Withdrawing with Honor: Strategic Lessons Learned from Case Studies on Military Withdrawals
Abstract
This thesis uses case studies to explore lessons learned from historic military withdrawals. Case studies included the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia. Although literature considering the decision to withdraw abounds, this study found a gap in how the strategic withdrawal strategy influences the well being of both nations. This study found the following trends across case studies: (1) protracted withdrawals risk being crippled by changing circumstances throughout the withdrawal, (2) although withdrawals often become delayed in hopes of ideal political solutions, these solutions rarely materialize and the delay instead worsens the conditions under which the final withdrawal is made, (3) negotiations with the enemy may secure a safe withdrawal yet hinders the occupying power's long-term interests, (4) the legitimacy of the internal government as perceived by the host nation is the most important factor in determining the long-term effect of the withdrawal on both nations, and (5) the long-term strategic effect on the occupying nation is rarely as significant as it appears when the withdrawal is being considered and conducted. Each trend yields significance for the planning of future withdrawals as parallels are found in historic withdrawals.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 10, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA536828
Entities
People
- David C. Hazelton
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College