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The Joint Military Intelligence College created the International Intelligence Fellows Program to strengthen intelligence relationships and enhance cooperation and understanding among senior military and civilian intelligence officials from allied nations. It is our hope that this program will contribute to stronger coalitions and alliances and thus to greater national security. Fellows in the program use case studies, executive exercises and seminar discussions to grapple with issues such as intelligence cooperation and coalition operations, as well as with other challenges we are likely to face into the future. This publication highlights some of the issues and principles that emerged from discussions among the Fellows during a two-week seminar that took place at the College in March 2003.



A. Denis Clift
President
Joint Military Intelligence College

The International Intelligence *Forum* will publish articles, letters or extended comments from International Intelligence Fellows past, present and future, as well as from other participants in the program, to make this a true forum for the thoughtful discussion of international intelligence cooperation. Please send your written contributions to Russell.Swenson@dia.mil, Director of the JMIC Center for Strategic Intelligence Research.

In this publication, comments attributed to participants have been reviewed by those individuals, but their comments do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government, nor of any other government represented by the International Intelligence Fellows, RAND Corporation or its sponsors, or other contributors.

INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

IN

THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION:

ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK

FOR MULTILATERALISM

INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FELLOWS PROGRAM
March 2003

Joint Military Intelligence College
Washington, DC

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Middle Row (Left to Right):

Brigadier Sarwar (Pakistan), Brig Gen (select) Simanjuntak, Mr. Dale Lewis (NGA), Mr. Mark Anglin (USPACOM), Col Haider (Bangladesh), Mr. Steve Worobec (Dept of State), CDR Hiponia (JMIC)

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Not Pictured: Col Rajkumar (India)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The production and publication of these proceedings would not have been possible without the tireless dedication and sustained effort of the International Intelligence Fellows Program Working Group. The staff and faculty contributors to the working group were directly responsible for the outstanding success and the continued growth of the Fellows Program. Additionally, the students from the Joint Military Intelligence College Class of 2003 played an integral role in these proceedings by serving as recorders and providing a comprehensive record of seminar discussions. Special thanks go to Dr. Russell Swenson for his guidance and valuable contribution in editing this publication. Finally, each and every International Intelligence Fellow should be recognized for their candor, insight, and innovation. The Fellows worked diligently and approached the curriculum with vigor and enthusiasm. As a result, the International Fellows proposed novel solutions to contemporary intelligence and security issues. Rather than looking to the past and seeking the security of traditional bilateral relationships, the Fellows looked to the future and embraced the possibility of an Asia-Pacific region guided by multilateral relationships.

The Center for the Study of Intelligence recently published the results of a September 2003 conference that explored intelligence and policy formulation issues in the post-9/11 security environment. Interestingly, one of the participants reinforced the primary findings of these IIFP Proceedings by stating "So I don't think we've got the politics and culture of a new concept of sharing down right. We are essentially using the old model of bilateral liaison relationships, when perhaps something much broader, more inclusive is called for."[1] Thus, we see that the International Intelligence Fellows had earlier in the year advanced the same vision that arose separately, several months later, in discussions among former and serving U.S. senior national security policymakers, experts from academia, and intelligence professionals!

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[1] Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence Conference Report, *Intelligence for a New Era in American Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC, January 2004), 19.

INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR MULTILATERALISM

Commander Larry Hiponia, USN
Program Coordinator

PROGRAM OVERVIEW

During March 2003, the Joint Military Intelligence College conducted the second iteration of its International Intelligence Fellows Program. The purpose of the Fellows Program is to provide a forum for senior leaders to exchange ideas and explore key regional and Intelligence issues in an academic and non-attribution setting. Senior military officers and civilian leaders from the U.S. and regional countries are invited each year to participate in two weeks of seminar discussions, debates, case studies, and a notional crisis planning exercise. The first International Fellows Program focused on Europe because existing security structures were already established and provided a cooperative framework to explore intelligence issues within the region. The second program shifted the focus to Asia, a region of the world where bilateral security structures are generally preferred over multilateral arrangements. Thus, the notion of multilateral intelligence cooperation is more complex in Asia. However, as various issues were explored during the two-week curriculum, a surprising trend emerged: the recognition that intelligence cooperation at the multinational level is not only desired, but required for Asia-Pacific countries to effectively address the changing regional security environment. This issue of the *International Intelligence Forum* presents key conclusions and recommendations made during the 2003 International Intelligence Fellows Program.

Eleven international and six U.S. Fellows participated in the 2003 program. Countries sending representatives were Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, the Philippines, Taiwan (two participants), and Thailand. Five U.S. intelligence entities were represented by six participants: the U.S. Pacific Command, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the U.S. Department of State, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly the National Imagery and Mapping Agency), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (two participants).

CURRICULUM OUTLINE

The International Intelligence Fellows curriculum was divided into two distinct phases: “defining the issues” and “attacking the issues.” The first week of

the program explored key security issues that impacted the Asia-Pacific region, starting from the macro level and progressing to a more micro or regional focus. Specific topics included:

- Global and transnational issues
- Information sharing and technology: a better strategy for exchanging intelligence
- Terrorism in Asia and the prospect for regional cooperation
- Counter-drug issues in Asia
- Medical intelligence and transnational medical threats
- Maritime piracy and maritime terrorism
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Asia

These issues were chosen because they uniformly impact almost every country in the Asia-Pacific region, and more importantly, because effective intelligence cooperation can mitigate these serious regional problems. Once these issues were defined, a common departure point for the discussion of intelligence cooperation was then established.

The theme of the second week of the curriculum was "attacking the issues" and focused on the specific perspectives of individual countries of Asia, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the Department of Defense. Having framed the issues during week one, the International Fellows discussed and debated the U.S. vision of cooperation in Asia as articulated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Mr. Peter Rodman, and others. The Fellows were then tasked to identify both impediments and opportunities for intelligence cooperation. Using the lessons learned from the discussions generated by guest speakers and seminar discussions, the Fellows participated in a notional crisis-action planning exercise designed to showcase intelligence cooperation in action. The exercise used a United Nations peacekeeping operation scenario and tasked the Fellows to devise a multinational intelligence support plan. The culmination of the two-week curriculum was a course synthesis seminar "The Way Ahead." The Fellows were first tasked to describe the current state of cooperation. Next, the Fellows were asked to describe their "ideal" vision of cooperation 10 years into the future. Finally, the fellows were challenged to identify key enablers to bridge the gap between cooperation "now" and that likely 10 years in the future.

The International Intelligence Fellows Program is conducted in an atmosphere of mutual respect, transparency, and non-attribution. Mutual respect is an essential aspect of the program, since the Asia-Pacific region is an area of great diversity and differences in cultural background, ethnicity, religion, and stages of economic development must be respected. Transparency is another key component of the Fellows Program. Although all program participants are intelligence

professionals, its main purpose is neither intelligence exchange nor intelligence collection. Rather, the Fellows Program seeks to promote meaningful discussion and dialogue on relevant intelligence issues impacting the region. In order to facilitate frank and forthright discussions, the Fellows were requested to adhere to the program guidelines of transparency. Transparency in turn builds confidence and fosters future cooperation among the U.S. and regional allies. Finally, in order to ensure an environment where candid and open discussion can occur, a policy of non-attribution was in effect during the entire International Intelligence Fellows Program. Therefore, comments in these proceedings will not be directly attributed to a specific International Fellow. Where a speaker's or participant's name has been used, that individual has specifically approved the release of material associated with his or her name. No distinction will be made between International and U.S. Fellows except when the individual's perspective is essential in understanding the context of the discussion.

The first portion of these Proceedings provides a summary of key points made by various distinguished speakers when addressing the International Fellows. Additionally, an overview of the Fellows' discussion that followed each guest speaker is provided. The second portion summarizes key conclusions and recommendations with respect to intelligence cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. These conclusions are based on the results of two major group exercises that required the Fellows to articulate a consensus viewpoint derived from group deliberations.

President Clift discusses regional security and intelligence issues with the International Fellows

INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FELLOWS PROGRAM CURRICULUM

WEEK 1: DEFINING THE ISSUES

Day One: Opening Remarks

- Mr. A. Denis Clift, President, Joint Military Intelligence College
- Lieutenant General H.C. Stackpole, USMC (Ret), President, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS)
- Vice Admiral L.E. Jacoby, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- Dr. Thomas Fingar, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Day Two: Global Issues

- Kenneth L. Knight, Jr., Defense Intelligence Officer for Global Trends, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
- Brigadier General Michael E. Ennis, USMC, Director for Intelligence, United States Marine Corps

Day Three: Terrorism and Regional Cooperation

- Brigadier General Hendrawan Ostevan, Defense and Military Attaché, Indonesia
- Colonel Nestor Sadiarin, Military Attaché, Philippines
- Small Group Discussions
  - International Intelligence Fellows Group 1: Opportunities for Cooperation
  - International Intelligence Fellows Group 2: Impediments to Cooperation
  - Plenary Session: Dr. Lee H. Endress, Director, College of Security Studies, APCSS

Day Four: Counter-drug and Transnational Medical Threats

- Counter-drug Issues in Asia Briefing: Defense Intelligence Agency
- Panel Discussion
  - Mr. Steve Worobec, Department of State
  - Senior Colonel Naretrak Thitathan, Defense Attaché, Thailand
  - Mr. Dan Becker, DIA
- Transnational Medical Threats Briefing: Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC)

Day Five: Maritime Piracy and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

- Maritime Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, Dr. Peter Chalk, RAND Corporation
- Colonel Abu Hashim, Military and Defense Attaché, Malaysia
- Air Commodore R.J. Newlands, Air and Defense Attaché, New Zealand
- Proliferation of WMD in Asia Briefing: Defense Intelligence Agency

WEEK 2: ATTACKING THE ISSUES

Day Six: U.S. Pacific Command's Vision of Cooperation

- Theater Security Cooperation Program and Enhanced Regional Cooperation, Mr. Mark Anglin, USPACOM J22, U.S. Fellow
- Distinguished Speaker Program, Mr. Jessie Romero, International Fellow, Philippines
- Rear Admiral Rose LeVitré, USN, Director for Intelligence, U.S. Pacific Command via secure video teleconference (VTC)
- Captain Barbara Bowyer, Commander, Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) via secure video teleconference (VTC)

Day Seven: Department of Defense Perspective

- The Honorable Mr. Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- Intelligence Partnership with the Warfighter, Rear Admiral Robert B. Murrett, USN, Vice-Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- National Military Joint Intelligence Center Briefing, Mr. Mark Lee, Directorate for Crisis Management, Joint Staff J2
- Dr. Satu Limaye, Director of Research, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Day Eight: Crisis Action Planning Exercise: Cooperation in Action (all-day event)

- Scenario: Intelligence Support to United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations (notional)
- Briefing to Executive Panel

Day Nine: Course Synthesis — The Way Ahead

- Intelligence Cooperation and the Future Course of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Richard B. Porterfield, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence
- Small Group Exercise: Cooperation Now and Cooperation in the Future; Defining the Way Ahead

Day Ten: Graduation

- Seminar Discussion: Final Impressions–what have we learned?
- Graduation Address, Mr. A. Denis Clift, President, Joint Military Intelligence College

PART I

SETTING THE STAGE: PERSPECTIVES FROM SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS AND CIVILIAN POLICYMAKERS

Lieutenant General H.C. Stackpole, USMC (Ret)
President, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

Several speakers were asked to provide their overall analysis of security, intelligence, and cooperation in the region. Lieutenant General H.C. Stackpole, USMC (Retired) provided the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies' perspective on intelligence cooperation in Asia. In his view, numerous issues need to be addressed:

- The problem of information overflow remains–that is, being able to separate the "wheat from the chaff" and appropriately tailoring intelligence to the needs of the user.
- Coordination and cooperation among regional countries needs to be enhanced.
- Recognition is needed that globalization has changed the dynamics of world affairs and this phenomenon should force states within the region to re-examine their domestic security environments for the good of the region.
- Recognition is required that the rule of law is both an asset and a limitation.
- That Asia is moving toward democracy at a pace wrapped in individual actor cultural norms–each must be allowed to progress at its own pace to have the best chance to succeed.
- Fora such as the International Intelligence Fellows Program have often achieved the "critical mass" necessary to significantly enhance regional cooperation.
- Russia has the potential to become a major player in the region: "Russia still has growth to do in Asia."
- Al-Qa'ida should be recognized as a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), albeit in a negative context.
- Major threats to the region include: energy and environmental concerns (environmental degradation and water issues), migration, and organized crime (including the influence of non-state actors).

- Institutions being attuned to compliance with international law is helpful. The example of U.S./Philippine combined operations being halted due to constitutional issues is a negative example.
- The U.S. enjoys sound and stable, but imperfect relations in the region...bilateral relations have improved after a brief hiatus, and new relationships are on the horizon. The U.S. is a key player in the security of the region and will continue in that position.
- Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) poses a tremendous threat. The DPRK possesses the capability to trigger a nuclear arms race in the region and to proliferate weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
- All players agree that the U.S. plays a vital role in solving the DPRK problem, but the U.S. would like to have the decisive role in establishing the terms. One basic tenet of the strategy is to have increased diplomatic dialogue. All players in the region agree that a multilateral approach to solving the DPRK problem is the first choice.
- Two U.S. Pacific Command initiatives will facilitate cooperation and coordination in the region: the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) and the Multilateral Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT). These structures focus on peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian issues, civil affairs, and refugees. Information sharing takes place across this wide range of issues to facilitate transfer of knowledge and lessons learned.
- The key to cooperation and coordination in the region is to use the existing security arrangements in the region as stepping-stones to better information and intelligence sharing, cooperation, and coordination.

LtGen H.C. Stackpole, USMC (Ret) addresses the International Fellows

Vice Admiral L.E. Jacoby, USN
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Vice Admiral L.E. Jacoby, USN, addressed the Fellows and challenged them to work very hard to promote a meaningful dialogue on several issues:

- ***Socio-Economic Climates*** that terrorist prey upon to recruit and plan their operations, such as areas possessing "youth bulges" where there is economic despair, or areas rampant with corruption and social dysfunction.
- ***"Ungoverned spaces"*** or pockets within a country where the government exercises less than full control. How can we assist governments in implementing strategies to gain and sustain control?
- ***Iraq.*** What are the Fellows' opinions of what a post-Saddam Iraq will look like and what type of initiatives will the international community be required to undertake in order to sustain new efforts in that country?
- ***Weapons of Mass Destruction.*** The concern is over the proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Al-Qaida specifically possesses a bio-capability and continues to pursue other capabilities. What can the world do about it, as the U.S. is not the only target?
- ***DPRK*** problem. How should the U.S. proceed? Lead? Co-lead? Adopt a supporting role?
- ***Russian nuclear capability.*** What is the status of the Russian nuclear stockpile? Is it secure?
- ***Nuclear delivery capability.*** Who possesses the capability? Who is trying to proliferate?

Just as the Fellows were given specific topics they should concentrate on, VADM Jacoby also provided insight on potential solutions to addressing some of those topics. Specifically, as an example, he noted that the Global Information Grid (GIG), which is being developed to facilitate operational and intelligence interconnectivity, will promote information sharing among coalition partners.[1] The Defense Intelligence Agency will use this interconnectivity aggressively. The GIG will deliver the right knowledge, to the right person, at the right time, in the right format. In order to facilitate its use, partners must create a dependable, secure network where security information is guaranteed throughout its useful life. Information management is also a key aspect of the GIG. Information will have to be put in a format that is useable. To do this, the Intelligence Community

[1] For an overview of this initiative, see *http://www.disa.mil/ns/gig.html.*

(IC) must adopt and use commercial approaches and technologies that already exist, and not create new approaches and technologies specifically for the IC. This is where the IC has failed in the past. Instead of pursuing existing tactics, techniques, and procedures, the first inclination was to create something new. Finally, in adopting these new approaches and technologies, the IC must develop an international standard that ensures seamless cooperation and coordination. The Defense Intelligence Agency's vision includes developing a partnership of highly skilled people with leading-edge technologies that provide warfighters, policymakers, and planners with assured access to required intelligence.

COMMERCIAL IMAGERY

After initial remarks that formally opened the program, VADM Jacoby opened the floor for questions from the International Fellows. The Fellows discussed with the Admiral the issue of imagery sharing among allies. VADM Jacoby noted that the problem of sharing imagery still exists today, since from a U.S. perspective, the protection of sources and capabilities continues to challenge the release of imagery to second- and third-party partners. He believes that in the future, a heavier reliance on commercial imagery may help alleviate the problem, but the issue must be addressed in the near term. The Admiral noted that as a major consumer of imagery, the Department of Defense has invested significant amounts of resources to spur the expansion of commercial imagery, but commercial imagery has not advanced as quickly as initially anticipated. Thus, VADM Jacoby maintains that the sharing of imagery remains a problem. Through the 1990s, the Intelligence Community relied heavily on overhead assets and less on airborne and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. He believes this trend will probably reverse in the future, especially in the area of coalition operations, since the preference is for airborne and UAV imagery. The Admiral stated that the images from these vehicles are more readily accessible to allies and in a timelier manner. However, one International Fellow cautioned the group that good intentions do not necessarily translate into operational successes. He cited recent problems with combined operations in Afghanistan. Although his country attempted to "play" in the coalition arena, imagery requested did not arrive in a timely enough manner or when imagery was delivered, the format was not compatible with their systems. The International Fellow's point is that a great deal of progress is still required despite stated U.S. intentions to improve the situation.

TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

The discussion next led to the issue of how the Intelligence Community balances technology with human resources. The need to ensure adequate human resources to match technological advancements was acknowledged by VADM

Jacoby. He noted that it is generally easier to procure funding for UAVs and hardware than it is for people. VADM Jacoby continued, stating that a reallocation of resources is required, with renewed emphasis on people (that is, analysts). The example of the U.S. launching a new imagery satellite was used by the Admiral. He remarked that just because a new overhead asset becomes available, there is no guarantee that the increased imagery capacity will help the analyst do his or her job better. He asserted that there must be a commensurate investment in enhancing analytical resources to exploit the imagery. The Intelligence Community is changing and is attempting to reorient itself to *capability.* Metrics exist to measure the number of images taken, but how does one measure increased analytical capability? By addressing such questions, VADM Jacoby believes the IC can do a better job of balancing technology and human resources.

Next, the issue of the U.S. helping lesser-developed countries was discussed. Specifically, how can these countries acquire required technologies to facilitate information and intelligence sharing? The International Fellows wanted to know if there were current initiatives to supply bilateral partners with prerequisite technology to interface with U.S. systems designed for coalition operations. VADM Jacoby noted that although there are no new programs being offered, the U.S. recognizes that the problem still remains. He stated that in the past, the U.S. often "forced" the issue, dictating the specific hardware required from the individual partners. However, the Admiral noted that there is a concerted effort to make U.S. systems more compatible and user-friendly across the broad spectrum of potential coalition partners.

Another issue for discussion involved the role of the Intelligence Community with regard to preparing intelligence estimates for policymakers. VADM Jacoby acknowledged that military intelligence capabilities have traditionally focused on force-on-force employment rather than "tribal relationships" and other social science issues. He believes the focus of intelligence requirements is changing and currently, the IC does not have the optimum skill set required to address some of the more non-traditional information requirements posed by policymakers. The Admiral noted that one immediate solution may lie in the use of academic personnel. He believes that using subject-matter experts from colleges and universities can provide a stopgap measure to address analytical shortfalls in the societal and cultural sectors not fully addressed by military intelligence analysts. He added that changes are being made to address the shifting focus of policymakers. The Admiral remarked that currently, "what happens after" is the type of information that policymakers require. In the 1990s, the emphasis was on the warfighter's needs. VADM Jacoby asserted that now, there must be a distinction made with regard to the customer...it makes a difference whether a warfighter is requesting information or whether a policymaker is requesting the information. The Admiral is convinced that the IC must re-engineer its capability to satisfy both types of information needs.

Dr. Thomas Fingar
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

My goal today is to stimulate thinking and discussion by posing a number of questions. For example, what approach, in international affairs, should nations use to reach decisions about their security concerns? Is it better to specialize and coordinate actions, or is it better for each country to identify its own security needs and go it alone?

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

The world situation today differs from that in the recent past, though it is not unprecedented. The challenge is to examine and refocus collective thinking about institutions that have worked well in the past or that still work in such diverse areas as regional prosperity, U.S. intervention, China in the international system, and solidarity in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). There is a natural tendency to stick with what has worked in the past, but it may be time to reexamine and perhaps redefine the concept of national security.

In Asia the security regime involves formal and informal interactions, an approach that continues to work today. This regime has produced more than 40 years of peace and relative stability in Northeast Asia and more than 30 years of peace and relative stability in Southeast Asia.

Whether by design or by "dumb luck," these interactions have established a solid partnership within the ASEAN community. But Asia is not Europe, and security is not just a political issue; it is also an economic one. The time has come to reexamine existing arrangements and inherited assumptions, if only to verify whether they remain valid. In addition, such a reexamination should determine whether proposed changes would provide greater security or, at minimum, maintain the current level of security.

U.S. DOCTRINE AND DEPLOYMENT

The time has come to examine the current state of U.S. doctrine and deployment requirements in view of changed threat perceptions. For example, whose armed forces should respond first, regional or U.S.-led forces? In addition, the question of forward-deployed forces in Asia should be reexamined to determine whether these forces are indeed a stabilizing factor in current bilateral relationships. The U.S. continues to maintain a global reach, but there is an ongoing debate concerning the need for forward deployment. Perhaps the

objectives to be met by regional deployments can be met by projecting power from the continental U.S.

In East Asia, different countries have different threat perceptions. This leads to the question of who is to respond first, in view of the fact that moving heavy equipment is difficult and requires time. Furthermore, is security enhanced if troops and equipment are at a distance or located within the theater? A "tripwire" may exist, meaning that if a country's troops are getting killed, that state is committed no matter what the official government position may be. Does military action contribute to stability or does it destabilize the region? Where should forces be deployed, and how and when should movement take place? Is it better to remain at a distance for a more flexible response, or is it more important to be in place near the perceived threat? The type of weapons and forces to be developed and for what purpose must be determined very early because of the long lead time required for identification of a threat, procurement, training, and deployment.

TECHNOLOGY GAPS

Defense-related technology gaps between the U.S. and its allies have been identified not just in Asia, but also in NATO. U.S. use of high-end technology far exceeds that of its allies in both theaters. This reality prompts several questions: How should these gaps be addressed? How should each partner interact? Can each nation afford to continue developing its own military capabilities independently?

Would it be possible for ASEAN countries to consider specialization, with each member state developing a particular capability, focusing resources in one area rather than continuing the current duplication of effort? The difficulty here is that in the U.S. the regular forces are no longer able to function for very long without the specialized reserves. Would a similar arrangement prevent ASEAN countries from functioning in a crisis? This issue concerns the nature of the threat perceived by each country and how a given country will respond to a given threat. A situation could arise wherein a country might perceive a specific crisis to have no relevance to or impact on itself and therefore fail to provide the required support or not respond at all, rendering any alliance ineffective.

NORTH KOREA

North Korea is unique because it may possess a nuclear capability combined with a proven missile capability. The U.S. believes North Korean WMD must be addressed and dealt with before it can be admitted to and integrated within the global system. North Korea perceives itself as being threatened by the world's only superpower and is concerned it is next on the U.S. hit list after Iraq. Therefore, from its perspective, North Korea is proceeding in a rational manner, realizing it

lacks the resources to meet its perceived threat. The response of the weak is either WMD or terrorism; North Korea is responding with nuclear weapons.

North Korea is trying to project an image that it possesses some capability that will cause problems for the U.S. But the de facto ambiguity surrounding the North Korean nuclear program makes the regime feel more secure and therefore less of a target. This situation invites other questions: If North Korea has the bomb, will it prompt others in the region to acquire nuclear weapons? Is this situation similar to when China acquired nuclear weapons, meaning a major shift in the geopolitical equation, or is it like India-Pakistan, where the two sides balance each other?

MISSILE DEFENSE

Drawing on North Korea's proven missile capability and possible proliferation activity, more countries could not only acquire missiles, but also produce better systems. This situation in turn encourages the development of missile defense systems. The question then becomes: Whose technology and whose cost? (Who pays and who benefits)? Should it be a national system or should it be a multinational, integrated system? It is important to keep track of the strategic view of regional security and identify what countries are buying what systems and how missile defense will affect larger security arrangements.

TERRORISM

The threat of terrorism exists within a country, from outside forces operating in a country, and against third parties (exemplified by a U.S. citizen in Japan who is attacked by a member of al-Qaida). What appears more real or more threatening? Is it an internal police matter or does it require an international response?

Following Dr. Fingar's remarks, the Fellows engaged in discussions stimulated by his presentation.

NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS

An International Fellow asked the group's opinion regarding the North Korean nuclear program. The Fellow believes North Korea's confrontational stance is a direct response to President Bush's "axis of evil" speech and that the North is seeking deterrence. Furthermore, the International Fellow believes the Asian North is uncertain about Western intentions.

Dr. Fingar likened the U.S. to a "500-pound gorilla" and said that characterization colors the North Korean perception of the U.S. Thus, the North Korean

problem falls into the "chicken and the egg" paradox: Is North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons to intimidate its neighbors or is it procuring nuclear weapons because it believes it has a genuine security problem? In this situation, it is difficult to separate perception from reality. Another factor is the North's complete lack of confidence in the West. North Korea perceives a lack of "carrots" to go with the "stick" ("axis of evil") and it perceives the need to get U.S. attention. The North gets the attention it desires; it has not, however, established the confidence-building measures required to improve relations with the U.S. As a result, it will now be difficult to return to diplomacy, a reality the North will be forced to accept.

Another International Fellow argued that North Korea is not being provided enough incentives to cooperate, and the North did not take up opportunities that previously existed. The Fellow believed North Korea is forcing a new reality on the U.S. and is now playing on the same level as India, Pakistan, or Israel.

Dr. Fingar thought the North's strategy is carefully calculated to get the attention it desires. North Korea's goal is to get U.S. attention by restarting its nuclear weapons program; if there is no favorable U.S. response, at least the North has gained a minimum deterrent capability. Thus, North Korea either gains a security pact or the means to develop more nuclear weapons. The U.S. views the North Korean situation as a multinational problem, while the North views it strictly bilaterally: that is, the U.S. is threatening North Korea. One participant opined that North Korea is wrong: If the North had shown more restraint, the world would be able to force the U.S. to address the crisis as a bilateral issue.

A program participant depicted the North Korean reaction as rational for a 17th century kingdom and said the North probably believes it will be the next target. Complicating the North's problems is the lack of support from China and its conventional capability. Therefore, North Korea perceives the need to develop nuclear weapons to defend against the U.S. North Korea has isolated itself and now poses a proliferation problem.

Another participant proposed assigning responsibility for the crisis to the U.S. The participant argued that North Korea is a society where language and words matter. Disparaging the leader of North Korea at the highest level of the U.S. government and aggravating the situation with the "axis of evil" speech indicated North Korea was the next on the list of U.S. military intervention. As a result, North Korean military and political advisers probably made a worst-case assessment, and truly believed they would be the next U.S. target. Pyongyang also believed the U.S. administration could have handled the situation better. Dr. Fingar stated that the "official" viewpoint is that the U.S. handled the situation correctly.

The moderator of the discussion asked whether North Korea matters-does it mean nothing or everything? One International Fellow stated that anything that

involves nuclear weapons should be of grave concern to everyone, especially the U.S. Therefore, it is fortunate that the U.S. is cognizant of ongoing developments. Another Fellow noted all should be involved, and the involvement should be at the diplomatic level.

An International Fellow suggested the need to revisit nonproliferation agreements because they were written in the early 1960s and tried to limit the nuclear weapons club to the five original members (U.S., USSR, Britain, France, and China). The Fellow thought there seemed to be a sense of insecurity on the part of these powers and that they were still trying to manage the issue with a Cold War framework, which no longer applies in today's security environment.

Another Fellow added that the North Korean nuclear program has had a long history that predates the country's inclusion in the "axis of evil." All of East Asia must be involved in the solution. The "slow motion" approach should work best; do not merely rely on pressure, and certainly do not back North Korea into a corner.

Another participant suggested South Korea believes the U.S. deliberately scuttled the Agreed Framework with an "in your face" approach intended to insult North Korea. The DPRK is not irrational and is responding in a manner consistent with an absence of diplomacy. The North is developing nuclear weapons out of self-defense. The participant remarked that the North appears to champion the South Korean "soft power" approach as a means to build confidence and added that an international protocol is required because the situation affects countries surrounding North Korea.

The discussion moderator asked whether U.S. policy toward China is similar to or different from that toward North Korea. An International Fellow said the U.S. is not doing enough to bring North Korea into the community of nations, and needs to follow the example it pursued with China to defuse serious potential for misunderstandings.

Another Fellow stated that at the end of Cold War the U.S. had an opportunity to use diplomacy to expand collective security. But 9/11 ended that opportunity, and Pyongyang now believes the Iraq war was a prelude to the invasion of North Korea.

CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

One of the program participants asked about the changing state of the institution of sovereignty, and whether or not multinational and subnational groups are modifying the definition of national security.

Dr. Fingar noted that changing the scope and definition of security beyond the military necessitates the consideration of economic and societal sectors. This

broader definition of security shrinks the role of government because it is no longer able to define defense as an imaginary wall around the country. Thus, it becomes more difficult to identify legitimate means to defend and enhance the stability and well-being of the nation.

ADDRESSING TERRORISM AT THE PROPER LEVEL

An International Fellow opined that dealing with international terrorism is not easy at the level at which the Fellows normally interact because the Fellows are technocrats and decisions relating to terrorism require action by policymakers. The issues addressed at the Fellows' level concern security issues from a military perspective, and require coordination of the armed forces, police, and intelligence agencies.

Dr. Fingar commented that the problem arises because policymakers often make decisions that are based on *internal* political considerations. Often, the policymakers have turned the issue over to the technocrats, hoping the military can solve the problem.

GLOBALIZATION

The moderator posed the following question to the Fellows: In view of the concept of globalization, what does sovereignty mean today? The moderator was curious about the Fellows' response as intelligence officers and tried to elicit their thoughts about the Internet (access to the worldwide web) as a security concern. An International Fellow explained that because most countries suffer from a lack of computer terminals to access the Internet, rather than a lack of knowledge on how use the Internet, hardware may be an issue. Another participant added that terrorists and criminal enterprises have utilized the Internet and now pose a viable threat to world finance and global trade. The moderator referred to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, and how the incident showed the need to develop redundant systems.

An International Fellow asked: What are our basic issues and what are they among terrorists? A participant offered the view that all need to agree on the basic framework — namely, what is the problem and how can it best be approached? The participant cited the development of a network in Europe to exchange information on terrorists. A common frame of reference that encourages the exchange of information on drug trafficking and terrorist networks could be a basis for a common security framework. A Fellow stated that there is a need for cooperation to improve and develop an institutional framework to encourage better cooperation; terrorism and counter-drug cooperation is a good place to start. But one must

consider globalization because it affects different parts of the world in different ways and seems to punish developing nations.

Participants also noted that one of the primary challenges in fostering cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region involves overcoming technical challenges of information exchange: developing compatible systems such as communications equipment, computer systems, software, and hardware that facilitate data exchange. Overcoming technical issues is just one aspect of achieving greater cooperation. Establishing common protocols, procedures, and a willingness to share information is just as important.

LTC Fukuyama (Japan), Mr. Swinnerton (Australia), Col Henkel (JMIC), Ms. Combs (U.S./DIA), and CDR Hiponia (JMIC)

BGen Michael E. Ennis, USMC
Director for Intelligence, Headquarters, USMC

General Ennis provided the International Fellows a glimpse of a "Comprehensive Approach to Sharing Intelligence." His overall thesis is that traditional methods of providing information to policymakers or to tactical level commanders are inadequate. He believes that the current process is slow and does not even provide thirty-five percent of all available information on a given subject. The government and military need to restructure information and intelligence acquired via computer. A more streamlined approach, using commercially available web-based browsers and applications, combined with universal "tagging" of data needs to be developed. Websites such as Travelocity, MapQuest, and Napster already utilize applications that allow a user to specify a query based on individually selected variables. Even more remarkable is that the databases are dynamic and reflect instantaneous changes throughout the information space.

INTELLIGENCE SHARING

BGen Ennis noted that intelligence sharing with coalition partners is restrictive in nature and therefore effective sharing of information often becomes obstructed by law and policy. This situation can often lead to intelligence failures if the process breeds reluctance and inhibits the sharing of information. He also mentioned that technological barriers can contribute to inefficiencies. He reiterated that sharing is not simply the exchange of liaison personnel, the distribution of copied information, or providing access to finished products. Rather, information sharing entails access to useful data and products that can be used to formulate intelligence assessments. Everyone possesses their own data files. The problem is that no one can or is willing to provide others direct access to their data. This is both a user and an application problem.

TRADITIONAL PATH TO KNOWLEDGE

The traditional path to formulate products is to research (use search engines, print material), then cut and paste the desired information into the final product. This path is inefficient, time consuming, and dangerous to the Intelligence Community. The current method for retrieving information is determined by the producer with little or no regard to the user—that is, the planner, decisionmaker, analyst, or policymaker. To be effective, a user must have access to all of the information to determine exactly what data are important to them. To accomplish this, production tools need to incorporate data tagging capabilities that allow users to search for "content" rather than "products." Commercial industry has already intro-

duced flexible applications that use enormous amounts of data stored in multiple databases that are updated continually to reflect changing information. Commercial industry has successfully crafted intelligence production tools and databases that empower the user to make complex queries and return the desired information in a matter of seconds. The Intelligence Community can follow the same path.

NEW PATH TO KNOWLEDGE

The steps in the process involve first "attacking the data" by using appropriate metadata tags to flag or identify certain information contained within an intelligence database. By accurately flagging key pieces of information within the database, an efficient search can be accomplished when searching for particular information. Next, a robust distributive search capability must be developed. Using technology similar to Napster, a search engine should be able to actively query all of the major databases of the Intelligence Community and return a definitive list of all the potential answers to the query. Finally, efficient manipulation and visualization tools must be developed to display and absorb the results of the search. Since vast quantities of data are involved, the end product must be in a useable form for the user. Data must become available to all (no longer remain proprietary) and use a common language or protocol. The most important product is the data proper. The obligation to produce value-added intelligence remains dependent on the analyst's "pulling" the information. The proposed architecture provides universal access to information and not merely to finished intelligence.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

An International Fellow argued that computers alone are not the solution–human interface must ultimately occur to ensure the intelligence is properly used. One universal problem noted by a Fellow is the issue of keeping databases current to meet customer needs. Another Fellow added that sometimes the problem lies with cross-agency sharing as well as vertical intelligence sharing. They also noted that law enforcement agencies have problems dealing with classified information and storage.

One International Fellow noted that his country suffers from a shortage of analysts and the proposed tools and search engines would help offset that problem. It is one potential solution to the problem of producing value-added intelligence products.

A question was raised about how the Asia-Pacific region deals with the sharing of information related to international terrorism, since most countries only have bilateral intelligence relationships. One International Fellow said it depends on the interests of the neighboring country. However, when international terrorism

is involved, they almost always have some type of real-time sharing capability. Another Fellow said that they share information digitally, but there are too many pathways and it becomes problematic from a security standpoint. Still another Fellow proposed an organizational solution: he simply meets and talks with his counterparts. The Fellow noted that this type of face-to-face information sharing accomplishes the job almost immediately. He maintained that his country is cooperating on the terrorist issue, but still needs to find a better way for cooperation on maritime piracy, smuggling, and counter-narcotics initiatives.

Another Fellow stated that his country has cooperated with other countries in the past based on interests. Using the example of maritime piracy, even though certain information may have been acquired through bilateral means, the information was quickly shared with other countries having mutual interests. Another Fellow confirmed the practice of sharing bilateral information with a third party, when it is in the interests of all involved.

One International Fellow stated that a serious problem was with terrorists operating cellular phones. Many countries simply do not possess the technology to intercept the signals. Another Fellow offered that countries do not share methods and sources, but only information. One International Fellow suggested establishing a common database for terrorist-related information. However, another Fellow argued that people will always hold back information in support of perceived national interests.

BGen Ennis discusses a "Comprehensive Approach to Intelligence Sharing" with the International Fellows

THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND'S VISION OF COOPERATION

Mark Anglin, U.S. Pacific Command

An essential aspect of the program involved interaction between the International Fellows and senior officials at the theater level. Thus, an entire day of the curriculum was devoted to exploring the U.S. Pacific Command's (USPACOM) vision of cooperation. The first speaker of the day was Mr. Mark Anglin, a U.S. Fellow representing USPACOM. He provided an overview briefing of "Theater Security Cooperation and Intelligence Programs."

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION (TSC) PROGRAM

Mr. Anglin began the presentation by describing the source documents that provide general guidance for this USPACOM Program. First, the *National Security Strategy* strives to create a balance of power that favors human freedom, defending peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants. Next, the *Defense Planning Guidance* seeks to assure allies and friends, dissuade adversaries, and deter aggression. Finally, the *TSC Regional Guidance* and country-specific guidance provide additional direction.

From the TSC Program flow three of USPACOM's Security Cooperation Pillars: U.S. influence, access, and competent coalition partners. Mr. Anglin noted that theater security cooperation can be viewed as occurring in a peace-war continuum. On one end of the spectrum, wartime skills are primary considerations. Here, TSC is secondary, and activities such as exercises, training, and operations are emphasized in order to deter aggression and dissuade adversaries. At the opposite end of the spectrum, TSC considerations are primary, and wartime skills are secondary. At this end of the spectrum, military-to-military contact, education, security assistance, and humanitarian assistance are emphasized. The primary USPACOM objective is to develop the three pillars of U.S. influence, access, and competent coalition partners.

ENHANCED REGIONAL COOPERATION

Mr. Anglin described enhanced regional cooperation (ERC) as a concept that allows timely and effective response to situations in the Pacific, but does not seek to reduce the existing, individual bilateral relationships within the theater. Instead, enhanced regional cooperation represents a grouping of states that identify common interests, promote dialogue, and address regional or functional challenges such as drugs, terrorism, or piracy. In addition, ERC countries share dependable expectations, build cooperation, and reduce the risk of conflict. Enhanced regional cooperation is inclusive of all willing partners, but is not meant to be a rigid defense alliance in the Asia-Pacific region.

Mr. Anglin then described ERC implementation in terms of learning to "crawl, walk, and run." During the "crawl" phase, seminars and symposia are conducted. During the "walk" phase, small-scale and service-oriented exercises are conducted. Finally, during the "run" stage, larger-scale, joint and combined exercises are conducted, such as the multilateral exercise TEAM CHALLENGE.

Using the example of terrorism, Mr. Anglin noted that terrorists exploit "seams" between countries and agencies. In both cases, existing "seams" provide a fertile environment for terrorists to thrive. The question is How do we close the "seams?" Cooperation on counter-terrorism in the region has improved greatly since 9/11. Shared regional experiences include a common mission against terror, and a realization that the threat is not just regional, but global as well. Additionally, the notion of interdependence based on regional and global links at many levels is another factor impacting enhanced regional cooperation. Finally, a need exists for a multilateral response, since one state alone cannot achieve the desired results against terrorism. Thus, sharing of intelligence and working together have allowed partners to close "seams" once available to non-state actors or terrorists. To summarize enhanced regional cooperation, Mr. Anglin posited three points. First, the U.S. and other countries of the region share many common security challenges. Second, strong regional leadership can assist the U.S. in building the capability, cooperation, and contribution of willing Asia-Pacific states. Finally, active dialogue and participation is essential to building trust and a sense of shared responsibility.

Mr. Lonnie Henley (DIA) and Mr. Mark Anglin (USPACOM)

ASIA-PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES (APCSS)

Dr. Satu Limaye, Director of Research, APCSS, Honolulu, Hawaii

Dr. Limaye provided his perspective of the current state of the Asia-Pacific security environment. He briefly described research products produced by APCSS that are available on the Internet, including products that cover India-Pakistan relations, Taiwan threat perceptions, China, the impact of 9/11, and regional responses to U.S. policies.[2] He also noted that his Center has recently "taken stock" of Asian responses to U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific region, taking into account such things as the recent Quadrennial Defense Review, the new American National Security Strategy, and the overall record of the administration during the past several years. He noted that APCSS products are cross-indexed by country, region, and subject.

U.S./ASIA-PACIFIC RELATIONS

Dr. Limaye observed that U.S. relations with Asia-Pacific states are generally cooperative and relations will likely remain strong. However, he noted that this situation contradicts assessments completed by the Center only 12 to 14 months prior, at which time several factors were especially significant. These factors included relations with China, the level of attention South East Asia, especially Indonesia, was receiving from the U.S., the importance the U.S. placed on theater missile defense systems, and the reluctance of the U.S. to accept international treaties or agreements (for example the Kyoto Treaty dealing with global warming and the International Criminal Court). He noted that gaps from that timeframe have been narrowed by improvements in key bilateral relations, particularly with Russia, China, and Japan. In contrast, Dr. Limaye noted that the bilateral relationship with the Republic of Korea has declined somewhat. He stated that the Asia-Pacific region tends to view the United States as a valuable partner that remains key to maintaining regional stability.

Dr. Limaye asserted that regional fundamentals in the Asia-Pacific region are stable because existing conditions make countries want to maintain good relations with the U.S. for two reasons. First, the U.S. is an important partner for each individual country and second, the U.S. is key to security in the region. As a result,

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[2] See the Asian-Pacific Center's website at *http://www.apcss.org/Reserch/research publications.html.*

countries have found a way to deal with divergences with the U.S. or have tried to influence the U.S. to modify its policies.

WAR ON TERRORISM

Dr. Limaye also discussed the centrality of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) vis-à-vis relations with the Asia-Pacific region. He asserts that the war on terrorism has eased tensions and facilitated relationships, providing more opportunities for Asia-Pacific countries to work with the U.S. in combating a common foe. For example, the U.S. now enjoys a more robust relationship with Malaysia and a more consolidated relationship with Singapore. Thus, countries are finding it more advantageous to deal with the United States as a direct result of the war on terrorism.

IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA

Dr. Limaye noted that the war with Iraq was not a major obstacle to improved U.S./Asia-Pacific relations since countries are willing to differentiate that issue from other regional issues. Regardless of the viewpoint taken by regional governments, he stated that Iraq is unlikely to be either a "tipping point" or litmus test for Asia-Pacific-U.S. relations. He further noted that North Korea is a more serious issue because of its provocative behavior, but regional countries realize the North's behavior is the source of tensions. All countries surrounding the peninsula desire peace, but look to the U.S. for leadership. Some countries like Russia and China favor a bilateral (U.S.-DPRK) solution, while the U.S. prefers a multilateral solution. Nevertheless, overall progress continues.

CAVEATS

Despite the regional progress, Dr. Limaye added the caveat that U.S.-Asia-Pacific relations remain imperfect. For example, he noted the gap between popular anti-American sentiments and the governments that are generally pro-U.S. Such differences could undermine support for the U.S. and subvert politics at the domestic level. Additionally, he noted that multilateral organizations remain important to the Asia-Pacific region, but the U.S. is viewed as less enthusiastic about such arrangements. The U.S. concern is that certain other countries may take advantage of multilateral organizations at the expense of U.S. interests or seek to exclude the U.S. Finally, Dr. Limaye noted that increased U.S. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region has heightened mutual expectations for which the U.S. ought to account and calibrate policy accordingly.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

An International Fellow asked Dr. Limaye to expand on his comments regarding multilateralism and why a revival of multilateralism may be negative for the United States. He responded that each country has a different motive for multilateralism. If the U.S. does not participate, but rather acts unilaterally, U.S. interests could ultimately be damaged and foster the perception that the U.S. has only a "hub and spokes" approach [referring to the analogy of a wagon wheel with the U.S. in the center or hub and the individual bilateral relationships with Asia-Pacific countries forming the spokes]. Dr. Limaye noted that ASEAN's multilateral activity has decreased in recent years, but interest in it remains. He added that Chinese interest in multilateral activity has increased.

An international Fellow asked Dr. Limaye to explain why one of his colleagues from the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies had in a publication characterized Indonesia as a "reluctant" strategic partner with the United States. The Fellow found this phrase "unhelpful." Dr. Limaye opined that the article title in question was an earlier assessment, encompassing policies under former presidents Suharto and Habibe, as well as under the current president, Megawati Sukarnopoutri. Another International Fellow added that, based on his country's dealings with Indonesia, he also felt that Indonesia's role in the war against terrorism was mischaracterized by the phrase. He noted that Indonesia had worked closely with his country and was supportive of the war on terrorism. He further asserted that Indonesia was a powerful country and their two nations had a strong, quiet, and productive relationship. A U.S. Fellow noted that words are important and the article was probably meant to provoke a response, but he believed a better word would be "constrained." He added that the type of debate and discussions the Fellows were engaged in was healthy.

Dr. Limaye then asked the Fellows if they found his perspective on Iraq was too optimistic. An International Fellow remarked that if the conflict was prolonged, then it could be a major watershed event. The Fellow believes that a prolonged conflict could empower anti-U.S. elements in Malaysia. He noted that Arab satellite news images of suffering Muslims have an impact.

Dr. Limaye then asked about the impact of the U.S. handling of the North Korean situation. An International Fellow responded that the region sees North Korea reacting to a bilateral challenge [from the United States]. The Fellow acknowledged that the region would be relieved if the U.S. dealt with North Korean concerns. He noted that even his country's foreign minister believed there was a bilateral dimension to the problem. Dr. Limaye noted that the U.S. never stated that the North Korean situation is exclusively either a bilateral or multilateral issue. He noted that Secretary of State Powell said that bilateral talks were a

possibility. However, Dr. Limaye is not sure that North Korea is reacting exclusively to the "axis of evil" speech since they have acted in a similar fashion previously. An International Fellow asserted that the "axis of evil" speech is seen as putting the situation into an imbalance and questions the timing of such rhetoric.

A U.S. Fellow noted that the Swedish Ambassador to North Korea, while passing through the U.S., said that Kim Chong-Il has the power to make decisions as long as he is within the framework and pattern established by his father and predecessor, Kim Il-Sung. Any deviation requires a broader consensus. The Fellow stated that there was such a consensus two years ago to break away from international isolation, to pursue economic reforms, and to open embassies with new diplomatic partners. The consensus included improving relations with the United States. North Korea expected improved relations, but when Ambassador Kelly rebuked North Korea regarding its nuclear program, Kim jong-Il found little benefit in continued "good behavior" and began to admit publicly the North's kidnappings, missile tests, and "renewed" nuclear program. Thus, North Korean consensus was broken and the North regressed to its formerly established pattern of behavior. Dr. Limaye commented that the insight provided by the Swedish Ambassador says a great deal about the limits of Kim Chong-Il's power. He then asked for the Fellows' reaction to North Korea's outreach to Japan.

An International Fellow asserted that the North's admission to the kidnapping of Japanese citizens was part of the larger consensus reached in the government. The North had hoped its admission would prompt a change in relations between the two countries. However, the Japanese public reacted strongly, and combined with U.S. Ambassador Kelly's accusations, North Korea had no way out. Another International Fellow offered his insight, based on speaking with his country's Science Attaché in Seoul. According to the Attaché, the South Korean perception contradicts the U.S. perception: North Korea does not pose a threat. The Fellow asserted that the South Korean government views North Korean capabilities as a charade and one only has to look at its wood-burning trucks to come to that conclusion. But a U.S. Fellow argued the point, noting that North Korea has over 1,500 tubes of artillery pointed toward South Korea. The International Fellow countered by noting that the North had no sustainability. The U.S. Fellow agreed that there would be a quick collapse of the North, but asked how many South Koreans would die first? But the International Fellow maintained that the South Koreans do not perceive that kind of threat from the North. Another Fellow suggested that the popular and governmental perceptions may be at odds. The Fellow offered an alternative perception that if something untoward happens to South Korea, the U.S. may have to restrain the South from attacking the North.

An International Fellow stated that popularly expressed opinions are not always the official or confidentially-disclosed view; some things are for domestic

consumption only. Thus, South Korea may say to its people that it sees a different threat, whereas they actually hold a view similar to that of the United States regarding North Korean capabilities. They may, however, differ as to the overall threat assessment of North Korean intentions. Another Fellow noted that although there may be differences of perspectives on North Korean intent, there is no difference of perspectives on North Korean capability.

Rounding out the discussion, the Fellows discussed intelligence forecasting and the tendency of political factors to impinge on intelligence analysis. One particular area where this occurs is in the acquisition field. There was some agreement on this observation, as several participants commented that threat assessments are overlooked or ignored when a powerful politician advocates a particular program. This creates the phenomenon of shopping around for a favorable, or best "assessment."

The International Fellows and the Joint Military Intelligence College student body listen intently to a guest during the Distinguished Speaker Series

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSPECTIVE

Peter Rodman
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The following is a transcript of a discussion Mr. Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, had with the International Fellows during their visit to the Pentagon. The comments from the International Fellows are not attributed to a specific individual.

Mr. Rodman: Welcome, let me start off by saying that I am a consumer of intelligence products. As a policymaker I will talk about the general context of how that relates to Asia. I would like to start off and make it a point to emphasize that even though the U.S. is currently occupied in other areas the U.S. never loses sight of our global interests. Asia is very high on our priority list. Asia has importance strategically for the U.S. and we haven't lost sight of this. We have a strategic view where we are looking ahead, looking at the broad trends. This is especially true at the Pentagon. It is obvious why Asia is crucial. All the big powers — Europe, Russia, U.S. — have interests in Asia. Asia, Southeast Asia, is undergoing change and is an area of change. The U.S. realizes this and we have many friends in the region.

As for our strategy objectives, there are many for Asia. One is the war on terrorism. All our friends big and small have a role. All of your countries have improved cooperation and we are grateful. Although we [U.S.] are accused of unilateralism we know that we need other countries to help.

We want to build the capacity of our friends to react. We can assist by providing resources and training. We want our friends strong. We want to deter aggression. We also want to move toward more interoperability.

One of the issues we are facing is the proliferation of WMD. This is the issue at stake in Iraq and North Korea. Late last summer we caught North Korea in uranium enrichment activities. These actions were in violation of previous agreements made. Since then it has turned into a complicated diplomatic exercise with the international community. We want the international community to get involved and get them to stop. We went to the Security Council but as of yet the council has not taken it up. Another proposal has come from the North Koreans. They want bilateral talks between themselves and the United States. The U.S. feels that this is an international and regional problem. North Korea wants bilateral talks with the U.S. to gain concessions whether they be non-aggression or monetary. The U.S. feels this is not a question of negotiation. We are looking for an international political agreement.

There are some general principles in how we operate with our allies. One of those is that we take seriously our commitments to our friends.

We have a role in the world because many want us there. This does not mean we stay where we are not wanted. An example of this is France in the 60s, and I know we have a representative from the Philippines. When the Philippines wanted us to leave we left. We did not leave on bad terms. We left as friends. We stay in areas for mutual interests.

The U.S. is not afraid to step up to our responsibilities as can be seen in Iraq. We believe in what we are doing and we are doing it for the broader interest. The action undertaken (Iraq) shows our resolve. I have sat through briefings today and we have sufficient force and capabilities to accomplish our mission.

International Fellow: This is about North Korea. I believe North Korea sees war between the U.S. and Iraq as an opportunity. Are you anticipating a provocation?

Mr. Rodman: They may think we are distracted but they would be wrong. We believe there are some restraining factors, especially Japan. The Chinese after the recent reconnaissance plane incident have also realized that there are issues more serious at stake. We need to keep up the diplomatic pressure. We need to show that the longer this goes on the more they lose. They need funds whether they are international or private. They are dependent on outside sources. We need to maintain a common front.

International Fellow: Reference U.S. force presence in East Asia: What is the U.S. policy in maintaining presence?

Mr. Rodman: We want to stay but we need to find what the most effective presence is. We may need to have a readjustment. We have to look at the mission, talk to our allies and decide jointly what is in the best interest of all. Whatever we think, we need to work together to provide a durable effective presence and not be a burden on the host country. Technology is changing how we operate so we will have to look at what is most effective.

International Fellow: You said that Asia is one of the high priorities, so how do you prioritize, because North Korea may be a higher threat than Iraq?

Mr. Rodman: Iraq and Saddam's inability to live by his agreements has been a long-term problem. The North Korean events have recently arisen. We think we can deal with the North Korean problem diplomatically. I am glad we have representatives from Taiwan here. The President is very supportive of Taiwan. We are for any peaceful, mutually beneficial and agreed-upon settlement to the China-Taiwan issue. We would be against any forceful or coercive settle-

ment to the Taiwan issue. The President and Congress feel very strongly about this issue.

International Fellow: In the world after Iraq, and with this concern for Asia, will there be a need to rebuild the UN? How will that be approached?

Mr. Rodman: The UN is still viable. The President in his recent meeting with the Great Britain Prime Minister and the Spanish President called for the UN to help in the rebuilding of Iraq. We believe in the potential of the UN. As in the North Korean situation, we are fighting for a UN role. For Iraq, the Security Council split and the point of the U.S. was do we stand down or take responsibility? It was a tragedy that there was not greater consensus. I think the U.S. is not abandoning international institutions. They will be put to use.

International Fellow: The main issue in Iraq is WMD; now that is changing to toppling Saddam. Is the U.S., after winning, going to have to prove WMD capabilities?

Mr. Rodman: Saddam had a chance but the inspections never had a chance. We know through intelligence that they have WMD. The nature of information as to the location of these weapons was not good. Iraq is a big country with many places to move weapons. So to find them as they are moving them to different locations was nearly impossible for the weapons inspectors. The second problem for inspectors was that the interviews conducted with scientists who know where the weapons are wouldn't tell the truth due to fear. During the interviews they were in fear for their families, rooms were bugged, or regime loyalists were in the room during interviews. Resolution 1441 called for the scientists and families to be able to get out of Iraq but it never came about. The U.S. believes a change of regime will allow the scientists to tell the truth as to the location and type of weapons. You cannot separate WMD and the change of regime. We think that we have a better chance than Hans Blix. Giving more time would not have helped.

International Fellow: Does the preemptive attack strategy open a Pandora's box to other conflicts?

Mr. Rodman: First of all the principle of preemption is one part of the new National Security Strategy from President Bush and I recommend that you all read the entire document because it is a great document. The principle of preemption has a narrow focus especially in the context of terrorism. We do not want to wait for them to shoot. The Iraq case shows us the WMD capabilities, the support for terrorism. We see these things and feel self defense needs to be defined more broadly and needs to be more proactive. The Pandora's box is a good question. We are in a new era where the threats are more catastrophic. The passive approach to defense is not useful.

International Fellow: Will the PRC and Russia be coaxed along on the DPRK issue?

Mr. Rodman: Each country is calculating actions based on their own interests. They have been hesitant to engage and our job is to keep the pressure on. There is a peculiar relationship between the PRC, Russia and the North Koreans. We believe that they do have leverage with North Korea. It is hard to predict because we are not sure where Russia is. They sometimes side with the European powers to hedge U.S. power as seen with Iraq. The Bush administration relationship with the PRC started early on with the EP-3 incident. We have disagreements but have stabilized relations since. We have serious differences with both but this is normal politics since the end of the Cold War.

International Fellow: We have talked quite a bit about WMD but what about conventional weapons proliferation of Russian arms? Can they be restrained by the U.S.? Is there a meeting of the minds on this issue?

Mr. Rodman: I am not aware of the specifics. Are you citing a specific case?

International Fellow: No, I am speaking in general.

Mr. Rodman: Our policy is to encourage restraint on the selling of weapons. However, I wouldn't count on great success.

International Fellow: I would like to show our appreciation for being here and being invited here and making these new friends. We like to defend our country. As for us, we are not provoking hostilities with the PRC. What we want are capable armed forces. That is why we are here. We need our friends' help. Thank you again.

Mr. Rodman: We give advice and help where we can. Taiwan needs to make an effort. One of the things is priorities. The systems to be bought need to be where the needs are. We have had some good discussions and we need to focus on the threat.

International Fellow: What kinds of policy things do you see for Asia, like restructuring?

Mr. Rodman: We will have to look at our missions. One thing is that terrorism is the linkage between countries.

International Fellow: After Afghanistan do you feel the terrorists will move north to the Central Asian Republics?

Mr. Rodman: The concentration of effort is along the Afghan-Pakistan border. I really do not feel the threat is moving that way. We are pleased with the new relationships we have made from operations in Afghanistan. It may take time to

overcome this problem of terrorism but we hope to demoralize them. Hope is that as they do not achieve their major goals and as we push them back and they do not find success they will become demoralized.

International Fellow: On the recent Iranian nuclear problem, when will Iran have a nuclear bomb?

Mr. Rodman: I do not know. They have possibly been cheating and receiving information from outside sources. Right now is not a good time for the U.S. to get involved with the current regime. We believe that regime is headed for a crisis and if it falls we do not want to be associated with it as a new regime moves in. That is a vulnerability. For them to have nuclear devices is a strategic problem but the regime's crisis needs to be watched carefully now.

Thank you I need to be going. [Applause]

Dr. Ron Garst (Provost) and Dr. Max Gross (Academic Dean) interact with LTC Fukuyama (Japan) and Brigadier Sarwar (Pakistan)

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (J2), JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PERSPECTIVE

RDML Robert B. Murrett, USN
Vice-Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Following the discussions with Mr. Rodman, the International Fellows received a briefing from Rear Admiral Robert B. Murrett, USN, Vice Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff. RDML Murrett discussed the organization of the intelligence directorate and provided insight on the philosophical guidance provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Richard Meyers, USAF. RDML Murrett remarked that the Chairman has three priorities: winning the global war on terrorism, enhancing joint warfighting, and transforming the armed forces to ensure military superiority. He also articulated three enduring principles guiding Joint Staff planning: sustaining global commitments, maintaining quality of force, and maintaining balance. He then opened the floor to questions.

EMBEDDED REPORTERS

An International Fellow asked RDML Murrett for any insight he might have on how the embedded reporters in Iraq traveling with the front line U.S. units were doing. The Admiral replied that the reporters were doing a good job. He added that from his perspective, it was a good decision to have embedded reporters. RDML Murrett remarked that there may be a question regarding the different views emanating from the media and the issue of how and what the press reports. The Admiral provided the example of a CNN view compared to the Department of Defense view. When one of the U.S. Army attack helicopters was shot down in Iraq, there was continual coverage of this one helicopter by the media. In contrast, there was no mention or only scant mention of the success of the other helicopters in destroying many armored vehicles.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ASIA

An International Fellow asked the Admiral to comment on Asia's importance for the overall strategy of the United States. RDML Murrett stated that in the near future, Asia will ascend in terms of U.S. priorities because of our ties to the region. He added that U.S. interests and links to the region will only continue to grow. RDML Murrett sees a decline in U.S. troops deployed in Europe and after this war in Iraq, and noted that there has been no official decision regarding troop drawdowns in Europe, but there are bound to be changes.

Col Puprayura (Thailand), CDR Hiponia (JMIC), and Brig Gen (select) Simanjuntak (Indonesia)

As a follow-up to the issue of troop deployments, another International Fellow asked the Admiral if there would be an adjustment of troop strength in Korea. RDML Murrett replied that the two most immediate U.S. concerns in Asia are Korea and China-Taiwan. The China-Taiwan problem will not be solved quickly since it is a long-term problem. The Admiral added that the U.S. is concerned about China as a weapons proliferator, but noted that the U.S. and China do have a close economic relationship. He believes that with effective diplomacy, many of the differences between the countries can be solved. The Admiral remarked that the issue of solving the Korea problem would be a great deal harder.

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

An International Fellow then asked the Admiral about the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and its relationship with national-level intelligence entities

such as the Joint Staff J2. RDML Murrett remarked that the Joint Staff has a significant amount of interaction with the various geographic area of responsibility J2s. The Admiral noted that the Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate has daily interaction with Pacific Command where current events and problems are reviewed. Additionally, watch conditions (WATCHCON) levels and shifts in those levels due to terrorist threats are also discussed. RDML Murrett stated that the Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate also communicates with the Pacific Command about intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) allocations and developments in Korea. The Admiral stated that overall, there is an immense amount of interaction between the Joint Staff and USPACOM.

COUNTER-NARCOTICS ISSUES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Moderator: Jon Wiant
JMIC Visiting Professor, U.S. Department of State

Mr. Wiant noted that in 1979 the Department of State twice raised with Mr. Frank Carlucci, when he was Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and later when he was Secretary of Defense, the problem of characterizing narcotics as either a social or legal problem. Although the U.S. had been treating narcotics as a criminal problem, State argued that it should be treated as a national security issue instead. The reason is that narcotics production and trafficking creates instability, supports insurgencies, and erodes government entities. Thus, instability is the environment for narcotics. Countries and regions that do not have stable governments and economies are the countries and regions in which narcotic-producing plants are grown and through which narcotic products are refined and transported. The international trafficking in narcotics is the nexus of both a criminal and a national security issue. Narcotics are not a one-government problem. Therefore, only close international cooperation can defeat the international narcotic growth and trafficking problem.

Mr. Jon Wiant, JMIC State Department Chair and Visiting Professor

The following briefing was provided to the International Intelligence Fellows:


WORLDWIDE OPIUM PRODUCTION
Directorate for Analysis and Production
MEXICO
Mexico
COLOMBIA
Colombia
THE GOLDEN CRESCENT
Iran
Afghanistan
Pakistan
THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE
Burma
Laos
Thailand
UNCLASSIFIED


SOUTHWEST ASIAN OPIUM PRODUCTION
Directorate for Analysis and Production
Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2002
High Density Poppy Cultivation Areas in Helmand, Oruzgan, Qandahar, Konar, Nangarhar, and Badakhshan Provinces
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
High Opium Prices and the Lack of Central Government Authority Spurred Widespread Poppy Cultivation Following Downfall of Taliban
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SOUTHWEST ASIAN OPIUM PRODUCTION

Directorate for Analysis and Production

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN OPIUM PRODUCTION, 1997-2002



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SOUTHWEST ASIAN OPIUM PRODUCTION

Directorate for Analysis and Production

RENEWED POPPY CULTIVATION IN 2002

- USG Estimates Afghanistan Produced 1,278 Metric Tons of Opium in 2002
- New Production Replenishes Stockpiles Drained by Taliban Opium Poppy Ban
  - Only 63 Metric Tons Produced in 2001
- Poppy Planting Reportedly Underway in Key Growing Areas
  - Crop to be Harvested in April/May 2003
- Karzai Government Pressuring Provincial Governors to Eradicate New Crop
  - Effectiveness of Campaign Unclear

Post-Taliban Afghan Government Eradicated At Least 20 Percent of 2002 Crop, According to British Authorities



President Karzai Reiterated a Ban on Poppy Cultivation in September 2002

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
AFGHANISTAN NARCOTICS PROCESSING
Directorate for Analysis and Production
Badakhshan Province, Afghanistan
Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2002
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan
Chagai Hills, Helmand Province, Afghanistan
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AFGHANISTAN NARCOTICS STOCKPILES
Directorate for Analysis and Production
Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2002
Ghani Khel, Nangarhar Province
PAKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
Lashkar Gah, Helmand Province
Sangin, Helmand Province
Town of Chutu, Helmand Province
Qandahar, Qandahar Province
Lashkar Gah Opium Bazaar Destroyed by Helmand Officials in November 2002
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SOUTHWEST ASIAN NARCOTICS FLOW
Directorate for Analysis and Production
HIGH LEVEL OF NARCOTICS SEIZURES
345 Kg Heroin Seized Feb 03
187 Kg Heroin Seized Jul 02
215 Kg Heroin Seized Jul 02
112 Kg Heroin Seized May 02
113 Kg Heroin Seized Jan 03
Russian Soldiers Guarding Afghan-Tajik Frontier
1.1 Ton Morphine Seized Feb 02
1 Ton Opium Seized Feb 02
427 Kg Morphine Seized May 02
242 Kg Heroin Seized Dec 01
790 Kg Morphine Base Seized Jan 03
630 Kg Heroin, 250 Kg Morphine Seized Jan 02
Iranian Seizure in Tehran of 1114 Kg Morphine Base
AFGHANISTAN
TURKMENISTA
UZBEKISTAN
UNCLASSIFIED


SOUTHEAST ASIAN OPIUM PRODUCTION
Directorate for Analysis and Production
OUTPUT IN DECLINE
SOUTHEAST ASIAN OPIUM PRODUCTION
Burma
Laos
Vietnam
Metric Tons
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Opium Production in Burma Drops by 200 Metric Tons from 2001 Levels
– Eradication Efforts not a Major Factor
Opium Poppy Cultivation
THAILAND
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BURMA-BASED DRUG TRAFFICKING ARMIES

Directorate for Analysis and Production

ETHNIC MILITIAS CONTROL DRUG PRODUCTION

- Trafficking Armies Given Control of Large Areas in 1989 Peace Accords
  - Ceded Areas Include Highest-density Opium Poppy Cultivation in Southeast Asia
- Most of Region's Heroin Refineries Are Located in These Areas

THE LARGEST TRAFFICKING ARMY IS THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY



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BURMA-BASED DRUG TRAFFICKING ARMIES

Directorate for Analysis and Production

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S LARGEST DRUG-TRAFFICKING ARMY

- Largest Producer of Heroin and Methamphetamine in Region
- About 20,000 Troops in Two Operational Commands
  - Northern (Along PRC Border)
  - Southern (Along Thai Border)
- Armaments Include Small Arms, Mortars, Some SA-7's
- UWSA Expanding presence on Thai Border

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EAST ASIA HEROIN TRAFFICKING ROUTES

Directorate for Analysis and Production

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CHINA: HEROIN FLOWS

Directorate for Analysis and Production

RISING SEIZURE TOTALS

- Region's Primary Transit Zone
  - Record Seizures in 2001-02
- Trafficking Contributes to Growing Addiction and HIV Rates
- Heroin Movement Occurs Along a Southern Corridor
  - Routes and Size of Shipments Suggest Significant Quantities Intended for Export



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THAILAND: DRUG FLOWS

Directorate for Analysis and Production

PRIMARY MARKET FOR METHAMPHETAMINE FROM BURMA

- UWSA Flooding Thailand With Methamphetamine Tablets
- Secondary Route for Heroin Moving to International Markets
- Heroin Moves Across Northern or Western Thai-Burmese Borders to Major Cities
  - Shipped Overseas via Containerized Cargo, Air Courier, or Express Mail
- Laos Emerging as an Important Secondary Route for Methamphetamine and Heroin

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EAST ASIA METHAMPHETAMINE TRAFFICKING

Directorate for Analysis and Production

ASIA'S GROWING SYNTHETIC THREAT

- China is the Region's Largest Producer
  - Seizures Rising Sharply
  - Very High Purity
- Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines are Key Regional Markets
- Trade Difficult to Combat
  - Low Costs/High Profit Margins
  - Perceived as Less Harmful than Heroin

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NORTH KOREA AND THE DRUG TRADE

Directorate for Analysis and Production

HEROIN TRAFFICKING

North Korean Motherships Have Been Implicated in at-sea Drug Transfers

- Widespread Reporting of North Korean Involvement in Illegal Activities, Including Drug Trafficking
  - Used to Gain Foreign Currency
- Reports of Opium Poppy Cultivation and State-Directed Heroin Production
  - Taiwanese Seizure of 79 kg of Heroin in Jul 02 Linked to North Korea
  - Pyongyang Cooperating with Regional Drug Syndicates

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NORTH KOREA AND THE DRUG TRADE

Directorate for Analysis and Production

METHAMPHETAMINE TRAFFICKING

- Pyongyang's Involvement in Methamphetamine Trafficking Appears to Have Increased in Late-1990's
  - Press Reports of Rising Seizures and North Korean Connection
- Japan Is the Primary Market
  - Shipments Also Have Moved to Taiwan, China, and the Philippines

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OUTLOOK

Directorate for Analysis and Production

EVOLVING DRUG THREAT IN ASIA

- Afghanistan and Burma Will Remain the Key Source Countries for Opium Production
- Asian Opium Production Likely to Remain Significantly Below Record Levels of Late-1990s
  - Heroin Purity may Decline
- Synthetic Drug Threat Will Continue to Increase
  - Production is Highly Profitable and Hard to Detect
  - Diffusion of Production Likely
- Drug Production Will Remain One of North Korea's Few Sources of Hard Currency

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OUTLOOK

Directorate for Analysis and Production

WORLDWIDE OPIUM PRODUCTION, 1997-2002



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OUTLOOK FOR SOUTHWEST AND EAST ASIA

An analyst from the Defense Intelligence Agency provided an overview of narcotics in Southwest and East Asia. According to the analyst, in Afghanistan, opium poppy growth rebounded in the year after the fall of the Taliban. Opium production in Northeastern and Southern Afghanistan was approximately 1,278 metric tons in 2002, as opposed to only 63 metric tons in 2001. Although the Taliban had allowed widespread poppy cultivation, current Afghan leader Hamed Karzai has banned all opium cultivation. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether his ban will be enforceable.

Substantial amounts of opium poppy product are being cultivated in and/or transported through Southern Afghanistan and Badakhshan Province in Northeast Afghanistan. Opium poppy product is traded and sold at many of the large bazaars springing up all over the country. Large seizures of opium poppy product are taking place, but large amounts of opium poppy products (primarily opium and heroin) are still moving through Central Asia. A primary overland route out of Afghanistan transits through Iran, through Turkey, and into Europe.

Another Defense Intelligence Analyst reported that only 630 metric tons of opium poppy product was produced in Myanmar (Burma) in 2002. This amounts to a 75 percent decline in opium poppy product production, but although the exact cause is unknown, it is probably not due to an eradication program currently in progress. More likely, either bad weather or stress on the soil system caused by overuse, or poor agricultural practices, is the real cause of the decline in production. There are three "drug" armies in Myanmar, the Kokang Militia, the Eastern Shan State Militia, and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), a producer of opium and methamphetamines. The UWSA appears to be the largest producer of heroin within the region, but their production of methamphetamines is clearly an emerging issue. The UWSA is truly an army equipped like light infantry. The drug trade is seen as a force for instability due to problems associated with addiction, the rise in acquired AIDS/HIV, and crime related to narcotics.

An International Fellow asked the DIA analysts their opinion of China's anti-narcotics efforts. The DIA analyst gave the People's Republic of China high marks for its strict anti-narcotics program (referring to the fact that China often executes drug traffickers), but noted that methamphetamines are overtaking opium poppy products as a threat to the region. For example, the UWSA in Myanmar began flooding Thailand with methamphetamines of up to 30 percent purity to the extent that the Thai army was sent to the Thai/Myanmar border to help stem the flow. But the UWSA evaded this attempt to disrupt its activities by establishing new transport routes through Laos. Methamphetamines are a more destructive threat to the region than opium because methamphetamine laboratories are much

harder to spot than poppy fields, and because there is no region-wide effort to control the traffic in methamphetamine precursor products. For example, ephedrine, a chemical crucial to the making of amphetamines, is easily available from China and other unspecified countries. In fact, there has been an upsurge in the production of methamphetamines and synthetic drugs because they take less time and labor to produce, and they can be made with less risk of compromise.

In response to the question "What does this mean for Asia," the DIA analyst replied that the future would likely see a decline in the purity of heroin and a surge in the production of synthetic drugs, such as Ecstasy.

THAILAND'S PERSPECTIVE

Senior Colonel (Brigadier General equivalent) Naretrak Thitathan, Defense Attaché to the U.S. from the Kingdom of Thailand, provided his perspective on the drug problem in Asia. He stated that the counternarcotics effort of today has a different focus from counternarcotics efforts of years past. In the past, the focus has been on the interdiction of opium and heroin, but currently the effort is focused on methamphetamines, known in Thailand as *Ya Ba* (crazy drug), also as "horse drug." In previous years, the opium poppy product growth was related to the deforestation problem in Northern Thailand. But now, approximately three million Thai people are already addicted to methamphetamines, which are easy to produce. This shows the problem in Thailand is reaching critical mass.

The Thai government continues to attempt to crack down on opium/heroin production areas in Northern Thailand and to fight the unemployment/underemployment problem, but the importation of up to 600 million amphetamine pills (vice six metric tons of opium), has caused the Thai government to take drastic measures to stem the flow of amphetamines. On 1 February 2003, the Prime Minister of Thailand declared war on drugs, and declared the period from 1 February through 1 May as a period of strict law enforcement. On 2 March, an Operations Center was opened and two committees were formed to monitor police activities and prosecute criminals. The drug war has resulted in numerous fatalities: from 1 February to 28 February, over 1,000 people died. In the Senior Colonel's opinion, the drug problem is a very serious problem and requires serious measures to counteract. Since Thailand is an open democratic society, he encouraged the International Intelligence Fellows to stay engaged with the situation and to monitor to progress in Thailand to learn from their experiences.

An International Fellow mentioned that Indonesia also has an unknown number of drug addicts, but stated that human rights issues were not the cause of the drug problem. He said that Indonesia metes out very strict punishment for drug traffickers, and asked Senior Colonel Thitathan how Thailand has dealt with drug

traffickers. Senior Colonel Thitathan replied that Thailand deals firmly with convicted drug traffickers, and in some cases has applied the death penalty.

An International Fellow mentioned that the laws of most European countries as a rule do not provide for capital punishment for convicted drug traffickers. In the U.S., several variable factors influence the severity of the sentence, such as whether or not it is the first offense for the defendant, the quality of the defendant's defense attorney, what lesser sentence can be obtained by plea bargaining (pleading guilty to a lesser charge in exchange for a reduced sentence) and other factors.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSPECTIVE

Mr. Steve Worobec, International Intelligence Fellow representing the Department of State, participated in a panel discussion and spoke on the changing nature of organized crime in Asia. Some members of the old generation of organized crime figures in Asia have passed from the scene. A new generation has evolved which is now operating within a poly-crime and poly-drug environment. More crime syndicates exist than ever before, with much greater opportunities for illegal profits in previously unexploited areas such as human smuggling and the theft of intellectual property, as evidenced by the proliferation of bootleg compact discs and digital video discs. Despite this evolution within the international criminal environment, official efforts to combat crime have remained too compartmentalized. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies are not communicating with each other enough, nor are they sharing enough of the intelligence that is contained in their respective specialized databases involving, for example, human smuggling, drug trafficking, counterfeiting, arms sales, and the like.

During the 1990s, China replaced Thailand as the principal gateway for the smuggling of illicit opiates from the Golden Triangle to international markets and a growing domestic China market. Since methamphetamine first began to be processed in the Golden Triangle around 1992, there has been an explosion in its use within Thailand. Demand for methamphetamine has also increased in other countries throughout the region such as the Philippines, China, Japan, Cambodia and Vietnam. The next wave of synthetic drug trafficking and abuse in Asia is expected to be for Ecstasy. To increase their already-attractive profit margins, members of crime syndicates will likely establish more synthetic drug refineries outside of the Golden Triangle–closer to marketplaces in the Asian region; that is, the Philippines, Taiwan, Cambodia and China.

Discussion moderator Dr. Wiant noted that we must study the "verticalization" of narcotics markets from product growth all the way through distribution, as was accomplished by the Colombian drug cartels. We also need to look at the factor of market saturation, as occurred in the cocaine market in the U.S., that led

to the production of crack cocaine and the targeting of African-American neighborhoods for crack sales.

Mr. Worobec mentioned that since there is no universal definition of organized crime, significant differences remain within and between law enforcement and intelligence agencies relative to the nature and scope of the "organized crime" problem.

Mr. Wiant asked whether organized crime syndicates have their own foreign affairs departments, and if not, how they manage to work so well together. Mr. Worobec replied that some of the international "connections" for members of narcotics trafficking syndicates were actually formed as members served time in prisons around the world, including in the U.S. Since the 1980s, there have been numerous extraditions of narcotics traffickers to the U.S. from Hong Kong. Members of what had been the largest-scale heroin-processing and trafficking organization in the Golden Triangle — Shan United Army — as well as members of independent trafficking syndicates, began to be extradited from Thailand to the U.S. during the 1990s. While in U.S. prisons, some of these traffickers not only established new contacts within their own ethnic/dialect group, but also with criminals from other ethnic groups (such as Italians or Hispanics). Wiant mentioned that this raises a huge intelligence problem. In the past, counternarcotics efforts focused on one nation at a time. But now, drug trafficking syndicates have sophisticated communications systems and operational methods that are extremely difficult to combat.

In response to a comment about the influx of ethnic gangs into the U.S., most of which are involved in narcotics trafficking and most of which are extremely violent, Mr. Worobec stated that there was a large influx of illegal aliens into the United States that came on the heels of changes in U.S. immigration law during the 1980s. Human smuggling syndicates successfully transported untold numbers of illegal aliens into the U.S. from such countries as China, particularly from several counties in Fujien Province. Some of these illegal aliens became members of gangs after settling in various U.S. cities. There was also the movement of members of international crime syndicates from Asia to the United States at times via Canada, Mexico, and Latin America. Narcotics traffickers are now much more sophisticated than in the past — well-traveled, better equipped technologically, and educated. For example, some of the sons — and sometimes daughters — who have taken over "the business" from their fathers have graduated from college. Some hold master's degrees in such subjects as business administration, finance, and computer science.

Mr. Worobec noted that if the International Fellows could take the elements of the previous day's exercise on counterterrorism and change the names of the players involved, there would be some striking similarities to counternarcotics issues in areas

such as cooperation, rule of law, human rights, and information exchange/storage between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. There are thus some lessons that can be learned for counterterrorism from previous experiences in counternarcotics; for example, in the establishment of intelligence centers/fusion cells and combined operations. Given the compartmentalized nature of the criminal activities of international narcotics traffickers and international terrorists, serious problems and challenges will remain in intelligence collection/analysis, operations, and prosecutions.

Mr. Wiant mentioned that although U.S. intelligence agencies initially did not want to get involved in counternarcotics efforts, they later made some valuable contributions. As an example of how intelligence was developed from reporting, he cited the regulation that required reports on the movement of money out of the U.S. for transactions of ten thousand dollars or more. The Treasury Department hired "order of battle" analysts to examine reporting patterns. After six months, their analyses clearly identified problem banks, including their corporate structures. This was an example of truly actionable intelligence information. Nevertheless, the counternarcotics effort is still too fragmented. The establishment of the multi-agency El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) in El Paso, TX, during 1975 was very helpful, but our organizations still remain too compartmentalized to attack international criminal syndicates that have become increasingly diversified.

A Defense Intelligence Analyst noted that military intelligence has had some successes in supporting the cocaine interdiction effort. Since 1989, for example, improvements have been made in tracking various drug transport methods. Interagency cooperation has been crucial in discovering cocaine movement from South America to the United States. Intelligence has driven the interdiction methods. As a result of interdiction successes, traffickers have changed their transport methods and means. Cocaine is shipped in multi-hundred-kilogram loads. As a result of successful interdiction efforts, cocaine is now sold principally in Europe, rather than in the U.S.

Mr. Wiant noted that close cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies is essential to successfully dismantle increasingly sophisticated narcotics trafficking syndicates. He cited a denial and deception operation against two U.S. Coast Guard cutters operating in the Gulf of Mexico area whereby traffickers sent two smaller boats, one carrying 50 kilograms of cocaine and another carrying 75 kilograms of cocaine into the patrol area of the cutters, where they were quickly boarded and seized. As the two cutters took their captured vessels ashore, traffickers sent a much larger ship carrying six thousand kilograms of cocaine directly through the same area, unchallenged. An International Fellow also mentioned the practice of using phony emergency broadcasts to divert Coast Guard assets from areas through which cocaine shipments were to pass.

Mr. Wiant emphasized that corruption must also be considered in counternarcotics intelligence efforts. For example, a senior U.S. counternarcotics interdiction official in Miami, FL, was arrested after it was learned that he was on the payroll of drug traffickers. In another example, a young U.S. service member in El Paso, Texas, met a girl who introduced him to her family. Her "Uncle Joe" told the service member that "we hate drugs, but maybe you can help me. I have to buy a Cessna aircraft, but the price seems way too low. Can you check your watch list at work to see whether this aircraft has been identified in connection with drug trafficking operations?" The service member agreed to help him with this seemingly innocent request, but afterward "Uncle Joe" had him check on several other aircraft before it was discovered that those same aircraft were in fact used in narcotics transportation operations after they had been found to be not on the watch list. In effect, the drug traffickers were conducting a False Flag operation.

In response to a question from an International Fellow on whether any evidence exists that profits from the sales of illegal narcotics are funding terrorist activities, a DIA analyst replied that there was a recent case in Hong Kong of a drug trafficker working to buy weapons for sale in Afghanistan. Additionally, the Taliban in Afghanistan gave safe haven to Al Qa'ida terrorists who had close ties to drug traffickers in that area.

Mr. Wiant cautioned against using the term *narco-terrorist* to label people indiscriminantly. He also noted that the involvement of senior government officials in narcotics trafficking (as in North Korea, for example) has serious diplomatic and political implications, so it is important that we use very precise language to avoid tarring a whole country with a broad brush when only certain persons are guilty of crimes.

In response to a question from an International Fellow about a drop in the demand side of the narcotics equation, a DIA analyst replied that in the U.S., the drop in demand for heroin can be associated in the identification and prosecution of the French Connection trafficking ring and other traffickers, but it might be due more to the advent of a methadone-maintenance program for addicts. Drug education, such as the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program, was also an important factor in the reduction in demand. Unfortunately, although use of cocaine is currently declining in the U.S., use of heroin is slowly rising. Another element in the reduction of demand for drugs is the recognition in narcotics-producing countries that narcotics are not just an "American" problem. In the past, an attitude existed in countries such as Thailand and Colombia that narcotics were a U.S. problem. But by now, it has become quite clear that narcotics are truly an international problem. Mr. Worobec added that the geometric growth in methamphetamine abuse worldwide is graphic evidence of the worldwide nature of the narcotics problem.

TRANSNATIONAL MEDICAL ISSUES

Moderator: Dr. Pauletta Otis
JMIC Faculty

ARMED FORCES MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER

An Analyst from the Defense Intelligence Agency's Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) provided a brief overview of the Center's mission. He indicated that medical intelligence information products from AFMIC are used by many levels of governmental, including offices that engage in the practice of medicine and in combating infectious diseases. Other areas where AFMIC products make a contribution are in the bioscience and environmental health fields, as well as in military operations from strategic (global) to tactical (battlefield). These products can be particularly useful in a variety of situations, including those where we are facing or engaged in an evolving military strategy in an unfamiliar or hostile environment. AFMIC is subordinate to the Defense Intelligence Agency, and has three subordinate divisions: the Medical Capabilities Division, the Epidemiology and Environmental Health Division, and the Intelligence Production and Integration Division.

In response to a question from one of the International Fellows on whether an operational staff would ever depend on AFMIC, a DIA analyst replied that it varies. AFMIC personnel try not to get medical planners to depend on them too much. AFMIC personnel advise medical planners to go to the relevant J2, not AFMIC. Moreover, not all staffs need detailed medical intelligence information. As part of its mission, AFMIC produces intelligence information products on the following: the roles, relationships, concepts of operation, organization, policy, doctrine, and interoperability of military and civilian health care systems; the location, capabilities, quality, and mass casualty readiness of fixed hospitals; and the capabilities of field hospitals. AFMIC also tries to reduce ignorance levels among engaged parties, especially with respect to toxic agents. For example, there exist today between five and ten thousand high-production chemicals, only approximately 60 percent of which we have any idea whatsoever about their toxicity.

HIV/AIDS

Another AFMIC analyst spoke about HIV/AIDS in China. She said that one of the causes of the spread of the HIV/AIDS virus in China has been the inertia of the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), which did not officially acknowledge that the virus existed in China until 2001. Additionally, both China

and the United Nations tend to underestimate statistical estimates of the spread of HIV/AIDS in that country. For example, according to PRC government figures, there are approximately one million cases of HIV/AIDS in China. According to the UN, approximately 1.5 million cases exist. According to U.S. government figures, 2 million cases of HIV/AIDS are estimated to exist in China.

The AFMIC analyst noted that there are times when our troops can be a vector for diseases like HIV/AIDS, and mentioned specifically the problems caused by and encountered by troops from several nations who supported the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in the early 1990s. Contingents from several countries failed to provide standard health screening for their troops, who passed sexually transmitted diseases (including HIV/AIDS) to local prostitutes, who in turn ended up passing those diseases to other UNTAC troops from countries where HIV/AIDS had not previously been a problem or had not even previously existed.

An International Fellow (not from the United States) mentioned that U.S. troops, as a rule, are not bearers of disease when they are posted overseas, but they sometimes can bring material that creates other environmental problems and that might have longer-term negative health ramifications, an example being the depleted uranium used in some U.S. ammunition. He made the point that the impact of military equipment is not always known or readily apparent.

OTHER MEDICAL RESOURCES

An AFMIC analyst noted that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, also known as CDC, has just been incorporated into the U.S. Department for Homeland Security, created after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. One of CDC's main missions is disease surveillance in the U.S.; for example, the Hantavirus problem that occurred in the Four Corners area of the Southwestern U.S. While the CDC conducts disease surveillance for the U.S., AFMIC maintains disease surveillance for the rest of the world, along with the World Health Organization (WHO). AFMIC routinely consults with CDC and WHO, but in the role of health professionals, and not in an intelligence role, as some might think. Another analyst mentioned that AFMIC has good contacts with the CDC, and routinely monitors CDC and WHO press reports.

Dr. Pauletta Otis, JMIC professor and discussion moderator, added that "promed.com" on the Internet is a good resource on diseases and health conditions worldwide. The AFMIC analyst replied that "promed.com," although it is "first-cut" reporting (probably not containing thorough, detailed analyses), is definitely a good resource.

An International Fellow asked where AFMIC finds sources for the information it obtains. The analyst replied that AFMIC does not have a medical information collection capability "in-house." Instead, AFMIC receives all-source intelligence information, including a substantial amount of open-source information, like that describing an outbreak of Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever, an Ebola-like virus, in Northern Afghanistan.

In response to a question on whether AFMIC is proactive or reactive, one of the analysts replied that AFMIC attempts to be as proactive as possible, like the rest of defense intelligence. Medicine can actually, in some circumstances, amount to diplomacy by other means. For example, providing actionable medical intelligence information can help a host government obtain the means to provide medical aid to its own people, thus aiding the country. The converse of this is also true: Withholding medical intelligence information from an unfriendly host country might help to de-legitimize the country by depriving it of a source of popular support that would have otherwise been available through its ability to respond to medical problems in a timely manner.

Dr. Otis suggested that although international medical organizations such as the International Red Cross know that medicine is a "weapon of war," they are nonetheless committed to delivering medicines and medical services in the most benign, evenhanded, harmless and helpful way possible. A DIA analyst replied that even though it may seem neutral, even-handed distribution of medical services can hurt both sides. An International Fellow provided as an example the case of Afghanistan under the Taliban, wherein an attempt by "Doctors Without Borders" to get Afghan females to use soap resulted in the Taliban's expelling all members of this NGO from the country. Nonetheless, organizations like the Peace Corps and the U.S. Agency for International Development have actually helped to legitimize governments by allowing them to provide medical services to their people. Infrastructure resources and who controls the end products can have a significant impact on many countries.

Dr. Otis mentioned that humanitarian and medical aid personnel should consider "externalities" such as the "fear factor." For example, even the mention of smallpox causes people to panic in some areas of the world. Education may be part of the answer, but the problem is how to implement effective educational programs. Dr. Otis added that in the 1920s and 1930s, after World War I, the U.S. government implemented a program mandating the use of hand soap by those peeling potatoes to be consumed by the U.S. military. Also, as a result of the devastating effects of influenza epidemics, women wore gloves in a specific effort to reduce contagion. But now, it seems there may be a vulnerability to epidemics because the general public has forgotten some of the lessons learned concerning public sanitation.

An International Fellow asked, as U.S. military forces expand operations, Does the U.S. capture local knowledge in the areas where the forces operate? The AFMIC analyst replied that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has an effort underway, mandated by Congress, to examine exactly such issues. AFMIC is looking hard at traditional medicines and practices not normally used in the U.S. This is being done for several reasons, not the least of which is that the U.S. is losing the malaria battle. Several strains of malaria formerly vulnerable to antibiotics have developed resistance to current anti-malaria prophylaxis. As a result, the U.S. is examining such traditional medicines as antimycin, derived from a Chinese root. The U.S. is also looking at other substances with potential medicinal value, such as pit viper toxin. An International Fellow asked whether we are doing a good job of getting in touch with providers of local medicine when our troops roll into an area. The AFMIC analyst replied that ideally we should be doing so, but in practice, we are not doing so well in contacting traditional medical providers upon our arrival. Dr. Otis added that our Special Forces troops have been very good at relying on traditional medicine providers when necessary, but they are not very good at establishing a corporate memory of substances upon which we can rely.

MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE ISSUES IN ASIA

In reply to a question about the spread of cancer in Asia, an AFMIC analyst replied that the situation is getting worse. As countries in the region become more wealthy, deaths from infectious diseases decline compared to those due to chronic diseases. The AFMIC analyst explained that cancer is increasing in Asia because people are now living long enough to get cancer. This development is accelerated by the implementation of such programs as the "Barefoot Doctors" in China in 1949 and 1950, which radically increased life expectancy.

An International Intelligence Fellow asked about diseases in Asia and how they affect different countries. One International Fellow stated that his military sometimes has problems with altitude-related diseases, despite having an administrative support-to-combat troop ratio of 13:1 for most mountain posts. For this reason, remote assignments are normally limited to a duration of three to six months. An International Fellow stated that the main medical problem in his country's military was oral cancer caused by chewing betel nuts. Young soldiers chew these nuts, easily obtained while on leave, and get oral cancer.

Another International Fellow stated that previously, the biggest medical problem encountered by his country's troops was malaria, but now the military is encountering increasingly frequent cases of hepatitis, often caused by troops drinking or filling their canteens with unclean water. The problem is exacerbated by troops passing canteens to each other in the field in response for a request for a drink of water. Recently, one battalion was stricken with 180 cases of hepatitis. His country is working with another Asian state to help find ways to battle new, resistant strains of malaria.

One International Fellow observed that his government is just beginning to recognize military medicine as a force-protection issue. His country's National Intelligence Organization now has three people (formerly one person) studying medical problems that may have military impact. Medical research in his country traditionally has been considered a subject for the Surgeon General's office, not one for Military Intelligence. That approach now appears to be undergoing change.

Another International Fellow stated that his Armed Forces have no significant medical problems, primarily because their military officers and enlisted personnel can visit any hospital or clinic in the country, anywhere, anytime, and get help for whatever medical problems they encounter!

Still another International Fellow stated that his country has started to include an environmental health assessment as part of all operational assessments. It has been noted in his country that some governments are underreporting or downplaying medical problems in their respective countries, and it has been realized that good intelligence is needed on medical issues. Additionally, some of his Navy's ships have had as many as 40 sailors refuse to take anthrax vaccinations. The International Fellow did not understand why they had a choice in the matter. The AFMIC analyst commented that anthrax vaccine is not 100 percent effective, but then it does not have to be. If the vaccine can be made up to 80 percent effective, then Anthrax is no longer a good weapon. An International Intelligence Fellow (not U.S.) commented that in his country, some troops took the military to court over the issue of mandatory anthrax vaccinations and won. Anthrax vaccinations are now voluntary, but a release must be signed.

Finally, one International Fellow stated that the biggest medical problem in his country, for both civilians and the military, is malaria. Formerly effective anti-malaria prophylaxis is no longer effective, and no prophylaxis of any kind is now provided. Nevertheless, awareness of the malaria problem is growing in his country.

Dr. Pauletta Otis, Faculty Member, Joint Military Intelligence College

THREATS TO THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT: INTERNATIONAL PIRACY AND TERRORISM

Dr. Peter Chalk
RAND Corporation

Dr. Chalk provided an overview of international maritime piracy and international maritime terrorism:



CHANGING NATURE OF SECURITY IN POST-COLD WAR ERA

Security in post-Cold War era characterized by

- Internal threats with transnational manifestations
- Challenges that:
  - Often lack clearly identified sovereign sources
  - Stem from non-state actors and non-governmental processes
  - Bear on the globalism inherent in contemporary int'l politics
  - Often "feed off" one another

New security challenges have particular emphasis to maritime environment:

- By its very nature, an amorphous and opaque environment
- Important conduit for global activity
- Typified by vast areas of "unpoliced" waters
- Restricted operational space on land
  - Reflects territorially-based global and regional security arrangements (esp. post 9/11)

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Piracy: Scope and Dimensions

Three main types of piracy in global waters

- Harbor/anchorage attacks
- Attacks against vessels on high seas/territorial waters
- Hijackings of commercial vessels on high seas (phantom ship phenomena)

Incidence of piracy has shown a marked increase since end of Cold War

- 2375 actual and attempted attacks between 1991-2001
  - Equates to an average of 215 attacks/year
- S.E. Asia most pirate-prone region of the world
  - 1567 actual and attempted attacks between 1991 and 2001 (66% of global total)

Figures do not reflect true dimensions of problem

- As most attacks go unreported

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Piracy: Factors Influencing Growth of Piracy

Several factors account for increased incidence of piracy

- Increase in global commercial maritime traffic
  - 90-95% of world freight moves by sea
  - Provides a ready supply of potential targets
- Lax port security at many regional ports
  - Increases vulnerability of ships at anchor
  - Especially apparent at ports in Asia and South America
- Growing trend toward use of "skeleton crews"
  - Increases ease of boarding and gaining control of vessels
- Fall out of Asian financial crisis
  - Has reduced resources for mounting coastal surveillance
    - Post 9/11 limited security resources increasingly directed to counter-terrorism missions
  - And increased incentives for engaging in maritime crime

Piracy: Dangers

Dangers of piracy cover a number of dimensions

- Constitutes a direct threat to the lives and welfare of the citizens of a variety of flag states.
  - Can also cause considerable mental trauma
- Has a direct economic impact in terms of fraud, stolen cargoes and delayed trips
  - Could also potentially undermine a maritime state's trading ability
- Can play a pivotal role in undermining and weakening political stability by encouraging official and governmental corruption
- Has the potential to cause a major environmental disaster
  - Nightmare scenario: oil spill in narrow sea-lane

Piracy: Phantom Ship Attacks

Constitute the high-end of pirate attacks

- Most ships fraudulently registered under Panamanian, Liberian, Belize, St. Vincent or Honduran flags
- Vessels typically undergo numerous changes of name
- Most syndicates are Chinese or of Chinese origin
  - Typically belong to Cantonese, Shanghai or Fuken groups
- Rely on intelligence from brokers and operators in a variety of countries
  - Provide up-to-date data on cargoes, ships, routes and buyers
  - Also ensures that syndicates are kept abreast of government/industry counter-measures
- Syndicates may conservatively earn as much as US$50 million a year from the practice

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Maritime Terrorism: One of the Rarest Forms of Terrorism

Terrorist attacks against maritime targets very rare

- Constitute only 2% of all international incidents over last 30 years

Several reasons account for low incident rate

- Most terrorists are "land-lubbers" with little experience of the maritime environment
- Attacking a vessel on the high seas less likely to attract int'l attention than more media-accessible land targets
- Operating at sea requires specialist equipment and skills
- Profusion of fixed land targets that offer higher visibility and greater ease of access
- Terrorists traditionally tactically conservative:
  - Adhere to tried and trusted methods
  - Tend to opt for the course of least resistance

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Terrorism: Past Examples

Few terrorists have developed a maritime capability, much less a maritime terrorist capability.

- **There have been some notable exceptions, however:**
  - **PIRA**
  - **Polisario**
  - **ASG**
  - **Palestinian groups**
  - **The Contras**
  - **Anti-Castro organizations**
  - **al-Qaeda**
  - **The LTTE**
- **There have also been a few high profile maritime attacks**
  - **The hijacking of a Greek freighter in Karachi in 1974**
  - **The seizure of the *Achille Lauro* in 1985**
  - **The bombing of a Philippine ferry in February 2000 (45 killed)**
  - **The suicide attack against the *USS Cole* in October 2000 (19 killed)**

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Terrorism Factors Increasing Perceived Threat

Perceived threat of maritime terrorism has increased in recent years

- **General factors that have relevance to maritime piracy**
  - **Lax port security, poor coastal surveillance, profusion of targets, trend toward "skeleton crews"**
- **Alternative venue for mass casualty attacks, targeting:**
  - **LNG carriers/terminals, refineries, petrochemical installations**
  - **Cruise ships and passenger liners**
- **Terrorists showing increased tactical sophistication**
  - **Exemplified by 9/11 attacks in the US**
- **Precedent of of *USS Cole* bombing**
  - **Generated enormous political capital**
  - **Underscored vulnerability of vessels at port**
- **Increased terrorist resource constraints in an era of reduced state sponsorship**
- **Growing dependence of global trade on maritime chokepoints**

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Terrorism: The LTTE Example

Frequent use of maritime attacks

- Over 40 sea-borne suicide attacks since July 1990
- Main aim: disrupt mobility of Sri Lankan Navy in northeast

Maritime capability vested in the Sea Tigers

- Roughly 3000 trained personnel, divided into 12 operational departments
- Between 100-200 surface and underwater, including:
  - Attack vessels
  - Logistics vessels
  - Fast personnel carriers
  - Suicide craft
  - Multi-purpose craft
- Has employed a range of innovative maritime technologies
  - Suicide stealth craft
  - Mini submarines for de-bussing suicide divers inside harbors
  - One-man suicide torpedoes

THREATS TO US VESSELS/ASSETS

Main pirate threat exists in Southeast Asia

- Particularly the waters around Indonesia

Main terrorist threat exists in the Persian Gulf and Malacca Straits

- Contiguous to known areas of extreme anti-US sentiment
- Threat in the Gulf likely to increase in the event of war with Iraq

Certain US ports also vulnerable to LNG terminal attacks

Ships most vulnerable when at port or awaiting transit at busy maritime choke points

Main vessels of concern:

- Cargo carriers
- LNG carriers
- Cruise ships

DISCUSSION AMONG INTERNATIONAL FELLOWS AFTER THE BRIEFING

An International Fellow noted that using the terms "phantom ships," "hijacking," and "piracy" interchangeably is not very helpful. He made the case that hijacking does not always result in a "phantom ship" and a "phantom ship" is not always the direct consequence of a hijacking. They are two different issues. He also noted that a "phantom ship" is a ship whose true identity is not known–they have false crews, false papers, and false registration numbers painted on the hull. The "phantom ship" goes through a quasi-legitimate process in order to gain a new identity. Information sharing is really the only way to solve many problems dealing with jurisdiction. Most flag countries have little interest in pursuing the issue of piracy, so information sharing becomes the basis for addressing the problem. The International Maritime Bureau would be more effective in dealing with the issue of piracy if countries provided them with more information.

Another International Fellow agreed that the issue of definitions complicates dealing with the actual problem. For example, do countries define a "phantom ship" and piracy the same way throughout the region? Definitions could impact whether or not the responsible criminals are prosecuted. A U.S. Fellow noted that his country's intelligence community considers an incident to be piracy only if it is committed in international waters. If it is in national waters, up to 12 miles from the coast, it is merely maritime crime. The U.S. Navy has serious issues when it comes to dealing with anything in international waters. U.S. intelligence considers a ship to be a "phantom ship" when the ship is taken from its owners and crew, re-flagged, and operated in the same general area where it was re-flagged. It will not necessarily be re-flagged and then sent on transportation missions around the world. The other International Fellow remarked that the re-flagging is not necessarily the only crime. It is compounded by what the ship does afterward. For example, since ships are insured, cargo is often "lost" due to some casualty or piracy and the shipping company collects the insurance. Furthermore, once the re-flagged ship is two or three flags away from the original flag, it is hard to tell where the ship actually started out or to whom it belonged.

Dr. Chalk agreed, and added that the sad fact is that nobody really pays any attention to this issue, and will not until there is an environmental catastrophe. One International Fellow noted that piracy accounts for approximately one billion dollars per year in economic losses, but only between 10-34 deaths annually. He observed that the personnel loss is relatively small compared to that related to other maritime crime. Dr. Chalk agreed on that point, and stated that the human element is indeed small. Increased efforts to counteract these types of crimes in

the future will likely result from an increased economic and environmental focus, and not from consideration of the human element involved.

An International Fellow noted that extortion by syndicates or independent groups is also an interesting topic. Dr. Chalk added that you must play the game and pay or be hijacked in many parts of the world. An International Fellow remarked that this situation occurs routinely in his country. Dr. Chalk mentioned that extortion also occurs routinely near Djibouti and Somalia.

Air Commodore R. J. Newlands
Air and Defense Attaché, New Zealand

The Defense, Air and Naval Attaché from New Zealand addressed the International Fellows on his country's perspective toward maritime piracy. The Air Commodore noted that New Zealand has increased the surveillance of waters near the country. He stated that there is less interest in piracy than with other issues of a transnational nature. Drug running and the movement of people, mostly refugees, are the biggest issues. Piracy is certainly a regional concern, but is not the chief concern for New Zealand. The maritime area around New Zealand is obviously very large, so there is a great deal of interest in the South Pacific. P-3 aircraft patrol these maritime areas regularly, with an aircraft deployed to the South Pacific approximately one week per month. Increasingly, non-military tasks, including drug and people movement interdiction, drive our force development in terms of the maritime surveillance capabilities of our P-3s, frigates, and the Navy inventory in general. The movement of drugs through the South Pacific is a significant problem, and there have been some notable successes by Australia and New Zealand, in concert with others, in interdicting these activities. The "boat people" problem demands constant intelligence, especially since Australia has tightened its borders to this problem. We are now more attuned to the threat of those people coming to New Zealand.

An International Fellow noted than in late 2000, the largest drug seizure in the history of the South Pacific occurred with the confiscation of 300 kilograms of heroin in Fiji. The Canadians, Australians, Americans, and Fiji participated in the seizure. This issue, unfortunately, comes into focus, moves back out of focus, then back into focus again. The Fellow then asked the Air Commodore if he could discuss the Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and Latin American connections and drug traffic transiting back and forth?

Air Commodore Newlands agreed that linkages are important. He stated that the U.S. has increased surveillance of those routes from Latin America to the United States. This has caused the drug traffickers to look for alternate routes. New Zealand is now looking more at pleasure yachts along the island chains.

An International Intelligence Fellow asked how human smuggling is being accomplished. Air Commodore Newlands noted that most of the refugees coming into the area are from Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. They often travel through Indonesia to arrive in New Zealand's area of interest. There are small groups who arrange the refugee's travel for money. These people are New Zealand's primary concern. No vessels have come to New Zealand yet, but it remains a concern. The reason we have not seen any vessels may well be the rough seas around our country. The refugee boats are not very sea-worthy so they tend to stay in the calmer waters near the north of Australia.

An International Fellow noted that "phantom ships" can be used in these human transportation operations very easily. Is this a serious problem and is there any process in place so we can track them? Dr. Chalk stated that there are currently two initiatives from the International Maritime Bureau to increase transparency. The first is to require a permanent registration number to be embossed on all vessels and put into a main database. The second is to encourage the use of commercial-carrier satellite tracking systems. The problem with these systems is that they are expensive. The tracking systems are commercially available and a good example is the SHIPLOCK system that can be covertly installed on a ship. Additionally, when registration numbers continually change, it makes it increasingly difficult to track vessels. This system would only apply to new vessels since all old vessels already have registration numbers. Tracking is really an enormous issue. But an even bigger issue is the containers and the ability to track them. There are many points in the shipment process where the containers can be compromised, for example during loading, transshipment, or during unloading.

An International Fellow noted that some countries are cooperating with the United States by allowing U.S. inspectors to inspect containers that are going straight from the particular country to the U.S. with no intermediate stops. These countries have divided their facilities and have double security from any landward infiltration into the secured area. Unfortunately, there is little or no security from the seaward infiltration. The major problem is to be cognizant of the containers and shipping without slowing international commerce. There are new initiatives, like the backscatter radar that provides visibility through containers, but they are few and expensive. The world is so integrated because of globalization that progress cannot be delayed or everybody will be affected. At present, fewer than two percent of all containers entering the U.S. are ever inspected.

An International Fellow brought up the International Maritime Bureau's (IMB's) opposition to arming crews to counter piracy. Were there any other passive defensive measures being pursued to help with the issue of piracy or of unauthorized people boarding ships? Dr. Chalk noted that the IMB publishes guidelines to help prevent piracy, such as keeping a vessel well lit and preparing

fire hoses to repel boarders. Vessels should also try to establish communications with their shipping company and with any other vessels that get too close to them in order to ascertain their intentions. They should also try to keep communications open with law enforcement officials in the area they are traversing. Their efforts to repel boarders should remain passive, because if they are not successful in repelling the boarders, it is more likely the boarders will do serious harm. There is no need for armed escorts, although there is talk about having armed people on board through the Strait of Malacca. There are difficulties with this issue on the high seas and in international waters.

An International Fellow remarked that ships can also over-pressurize or create slight vacuums to make doors very difficult to open. These actions may not deter maritime piracy by organized crime, but they may deter the "part-time pirates." Unfortunately, the professional thieves know exactly which containers they want to rob and precisely where they are located. There is definitely corruption involved when the criminals know which specific container to target. Additionally, there is a company that sells electrified fences for yachts. These are a few of the passive measures available, but they are not very effective.

Dr. Chalk noted that the best thing the commercial carriers can do is just be prudent and know the dangers of the waters in which they are sailing. There are certain areas known to have a high incidence of trouble, and warnings are issued. For example, if a ship transits near certain areas in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa, in all likelihood, the vessel will be boarded. Some carriers have begun to hire ex-military personnel, especially from Russia, to ride their ships and repel boarders. This is expensive and most ship owners will not pay for this service. In territorial waters, there are rapid intervention teams, coast guard response mechanisms, and law enforcement to deter piracy.

An International Fellow noted that countries just need to get together with each other and their respective coast guards to talk about the issues and find out what works best.

An International Fellow (not Japanese) noted that the Japanese are doing a tremendous job in countering piracy. The International Fellow noted that the Japanese have worked for the past two and a half years to form a multilateral coalition focused on anti-piracy efforts in the Strait of Malacca. The Japanese have gathered information on piracy incidents, conducted analysis, and shared the information with many other nations in the region. The Japanese use their Maritime Safety Agency (coast guard equivalent) and naval air assets to conduct surveillance. Although the Japanese do not have jurisdiction in most cases, presence, surveillance, and cooperation are enough to deter potential piracy. Another International Fellow noted that Japan was playing a major role in the safety of navigation of the Malacca Strait. Unfortunately, the Chinese and South Koreans

are not interested in getting involved and are not providing support even though they are affected, according to an International Fellow. It was noted that maritime safety is essential for Japanese survival. A Japanese ship recently disappeared from the Malacca Strait and was later discovered by the Indian Navy. The cargo was already gone and the name of the ship had been changed. The International Fellow used this example to underscore the need for additional cooperation.

An International Fellow agreed with the initiative to emboss registration numbers on the hull of ships, as mentioned by Dr. Chalk. The Fellow agreed that this was a good method to defeat piracy in the long term. However, another International Fellow reiterated that if the market persists whereby non-embossed ships are allowed to enter ports and off-load cargo, then the initiative will be undermined. An International Fellow wondered whether insurance companies have sufficient incentive to pursue initiatives like embossing registration numbers. Another Fellow opined that insurance companies are probably indifferent since the majority of piracy incidents are not reported for fear of insurance premiums being raised. The Fellow stated that it was probably cheaper for a shipping company to absorb the losses due to minor piracy rather than pay increased insurance premiums.

Colonel Abu Hashim
Military and Defense Attaché, Malaysia

Colonel Abu Hashim provided his perspective of maritime piracy. He noted that the Malacca Strait is a very narrow and busy waterway. Malaysia is taking serious issue with piracy that occurs there. They have established radar monitoring sites along the coastline to better monitor shipping within the strait. These radar sites are not yet fully operational. Maritime crime and robbery is a serious issue for Malaysia. Colonel Abu Hashim believes that there are no organized pirates in the Malacca Strait; instead, only “part-time” or “small-time” robbers operate there.

Terrorists are more of a concern to Malaysia. Especially to the east of Sabah, bordering the Philippines, there are most likely terrorists rather than pirates. The Abu Sayef Group is active in the area and kidnappings did occur, which affected the tourism industry in the area. The Malaysian government is serious about stopping this problem and has recently devoted an additional $200 million to support operations in this area. The money went to the Malaysian Armed Forces and Royal Malaysian Police, so that patrols can be carried out up the border. The initiative has led to increased air and sea surveillance, and to setting up of military and police posts on all the islands. The Navy is tasked with patrolling between three nautical miles from the coast up to the border. The Colonel believes that piracy and hostage-taking in the Strait of Malacca has been reduced as a result of

their concerted efforts. He does note, however, that organized crime has taken at least one ship from Singapore to China, but this incident was not considered piracy. Maritime terrorists should be our focus now since they can become a threat to any country.

PIRACY CENTER

An International Intelligence Fellow asked about the Piracy Center in Kuala Lumpur. He wanted to know if this Center was part of the International Maritime Bureau. Dr. Chalk replied that the Piracy Center was indeed part of the IMB; however, staffing is extremely limited, with only three people assigned to the Center, including an individual from Scotland Yard. The Piracy Center has a very limited budget, but Dr. Chalk believes they do a good job for being so small. Another International Fellow added that the Center's personnel must also act as policemen, doing paperwork, appearing in court, and traveling to all parts of the region.

An International Fellow asked the group if a database existed where suspect vessels were already listed. One of the Fellows replied in the affirmative, specifically for the issue of piracy. Dr. Chalk noted that there was a database on vessels at the Piracy Center. One International Fellow noted that the U.S. recently undertook an operation called WINTER NIGHT that built profiles on all suspect containers. It was an attempt to bring information from all field offices into one cell, within a center established in El Paso, Texas. The idea was to tag all containers. The Fellow was not aware whether this operation is ongoing, but asked the other Fellows if their countries have engaged in similar activities.

One International Fellow noted that outside of the intelligence field, the Ministries of Transport of many Southeast Asian countries are cooperating and sharing information in a program called Port State Control. The program's intent is to inspect crews, and the ship's overall ability to engage in commerce. For example, if a ship pulls into port, a safety inspection of fire fighting and navigation equipment might be conducted. The inspections are fairly effective at rooting out fraudulent shipping and false crews. If a ship does well, it is cleared for other ports in the region for a period of approximately one year. If the ship is not cleared, the ship must go through several more inspections each time the vessel arrives in a new port. The participating countries share information and establish a "black list" of suspect ships and a "white list" of cleared ships. According to the Fellow, it is a great program but only used among cooperating countries. The Fellow added that the program can be a very effective mechanism for checking phantom ships.

The discussion moderator, Dr. Mark Weisenbloom, Faculty Member, Joint Military Intelligence College, asked: Since crime syndicates are becoming more involved, is there any consolidated information anywhere on this issue? Dr. Chalk

replied that the occurrence of hijacking is increasing. As far as terrorism is concerned, there are too many gaps in the container industry to even address the problem. In Amsterdam, for instance, ships are not even inspected until they have been in the port for 24 hours. Since there are no standardized seals being used, break-ins are virtually impossible to detect. Furthermore, there are no inspections for land transport of containers to ships. How can all these things be inspected without slowing down progress? An International Fellow agreed, and remarked that container security initiatives rely on the shippers, who are sometimes terrorists, to tell the truth about what is inside the container.

Another International Fellow added that people being smuggled by containers is also becoming a big issue. The Fellow cited an incident of a terrorist using a container to travel. According to the Fellow, the terrorist had his own power generator, Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) receiver, food, and water all inside the container with him.

An International Fellow made the comment that surely there is some sort of x-ray device or other technology to detect explosives in containers. The Fellow remarked that the ability to mass-scan everything coming into a port is required because it takes too much time to open all containers for inspection. Another International Fellow remarked that there are some types of scanners but they are very expensive. Still another Fellow added that most scanners look for vapors that a sealed container may not produce. Back Scanner Radars could be used to look for people but that takes time. Other scanners are too expensive and not available everywhere.

Air Commodore Newlands noted that from the intelligence perspective, low-level, small-scale piracy is difficult to counter, especially when it occurs in the national waters of another country. Larger-scale operations where cargo is taken are a bit easier to manage and some information can be gathered.

Mr. Romero (Philippines), Maj Gen Lee (Taiwan), and Brig Gen Simanjuntak (Indonesia) demonstrating intelligence cooperation

EXPANDING THE DEBATE: SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

During the next seminar discussion, the Fellows were asked to contemplate the changes that had occurred in Asia as a result of the events of 9/11. An International Fellow stated that the Cold War era was defined by bipolarity and a policy of containment (of the Soviet Union). After the breakup of the Soviet Union, a multi-polar security environment emerged, which has provided little incentive for cooperation. Today, the global war on terrorism defines the region's priorities and is bringing countries closer together.

Another Fellow stated that there now appears to be a greater sense of urgency on the part of the United States with respect to information sharing. Information sharing is good, but there is no *proactive* system yet to address terrorism in a comprehensive manner. The challenge is huge, but the response thus far has primarily been at the tactical level. The Fellow suggested moving forward by responding to the root causes of terrorism.

DEFINING TERRORISM

The same Fellow asserted that countries have not collectively arrived at a basic definition of terrorism. Other Fellows agreed, emphasizing the fact that states must define terrorism collectively before countries can respond and assist each other. Definitions become critical since one nations' terrorist can easily be construed as another nation's separatist. For example, a certain country may not view local "troublemakers" as terrorists, and instead view the group as an internal problem. At the same time, the international community may categorize the group as terrorists and view the country as harboring terrorists. Legal considerations also come into play and again emphasize the need for a clear taxonomy, since extradition proceedings and requirements involve international law. The problem is that there is no universal definition of terrorism and as a result, intelligence cooperation is impeded.

FACILITATING COMMUNICATION

An International Fellow noted that although intelligence relationships in Asia may be viewed as bilateral, the relationships are expanding. Formal intelligence exchanges exist bilaterally, but several countries in Asia are now asking questions of all of their allies, one-on-one or in groups, and are trying to work together. All agreed that the status of Taiwan poses a dilemma for countries in Asia wishing to exchange intelligence, as any interaction is constrained by diplomatic consider-

ations. Another Fellow noted that participants are more likely to share information with each other directly as a result of participating in the International Fellows Program. However, in order to influence institutional sharing–among individuals unknown to each other, yet working in corresponding areas of mutual interest–the proper means of communicating from one country to another must be established. Even if any of the program participants wished to exchange intelligence with each other, few have the technological capability to do so.

Another Fellow emphasized that governments must listen to other governments more closely. The U.S. should support legitimate governments and confront entities that challenge the legitimacy of those governments. During the Cold War, the U.S. was viewed as using other nations as pawns. However, in the Global War Against Terrorism, countries at large are viewed on a more equitable basis, with a corresponding recognition of experts in any given region's problems. For example, Asian partners can provide a deeper understanding of issues than what U.S. technical intelligence alone can provide.

INSTITUTIONAL HINDRANCES

One International Fellow noted that territorial disputes between nations in the region limit cooperation, and other Fellows agreed. The Fellow suggested that Coast Guard-like agencies can be used to bridge gaps. Another source of institutional hindrance comes when an individual moves from one government agency to another, and severs all ties with the former agency because of concerns over loyalty. Although this situation does not occur uniformly in Asia, this Fellow reported that he was speaking from personal experience.

ANALYTICAL ISSUES

One of the problems often cited in post-September 11 retrospective reports is the evident lack of analysis of intelligence that was already in hand: Most of the clues leading up to the planes' crashing into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were present, but were not recognized, perhaps due to the non-state entities involved. One of the Fellows remarked that part of the analysis paradigm is that analysts cannot work a problem without categorizing or assigning labels and names. This Fellow cited members of the Moro Independence Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines as an example. He stated that MILF members often change affiliations and names and no longer identify themselves as members of the MILF despite other states maintaining the same label. The Fellow advocated that looking at names and labels is harmful to analysis and instead, a closer look at individuals should be undertaken.

Economic analysis is of great importance, according to the International Fellows. All agreed that it is important to follow the "money trail." One Fellow noted that terrorism and criminal enterprises are often interrelated–the actions of non-state actors being mutually reinforcing to somewhat compatible, yet divergent goals. Terrorist groups in one country may be actively involved in illicit arms smuggling or even legitimate arms trading to finance terror operations. Likewise, a drug cartel may use terrorism to instill fear in the local population and to ensure the unimpeded and secure flow of narcotics money. The Fellow noted that there may be connections or "marriages of convenience" that have yet to be identified and exploited.

Another International Fellow asked about the future of intelligence in transnational crime. The Fellow admits that there is some overlap between criminal syndicates and terror groups, but more often than not, the only ideology a crime group possesses is fealty to money–there is not necessarily a connection with terrorism. Thus, the question becomes, Can intelligence support law enforcement if the criminal enterprise does not fall under the umbrella of terrorism?

One International Fellow indicated that the U.S. should not look for bilateral solutions for law enforcement and intelligence coordination problems. Instead, a multilateral and common approach would be more appropriate, especially given the numerous territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific region. Another Fellow countered that if the U.S. does desire to move toward multilateral agreements, it must find common ground and begin with bilateral agreements. These agreements could redefine financial, extradition, and drug control issues.

Another Fellow warned of "gray areas" into which terrorists and criminals may fall. One example cited was a geographical "gray area" where a territorial dispute exists. Because of the sensitivities involved, neither of the disputing parties patrols the area and as a result, maritime pirates roam freely to wreak havoc on unsuspected merchants. Another example was of an organizational "gray area" where agency turf battles result in an issue being entangled in bureaucratic infighting.

The discussion moderator noted that many countries assume that the U.S. Intelligence Community has visibility into all aspects of an intelligence situation, yet in reality the real expertise lies within the states represented by participants in this International Intelligence Fellows Program. One International Fellow noted that his government has good relations with most countries participating in the program, but his country would like to expand intelligence relations with other countries. He was grateful to the Joint Military Intelligence College and the Defense Intelligence Agency for this opportunity to begin cross-dialogue with various representatives, and implored other Fellows to maintain contact with one another. This International Fellow referred to difficul-

ties in communicating information when no formal channels for intelligence exchange exists, and hoped that the International Fellows Program would lead to an expansion of formal relationships.

Mr. Jessie Romero (Philippines) addressing the International Fellows and JMIC students

COOPERATION IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM: REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES

PHILIPPINE PERSPECTIVE

Mr. Jessie Romero, Philippine National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), provided a briefing on "Al-Qa'ida, Jemaah Islamiyah and Terrorism in the Philippines and Southeast Asia" to a session of the College-wide Distinguished Speaker Program. Following the formal remarks, Mr. Romero entertained questions from the Joint Military Intelligence College student body and faculty. The following questions and answers are from this session.

Question: What progress has been achieved by the Philippines and regional intelligence organizations to unravel terrorist networks?
Answer: The Philippines have worked with a host of entities to paint the regional picture; we have used active and dynamic intelligence exchanges and put aside barriers; regional intelligence contacts are but a phone call away.

Question: How would you characterize the intelligence relationship between Malaysia and the Philippines?
Answer: A lot of informal exchanges of information and intelligence take place. I am not aware of any formal relationship yet. But Malaysia has been

very helpful and extends great help in many areas of bilateral peace and security initiatives.

Question: How has disruption of Al-Qa'ida's efforts in Afghanistan affected terrorist activity in Asia?
Answer: It has increased greatly because Al-Qa'ida is relying on terrorist organizations unique to the region to carry out terrorist activity in the name of radical Islam. They are providing training, financial, and other support.

Question: Could you expand on Jemaah Islamiyah and MILF, working out of Myanmar?
Answer: There is no evidence pointing to cooperation between these groups undertaking terrorist operations in Myanmar. A Myanmar jihadist group is, however, believed to be involved in sending letter bombs to its diplomatic missions, such as those in Japan and the Philippines.

Question: What is the role of the Philippine military in the internal fight against terrorism?
Answer: The military is in the forefront of our fight against terrorism, jointly of course with the Agency (NICA) and the Philippines National Police plus the Justice Department. We work as a team under the banner of the Counter-Intelligence Terrorism Organization Center (now called the Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Center), which orchestrates intelligence and law-enforcement operations against terrorism groups, and collects and fuses information from member agencies.

Question: What is the relationship between Muslim terrorist organizations and the Communist Party of the Philippines/the New People's Army (CPP/NPA).
Answer: they coexist and in some instances collaborate. There is reliable information that MILF and the CPP/NPA are cooperating in areas like knowledge sharing/training in urban operations, and in other areas.

Question: Who are the arms providers for the region?
Answer: Generally, the NPA procure their armaments from local sources such as ambushes, "agaw armas"/forcible firearms grabbing, from legitimate firearms holders — unsuspecting policemen/soldiers–and in the black market, from firearms smugglers. The CPP/NPA has also attempted to procure firearms from foreign fraternal groups like the Communist Parties of China and North Korea. Like the CPP/NPA, the MILF is getting arms from local sources, but also from arms smugglers from Thailand and Vietnam and other countries, and it is funded mostly by sympathetic benefactors from Islamic countries in the Middle East and Asia.

Question: What are the key environmental factors in recruitment in the region and what is the Philippine Government's counter-plan?
Answer: The problem is socio-economic, where men cannot adequately provide for their families; part of the problem is that the men are attracted by

arms and adventure. However, the bottom line is that there are a variety of reasons; recruits are mostly reared on strict Islamic faith in *madrassas* [schools]. The Philippine Government addresses the problem by giving special attention to certain geographical areas and by opening avenues for assimilation. A big problem is providing the opportunity to earn income. However, the bigger problem is with disarmament, because weapons are a symbol of manhood in the region — "take my wife, but not my firearms."

Question: What is the predominant motivation for Al-Qa'ida cooperation with regional terrorists; what is the predominant motivation of regional terrorists?
Answer: The terrorists view the U.S. in the same light as other Muslim terrorist groups do — Americans are oppressors who obstruct Islam and its global influence. This is a matter of the so-called "clash of civilizations." During several tactical interrogations, these sentiments were echoed by all. The Philippine government is using scholars and academia in general to understand the roots of radical Islam to better handle the terrorist problem in Asia. Remember that radical groups are a small minority, but their size is increasing.

Question: What is the relationship between the Jemaah Islamiyah and Muslim/Christian massacres in Southeast Asia during the past decade?
Answer: [Answered by the Indonesian Fellow] — Indonesia is 80 percent Muslim and 10 percent Christian (in the East). Wealthy and influential Islamic migrants moving to the East created resentment from the Christian majority.

Question: What impact do moderate Islamists have on the more radical elements?
Answer: Moderates try to persuade radical elements to more moderate stances; prompted by fear of government reprisal. Some moderates have helped pinpoint radical activity, allowing governments to neutralize many of the threats. The flip side is that openly radical organizations (NGOs) continue to incite trouble.

Question: Do you think the Abu Sayef Group (ASG) will be neutralized this year?
Answer: ASG is a clan organization. To neutralize the ASG, the entire clan would have to be neutralized. The support base for the ASG is larger than the 250 or so active members. The ASG branches out, based on clan structure; each ASG leader is an "emir" in his own right. The best approach is 1) education–children being raised entirely in *Madrassas*; they need to be taught a higher level of awareness, and 2) economic support–insurgents are prompted by an inability to support families (some have 4 wives and 15-18 children); fishing and agriculture are not enough to support their basic needs. There is not a single resolution–a solution requires a comprehensive approach.

President Clift presents Mr. Romero with a Certificate of Appreciation for his participation in the JMIC Distinguished Speaker Program

INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE

The Indonesian International Intelligence Fellow, Brigadier General (select) Yan Simanjuntak, Indonesian Air Force, and the Indonesian Defense and Military Attaché, Brigadier General Hendrawan Ostevan, Indonesian Army, addressed the International Fellows on the terrorism situation in their country. Gen Ostevan started the briefing by noting that the Bali bombing has changed the way Indonesia views terrorism, resulting in increased protectiveness and defensiveness with regard to national interests. Security threats are now more pressing than military threats, noting that such things as environmental, political, and economic threats constitute the broader considerations of security. He added that Indonesians are very anxious about the state of the world, specifying that issues such as Iraq, North Korea, democratic reform, and environmental concerns are of primary concern. The General also mentioned that although progress has been made in Aceh, problems still exist. Specifically, he noted that many Aceh separatists are not abiding by agreements which were previously signed with the Indonesian government.

Gen Ostevan continued by noting that the terror threat is clear to Indonesia, and progress has been made in the Bali investigation as evidenced by 31 recent arrests. However, questions remain, including details of who, what, where, and

how, and especially aspects related to the technology of terrorist operations. The connection between Jemaah Islamiyah and Al-Qa'ida is especially interesting to Indonesia. He noted that cooperation between countries is essential and that the terrorism threat has resulted in a new security culture that emphasizes proactive alliances with others. Gen Ostevan stated that although the world is seeing success in the global war against terrorism, important "headway" does not equate to "winning." He emphasized that there is still not enough information on terrorists, including their history, and many are still at large. The General also noted with concern the growing sophistication of the terrorists. He emphasized to the Fellows that despite recent successes, now is not the time for self-congratulations.

Gen Ostevan noted that the war in Iraq will have significant ramifications on Islam worldwide. Two risk factors regarding militant Islam were identified. First, with nearly 200 million Muslims in Indonesia, if militancy was adopted by only 1 percent (2 million), it could create significant problems for his country. Second, militant attacks are fracturing ethnically integrated communities of Christians and Muslims. The results are decreased social stability and less enthusiasm from foreign investors. Gen Ostevan emphasized the importance of neutralizing militant Islam to maintain a tolerant democracy. Failure to do so could result in democratic decay.

Gen Ostevan stated that there was great concern about the situation in Iraq, and that settling the Arab-Israeli dispute and rebuilding Iraq should be the top priorities after regime change in Iraq. His final point was that the Indonesian Defense Forces (IDF), numbering 300,000, are stretched very thin among the various deployments and commitments. The IDF and the police force, he maintained, must be kept strong to ensure democratic stability. Both organizations are in the process of reform and professionalization.

General-Select Simnajuntak, the International Intelligence Fellow representing Indonesia, continued the presentation by summarizing the current terrorist groups that are believed to be operating within Indonesia. He began by giving a short political history of Indonesia. He noted that there are three main political persuasions in Indonesian history: Nationalist, Islamic, and Communist. President Sukarno began as a Nationalist, but later leaned toward communism. President Soeharto came to power and formed a strong Nationalist government. He was followed by President Habibie, who favored an Islamic government. President Wahid, who favored nationalism but did not reject communism, then served a short term followed by the current president, Megawati, who has returned to Nationalism. The Indonesian government does not support terrorists of any kind, but Gen Simanjuntak admits that there are some individual Indonesians who do sympathize with terrorists.

During his briefing, Gen Simanjuntak noted that the main radical/militant groups in Indonesia that can be influenced by the terrorists are:

- Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) (3,000 members in Jakarta and Java)
- Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) (2,000-5,000 members in Jakarta)
- Hizbullah Front (200-1,000 members in Jakarta and West Java)
- Laskar Jihad Ahlussunah Waljamaah (10,000 members)
- Taliban Brigade (600 members)
- Mujahidin (1,000 members in Jakarta, but also has 2,000-5,000 sympathizers in other areas)
- Hammas (no links to the Mideast Hamas)
- Laskar Jundullah
- Ikwanhul Muslimin Indonesia
- Jemaah Islamiyah. Gen Simanjuntak stated that there is a link between Al-Qa'ida and the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiyah.

The General mentioned several militant leaders including Abubakar Ba-asyir, Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali), Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, Mohammed Zainuri, and Parlindungar Siregar. He finished by presenting the information regarding probable links between Jemaah Islamiyah and Al-Qa'ida.

PANEL DISCUSSION

A panel discussion was conducted in the wake of the Indonesian briefings. The question and answer session is summarized below:

Question: How well does your government share intelligence with law enforcement?
Answer: The Indonesian officers remarked that the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) facilitates intelligence exchange, and there is good cooperation, including weekly inter-departmental meetings.

Question: An International Fellow asked how Indonesia addresses the problem of sharing classified information with law enforcement, considering the legal constraints and "discovery" limitations that tend to limit potential use of information as evidence.
Answer: A U.S. Fellow noted that this is a common problem, both in the U.S. and abroad, where the interests of law enforcement and the intelligence community conflict with the human rights orientation of the State Department (as, for example, in Singapore). Another Fellow noted that the Defense Intelligence Agency maintains liaisons with many different agencies and also has representation on the numerous homeland security task forces. An additional Fellow remarked that his country has strong inter-agency cooperation, coordination, and planning. One weakness he highlighted was the means and ability for agencies to communicate electronically with one another.

Question: An International Fellow asked if Indonesia has a legal infrastructure for dealing with the security of sensitive information used against terrorism suspects. He also asked the other Fellows how their countries grapple with the inherent problems involved with providing sensitive intelligence to law enforcement agencies, and the potential use of that intelligence as evidence in prosecuting terrorists.
Answer: The Indonesian Fellow stated that his country had established the Intelligence Center for International Terrorism in 2002, which brings together all concerned agencies under one organization. Furthermore, Indonesia has established a special counter-terrorism court branch in the Department of Justice. Another International Fellow cited his country's efforts to improve liaison between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, both at the national and regional levels. However, the Fellow noted that physical communication paths remained a major obstacle to the flow of information. Another International Fellow mentioned how his country uses legal methods, including special courts with selected judges to oversee terrorist cases. This International Fellow also noted that his country has established anti-terror task forces, whereby intelligence and police forces work together to gather and share information. Another Fellow noted that his country labels some suspects as "enemy combatants," and thus avoids some of the legal due-process normally afforded suspects in the judicial system.

Question: An International Fellow asked the group how effective their mutual legal treaties and extradition processes are in the war on terrorism.
Answer: One Fellow noted that his country has not used extradition treaties to a great extent and many of the Fellows agreed. One Fellow noted that extradition was difficult for his country because of political sensitivities. He added that they have the ability to detain, but they cannot extradite. Another Fellow stated that his country has recently expanded the military's arrest capability.

Question: An International Fellow asked the others how their countries avoid the public perception that the war against terror is actually a war against Islam?
Answer: An International Fellow stated that the situation is different for each individual country. However, one important aspect should be avoiding using terms such as "Islam" or "Muslim" when dealing with terrorists. One of the U.S. Fellows stated that vocabulary is very important, especially since the U.S. does not understand Islam very well. For example, most Americans believe that *jihad* only means armed conflict while it can also mean a struggle within oneself.

Question: A U.S. Fellow asked about complications presented to host countries officials when they are working with U.S. military forces in their respec-

tive countries.

Answer: An International Fellow stated that working with the U.S. military is not a significant complicating factor, except for a small segment of fundamentalists. Another International Fellow noted that there is sometimes a lack of trust between U.S. units and the host country's government regarding the veracity of local leaders and their claims about helping Al-Qa'ida. Another International Fellow was asked about his country's experience working with U.S. Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency. He responded by saying many of his countrymen do not trust the U.S. because promises have not been kept. For example, the U.S. promised to build a certain road many years ago, but no progress was made until recently, even though money had already been allocated for the project.

Question: An International Fellow asked how we can better discuss the Islam-Terror linkage without using language that might be offensive to some.

Answer: One Fellow remarked that it is better to avoid using negative terms because of the risk of offending moderates.

The moderator ended the session by encouraging members to think about ways that vocabulary can act as an impediment to cooperation.

PREEMPTION IN IRAQ

An International Fellow asked about the danger of other countries using the U.S. preemptive action in Iraq as a model for their own preemptive attacks. The world looks to the U.S. for leadership and its preemptive actions in Iraq can be interpreted by some as permission to do the same. The International Fellow provided the hypothetical example of North Korea using Iraq as precedent for invading South Korea. If the North felt threatened to the point where survival of the regime becomes uncertain, a preemptive invasion of the South could be justified by citing national security concerns and regime survival.

A U.S. Fellow agreed that yes, the Iraqi invasion does open the door for other countries to do the same; however, he remarked that the U.S. is no longer in a position to be able to defend itself against attack from weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats, which can come from anywhere without warning. The U.S. Fellow added that terrorism is a different type of asymmetrical threat, and 9/11 revealed that consequences are too great to wait for a potential threat to become a reality before action is taken. He explained that there was no intelligence-based warning prior to the attack. He noted that the events of September 11th were terrible, but not the apocalyptic nightmare scenario that could have occurred. He believes that if a greater number of people had died on 9/11, the U.S. leadership may have taken different actions that the country has; calm leadership deterred an immediate over-reaction to the tragic events. The U.S. has demonstrated determined resolve and cannot wait for WMD to come to the United States before taking preventive action. The U.S. recognizes both the danger and the necessity of a preemptive policy.

An International Fellow, commenting on the hypothetical North Korean scenario, stated that North Korean nuclear development is of great concern to the U.S., but it appears that Russia and China are less concerned. The Fellow believes that the U.S. has a different perspective on terrorism than others have. Another International Fellow agreed and stated that perceptions are very important.

An International Fellow noted that when Osama bin Laden issues a fatwa or religious edict, he gives motivation and intent for attackers, but there is still uncertainty about the nature of impending attacks and the potential use of WMD. The Fellow believes another successful attack on the scale of 9/11 will likely have major economic impact on the U.S. and the world economy. Another International Fellow felt that the problem with the U.S. preemptive action is the bad logic connecting Al-Qa'ida and Iraq. He noted that Saudi Arabia and Yemen are the sources of the Al-Qa'ida movement and perhaps regime change in those countries should have been pursued rather than in Iraq.

COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

How grave is the terrorism threat to the population at large? One Fellow noted that the Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo's use of sarin gas in a Tokyo subway could have killed many more people if the delivery method had been more effective. Another International Fellow declared that many terrorist groups already possess ricin, but its delivery is too difficult for it to be an effective WMD. Still another International Fellow stated that it is easy to produce a nuclear weapon, but access to nuclear fissile material is not guaranteed. He added that terrorists are using different means to obtain the same results, like using airplanes as weapons of mass destruction. The Fellow added that it is important to understand how terrorists think. Another Fellow remarked that terrorists use indigenous capabilities, local sources, innovative methods, and a network of local operatives.

One of the International Fellows suggested a strategy of removing from easy availability some sources of inspiration for terrorists–such as the book *Unrestricted War* and other written material that are "how to" manuals for terrorists. The discussion moderator responded by saying censorship of ideas is impossible in a free society. The moderator added that today's evolving technology in computers and communications allows the rapid and pervasive spread of ideas almost instantaneously around the globe. An International Fellow asked for clarification about the comment on restricting access to materials deemed useful for terrorism. The Fellow who suggested the idea explained that efforts should be made to convince countries to keep their studies of terrorism and asymmetric methods in military channels and place more restrictions on the distribution and access to these materials.

An International Fellow offered his perspective gained through conversations with representatives of the Muslim community in his country, most notably religious leaders or Imams. The Fellow said that these Imams have suggested that a countermeasure to terrorist exploitation of Islam is to educate people on the positive aspects of the Koran and to provide more effective micromanagement of basic education. The Fellow stated that the problem is that Muslims in his country, at least the radicals, feel isolated and marginalized. The hopelessness of their situation motivates them to fight for recognition.

Another International Fellow noted the difficulty associated with the lack of a common definition of terrorist and terrorism. The Fellow asked how one may distinguish between a member, sympathizer, and a mere associate. The Fellow believes this distinction is the real challenge. Is a member a violator by association? The Fellow believes that the line has to be involvement with the conspiracy to commit violent acts of destruction and murder. Thus, it is permissible to be a sympathizer, but not a conspirator. The Fellow who related the conversation with

the Imams agreed, saying that one needs to recognize the differences among those who cross that defining line. Another Fellow added that an index of possible terrorists, their associates, and collaborative organizations must be established to determine who is a threat or potential threat.

An International Fellow responded that this type of initiative requires much better intelligence. The Fellow stated that phone calls and other means of communications must be monitored in order to establish what relationships exist among various terror suspects. Furthermore, laws must be robust enough to allow prosecution of these suspects. The Fellow reminded the group of one of the conclusions reached during the terrorism discussion: One man's terrorist is often another man's freedom fighter. He suggested efforts to study the root causes of terrorism must not be neglected, since this knowledge is vital in stopping the spread of terrorism and can help develop countermeasures.

An International Fellow (not from the U.S.) suggested that there is a need to understand that Iraq was a terrorist state, rather than trying to make a tenuous connection with Osama bin Laden and Al-Qa'ida. He noted that Iraq's leadership has used chemical weapons to terrorize its *own* people and attack other countries such as Iran and Kuwait. He argued that weapons of mass destruction are designed to deter war, and not to actually ever be *used* on people. He admitted that the timing of the Iraq war was not the best, diplomatically speaking. However, preemption was still necessary since Iraq had both the capability and intent to use WMD.

Another International Fellow noted that since 9/11, people are thinking differently about terrorism. The Fellow went on to note that the unfortunate reality is that people are generalizing about Muslims in an unfavorable light. He emphasized that labels imply certain things, and cited an example associated with Northern Ireland. The International Fellow said that when one thinks about the UK and the Irish terrorists, the Catholic religion is not denigrated in the bargain. Using the label "Muslim" or "Islamic" interchangeably with "terrorist" is a bad idea. People who are Muslim and are not terrorists feel unfairly marked or branded. This animosity causes problems and complicates the war on terrorism. The Fellow's final point was that the effect of this misnaming is and will be counter-productive.

The discussion moderator asked if the Fellows see the mislabeling of Muslims as terrorists as a continuing trend. One international Fellow reiterated the previous argument that the name of Islam is not being used in the proper context. The Fellow noted that moderate Muslims are the majority in his country, but they are now decreasing in number. The Fellow added that while none of his countrymen has been linked to terrorism against the U.S., they still are identified as terrorists under the Muslim label. He believes the mislabeling of an entire religion has antagonized the people and pushed them toward violence rather than away from it.

Another International Fellow unconditionally agreed stating, “It’s all in the name!” The Fellow implored others not to generalize and say “Muslim” or “Islamic” in association with “terrorist.” Sensitivity to the use of labels will encourage Muslims to support counter-terrorism initiatives. One of the U.S. Fellows agreed with the wisdom of avoiding generalizations. However, he noted that the current situation is somewhat problematic since the terrorists involved are identifying themselves as Muslim and Islamic, in contrast to the Irish terrorists who do not usually emphasize their religion in a similar fashion. The Fellow noted that Islam is still relatively distant to the U.S. people and therefore, the normal fear of the unknown is manifesting itself.

Another U.S. Fellow stated that President Bush made an effort to recognize the terrorists as a radical element of Islam, acknowledging publicly that Islam is a peaceful religion. However, he feels that the statements may have had the wrong impact. Even when statements are made with precise and deliberate language, the diplomatic consequences remain unclear. The Fellow continued, saying that now the perception is that the U.S. has a problem with Muslims and the Islamic religion. An International Fellow added that his country’s overall support for the U.S. initiatives in the war on terrorism remains weak precisely because of the misperceptions of Islam discussed by the U.S. Fellow.

An International Fellow from a predominantly Muslim country stated that radical Islam hides in the *madrassas* or schools of religion. The Fellow noted that his government is sensitive to the use of these schools as a breeding ground for fomenting radical thought. He continued by using the analogy of a dentist faced with a sore tooth. The Fellow compared the U.S. to a dentist who does not fully comprehend the sensitivities of the toothache. In his opinion, the dentist (U.S.) is trying to extract the entire tooth without precision rather than trying to preserve the tooth and repair the cavity. The Fellow continued the analogy, stating that if one touches religion (sore tooth) without the necessary and proper precursors, the outcome will only result in more pain. The International Fellow contends that any attempts to address the problems related to religion without finesse and skill will result in backward progress in the war against terrorism. Another Fellow added that understanding the root causes of the problem is necessary and the key to any solution.

The discussion moderator observed that over the two weeks of the curriculum, the International Fellows have consistently proposed an agenda of studying the phenomenon of terrorism by understanding root causes and accepting the ambiguities that impact analysis. Additionally, the moderator observed that the Fellows unanimously endorse the sharing of data among local and international bodies. The moderator then noted that the original, root causes of terrorism are often local, rather than international in origin. He added that the U.S. needs the help of

allies to understand why terrorist groups are initially established. The U.S. does not have the same capabilities and expertise that regional countries possess, and sharing information is essential. An International Fellow added that the West can only be partly successful. Help from the Muslim countries is a necessity.

The moderator noted that the history of terrorism shows it will not be beaten, but it can be limited. Using Hizbollah as an example, this grassroots movement itself provides social services and is more than a terrorist organization. The terrorists form only a small part of the whole organization. It is complicated. Countries have to work together to suppress the terrorists and warn each other in order to anticipate terrorist action and intervene when necessary.

The International Intelligence Fellows Program is conducted in an atmosphere of transparency, mutual respect, and non-attribution.

PART II

OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION IN THE GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

The Fellows were divided into two groups of equal size, with membership randomly determined, to brainstorm ideas with respect to international intelligence cooperation in countering terrorism. The groups worked in physically separated spaces and worked under some time pressure. One group was asked to consider potential opportunities for enhancing cooperation. The second group was asked to examine potential impediments to cooperation in the global war against terrorism. Each group was then asked to rank the impediments or opportunities and discuss their findings in a plenary session. The comments presented below were distilled from a record of these activities, and are set forth on a non-attribution basis.

GROUP 1: OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION

Group 1's strategy was to begin its session by "brainstorming" various ideas. All members of the group were encouraged to provide their thoughts on potential opportunities for cooperation in the war on terrorism. The concepts and ideas were recorded on a "white board" for everyone to review. No value judgment on the merit of the ideas was made during this time. Instead, the purpose of this phase of the exercise was to capture as many different ideas as possible. After the group accumulated all possible ideas within the specified timeframe, the facilitator reviewed the ideas and concepts that were listed during the session. It was during this phase of the exercise where the thought process behind a suggestion was expanded upon and the Fellows were encouraged to engage each other in debate and discussion in order to make value judgments on the merit of a particular suggestion. The goal was either to eliminate or retain each suggestion provided. The final step of the process involved ranking the remaining ideas through consensus and compromise. The following concepts were the result of Group 1's deliberations:

Existing Bilateral Relationships

An International Fellow suggested one opportunity for cooperation was the numerous bilateral relationships that already exist in the Asia-Pacific region. By using an already established framework, one can easily translate those same relationships to the war on terrorism. These relationships would facilitate identifying a common operating basis, whether operating at the individual level, nation or state level, regional level, or international level.

Develop Multilateral Relationship

The Fellows acknowledged that developing multilateral relationships may be problematic, but the common vision of combating terrorism may prove to be the needed impetus for driving the region toward permanent multilateral relationships and formal agreements.

The group then discussed some perceptions of multilateralism. One Fellow commented that a perception of multilateralism by some people is that of imposition; that is, some people feel that the notion of multilateralism is being thrust upon them unnecessarily. However, the Fellow conceded that there are others who probably view multilateralism as a necessity. Another International Fellow stated that his country recognized the problems involved with multilateralism several decades ago–and that it must be addressed immediately since a clear and present danger is posed by international terrorism and multilateralism can help address the issue. Finally, one International Fellow argued that multilateralism also involves the ability to rapidly coordinate efforts for humanitarian disaster assistance–and not just for the massing of troops in time of crisis.

Recognition of a Common Threat

An International Fellow suggested that one opportunity for cooperation was in the recognition of a common threat. If everyone's actions are directed against a common foe, there is a greater tendency to overcome differences for the greater good of all. Thus, the Fellow believes that because the war on terrorism is against a common threat, the threat itself becomes a unifying and motivating factor for greater cooperation.

Confidence Building in Intelligence Sharing

The group then discussed the possibility of increased intelligence sharing due to the war on terrorism. The Fellows mulled over how incremental sharing of intelligence on terrorism issues can be construed as confidence-building measures that ultimately enhance regional stability. An International Fellow noted that this is the first clear, common threat for the region and reiterated the unifying effects of a common foe. The discussion facilitator added that this is the first time that a threat against nation-states has originated from a non-state actor. Another International Fellow noted that terrorism was a threat to international peace and security overall. However, he noted that there was nothing unique about terrorism-in fact terrorism was just another common threat like narcotics. Another International Fellow disagreed with the narcotics analogy, saying the situations are in fact different since some non-state actors are not involved in terrorism and they are not involved in narcotics...yet. Another Fellow added that perception is very important: Some countries may not perceive terrorism as a threat just because the U.S. does.

Identifying Common Goals and Mission

One International Fellow expanded on the notion that a common threat is a unifying theme by pointing out that identifying common goals and a mission resulting from the war on terrorism can also be an effective means of enhancing cooperation. In other words, because countries are more likely to cooperate in the face of a common threat, moving beyond the threat and identifying common goals and a mission can be a forceful unifying factor as well.

Identifying Functional Opportunities

The International Fellows discussed the notion of identifying functional opportunities to enhance overall cooperation. An example is identifying cross-state processes that are already occurring in the war against terrorism and improving those processes to leverage increased cooperation. That intelligence-sharing is in process now, at least on a bi-lateral basis, was acknowledged; however, other processes are also involved such as operations and communications. Another functional opportunity noted was interoperability. Previous discussions have alluded to the basic problems of hardware and software compatibility when working in a multilateral environment. Addressing interoperability issues will bolster confidence between allies and improve the process of exchanging information.

Leveraging the Strengths of Allies and Friends

The International Fellows discussed the fact that the U.S. should use regional capabilities and expertise in consonance with its own capabilities to prosecute the war on terror. By acknowledging the strengths and unique skill sets that are resident in the region, another venue for building confidence and expanding multilateral relationships can be developed. Furthermore, regional expertise is the best source of intelligence due to its unparalleled knowledge of the local culture, language, and history. Existing Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT) can be leveraged and new sources developed. A greater understanding of the intricacies and complex relationships of the regional terrorist groups can be gained through greater information sharing. A regional perspective provides more accurate interpretation of information and more comprehensive analysis of intelligence than any single country can muster. As the quality and timeliness of intelligence improves, better indications and warning will result, and the ability to thwart future terrorist acts expands throughout the region.

The Fellows suggested that one area where countries of a particular region could provide an immediate impact is in the realm of training. Each country has studied local terrorist groups longer than any U.S. intelligence agency and are more familiar with the "target." Local expertise can be used to train not only U.S. personnel, but other friends and allies operating in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus,

training opportunities related to the war on terrorism become another motivating factor for greater cooperation in the region.

Regional expertise can provide precise, targeted linguistic support for monitoring communications of terrorist organizations, thus enhancing existing technical capabilities. Problems associated with linguistic variances, such as terrorists using unfamiliar local dialects or slang, can easily be overcome by regional interpreters. Additionally, local analysts very familiar with indigenous structures, terrain, and vegetation may be able to interpret overhead imagery or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) video more accurately. Liaison can also be useful in other areas besides intelligence. For example, law enforcement and judicial considerations are two areas where local knowledge can facilitate imprisonment, prosecution, or extradition of suspected terrorists.

Identify Root Causes and Remedies

One International Fellow suggested that identifying root causes and remedies for terrorist grievances may help solve problems and foster greater regional cooperation. He remarked that in order to gain a deeper understanding of root causes and potential remedies, cultural intelligence is required to correctly ascertain social, ethnic, and religious components motivating the terrorists. Often, the most accurate method of obtaining the necessary information is through HUMINT sources.

This International Fellow added that in the same manner in which conventional intelligence emphasizes information related to enemy order-of-battle (OOB), terrorism analysts need to know cultural sensitivities and needs. A U.S. Fellow noted that his country was better at helping address root causes after the fact. Another International Fellow emphasized that the solution is to address root causes earlier in the process and intelligence has to play a role in determining those root causes. Still another International Fellow emphasized that any approach used to address root causes must be holistic, multilateral, and sustainable.

Non-Governmental Organizations

The group's discussion shifted to the consideration of initiatives that may help entice additional stakeholders beyond military or law enforcement organizations to cooperate in the war against terrorism. The International Fellows believed that there are benefits to be gained by working with certain entities not normally associated with the war on terrorism, since those particular entities have intersecting interests. For example, NGOs can contribute knowledge about the people, culture, and other intangible aspects of a region that would be extremely helpful in counter-terrorism efforts. Any opportunity to expand cooperation and trust with NGOs should be developed and implemented. A basis exists for cooperation with NGOs because many of their objectives are impeded by acts of terrorism. An

impediment is that there is an inherent unwillingness among many NGOs to cooperate with military or governmental entities, based on their fear of losing the advantage of being perceived as politically neutral.

Differences in Perception

The group then agreed that their collective position was that terrorism is a common global threat. One International Fellow reiterated that Al-Qa'ida is definitely a terrorism problem threatening all nations. Another Fellow added that although terrorism is a problem for all countries, it is not necessarily a top priority or at the forefront of issues for all countries. A third Fellow noted that efforts to create structure can flounder if the parties involved cannot agree on basic issues. He specifically cited differences in the perception of terrorism between Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and South Asia. For example, currently the terrorism threat is a more prominent concern in Southeast Asia compared to the level of concern for terrorism in North Asia. Each country within the specific geographic regions of Asia has a different perspective on the particular impact of terrorism on their country's security. Thus, it is not a guaranteed outcome that terrorism will necessarily result in a regional consensus of a common threat.

Limited Multilateral Opportunities

One International Fellow noted that currently, no venue exists for the international community to work collectively against the terrorist threat. The Fellow acknowledged that close ties exist between certain countries, but not uniformly across other countries. Thus, channels for multilateral discussions are limited. Another Fellow stated that each country has a threat, but often there is nothing special about terrorism to elevate it above diplomatic concerns or other perceived transnational security threats such as narcotics. The Fellow stated that progress would come from applying available tools to address terrorism-related problems. For example, information shared between countries can lead to a more thorough nodal analysis of financial linkages, in turn revealing funding sources of terrorist groups that may otherwise not be exposed. Disrupting the financial networks that fund terrorism is an effective way to husband the collective resources of concerned countries.

Another Fellow accepted a vision of terrorism as a clear and common threat, but with varying levels of intensity. The Fellow added that terrorism is not an isolated threat; cells exist everywhere and can adapt to affect each and every state. He noted that coalitions easily come together now for economic reasons. For example, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is a compelling example of the region addressing common interests in a multilateral venue. However, current coalitions against terrorism do not work in the same fashion. The Fellow maintained that the difference is related to the idea that what one particular

country views as terrorism, may not necessarily be viewed in the same light in another country.

GROUP 2: IMPEDIMENTS TO INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

Group 2 had the task of considering impediments to cooperation in the war on terrorism. The Fellows in Group 1 (opportunities for cooperation) remarked that it appears far easier to list obstacles than it was to list opportunities for cooperation. The "impediments group" approached their tasking in the same fashion as the "opportunities group." The Fellows first "brainstormed" ideas, recording all suggestions regardless of merit. They then revisited each impediment and identified those they found to be the most significant barriers to cooperation.

Definitions

An International Fellow opened the discussion by stating that uneven perceptions of terrorism are a big obstacle to making progress at the global level. Specifically, the Fellow argued that terrorism has no decisive definition and countries cannot unilaterally apply a uniform interpretation of the term that is acceptable to all. Terrorism elicits different emotional effects in distinct countries based on many internal factors. The discussion moderator also acknowledged that a great number of problems arise in trying to achieve conceptual harmony in national interests due to the distinction made between domestic and international affairs.

Differences in Culture

On another subject, a Fellow noted that differences in culture, and especially the clash of bureaucratic cultures, contribute to complications in cooperation. Additionally, the Fellow noted that carrying out the war on terrorism involves legal considerations and brings inherent problems in law enforcement coordination between countries. Cultural differences reinforce differences in thinking between domestic law enforcement entities and international security entities (like the military). The Fellow noted that within any country, there is a level of trust that has to be established between law enforcement and security institutions, because mistrust characterizes the current relationship.

Complications Dealing with Law Enforcement

Another Fellow stated that concerns over the ability of law enforcement entities to handle and exploit classified information is one impediment to cooperation; this issue needs to be addressed so that trust and confidence can be built, resulting in a greater level of information exchange. An International Fellow asked if this means that proper authority or authorization to provide classified intelligence to law enforcement must first be obtained. Another Fellow said yes, getting the clearance to accomplish an effective intelligence exchange with law enforcement

is critical, and individual countries must grant proper authorization. Another Fellow agreed but added that impediments to automated information exchange and networking problems also slows or stops information flow. Another International Fellow added that there is an institutional predisposition to guard local databases "like gold" and this practice obstructs information flow. Law enforcement and intelligence organizations both operate in a culture that guards information, and routine sharing of information outside of restrictive, trusted channels is not a normal practice. Another Fellow added that his country's intelligence organization does not share classified information with law enforcement organizations that is "TOP SECRET," but only shares intelligence at the "SECRET" level. This self-imposed prohibition clearly inhibits effective information exchange.

Identifying Complex Causes

An International Fellow stated that combating terrorism is a complex situation, and that disagreements about terrorist motivations inhibit cooperation. The Fellow believes that terrorism should be approached from a political standpoint in addition to military and law enforcement initiatives. One suggestion was to appeal to the people causing the disturbances by addressing their concerns. Additionally, understanding religious dimensions of terrorism can provide insight into the grievances of those causing trouble within and beyond a country's border.

Perception Issues

Another Fellow stated that problems in coordinating policies among governments are another source inhibiting cooperation. For example, one country's government may direct its military to actively pursue elements of a terrorist group while an adjoining country does nothing. The Fellow emphasized that contradictory threat perceptions lead to differing operational decisions regarding the scope and degree of prosecuting internal and external terrorist threats.

One International Fellow emphasized that fighting fundamentalist groups in his country is quite difficult. He stated that people remain quiet and complacent toward the so-called fundamentalist threat. The Fellow reported that police find it difficult to garner popular support for their efforts against terrorism, since the government makes no appeal to the masses. Another Fellow suggested that one solution to make counter-terrorism acceptable is to fight against *all* terrorists, and not discriminate against any one particular category based on arbitrary labels, such as "fundamentalist."

The discussion then transitioned to the lack of a common vision regarding the issue of terrorism. One International Fellow noted that the issue ultimately leads back to the basic definition of terrorism, as previously discussed. Terrorism in some circles may be viewed as an extension of political means, based on legiti-

mate aims, rather than a violent struggle. However, the Fellow emphasized that violence is not an option in political affairs.

Another Fellow then provided a practical example to illustrate some of the complications involved with perceptions and definitions. His hypothetical example consisted of a person from country "X" who lives in another country, "Y." When country "X" identifies the person as a known terrorist and requests country "Y" to extradite the suspect, "Y" refuses. Country "Y" views the suspect as a criminal, but not a terrorist. The Fellow argued that there are multiple views of what constitutes terrorism and what constitutes simple criminal activity. Thus, differences in perception result in differing opinions of how to combat terrorism, and hampers efforts to cooperate.

Another Fellow cited the support given to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) both at home and abroad. Supporters of the organization perceive the IRA as fighting for legitimate political causes, rather than imputing terrorist motives to the group. The Fellow noted that it is difficult to say this form of terrorism is unacceptable, given this particular perspective. He argued that what is needed is a concrete definition of terrorism as well as a definition of the elements that comprise terrorism.

Another Fellow used the example of suicide bombings to make his case. The Fellow noted that although most cultures view suicide bombing as unacceptable, that notion is not universally held. The fact that martyrs are held in high esteem in the Middle East is only one reason for the continued suicide bombings in Israel. Thus, it is important to understand the cultural aspect behind the terrorist's actions in order to establish a common understanding of the problem. Problem identification and definition becomes the basis of a solution.

Definitions Revisited

The discussion moderator noted that over time, perceptions tend to change, as a function of issue fluidity. If the problem set continues to shift, as it does with terrorism, is it possible to obtain the common terminology and definition desired? Another complicating factor is changing national priorities and interests. Each time the priorities of a country change, the definition of terrorism is likely to change to support the new national objectives being articulated. The constant reshuffling of national priorities may in itself be aggravating the problem of definitions. Can it be overcome?

One International Fellow stated that his country is struggling with the very issue of definitions and the ability to translate intelligence into something actionable. He stated that security forces and intelligence entities in his country initially interpret potential terrorist threats. Based on the interpretation of intelligence, a threat level warning is issued by the government. However, those levels can vary from country to country. For example, the U.S. may be at threat condition

"orange," while the Fellow's country remains at a lower, "yellow" level. The Fellow argued that the threat condition should be the same for all countries.

The discussion moderator made the point that the U.S. is essentially "painting a picture" for others. What kind of message is the U.S. sending? Can the U.S. properly set the threat level for cross-cultural and national organizations? Can the U.S. properly communicate the threat for others abroad?

Other Problems Impeding Cooperation

An International Fellow stated that another obstacle to cooperation is resource constraints. Countries have finite budgets and there are always issues of balancing domestic priorities against national security priorities. Another fellow mentioned that technology serves as another barrier to cooperation. Not all countries have compatible communications, computers, and protocols essential to exchanging information. Unless standards are established, effective information exchange will be inhibited.

Another deficiency noted was the lack of a terrorist identification system or database. One Fellow stated that terrorists generally operate transnationally, and thus will transit to and from other countries. It is essential that all countries share suspect lists so that potential terrorists may be apprehended in the course of their travels. If a common identification system were to be established, states could work together easily through an exchange of information on potential terrorists entering their respective countries.

One International Fellow noted that increased international information sharing may generate legitimate concerns over incompatible or lax information security practices, to include an increased threat of computer viruses being spread from one country to another. Recent forays by computer hackers have demonstrated the Internet's vulnerability to malicious code. The Fellow also noted another concern: ensuring that the information passed is not going to a third country or being leaked to the media.

Monitoring the Terrorists

A problem discussed by the Fellows was the issue of monitoring terrorist movements and activities. The International Fellows all agreed that they do not currently have a comprehensive knowledge base or the level of training required to effectively monitor and predict terrorist movements. Another significant factor discussed by the Fellows was the uneven access to money by terrorists and by those seeking to counter their activities. An International Fellow stated that terrorists have plenty of money and access to high-tech equipment. Their equipment can be so advanced that the technology is unfamiliar to the countries where they are operating, and the terrorists cannot be countered. For example, commercial encryption devices used to scramble communications are readily available to

terrorists and do frustrate collection efforts by intelligence agencies. Countries of the region may have limited capability to decrypt and break communications; terrorists have advanced systems that prove ever more formidable. One Fellow noted that local police forces especially have a difficult time detecting and monitoring terrorist activities.

Democratic Barriers to Cooperation

One International Fellow noted that terrorism takes advantage of the rights afforded to a democratic society and the terrorists enjoy the "fruits of democracy." Most societies in Asia are open societies with freely accessible information that terrorists can easily exploit. Additionally, the rule of law and due process dictate strict guidelines for the apprehension and prosecution of accused suspects. Terrorists also take advantage of the situation by crossing borders between countries, thereby managing to exploit the lack of extradition treaties between countries.

Database Concerns

The discussion then turned to the issue of a common terrorist database. As a starting point, the moderator asked if it was even feasible to arrive at a point where countries can reach consensus on a common list. One Fellow opined that the problem is extraordinarily complex due to the coordination required across different legal systems in the region. Thus, the ability to pass evidence and extradite suspects becomes complicated. The Fellow specifically pointed out that the rules of evidence differ for each regional justice system and this is a difficult problem to overcome. Additionally, efforts to amend constitutional barriers may face insurmountable obstacles. One Fellow compared the issues at play in developing a counterterrorism database to global trade: All countries are affected in one way or another and should provide the requisite amount of assistance for the common good.

Monetary Accountability

One Fellow noted that it appears as if the U.S. government does not trust NGOs, because of the aid these organizations receive from foreign countries. Additionally, the Fellow stated that one perception is that the U.S. does not have confidence in the governments of the countries that do receive financial assistance to fight terrorism. The Fellow's impression is that the U.S. believes aid given to foreign governments and NGOs can be better utilized. At the same time, the Fellow acknowledged that there could be some basis for the U.S. concern, since governments of certain countries could do a better job of monitoring the flow of money to and from their states. He argued that a lack of accountability leads to corruption and the misuse of funds. Money earmarked for counterterrorism flows into a country and other supporting organizations; however, there is no guarantee that the funds will actually be used for the original intent of combating terrorism.

This Fellow advocated that more stringent measures be used by contributing countries to ensure counterterrorism funds are being properly used.

Complex Relationships

One International Fellow recalled the group's consensus that no common definition of terrorism exists. However, he noted that it might still be possible to reach some sort of workable solution despite the lack of a common definition. He advocated continued efforts at cooperation while simultaneously working toward an acceptable definition of terrorism. The Fellow argued that cooperation must lead in particular to increased border security, airport security, and seaport security. Another Fellow countered that something more substantial than current cooperation initiatives must be undertaken. Diplomatic considerations play a prominent role in the actions of governments in the region. Even though countries may have military-to-military contact, combined operations against terrorism are very fragile and often "under the table" because of political concerns with respect to major regional powers, especially China. He went on to say that military affairs may not be the main issue, as we address terrorism.

Rules of Evidence and Financial Dealings

The U.S. has always faced the sometimes vexing issue of abiding by evidentiary rules in domestic cases of illegal activity. The discussion moderator provided several examples of drug traffickers being arrested initially, only to be released and their cases later being dropped due to technicalities regarding violations of the rules of evidence. Rules of evidence also apply in other countries and their laws must be respected as well. The difficulty with monitoring terrorists and their financial dealings is that more often than not, money is moved under the guise of legitimate transactions from one false entity to another. Multiple transactions using overseas banks and front companies add to the difficulty of deciphering complex financial relationships between financier and terrorist. It becomes more difficult to track the origin of money as each succeeding transaction branches out to multiple transactions, distancing the ultimate recipient from the original benefactor. It is difficult to obtain evidence that proves laundered money is actually supporting terrorism and other illegal activity. The complex nature of tracking financial transactions of terrorists across international boundaries, coupled with the restrictive rules of evidence, results in a major obstacle to cooperation just where it is most needed.

PLENARY SESSION: IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION

The final step of the exercise was for both groups to reunite and discuss their findings in a plenary session. The "impediments group" went first, presenting their top five barriers to cooperation in the war against terrorism. The "opportunities group" then followed, presenting their opinion of the top prospects for cooperation. Both groups arrived at their final rankings based on deliberation over the issues following their brainstorming sessions. The five impediments were presented using the following graphics:

A Single Focal Point: Definition

During the group's deliberations, an International Fellow suggested that the group try to connect all of the issues to a single focal point. To him, it appeared that the clearest, single point of convergence was the absence of a universal definition for terrorism. He argued that not only is a common definition required, but a universal lexicon must also be adopted. In addition, communication is fundamental to cooperation, and because of cultural biases, different words mean different things to different cultures. Thus, the lack of a common definition and lexicon for terrorism impedes cooperation–and all other impediments can be linked to this obstacle.

Trust and Confidence

The International Fellows discussed the interaction between legal systems and intelligence organizations. One Fellow suggested that a great deal of mistrust between the two types of organizations is due to the previously dissimilar objectives of law enforcement and intelligence gathering. The Fellows agreed that the law enforcement culture is based on gathering evidence after an event has already occurred, and preserving that evidence in a judicial sense. The evidence must be able to stand in a court of law and be used by the prosecution to obtain a conviction. Intelligence organizations, on the other hand, are preemptive. Analysts use intelligence sources and methods to predict future events based on established indicators and estimative analysis. Since the advent of the war on terrorism, there has been a convergence in roles and objectives of law enforcement and intelligence. Both types of organizations now seek to preempt the actions of terrorists. Intelligence has now evolved into an important source of evidence used by law enforcement organizations. This use of intelligence goes against the culture of intelligence organizations, where sources and methods are guarded with great secrecy and caution. Thus, the major reason for the mistrust is the concern for the security of information exchanged. One international Fellow suggested institutionalizing exchange protocols and establishing standard operating procedures to build trust and confidence between intelligence and law enforcement entities. Another Fellow declared that part of the problem stems from the lack of internal

structures to facilitate the sharing of information received. Thus, even though information is received by an organization, there is no guarantee that the proper person within the organization will receive the critical piece of information. Another Fellow added that bureaucratic cultures themselves inhibit cooperation.

Mutual confidence is gained through liaison officers, but more importantly, by law enforcement adhering to security restrictions and intelligence officers adhering to the rules of evidence. Law enforcement and intelligence organizations now operate in the same environment and seek common goals. Each organizational culture must appreciate the unique constraints that circumscribe the operations of their counterparts. Only then can meaningful trust and confidence be nurtured enough to result in institutional changes that promote sustained information exchange.

Lack of Adequate Resources

The reporting Fellow maintained that the next major obstacle to cooperation involved the lack of adequate resources dedicated to combating terrorism. Issues dealing with scarcity of assets such as funding, personnel, and equipment are major barriers to cooperation. Related to the issue of scarcity is the problem of systems compatibility. Protocols, methods, and procedures are just a few examples of basic compatibility issues that in turn lead to barriers to cooperation. To

further complicate the issue, intelligence used within the legal framework and the rules of evidence adds to the difficulties of cooperation. The issue of protecting intelligence sources must be balanced with the need to present the compelling evidence necessary to achieve a conviction in a court of law.

Additionally, an International Fellow noted that often, human rights violations are used as a criterion for disbursing funding and assistance. Financial assistance, trade, and technology are used to coerce countries into improving human rights. However, the Fellow emphasized that each country has a different interpretation of human rights based on culture and history. This difference in perception is especially evident in the Asia-Pacific region. Differences in perception can also be linked to the problems originating from a lack of common definitions. An International Fellow noted that other issues can influence or interrupt internal or external factors that impact the allocation of resources; for example, the current state of trade negotiations. Just as the perception of human rights violations influences aid given to combat terrorism, the Fellow maintained that trade relations likewise influence the amount of aid that will be received.

Other Considerations (Internal and External)

In an effort to address some of their other concerns that did not neatly fit in a single category, the Fellows developed a separate grouping of issues they titled "Other Considerations." Under this category, they placed the issue of tracking

financial assets of terrorists as a contributing factor to impeding cooperation. The group agreed that tracing the flow of money, combined with other economic issues related to terrorism, causes problems. One Fellow explained that certain countries want to preserve the confidentiality of financial transactions since that is one aspect of overseas banking that attracts businesses to financial institutions located in particular countries. Scrutinizing bank accounts could have unintended consequences, impacting the legitimate financial operation of banks.

The Fellows then stated that there are other economic considerations peripherally related to tracking the flow of money that impede cooperation. For example, the practice of inspecting containers in free ports involves legal processes, and will only cover a small percentage of all sea-borne containers. The cost versus benefit must be weighed carefully to determine if an overall delay in commercial activity is worth the incremental gain in security. As previously discussed, such economic considerations will have a diplomatic dimension in agreements between countries. Security, economics, and diplomacy are all interrelated and impact the way the war on terrorism is waged.

The Fellows also wanted to include the issue of mushrooming Non-Governmental Organizations and the relationship these entities have with the governments of countries. The consensus among the Fellows was that when convenient, the U.S. prefers to deal with NGOs rather than governments. The Fellows were concerned that not all NGOs are as they appear on the surface. They believe that some NGOs are manipulated by insurgents, separatists, or terrorists–essentially becoming willing tools of these anti-government factions. Thus, support for NGOs must be carefully weighed, since some NGOs may inadvertently undermine government initiatives.

A U.S. participant helping moderate the plenary session noted that based on his personal experiences, NGOs were not typically a breeding ground for terrorists. He questioned the language on the slides and noted that collectively, NGOs probably do more good than harm. A negative impression may stem from the actions of a few deceitful NGOs. An International Fellow responded by stating that religion is being exploited by terrorist organizations for recruitment and training. As a result, some apparently benign NGOs are actually terrorist organizations in disguise and seek to undermine host governments. The Fellow stated that determining which NGOs are related to terrorists becomes the problem. Another Fellow noted that in the Philippines, 20 percent of NGOs were identified as being affiliated with Abu Sayef or Al-Qa'ida.

Difficulty of Multilateral Approach

The final impediment that the Fellows presented concerned the difficulty associated with working in a multilateral environment. The Fellows noted that there are no well-established multilateral security structures in place in the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, most countries are comfortable working on a bilateral basis–sharing intelligence and conducting combined exercises between two countries. Thus, very few countries have experience working in a multilateral environment such as the regional coalition fighting against terrorism. The Fellows acknowledged that countries are hesitant and less comfortable sharing intelligence in a multilateral environment. These barriers can be overcome through trust and confidence-building measures. The more the countries in Asia work together, the easier cooperation becomes, and sharing information will become second nature. However, the Fellows agreed that the process needs to be deliberate and not rushed. Another International Fellow added the point that bilateral exchanges are much easier to manage than multilateral exchanges because differences and difficulties between two countries are much easier to resolve than differences among a group.

International Intelligence Fellows engaged in debate and dialogue

PLENARY SESSION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION

The opportunities group then presented their findings to a collective gathering of Fellows. In the process of refining their conclusions, the group agreed on three primary opportunities for cooperation. Again, the group reiterated their position that it is more difficult to find opportunities than to list obstacles. The opportunities are presented below:

Opportunities for Cooperation

- Identify Common Threat, Goals, and Mission
  - Identify root causes and remedies
  - Holistic, multilateral, sustainable remedy
- Use Relationships
  - Bilateral
  - Multilateral
  - Stakeholders

INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FELLOWS PROGRAM

Opportunities for Cooperation (continued)

- Leverage Strength of Allies and Friends
  - Identify functional opportunities and processes
  - Emphasize intelligence liaison and information sharing
  - Employ appropriate technology
  - Address law enforcement and legal issues
  - Achieve interoperability—Command & Control, tactical

INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FELLOWS PROGRAM

Common Threat

The Fellows in the "opportunities group" believed that the biggest potential for cooperation comes from the perception of a common threat from terrorism. Because of this perceived common threat, a common mission and goals emerge. It is this commonality that the Fellows wish to leverage in order to obtain further collaboration among regional countries. A key to the problem then becomes identifying root causes of terrorism and trying to solve the source of the terrorist's grievances. The discussion moderator asked how the issues of poverty and the disenfranchised are to be dealt with when discussing root causes. One of the International Fellows stated that overall, the key was "thinking out of the box," and not using traditional methods to address such problems. The overall war on terrorism is asymmetric and exists "outside of the box." Likewise, solutions to the problems caused by terrorism can only be achieved through innovative solutions. For example, the Fellows noted how a previous guest speaker discussed the Philippine Government's efforts to quell the Islamic separatist movement in the south. For years the Philippine Army had been waging guerilla warfare with various separatist and insurgency factions in the jungles of Mindanao. In an effort to curtail the appeal of these separatist groups, the government began a campaign of digging wells in villages, hoping to win the hearts and minds of the local people and denying the insurgents a principal source of future recruits. According to the speaker, this rather elementary and non-military solution did more to stem the appeal of the insurgency groups in a few weeks, and achieved more results, than all the years of fighting. The Fellows thus reiterated that concentrating on root causes is the key to finding feasible solutions to the underlying issues of terrorism.

The discussion moderator asked to what degree the Fellows foresee intelligence professionals involved in identifying terrorism's root causes. One International Fellow stated that intelligence practitioners are accustomed to support the military aspects of a mission. However, when dealing with terrorism and all of its intangible aspects, it is essential that these professionals gain a better understanding of root causes in order to provide more relevant analysis. In the example of the Philippine government's undermining insurgents by digging new wells, intelligence was required to implement the solution. For example, knowledge of the local topography and hydrology was required in order to determine prospective dig sites. Intelligence provided the essential information necessary to implement the solution. An International Fellow added that knowledge is power and intelligence professionals are information managers. The discussion moderator then asked if a country's intelligence community has the proper resources to address the issues of root causes. The Fellow replied that resources need to be refocused within an intelligence community.

The Fellows added that a practical solution can only be achieved through addressing the underlying issues of terrorism from a broad and all-encompassing perspective. In other words, a holistic and synergistic approach must be used to properly address the root causes of terrorism. Additionally, the Fellows reiterated that any solution that attempts to address root causes must be multilateral and sustainable. It is important that all of the countries in the region be engaged against terror. Due to terrorism's transnational nature, multilateral cooperation and information sharing is essential to finding feasible solutions. Furthermore, the countries must be committed against the threat for the long term, since perseverance is the key when the fight is as open-ended as the war on terror.

The discussion moderator noted that the implication based on the material the Fellows presented is that a direct link exists between terrorists and poverty, politics and drug trafficking. An International Fellow responded by stating that countries see a variety of issues related to terrorism and circumstances differ between countries. However, most countries view terrorism in a broader sense, and multiple issues such as poverty, politics, and drugs can be easily intertwined with the larger issue of terrorism.

The discussion moderator then stated that the current opponent is motivated by more than ideology and the vision of political Islam. However, an International Fellow noted that religious ideology is still a major influence on terrorism. The discussion moderator then asked the Fellow to clarify...Did he mean religious or political influence? The Fellow responded that religion still has a major influence on terrorism. He noted the resurgence of political Islam and efforts to exploit the chasm between the "haves" and the "have nots." Socio-economic discontent easily becomes another root cause of terrorism.

The discussion moderator then asked what job exists for intelligence within the context of identifying root causes? Is this normally the type of information intelligence professionals deal with on a day-to-day basis? An International Fellow responded that it is not outside the realm of intelligence to determine some of the specific root causes of terrorism and then to analyze the wider implications of those causes. The Fellow added that unfortunately, terrorism is not a homogenous global issue, and not all countries will approach the issue of root causes in the same manner. The Fellow added that intelligence professionals need to choose the right methods and tools for analyzing each particular root cause. The discussion moderator then noted that the evil genius of Usama bin Laden is that he made the cause of Al-Qa'ida generic enough to take root anywhere, taking advantage of Moslems worldwide and exploiting issues such as poverty found throughout the globe. The discussion moderator added that poverty breeds conditions that are later exploited by Usama bin Laden's perversion of Islam, similar to how the Ku Klux Klan perverts Christianity to justify their misguided causes. Additionally,

Al-Qa'ida's support of issues such as the plight of the Palestinian people and fighting against perceived "American imperialism" are attractive to bin Laden's disenfranchised followers who are looking for a rallying point in an otherwise despondent life. The generic yet polarizing nature of bin Laden's causes ensures him a steady stream of new followers and new sources of financial backing.

An International Fellow noted that once a particular group does something, the U.S. labels the group according to very generic traits, and it is lumped into a particular category like "terrorist." The Fellow reiterated that often, the motivations behind a particular group may appear to be terrorism on the surface, when in fact there are other primary motivating factors. The moderator asked what there is in common between Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups? One International Fellow responded that Al-Qa'ida is willing to inflict mass civilian casualties for a political purpose. Another Fellow noted that whatever the motive, when an organization turns to terrorism, they are in fact terrorists. The Fellow stated that acts against civilians are considered terrorism since such actions are not covered under the Laws of War. The motivations behind certain terrorist action are based on causes, but they are not legitimate causes. A Fellow noted that the problem with terrorism is that conditions are always changing and a group may not be considered terrorists if their cause is just. For example, several Israeli leaders were once wanted as terrorists before the establishment of the state of Israel, but now they are regarded as "freedom fighters."

The discussion moderator asked what might be the most effective way to combat terrorism. An International Fellow noted that due to the nature of terrorism, it is a never-ending process. The Fellow added that unless terrorism is addressed in a prognostic manner, the number of terrorists will continue to increase due to the continued backing from people looking for a cause to support. The Fellow offered the idea that one potential method for legitimate governments is for them to mediate the underlying problems or root causes as previously discussed. Going after what motivates the terrorists and addressing their grievances may be one part of the solution. Opening a dialogue through meetings or by any means that promotes communication is a first step toward identifying potential solutions.

Bringing the Gaps

In an effort to summarize findings, the discussion moderator asked if any of the opportunities identified could be used to address the impediments discussed, thereby bridging the gap between obstacles and prospects. The moderator asked the Fellows to consider the impediment of trust and confidence. What efforts must be accomplished to strengthen trust and confidence among coalition partners, thereby ultimately improving intelligence cooperation? In other words, what has to happen to break through this particular impediment?

One International Fellow noted that the impediment of "trust and confidence" could probably be addressed by the opportunity identified as "existing relationships." The Fellow stated that as interaction increases among members of a group or among sovereign entities, trust and confidence also increases. Another International Fellow added that sometimes trust, which already is established, is lost due to global perceptions of certain actions. Courses of action should be pursued that prevent that loss of trust. Concurrently, there are actions that can be undertaken to build confidence and trust where none exists. The Fellow stated that dealing with the issue of trust and confidence results in measures that deal primarily with symptoms of poor communication. After communication goals are identified, then quid pro quo exchanges can be established. This is the first stage in developing a more robust intelligence exchange regime, where reciprocity no longer becomes the driving factor in sharing information.

The discussion moderator then asked how to deal with the issue of resources in the context of an impediment. An International Fellow noted that countries are supposed to be sharing information but sometimes, financial resources are used as incentives for cooperation. The Fellow acknowledged that often, withholding resources could be perceived as a human rights violation. The Fellow stated that resources come from international organizations as well as donor countries. Although the resources flow from one country to another, improvements to existing channels are still required to facilitate the distribution of resources.

The discussion moderator noted that the U.S. establishment of the Department of Homeland Security is based on a need for more effective sharing of information. The establishment of the new department is based on achieving synergy to address the problem of homeland defense. It is necessary to have information sharing between disparate entities such as banks, transportation agencies, and border check points even though they are not accustomed to cooperating with each other. According to the moderator, unless agencies talk with each other, they cannot effectively deal with the problem of terrorism and ultimately, home and defense. It is an enormous task the new department faces, with cultural and social aspects intertwined.

SYNTHESIS: THE WAY AHEAD

The final group exercise challenged the International Fellows to articulate lessons learned and conclusions derived from the two-week program. The Fellows once again were divided into groups of equal size whose members were selected at random. The four groups were tasked to describe the current state of information-based cooperation as they understood it through the Fellows Program. Secondly, they were asked to provide a vision of where cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region should be in the year 2010. Finally, they were asked to list steps needed to bridge the gap between the reality of cooperation today and the vision of cooperation a decade hence.



Course Synthesis Exercise

GROUP 1

Cooperation Now

An International Fellow began the discussion by characterizing the present state of cooperation as bilateral and single-issue focused. He added that there is still some mistrust within the Asia-Pacific region and countries are having difficulty overcoming barriers to the sharing of information. Another International Fellow asked What is cooperation? He believes cooperation implies working toward a common objective, based on mutual concerns and requirements. Another Fellow added that cooperation should not be myopic, but rather ought to be a broad-based discussion of problems that have a common thread. Currently, the common thread is terrorism, but Usama bin Laden and terrorism will not always be in the forefront of issues in the region. The Fellow advocated identifying the issue or issues that will form the common thread for cooperation in the future. He added that problems come in many shades of color, and right now the primary problem is terror. However, with an eye on the future, the Fellow asked the other group members if China is a concern for the entire region or for just some of the countries? The International Fellow stressed that concern and cooperation will vary from issue to issue.

An International Fellow acknowledged that the region has already established a good deal of cooperation on a bilateral level concerning terrorism, but asked how it can achieve the same level of cooperation multilaterally. Another agreed that bilateral relations were good, but emphasized that multilateral efforts need to succeed or else barriers will continue to impede the overall regional cooperative effort. He also pointed out that officials at the political level are responsible for many of the barriers currently in place. Thus, the question remains as to whether policymakers or laws inadvertently impede the effective sharing of information and intelligence. If in fact the laws are outdated, then the International Fellow advocates reviewing and revising the laws to more accurately reflect the security environment of today.

The group consensus was that current information or intelligence-sharing activity in the Asia-Pacific region is predominantly bilateral and not multilateral. However, the group agreed that the way to begin fundamental change is to continue bilateral measures and agree to include third parties as the situation warrants. Most importantly, the third-party member should not be excluded once the immediate “hot button” issue is resolved.

The group moderator asked why the current state of cooperation is limited and bilateral, and not naturally progressing to a more multilateral state? In response, an International Fellow stated that doubts and mistrust still permeate the region and different countries have different national agendas. He added that

often, the two parties who mistrust each other are neighbors. This historical mistrust may be traced to remaining differences related to colonial rule and the consequences of colonization during the first half of the 20th Century.

The group moderator asked the Fellows what other factors contribute to the current condition of cooperation now (in 2003). One Fellow observed that personal animosity was one factor. Another International Fellow noted that there was no sense of regional cooperation because of the lingering Cold War, bipolar security environment. Another Fellow noted that not all countries have yet established robust bilateral relationships. The Fellow gave the example of India and Taiwan having extensive bilateral relationships within the region, but noted that Pakistan and Bangladesh were lacking in their bilateral exchanges. The Fellow stated that many countries simply have no sense of need for extensive bilateral relationships and that there are some problems that do not impact other states within the region. The sense of mistrust is much more difficult to assess if there are no relations between the two countries. The group provided the following graphic to portray their interpretation of present-day cooperation:

Cooperation in the Future

Next, the group moved to the question of defining cooperation in the near future. According to one International Fellow, the vision of cooperation needs to revolve around a multilateral outlook. Each country in the region should want to

belong to whatever multilateral forum is established. The discussion moderator asked Should the U.S. organize this multilateral community or should it be left up to Asians themselves? An International Fellow stated that the forum established should be inclusive, where all nations can participate. The Fellow noted that currently, Taiwan is restricted from participating in certain fora due to political concerns and sensitivities.

Another Fellow advocated a multilateral approach in the future due to the transnational nature of international organized crime. The Fellow stated that currently, terror serves as the driving force toward multilateral cooperation and will continue to do so in the near future. However, the problem will have a narrower focus, with different participants than today. The Fellow advocated the creation of institutional infrastructures that underpin sharing and cooperation. In order to facilitate multilateral cooperation, common tactics, techniques, and procedures must be created. The group presented the following vision of cooperation in the future:



Intermediate Steps Required

The final portion of the exercise required the Fellows to bridge the gap between information-based cooperation today and their vision of such cooperation for tomorrow. Group 1 decided that the first step in achieving their vision was

"planting the seeds" of multilateralism. One of the International Fellows suggested that advocacy work was important toward gaining initial support and sustaining momentum. Although the Fellows all agreed that multilateralism is desirable, they also noted that they are currently not in a position to make decisions and set policy. Thus, the Fellow suggested that efforts must be undertaken to influence the higher levels of the military and civilian leadership and to gain policymaker buy-in.

Another International Fellow suggested holding a series of multilateral conferences on distinct, bounded issues, rather than focusing on a mix of topics. For example, the first conference should be on Jemaah Islamiya. The Fellow suggested an intelligence symposium on terrorism first because a common foe exists and this will facilitate multilateral exchanges. He suggested that other conferences could then follow; for example, a conference on transnational crime. Another International Fellow suggested that focusing specifically on intelligence exchange programs, both bilateral and multilateral, might be productive. These intelligence exchange programs could grapple with the problems of where to start the multilateral exchange of information and could identify common concerns. Another International Fellow suggested the possibility of exploratory talks on multilateralism — informal and non-binding dialogue to nurture future initiatives and establish the foundation for more permanent multilateral structures.

The group indicated that the next step would be to formalize initial programs and initiatives into more permanent agreements and structures. One way of accomplishing this, according to a participant, is to institute cross-training of personnel in appropriate specialties. Another Fellow suggested establishing a multilateral "hotline" located in intelligence centers, but not co-located with politicians. Communications between alert centers must be facilitated. Multilateral conference calls should become second-nature and allow all countries access to the "hotline." Another International Fellow suggested that an intermediate step could involve establishing a common communication capacity from existing resources-based on a webpage, for example. Additionally, a Fellow suggested that a formal, multilateral agreement on intelligence sharing should be established. The sense of the group was that efforts should focus on achieving an intelligence-sharing agreement dealing specifically with counterterrorism, since much of the groundwork for multilateral sharing of information in that arena has already been established. Additionally, steps to create a multilateral computer network capable of exchanging classified information must be undertaken.

The final step proposed by Group 1 was institution building. For example, an International Fellow recommended concluding formal, multilateral agreements on counterterrorism, crime and drugs, as well as other regional security issues. Additionally, a common multilateral data bank accessible by others from outside the

region should be institutionalized since regional problems are often related to a larger global threat. Regional think tanks operating at the multilateral level are also another way of formalizing efforts. Finally, formalizing a standard set of tactics, techniques, and procedures is essential to ensuring the appropriate level of multilateral interoperability. Group 1 encapsulated their choices for incremental steps for achieving multilateral cooperation in the following graphic:



GROUP 2

An International Fellow noted that cooperation is mostly bilateral and based on the interests of the states themselves. He added that many issues need more cooperation, such as terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, illegal immigration, drugs, crime, arms smuggling, and piracy. The Fellow suggested that in the future, cooperation should be more multilateral, not just bilateral. Another Fellow added that much depends on how each nation defines its national interests. One participant asserted that the definition of the problem and its interpretation is also a factor. He noted that currently, a narrow view of issues is the norm; in the future, the Fellow believes a more broadly based view is required. He also acknowledged the need to work on agreed definitions.

Another Fellow noted that the terrorism issue has opened up lines of communication among key players in the region. However, another individual asserted that during the entire program, some of the important issues of the region had been overlooked, an example being the Nepalese struggle with the Maoists. He maintained that this and other important regional issues continue to escape attention. The group noted that all problems with potentially serious impact should be approached and not ignored. Another Fellow added that Burma was not discussed even though the country borders on many states in the region. The Fellow noted that the U.S. has isolated the Burmese; for example, they were not invited to this exchange program. The Fellow attributed their exclusion to U.S. disagreement with the way Burma is governed.

Another Fellow agreed and advocated the inclusion of all countries in the region as a necessary step toward meaningful dialogue on multilateralism. Additionally, another Fellow stated that one of the issues that requires attention is building legal infrastructures necessary to actually take action on many of the transnational problems discussed during this forum. These legal infrastructures would be based both on bilateral and multilateral treaties.

Another Fellow suggested the need for a regional coordination headquarters, or for several headquarters. He cautioned that political sensibility is needed in establishing the location of the coordination center; it should not be located in a pivotal country like India, Pakistan, or Taiwan. The Fellow asserted that all key players must be represented in this regional coordination entity. He believes that currently, countries are only paying lip service to cooperation; resources must be devoted toward achieving tangible results. Additionally, the Fellow cautioned that a multilateral approach is not always the appropriate solution and may not always work.

An International Fellow suggested that bilateral cooperation on terrorism can perhaps be used as a springboard for multilateral cooperation. Another Fellow stated that United Nations backing is required for success, even though the final multilateral structure will not be a UN organization. Another Fellow remarked that a method to incorporate all key players in the region is required. One International Fellow suggested using existing regional and international organizations or bodies, like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Other Fellows recommended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization (APEC) and the South Pacific Forum (SPF) as potential springboard organizations. A Fellow noted that there are no multilateral intelligence centers in existence now, even within the organizations listed. An International Fellow used Interpol as an example of multilateral sharing, but admitted that the Interpol database is very narrow now because countries are not willing to provide much information or intelligence to the organization.

An International Fellow remarked that it is a healthy sign that more countries are trying to work together. He used the example of terrorism in his country, noting that the majority of incidents are perpetrated by local gangs extorting money from people. This situation does not affect people across country borders, so these terrorists can take refuge in other countries and those other countries will not help to apprehend them. The International Fellow asserted that they currently have no problem with Al-Qa'ida, but bombs, explosions and killings occur all the time, and people are living in a state of fear from these gangs. The Fellow argued that terrorism, in any place or in any form, should be combated by all states and peoples.

An International Fellow asked where funds would come from for regional centers. Was the United Nations a viable source of funding and resources? The Fellow noted that all countries are in a different place in terms of how prepared they are to assist. There would need to be money for training, for acquiring and sharing technology, and so on. Another Fellow said that there are different levels of seriousness in different countries. Another Fellow also added that recognizing existing political hurdles was important and overcoming these impediments is essential.

An International Fellow suggested one problem is the egoistical approach, for example, of the U.S. toward Burma. The Fellow noted that this country receives a great deal of support from Japan and China, so U.S. unilateral sanctions will not have great effect. Another Fellow asserted that countries in the region will engage Burma whether the U.S. likes it or not.

Returning to the issue of regional centers, an International Fellow suggested that those who can pay will pay; everyone else will contribute what they can. The Fellow noted that presently, his country has no one to talk to about the problem of

terrorists taking refuge in neighboring countries; his country needs a regional headquarters where they can go for assistance. The Fellow stated that perhaps ASEAN could host an intelligence headquarters within the ASEAN Secretariat. The regional center could draw resources from separate funding from Japan, Korea, China, India, or maybe even Malaysia. Those countries that cannot contribute financially may be able to contribute personnel or other resources. The Fellow emphasized the need for a coordination center to address all of the issues discussed.

Another International Fellow cautioned the group to remember that multilateral initiatives will not always work; some places and some issues will still need to be addressed primarily with bilateral instruments. The Fellow argued that articulating a desire to move toward multilateral initiatives is not a final answer by any means.

On the issue of terrorists, one Fellow suggested the first step is to segregate them from other people — from those who provide their means of support. The Fellow noted that primarily, a military approach has been used so far, but more attention needs to be devoted to psychological operations and also addressing the needs of innocent people so they do not support or even come in contact with terrorists. The Fellow advocated a more comprehensive approach toward terrorism. An International Fellow stated that better lines of communication to everywhere, both within and outside the region, are needed. He noted that "everything is connected to everything else."

An International Fellow suggested that some world problems create an environment where terrorism can grow, an example being the situation in Kashmir or the Tamils in Sri Lanka. These disputes do not receive mediation. The Fellow also mentioned the plight of the Kurds, who do not have their own Kurdish state. He suggested that all of these movements have common popular appeal. Thus, real root causes of problems must be addressed in order to properly understand the underlying causes of terrorism.

The following graphics represent Group 2's vision of cooperation now, cooperation in the future, and intermediate steps required to transition from the present to the future:

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Cooperation Now

- Bilateral
- Narrow Focus
- Exclusive
- Compartmentalized
- Individual definition/translation

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Cooperation in the Future (2010)

- Multilateral
- Broad-based approach
- Inclusive
- Connected/shared
- Agreed definitions

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Intermediate Steps

- **Step 1**
  - **Invite all concerned participants, using existing organizations (ASEAN, SAARC, APEC, SPF, etc.)**
- **Step 2**
  - **Build legal infrastructures based on existing bilateral structures; establish multilateral agreements**
- **Step 3**
  - **Establish several regional coordination centers**

UNCLASSIFIED

GROUP 3

Group 3 defined the current state of regional cooperation as bilateral; but not, as one International Fellow pointed out, a full bilateral network. The group noted that the current situation of bilateral cooperation does not include all the states in the region that otherwise should be involved. Also, all agreed that cooperation is currently based on shared interests, but not always on areas of mutual concern. An International Fellow pointed out that there is a need to recognize these differences. Mutual interests do not always outweigh a state's national interests. An International fellow pointed out that current cooperation efforts are heavily focused on terrorism. This focus is sometimes to the detriment of other important global issues.

Group members characterized current cooperation as static and conference-based. As an alternative, they proposed cooperation that is dynamic, ongoing, and with a continuous flow of information. The group mentioned that current cooperation is subject to political, legal, organizational, information technology (IT), and cultural constraints. IT constraints include the lack of interoperable technology and information systems. One International Fellow questioned the idea of cultural constraints. Two of the Fellows clarified that they meant different cultural styles of thinking and communication. The U.S. Fellow gave the example that in Asian societies, important subjects are discussed in very low voices whereas Americans tend to discuss important subjects in louder voices; the more important the subject, the louder Americans become. One participant expressed the need to find an intercultural "third way" to enable communication between different cultures. The skeptical participant maintained that there were no cultural differences that mattered. He used the example of his country and a neighboring country where tensions were high, and asserted that even though both sides disagreed in most areas, they could and did cooperate on the shared interest of countering narcotics. The following graphic represents Group 3's characterization of present-day cooperation:



The third group of Fellows characterized their vision of future cooperation as more multilateral, based on communities of interest, and even international, although bilateral and regional arrangements will continue. The group believes countries will understand their common interests and embrace differences. The Fellows noted that globalization will lead to a variety of diverse foci, based on emerging multinational threats. The group named some of the threats that might be bigger issues in 2010: environmental threats, involving water, air, and food supplies; economic threats, including poverty; cyber-threats; energy problems; and illegal immigration. One Fellow pointed out that even legal immigration was changing the nature of many developed countries. He characterized this as a "clash of hemispheres" or a clash between the developing countries and the developed ones. Poor countries are exporting their problems to the richer ones. Terrorism will remain, but not as the main focus of cooperation. Group 3 captured their vision of cooperation in the following graphic:



Finally, members of Group 3 agreed that identifying areas of common interest and concern is one important intermediate goal to achieving greater multilateralism. Another step suggested was the creation of a type of regionalism that is inclusive of all countries in the area. Next the group agreed on the importance of establishing regional information and intelligence-sharing hubs-although these may be virtual rather than physical hubs. The group also suggested facilitating human networking through regional leadership fora and regional training centers, and facilitating electronic networking through shared procedures. Finally, the group observed that addressing differences and building trust, in addition to addressing legal impediments to increased cooperation, were essential intermediary steps.

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Intermediate Steps

- **Step 1**
  - Identify areas of common concern and interests
  - Inclusive regionalism/communities of interest
  - Regional information sharing hubs
- **Step 2**
  - Human networking (developing procedures, understanding, etc.)
  - E-networking; establishing procedural & electronic interconnectivity
  - Training; regional training center
- **Step 3**
  - Address differences/build trust
  - Address legal impediments

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GROUP 4

Group 4 described the current situation of cooperation as one of great national and regional resilience. The group noted there were many organizations assisting cooperative efforts such as ASEAN, and the ASEAN/Prime Ministerial Conference (PMC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Additionally, bilateral relationships between external states and inter-regional relationships between countries facilitate cooperation. Finally, the Asian Development Bank was noted as an organization that encourages multilateral cooperation. The group noted that there are international organizations that promote multilateralism, but most cooperation is based on bilateral discussions and agreements between individual countries. Thus, few agreements are among multiple countries in the region.

Group 4 envisioned a world situation in 2010 where Asia is a "flashpoint." Existing problems have now moved to the forefront. Additionally, new problems can be expected to migrate to Asia from Iraq and Afghanistan as terrorism continues to be a threat. Furthermore, Asia faces economic problems and food shortages. Plausible scenarios include the development of a "NATO-like" organization

for Asia; that existing organizations might be refined and improved or that there might be a "coalition of the willing." Group IV was unable to predict which of these scenarios might develop.

Group 4's recommended intermediate steps began with a "Big Power" initiating changes in regional organizations. These changes include reviewing and calibrating memberships, and reviewing the relevance of existing organizations. Also, control of money flow would be tightened, and select multilateral (at least trilateral) dialogues would be initiated. Additionally, technical standardization would begin.

The group then identified the next set of intermediate steps required. The Fellows agreed that membership in organizations will continue to be calibrated throughout the process and the relevance of the organizations would continue to be reviewed. Tight control of money flow would continue, but the role of the "Big Power" would decrease. The number of reviews would increase, as well as the number of dialogues and participants. The group also suggested expanding the cooperation toward counternarcotics efforts.

The third set of intermediate steps that Group 4 identified continues to build upon the first two steps. Review and calibration of organizational membership continues. Dialogue expands in terms of the number of participants and frequency

of meetings. The role of the "Big Power" lessens and preferably disappears while regional power increases and becomes self-sustaining. Finally, regional efforts against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are expanded even further.



This presentation was the most controversial and led to the most discussion during the plenary session. One of the participants asked how the group reconciled the increase in problems migrating into Asia at the same time as expecting the role of the "Big Power" to decrease. Group 4's spokesman agreed that problems would not go away and would even increase, but they hope that regional players would come to be ever more in charge of the resolution of these problems. Another participant asked if the migration of problems to the region might actually play a positive role in uniting the region and creating regional cooperation. Group 4 agreed that is probable. Another participant asked if they had considered another "Big Power" besides the U.S., possibly India, Japan, or China? The group spokesman said that the non-U.S. members of the team had asked for an external "Big Power," but the ownership of the "Big Power" role could devolve in time to a regional country.

CONCLUSIONS

All four groups seemed to agree that current cooperation, especially in the information- and intelligence-sharing arena, is bilateral, with some key countries excluded. All agreed that in the ideal future, this would change to multilateral, more inclusive information sharing. Current cooperation is constrained by the lack of a common definition of "cooperation" as well as historical and cultural differences that would need to be overcome by intermediate steps. The final area of agreement was that the current focus for cooperation is very narrow. The Fellows agreed that cooperation should be broadened to include the global issues discussed during the International Intelligence Fellows Program, with recognition that global issues will change and grow in importance, and new issues will arise. Each group presented insightful and achievable intermediate steps, including the creation of new organizations, to transition toward ideal visions of cooperation in 2010.

CLOSING THOUGHTS

During the final seminar session, the International Intelligence Fellows were asked to reflect on the discussions of the previous two weeks. The program coordinator asked each Fellow to elaborate on the two most important points they absorbed during their time together. The following is a compilation of these points:

- Based on the discussions of the global war on terrorism, we need to be sensitive in making a distinction between the term terrorists and Muslims.
- When the participants were first introduced, they were just like names of countries. Now I can put a human face in the form of friends, where there used to be only place names on the map.
- Everyone has a common view with respect to counterterrorism...we can take a common stand and work together to solve the problem.
- Learned a great deal about the maritime aspects of the issues discussed...not enough information on this...more for next time.
- Counterterrorism is a global concern; there should not be barriers to intelligence and information sharing...no matter what the political situation; each country should work together on things like arms smuggling, human trafficking and narcotics because they all are connected to counterterrorism.
- After this conference is over, when we get back we should stay in touch, and let our governments know how important it is to continue working together.
- Global issues have so many different aspects and are connected in so many ways...lots of ideas on how to deal with them from this forum.
- Being able to understand our differences in this way, we can find common ground and can solve the issues working together.
- Being exposed to the different perspectives of various countries on cross-national issues was valuable.
- U.S. briefings on U.S. intelligence perspectives on various topics were very insightful.
- The information we learned here should be elevated in our governments to the policymakers.
- Marginalized countries like Burma, Laos and Vietnam should be contacted...we should extend cooperation to these nations because we need to understand their problems and how those problems contribute to the issues we have discussed here, such as counterterrorism.
- Suggest appointing a person from this group to be the informal point of contact for an e-mail list.

- Intelligence sharing with other nations, learning their culture and relationships with other nations proved very insightful.
- Understanding the problems of other countries in order to interact better.
- Senior U.S. officers exchanging views on vital topics of U.S. policy was very important...Mr. Rodman and RDML LeVitré understand the China-Taiwan situation very well. It was very reassuring.
- Suggest for the next iteration of the Fellows program, syllabi be made available to all attendees beforehand so that all can come prepared. Also, each participant could bring a specific issue to be discussed at length.
- The common thread in this program was terrorism, but after terrorism is dealt with, what is next? Global issues in the wake of counterterrorism success should be identified.
- Very interested in intelligence sharing, especially in the bilateral relationships I learned about...Intelligence priorities have changed from conventional military issues to things like terrorism, human trafficking, etc...this is a cause for optimism, since the common thread will lead to greater cooperation (intelligence and otherwise) between countries.
- Perhaps we can reduce the [redundant] comprehensiveness of each other's military and intelligence organizations...can we draw on each other's strengths?
- We need to communicate and work as a team, sharing responsibility for a peaceful global community.
- In response to what Mr. Rodman said yesterday about the resentment of U.S. forces in the Philippines, the influence of socialism and communism led to the closing of the bases, but right-thinking citizens think that the ousting of U.S. personnel weakened our relationship and some think it was a mistake.
- The wargame reinforced the need for common tactics, techniques, and procedures to be developed. Additionally, concept of operations (CONOPS) documents should be developed so that when we need to work together in an operation, we can bypass the stage for developing common language/definitions and such to begin operating more quickly.
- I was surprised at the unanimous agreement that more cooperation on intelligence sharing and multilateral agreements–through regional forums and multi-national training–is needed.
- Great discussion on the language issue in the global war on terrorism...the insensitivity to Islam and regional cultures with respect to terrorism should be examined...it is important to call Al-Qa'ida "Al-Qa'ida" rather than a radical Muslim group.
- Reintegrating countries like Burma into relationships and policy is going to be tough but should be done.

- More technological interoperability is needed in order to share information more effectively.
- The briefings on each country's intelligence organizations were very insightful...I was amazed by how many intelligence organizations are out there...there should have been more time for participants to discuss what works and does not work in their particular systems. I realize it is hard to talk about what does not work, but we would benefit from hearing about changes that were made to address specific problems and whether they worked and how.
- The importance of intelligence relationships...my country has most often looked to the U.S. and Europe, but coalition warfare means looking farther afield than that. Policymakers and ordinary citizens need to be exposed to the need for greater openness to such relationships–to open their eyes to different paths for interaction.
- This forum reminded me of the importance of the human side of relationships...the connections made during opportunities like this remind me of the value of face-to-face meetings for my customers as well as colleagues. It all works, at heart, on personal contact.
- The importance of alliances and strategic relationships was also brought home, especially our relationship with the U.S, and particularly at this time, during the war in Iraq. Views differ, and administrations change, but the alliance continues...the same goes for the other enduring alliances my country has in the region...this forum refreshed my understanding of the importance of that.
- I was pleased we did not have to "sell" multilateralism to this group. The development of that concept in the East Asian region is very important, and that importance arose on its own, without being foisted on the participants.
- Though we naturally focused on the desirable outcomes of working together, we did not go into why such cooperation has not come to pass...establishing trust in other nations' security apparatus is the first barrier to information sharing...bilateral relationships can grow into multilateral ones...we can build on relationships that already exist and maybe overcome the distrust.
- An appreciation for the gray areas...unlike law enforcement, in foreign affairs, clarity is elusive, and I understand some of the gray better now.
- Technology often leads to less human interaction, and increases detachment...opportunities like this decrease that detachment, allowing us to reconnect with individuals. We have to personalize relationships because at the bottom level, cooperation is between human beings.

The International Intelligence Fellows and Distinguished Guests enjoy a Farewell Dinner

EPILOGUE

In retrospect, the Fellows all agreed that the second iteration of the Joint Military Intelligence College's International Intelligence Fellows Program was a huge success. They valued the frank and candid comments provided by senior U.S. military and civilian leaders. The Fellows also appreciated the various perspectives on key regional security issues provided by both U.S. and Asia-Pacific guest speakers. The International Fellows contemplated the changes in the post-Cold War security environment and the implication of challenges stemming from transnational threats such as terrorism, narcotics, maritime piracy, and weapons of mass destruction. These issues served as the catalyst for the Fellows to propose various options for intelligence cooperation. Opportunities and impediments were identified; potential solutions to bridge gaps were explored. A "synthesis" exercise elicited suggestions for "the way ahead," as the Fellows offered four unique visions characterizing cooperation now and cooperation in the future. As a product of this exercise, the Fellows identified incremental steps required to attain their vision of cooperation.

The major finding brought out in these Proceedings is that Asia and its predominantly bilateral security architecture is now ready to evolve toward a multilateral framework for information and intelligence sharing. The current security environment encourages increased multilateral cooperation and the International Fellows repeated this theme throughout the two-week program. The Fellows agreed that increased intelligence cooperation is required to combat the complex nature of today's threats. Although terrorism is the polarizing issue of today, the Fellows believe that major issues of the future must also be identified to ensure continued cooperation.

Throughout the two-week curriculum, the International Intelligence Fellows engaged each other in meaningful, probing, and insightful dialogue. As a result of open and honest discussions, mutual trust and understanding was established among the Fellows. More importantly, the Fellows agreed to maintain the same cooperative spirit once they returned to their respective countries, with the greater purpose of influencing their policymakers and leaders. Although the Asia-Pacific region may not transform its security structures overnight, the participants of the second iteration of the International Intelligence Fellows Program made substantial progress in planting the seeds required for greater multilateral intelligence cooperation.

BIOGRAPHIES OF SENIOR LEADERS AND U.S. POLICYMAKERS

Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby
United States Navy
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby assumed duties as the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency on 17 October 2002. He has served in various leadership capacities in the Pacific including tours as the Commander, Joint Intelligence Center-Pacific (JICPAC) and the Director for Intelligence, U.S. Pacific Command. Admiral Jacoby previously served as Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence, 57th Director of Naval Intelligence, and Joint Staff J-2 before assuming his present duties.

A. Denis Clift
President
Joint Military Intelligence College

A. Denis Clift was appointed President of the Joint Military Intelligence College in 1994. In 1999, in his role as president of the college, Mr. Clift was elected to serve as a Commissioner on the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools for the term 2000-2002. Since 1992, he has also served as a U.S. Commissioner on the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on Prisoners of War/Missing in Action, a commission created by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin with the humanitarian goal of accounting for servicemen still missing from past conflicts.

The Honorable Peter W. Rodman
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

Peter W. Rodman has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs since 16 July 2001. He is a principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on the formulation and coordination of international security strategy and policy, with responsibility for East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Africa, and Latin America. Mr. Rodman was most recently Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center. Mr. Rodman has served as Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and NSC Counselor.

Dr. Thomas Fingar
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
United States Department of State

During the Fellows Program, Dr. Thomas Fingar was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Previous assignments in the Department include serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis, Director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, and Chief of the China Division. Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior Research Associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control, and Director of the University's U.S.-China Relations Program. Dr. Fingar is currently the Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Lieutenant General H.C. Stackpole
United States Marine Corps (Retired)
President, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

H. C. “Hank” Stackpole joined the Center from the private sector after serving as President of Loral Asia-Pacific, based in Tokyo. Prior to that time, he served in the United States Marine Corps for 36 years, retiring as a Lieutenant General in 1994 when he joined Loral. His last active-duty assignment began in July 1992 in Honolulu, Hawaii, as the Commander of Marine Forces Pacific, the single largest U. S. Marine Field Command in the world. Concurrently, he planned and supervised the stand-up of the Combined Marine Forces Command, the Marine component in Korea responsible for a force of more than 150,000 military personnel from two nations and five services.

Brigadier General Michael E. Ennis
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
Director of Intelligence

During the Fellows Program, Brigadier General Ennis was serving as the Commandant’s Director of Intelligence at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Recent tours in the Pacific include Commander of the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 of the III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa. General Ennis is a Russian Foreign Area Officer. He was assigned to Moscow, Russia, where he served as the Assistant Naval Attaché and as the U.S. Military representative to Azerbaijan. General Ennis is currently the Director for Human Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency.

Rear Admiral Robert B. Murrett
United States Navy
Vice Director for Intelligence, J2
Joint Staff

Rear Admiral Robert B. Murrett was assigned as the Vice Director for Intelligence, J2, on the Joint Staff in January 2002. Previous tours include Director for Intelligence, U.S. Joint Forces Command; Commander, Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC); and Director, Intelligence Directorate, Office of Naval Intelligence. Additionally, he served on the Chief of Naval Operations Staff as Executive Assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence. Admiral Murret has extensive sea duty experience, including numerous deployments to the Mediterranean, North Atlantic, and Western Pacific.