of Muhammad and his Sahaba (prominent companions of Muhammed), but that undesirable innovations have been added over the later centuries due to materialist and cultural influences. Salafism seeks to revive a practice of Islam that more closely resembles the religion during the time of Muhammad (Hoebink 2007).

Sufism is a mystified version of Islam. Sufism is a science whose objective is the reparation of the heart and turning it away from all else but God (Zarruq 2008). Several Sufi sects, such as the Mourides and Tijani in Senegal, follow the tenets of Islam as interpreted by those sects’ founding prophets.

Arab traders, and the Berbers of North Africa, brought Islam to West Africa through the northern part of Africa. The Berbers converted to Islam as far back as the 7th century and through their commercial transactions and influence on northerners, were able to spread Islam quickly among inhabitants of the region. In West Africa, large cities

like Timbuktu, Goa and Djenne, had large Berber and Arab populations and with them came Islam from the Middle East. On the east coast of Africa, a new culture came about from the mixture of Arab traders and Africans living together. City States like Zanzibar and Kilwa were a testament of the greatness of the two cultures building together and sharing knowledge. There is evidence that many rulers converted to Islam not because they wanted to be Muslims but rather for economic and political reasons. Islam continued to spread with its trade links to the Arab world, converting many West Africans who saw Islam to be lucrative because of its economic prospects (Kalagenesis 2009).

In West Africa, great kings like Mansa Musa of the Mali Empire, who made the Hajj to Mecca, on his return from the trip, brought many famous Islamic scholars from Cairo to build new schools and mosques in Timbuktu. These Islamic scholars later began to demand strict interpretation of Islamic law as the Muslim population grew larger. Mansa Musa's pilgrimage projected the Mali Empire's enormous wealth and potential, which further attracted many Muslim traders and scholars. Local leaders took keen interest in the Islamic legal system and Islamic theology. Timbuktu became a center of Islamic learning and civilization and established Sankore University, the first Muslim University in West Africa (Doi 2006). Many major towns became the principal focus of Islam and relations were established with the Arab world in the Middle East. The various trade routes between West Africa and the North made places like Gao, Timbuktu, Sijilmasa, Taghaza, Borno in northern Nigeria and Hausaland very important (Hill 2009).

The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 strengthened the rise of anti-British and anti-Western sentiments, particularly among Islamic scholars, which gave rise to Pan-

Islamism. Over the years, this British occupation led to the formation of various militant Islamists groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which fought against British colonial rule. These groups soon spread throughout Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and North Africa (Servold n.d., 46).

Throughout the nineteenth century and in the beginning of the twentieth century, Sufis stood at the forefront of the Jihad against Europeans in all parts of Africa. The Libyan, Omar al-Mukhtar, led the struggle against the Italian occupation; the Somali Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan led the struggle against the British, Italians and Ethiopians; and other less known Islamic Sufi scholars, such as those who took part in the Maji Maji rebellion against the Germans in Tanzania (Terdman 2007).

Gradually, this militant form of Islam penetrated both inland and southward through the activism of major charismatic figures that inspired intense resistance against European domination. These activities sowed the seeds of resistance against the colonial powers and local leaders that supported them. This process of Islamization in Africa did not cease after the colonial period and continues even today with the result that some African Muslims now carry on a tradition that has had a long history in certain areas of sub-Saharan Africa.

Christianity finally came to West Africa with the arrival of the Portuguese and Dutch in the 15th century. Although there were previous attempts to introduce the religion, these attempts did not yield any positive results. The indigenous people however, continued to indulge in their own traditional religious practices until the 19th century when Christian missions to Africa increased because of anti-slavery crusades and the interest of Europeans in colonizing Africa. In areas where people had already

converted to Islam, however, Christianity had little success (BBC Religious Compilation on Africa n.d.).

Christianity came as an agent of change to West Africa in that it brought new opportunities to some and destabilized the power base of others. In the Gold Coast, present day Ghana, Christianity culminated in a series of battles and wars between the Ashanti kingdom and the colonialists. These Christian missions brought education, literacy and slave trade to the shores of West Africa. Although the practice of slavery had occurred all over the world for many years, this was the first time that so many people from one continent had been transported to another against their will. Spread of the Christian religion, at this point, was minimal and limited to the coastal regions (BBC Religious Compilation in Africa n.d.).

Radical Islam may be described as a group of Muslims with extremist views who want to bring about fundamental change. It has normally been associated with the Middle East, South East Asia and parts of North Africa. Radical Islam has been associated with Islam largely because of various interpretations of the Qu'ran by many people to achieve groups or individual objectives. Radical Islam is commonly promoted through extreme acts of violence and terror such as that promoted by Osama bin Laden and Al Qaida. Islamic fundamentalism is a conservative religious movement that seeks a return to Islamic values and Islamic law (Sharia) in the face of Western modernism, which it sees as corrupt and atheistic (Britannica Concise Dictionary). Radical Islam is therefore different from Islamic fundamentalism in the sense that while radical Islam seeks to bring about change in a radical way, Islamic fundamentalists aim to return to the fundamentals

of Islam in the face of what they perceives as corrupt and atheistic tendencies of Western culture.

It is pertinent to note, however, that both radical Islamists and Islamic fundamentalists seek to bring about change. The former seeks radical changes usually by violent means and the latter by a return to the fundamentals of Islam. Many people have associated radical Islamists with fundamentalism perhaps because of the difficulty in differentiating one from another. Fundamentalists seeking change or a return to the fundamentals of Islam may not necessarily be associated with violence. It is fair to state, however, that fundamentalists with extremist Islamic views who seek to bring about radical changes through violence can be referred to as radical Islamists.

Radical Islam can be traced as far back as the 13th Century when the armies of Islam waged war, destroyed and completely conquered Persia, which at that time had been exhausted by many previous wars. The defeat of Islam and the advent of the Industrial Revolution turned Europe and Western economies into developed nations (Demant 2006, 26, 39).

Over time, as some analysts have argued, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War resulted in the gradual rise of radical Islam. During this period, radical Islam metamorphosed into a complex ideology manifesting itself in various forms such as kidnapping and terrorist attacks. Islam, which started in the early days of Muhammad, has often been turned into a radical ideology by some and has been used several times by various Muslim sects to propagate their own group interests (Pipes 2000). While many followers of the religion would regard radical Islam as a religion,

others may want to visualize it as an ideology, just like fascism, communism and Marxism.

In West Africa, characteristics of radical Islam can be traced to around the 18th century, when Uthman Dan Fodio, a Fulani scholar, led a major jihad 1802. With the help of a large Fulani cavalry and Hausa peasants, Fodio overthrew the region's Hausa rulers and replaced them with Fulani emirs. The movement led to centralization of power in the Muslim community, education reforms, and transformations of law. Uthman Dan Fodio also sparked a literary revival with a production of religious work that included Arabic texts and vernacular written in Arabic script. His heirs continued the legacy of literary production and education reform (Hill 2009).

During that period of British colonial rule, the Muslim north perceived itself as separate from the Christian and animist south. The British modified indigenous practices as necessary to assure the continuation of colonial rule, but they did not fundamentally disturb Islamic practices in the north. They permitted the application of Sharia in some aspects of criminal law and removed some of Sharia's more stringent penalties such as stoning, amputation, and death (Falola 1999).

In northern Nigeria, the most conflict-ridden cities included Kano and Kaduna, where there were substantial Christian communities. In addition to Sunni activism for Sharia, violence-prone Shia sects also emerged. These sects have been involved in clashes in Kano, Kaduna, and Zaria, where they were most prominent and referred to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as their source of inspiration for revolutionary leadership (Falola 1999). Many believed that this attempt to impose Islam in all spheres of life against African traditional religion marked the beginning of radical Islam in the region.

In recent times, the idea of rejecting modernity in favor of a return to the sacred past with its varied and ramified history has given rise to a number of movements. The most important of these undoubtedly has been that known, after its founder, as *Wahhabism* (Lewis 2004). Additionally, the phenomenon of radical Islam, which calls on Muslims to use violence, has become a common feature in some West African countries.

The 11 September 2001 attacks awoke the world to a sophisticated form of Islamic terror whose network was worldwide with far reaching consequences. The attacks also ushered in an era of a new wave of violent attacks by radical Islamist groups. Recent efforts by Al Qaida leadership to extend its bases into Africa and events in recent past in some countries, especially Nigeria, suggest a growing trend of radical extremist activities in West Africa. In the most recent violence in 2010, a group calling itself the *Boko Haram* unleashed mayhem on the population in some northern states of Nigeria resulting in the deaths of about 700 people (Bauchi 2009). Other radical groups have alleged, among other issues, that Christians have encroached on their farms and grazing lands driving their communities into economic deprivation and poverty. This brings to fore the settlers and indigenes problem, which alludes to the role of economic resource misallocation as a potential source of religious conflict (Paden 2010).

A range of socioeconomic and psychological factors have been associated with those who have chosen to radicalize to include the bored and frustrated, successful college students, the unemployed, the second and third generation, new immigrants, petty criminals, and prison parolees. Invariably, these individuals seek other like-minded individuals and often form a loose-knit group, cluster, or network. Commonalities among

these individuals' age, residence, schools, interests, personality, and ethnicity are critical in determining who becomes a member of a particular group or cluster (Sageman 2004).

Islam represents about 50 percent of the population in the West Africa region against approximately 40 percent for Christians. Social changes in West Africa have given rise not only to a complexity of religious expressions but also diversity and divergence of theological expression. There are fundamentally different views of Islam within the religion. There is the Ahmadiyya, which has a theology quite different from the patterns of worship in orthodox Islam. There are variant groupings referred to as Sufi sects, such as the Tijanaiyya, Qadriyya and the Badirriya (Assimeng 2010). While these various movements have differences, which sometimes resulted in conflicts in the region, they have generally co-existed in relative peace.

The process of radicalization, often described by many authors, seeks to attribute certain factors to the cause of radical Islam. These factors include large Muslim populations, poverty and unemployment, illiteracy and marginalization amongst others. A close look at the region however indicates other underlying factors. For instance, Gambia and Guinea, with significant numbers of Muslims and deplorable poverty levels, have not recorded significant activities of radical Islamists. Senegal, a country with about 95 percent Muslims has also not experienced violent activities of radical Islam. Nigeria on the other hand, with about a 60 percent population of Muslims, has been ravaged by violence by radical Islamist groups. There are indications therefore that other factors peculiar to the region may be responsible for the radicalization of the Islam.

Problem Statement

While in past decades, the West Africa region has been characterized by civil conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, and Guinea Bissau, there is a growing security threat emanating from the activities of radical Islam. Radical Islam has assumed prominence in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States homeland by Al Qaida operatives. Osama bin Laden, in launching the attacks on the U.S., has issued a fatwa calling on all Muslims to kill American citizens. Many radical Islamists and fundamentalist groups have conducted various attacks against innocent people in the name of religion. While this development has created a generally negative perception of Muslims worldwide, many believe that the perpetrators of these heinous crimes are not true Muslims.

Recent comments by Al Qaida leadership to extend its bases into Africa's large ungoverned spaces, coupled with the increased religious violence in northern Nigeria and other parts of the sub-region, have alerted the international community to the possible dangers of radical Islamists groups' activities. Although the phenomenon of radicalization of Islam became prominent after the 11 September 2001 attacks, its origins can be traced far back into history.

While many believe that the religion of Islam is prone to violence, there are factors that indicate the contrary. For instance, Senegal and Gambia, whose Muslim population is about 95 percent and 90 percent of their population respectively, have remained peaceful over a long period, whereas in Nigeria and other countries with relatively lesser number of Muslims percentages, violence continues to rage. This

development suggests that there are other factors besides religion, which influence people to radicalize. Can it be said then, that Muslims are more tolerant of other Muslims?

A careful look at the process of radicalization highlights conditions under which individuals radicalize but the situation in the West African sub-region suggests other factors that also contribute to the radicalization of Muslim youth. Although some have argued that radical Islam in the region is imported, others allude to factors in the region that account for the seemingly increasing tendency of radical Islamist activities and violence. These factors include the introduction of Sharia, poverty, unemployment and other socio-economic grievances including the non-availability and lack of access to resources.

The model of radicalization suggests that a Muslim male-dominated society is one important condition, which is favorable for the radicalization process to thrive. Certain areas in West Africa, like Senegal, with a Muslim dominated male population have not shown signs of radical Islam suggesting that the model may not be applicable to all of West Africa and other factors could be responsible for radical Islam in the region.

Against the backdrop of a region with large Muslim populations, impoverished by famine, poverty, high levels of unemployment, disease and many conflicts, a foothold by radical Islamist groups, especially in Nigeria, could destabilize the whole region, given the huge population and complex demographics of Nigeria. This would invariably have repercussions for regional stability and its consequences could be felt far beyond the region.

Proposed Research Question

Is radical Islam, whether imported or home grown, on the rise in West Africa and if so what is causing the rise and what are the implications on the region's security and stability?

Secondary Research Questions

1. What is the radicalization process?
2. How susceptible are West Africa Muslims to be drawn towards radical Islam?
3. Has a more radical form of Islam made its way into the region, if so where are the fault lines and how has it manifested in the region within the last 10 years?
4. What is the appeal of radical Islam to Muslims in West Africa?
5. What has the west done in response to a perceived presence of radical Islam and radical non-state actors in the region?
6. If radical Islam has established itself in West Africa, why has it manifested in some countries and not in other countries?
7. What is the role of grievance in explaining the manifestation of radical Islam?

Summary

Arab Berbers introduced Islam in West Africa from North Africa through trading. Islam co-existed with West African traditional religion until the era of colonial rule when radical Islamist groups began resistance against to what they perceived to be oppression and an affront to Islam.

In the post independence era, when militant Islamic struggles continued in other parts of the world, West Africa remained relatively peaceful and devoid of any serious

religious conflict until the latter parts of the 20th century. The 11 September 2001 attack on the United States ushered in an era of increased violence by Muslim radicals in certain countries in the region especially in Nigeria. The interest and presence of radical groups in Africa assumes an alarming dimension in the wake of political violence in Nigeria and reflects West Africa as a viable region for the growth of radical Islam. This has manifested itself through self-radicalized sympathizers of global Jihad, which follow the strategy and doctrines of Al-Qaeda and its supportive clerics and scholars. In the recent past, the world has witnessed a growing presence of newly formed radical jihadi groups in Nigeria and other parts of West Africa using violent conflicts to radicalize African Islamic elements, recruiting and bringing the African arena under the Jihadi “global umbrella” (Terdman 2007).

Although many studies have pointed to certain underlying factors, which facilitate the process of radicalization of Islam, West Africa does not fully lend itself to such interpretations, prompting an analysis of other factors. This thesis was developed with a study of the phenomenon of radical Islam, using Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire as case studies.

Assumptions

Radical Islamist groups will continue to seek safe havens in West Africa.

Limitations

The limitation of this research is the inability of the researcher to conduct interviews with West Africans on the subject matter from Fort Leavenworth.

Delimitations

Analysis will be restricted to that of West Africa with little emphasis on other parts of the world except where there is direct linkage to West Africa. The study will be confined strictly to the radicalization process and how to deal with the problem.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Chapter 1 of this thesis was an introductory chapter, which covers the background of radical Islam in West Africa with particular reference to Nigeria. This chapter reviews and discusses literature that is relevant to the key research questions in the thesis. These are the reasons why radical Islam has assumed prominence in West Africa; the history of Islam and how sub-Saharan Muslims view the role of Islam in their lives; various manifestations of the role of Islam, and why it has not manifested in other countries perceived to have similar conditions. A number of articles have been written on radical Islam. In all the articles, the quality varies widely, ranging from a general overview to more specific analysis of radical Islam. In order to gain insight into the topic, I will use unclassified sources such as books, MMAS Theses, magazines and other professional journals, by authors known to be respected in the chosen fields, and materials from the World Wide Web.

The Radicalization Process

According to Mitchel D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, in their paper, *Radicalization in the West-The Homegrown Threat*, there are four stages in the process of radicalization; the pre-radicalization stage, self identification stage, the indoctrination stage and the jihadization stages. Each of these phases is unique and has specific signatures associated with it.

Silber and Bhatt notes that during the pre-radicalization stage, individuals who are attracted to radical thought, usually live, work, play, and pray within these enclaves of

ethnic, Muslim communities. Their gender, age, family's social status, stage in life as well as psychological factors all affects vulnerability for radicalization. Fifteen to thirty-five year-old male Muslims who live in male-dominated societies are particularly vulnerable. These individuals are at an age where they are often seeking to identify who they really are while trying to find the "meaning of life." This age group is usually very action-oriented. Middle class families and students appear to provide the most fertile ground for the seeds of radicalization.

Silber and Bhatt observes that in the self-identification stage, individuals most vulnerable to experiencing this phase are often those who are at a cross road in life. Some of the crises that can jumpstart this phase include economic problems, social alienation, political conflicts involving Muslims and personal loss of a family member. Given the high volume, popularity, and the nature of the extremist agenda, an individual who goes searching for answers will be exposed to a plethora of Salafi/Wahhabi interpretations of Islam. Most often the vehicles for these exposures include family ties or old friendships, social networks, religious movements, political movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, or extremist-like discussions in halal butcher shops, cafes, gyms, student associations, study groups, non-governmental organizations and, most importantly, the internet. The next stage, the indoctrination stage is where individuals progressively intensify their beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the Salafist cause. The last stage, the jihadi stage, is the stage in which members of the cluster accept their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen. Here the group begins operational planning for jihad or a

terrorist attack. Silber and Bhatt notes that small group dynamics play a much more prominent role in this stage. While during the earlier stages, the group members may have been only acquaintances, meeting each other in Salafi chat rooms, at university or simply by being friends, individuals see themselves as part of a movement and group loyalty becomes paramount above all other relationships.

According to Michael Genkin and Alexander Gutfraind, in their research work, *How Do Terrorist Cells Self-Assemble? Insights From an Agent Based-Model*, the way individuals with radical beliefs find one another and form groups is the same way persons with similar beliefs or interests find each other. They identified three factors, (structural, individual, and network) to be responsible for the process of radicalization. Structural factors include a set of characteristics in the social structure such as the size of the population, the attrition rate, the distribution of particular beliefs, the population size, and the availability and type of sites that provide meeting opportunities. Individual factors are a set of characteristics that are internal to the individual such as the variation of innate and variable attributes and a person's impressionability (how easily a person conforms to pressure by peers). Network factors are the characteristics of the social network, such as the amount of friends a person can be linked to.

Genkin and Gutfraind assert that a basic factor to start from is the population size since the size of the society is a universal parameter in virtually all social simulation work. Another basic factor to take into account is the distribution of belief in political extremism in a community, which they classified into three categories: radicals, moderates, or pacifists. They contended that the process of radicalization would strongly depend on the fraction of the population that holds radical beliefs.

Another factor they identified was the presence of sites and various social organizations where people meet and form friendships. This is one of the most important factors in the model. These sites may include camping, canoeing, white-water rafting, paintballing and other outward-bound type activities. Finally, the number of individuals who are leaving and entering the community, they noted, could have importantly, a disruptive effect on the formation of radical cells.

Susceptibility of African Muslims towards Radical Islam

Charlotte and Frederick Quinn, in their book, *Pride, Faith, and Fear: Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa*, says Islam in West Africa is referred to as local Islam where there are no institutions of higher Islamic learning, ordained clergy or international body to regulate doctrine. Without any specific educational or doctrinal standards beyond adherence to the five basic tenets of Islam, there is considerable variety among the preaching and practices of individual mosques. Islam overlaid with traditional local belief systems usually has provided its own explanation about life and death and how to deal with reverses and good fortunes. Elements of folk belief, rituals and music were retained and given an Islamic overlay. Thus, the blending of Islamic with pre-Islamic cultures was a distinction of Islam in West Africa to which the prayers of Sufi mystics and the language of the Quran was added.

They observed that despite the leaderless nature of Islam in the region, Sufism and several brotherhoods have expanded throughout the region beyond national borders. For instance, Senegal's Tijaniya has a large following in northern Nigeria and the Mouridina clerics follow peripatetic Wolof traders throughout West Africa, Europe, and North Africa.

According to Hussein D. Hassan, in a *Congressional Research Service Paper*, *Islam In Africa*, African Muslims, like other Muslims in Asia, the Middle East and the rest of the world, seem to be locked into an intense struggle regarding the future direction of Islam. At the core of the struggle are questions about the way in which Muslims should practice their faith. This scholar asserts that the majority seems to prefer to remain on the moderate, tolerant course that Islam has historically followed. However, a relatively small, but growing group would like to establish a stricter form of the religion, one that informs and controls all aspects of society. He noted that although the majority of Muslims in Africa are Sunni, the complexity of Islam in Africa is revealed in the various schools of thought, traditions, and voices that constantly contend for dominance in many African countries. African Islam is not static and is constantly being reshaped by prevalent social, economic, and political condition.

Hassan states that African Islam has both local and global dimensions. On the local level, experts assert that African Muslims operate with considerable autonomy and do not have an international organization that regulates their religious practices. This fact accounts for the differences and varieties in Islamic practices throughout the African continent. On the global level, however, African Muslims belong to the Umma, the worldwide Islamic community, and follow global issues and current events that affect the Muslim world with keen interest. With globalization and new initiatives in information technology, African Muslims have developed and maintained close connections with the wider Muslim world.

Lamin O. Sanneh in his book, *The Crown and the Turban: Muslims and the West African Pluralism*, reveals that when Islam first appeared in West Africa, people were

intrigued, curious, puzzled perhaps bewildered but seldom hostile. The warm reception received by Muslims enabled them to flourish and the indigenous people found their usefulness as important traders and Arab importers of a written language. In time, Muslim commercial enclaves grew in size and influence, attracting converts from the local population. As time elapsed, converts practiced the old African traditional beliefs and at the same time drawing on their new found faith, which became inconsistent with earlier custom and usage. As knowledge increased, the practice of Islam became lax. The book reveals that persistent visits to West Africa by prominent Islamic scholars raised the general standard of observance by bequeathing requisite symbols of Islam, like the Qur'an, a legal document, a turban, prayer rug, some prayer beads, a silk gown and other items. It further notes that Muslims took a favorable view of Africa's religious openness, found affinity in certain practices and exploited gaps in local techniques and resources and asserted the primacy of Muslim scripture, law and practice. This dynamic historical theme of affinity and challenge, accommodation and primacy helped establish Islam in West Africa.

Fault lines and Manifestation of Radical Islam in West Africa

According to Matt Steinglass of the *New York Times*, in his article "Why is Nigerian Islam so Radical," he noted a number of countries with large Muslim populations in West Africa including Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Gambia, Niger, Sierra Leone, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. Only Nigeria struggles with a very strong radical Islamist movement, and only Nigeria has Sharia law, the strict rule of law based on the Koran, in its 12 northern states. What makes Nigeria so different is that its population of about 130 million outnumbers that of the rest of West Africa

combined. Its oil has made a few families staggeringly wealthy, while the vast majority of its population is among Africa's poorest. In other words, the religious fault line in Nigeria is because of social scale. The size of the country, coupled with economic discontent, is the reason for religious unrest.

Steinglass notes that what causes a religious fault line is a perceived break between the promises and assurances of a religion and the failures and shortcomings of society in its organized institutions and structures. A religious fault line is characterized by a polarized worldview which presents an idealized past. He notes for example, that, Usama bin Laden presents his cause as a modern day version of the Prophet's struggle, and the situation of Muslims under Western influence as corresponding to the situation of the early Muslims under siege in Mecca. He therefore urges a *hijrah*, the drawing of a line in the sand, in imitation of the first *hijrah* to Medina, the prelude to the establishment of an Islamic state. This pattern was little different from that followed by West African jihad leaders. For the unrest to assume political significance, a religious fault line in that situation depends on a critical mass of followers, usually young, socially deprived, and footloose, coalescing around a charismatic and equally footloose leadership. This was true of the Maitatsine uprising in northern Nigeria in the 1980s. Steinglass is of the view that social scale comes into play only when the ideological trigger is in place, and when that trigger has been primed by a messianic ultimatum. This analysis seems to draw a link between population numbers, economic discontent or poverty and radicalism. If this is true, then the large population of Muslims living in abject poverty in West Africa presents a breeding ground for radical Islamic leaders like Usama Bin Laden and his cohorts.

Jonathan Schanzer, in his study *At War With Whom: A History of Radical Islam*, notes that Napoleon Bonaparte's expedition in Egypt, the French seizure of Algeria in 1830 and its occupation of Tunisia in 1881, together with British and Italian grips on Aden and Libya, contributed to the weakening of Islam over the years. He observed that the most painful penetration of the Islamic world would be the creation of the State of Israel. Also to the embarrassment of the Muslim world, a unified front of Arab armies lost a bitter war to the newly formed state with only about 600,000 Jews. Schanzer reveals that although many Muslims adapted to the fast pace of western industrialization and influence, a few have created a rigid ideology embedded in the traditional values and laws of the Qu'ran. Radical Islam came to be seen as a struggle to return to the glorious days when Islam ruled supreme. Accordingly, the desire to return to the past fuels the few to resort to violence to achieve this end.

Andy Genaski, in his MMAS thesis paper, "Overt Islam in Nigeria," is of the view that Islam in West Africa is generally not extreme and when it is extreme, it is not dangerous until well funded and is clearly manipulated by global Islamic extremists. There may be disagreement to this stance as a group of Muslims sharing a radical ideology with or without funding could pose a threat to any community. It can also be argued that extreme Islam as has been observed in Nigeria with or without sponsors can be dangerous and violent. Recent violent clashes between radical Islamists groups in northern parts of Nigeria are a testament of this phenomenon.

David McCormack in *Africa Vortex: Islamism in West Africa*, has observed that over the last five years, Islamists in the predominantly Muslim north of Nigeria have begun to codify Sharia and other Islamist social policies. Such activity has led to

widespread violence and instability that threatens the viability of the Nigerian state. He believes that radical Islam is gaining ground in sub-Saharan Africa to the detriment of Africa and the West.

Using Zamfara State in Nigeria as an example, Mc Cormack notes that under Sharia, public transportation has been sexually segregated and alcohol banned regardless of a citizen's faith. Furthermore, corporal and capital punishment, including flogging and death by stoning have become institutionalized. And as in Saudi Arabia, a vigilante organization, the Joint Islamic Aid Group, was established to monitor compliance with the new laws. Aside from the new penal code, the northern states sought to implement other Islamist policies, disclosing a plan at an event organized by the Saudi Embassy in Nigeria to enforce the teaching and usage of Arabic in Zamfara and to begin paying Islamic preachers out of state funds.

Ricardo Laremont and Hrach Gregorian, in their book, *Political Islam in Africa and the Sahel*, have also noted the emergence of radical Islamist groups in Nigeria and Niger. According to them, the existence of terror financing networks involved in the sale of diamonds coupled with the migration of the Al Qaida-linked Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) from southern Algeria to eastern Mauritania, northern Mali, and northern Chad, indicates the intent of radical groups to establish safe havens. These activities point to the growing threat and evidence of radical Islam in West Africa. They cite recent violence in northern Nigeria especially by groups like the Taliban, Boko Haram, and other radical Islamic groups to buttress the point. They pointed out that in addition to Sunni activism for Sharia, violence prone Shia sects, which have been involved in Kano, Kaduna, Maiduguri, Katsina, Bauchi, and Zaria, are emerging.

Cyril Obi in his essay, *Terrorism in West Africa: Real, Emerging or Imagined*, states that students in higher institutions of learning are involved in the rather episodic upsurge in militant Islam in northern Nigeria. Most critical, however, have been the activities since late 2003 of a militant group referred to as the *Taliban* in northeast Nigeria, particularly in Borno and Yobe states. This group, suspected to be affiliated to the Al Sunna Wal Jamma, has been involved in attacks on police stations and other government offices and in the murder of police officers and civilians in 2004. According to Obi, militant Muslim university and polytechnic students reportedly formed the group that reportedly models itself after the *Taliban* of Afghanistan. Others believe that a fugitive Afghan Taliban leader in Nigeria established it. In September 2004, one of the group's camps was raided within the Sahel in the southern-most limits of the Sahara, in northern Nigeria by a combined team of police and the military. This area falls within the region perceived as being vulnerable to becoming a terrorist sanctuary. Obi says there are also reports of the arming and training of militant groups in Nigeria that have been traced to funding from groups in Saudi Arabia, other radical Islamic countries, and to the activities of militant Islamic preachers or members of terrorist networks operating along the trans-Sahara routes.

Not everyone, however, alludes to the growing influence of radical Islam in the sub-region. In his book, *The Dark Sahara*, Jeremy Keenan, is of the opinion that citing the need to combat the growth of Al Qaida in Africa is a deception by the U.S. to establish bases in the region and pursue its multiple imperial objectives in the name of security.

John Paden, in an article, “Is Nigeria a Hotbed of Islamic Extremism,” disagrees with the assertion that radical Islam is on the rise in Nigeria. He notes that religious violence in Nigeria must be understood as part of a complicated political context in a country striving to maintain national unity amongst an ethnically diverse population split evenly between Christians and Muslims. Paden states that Nigeria is not a hotbed of Islamic extremism but one of Islamic moderation. He observes that while much of West Africa’s Islam is influenced by Sufism, the Sokoto Caliphate has maintained a decidedly West African version of Islam, less dependent on external Arab influences.

What Makes Radical Islam Appealing to West Africa Muslims

The question of why extremist groups continue to be able to attract followers perpetually seems irrational especially in the face of social stigmatization, emotional separation from one's family, professional risks, and police harassment. Yet recruiting efforts nevertheless continue to draw members into the fold. David Mc Cormack, in his Occasional Paper Series titled, *The African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, notes that while the historical complexities that allowed the penetration of radical Islam are many, greatest consideration is generally given to two potential sources. First is the mixture of dire political, social and economic conditions that arose from the inability of African states to forge representative governments and strong economies following the collapse of colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s. He observes that while Africa has taken desirable steps in recent years away from its economic and political backwardness, these have not been enough to discourage its large Muslim populations from the Islamist lure, as Africa continues to be plagued by unaccountable and corrupt governments and under-developed economies. Ironically, he notes that, where democratic transformation is

taking place, Islamists have been afforded greater freedom to implement their program, while sometimes painful but important economic reforms have created dislocation used as ammunition by Islamists. Undoubtedly, poverty, disenfranchisement and general societal disorder play a role in making African Muslims susceptible to Islamist influences. He continues however, that to assign this combination primary responsibility for an increasingly extremist African Islam would be a mistake. Rather, the systematic capturing of the Islamic message by states from the heart of the Muslim world, who introduced radical, intolerant brands of Islam in a quest to find solutions to internal challenges and external rivalries on the global stage, has been the driving force behind the Islamist advance on the sub-continent.

In his book, *The Crisis of Islam, Holy War and Unholy Terror*, Bernard Lewis states that almost the entire Muslim world is affected by poverty and tyranny. Both of these problems are attributed to American economic dominance and exploitation, thinly disguised as globalization. He notes that the increasingly wretched economic situation in most of the Muslim world and sub-Saharan Africa, compared not only with the West but also with the rapidly rising economies of East Asia, fuels these frustrations. To buttress the point further, he observed that the World Bank reported that in the 1990s, the combined gross national products of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, three of Israel's neighbors, were considerably smaller than that of Israel alone. He also cited World Bank reports in 2000, which stated that the average annual income in the Muslim countries from Morocco to Bangladesh was only half of the world average. He concludes that these problems, coupled with the combination of low productivity and high birth rate results in a growing population of unemployed, uneducated and frustrated young men

According to Quintan Wiktorowicz, in his book, *Radical Islam Rising*, extremist groups focus on creating cognitive openings that shake individuals' previous beliefs. This was best accomplished by evaluating an individual's most pressing concerns and tailoring discussions towards alternatives to meet those needs. Wiktorowicz's study illuminated certain psychological aspects of the radicalization process and tactics used by extremist groups, pinpointing collective action like protests and propaganda that focus on the oppression of Muslims all over the world.

Wiktorowicz observed that radical groups use graphic images and rhetoric to highlight the various perceived acts of “genocide” being perpetuated against Muslims. The objective is to convince audiences that immediate action is needed to protect Muslims, to induce a sense of moral shock and outrage and underscore the ineffectiveness of mainstream approaches to addressing the crises. This seem to have caught on well in northern Nigeria where states have declared Sharia over existing laws and seek ways of using religion to address socio-economic and political concerns.

David McCormack, in his paper, *An African Vortex: Islamism In Sub- Saharan Africa*, notes that African Islam has been undermined in recent years by the steady expansion of Islamism. According to him, while the historical complexities that allowed the penetration of radical Islam are many, the greatest consideration is the mixture of dire political, social and economic conditions that arise from the inability of African states to forge representative governments and strong economies following the collapse of colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s. While Africa has taken desirable steps in recent years away from its economic and political backwardness, these have not been enough to discourage its Muslim populations from the radical lure, as Africa continues to be

plagued by unaccountable and corrupt governments and under-developed economies. Ironically, where democratic transformation is taking place, Islamists have been afforded greater freedom to implement their program, while sometimes painful but important economic reforms have created dislocation used as ammunition by Islamists.

Undoubtedly, poverty, disenfranchisement and general societal disorder play a role in making African Muslims susceptible to Islamist influences. To assign this combination primary responsibility for an increasingly extremist African Islam would be a mistake. Rather, McCormack notes that the systematic capturing of the Islamic message by states from the heart of the Muslim world, who introduced radical, intolerant brands of Islam in a quest to find solutions to internal challenges and external rivalries on the global stage has been the driving force behind the Islamist advance on the sub-continent. He observes also that given the strength of African Islam's moderation, Islamists recognized the need to first promote the Islamization of Africa, which was laying the foundation of Islamic awareness, which was seen as a precondition for the introduction of radical Islam.

The Western Response to Radical Islam

According to Alfred de Montesquiou of the *Associated Press*, the U.S. is trying to help nations bordering the Sahara and the arid Sahel region to contain a growing threat of radical Islamist activities. A number of U.S. Special Forces and African troops trained together in the latest of several large military maneuvers over the past few years. Intelligence officers estimate there are some 400 Al Qaida extremists based in the vast emptiness of the Saharan. He observes in the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* that the U.S. is

worried that the militants are teaming up with smugglers carrying cocaine across the desert to Europe and with the restless nomad tribes of the Sahara.

According to *Terrorism Monitor*, in the midst of a major drive to increase security in Africa's Saharan and Sahel nations, American, African, and European military forces in May 2010 concluded the latest version of Operation Flintlock, one in a series of multinational military exercises designed to foster and development international security cooperation in North and West Africa. The latest exercises come at a time of growing concerns over large-scale drug trafficking in the region and kidnappings carried out by elements of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). These maneuvers were conducted as part of the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Over 1,200 soldiers participated in the latest maneuvers, including 600 U.S. Marines and Special Forces, units from France and Britain and smaller European contingents from Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands. African countries with military representation included Mali, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria, Chad, Senegal, Tunisia, and Morocco. Malian Special Forces also received training in response to hostage-taking operations normally carried out by AQIM (Terrorism Monitor, 2010).

Jalloh and Falola observes that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has in recent times, increased development aid for the Sahel, believing that poverty makes Muslims there susceptible to foreign extremists. The Bush Administration initiative, the Millenium Challenge Account, provides supplemental development aid to nations, and targets certain Sahelian countries.

According to Cyril Obi, in his essay, *Terrorism In West Africa: Real, Emerging or Imagined Threats*, the U.S. has also launched the Pan Sahelian Initiative (PSI), which

became and the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) at an estimated cost of approximately US\$120 million. Apart from building up regional defense and security capacities, the TSCTP aims to train additional forces, include more countries and help foster better information sharing and operational planning between regional states. The TSCTP then expanded its coverage to include Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal, Ghana and Nigeria. Its focus has been largely on training soldiers from these countries, providing military assistance in the form of both hardware and software, preventing the spread of extremist forms of Islam and securing national and regional borders.

Why Has Radical Islam Manifested In Some Countries and Not In Others

Fumni Olonisakin observes in his research paper, “Militancy and Violence in West Africa: Local Factors and External Influences in Trends and Dynamics,” that the causes of radical Islam in West Africa have continued to be a debate in international circles because the West Africa situation does not replicate the traditional explanation of the process of radicalization. According to Olonisakin, the situation in West Africa can only be understood when one considers a whole range of interrelated issues from history, politics, religion and economics. Key issues to be considered include political instability, diversity, poverty, external influences, militancy, and youth intergenerational issues. He asserts that this explains the reasons why some countries in the sub-region are experiencing activities of radical Islam and others with economic problems are not.

John Glover, in his book, *Sufism and Jihad in Modern Senegal: The Murid Order*, observes that the early group of West African Muslims enjoyed a reputation not only of commerce but also in Islamic teaching and learning as their families plied the trade routes in the region, spreading both contact with trans-Saharan trade and Islam. The scholarly

and commercial lineages came to be known by different names such as the Jakhanke in Senegambia, Wangara along the desert edge, Juula in more southern regions and Marka in the Niger valley.

Glover notes that the Jakhanke branch of this commercial-Islamic diaspora is of particular importance as the group is credited for spreading their own brand of Islam characterized by a high level of scholarship and teaching and a pacifist interpretation of Islam's role in society at large in which religion was held as politically neutral. Alhaji Salim Suware, the leader of the Jakhanke group's focus on pacifism and attention to learning influenced scholars later in the centuries and set this interpretation of Islam apart from the beliefs and activities of more militant Muslims some of whom embraced scholarship yet rejected the position of neutrality.

John Glover, in his book, *Sufism and jihad in modern Senegal- the Murid order*, states that the development of the Murid Sufi order in Senegal is a combined study of West African history, Islamic reform, Sufism, and European colonization. He said the Murid perception of modernity arose from disparate sources and are reflected in the production and interpretation of Murid historical narratives. He saw the Murids as the descendants of Maam Cerno, who was a distinguished scholar, teacher, diplomat, farmer and a community leader. While some of the Cerno's disciples were scions of scholarly Muslim families, others were of aristocratic background that had come to terms with the Murid brand of Islamic reform. Most were however, artisans, peasant farmers and runaway slaves.

According to Glover, success in food production did much to attract more disciples to the order. Maam Cerno, who could maintain agricultural surpluses of the

main food crop, millet, even during prolonged periods of drought and famine were greatly distinguished from the population. Cash crop production became integral to the success of the Murid order. The leadership of the Murids also established a socio-political relationship with the colonial government, which worked to their advantage.

Senegal presents a unique case of a country with a significant population of Muslims that has not experienced violence associated with radical Islam. According to Papa Birane Dieye, a Senegalese CGSC student, Senegal remains a secular state and the religion of Islam is not even mentioned in the country's constitution. Ironically, from independence, all three presidents of Senegal were married to Christians. He notes that the history of the Jakhanke group seems to have been handed down throughout history to the present generation in Senegal. Also in Senegal, the Mourides and Tijani sufi sects are tightly intertwined with several key economic sectors. Radical behavior tends to lead to instability, which negatively impacts upon a nation's economy. Thus, it is in their interest to ensure stable conditions.

Role of Grievance and Violence

In their book, *Understanding Civil War, Evidence and Analysis*, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Nicholas Sambanis have developed a model, the Collier-Hoeffler (CH) Model that was used as a guide to conduct systematic case studies of the occurrence or absence of war. Collier and Hoeffler demonstrated that, for given levels of political and social grievance, the greater the opportunity for organized rebellion within a country, the more likely civil war is to occur. Additionally, they argue that the existence of such opportunity is largely determined by particular socio-economic conditions such as widespread poverty, low levels of education, and heavy dependence on natural resources.

Collier identified grievance to be key in the analysis of civil wars. The key variables identified by the CH Model were ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, polarization, ethnic dominance, income inequality, mountainous terrain, geographic dispersion, and land inequality. They describe how each variable and their correlation with others can lead to war. By tracing out the process of conflict escalation, Collier and Hoeffler explain when, where, and why civil war is likely to occur. They advance the theoretical and empirical understanding of civil war and delve closer into developing appropriate policy intervention to reduce the prevalence of civil war.

Collier and Hoeffler demonstrate that objective grievance is an important element of rebellion. The study also concludes among others, that the availability of finance is very influential and substantially increases conflict risk. Secondly, male secondary education enrollment, per capita income, and the growth rate all have statistically significant and substantial effects that reduce conflict risk.

Ragnhild Nordas also asserts in his paper, *Identity Polarization and Conflict: State Building in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana*, that grievances are often seen as the core motivation to violence in response to unequal distribution of land, income, or political power or in response to a sense of threat, often also ultimately rooted in power and resource distribution.

Summary of Literature

Islam over the years has co-existed with traditional religion for a long time. The decline of Islamic influence, blamed on the West, gave rise to the birth of an ideology called Islamism. This ideology has been generally characterized by violence, perpetuated

on non-Muslims and Muslims alike, and other religions, in a bid to impose a strict form of Islam on the world.

The West Africa sub-region in recent times has witnessed a number of radical Islamists activities, raising security concerns for a region already saddled by poverty, disease and conflicts. Some, like Keenan, see the increased awareness of radical activities in West Africa as a ploy by the U.S. and western allies to propagate its imperial motives. Keenan's views, for instance is contrary to those who believe that the activities of radical Islamist groups have been prominent.

Most of the literature reviewed and others already written about radical Islam in West Africa did not bring out the correlation between the process of radicalization and the current situation as it pertains in West Africa. There was also little research on why countries in the sub-region with similar demographics have manifested differently in terms of violence by radical Islamist groups and the regional security situation. This situation in itself gives the potential perception that activities by radical Islamist groups are localized and do not have the probability of seriously affecting the security situation in West Africa. Senegal presents a unique case of a country with about 95 percent Muslim population which has not experienced much violence by radical Islamists

From the CH model, it can be deduced that economic and social marginalization, poverty, lack of education and illiteracy, religious and ethnic, and financial support for any group are important factors in the analysis of conflicts. The major variables identified in the CH model will form the basis for the selection of criteria and subsequent analysis of the topic.

Having reviewed literature from various sources, the next chapter will outline the methodology that will be used in the analysis of the data to answer the questions posed in the thesis' main hypothesis.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapter 1 of this thesis was an introductory chapter, which covered the general background of radical Islam and how it is beginning to assume prominence in West Africa. The chapter also highlighted the historical perspective of the development of radical Islam and introduced key concepts to be used in this research in order to enhance a common understanding of the subject matter.

Chapter 2 reviewed and discussed relevant available literature, which is related to the key research questions of the thesis. This included the process of radicalization; susceptibility of African Muslims to radical Islam; fault lines and manifestations of radical Islam; what makes radical Islam appealing to West African Muslims; the western response to radical Islam and why radical Islam has manifested in some countries and not in others with similar demographics.

Chapter 3 explains how the sources in the preceding chapter are to be used to develop variables for analyzing the process of radicalization in the sub-region using Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire as case studies. This chapter outlines the design method used during the conduct of the research. The methodology used is the qualitative method of research aimed at evaluating the case study by using both primary and secondary sources of data and information to establish the regional security implications of the spread of radical Islam in West Africa. Through the research, this thesis aims at identifying and analyzing answers to the secondary questions that will facilitate the answering of the thesis's primary question. One method of analysis is the qualitative method, which

involves analysis of data such as words, pictures, objects and artifacts. In this method of research, the researcher is the main data-gathering instrument.

Qualitative research is one of the two major approaches to research methodology in social sciences. Qualitative research involves an in-depth understanding of human behavior and the reasons that govern human behavior. Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research relies on reasons behind various aspects of behavior. Simply put, it investigates the why and how of decision-making, as compared to what, where, and when of quantitative research. Hence, the need is for smaller but focused samples, rather than large random samples by which qualitative research categorizes data into patterns as the primary basis for organizing and reporting results. Unlike quantitative research, which relies exclusively on the analysis of numerical or quantifiable data, data for qualitative research comes in many media - including text, sound, still and moving images. (Free Dictionary 2010)

As put forward in a study by Anne-Marie Ambert, qualitative methods trade comparative objective studies of a broad range of subjects for depth, to facilitate understanding on a more finite sampling. Qualitative methods focus on how and why people behave, think, and make meaning, rather than focusing on what people do or believe on a large scale. Another benefit, according to Ambert, is that qualitative research enables the researcher to analyze data from the macro to the micro level without risking analytical integrity by comparing the proverbial apples to oranges (Ambert et al. 1995, 880).

According to Ellen Taylor-Powell, in analyzing qualitative data, the researcher must know the material, focus the analysis, and categorize the information by identifying themes or patterns and organizing them into coherent categories. The researcher then continues with an interpretation of the data where he attaches meaning and significance to the analysis (Taylor-Powell 2003, 2).

The congruence method, a subset of qualitative analysis, allows for such challenging data to be analyzed and compared within each individual case study to

extract the impact of the various relational characteristics without the necessary requirement of finding multiple case studies that can be compared on an even plane to objectively measure the accuracy of the hypothesis. The congruence method tests a hypothesis's ability to predict whether the variables vary in the expected directions, to the expected magnitude, along the expected dimensions, or whether there is still unexplained variance in one or more dimensions (George and Bennett 2005, 181-183).

Selection Criteria and Explanation

The first step in the development of the hypothesis was to examine available background material on the growing trend of radical Islam and the effects it has on the security situation in West Africa. The characteristics were identified from instances where different authors, citing different sources, came to similar conclusions about the influence of a particular criterion, giving credibility to the characteristics. The variables that will be used for this analysis are: external influences, significant Muslim population with grievances, economic deprivation and marginalization, religious and ethnic undertones, socio-political imbalance, high rate of illiteracy, and the number of violent attacks by radical Islamic groups. This section provides a closer look at each characteristic and why it was selected as criteria.

External Islamic Influence

External Islamic influences play a key role in the growth and spread of radical Islam in the sub-region. External Islamic influences can take the form of ideology, funding and/or environmental influence. The West Africa region and the Middle East have a complex relationship that can be explained from a historical perspective. One of

the important aspects of Islam in contemporary life is the appearance of movements standing for the re-establishment of the full and complete reign of the Sharia over the everyday life of Muslims. Some suggested that northern states in Nigeria proclaimed Sharia in order to gain aid from the Muslim countries of the Middle East, especially oil-rich Saudi Arabia. As far back as 1950, Saudi Arabia exerted pressure on Nigeria and other states to declare a constitution that would enable them to become Islamic states (Deegan 2009). For increasingly impoverished sub-Saharan African states, external inducements to proclaim themselves Islamic can be significant. This underlines the importance of organizations like the Islamic Conference Organization, the Islamic Development Bank and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (Deegan 2009).

This characteristic is rated by how external Islamic influence supports the trend of radicalism. A score of 4 will be given to communities and areas of the sub-region that lack the resources to continue violent activities and therefore are greatly influenced by external factors. Other areas where external influence is less significant because of the population's willingness to resort to other non-violent measures or the people's unwillingness to accept external Islamic influence will receive reduced scores.

Significant Muslim Population with Grievances

Radical Islam may thrive in a region of significant Muslim population where the population seeks to address local grievances that the central government is unable or unwilling to address. This serves as a base line and foundation on which to build and serves as a pool from which willing individuals can be recruited. According to the RAND study *Ungoverned Territories*, if the state is unable to set its roots of legitimacy in the

Muslim populations or to demonstrate equal concern for immigrants' wellbeing, the Muslim population within the state will seek to be represented by other entities, often from external sources (RAND 2007).

RAND also notes that these areas of large Muslim populations are comprised of emotionally wanting individuals who are favorable to ideological orientation. The key to ranking this characteristic will be the extent to which the Muslim population views the willingness of government to address their problems. The more the population feels that their concerns and challenges are not being addressed, the higher the score as this increases the tendency of individuals and groups to become radical. A Muslim population that perceives itself being marginalized by the government and other groups, and does not have any avenues to address or redress their concerns will have a score of 4. The score decreases in populations with adequate representation in established government structures and are willing and able to use such legal structures to adequately address their challenges and concerns.

Economic Deprivation and Marginalization

Economic Deprivation results in poverty, which is exacerbated by the lack of access to basic amenities like water, food, shelter and education. The annual increase in unemployment levels in northern Nigeria means that graduates cannot find jobs, adding to the already large number of unemployed youth. Resentment invariably grows among the group towards the government's inability to provide for the needs of the community. Economic deprivation can be discussed by three concepts: relative deprivation, polarization and horizontal inequalities (HI). The notion of relative deprivation is defined (Ted Gurr 1970) as the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what

they actually think they can get, or in short the disparity between aspirations and achievements. Polarization occurs when two groups exhibit great intergroup heterogeneity combined with intra-group homogeneity. HIs are inequalities among groups of people that share a common identity. Such inequalities have economic, social, political and cultural status dimensions, each of which contains a number of elements (Stewart 2010, 2). The notion of HIs between groups, classified by ethnicity, religion, linguistic differences and so on, is thought to be an important cause of contemporary civil war and sectarian strife (Murshed Pavan 2009, 16).

Economic HIs include inequalities in ownership of assets be they financial, natural resource-based, human and social and of incomes and employment opportunities that depend on these assets and the general conditions of the economy (Langer Mustapha and Stewart 2007, 4). Economic inequalities in Nigeria are severe and core poverty is twice as high in the northwest of the country as compared to the southeast. Some of the economic inequalities can be traced to discriminatory allocation of government projects and grants, and differential access to key sectors of the economy, such as oil and gas, and telecommunications. Others are the unintended consequences of macroeconomic policies. Dynamic areas accumulate advantages, while deprived areas do the opposite through this polarization effect (Langer Mustapha and Stewart 2007, 10).

The key to ranking this characteristic will be the extent to which the livelihood of the population has been affected by the deprivation of the necessities of life. The necessities of life include but are not limited to access to water, food, health services, education and shelter. A population whose denial or lack of access to economic resources

is significant will be scored 4, whereas communities with relatively good access will receive a lesser score.

Religious and Ethnic Undertones

Religious intolerance has been with humanity since the beginning of time. Islam remains the dominant religion in northern Nigeria. With a large unemployed population, fuelled by radical Islamists whose message is to annihilate all other religions and impose a caliphate in their regions, there is little room for the tolerance of other religious views. This results in a vicious cycle of violence and reprisals.

What makes Nigeria's case a complex one is the ethnic undertones that lie beneath the volatile religious tension. The various ethnic groups in Nigeria, over time, have struggled for political power. Until its pattern of ethnic diversity is delineated, one cannot understand the socio-political fabric of Nigeria. It is important to note that while the Hausa-Fulani north is predominantly Muslim, the Yoruba-Igbos in the south are predominantly Christians. The Hausa and Fulani have adopted the Hausa language and culture and have intermarried over time to make their distinction sometimes rather difficult (Flint, 1960). This complex demography has resulted in situations where conflicts of a religious nature easily turn into ethnic conflicts with its associated violent reprisals likely to have ethnic repercussions for any group of people. Any attack on an ethnic group is likely to be viewed as an affront on a group's religion. In ranking this characteristic, any religious group with a preponderance of population linked directly to a particular ethnic group will be given a score of 4 whereas religious groups with less linkage to ethnic groupings would have a lesser score.

Socio-Political Imbalance

Social inequalities cover access to a range of services including education, health and housing and inequalities in achievements in health and educational outcomes.

Cultural status HIs refer to differences in recognition and (de facto) hierarchical status of different groups' cultural norms, customs and practices (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart 2007, 3). Social inequalities and associated problems are significant in many parts of the northern half of Nigeria and other parts of West Africa (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart 2007, 7). In the northern parts of Cote d'Ivoire, which is predominantly Muslim, access to social amenities and conditions of living are poor.

While attention is paid to ensuring equity in political and bureaucratic offices that concern the elite, not much has been done to promote equity in social life as indicated across the northern parts of the country. Though political and bureaucratic inequalities are more emotive and draw the attention of the media, social inequalities affect the lives of more people. Social inequalities have complex causes and have become entrenched in Nigerian national life. Sokoto state is peaceful in comparison with other states in Nigeria and the relationship between the indigenes and settlers is harmonious. However, according to a study by the Centre for Research and Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, there is evidence of the existence of inequalities between indigenes and settlers with discriminatory practices mainly based on ethnic and religious divides. The research also revealed that basic amenities are not equitably distributed as the settler settlements are neglected in terms of the provision of such amenities, lacking access roads and good schools (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewards 2007, 10).

Political HIs consist of inequalities in the group distribution of political opportunities and power, including control over the presidency, the cabinet, parliamentary assemblies, the army, police and regional and local governments (Stewart Brown, and Langer n.d.). The sharp differences in traditional culture and social structure between these three ethnic groups gave their numerical preponderance, huge political significance. The regional distribution of the population thus itself became an important dimension of the ethnic balance of power. With the Yoruba and Igbos comprising slightly two-thirds of the regional population and the Hausa-Fulani about half the population in the north, there was sufficient numerical advantage to ensure political dominance by the majority ethnic group (Coleman 1958). There is also evidence that non-indigenes in some cities in parts of Nigeria are disenfranchised (Langer Mustapha, and Stewart 2007). The key to ranking this characteristic would be how the population views measures by the central government to remove social barriers and guarantee full inclusion in the socio-economic and political process. A score of 4 will be given to communities where the government has been unable to bridge the gap between the so-called indigenes and non-indigenes.

High Rate of Illiteracy

Many have postulated that there is a relationship between violence and illiteracy. Although many believe that poverty, homelessness, and other mishaps cause illiteracy, the reverse has been proved to be fact. Illiteracy causes poverty, drug usage, crime and other vices. For instance, there is an established cause-effect relationship between reading failure and delinquency. Schools with high expectations do teach children to read in spite of problems resulting from poverty, homelessness, and drug addiction (Hinds n.d.).

In a study on reading failure and juvenile delinquency, the study was unsuccessful in attempting to correlate aggression with age, family size, or number of parents present in the home, rural versus urban environment, socio-economic status, minority group membership, or religious preference. Only reading failure was found to correlate with aggression in populations of delinquent boys. It concluded therefore that reading failure is the single most significant factor in those forms of delinquency which can be described as anti-socially aggressive (Hinds n.d.).

The level of education generally has a bearing on how a community can be influenced. A population with a high-level of illiteracy is likely to be easily influenced by religious and political leaders to resort to violence. A population with an appreciable level of literacy is less likely to be amenable to negative influences of sect and groups leaders. Most communities in northern parts of countries in West Africa have a high rate of illiteracy, making them vulnerable to the manipulation by leaders towards radicalism.

A score will be assigned to this variable based on whether the violence can be attributable to ignorance of the perpetrators or the community in general. This will be assessed by the extent of involvement by educated people within the community. A score of 4 will be awarded to the situation where ignorance, lack of knowledge, and level of education is believed to have greatly influenced violence.

Adoption of Sharia Law

Sharia is the system of Islamic law that is based on the Qur'an and the Ahadith and the work of Muslim scholars. Sharia extends just beyond civil law. It is the totality of religious, social, political, domestic and private life. Sharia law is primarily meant for all Muslims, but applies to a certain extent on people living inside a Muslim society (Rieber

n.d.). The imposition of Sharia law has generated lots of discussion and apprehension amongst many people especially non-Muslims living in the Muslim dominated areas. In the last decade, many northern states of Nigeria have adopted Sharia law amidst protests from the international community, especially human rights groups and activists fearing that the application would result in human right violations. This is because the Sharia criminal code has penalties for specific violations such as flogging for imbibing alcohol, removal of hands and then feet for recidivist thieves, and stoning in cases of proven adultery (Global Security 2009).

A score will be assigned to this variable based of evidence that its adoption and implementation has resulted in violence by radical Islamic groups. A high score of 4 will be awarded where there is evidence that Sharia has resulted in violence and in areas where violence cannot be attributed to the adoption of Sharia, a lesser score will be given depending on the extent.

Muslim Identification with Islamic Caliphate

Many Muslims believe that the time has come for the rise of an international Islamic caliphate reminiscent of the era between 10th and 17th century when Islam dominated the global economic arena and others spheres of life. Three major Islamic empires created during the period were the Safavid empire in Iran, the Moghul empire in India and the Ottoman empire in Syria, Anatolia, North Africa and Arabia. All the empires, influenced by the Mongol idea of the army state, involved civilians in their imperial policies, which made them win grass-roots support (Armstrong 2000, 115).

The western occupation of Islamic lands through France's occupation of Algeria in 1830, and Britain's occupation of Aden 1839, Tunisia in 1881, Egypt in 1882, the

Sudan in 1889, and Libya and Morocco in 1912, coupled with the creation of the state of Israel in the heart of Arab land made politics central to the Islam (Armstrong 2000, 152). Some believe that the rise of the west especially the U.S. and the factors outlined above are responsible for the collapse of the Islamic caliphate. They are therefore sympathetic to the plight of Muslims and tend to associate with the ideals of radical Islamic groups who aim to cause the downfall of western power as a means to enable the dream of the global Islamic caliphate.

A score will be assigned to this variable based on evidence supporting the assertion for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. A high score of 4 will be given where the evidence that Muslims identify with the intent and objectives of establishing a caliphate is high. A lesser score will be awarded where there is significantly lesser or no evidence of the creation of a caliphate.

Intensity of Radical Islam

The analysis of the input variables of external Islamic influence, significant Muslim population with grievances, economic deprivation and marginalization, religious and ethnic undertones, socio-political imbalance, high level of illiteracy, adoption of Sharia law and Muslim identification with Islamic caliphate will result in an output variable showing the level of intensity of radical Islam in West Africa.

Selection of Research Case Studies

The next step is to test the various characteristics against the known facts of case studies of radical Islam. Two countries in the West Africa region, Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, were selected for a better understanding of the subject. Nigeria is the most

populous country in Africa accounting for about approximately one-sixth of Africa's population. With a variety of customs, languages, and traditions, the country's over 250 ethnic groups present great cultural diversity and complexity. Recent trends of violence in some northern states of Nigeria have depicted a growing influence by radical Islamist groups, which threaten regional security. Radical Islamist groups such as the Boko Haram and Nigeria Taliban have caused violence in the middle and northern parts of Nigeria, which has resulted in hundreds of deaths. Other like-minded groups are suspected to be operating clandestinely in the northern half of the country.

Cote d'Ivoire has been rocked by violence that has broken up the country into a Muslim north and a Christian south. The current political stalemate, which continues to stall the peace process, is likely to further isolate the north and deprive it from central government resources. This could set the conditions for the radicalization of the Muslim north.

The matrix below showing the various variables and possible scores will be used in the analyzes in the subsequent chapter.

Table 1. Sample Table for Scoring Input Variables against Case Studies

Serial	VARIABLES	NIGERIA	COTE D'IVOIRE
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	External Islamic Influence	(1-4)	(1-4)
2	Significant Muslim Population with Grievances	(1-4)	(1-4)
3	Economic Deprivation and Marginalization	(1-4)	(1-4)
4	Religious and Ethnic Undertones	(1-4)	(1-4)
5	Socio-Political Imbalance	(1-4)	(1-4)
6	High Level of Illiteracy	(1-4)	(1-4)
7	Adoption of Sharia law	(1-4)	(1-4)
8	Muslim Identification with Islamic Caliphate	(1-4)	(1-4)

Source: Created by Author.

Table 2. Interpretation of Grading

Grades	Interpretation
4	Evidence of variable is overwhelmingly high
3	Evidence of variable is high
2	Evidence of variable is moderately present
1	Evidence of variable is barely present
0	Evidence of variable is not present

Source: Created by Author.

Table 3. Sample Table Showing Scoring of Output Variable for Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire

Serial	OUTPUT VARIABLE	NIGERIA	COTE D'IVOIRE
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Intensity of Radical Islam	(1-4)	(1-4)

Source: Created by author.

Summary

Chapter 3 has explained the methodology that will be used in the analysis of the various characteristics identified. These include economic factors of poverty and deprivation, religion and ethnic complexities, socio-political factors, the preponderance of the Muslim population in certain communities of West Africa and illiteracy and ignorance. It also explained the reasons for the various characteristics and their relevance to the research.

Chapter 4 will analyze in detail the selected case studies in order to make recommendations on what can be done by stakeholders to effectively mitigate the rising trend of radical Islam in West Africa.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE RISE OF RADICAL ISLAM IN WEST AFRICA: CASE STUDIES OF NIGERIA AND COTE D'IVOIRE

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the activities of radical Islam in West Africa using Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire as case studies. In doing so, the variables identified in the previous chapter will be analyzed in relation to evidence adduced in each of the countries with a view to ascertain any emerging trends which can substantiate or debunk the idea of the rise of radical Islam in West Africa.

A Case Study of Radical Islam in Nigeria

General Background

Nigeria lies in the West Africa region with a land size of about 923,770 square kilometers. It shares borders with Benin to the west, Niger to the north, Chad to the north east, Cameroun to the east and southeast and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. The country is divided into 36 states and its capital is Abuja. It has a population of about 151,030,462 as of the 2009 census (Coleman 2010). It is ethnically diverse with over 250 ethnic groups. The dominant ones are the Hausas, Yorubas, Ibos, Fulanis, Kanuris, Ijaws, Ibibio, and the Tivs. Muslims account for about 55 percent of the population, while Christians are about 40 percent. Its largest cities include Abuja the capital, Ibadan, Lagos, Kano, Kaduna and Jos. The divergence of religion, ethnic groups, culture, and values are seen as a catalyst for the recurring violence (CIA World Factbook 2010).

External Islamic Influence

The issue of radical Islam assumed prominence in Nigeria as a result of increasing violence by radical groups suspected to be affiliated to state, and actors like militant Islamic groups outside the country. During the 1950s, Islamic ideals became central to the goals of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), whose founder was Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto and grandson of Dan Fodio. Bello aligned himself to Abubakar Gumi, a leading Muslim intellectual and prominent writer, who established a critical link with the Al Saud family of Saudi Arabia. This guaranteed external support for the Islamist party, mosques and madrasas from Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sudan, the United Arab Emirate and Saudi Arabia. In addition to overt Muslim philanthropic activities, funds for radical Islamic movements reached Nigeria through courier and the informal banking system (Laremont and Gregorian 2006, 29).

Gumi and Bello travelled together for the pilgrimage to Mecca and were introduced to King Saud bin Abdul Aziz. Over the following years, the Saudi Arabian government is reported to have given the *Izala*, a group founded by Gumi, significant material support and encouragement. The effects of external factors are historic and significant. This support is believed to have influenced states in northern parts of Nigeria not only to implement Sharia for possible financial gains, but also to lean towards a more radical political Islamic ideology (Hill 2010, 21).

Foreign groups have also aided the institutionalization of Islamic law. Saudi, Sudanese, Syrian and Palestinian representatives appeared with the governor of Zamfara state, days before he announced his plan for Sharia. This State government has sent

Islamic judges for training in Malaysia and Sudan. The government of Katsina state also sent a delegation to Sudan to study its laws (Marshall 2004).

There is also evidence of infiltration of foreign radical groups. For instance, in November 2001, the Nigerian police arrested six Pakistani preachers, accused of inciting religious violence in Ogun state. The police stated that scores of Pakistanis have been arrested in different parts of the country for allegedly fomenting religious trouble after September 2001. The Nigerian police again in February 2004 announced the arrest of an Iranian diplomat in Abuja after he was found to have taken photographs of Churches, a presidential villa, the Defense headquarters and the Israeli, British, and American embassies (Marshall 2004).

The Sharia movement in the north has also advanced because of continued substantial support from external sources in Sudan, Iran, Libya, Syria, Palestine and especially Saudi Arabia. In addition to overt Muslim philanthropic activity, funds for radical Islamic movements reach Nigeria through informal banking systems resembling the hawala banking of East Africa, South Asia and the Middle East (Laremont and Gregorian 2006).

The resurgence of radical Islamist activities in 1999 was influenced by an infusion of Saudi-educated scholars who challenged less austere versions of Islam. Radical Islam acquired a more pronounced political edge as the national fortunes of the governing Muslim national elite declined dramatically with the election of President Obasanjo, a born-again Christian from the south. Having played a major and dominant role in the government and military for almost forty years, northern Muslims felt sidelined. Among the reasons for these

feelings was Obasanjo's removal of politicized military officers, who were disproportionately Muslim (Dickson 2005, 7).

The election of the late President Yar' Adua, a Muslim, presented the Muslim fraternity with an opportunity to implement their religious and political goals. The implementation of Sharia has led to the emergence of more radical groups in the north of the country. The most prominent and successful is the Boko Haram. The group, often referred to as the *Nigerian Taliban*, emerged in 2002 in the northeastern city of Maiduguri, which is located close to the border with Chad. The group in 2004 clashed with security forces in a series of bloody riots. Again in 2009, many cities and villages in the north were plunged into violence when Boko Haram militants opened fire on a police station in Bauchi. The resulting violence claimed over 700 lives in several days. These developments, coupled with the capture of sophisticated weapons and communication equipment by the security forces further lend credence to the influence of external support (Associated Press 2009).

It is evident, that external pressure and support was the driving force for the implementation of Sharia, which set the conditions for the formation of radical Islamist groups and the resurgence of violence. In the northern parts of Nigeria where governments seem unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs of the population, assurances of support from oil rich nations, like Saudi Arabia and Libya, become too lucrative for some local governors and leaders to neglect. The external Islamic influence variable was critical and was scored a high of 4.

Significant Muslim Population with Grievances

Radical Islamists violence has taken place in areas of the north where there is the preponderance of Muslims in the communities. The violence has spread into other areas where Christians and other religious groups have significant numbers. For instance in the middle belt, the population of Muslims and Christian in certain areas is at par.

In a Muslim dominated area where the population is aggrieved and does not see any immediate solution to the problem by the government, there is the likelihood of radical militant groups taking advantage of the situation to perpetuate violence. Once the group is seen to be championing the cause of the population, it is likely to receive support from the locals who feel aggrieved. Al Qaida and other radical Islamic groups may continually seek minority groups, which are not adequately represented, or the disadvantaged in society. In Nigeria, just like in other West Africa countries, the country is demarcated into a north-south divide where Muslims are found in the deprived north. The Muslim community therefore rally behind Islamic groups that promise to address their concerns. It can be stated that although violence by militant Islamic groups can take place in a community irrespective of which religion is in the majority, the likelihood of violence in Muslim dominated regions is highly probable when the population is aggrieved. The variable is therefore rated 3.

Economic Deprivation and Marginalization

Economic deprivation and marginalization has been with most people of mid and northern Nigeria for a long time. According to the Nigerian Federal Office of Statistics, in 1960 about 15 percent of the population was poor, but by 1980 this percentage had

risen to 28 percent. By 1996, the incidence of poverty in Nigeria was 66 percent or 76.6 million people (Garba 2006).

In Kano, in the north, new ethnic categories of *southerners* and *northerners* arose when southerners, particularly Ibos, began to threaten economic interests of the Hausa commercial empire based in Kano. Northern elites adopted the policy of *northernization* during the late 1950s, and sought to open jobs for Hausas in commercial firms in Kano, gain greater access to government contracts, civil service posts, and financial services, and reassert control over produce export. The fear of losing out economically heightened the sense among northern indigenes of marginalization (Paden 1973).

The phenomenon of *northernization* established the predominance of politics over economics, which made political competition at the national level a matter of primary concern. Nothing in the four decades since independence has lessened these concerns. It is therefore not surprising that one of the reasons given for the Hausa-Fulani attack on non-indigenes, mostly Christians and Ibos from the south, was the encroachment of their grazing lands (Global Security 2009).

In Jos, the manifestation of conflict between Muslim settlers and Christian indigenes started emanating in the 1990s amongst residents. This culminated in 1994 into open clashes mainly between the Berom indigenes and Hausa/Fulani settlers over farmland and local chieftaincy titles. Jos metropolis, the capital of Plateau State, registered a great deal of crises followed by numerous attacks by marauding Hausa-Fulani Muslim militias on citizens living on the countryside in the Northern Senatorial Districts of Plateau State. The attacks eventually culminated in major crises that killed hundreds of citizens, first in Yelwa in February with the massacre of about a hundred

Christians, 67 of them in COCIN Church Yelwa and later again reprisal killings in Yelwa with revenge killings by Christians who massacred between 650 and 700 Muslims in May 2004. The outcry by Muslims against the latter killings led to the declaration of a State of Emergency in Plateau State by President Olusegun Obasanjo (Danfulani n.d., 3)

The crises on the Jos Plateau are first a struggle over land. The majority of Plateau State indigenes are Christians tied to the land as peasant farmers or workers in the civil service, while the mainly Muslim minorities are Hausa dry-season farmers and cattle rearing Fulani, with the Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa dominating the business life of the metropolis. The land thus remains an important emotive factor to a region that is predominantly inhabited by peasant farmers, frustrated over lack of fertilizers, and cattle herders' Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which brought about the retirement and retrenchment of many public servants, and military personnel most of whom actively returned to the farmlands thereby exerting great pressure on land resources. The land that used to be available to those who used or needed it now became a prized possession. Both the host communities and settlers alike began to rationalize their inability to acquire and possess land to the presence of the other group, thereby undermining the imperative of their co-existence and the basis of consensus and confidence building (Danfulani n.d., 4).

In Ghana, the settler and indigene problem is nonexistent and every citizen, including Muslims, can own land and other property in any part of the country. Land is central to survival, hence conflict very often occurs over access to pastoral and arable land. Differences in ethnic nationality and religion between Plateau ethnic groups and the Hausa-Fulani only serve to compound these economic problems. The collapse of the once

thriving tin mining industry in the state and the arrival of petro-dollars gave birth to attendant dislocation and job losses. This unfortunately coincided with the period of Sharia expansion in the northern states to compound the problem. This has contributed to poverty in the northern parts of Nigeria (Danfulani n.d.).

The regional distribution of a poverty indicator shows that poverty incidence actually improved in the southern zones during the 1990s, but deteriorated in the north, particularly in the rural areas. The case of poverty in northern Nigeria is monumental and quite pathetic. Not only does the north lead the south in terms of poverty levels, but the trend of events there also seems to point to a worsening situation. In the past several years, reports warned that foreign and domestic companies were migrating away to other parts of the country as a result of religious riots and intolerance (Garba 2006).

Many have argued that economic decline and the severe inequalities in wealth between the north and south are two key reasons why the northern states are moving towards Sharia. They have lost confidence in the central government's ability to provide for their basic needs (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart 2007, 15).

Economic deprivation and marginalization cuts across all the other factors as the encroachment of grazing lands and the threat to the livelihood has always resulted in violence. It can also be argued that in the absence of economic deprivation, people are able to work and earn reasonable incomes, which facilitate access to health, food, water, shelter and education. This can have significant effects on the individual and society. The economic deprivation and marginalization variable analyzed in the Nigeria case study is therefore rated 4.

Religious and Ethnic Undertones

The ethnic and religious demography of Nigeria presents a complex issue that underlies most of the violence. The Hausa-Fulani ethnic group dominates the northern part of Nigeria, which is predominantly Muslim. The area has seen socio-political and economic marginalization for a long period. In the south, the religion is predominantly Christian and an ethnic mix of Ibos, Yorubas and other minority ethnic tribes, which dominate the area. The Hausa and Fulani have adopted the Hausa language and culture and have intermarried to such an extent that the two groups are sometimes difficult to distinguish (Flint 1960). Closely related to the Hausa-Fulani are the Nupe and Kanuris. Both of these groups share with the Hausa-Fulani, the two cultural elements that most sharply distinguish them from the Ibos and to a lesser extent, the Yorubas: a deep and diffused faith in Islam and a tradition of large-scale rule through centralized authoritarian states. Although not as tightly organized like the Hausa-Fulani emirates and never united in a single state, the Yorubas were also grouped into large-scale kingdoms (Diamond 1988). Given such a complex demography, conflicts of a religious nature most often have ethnic repercussions. Any attack on an ethnic group is likely to be viewed as an attack on a group's religion. It is said that military regimes in Nigeria managed to suppress religious and ethnic strife. After the transfer to civilian rule in 1999 however, the nation has suffered from increasing internal conflicts. Ethnic and religious groups compete for political power and control over lucrative resources.

The State of Kano, with a population of about 7 million, is home to more than 100 ethnic groups. Islam is the dominant religion, and most Muslim residents are pastoralist cattle herders. The Christian minority group is comprised predominantly of farmers and

merchants based in urban centers. This economic and political divide has recently increased tensions. Loss of grazing land to the expanding Sahara Desert has aggravated the struggle for land and other natural resources and has increased poverty among pastoralists. The diminished central government control following the end of military rule has also permitted a power struggle between ethnic groups (John et al. 2007, 424). The situation is exacerbated by the imposition of Sharia in Kano and other northern states, as it has been perceived as a threat to the Christian minority.

One of the consequences of this exclusionist and divisive system of citizenship has been a number of violent ethnic conflicts. In February 2004, 67 Christians were massacred at a church in Yelwa, a city in Plateau State, south of Kano. A massive reprisal by Christian militia killed several hundreds of Muslims. Plateau State, as a hub for Christian groups in the mostly Muslim north, had previously experienced low-level ethnic tensions. However, in this instance, the violence rapidly spread to Kano, where retaliatory riots led to the displacement of 50,000 people and an unknown number of people killed. For the first time since the beginning of civilian rule, the President instituted a state of emergency. When he was unable to control the violence, the governor of Plateau State was suspended and a retired general replaced him (John et al. 2007, 425)

In Zango-Kataf, claims by the indigenous Kataf against the immigrant Hausa community exploded into violence in February 1992. The government set up a commission of inquiry into the disturbance. In May, however, before the commission's report was released, a new outbreak of violence led to the burning of the town and some neighboring villages. In sympathy with their Hausa kith and kin, the Hausa majority in Kaduna and Zaria rioted. At the end of the violence, over two hundred people had been

killed in Zango-Kataf while over one thousand others died in Kaduna, Zaria and elsewhere in the north (Nnoli 2003, 15). Many of the victims of this particular violence were Christians. A crisis that started as an ethnic conflict eventually resulted in religious violence and a massacre.

It is to be noted that a similar violent conflict erupted in 1990, 1991 and 1992 between the indigenous Jukun and the immigrant Tiv communities in Wukari and its environs. This conflict is still believed to be going on, albeit, with occasional peaceful interludes. Any time it erupts, thousands are killed and wounded and hundreds of houses are burnt or otherwise destroyed (Nnoli 2003, 15). Many people see the causes of these violent clashes as ethnic, whereas others have argued that it is religious. What is glaringly unarguable, however, is the intertwining of both religion and ethnic factors in the causes of many of these conflicts.

Based on the analysis above, it is clear that the ethnic and religious demography makes it virtually impossible to classify most violence as solely religious or wholly ethnic. It is also evident that religious and ethnic undertones remain a complex and dangerous influence of violence in various parts of Nigeria, particularly in the north. This variable is therefore scored a high of 4 as its absence could significantly reduce the recurrence of violence and the number of reprisal action and casualties sustained.

Socio-Political Imbalance

Socio-political imbalance and its associated problems of poverty and deprivation remain a significant part of the north. Many people feel discriminated against on account of their ethnicity, religion, and region. In the northwest of Nigeria, only 25 percent of pregnant women use clinics compared to 85 percent in the southeast and maternal

mortality rates in the northeast are 939 percent higher than in the southeast. Additionally, core poverty in the northeast is twice as high in the north west of the country than in the southeast. There is also discriminatory allocation of government projects and grants and differential access to key sectors of the economy, such as oil and gas and telecommunications (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart 2007, 9).

Despite the large number of Ibos in Lagos and Kano, Hausas in Shagamu and Yorubas in Funtua, their absence from modern governance structures in their respective areas of abode is a testimony of the extent of their marginalization. In many parts of the country, such as Plateau, Nassarawa, and Taraba states, some Nigerians are labeled indigenes and others, settlers. The former claim to be the natives and owners of the land while all others are regarded as tenants. In daily existence, the indigenes contend that all opportunities must go to them to the exclusion of the settlers. These exclusionary politics sow the seeds of violence. Muslims, who are marginalized even for reasons aside religion, become peeved and seek to do same in areas perceived to be dominated by them (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart 2007, 11).

The state of Sokoto, for instance, is relatively peaceful as compared to other states. There is however, the existence of inequality between indigenes and settlers with discriminatory practices based on religion and ethnic divides. There is evidence of discriminatory practices in terms of job opportunities, conditions of work, educational opportunities, and basic amenities are not equality distributed. Settler communities lack access roads and good schools. The non-indigenes of Sokoto are only allowed to vote, but not to be voted for. Except for token appointments, political appointments are reserved

for the sons of the soil. The non-indigenes are employed on contract and pay higher school fees than the indigenes (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart 2007).

A region with a high fertility rate coupled with lack of employment opportunities invariably would result in a large number of disgruntled unemployed youth who then become disillusioned with life. If a group is excluded from political power and marginalized economically, group consciousness arise and disparate subgroups will be brought together under a common identity to create a more effective resistance (Steward 2009). These groups of people are the willing tools of any radical Islamic group or leader who seeks to recruit them.

From the above analysis, socio-political imbalance influences the ability of individuals and groups to resort to violence especially when they group under the banner of religion. This variable is scored 3 because although socio-political marginalization resulted in the violent reprisals in Sokoto and Kaduna, other factors such as religion and economic factors precipitated it.

High Rate of Illiteracy

There exist two broad streams of education, in northern Nigeria, the Islamic and the Western systems of education. Both run parallel to each other with little chance for cross-over by participants. The school options in the Islamic education system vary from the traditional Quranic schools, followed by the Islamiyyah General schools and Islamiyyah Primary schools. There exist a significant gap between the number of children attending Islamic schools and those attending western type of primary schools. In the Sokoto and Zamfara States, for instance, the National Primary Education Commission statistics shows that as at June 1995, three times as many children were attending

traditional Quranic schools and Islamiyyah schools than western primary schools. Pupils however, leave these schools without any skills or competences to join the modern world (Ejembi 2003). This buttresses the extent of marginalization and its effects on the literacy levels in the north.

Evidence on the zonal patterns of early childhood education and net primary school attendance from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), in 1999 revealed that, with figures of 3 and 4 percent, early childhood education was practically non-existent in the north of Nigeria. Primary school attendance is also lowest in the north-west and north east compared to the rest of the country. MICS data also shows that school attendance in the north-west (28 percent) and north east (39 percent) was significantly lower than in the southeastern (79 percent) and in the south western (81percent) parts of the country (Ejembi 2003). +Given that northern Nigeria currently has the highest concentration of illiterate children in the world, premonition point to the probability of future existence of high poverty rate in the region unless drastic measures are taken to recoil the ugly trend (Aluaigba 2009, 21).

The influence of illiteracy has a multiplier effect on the incidence of violence. The Hausas in Kaduna and Kano, in solidarity with their kith and kin in the Zango-Kataf incident, attacked Christians and other minority groups. The violence could have been mitigated, if the level of literacy of the citizenry in the community was relatively high, as individuals and groups could have better appreciated the second and third order effects of their actions on the community as a whole. In a community, which was predominantly illiterate, it is difficult for stakeholders to persuade the population to seek peaceful resolution of disputes. The level of illiteracy can therefore be described as being directly

proportional to the propensity of violence, although illiteracy in itself, may not necessarily lead to violence. This variable is therefore given a rating of 3.

Adoption of Sharia Law

The phenomenon of radical Islam and the advocacy for Sharia started from the days of Uthman Dan Fodio through the era of independence to the latter parts of 1990s. Some radical groups believed that some developments in the country made it difficult for them to carry out the tenets and pillars of Islam. They assert that some of these hindrances are caused by the government, while others are rooted in the nature of the evolution of the Nigerian state, which many of them believe is strongly skewed in favor of Christians. Additionally, many believe that the Islamic religion ought to be practiced exactly in the ways Prophet Mohammed stipulated in his time. It is the belief of these people that many of the problems facing Nigeria today can only be addressed if the country adheres to the practice of Islamic doctrine as laid down in the Qur'an by the Prophet Mohammed. They see the adoption of Sharia to be the only way of eradicating the socio-economic problems of the country (Alao, 15).

The antecedents of Sharia can be traced to the mid 1970s, when during the debate for the promulgation of the 1979 constitution, some Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly called for the incorporation of Sharia law. This polarized the country, especially as most of those making the case for Sharia introduction were from northern Nigeria. This problem was not resolved until the military overthrew the government in 1983. The secularity of Nigeria became doubtful when in 1985, the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida took Nigeria into the Organization of Islamic Conference States (OIC), albeit as an observer. The interpretation given to this decision was that the

Babangida administration wanted to declare Islam as the state religion in Nigeria (Alao 13).

As a result of the controversies that emerged from the inclusion of the Sharia in the Nigeria constitution, Section 275 was inserted as a compromise for the Muslims, which recognized a Sharia Court of Appeal, subject only to the Supreme Court and Section 10, which was promulgated as a way of appeasing Christians. Section 10 provides that the government of the Federation or a state shall not adopt any religion as a state religion. Consequently, successive administrations have been striving to strike an uneasy balance between these contradictions. Sections 10 and 275 of the Nigerian Constitution seem to contradict each other on the issue of religion and the state (Alao 13).

It is believed that the deepening economic problems in the late 1990s coupled with events of 11 September 2001 empowered radical Islamic groups to take advantage of this constitutional gap to pressure local politicians for the adoption of Sharia.

The adoption and implementation of Sharia law in some states in Nigeria has undoubtedly caused tensions and violence over the last decade. Although it is true that Muslims dominate the northern parts of Nigeria and Christians are the majority in the south, this assumption is too simplistic as there are areas in northern Nigeria with large Christian populations. The issues that arise are whether Christians living in Muslim dominated areas should be subject to Sharia law. This invariably continues to create implementation problems, which causes intermittent rioting.

In October 2009, the governor of the northern state of Zamfara announced plans to implement a Sharia criminal code. At the time, Zamfara state had already incorporated Sharia into aspects of family and civil law. The governor eventually effected the law.

Although he stressed that it was to be applied only to Muslims, certain measures such as the ban on alcohol and public music and the closure of all cinemas have impinged on the lives of the Christians minority (Center for Inquiry 2010).

In February 2010, hundreds of people died after fighting between Christians and Muslims erupted over proposals to expand the jurisdiction of Sharia Islamic Law. Tension remained high in the city of Zamfara as more than 1000 buildings were burnt down in the rioting. This was after similar series of violence in Kaduna, where Churches and Mosques were set on fire, and eyewitnesses said rival gangs of Christian and Muslim youths burnt and hacked each other to death (Center for Inquiry 2010).

The adoption and implementation of Sharia law has resulted in increased radical Islamists violence as the radical groups continually seek to enforce the Islamic code on the society. With a Muslim majority population bent on implementing Sharia against Christian resistance because of what the latter sees as an infringement on their rights, the results has often been violence and reprisal actions. The adoption of Sharia, therefore, constitutes a major factor to the rise in Islamists violence. The variable of Sharia adoption is therefore rated as 4.

Muslim Identification with Islamic Caliphate

The Muslim world has nurtured the desire for an international caliphate for a long time now. Many efforts have been made by various Muslim groups throughout the world to set conditions for this realization. For instance the Indonesian branch of Hizbut Tahrir, hosted the 3rd International Caliphate Conference in Jakarta on 12 August 2007. The conference drew over 90,000 participants from at least 39 different countries. Groups in attendance, ranging from moderate Islamic organizations to those associated with Al

Qaeda, were bound by the desire to reestablish the Caliph as a religious and political leader of a global Islamic state. The caliph dates back to the Holy Prophet Muhammed in the early 7th century. During the Ottoman Empire, the Caliphate was moved to Turkey where it resided for over three hundred years. In 1924, the Islamic Turkish government, seeking to become a more secular country, banned the Caliphate after having a chain of over one thousand successive Caliphs. Reestablishing the Caliph has been a salient cause among some Islamic circles ever since (McLeod and Hairgrove 2008).

In West Africa, the creation of the Sokoto caliphate in northern Nigeria led by Uthman Dan Fodio, around 1809 inspired politico-religious movements elsewhere in the region, most notably in what became the Tukolor and Mandinka empires of what is now Mali, Senegal, and Guinea. The Tukolor empire was created by a Muslim preacher named Al-Hajj Umar. Umar set off in 1826 on a lengthy pilgrimage to Mecca, during which he was strongly influenced by Muslim reformist movements in Arabia and Egypt as well as by the spirit of jihad in the Sokoto Caliphate. From there he traded non-Muslim captives in exchange for firearms with which he modernized his army. By 1854 he had captured the inland kingdom of Kaarta, and in the early 1860s he extended his conquests through the upper Niger River states of Segu and Masina (Lindsay n.d., 4).

For some present day Muslims in West Africa, the imagery of Islam reflective of the golden era of the Holy Prophet Muhammad and other prophets is a religious value worthy of pursuit in terms of life goals, finances, and personal sacrifice in the cause of Allah. This is especially so in the face of what many Muslims consider being the deliberate marginalization of its followers by governments aligned to Western ideology. This ideological war for the hearts and minds, for Muslims, is considered a war for a

collective identity and has no shortage of patriots willing to join the struggle (McLeod n.d.). The western occupation of Islamic lands, coupled with the creation of the state of Israel in the heart of Arab land, made politics central to Islam (Armstrong 2000, 152). This development, together with the desire to return to Islam's glorious past, has increased the support for the creation of a Muslim Caliphate throughout the West Africa region.

Some Muslims in West Africa are sympathetic to the cause of the plight of Muslims and tend to associate with the ideals of radical Islamic groups who aim to cause the downfall of western power as a means to enable the dream of the international Muslim caliphate. This is why radical militant groups in West Africa continue to associate and name their groups after radical Islamic groups like the Taliban and Al Qaida. The Nigeria Taliban, the Boko Haram, and the Nigeria Mujahideen are some of the groups whose secondary aim is the wider imposition of Islamic rule beyond Nigeria (Jane's Information Group 2009).

Among the youth of West Africa, bin Laden is popular for the simple reason that he is standing up to the United States. T-shirts and pictures of the Al Qaida leader are noted to have been distributed and later impounded among the youths in Kumasi and Tamale in Ghana, Dakar in Senegal and parts of northern Nigeria (Assimeng 2010, 230).

From the analysis, it can be deduced that many Muslims have lost confidence in the ability of the central governments to cater for their needs. They have therefore turned to religion to address their socio-economic problems. Some have become sympathetic to the cause of radical Islamist groups as long as they proclaim the desire to establish a Muslim Caliphate. The desire for the reestablishment of a global Muslim caliphate is high

not only among radical Islamic groups but even among Muslim moderates. The variable is therefore rated 3.

Table 4. Scoring of Input Variables for the Analysis of Nigeria

Serial	VARIABLES	NIGERIA
(a)	(b)	(c)
1	External Islamic Influence	4
2	Significant Muslim Population with Grievances	3
3	Economic Deprivation and Marginalization	4
4	Religious and Ethnic Undertones	4
5	Socio-Political Imbalance	3
6	High Level of Illiteracy	3
7	Adoption of Sharia law	4
8	Muslim Identification with Islamic Caliphate	3

Source: Created by author.

A Case Study of Radical Islam in Cote d'Ivoire

General Background

Cote d'Ivoire shares borders with Liberia and Guinea to the west, Mali and Burkina Faso to the north, the Republic of Ghana to the east and the Atlantic Ocean lies to its south. With a land area of about 322,500 sq km, the country is slightly larger than New Mexico. Its capital city, Yamoussoukro, lies in the center of the country and other prominent cities across the country are Abidjan, San Pedro, Bouake, Daloa, Man and

Gagnoa. The 2006 estimate puts the country's population at approximately 18,900,000 (Department of State Website 2010).

Cote d'Ivoire has more than 60 ethnic groups which are usually classified into five divisions; the Akans (east and center), Krous (southwest), South Mandes (west), North Mande (northeast) and Senoufo/Lobis (north center and northeast). The Baoules, in the Akan division, probably comprise the single largest subgroup with 15 to 20 percent of the population. They are based in the central region around Bouake and Yamoussoukro. The Betes in the Krou division, the Senoufos in the north, and the Malinkes in the northwest and the cities are the next largest groups, with 10 to 15 percent each of the national population. Most of the principal divisions have a significant presence in neighboring countries. The religious demography depicts that 35 to 40 percent of the population are Muslims, while Christians and other denominations account for between 25 to 35 percent of the population (Department of State Website 2010).

What is interesting about the sociological diversity of the country is that the different ethnic-religious groups are not confined to their historical-geographic spaces; they are blended with one another. That is why there are as many Muslims in Abidjan and the major cities of the southern part of the country as there are Christians. It is however fair to state that Muslims still remain in the majority in the north while Christians are perceived to be more in the southern regions.

External Islamic Influence

The external Islamic influence in Cote d'Ivoire can be analyzed in the context of the spread of the Islamic religion and the influx of Muslim immigrants into the country. To an extent, religion in Africa and the Middle East has been politicized largely because

of the paucity of channels through which to articulate opposition and the general authoritarian political structures which existed. One of the important aspects of Islam in contemporary life is the appearance of movements standing for the re-establishment of the full and complete reign of Sharia. The basis for this trend rests on the strong desire among many people for a moral revival and renewal (Deegan n.d.).

One Islamic movement, which had the desire of championing this course in Cote d'Ivoire was the Wahhabi movement from Guinea. The Wahhabi movement in Cote d'Ivoire emerged in the 1950s from Conakry, Bamako and French Sudan when a young generation of pilgrims and students, many of whom were Guineans returned from Mecca, and the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo. With new reformed Islamic schools and the Dakar-based Muslim Cultural Union, the movement gained ground throughout Cote d'Ivoire and French-speaking West Africa. The Wahhabi movement, preaching a return to the pristine origin of Islam, also denounced elements of the local cultural heritage as non Islamic. Their most virulent attacks were against the Sufi brotherhoods, depicting them as vile social parasites and henchmen of colonial authorities. This led to tensions and open conflicts with traditionalists (Miran 2006, 12).

On attainment of independence, President Houphouet-Boigny though a devout Catholic, developed close albeit ambiguous relations with Muslims. Rumors circulated that his father was a Muslim from Mali but he never either confirmed or denied the information. His first wife was a pious Muslim of mixed Akan and Senegalese parentage and one of his last mistresses was also a Muslim, in whose memory he built the prominent Riviera Golf mosque in Abidjan. He cultivated lasting spiritual friendships with renowned Sufi marabouts such as Yacouba Sylla and Amadou Hampate Ba and was

captivated by traditional Islam's mysticism. At the beginning of his political journey in the RDA party, many of his friends and collaborators were Muslims (Miran 2006, 7).

Even though Houphouet-Boigny fully acknowledged the contribution of Muslims to the social and economic development of the nation, he categorically denied them any political autonomy. To keep the Muslim community in line, he used the strategies of co-optation and control, ranging from discrete surveillance to outright repression. He ruled with money and gave many generous gifts to Muslims. He built mosques, sent checks to Imams, and sponsored Imams to Mecca. As long as Muslims accepted Houphouet-Boigny's gifts and political tutelage, their relations with the political authorities were uneventful. But whenever any Muslim hinted a critique at the existing order or rose to a position of threatening dominance, repression followed on grounds of sedition. Even Mamadou Coulibaly, who was next to the president, was once called to order after his return from his first pilgrimage in 1973. His religious contacts with Saudi dignitaries and representatives of pan-Islamic agencies had angered President Houphouet-Boigny (Miran 2006, 8).

President Houphouet-Boigny vetoed several transfers of funds from pan-Islamic agencies to the Ivorian Muslim communities and other Islamic associations. Indeed, so acute was the President's suspicion of Arab-Islamic countries exporting religious ideologies that until the year of his death, Cote d'Ivoire did not establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and when it did in 1993, Saudis were not allowed to open an embassy in Abidjan for another nine years. President Houphouet-Boigny thus created a firmly rooted political culture in Cote d'Ivoire where state authorities are willing to express deference, even gratitude to Muslims as long as they refrain from making any

political claim of their own. If the Muslim constituency appeared to dissociate itself from the Head of State or ruling party, it could be accused of all ills, including treason to the nation, and repressed (Miran 2006, 8).

Unlike in Senegal, Mali or Burkina Faso, the 1970s' oil booms were not followed by a massive influx of Arab-Islamic financial aid to Cote d'Ivoire. This state of affairs was in part due to Muslim associations' own internal weaknesses and more significantly, Houphouet-Boigny's enduring distrust of pan-Islamic organizations, especially those linked to Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya. The level of international assistance sporadically received by local Muslim communities was dwarfed in comparison to that secured by the Catholic and Protestant churches. Although this was a handicap to a certain extent, the scarcity of outside funds and logistical assistance nonetheless became a comparative advantage for Ivorian Muslims in the long run. Cote d'Ivoire was spared the Arab world's religious and ideological divisions that have been imported along with petro dollars into other neighboring countries. Relations between the Arab-Islamic world and both the Ivorian government and Muslim associations have taken on a new trend after president Gbagbo opened up towards all potential sources of financial aid (Miran 2006, 23).

Another issue for consideration is the influx of immigrants from other countries. In Cote d'Ivoire, migrants were initially encouraged to migrate to the country to work on the large cocoa and coffee plantations. At the time of the outbreak of the conflict, they constituted approximately 40 percent of the total population as many of them had become second or third generation immigrants. Of the over 5 million non-Ivoirian Africans living in Cote d'Ivoire, one-third to one-half were from Burkina Faso (Nordas 2007, 7).

The Lebanese community in Cote d'Ivoire was mostly religiously passive on the public scene. One exception was the Shi'a movement initiated by Imam Cheikh Jaafar Sayegh in the neighborhood of Adjame in Abidjan in the 1980s. Like the Ahmadiyya mission directed by Pakistanis, it attracted mostly poor urban dwellers and migrants, often foreigners and women. In the past ten years, however, Iran has become more present in Cote d'Ivoire both on the religious and socio-economic fronts and more African Sunnis have converted to Shia Islam, rising to positions of Imam (Miran 2006, 23). The Islamic influence by the Lebanese and Pakistanis was however very minimal.

This Islamization brought about a shift in the Muslim population's status, from minority to a quasi-majority. This decisive enlargement allowed Muslims to become more visible and enterprising in the national public sphere. What is more, it has redrawn the country's religious map and the Muslim presence has expanded to the entire Ivorian territory, including the south (Miran 2006, 2).

Although Burkina Faso and Liberia were purported to have supported the northern faction during the crisis, their influence was more political in nature than religious. From the analysis, it is obvious that external Islamic influence has been minimal because of the policies adopted by the first president of Cote d'Ivoire. The variable of external Islamic influence is therefore rated 2.

Significant Muslim Population with Grievances

The Muslim population of Cote d'Ivoire is approximately 35 to 40 percent of the population. This is significant but not dominant, if compared to other religions in the country. This makes the Muslim community an important segment of the society. No Muslim has been president since the country's independence. Even in the face of

marginalization, the Muslim population has not resorted to violence, lending credence to the assertion that, perhaps Islam in West Africa is a tolerant breed, which can co-exist with other religions.

Cote d'Ivoire has a significant Muslim population, but there is no evidence to suggest that the religion of Islam or activities of radical Islam were responsible for the conflict and violence. The current political stalemate has divided the country into a perceived Muslim north and Christian south. If not resolved, this could empower radical Islamists to commence activities in the north, since the government does not control the northern half of the country and that region has seen least in terms of investment in education and economic development.

From the analysis, it is difficult to state that the preponderance of significant Muslim populations in communities contributed to the violence. Most of the violence at the grassroots level occurred in the capital where the religious demographics were mixed. The variable of significant Muslim population is thus rated 1.

Economic Deprivation and Marginalization

Cote d'Ivoire was for many years regarded as an African success story based on its economic progress and political stability. The country experienced remarkable economic growth in the first two decades after independence. The economy was based on the export of primary commodities, with cocoa and coffee as the most important exports. Immigration provided useful labour for Cote d'Ivoire's plantation economy. An estimated 30 percent of the Ivorian population is believed to be first, second or third generation immigrant. Although the biggest group is believed to be from Burkina Faso,

significant numbers have also come from Mali, Guinea, Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal and Mauritania (Yaro n.d., 6).

While the rising price of cocoa and coffee exports contributed to its economic growth, prosperity and stability, this was possible as a result of the heavy reliance on largely Muslim immigrants from poorer countries in the north doing a majority of the cocoa and coffee cultivation. The fall in the price of cocoa and coffee in the 1980s exacerbated the poverty in the country. Job opportunities grew scarce and original farmers in the south began to demand that their land be returned to them, igniting conflict between northern immigrants and the southwestern Bete and southeastern Baoules (Sany 2007, 4). It should be noted that while these socio-economic disparities did not immediately cause violence, they set dangerous and volatile conditions for the conflict.

The economic deprivation and marginalization, which resulted from the socio-economic disparities, combined with existing ethnic tensions laid the foundations for a volatile situation. Economic deprivation contributed greatly to the crisis and it is therefore rated 4.

Religious and Ethnic Undertones

Cote d'Ivoire's people belong to approximately 60 different ethnic groups that can be further grouped into five larger socio-cultural or ethno-linguistic groups: Akan, Voltaic or Gur, Kru, Northern Mande and Southern Mande. The Akan are by far the largest ethnic group and are predominantly found in the eastern and central regions of Cote d'Ivoire. The main northern ethnic groups are the Northern Mande and Voltaic, and together account for 34 percent of the population. Although these ethnic groups originate from Cote d'Ivoire's northern regions, many people belonging to these groups actually

live in the southern parts of Cote d'Ivoire. For instance, approximately 23 percent of the Northern Mande population lives in the coastal city of Abidjan (Langer 2004, 10).

The ethnic groups, Kwa and Krou are generally established in the sub-tropic areas along the coast, whereas the Mande and Gur ethnic groups have their origin in the savanna region in the northern parts of the country. All four clusters of ethnic groups have strong linguistic and cultural ties with groups in neighboring countries.

During the reign of President Houphouet-Boigny, his informal policy of ethnic quotas was rather moderate which meant that politicians had few incentives to mobilize their constituents along ethnic lines. New players and rules, however, characterized the electoral and political environment of the 1990s (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart 2007, 21-23).

The 22 October 2000 elections brought many of the underlying ethnic tensions into the streets. On 24 October, when it was clear that he was not winning at the polls, General Robert Guei arbitrarily declared himself the winner. Laurent Gbagbo, from the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), President Guei's only real competitor, denounced this victory on national television and encouraged his supporters to march in the streets. Gbagbo's followers took to the streets by the thousands throughout Cote d'Ivoire. In the ensuing crises, Guei was assassinated and Gbagbo became president. Later in the month, supporters of Ouattara and of the PDCI candidate, who felt slighted throughout the election process, took to the streets as well. This resulted in mass demonstrations accompanied by ethnic and political violence in the form of massacres, sexual abuses and killings resulting in the deaths of hundreds. The victims of the abuse were mostly Muslim northerners associated with Ouattara's party as well as some foreign citizens from

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea. Many of the perpetrators of the most serious abuses were allegedly members of the National Police Academy and the Presidential Guard (Boudon n.d., 2).

The violence spread throughout the country and the developments in the Abidjan suburb of Yopougon, epitomized the severity of the situation for both Ivorians and the international community. On 27 October, the bodies of fifty-seven men were found buried haphazardly in Yopougon. All the victims, alleged to be supporters of the RDR political party and predominantly Muslims, had been brutally killed a day earlier by the local gendarmes. Laurent Gbagbo did not condemn the killings and violence. He also did not take any firm steps toward capturing the perpetrators and bringing them to justice. In the absence of justice, ethnic violence broke out again shortly before the 10 December 2000 parliamentary elections. Foreigners working on southern plantations, including an estimated 300,000 Burkinabes, fled the country in horror and thus were not available to harvest the coffee or cocoa crops (Boudon n.d., 2).

While nationalist and xenophobic sentiments were clearly provoked and manipulated by Bedie, the RDR may have contributed to the strengthening of ethnic and religious cleavages through their way of handling the political conflict. In their view, Alassane Ouattara was excluded from politics because he was a northerner and a Muslim. Their strategy, therefore, was to mobilize the support of Ivorians in the north, and Muslims in particular, by telling them that the political elite excluded them on grounds of their ethnic affiliation and their religion. This seem to have worked perfectly in the initial stages as most people in the north, who interacted with the writer while he was on peace

operations in the north, were of the opinion that the conflict was between Christian southerners and Muslim northerners.

Religious leaders, Muslim and Christian, did not distance themselves from the rhetoric of the politicians. The politicization of the religious sphere and injection of political rhetoric with faith was one of the underlying factors of the crisis. For instance, as their followers were subject to police pestering and brutality, Muslim leaders did not hesitate to make pronouncements against this state of affairs. Their political militancy and partisanship came to the surface when Imam Boubabar Fofana, the spokesperson of the Superior Council of Imams of Cote d'Ivoire, stated that Muslims have no qualm giving their support to Alassane Ouattara, if the community deems him the best candidate. He said Muslims should not be blamed for their support for Ouattara, because it is as legitimate as the support the Baule people give to Bedie, and the support that the Bete people give to Gbagbo as well. The repression that the Muslims underwent during the elections and Gbagbo's utterances forced the Supreme Leader of the Muslims to state that the regime of the current President was built by the blood of the martyrs of Islam (Konate 2004).

Just like the Muslim congregations, the Christian church was steeped in the political strife, with church leaders choosing sides openly. Archbishop Bernard Agre of the St. Paul Cathedral of the Plateau, Abidjan, was cited for being instrumental in the rejection of the candidacy of Mr. Ouattara. The bishops of Cote d'Ivoire, during a conference convened in September 2000, in Yamoussoukro, a few days before the presidential elections of October 2000, released a common statement where they publicly opposed Ouattara's candidacy. They argued that in the opinion of the people of Cote

d'Ivoire, some candidates raise more problems than they solve. For the sake of the country, therefore, which is dear to all Ivorian, be it naturalized or native, they ask these leaders to be brave and wise enough to reconsider their stand and pull out of the political race (Konate 2004).

These developments condoned the stratification of the citizens of the country by referring to them as Ivorians by origin and Ivorians by adoption, which was the rhetoric of the politicians. Under normal circumstances, wisdom and religious values, virtues of peace and tolerance, respect of the other, the condemnation of injustice in whatever form it presents itself, and the separation of religion from the State as enshrined by the Constitution of Cote d'Ivoire would have restrained religious leaders from assuming a central role in the political arena (Konate 2004). From their pronouncements, leaders of these two religious institutions were polarized along political lines, and religion thus became a determinant factor in the political arena.

The conflict also led to emergence of militant pro-government youth organizations, the Young Patriots. While the Young Patriots initially were able to mobilize a wide cross-section of the population in Abidjan, they soon developed into urban militia forces under the control of the government, consisting exclusively of people from the southwestern part of the country, the home region of President Laurent Gbagbo (Stewart 2009, 23). The Young Patriots were used several times to conduct violent demonstrations against other ethnic groups. The writer witnessed several instances where the government propagated demonstrations by the Young Patriots even against the United Nations forces.

The Mande and Voltaic ethnic groups, which include the Malinke and Senufo people, are largely Muslims. The Akan ethnic group, which includes the Baoule and Agni people, tends to be Catholic. There is also some correlation between religion and political affiliations and socio-economic class. For instance, most Muslims favor the opposition RDR party (Department of State website n.d.). Given the fact that power has rotated between the Christian Baoule people of central and eastern Cote d'Ivoire, the sentiments of the Muslim community could be understood.

Religious and ethnic factors played a crucial role in the violence as has been analyzed. From the foregoing, it is clear that religious and political affiliations followed ethnic lines and negatively affected and contributed to the violence in Cote d'Ivoire. It must be noted, however that the violence perpetuated by Muslims was not attributed the activities of radical Islam as there is no evidence to support such assertions. The mere nature of the complexities of the religion intertwined in ethnicity can be attributed to the violence. The variable is therefore rated 3.

Socio-Political Imbalance

At the dawn of 1990, under mounting economic pressure culminating in street protests, President Houphouet-Boigny called back Alassane Dramane Ouattara, who was living abroad, to give some impetus to the economy. Ouattara was appointed as the president of the inter-ministerial committee in charge of coordinating the policies of the different ministries. A few weeks later, he was appointed the first Prime Minister of Cote d'Ivoire, and became the second highest personality after the President of the Republic. Two years later, having tasted the comfort of power, he decided to make public his intentions to do politics. That pronouncement created consternation among the partisans

of Henri Konan Bedie, the then President of the National Assembly, the Legislative Body of the Republic. According to the supporters of Bedie, Ouattara had an agreement with Houphouet-Boigny not to get involved in politics because he was simply there to redress an economic situation. This disagreement started a war of succession plunging the country into series of coups (Konate 2004).

Following the death of the President, Henri Konan Bedie, the President of the National Assembly, took over the presidency as specified by the constitution. He created the concept of *Ivoirité*, which distinguished between real Ivorian citizens and others, heightening ethnic tensions in the country. He added a clause to the constitution that Ivorian presidential candidates must be Ivorian citizens and have proof of their parents' Ivorian citizenship. This clause was allegedly aimed at keeping Alassane Ouattara, a Muslim Northerner, out of the electoral contests in the country since at least one of his parents was from Burkina Faso.

The concept of *Ivoirité* is about nationalism, a sense of belonging to the Ivorian nation, regardless, in principle, of ethnic affiliations. *Ivoirité* is the set of socio-historical, geographic, and linguistic data, which enables one to say that an individual is a citizen of Cote d'Ivoire or an Ivorian. The person who asserts his *Ivoirité* is supposed to have Cote d'Ivoire as his country, be born of Ivorian parents belonging to one of the ethnic groups native to Cote (Akindes 2004, 27).

The *Ivoirité* law called into question non-Ivorian's rights and access to land and property ownership. Given that approximately a quarter of the country's population were either immigrants or descendants of immigrants, and mostly Muslim farmers, this law had far reaching repercussions for the livelihood of the people, especially Muslims. It

was thus, seen as a strategy against northerners who also constituted the bulk of Ouattara's supporters. The politicization of identity based on national origin thus became a divisive force that tore the social fabric of the country (Sany 2008, 4).

While Cote d'Ivoire's outward-oriented agricultural development strategy produced impressive economic results, the concentration of investment, jobs and wealth in the southern parts of the country, especially in Abidjan and the cocoa area known as the *Boucle du Cacao*, exacerbated the socio economic disparities between the north and south (Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart 2003, 22). The long-term marginalization of the north, coupled with the present actions to further alienate them caused supporters of Ouattara, mainly in the north, to rebel against what they saw as a Christian government in the south, which aimed to politically marginalize them and economically deprive them of their livelihood. In the ensuing clashes, full-scale violence erupted leading to many deaths, destruction and hatred of immigrants.

Socio-political imbalance has been with Cote d'Ivoire for a long period. The current conflict has worsened an already volatile situation. The northerners who are predominantly Muslims have been marginalized as a result of the concept of *Ivoirité* instituted by Bedie which barred Ouattara from politics. This was the most important factor that culminated into the conflict. This variable is therefore rated 3.

High Rate of Illiteracy

Cote d'Ivoire's education system is similar to the French system. The primary school is comprised of six grade levels leading to a certificate of primary studies. The secondary school has seven grade levels leading to a certificate, or *baccalaurea*, only

available in Abidjan. As of 1980, approximately 14 percent of primary schools and 29 percent of secondary schools were privately owned (Berman and Stepanyan 2004, 25).

Most of these schools were Catholic schools that were partially subsidized by government funding. Quranic schools, common primarily in the north, were not supported by government funding. Despite criticism of a functionalist nature, traditional Quranic schools continue to play an important role in the safekeeping of Muslim identity and the social cohesion of many local communities, particularly outside the main cities. Many new generation reformists have given negative reviews about the Quranic schools. With no public funds and very limited foreign assistance, many of these schools lacked basic amenities and infrastructure (Miran 2006, 6).

The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in 2001, reported a net enrolment rate of 58.3 percent in primary education. This represented the number of children enrolled as a percentage of the total school age population. This rate was lower compared to other countries in the sub-region and masked the disparities between regions of the country, particularly between well-served southern and central regions where net enrolment in primary schools reached 80 percent and the northern and southwestern regions where it barely reached 50 percent (Sany 2010, 3).

It is evident that the northern and southwestern parts of Cote d'Ivoire, which was predominantly Muslim prior to the conflict, suffered from lack of government educational support. This affected the standard of education and level of literacy of the regions of the southwest and north. It can be argued that the population with a higher level of literacy would not easily be amenable to manipulation. The northerners, if well

educated, could have discerned that the new policy of *Ivoirité* was a mere political strategy without any religious inclinations. The variable, high level of illiteracy is therefore rated a high of 2.

Adoption of Sharia Law

Muslims from the Wahhabi sect, consisting of a young generation of pilgrims and students who had returned from Mecca, emerged in the 1950s in Bouake and gained grounds throughout the country. This Islamic group, while preaching a return to the pristine Islam of its origin which entailed the adoption of Sharia law, also denounced elements of the local cultural heritage as non-Islamic. Their attacks on the Sufi brotherhood, which they depicted as henchmen of the colonial authorities, led to tensions and open conflicts with traditional authorities. Over the period, the Wahhabi movement lost momentum in Cote d'Ivoire (Miran 2006, 11).

Since the late 1990s, Abidjan and particularly the Cocody campus of the University of Abidjan have witnessed a resurgence of Sunni (now also called Salafi) discourses and activities. Young theologians trained in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Anglophone Cocody students from Northern Nigeria have recruited followers, including young educated women, some of whom were expelled from university after they refused to identify themselves by showing their face before exams (Miran 2006, 12).

The influence of the Wahhabi sect whose doctrine supports the Sharia law has diminished over the years. Ivorian Muslims in Cote d'Ivoire have generally not embraced the Sharia ideology. What they seem to have done is to align themselves with Ouattara, leader of the RDP, who is himself a Muslim in the face of marginalization and repression. There is no clear evidence of the activities of militant Islamic groups operating in the

country. This could be attributed to president Boigny's strong control of Muslims affairs and may explain why the ideology of Sharia has not been embraced. Many Muslims living in the northern parts of Cote d'Ivoire, have however showed sympathy to the rebel group in the north, otherwise known as the New Forces .

It is the conviction of the writer that if the current political north-south divide is not resolved amicably, it would invariably alienate the north from the south and set conditions for the formation and infiltration of radical Islamic groups whose mode of operating includes a violent advocacy for Sharia law. The variable is therefore rated 1.

Muslim Identification with Islamic Caliphate

Although many Muslims in the sub region continue to nurture the idea and realization of an international caliphate, there is no direct evidence of an Islamic radical group whose activities depicts that realization in Cote d'Ivoire. One strong reason, which radical Islamic groups and advocates use in rallying support for the global Islamic caliphate is the inability of central governments to provide for their socio-economic needs.

The present crisis in Cote d'Ivoire, coupled with the large, increasingly marginalized Muslim population is however, likely to create favorable conditions for Muslims to identify with the idea of an international caliphate. There is no evidence of activities of radical Islamic groups to whip up sentiments of Muslims to identify with a global caliphate, although the predicaments of the Muslim population tend to make them susceptible to the global caliphate idea. This variable is therefore rated 1.

Table 5. Scoring of Input Variables for the Analysis of Cote d'Ivoire

Serial	VARIABLES	COTE D'IVOIRE
(a)	(b)	(c)
1	External Islamic Influence	2
2	Significant Muslim Population with Grievances	1
3	Economic Deprivation and Marginalization	4
4	Religious and Ethnic Undertones	3
5	Socio-Political Imbalance	3
6	High Level of Illiteracy	2
7	Adoption of Sharia law	1
8	Muslim Identification with Islamic Caliphate	1

Source: Created by author.

Security Situation in West Africa

A glance of West Africa shows a volatile region where the characteristics of political corruption, poverty, ethnic strife, social marginalization continue to interact to destabilize the region. The porous borders among the countries coupled with weak law enforcement and border security makes trans-border crimes like human trafficking, drug trafficking, and smuggling very difficult to tackle.

Mali, Niger and Mauritania continue to battle with incursions of radical Islamist groups. Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire are still recovering from the effects of conflicts. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region has been unprecedented and the expertise for locally manufactured weapons is gradually

expanding. Although, human security is improving, the general security situation remains fragile.

The effects of military coups have affected the stability of countries like Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, and Mauritania. In Nigeria, the government is battling with Muslim extremism in the north, ethnic and religious violence in the middle belt, and an ongoing insurrection in the oil-rich Niger Delta.

Given the leading role of Nigeria in the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), its destabilization would have devastating effects in the sub-region and on the African continent.

Table 6. Scoring of Input Variables for Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire

Serial	VARIABLES	NIGERIA	COTE D'IVOIRE
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	External Islamic Influence	4	2
2	Significant Muslim Population with Grievances	3	1
3	Economic Deprivation and Marginalization	4	4
4	Religious and Ethnic Undertones	4	3
5	Socio-Political Imbalance	3	3
6	High Level of Illiteracy	3	2
7	Adoption of Sharia law	4	1
8	Muslim Identification with Islamic Caliphate	3	1

Source: Created by Author.

Table 7. Scoring of Output Variable for Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire

Serial	OUTPUT VARIABLE	NIGERIA	COTE D'IVOIRE
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Intensity of Radical Islam	4	1

Source: Created by author.

Summary of Chapter

Radical Islam is taking root in the northern parts of Nigeria as a result of weak governmental influence in those areas. The region is deprived and marginalized and is gradually turning to solicit support from Islamic groups which are being sponsored by some states and non-state actors through various organizations.

In Nigeria, social-political imbalance and economic deprivation are prevalent in the north. The access to education is relatively poor compared to the south, leading to high levels of illiteracy in the north. The adoption of Sharia law and its implementation has caused violence in many towns and cities in the north. Most of this violence has been instigated and perpetuated by radical Islamic groups. External Islamic influence remains one of the driving factors in the adoption of Sharia by many northern states of Nigeria. This adoption of Sharia seems to be driven by the central government's inability to provide for the basic needs and the marginalization of the northern sector by preceding governments. This situation has heightened the desire of many Muslims to identify with the idea of the global caliphate.

In Cote d'Ivoire, along with the Wahhabi movement, other Islamic groups from Pakistan and Guinea and the government of Saudi Arabia at different times attempted to

infiltrate the country. The strong control of President Houphouet-Boigny ensured that external Islamic influence was kept to a minimum. The Muslim population, however, increased as a result of the liberal immigration policies instituted by the first president aimed at developing the economy of the country. Although Muslims have been marginalized, their stake in the economy of Cote d'Ivoire seems to have kept them from any conflicts until the armed conflict erupted in 2002 leading to the division of the country into the government controlled south and the rebel-controlled north.

Religious and ethnic undertones also contributed to the conflict as many Muslims rallied support for Ouattarra's party while Christians also supported Henri Konan Bedie and Gbagbo. Both sides committed grave human rights abuses, kidnappings and severe persecution based on ethnicity, nationality and political opinion. The concept of *Ivoirité*, apart from dividing the country, affected the social cohesion of the country as approximately a quarter of the population was economically deprived and socially marginalized. For the Muslim north, it was a policy to deprive them of their livelihood and further marginalize them for the sake of religion.

There is no evidence, however, to support an assertion that the violence perpetuated by Muslims during the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire is attributed to activities of radical Islam. What is unfolding is the ability of politicians to use religion to further political aims. This initially seemed to have worked in the north and other areas perceived to have very low standards of education and hence high illiteracy. There is no evidence of the activities of radical Islam in Cote d'Ivoire. The violence that erupted in 2002 was purely one without a direct manifestation of radical Islam.

Although there is no evidence of a foothold of radical Islam in the country, the current trend where the areas of the north have been marginalized sets the conditions for the growth of radical Islam. Without government law enforcement, the north could quickly become a safe haven for radical Islamist activists. Additionally the policy of the current government to solicit for financial support from all countries including those of Iran and Saudi Arabia could also set the conditions for external Islamic influence.

What cuts across all these factors are competition for resources and the tendency of political and religious leaders to whip up ethnic and religious sentiments to their advantage. This phenomenon seems to have more consequences in areas with a high illiteracy rate.

From the analysis, it is clear that certain factors underlie the rising trend of radical Islam and its associated violence in the communities. These include the exploitation of a mostly illiterate Muslim community by political and religious leaders, the economic deprivation and the socio-political marginalization of the Muslim communities and the adoption of Sharia law. It is evident that radical Islam in Nigeria has caused widespread violence as a result of factors enumerated in the chapter which has led to the institutionalization of Sharia law in many northern states of Nigeria.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Conclusion

This study set out to examine the effects of rising radical Islam on the state of security in West Africa with the view to identify some of the key factors that contribute to violence in that region. The study also examined the forms of its manifestations and offers some recommendations on how this rising trend of radical Islam can be curtailed.

The researcher identified several factors, which singularly or in combination with other factors, contribute to the growth of radical Islam. These include the social-political marginalization of groups because of race, religion, tribe or creed and competition for economic resources among different groupings of society. The virtual loss of power for Muslims in the region contradicts its perceived claim to power and tends to encourage them to identify with a global Islamic caliphate.

The development of a north-south divide where Muslims in the north are marginalized is common in the region, especially in Nigeria, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. What has kept Muslims from connecting to radical Islam may be their hold and control of economic resources. For instance, in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, Muslim farmers can own land and other properties in any part of the country contrary to the issue of indigenes and settler problems they face in Nigeria. In Senegal, Muslims form an integral part of economics and commerce.

The external Islamic influence from nation states and non-state actors is another factor, which has culminated in the adoption of Sharia law in most states in northern Nigeria without due regard to its implementation and how it affects other people of

different religious beliefs. Given the lessons from Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire should avoid the institutionalization of Sharia law, which could reinforce the divisions within the country to further the cause of local leaders.

The high rate of illiteracy, resulting from lack of access to basic education which results in high rates of unemployed youth in the communities along with religious and ethnic differences, are used by various leaders to amplify the differences between groups in societies which often serve as a catalyst to fuel conflicts.

The causes of the rise of radical Islam in West Africa do not wholly replicate the traditional explanation of the process of radicalization. The West African situation can only be understood by considering other factors such as political instability, history and religion, and the diversity of the people within the context of key variables. Key factors that remain at the epicenter of the spread of radical Islam in West Africa include competition for economic resources, external Islamic factors, socio-political marginalization and the adoption and implementation of Sharia law. These factors combine to set the stage for the rise of radical Islam in West Africa.

Recommendations

Based on the analysis of radical Islam in West Africa in the two case studies, the rising trend of radical Islamism can be addressed if West African governments implement the following recommendations:

Socio-Economic Development

The government of Nigeria should set conditions for economic development of poor communities especially those in the northern parts of the countries. There should be

investment in infrastructure to improve social services, provision and access to basic amenities to all people irrespective of their ethnic or religious background. Governors should encourage trading between the northern states and other neighboring countries to increase trade and expand markets across the northern half of the country. In this regard, the governments should invest in the construction of rail and road networks linking the north and neighboring countries to facilitate economic development.

The government of Cote d'Ivoire should develop the northern parts of the country by building and extending water and electricity facilities. It should also provide tax relief to companies directly involved in economic development in the northern parts of the country.

Eradication of Illiteracy

The government of Nigeria should invest in the education sector in the northern parts of the country. It should have some measure of oversight of all religious educational institutions in the north. This could be done through the provision of financial support to Islamic schools and the supervision of recruiting qualified and accredited religious scholars. The government should educate the civil population on the need for tolerance and respect for other religious views. This could be done through the media and adult education programmes commonly known as the adult non-formal education.

The government of Cote d'Ivoire should increase the educational infrastructure by building primary, secondary and technical schools in the north to enhance access to formal education by the local inhabitants. The government should also use the media to educate the population.

Promotion of Inter-Faith Dialogue

Religion and ethnicity are part of the political process in most West African countries. Both Nigerians and Ivorian politics are split along ethnic and religious lines. The government of Nigeria should organize regular inter-faith dialogue between Christians and Muslims to promote peaceful co-existence of both religions in the society. The Nigerian government should intensify its use of the Christian Association of Nigeria to dialogue with credible Muslim organizations to sensitize their members to refrain from violence and resort to peaceful means of resolving differences. The government should transform the National Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) to a more community entrenched institution with active branches in all the states and support judicial conflict mediation.

The government of Cote d'Ivoire should foster inter-faith dialogue by regular meetings of the Supreme Council of Muslims and the Conference of Archbishops. At the local levels, local leaders, senators, and mayors should be empowered to involve local Christian and Muslim leaders in peace building efforts. Additionally local politicians and non-governmental organizations should be encouraged by the Ivorian government to sponsor and organize regular dialogue between representatives of all the major ethnic groups. This should not take place after violence has broken out but must be a regular feature of the local government authorities.

Resolve Settlers and Indigenes Distinction

The settler and indigenes distinction in northern Nigeria is manifested in Cote d'Ivoire by the concept of *Ivoirité*. With a quarter of the population affected by the

concept in Cote d'Ivoire, it is almost certain that civil strife will resurge if the issue of *Ivoirité* is not properly addressed.

The government of Nigeria should initiate a national process aimed at addressing the settler and indigene problem. This should take the form of nation-wide consultations and dialogue involving all stakeholders through the establishment of an inter-ethnic committee with governmental oversight. This should bring together key leaders from all the settler and indigene communities to find an amicable settlement to the problem. The government should aim at a new land reform policy for the affected areas.

The government of Cote d'Ivoire should institute constitutional reforms aimed at addressing the problem at the national level. This could be preceded by a national referendum to ascertain the level of support before taking the issue to the legislature.

The international community represented by the United Nations, United States, African Union, ECOWAS and other stakeholders like France and Burkina Faso should support the government in establishing a new socio-political climate based on equality, tolerance and mutual respect for all parties in the Ivorian conflict. Cote d'Ivoire should embrace a concept of universal citizenship rights for all the citizenry.

Curtail External Islamic Influence

The government of Nigeria should curtail external Islamic influences from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran. This can be achieved through the monitoring of states' interaction with other nations by the federal government. The federal government should also explore diplomatic avenues to reduce interaction between such countries and individual states.

The government of Cote d'Ivoire should be circumspect in its dealings with Islamic states. It should closely monitor the aid package from Islamic nations to ensure that such aid package is consistent with the long term efforts to achieve peace and unity.

Promotion of Good Governance

The governments of Nigeria should improve local governance structures in the northern parts of the country. The federal government should be transparent especially during local and national elections. Government officials should be held accountable to the people through by upholding the tenets of justice and equality, freedom, probity, and accountability. This would ensure the reduction in the levels of corruption by government and public officials and thereby boost confidence of the population in the government's ability to administer its affairs.

The government of Cote d'Ivoire should promote public access to information and involve the local population in the north in the decision-making process. The government should open up the judicial courts in the north to enable the people to have access to redress. This could facilitate the rule of law where no one group or class of people would be seen to be dominant in government and the citizenry would have confidence in the ability of government to dispense justice with fairness. Individuals would then not feel marginalized in the society and could resort to the judicial process to address its grievances.

Institute Cross Border Intelligence Sharing

The government of Nigeria should initiate cross border intelligence sharing with neighboring countries and developed countries with the appropriate technology to reduce

or prevent activities of radical Islamic groups in the region. The national intelligence agency should collaborate with agencies, along with the Central Intelligence Agency and Interpol, to enable it to gain information before violence erupts.

The government of Cote d'Ivoire should institute collaboration with its neighbors to share information relevant to sub-regional security. Where necessary the government should collaborate with Interpol and developed nations, like France, on information sharing.

Prevent Institutionalization of Sharia law

The government of Nigeria, in consultation with religious leaders and organizations, should clearly define the jurisdiction of Sharia law. This should include those areas and individuals who are subject to Sharia law. Individual states should educate the citizenry on Sharia implementation through formal and informal forums and the media. These forums must address what constitutes violations of the code, persons authorized to effect arrests, the need to avoid violence and which courts have jurisdiction to conduct trials. Individual states that have not adopted Sharia law should avoid the institutionalization of the Sharia law.

The government of Cote d'Ivoire, notwithstanding the absence of the problems of Sharia, should not institutionalize Sharia law. The government of Cote d'Ivoire should draw lessons from Nigeria and not inculcate Sharia law into divisions of the constitution to maintain the secular nature of the state.

Recommendations for Further Study

During the research and analysis processes, certain areas for further study became apparent although this study answered the primary and secondary questions related to the topic. There is an emerging school of thought that links militant activities of the Niger Delta and radical Islamic activities in northern Nigeria. There is the need to further study to establish, the relationship existing if any, between militants of the Niger Delta and militant Islamists groups operating in the northern parts of Nigeria.

Another area for further research is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa. Additionally, further study is needed on the effect of corruption and how it affects the growth of radical Islam in the region.

Many have argued that Islam cannot exist without violence. This is however, flawed by the peaceful co-existence of Islam and other religions in other countries in the region for many centuries. Pundits attribute radical Islam to the political nature of contemporary Islam. This leads one to consider the need for another area of further study, which is whether Islam can exist with other religions peacefully, especially in the coming years in the face of globalization in West Africa.

GLOSSARY

Extremism: The holding of extreme opinion: the holding of advocacy or resort to measures beyond the norm. A term used to describe the actions of extreme political or religious views or the taking of extreme actions on the basis of those views. (Encarta Dictionary)

Fundamentalism: A movement with a strict view of doctrine. A religious or political movement based on a literal interpretation of and strict adherence to doctrine, especially as a return to formal principles. (Encarta Dictionary). Fundamentalism as a term was a definition used by the American Protestantism movement in the period of 1865-1910 and became in popular use after 1919 with the creation of the World Christian Fundamentalist Association. The movement stood for the return of historic Christian theology and interpretation of scripture and was in opposition to the modernisation/liberalisation of the modern church (The Runnymede Trust 1997)

Islam: A monotheistic religion based on the word of God as revealed to the Holy Prophet Muhammed. It is characterized by the acceptance of the doctrine of submission to God (Allah) and to Muhammed as the chief and last prophet of God (The Free Dictionary).

Islamic: Fundamentalism. A term used to describe religious ideologies seen as advocating a return to the fundamentals of Islam; the Quran and the Sunnah (The Free Dictionary).

Islamism: An Islamist revivalist movement, often characterized by moral conservatism, literalism, and the attempt to implement Islamic values in all spheres of life (The Free Dictionary).

Jihad: A holy war against infidels undertaken by Muslims in defence of the Islamic faith, a personal struggle of the individual believer against evil and persecution. It is rarely a crusade in support of a cause (Free Dictionary).

Madrassas: The Arabic word for any type of educational institution, whether secular or religious (of any religion). It is variously translated as madrasah, madarasaa, medresa, madrassa, madraza, madarsa or medrese (The Free Dictionary).

Muslim: A follower of the religion of Islam, a moslem. A believer in or adherent of Islam (Concise Oxford English Dictionary).

Radical: Relating to or affecting the basic nature, far-reaching, searching and thorough. Arising from or going to a root or source, departing markedly from the usual or customary, extreme (Concise Oxford English Dictionary).

Salafism: A Sunni Islamic school of thought that takes the pious ancestors of the patristic period of early Islam as exemplary models. The principal tenet of *Salafism* is that Islam was perfect and complete during the days of Muhammad and his companions, but that undesirable innovations have been added over the later centuries due to materialist and cultural influences. *Salafism* seeks to revive a practice of Islam that more closely resembles the religion during the time of Muhammad. *Salafism* has also been described as a simplified version of Islam, in which adherents follow few commands and practices. *Salafism* is often used interchangeably with *Wahhabism*. Adherents usually reject the term *Wahhabism* because it is considered derogatory (The Free Dictionary).

Sharia: A body of Islamic religious law. It is the legal framework within which the public and private aspects of life are regulated for those living in a legal system based on Islamic principles of jurisprudence and for Muslims living outside the domain. Sharia deals with many aspects of day-to-day life, including politics, economics, banking, business, contracts, family, sexuality, hygiene, and social issues (The Free Dictionary).

Sufi Islam: Sufism is generally understood by scholars to be the inner or mystical dimension of Islam. A practitioner of this tradition is generally known as a *Sufi*, though some senior members of the tradition reserve this term for those practitioners who have attained the goals of the Sufi tradition (The Free Dictionary).

Wahhabism: A name sometimes applied to the conservative 18th century reformist call of Sunni Islam attributed to Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, an Islamic scholar from what is today known as Saudi Arabia, who became known for advocating a return to the practices of the first three generations of Islamic history (The Free Dictionary).

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