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**Phase Zero Operations for Contingency and Expeditionary
Contracting—Keys to Fully Integrating Contracting Into
Operational Planning and Execution**

2 August 2010

by

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Graduate School of Business & Public Policy

Naval Postgraduate School

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The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has published several works that highlight significant progress in the planning and execution of Operational Contract Support. For example, The Yoder Three-tier Model for Optimal Planning and Execution of Contingency Contracting (YTTM) research project (NPS-AM-05-002) the Joint Effects-based Contracting project (NPS-AM-08-127), and many others are recent published works that may be instrumental in shaping public and military policy related to the structure, planning, and execution of Operational Contract Support. Of particular note is the NPS Joint Effects-based Contracting project (NPSAM- 08-127), which created a new concept of Operational Contract Support and developed and exercised simulation modeling to demonstrate the efficacy of the concepts. A key element of the work was the identification and creation of a Phase ?0? operational model. The results are that with the Phase ?0? concept in operation significant efficiencies and greater effectiveness can be achieved in planning and executing any operation requiring Operational Contract Support. This sponsored research report proposes and formulates the concept of contract integration into joint doctrine and planning documents as a key element of meeting potential gains in efficiency and effectiveness of operations, and in meeting elements of the revised title 10 U.S.C. section 2333, directly shaping public policy. Of particular concern to the author is that despite significant movement and progress in developing the Operational Contract Support construct, joint planners and practitioners in supported and supporting roles are still suboptimized due to the lack of an integrated structure and construct at the joint strategic level. The early planning phase parleyed terminology utilized by the warfighter and planning communities, aptly titled Phase Zero operations, that is, all planning and exercising that can and should occur prior to an actual real-world event or before a contingency crisis is manifest. The clear purpose and intent of this research is to provide a concept model that can guide planners and resource holders to create and utilize the recommended mix of personnel, platforms, and protocols to achieve better contracted effects, create efficiencies and effectiveness, and improve business operations across the full spectrum of war and peacetime operations. The research incorporates a thorough examination and review of key literature germane to the background and development of the work. The author creates a framework of integration into Phase Zero ? shaping phase- doctrine and provides the construct for operation reality.

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Abstract

The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has published several works that highlight significant progress in the planning and execution of Operational Contract Support. For example, *The Yoder Three-tier Model for Optimal Planning and Execution of Contingency Contracting* (YTTM) research project (NPS-AM-05-002), the Joint Effects-based Contracting project (NPS-AM-08-127), and many others are recent published works that may be instrumental in shaping public and military policy related to the structure, planning, and execution of Operational Contract Support.

Of particular note is the NPS Joint Effects-based Contracting project (NPS-AM-08-127), which created a new concept of Operational Contract Support and developed and exercised simulation modeling to demonstrate the efficacy of the concepts. A key element of the work was the identification and creation of a Phase “0” operational model. The results are that with the Phase “0” concept in operation, significant efficiencies and greater effectiveness can be achieved in planning and executing any operation requiring Operational Contract Support.

This sponsored research report proposes and formulates the concept of contract integration into joint doctrine and planning documents as a key element of meeting potential gains in efficiency and effectiveness of operations, and in meeting elements of the revised title 10 U.S.C. section 2333, directly shaping public policy. Of particular concern to the author is that despite significant movement and progress in developing the Operational Contract Support construct, joint planners and practitioners in supported and supporting roles are still suboptimized due to the lack of an integrated structure and construct at the joint strategic level.

The early planning phase parleyed terminology utilized by the warfighter and planning communities, aptly titled *Phase Zero* operations, that is, all planning and exercising that can and should occur prior to an actual real-world event or before a contingency crisis is manifest. The clear purpose and intent of this research is to



provide a concept model that can guide planners and resource holders to create and utilize the recommended mix of personnel, platforms, and protocols to achieve better contracted effects, create efficiencies and effectiveness, and improve business operations across the full spectrum of war and peacetime operations.

The research incorporates a thorough examination and review of key literature germane to the background and development of the work. The author creates a framework of integration into Phase Zero – shaping phase- doctrine and provides the construct for operation reality.

This work will formulate and further develop operational construct concepts into executable concepts for incorporation into joint doctrine, planning documents, and business operations, and will explore implications for war-fighters, logisticians, and contracting offices. Specific conclusions and recommendations are provided in the final chapter, along with areas recommended for further research.

The concepts developed and presented in this research report will meet the warfighter and legislative requirements for improved integrative planning, and will be optimized to complement and best support the Unified Combatant Commander's desired effects as iterated in the Operation Plans and Operation Orders - OPLAN and OPORD - by incorporating a holistic approach of the right mix of credentialed personnel; refinement and utilization of existing platforms utilized in the joint planning environment; and implementing, exercising, and fully employing forward-leaning protocols necessary for the creation of a sound business effect.

Keywords: Contracting, Contingency Contracting, Expeditionary Contracting, Joint Planning, Joint Contract and Logistics Planning, Contracting workforce, Joint Doctrine, *Joint Publication JP 4-10*, Operational Phasing, Effects-based Contracting, Yoder Three-tier Model, Joint Operations Planning, Operational Contract Support, Operational Contracting Support, OCS.



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Lastly, I thank my mother, Dixie Yoder, for her continued mentorship, encouragement and excitement for my work at the Naval Postgraduate School.



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- *Contracting Out Government Procurement Functions: An Analysis* (NPS-CM-07-105), E. Cory Yoder and Dr. David V. Lamm (presented at the Acquisition Symposium in May 2008).
- *Capitalizing on Commercial Item Designation Provisions of FAR 13.5; Getting the Most from Limited Resources* (NPS-AM-06-049), E. Cory Yoder.
- *Engagement versus Disengagement: How Structural & Commercially Based Regulatory Changes Have Increased Government Risks in Federal Acquisitions* (NPS-AM-05-001), E. Cory Yoder.



- Publications resulting from CDR (Ret) Yoder's *Engagement versus Disengagement* NPS working paper include the following:
 - o Published in the peer-reviewed *Journal of Public Procurement (JOPP)* December 2007, Volume 7, Issue 2.
 - o The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) has published this work as a "white paper," retaining its NPS branding. POGO is a nationally recognized leader in Government acquisition oversight and policy analysis, and provides testimony on key topics to Congress.
 - o Referenced and cited in the *Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations*, Dr. Jacques Gansler, Chairman, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), October 31, 2007.
 - o Referenced and cited in the *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Management and Oversight in Acquisition Organizations*, USD (AT&L), Washington, DC, March 2005.
- *Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimal Planning and Execution of Contingency Contracting* (NPS-AM-05-002).

Publications resulting from CDR (Ret) Yoder's Three-Tier Model NPS working paper include the following:

- o Referenced and cited in the *Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations*, Dr. Jacques Gansler, Chairman, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), October 31, 2007.
- o Referenced and cited in the *July 2006 Special Inspector General Report for Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement*, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2006.
- o Presented at the 2005 Acquisition Research Symposium in Monterey, California, and included in the proceedings of the Second Annual Acquisition Research Symposium, *Acquisition Research: The Foundation for Innovation*, May 2005.



- o Published as “Contingency Contracting Operations—Achieving Better Results,” an excerpt in the *Army AL&T Magazine*, January-February 2004 edition.

CDR Yoder is a Beta Gamma Sigma honor society member with a lifetime appointment; he is certified DAWIA Contract Level III; he is an active member of the Institute for Supply Management (ISM); and he holds an active Top Secret security clearance.





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Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the Federal Government.



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Table of Contents

I.	Introduction and Objectives.....	1
A.	Background	1
B.	Objective and Purpose of the Research—Key Planning Elements .	3
C.	Research Questions	5
D.	Methodology and Scope.....	5
E.	Terminology.....	7
F.	Research Limitations	7
G.	Chapter Summary—Report Content.....	8
II.	Joint Planning Environment—Calls for Integrative Planning.....	11
A.	Mandates for Joint and Integrative Planning	12
B.	Joint Operation Planning Framework and Joint Doctrine.....	14
C.	Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)—Platform & Protocol Framework	16
D.	Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support.....	19
E.	DoD Directive 3020.49, Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution	23
III.	Premise of the Yoder Three-Tier Model and Joint Effects-Based Contracting Execution System (JEBCES) and Phase Zero	25
A.	Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTTM)	25
B.	The YTTM Conclusions and Recommendations	30
C.	The Yoder Three-Tier Model Gains Traction in the Broader Community	32
D.	YTTM Summary and Implications for this Phase Zero Research ..	32



E.	Yoder Three-Tier Model as a Building Block for Additional Research and the Joint Effects-Based Contracting and Execution System (JEBCES)	33
F.	The Joint Effects-Based Contracting Execution System (JEBCES): A Proposed Enabling Concept for Future Joint Expeditionary Contracting Execution	33
G.	Chapter Summary	40
IV.	Integrating YTTM & JEBCES in Phase Zero.....	41
A.	Introduction.....	41
B.	Key Pillars for Integrative Success: Personnel, Platforms, Protocols.....	42
C.	Addressing Universal Questions of Integration.....	43
D.	Time-Phase Integrated Product—The Contracting Support Integration Plan (CSIP)	63
E.	Process Mapping—Laying Out the Integrated Concept.....	65
F.	Chapter Summary and Conclusion.....	65
V.	Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications for Policy Makers: Phase Zero Contracting Operations.....	67
A.	Introduction.....	67
B.	Conclusions and Implications	69
C.	Recommendations.....	73
D.	Areas for Additional Research	74
E.	Final Summary	75
	List of References.....	77



I. Introduction and Objectives

A. Background

The Department of Defense's (DoD) use of contractors has increased dramatically in the past decade. In Iraq alone, the number of contractor personnel now exceeds the number of uniformed military personnel. Congress has recently increased scrutiny and expressed concern over the significant challenges that the DoD faces in planning, executing, and managing Operational Contract Support. Among the many challenges are, for example, failure to adequately integrate contracting into operation planning, exercising and employment in actual crisis events. To address these concerns, Congress enacted an amendment to title 10 U.S.C. adding section 2333 directing the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint policy for contingency and Operational Contract Support requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency operations during combat and post-conflict operations. This mandate, in addition to concepts presented in this paper, create the framework for a better structure for planning and executing joint planning. The research proposes concepts for integrating contract support into comprehensive plans for effective and efficient utilization of contractors in supporting roles across the full spectrum of war, peacetime, and other operations in which contractors will be integral to mission success.

To date, Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports indicate that some progress has been made in Operational Contract Support. However, it is essential that additional progress be made to ensure effective and efficient integration of contracted support into operations plans (OPLANs) and operations orders (OPORDs) in order to meet the increasing demands of the warfighter, the congressional overseers, and for the increased and continued confidence of the American taxpayers.



The Naval Postgraduate School has published several works that highlight significant progress in the planning and execution of Operational Contract Support. For example, The Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) (NPS-AM-05-002), the Joint Effects-based Contracting project (NPS-AM-08-127), and many others, are recent published works that may be instrumental in shaping public and military policy related to the structure, planning, and execution of Operational Contract Support.

Of particular note is the NPS Joint Effects-based Contracting project (NPS-AM-08-127), which created a new concept of operational contract support and developed and exercised simulation modeling to demonstrate the efficacy of the concepts. Among key elements of the work was the identification and creation of a Phase Zero operational model. The results are that with the Phase Zero concept in operation, significant efficiencies and greater effectiveness can be achieved in planning and executing any operation requiring Operational Contract Support.

This sponsored research report proposes the concept of integration into joint doctrine and planning documents as a key element in meeting potential gains in efficiency and effectiveness of operations, and in meeting essential elements directly shaping public policy. Of particular concern to the author is that despite significant movement and progress in developing the Operational Contract Support (OCS) construct, joint planners and practitioners in supported and supporting roles are still suboptimizing due to lack of an integrated structure and construct at the joint strategic level.

This work will construct and further develop operational construct concepts into executable concepts for incorporation into joint doctrine, planning documents, business operations, and it will explore implications for warfighters, logisticians, and contracting offices. Specific conclusions and recommendations are provided in the final chapter, along with areas recommended for further research.



This research incorporates a thorough examination and review of key literature germane to the background and development of this work. It creates a concept of integration to show the structure and conduct of integrating Phase Zero into doctrine and provides the construct for sound operation reality.

B. Objective and Purpose of the Research—Key Planning Elements

Planning and exercising is essential for warfighters and business practitioners alike. In the Unified Combatant Commanders' arena, a significant amount of time, energy, and resources are devoted to the integrative planning and exercising of war plans. However, the same level of time, energy, and resources have been woefully omitted in integrating a key complementary support element for traditional logistics plans in even the most critical of Operations Plans (OPLANs)—including the plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom (Anderson & Flaherty, 2003). Integrated planning, wherein contract support design is fully integrated into operation plans and is fully exercised, is an essential and imperative element of sound doctrine and business practice. To highlight the need for integrative planning and the significant lack of an integrated planning structure, which failed to incorporate contracting into major war plans, joint applied project authors Flaherty and Anderson (2003) examined the Operation Iraqi Freedom OPLAN/OPORD Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) and found that it was regrettably deficient, and that it lacked sufficient structure and necessary detail.

The planning of military operations should take into account all of the critical and essential elements to create the desired effect in concert and harmony with the Unified Combatant Commander's intent. The researcher published a working paper titled *The Yoder Three-Tier Model for Optimal Planning and Execution of Contingency Contracting* (2003) that created the construct for a tiered structure, capitalizing on specific credential, experiential, and educational criteria for assignment of personnel for strategic and operational



planning and operational and tactical execution of contracting functions (Yoder, 2004).

Subsequently, student researchers, and joint applied project and Acquisition Research Program sponsored research authors Kelly Poree, Karina Curtis, Jeremy Morrill, and Steven Sherwood (2008a, 2008b), further developed the Yoder Three-tier Model through incorporation of key planning elements and methodologies, such as strategic purchasing analysis, in the joint planning construct. These researchers created a modeling and simulation that used sensitivity analysis, with varying degrees of utilization of proposed concepts, to demonstrate the efficacy of higher integrative planning concepts. The results were striking in that prior contract planning and integration utilizing specific concepts such as, spend analysis and creation of “ready” contracts, created a huge return in capability “effects” and reduction of cycle time response to the warfighter.

The early planning phase parlayed terminology utilized by the warfighter and planning communities, aptly titled *Phase Zero* operations, that is, all planning and exercising that can and should occur before an actual real-world event or contingency crisis is manifest. The clear purpose and intent of this research is to provide a concept model that can guide planners and resource holders to create and utilize the recommended mix of personnel, platforms, and protocols to achieve better contracted effects, create efficiencies and effectiveness, and improve business operations across the full spectrum of war and peacetime operations.

The concept development presented in this research report will meet the warfighters’ and the legislative requirements for improved integrative planning, and will be optimized to complement and best support the Unified Combatant Commander’s desired effects as iterated in the OPLANs and OPORDs. This is accomplished by incorporating a holistic approach including the right mix of credentialed personnel; the refinement and utilization of existing platforms used



in the joint planning environment; and, the implementing, exercising, and full employment of forward-leaning protocols necessary for the creation of a sound business effect.

C. Research Questions

The primary research question is: How can the Yoder Three-tier Model and Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution Systems improve DoD and joint contingency contracting support planning processes?

In order to answer the primary question, five subsidiary questions are posed, addressed, and answered:

1. What current initiatives are targeted at improving joint contingency contract planning?
2. What are the key elements of the Yoder Three-tier Model and the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System, and do they complement current initiatives?
3. What primary pillars, or elements, are required for optimizing joint contingency contract planning?
4. How can the Yoder Three-tier Model and the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System be integrated at the strategic planning level to optimize results?
5. What policy implications are inherent if the research conclusions and recommendations are followed?

D. Methodology and Scope

I conducted a thorough and extensive literature review, utilized graduate student teams (i.e., working groups) to analyze doctrine and written policies, and capitalized on personal experience and imagination to develop this body of work and its concepts. A more detailed explanation of the methodology follows.

I conducted a thorough and extensive examination and review of existing published works, including, but not limited to, Joint Doctrine, Commission



Reports (Gansler, 2007; –CWCIA, 2009, Department of Defense directives and instructions, student theses and joint applied projects, sponsored research and working papers, Congressional Research Service reports, Government Accountability Office reports and testimony, and published documentation, slides, and reports from Joint and Service community planners, contracting experts, and practitioners.

Additionally, two teams of graduate students were utilized to examine and provide critical assessment of “Phase Zero” operations (planning in advance of a real event) in respect to contingency contracting, including, but not limited to: (1) the Yoder Three-tier Model (Yoder, 2004); (2) the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System (Poree, et al., 2008a, 2008b); (3) *Joint Publication 4-10* (CJCS, 2008b); and (4) other pertinent referenced documents. Team 1 consisted of 19 uniformed officers from the Army and the Navy and international students enrolled in the Naval Postgraduate School’s MBA program. Team 1 was in their fifth program quarter (out of six total quarters) and enrolled in the MN3318 Contingency Contracting course. The mix of Team 1 students ranked on average at the 0-3 to 0-4 level and about half of them had at least one prior tour in a contingency or expeditionary operational billet. Team 2 consisted of 15 students enrolled in the Master’s of Science in Contract Management (MSCM) curriculum in their sixth quarter of an eight-quarter program. This group predominantly consisted of Department of the Army civilian 1102 series contract specialists. A majority of these students were DAWIA Con Level II or III, with an average of seven years of experience in contracting positions.

When either subject-matter experts or student teams were utilized, the DoD and NPS mandated that Institutional Review Board (IRB) protocols be followed to ensure full notification of the intent to use information gathered for research purposes and related compliance. All information gathered via contact with individuals and/or groups was subject to a prior verbal “consent to use” provision.



Based on the literature review, consultations, and student team analyses, the author created the framework and concept structure for Joint Effects-based Contracting and Phase Zero Operations, incorporating key pillars that the author considers essential for effective implementation: (1) personnel, (2) platforms, and (3) protocols for integrated planning and execution of contracting functions in OPLANs and OPORDs in harmony with the Unified Combatant Commander's intent and effect.

E. Terminology

The author recognizes that many in the contracting community may not be well versed in the terminology associated with the joint warfighter community and vice versa. In that regard, every effort has been made to ensure that definitions are provided or that concepts are fully explained. The intent is to ensure that the research product is useful to planners, contracting experts, and warfighters, thereby increasing the potential utility of the work in shaping public policy and practices.

F. Research Limitations

The structure and presentation of this research is designed to provide information on the Joint planning process framework, on the background and premise of the Joint Effects-based Contracting (JEBC), and on Phase Zero operations as appropriate in order for the sponsor and readers to have a useful and meaningful concept for real-world integration and implementation into existing doctrine and practice. Utilization of existing platforms and processes are paramount because the intent is not to re-invent or change elements of the Joint Planning Process that are currently in place and working. The author developed concepts that rely on existing planning platforms and protocols while adding the critical capability analysis function that is currently lacking at the strategic level.



Limitations include those associated with concept development. Specifically, while the concepts were tested through simulation, they will still require actual implementation and refinement, a process that will naturally require additional commitment, dedication, time, and resources. Specific recommendations at the conclusion of this report will address these issues.

G. Chapter Summary—Report Content

This introduction and objectives chapter provided the background, purpose, methodology, and limitations of this sponsored research report.

The following chapter, Chapter II, provides an overview of the Joint Planning environment with particular emphasis on recently introduced doctrine and policy, including *Joint Publication 4-10 Operational Contracting Support*, *DoD Directive 3020.49 Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Contract Support*, and recent mandates to integrate contracting into the Joint Planning system, including title 10 U.S.C. section 2333 of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act and its implications for contingency and expeditionary contract support planning and execution.

Chapter III, Background and Premise of JEBC and Phase Zero, provides an overview of the Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) (Yoder, 2004), its incorporation in subsequent reports and recommendations, and its use as a building block for the next step in contract planning integration. Chapter III also includes key elements of the Joint Effects-based Contracting student MBA Acquisition Research Program project to demonstrate the potential gains from fully integrated planning and execution.

Chapter IV, Integrating YTTM and Phase Zero, presents the required concept for integrating the personnel, platforms, and protocols effectively.

Chapter V, Conclusions and Recommendations, provides the specific conclusions and related recommendations, including areas for further research



and recommendations for an implementation strategy, imperative for policy makers, senior planners within joint and service planning, Unified Combatant Commanders (COCOMs), agencies and service components, and service communities including the logistics and contracting functional area groups.



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II. Joint Planning Environment—Calls for Integrative Planning

This chapter provides a construct of the Joint Planning Environment and a review of key documents germane to this study. This information is important for those interested in placing the researcher's model into the broader context of joint planning and execution.

An extensive review of historical and recent literature was conducted with the objective of determining (1) historical backdrop; (2) recent and pertinent legislative, doctrinal, and operational references; and (3) current academic works related to integrative planning and exercising of phase zero operations.

The primary sources of literature include, but are not limited to, (1) Joint Publications (doctrine), including *Joint Publication 4-10* and *Joint Publication 4-0*; (2) Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that highlight current initiatives and legislation and provide critical analysis; (3) Department of Defense (DoD) reports, directives, and instructions; (4) NPS joint applied projects; (5) NPS Acquisition Research Program sponsored research reports and working papers; (6) current website publications and postings from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff, including J-4 (Joint Logistics), Army Contracting Command (ACC), the Naval Expeditionary Contracting Command (NECC), and other key Service-affiliated websites; and, (7) other key documents as referenced herein.¹

¹ The author reviewed hundreds of relevant documents for this research, totaling over 4,000 pages. Those with particular importance are referenced and/or cited herein and used for establishing the continuity and harmony of the research model against existing Federal mandates, doctrines, and policies.



A. Mandates for Joint and Integrative Planning

The formal requirement for joint planning is not new. In fact, it dates back to the inception of the statutory mandate for Joint structure and command under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, reworked the command structure of the United States military. It increased the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, implementing some of the suggestions from the Packard Commission formed by President Ronald Reagan in 1985. The statutory provision created joint billet coding, wherein Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) billets in key functional areas required personnel with joint credentials that had been attained through education and experience. The joint requirement, along with the structural changes that Goldwater-Nichols created via the Joint Command structure, revolutionized the way forces are structured, trained and exercised. However, the author contends that this requirement, in and of itself, did not guarantee that joint and integrative planning in the contracting arena occurred.

Problems encountered in creating and executing comprehensive plans in contracting were manifest despite the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Operation Iraqi Freedom and the huge theater contracting effect that ensued had little, if any, joint and integrated contract planning in the early phases of the operation.²

² The author recommends the NPS joint applied project by Anderson and Flaherty (2003) for the examination of the Operation Iraqi Freedom Operation Plans (OPLANs) and other referenced works from the Government Accountability Office (2004, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e, 2009f, 2009g, 2010a, 2010b), Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) (?), the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWCIA-I/A) (2009), the “Gansler” Report (2007), etc., for a comprehensive examination of the negative effects of the lack of coordinated and integrative planning on military and business operations.



Congress, the GAO, and others have frequently reported on, or expressed concerns about, the long-standing challenges that the DoD faces when managing operational contract support. These challenges include a failure to adequately plan for the use of contractors, poorly defined or changing requirements, a lack of deployable contracting personnel with contingency contracting experience, and difficulties in coordinating contracts and contractor management across military Services in joint contingency environments. Furthermore, as previously stated, the DoD has not provided a sufficient number of trained contract oversight and management personnel in contingency operations, and visibility of contracting activities and contractors has been limited. As we have testified, problems associated with the DoD's inability to overcome these challenges have resulted in higher costs, schedule delays, unmet goals, and negative operational impacts. To respond to these concerns, Congress enacted an amendment to title 10 of the U.S. Code adding section 2333, which directed the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint policies by April 2008 for requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting during combat and post-conflict operations. In January 2008, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, hereafter referred to as the NDAA FY08, amended section 2333 to add a new subparagraph directing that these joint policies provide for the training of military personnel outside of the acquisition workforce who are expected to have acquisition responsibilities such as oversight of contracts or contractors during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations. Additionally, NDAA FY08 directed the GAO to review the DoD's joint policies and determine the extent to which those policies and the implementation of such policies complied with the requirements of section 2333 of title 10 of the U.S. Code³ (GAO, 2008).

³ What happened next, in the 2008–present time frame, was a huge push toward getting the



B. Joint Operation Planning Framework and Joint Doctrine

Joint doctrine publications and DoD directives and guidance have recently incorporated many changes to address contracting process integration, to include, but not limited to: *Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support* (CJCS, 2008b); *DoD Directive 3020.49, Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution* (USD[AT&L],2009), and GAO references highlighting title 10 U.S.C. section 2333 of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Act, Overview and Implications for Contingency Operations. These documents, along with all other referenced materials, working groups, and the researcher's professional and academic experiences, provide the analytical framework for placing the Yoder Three-tier Model and the Joint Effects-based Contracting System into a cohesive model for implementation across the Services and in the Joint Unified Combatant Command structure.

Understanding the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is essential for any practitioner, planner, contracting officer, or senior leader with a role in the design, planning, construct, exercise, and, ultimately, utilization of contracting for any joint operation. And, quite frankly, most, if not all, modern operations have a joint requirement. According to Richard W. Goodale, Jr., in "Planning for War: A System," "planning must be visionary, quick, flexible, and adaptive. To achieve that end, we must understand the architecture of the planning system and on-going initiatives to improve" (1994).

strategic doctrinal framework, service policies, and operational organization policies in place and in practice in order to address and overcome the identified deficiencies. A review of key elements is presented in this chapter. However, I contend that doctrinal and operational personnel, platform, and protocol shortfalls still exist that will sub-optimize and hinder the effective and efficient integrative planning for joint contracting operations, and propose in Chapters IV and V a concept model designed to address those shortfalls.



Joint Publication 5-0 (CJCS, 2006) entitled, *Joint Operational Planning*, is the overarching doctrine mandated for utilization by all Services and the Joint community. *Joint Publication 5-0*, along with the other Joint doctrine publications, including *Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics Planning* (CJCS, 2008a), and *Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support* (CJCS, 2008b) discussed subsequently, must be utilized in concert to achieve an integrated logistics and contracting support plan. These joint publications have all undergone recent revisions to reflect the need for more comprehensive examination and integration of doctrinal concepts aimed at providing a better support capability for operations. The recent rewriting of the Joint Publications, “reflects the current doctrine for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational planning activities across the full range of military operations. This vital keystone publication forms the core of joint warfighting doctrine and establishes the framework for our forces’ ability to fight as a joint team” (CJCS, 2006).

All doctrine must be utilized as the overarching strategic framework for planning, force structuring, and process protocol. Joint doctrine, according to the Joint Chiefs’ and iterate,

[Joint doctrine] applies to the Joint Staff; to commanders of Unified Combatant Commands, sub-unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and combat support agencies; and to the Services. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. (CJCS, 2006)



Given the aforementioned mandate to follow joint doctrine for any doctrinal and/or procedural protocol, the researcher thoroughly examined current doctrine to ensure that the model constructs of the Yoder Three-tier Model, the Joint Effects-based Contracting and Execution System, and the main purpose of this research, creating the Phase Zero model, is harmonious with, and complementary to, established doctrine. For more in-depth information about the contextual framework, examine the referenced documents.

C. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)—Platform & Protocol Framework

According to *Joint Publication 5-0*, “Joint operation planning includes all activities that must be accomplished to plan for an anticipated operation—the mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces. Planners recommend and commanders define criteria for the termination of joint operations and establish criteria for attainment and achievement of the end state. Joint operation planning is an inherent command responsibility established by law and directive” (CJCS, 2006). This publication provides the doctrinal framework for all other activities related to joint operational planning. Within this construct, *Joint Publication 5-0* states:

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) share the same basic approach and problem-solving elements, such as mission analysis and course of action development. The combination of JOPES and JOPP promotes coherent planning across all levels of war and command echelons, whether the requirement is for a limited, single-phase operation such as noncombatant evacuation or for a multiphase campaign involving high-intensity combat operations. JOPES formally integrates the planning activities of the entire JPEC during the initial planning and plan refinement that occurs both in peacetime and when faced with an imminent crisis. While JOPES activities span many organizational levels, the focus is on the interaction which ultimately helps the President and Sec Def decide when, where, and how to commit US military capabilities in response to a foreseen contingency or an unforeseen crisis. JOPP is a less formal but



proven analytical process, which provides a methodical approach to planning at any organizational level and at any point before and during joint operations. The focus of JOPP is on the interaction between an organization's commander, staff, the commanders and staffs of the next higher and lower commands, and supporting commanders and their staffs to develop a joint operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD) for a specific mission. (CJCS, 2006)



Figure 1. **Overview of Joint Operation Planning (CJCS, 2006)**

JOPES, in essence, provides the platform and associated protocols required for its employment and for the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical elements in the planning, exercising, and execution of complex military operations. It is also the network of systems and people required to coordinate all the efforts in peacetime and wartime environments. JOPES can be viewed as the heart of the “system” utilized in the joint planning community, as evidenced in Figures 1 and 2.





Figure 2. **Planning Concepts and JOPES (CJCS, 2006)**

D. Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support

Joint Publication 4-10 entitled *Operational Contract Support* (CJCS, 2008) created doctrine designed to address many of the shortcomings associated with a lack of comprehensive strategic-level contracting doctrine prior to its publication. Additionally, it fulfilled an essential statutory mandate under title 10 U.S.C. section 2333, as was discussed earlier. *Joint Publication 4-10* established doctrine for planning, conducting, and assessing operational contract support integration and contractor management functions in support of joint operations, and it provides standard guidance and information related to integrating operational contract support and contractor management (CJCS, 2008b).

Joint Publication 4-10 created the doctrinal, strategic-level concept, and promotes Operational Contract Support (OCS), which is “the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations along with the associated contractor management functions. Successful operational contract support is the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing that support” (CJCS, 2008b). Like much of U.S. doctrine, OCS under *Joint Publication 4-10* calls for centralized planning with decentralized control.

The doctrine created under *Joint Publication 4-10* emphasizes a key role for Unified Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) in relation to integrated planning and assigns unique functional roles and responsibilities to the joint staff codes under joint authority. Figure 3 provides an excerpt from *Joint Publication 4-10* that gives specific guidance on this subject.⁴

⁴ *Joint Publication 4-10* creates flow-down doctrinal responsibilities in addition to the CCDRs listed in Figure 4. However, for the purposes of my model creation and presentation, the CCDR, or COCOM, level and that of the specific Service components is most germane for the



5. Combatant Commanders and Subordinate Joint Force Commanders

a. **Supported CCDRs** play a key role in determining and synchronizing contracted support requirements, contracting planning as well as execution of operational contract support oversight. The supported CCDR must work very closely with the appropriate subordinate JFCs, functional combatant commands, Service components, and DOD combat support agencies to determine operational contract support requirements, policies, and procedures. Supported CCDRs' specific contracting support and contractor management roles and responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

(1) Developing and publishing applicable regulations, instructions, and directives for the conduct of efficient and effective synchronization of operational contract support.

(2) Developing a CSIP as part of every OPLAN or OPORD that includes specific contract support integration related organizational guidance and lead Service or joint theater support contracting command responsibilities as applicable.

(3) Establishing, manning, and executing appropriate operational contract support related boards, centers, and working groups.

(4) Developing and promulgating contractor management plans to include theater entrance requirements for all CAAF to include specific delineation of the differences between US citizens and non-US citizens in government furnished support standards.

(5) Integrating and controlling the deployment of CAAF and contractor equipment.

(6) Planning and managing CAAF government furnished support requirements.

(7) In coordination with the Joint Staff, reviewing, developing, and promulgating predeployment training standards for CAAF.

Figure 3. **Excerpt from Joint Publication 4-10**
(CJCS, 2008b, pp. II-8–II-9)

discussion. Readers are encouraged to examine *Joint Publication 4-10* in detail for a greater understanding and appreciation of the doctrinal provisions.



The doctrine also creates uniquely identified service component functions that must be examined in concert with the roles of the CCDRs. Figure 4 is an excerpt from *Joint Publication 4-10* that outlines these roles.

6. Service Component Commands

The Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force Service component commands are responsible for planning and executing contracting support IAW the guidance received from their respective Military Departments and supported JFC. Specific operational contract support related Service component roles and responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

- a. Unless otherwise directed, providing HCA over Service theater support contracting organizations within their operational area.
- b. Executing or supporting lead Service contracting responsibilities as directed.
- c. Analyzing existing and projected Service theater support and DOD-wide external support contracts in order to reduce any redundancy and maximize economy of effort.
- d. Enforcing JFC established priorities of contract support across the joint force, multinational partners, and OGAs.
- e. Determining operational specific contracting and contract management personnel force requirements and capturing these requirements in Service component CSIPs, per JFC guidance.



- f. Ensuring funds are available to support contract requirements.
- g. Developing and enforcing policies and directives that are based on JFC and military Service guidance.
- h. Ensuring all CAAF meet specific theater entrance requirements prior to deployment to the operational area.
- i. Ensuring all CAAF and their associated equipment are properly incorporated into deployment plans regardless if this deployment is via military means or self-supported.
- j. Ensuring subordinate units are prepared to execute operational contract support responsibilities to include developing “acquisition ready” requirements packages consisting of PWSs, IGEs, and other contract related documents as necessary and by providing trained CORs as required.
- k. Executing operational specific collective and individual contract support integration and contract management training requirements.
- l. Developing contingency plans to ensure continuation of essential contractor services, per DOD policy.
- m. Collecting and distributing operational contract support lessons learned to the appropriate Service lessons learned program.

Figure 4. **Excerpt from Joint Publication 4-10**
(CJCS, 2008b, pp. II-10, II-11)

Joint Publication 4-10 integrated two key and instrumental agencies into the doctrine: the Defense Contract Management Agency and the Defense Contract Audit Agency. This integration, in addition to creating the strategic framework for creation of the Contracting Support Integration Plan (discussed in Chapter IV), was monumental at creating the strategic framework required to fully integrate contracting into operation plans and in the conduct of business across the spectrum of war.



E. DoD Directive 3020.49, Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution

In a monumental step towards better contract planning integration, DoD published *DoD Directive 3020.49* (USD[AT&L], 2009), establishing the policy and assigned the responsibilities for program management for the preparation and execution of acquisitions for contingency operations. This directive further stipulates that all DoD service components be in full compliance with statutory and doctrinal requirements under the aforementioned statutes. As the directive title clearly states, the service components must perform the orchestration, synchronization, and integration of programmatic and systems contractual support within operations plans (USD[AT&L], 2009, para. 4[d]). In other words, all weapons systems that will be deployed for military operations must have an integrated contract support plan,⁵ fully integrated and synchronized with the operations' plan time phasing.⁶

⁵ The OCS integrated support plan is now required as Annex W to all OPLANs and OPORDs.

⁶ The author notes that throughout 2009 and 2010, program offices contacted for this research effort had been engaged in developing the comprehensive contract requirements specifically driven by this requirement. Additionally, Operational Contract Support (OCS) has gained concurrent momentum, including staging two OCS conferences in the national capital region.



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III. Premise of the Yoder Three-Tier Model and Joint Effects-Based Contracting Execution System (JEBCES) and Phase Zero

This chapter provides the background and premise of the Joint Effects-based Contracting concept and Phase Zero operations. The primary objective of this research is to integrate the Yoder Three-tier Model (Yoder, 2004) and the Joint Effects-based Contracting concepts originally proposed by NPS students and published as an MBA joint applied project and an NPS Acquisition Research sponsored research report (Poree et al., 2008a, 2008b) in a sound strategic and operational construct model for senior executives, planners, practitioners, and policy makers. Therefore, a review of the aforementioned research works is necessary. Those desiring a more comprehensive look at those products are encouraged to review them.⁷

A. Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTTM)

The Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) was originally published as a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Acquisition Research Program (ARP) working paper (Yoder, 2004) and is still available from the Acquisition Research Program's website (www.acquisitionresearch.org). This working paper was created following the author's publication in the *Army AL&T* magazine, which called for a better structure for planning and executing contingency contracting operations (AL&T Magazine, 2004). In order to satisfy calls from senior leadership, operational managers, and practitioners for a more comprehensive development of the concept presented in the *Army AL&T* magazine article, the author published the YTTM as part of the NPS working paper series. The working paper has two sections. Section one is the basic

⁷ It should be noted that under this current research effort, and based on the significant amount of analysis conducted in the preparation of this report, some changes to those original works are recommended by the author and are presented herein. Specific changes are clearly stated within this and subsequent chapters, where applicable.



premise of contingency contracting and its unique contextual elements. Section two is the presentation of the YTTM itself. The layout of the document is as follows:

Section One: The Unique Contingency Contracting Requirement

- I. Contract Definition
- II. Functions of a Contract
- III. Contingency Contract Definition
- IV. Real-world Examples (taken from up to and including the 2004 publication date)

Section Two: The Contingency Contracting Officer Yoder Three-tier Model

- I. Calls for Better Planning and Coordination
- II. The Yoder Three-tier Model for Contingency Contracting:
 - A. Ordering Officer Model
 - B. Leveraging Contracting Officer Model
 - C. Integrated Planner and Executor Model
- III. Moving from Theory to Practice—The “Who Cares” Test

In the working paper, the author proposed three models of employment for contingency contracting officers. Each tier performs unique functions and requires specific education, developed skill sets, and unique personnel and manpower characteristics. Each tier is co-dependent, or integrated in a hierarchal manner, on the other tiers. The Yoder Three-tier Model maximizes the effectiveness and the efficiency of theater contingency contracting operations and directly links operations to the Unified Combatant Commander (COCOM) broad objectives through integrative planning and execution (Yoder, 2004).

1. Tier One: Ordering Officer Model. The most basic and simplistic model is the “ordering officer” model. This model is the most rudimentary of contracting support, which includes functions such as placing orders against existing theater



contracts. By nature, this model requires little interactive engagement with the environment and is best suited for warranted junior officers and enlisted personnel.

2. Tier Two: Leveraging Contracting Officer (LCO) Model. The next level in the model is the “leveraging contracting officer” model. This level includes the basic ordering functions of the ordering officer model, but it includes leveraging the capacities and capabilities of the local and regional economies in the contingent theater. As a result, there may be a reduced need for organic service and material support. The practitioner in the leveraging model clearly will be engaged in interfacing with local and regional businesses, in creating business processes, and in potentially coordinating with higher military personnel, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations (PVOs) and with political organizations. With this in mind, only more qualified and capable practitioners should perform in the leverage model. A shortfall of this model is that the contingency contracting officer (CCO) operation may or may not be integrated with the broader goals of national and theater objectives. In the worst case, some of the tactical execution may actually be counter productive to those higher level goals.

3. Tier Three: The Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) Model. The highest-level model is the “Integrated Planner and Executor” (IPE) contingency contracting officer. This model takes the leveraging contracting officer function one giant step forward. In this model, well-educated and qualified CCOs are integrated into the operational-planning phases of contingencies, often before actual troop deployment; they then make the transition to operations. The hallmark of the IPE CCO is that contingency contracting operations may be planned and subsequently executed to meet national strategic and theater objectives. Additionally, the myriad NGOs and PVOs—which, in many if not most cases, are essential to the overall efficiency, effectiveness, and, ultimately, the success of operations—can be integrated into the planning and execution of contingency operations. While this integration requirement may seem painfully obvious, the integrated planning and execution among warfighters, contingency contracting officers, and the NGOs and



PVOs is not, and it does not occur on a regular and recurring basis. The author proposes that the IPE CCO be utilized in a broader planning-and-execution environment. The CCO with higher level certification, education, and experience, should be integrated within the J-4 and J-5 Logistics and Planning/Operations and Exercise organization structure. Integration is essential to achieving the desired synergies between the myriad organizations involved in and participating in contingency environments. Concurrently, operational planners can leverage integration of all theater players (military, NGOs/PVOs, and contractors) to achieve harmony between National Security Strategy (NSS), Unified Combatant Commander (COCOM), and NGOs' and PVOs' objectives through integrated planning, exercising, and, ultimately, execution. This integrative planning, exercising, and execution may (1) help eliminate the competing (and often conflicting) demands of the participants, (2) closely marry acquisition support with stated objectives, (3) allow for the creation of robust Contingency Contract Support Plans, and (4) integrate such plans into broader operational plans in support of theater operations.





Calls for Better Planning and Coordination



Integrated Planner and Executor Model




Figure 5. **Calls for Better Planning and Coordination – Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) Model**

(Yoder, 2004)

The true heart of the model in Figure 5 is portrayed in Table 1 as it originally appeared in the YTTM working paper.



Table 1. Yoder Three-Tier Model for Contingency Contracting Operations

Table 1. Yoder Three-Tier Model for Contingency Contracting Operations		
Model Tier Level & Model Title	Functions/Education/Rank	Highlights and Drawbacks
Ordering Officer—Tier One	• basic ordering • some simplified requisitions • training: DAU CON 234 • DAVIA Certified CON Level I or II • junior to mid-graded, junior officers, GS-7 to GS-9 1102 series civilians	• simple buys • little integration • no operational planning • no broad liaison functions
Leveraging Contracting Officer—Tier Two	• leverages to local economy • reduces "pushed" materiel support • training/education: DAU CON 234, recommended higher education • DAVIA Certified CON Level II or III • senior enlisted, junior to mid-grade officers, GS-11+ 1102 series civilians	• better local operational planning • some integration • more capability for the operational commander • no planned theater integration • no broad liaison functions • may perform to optimize local operations at the detriment to theater ops
Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE)—Tier Three	• highest level of planning and integration—joint • linked/integrated with J-4 and J-5 • creates and executes OPLAN CCG strategy • provides direction to tier two and one • links operations strategically to theater objectives of CCGOM • education: Master's degree or higher and, JPME Phase I and II • DAVIA Certified CON Level III, and other DAVIA disciplines (LOG, ACQ, FIN, etc) • senior officers (O-6+), senior civilians, GS-13 - or SES	• performs operational and theater analysis, integrates results into OPLAN • link between CCGOM and OPLAN to all theater contracting operations • coordinates theater objectives with best approach to contracted support • can achieve broader national security goals through effective distribution of national assets • includes planning, communication, coordination, and exercising with NGO and PVO in theater

L. Gary Yoder, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004.



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- 17 -

B. The YTTM Conclusions and Recommendations

The Yoder Three-tier Model addresses a significant shortfall in current contingency contracting operation support: integrative planning and execution. As is demonstrated in the Anderson and Flaherty (2003) project, comprehensive planning in the joint environs of the Unified Combatant Commander's J-4 (logistics) and J-5 (planning and exercising) is currently not being accomplished in any significant



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- 30 -

degree. Instead, what the acquisition and contracting community is providing the COCOM is sub-optimized.

The Yoder Three-tier Model calls for the cultivation and utilization of senior officers and civilians with sufficient education, joint qualification, multi-discipline Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certifications, and other professional qualifications to perform at the highest integrative-planning and execution levels. At the highest level, the Integrative Planner and Executor (IPE) is the essential and critical linchpin, allowing for the development of a comprehensive Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) that integrates contracting with the broader theater objectives in the Operation Plan (OPLAN).

The IPE, being integrated at the J-4 level, will plan, exercise, and call for adequate theater contingency contracting personnel provisioning (which may vary depending on the phases of the contingency operation) to effectively and efficiently meet theater objectives.

The primary recommendation is that the Yoder Three-tier Model be reviewed and implemented across all Services. In order to effectively accomplish this implementation, the author recommends that senior leadership, including the secretariat level, take pro-active measures to implement the model. Such review and implementation considerations include the following:

- Mandate that the Services implement the Yoder Three-tier Model;
- Fully fund educational and career-development programs, which are the hallmark of the Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) and the Leveraging Contracting Officer (LCO);
- Ensure that the Services create career incentives for personnel choosing to take positions in support of the Yoder Three-tier Model;
- Mandate that the J-4 structure include the IPE, top-level integrative planner and executor; and
- Mandate that personnel at the IPE and LCO model levels achieve Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phases I and II.



C. The Yoder Three-Tier Model Gains Traction in the Broader Community

The Yoder Three-tier Model, subsequent to its original publication, was cited and/or referenced in several studies and commission reports. The author attributes the success in large part, to the efforts of the staff at the Acquisition Research Program at the Naval Postgraduate School who championed the work. Among the works that reference or cite the model are the *Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations* (Gansler, 2007), and the *July 2006 Special Inspector General Report for Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement* (SIGIR, 2006). The model was also presented at the 2005 Acquisition Research Symposium sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

Of particular significance is the Gansler Report. The tier structure recommended in the YTTM was adopted by the Gansler Report in late 2007, and subsequently has become the tier structure authorized by Congress for the Army Contracting Command commissioned in early 2008. The YTTM structure, embedded in the overarching recommendations in the Gansler Report, became the foundation that authorized and created a position equivalent to two stars and its associated lower tiers for the Army Contracting Command.

D. YTTM Summary and Implications for this Phase Zero Research

The YTTM tackled a most critical issue in the broader context of integrative planning—lack of credentialed personnel and lack of actual defined positions within the existing joint planning environment. This is the personnel aspect of the key elements defined in this research work: personnel, platforms, and protocols. Additionally, the YTTM, shown in the body of Table 1, provided the basic elements of protocols, or what should be done, and, in a very basic sense and to a lesser degree, how it should be done in the context of the hierarchy.



E. Yoder Three-Tier Model as a Building Block for Additional Research and the Joint Effects-Based Contracting and Execution System (JEBCES)

The YTTM was, and is, a concept model. As such, it lends itself to further analysis, analytical review, refinement, and development. Subsequent to its publication, Naval Postgraduate School MBA students utilized the basic framework proposed in the YTTM and conducted the aforementioned analysis, analytical review, refinement, and development as their MBA joint applied project. Concurrently, the framework of the model was used in an Acquisition Research Program student thesis (which was advised by this author and Dr. Rene Rendon), entitled, *The Joint Effects-Based Contracting Execution System: A Proposed Enabling Concept for Future Joint Expeditionary Contracting Execution*, previously referred to as the JEBCES (Poree et al., 2008a, 2008b). Three of the student researchers were graduates of the United States Air Force Academy, and one of them was a graduate of the United States Naval Academy; all of them graduated from the NPS MBA program.

F. The Joint Effects-Based Contracting Execution System (JEBCES): A Proposed Enabling Concept for Future Joint Expeditionary Contracting Execution

1. JEBCES Overview.

The JEBCES took several concepts explored in the NPS MN3318 Contingency Contracting course, in which the students were enrolled, along with the YTTM, and several innovative business and warfighter tools and applications heretofore not examined or applied in the particular context of attempting to achieve a better integrated approach to contingency and expeditionary planning and execution. According to the abstract in the JEBCES project, its purpose was:

“to deliver a concept enabling joint effects-based contracting (EBC) execution throughout all of the following phases of the Unified Combatant Commander’s campaign plan: shaping, deterring, seizing the initiative, dominating, and



stabilizing and enabling (Phases 0-V), respectively. Under the enabling civil authority phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Commanding General of the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) pioneered effects-based contracting (EBC) to align tactical contracting efforts with the strategic objectives of the OIF campaign plan. The JCC-I/A accomplished this by integrating contingency contracting officers (CCOs) with the warfighters' operational planning cycles, linking contracting efforts with desired strategic operational effects, and prioritizing contracting work based on the warfighters' main efforts." (Poree et al., 2008a, 2008b)

This project applied EBC methodologies and the systems engineering process to introduce the framework for the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System (JEBCES)—an integrated composite of people, products, and processes to deliver an acquisition capability. Within this framework, the researchers proposed a Phase-based Acquisition Capability (PBAC) to enable forward-leaning, responsive joint expeditionary contract support. This framework emphasized providing future CCOs with a pre-awarded, rapidly deployable acquisition capability, thereby creating greater uniformity and efficiency in joint EBC execution" (Poree et. al., 2008a).

2. JEBCES Construct #1: Phasing Harmony and Synchronization with Spend Analysis.

JEBCES utilized Arena 10.0 Forward Business Solutions by Rockwell Software, Inc., to model and simulate discrete events in order to create a Phased-based Acquisition Capability (PBAC) that placed the right contracted support at the right time and place and to create a desired effect—hence the concept of Effects-based Contracting (EBC) and the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System (JEBCES). The research utilized actual Operation Iraqi Freedom spend data to understand the nature of goods and services required for the operation, at specific time phases or milestones of the operation. Then the researchers linked the time-phased spend data to traditional contracting phases, as explained in the Yoder Three-tier Model and recognized by the broader contingency and expeditionary contracting communities, and compared it against the war planner's and warfighter's campaign plan structure system, which is described below.



Traditionally, the contingency and expeditionary contracting community has defined four phases of contracting in support of military operations. Phase 1 is the initial deployment of forces in response to an event requiring the utilization of the military. Phase 2 is the build-up, wherein a capability is grown through introduction of more forces. Phase 3 is the sustainment phase, wherein operations are maintained and/or matured. Phase 4 is the redeployment of forces, or in other words, the termination of the operations.⁸

The warfighting community utilizes a different phasing system, as was presented and analyzed in the JEBCES report. Phase 1 is the deter phase, deterring potential enemy action. Phase 2 is seizing the initiative and includes the initial buildup of military personnel and equipment while concurrently posturing for kinetic events. Phase 3 is the dominate phase, including the full employment and utilization of forces with the intent of dominating and controlling the operational environment. Phase 4 is the stabilize phase, marking the end of the dominant phase while creating the framework for the desired end-state. Phase 5 is the enable civil authority phase, enabling the political, economic, and security structures to enact the desired end state.

The JEBCES report analyzed the plans and actual spend data of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) campaign across all commodity groups and categorized them according to which phase of the contracting and military operation phase that the commodity was acquired.

3. JEBCES Construct #2: Effects-Based Contracting (EBC).

Effects-based Contracting (EBC) was pioneered by the Commanding General of the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–I/A) in an effort to align

⁸ A thorough discussion of the traditional four phases as defined by the contingency and expeditionary communities may be found in the Yoder Three-tier Model (Yoder, 2004). It should be noted that the author is proposing the introduction of a fifth phase preceding phase 1, entitled “phase 0”.



contracting efforts with the campaign plans. The EBC concept was promoted as coordinating contracting resources and capabilities in time, space, and purpose. The key tenant of EBC is to integrate contracting early in the planning process in the appropriate time and space in order to complement the five warfighter phases defined earlier. The EBC concept relies on five key components to be successful:

1. Developing a concept of support,
2. Identifying key players,
3. Knowing the warfighters' battle rhythm,
4. Ensuring visibility by being in the right planning evolution, and
5. Having flexibility within the enterprise. (Poree et al., 2008a, p. 15–16)

The student JEBCEs project examined JCC–I/A business operations in concert with the key components identified above as part of their effort to validate the EBC concepts. According to the JEBCEs authors, the utilization of EBC was successful, but the expected benefits—getting the right contracted support at the right place and right time and in harmony with the warfighters' phasing—did not fully manifest itself. The researchers' analysis demonstrated that the integrative planning occurred in the later phases of the warfighters' operations, and hence, was suboptimized.

4. JEBCEs Construct #3: Marrying the YTTM to EBC.

The JEBCEs researchers, recognizing the merits of the EBC concept and the degree of success in OIF, albeit suboptimized success, married the Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) construct to the phasing and spend data from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). JEBCEs used the key Integrated Planner and Executor tier of the YTTM, the highest levels of strategic planning, and modeled assuming varying rates of utilization of this position in combination with spend analysis data. Then JEBCEs synchronized the data with the warfighters' phasing and mapped out scenarios that simulated the varying degrees of mission employment and their potential effects.



The effects were examined as to the ability to acquire and field the rights goods and services required, at the right place and right time, complementing the warfighters' desired effect.

JEBCES proved that utilizing the YTTM IPE tier while incorporating historical spend analysis to create and execute the support plans for emerging operational requirements provided significant improvements—particularly when done in the earliest phases of the operation, and ideally when done prior to the manifestation of an actual military requirement.

5. JEBCES Conclusions and Recommendations.

The JEBCES authors derived three conclusions from their research and provided four recommendations.⁹

Conclusion 1: Transforming the Contractual Requirements from Operations. The transformation of the contractual requirements from operations (i.e., the spend analysis) into a PBAC improves joint expeditionary execution. Combining YTTM tiers (personnel), performing strategic spend analysis, and creating mission oriented contract support, allows for a significant reduction in the total contractual response time. Under the PBAC JEBCES system, standardizing 10% of the commodity purchase requests decreased total system time by 12.2%. Additionally, if operational customers are willing to standardize requirements at the 75% level, they can realize a 76% reduction in cycle-time.

Conclusion 2: JEBCES Provides the Framework for the DoD to Better Align Funding to Enable Responsive Contract Support. In an effort to align funding with phase-related activities, the Federal Acquisition Regulation provides for bulk funding, whereby the CO receives authorization from a fiscal and accounting

⁹ The author of this research has rephrased the JEBCES original conclusions and recommendations for clarity and conciseness because the original JEBCES wording didn't lend itself to a clear presentation of the ideas without all of the original content and context of the JEBCES report.



officer to obligate funds on purchase documents against a specified lump sum of funds. If a high percentage of requirements are standardized, then phase-based demand data should be used to effectively and efficiently deliver supplies and services to the warfighter in proper time phasing. Funding, aligned with forecasted requirements, can provide for transparency and fund accountability.

Conclusion 3: JEBCES Enables Efficient and Effective Use of Limited CCO Resources. JEBCES demonstrated the efficacy of the Yoder Three-tier Model concept. The analysis clearly indicated that properly using the Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE), the top strategic-level tier of the YTTM and working in harmony with the lower tiers greatly enhanced the capability of the Phased-based Acquisition Capability (PBAC). Thus, it created the effects desired and required by the warfighter as well as the synchronization with time and location specified in the operations plans; it also achieved greater effectiveness and efficiencies, as measured by reduced cycle-times and fewer required personnel.

Based on these conclusions, the JECBES researchers made four recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Design a Deployable Information Technology (IT) Solution to Integrate Contracting at the Theater Tier. Along with a PBAC, the IT system would be used at all tiers to perform the various functions that would be required in a contingency arena. The IT system should enable central contracts to be used at remote locations, which in turn would empower the strategic tier to analyze and make command decisions on requirement fulfillment options. A design attribute of a centralized IT system is making contracting activities more transparent and accountable. This could be conducted concurrently with a spend analysis (see Recommendation 2).

Recommendation 2: Conduct a Spend Analysis. Decision makers should conduct spend analysis on past contingencies that are appropriate for the area, size,



and type of contingency that planning is being conducted for. The area should be delegated and defined by the appropriate CCDR. The CCDR would be responsible for determining what would be available in theater and what reach-back capabilities would be needed appropriate to the phase. The size of the contingency should be compared to past events that are similar in size and type as appropriate.

Recommendation 3: Develop a Pre-Awarded Rapid Acquisition

Capability. By developing a pre-awarded rapid acquisition capability such as a Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery based on the CP spend analysis, future CCOs would be provided the means to enter into Phase Zero shaping, with rapidly executable capability. Additionally, at the operational level, further improvement of EBC methodologies was recommended.

Recommendation 4: Develop a Strategic Contracting Plan. Once a spend analysis and a concept of operations are developed, a strategic contracting plan would need to be drawn up. This would be the time when theater-wide contracts could be competed. As per the CCDR's analysis, the needed reach-back contracting could be put into place to have the appropriate resources available when needed. Tier III contracting officers are appropriate for this tier of contracting, and these contracts would be placed into the deployable IT solution for use in a contingency environment. When a contingency does occur, dependent on the magnitude, an appropriate manning plan would be developed based upon the existing available theater contracts. This is when the true benefit of the PBAC would be realized. Currently there is low use of lower tier contracting officers and overuse of higher tier contracting officers. The deployment of contracting officers would be appropriate to fit the tier of contracting needs for an area instead of to fit what is available at the time.

More experienced contracting officers would be relieved of high-volume routine-items that are available on theater-wide contracts. This relief would then enable them to meet potentially complex requirements experienced once kinetic, or other type of operations commence.



6. JEBCES Summary and Implications for This Phase Zero Research.

The JEBCES report tackled several critical issues in the broader context of integrative planning—validating the YTTM tier structure for placing credentialed personnel within the planning and execution framework (the personnel aspect) and calling for and validating through modeling and simulation (some of the protocol aspects), including conducting strategic spend analyses and phasing the contract and purchase spend in harmony and synchronous with the warfighters' operation schema. This complements the key elements defined in this research work: personnel, platforms, and protocols.

G. Chapter Summary

This chapter provided the background and premise of the Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) and the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System (JEBCES); it also explained the model's potential gains in terms of the efficiency and effectiveness of having the right people with the right credentials properly placed in the organization (personnel) and ensuring that those people are employing the correct protocols to ensure proper harmony with the warfighters' operations schema and plan phasing (protocol).

However, to properly capitalize on these concepts, they must be integrated into doctrine and policies to ensure that the personnel, protocols, and platforms are fully institutionalized. It is the full integration and implementation into doctrine, policy, and practice that is addressed in Chapter IV.



IV. Integrating YTTM & JEBCES in Phase Zero

A. Introduction

This chapter proposes and provides the conceptual models for fully integrating contingency and expeditionary contract planning in the joint environment. It's been demonstrated in previous chapters that there has been a significant amount of forward movement in doctrine, directives, and practice, particularly since 2008, a thorough review of the doctrine, directives, and practice reveals that currently, there is no single integrative model or framework fully embracing all of the elements necessary for successful integrative planning. This chapter will define and expand on those elements considered imperative for integrative contract planning in the joint environment; it also answers subsidiary research questions three (What primary pillars, or elements, are required for optimizing joint contingency contract planning?) and four (How can the Yoder Three-tier Model and the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System be integrated at the strategic planning level to optimize results?).

In order to answer subsidiary research question four, five “universal” questions must be addressed. Those questions are as follows:

1. Who must be involved in planning at the strategic level?
2. Where within the organizational structure must individuals be positioned and conduct planning?
3. What must strategic contingency and expeditionary contract planners accomplish?
4. When must strategic planning take place?
5. Why must strategic planning take place?



B. Key Pillars for Integrative Success: Personnel, Platforms, Protocols

Three key pillars imperative for integrative planning success—personnel, platforms, and protocols. Without all three pillars working in harmony, the contracting, planning, and associated support provided to the warfighter will be suboptimized. Suboptimization will result in lost efficiencies and effectiveness and, at worst, may act to subvert the COCOM objectives. Embedded within the three pillars are key enabling elements, which were discussed separately in Chapters II and III, including the JOPES system, the Joint Doctrine framework, the Yoder Three-tier Model, the JEBCES report, and associated publications, see figure 4 below.




Figure 6. **Integrating the Yoder Three-Tier Model and Phase Zero Operations: Mandatory Pillars for Integrative Success**

Within the personnel pillar is the YTTM governing the critical link between personnel rank, position, credential, and capability—in other words, having the right



people with the right skill sets in the right positions within the organizational framework.¹⁰ The protocols—defined as the rules, decision-making framework, and business models employed—are the complex set of logic-based systems that allow business operations to follow sound practices. The platforms are those hardware and tangible software systems that provide the mechanisms for analysis, decision making, and communication.

C. Addressing Universal Questions of Integration

Answering the five universal questions of who, where, what, when, and why provides the required comprehensive view of the answer to subsidiary research question four, —How can the Yoder Three-tier Model and the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System be integrated at the strategic planning level to optimize results?

1. Question 1: Who must be involved in planning at the strategic level?

The answer to this question is provided in the Yoder Three-tier Model at the Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) tier. The IPE is the highest level and requires the highest credentialed personnel in the YTTM model. The credential is imperative for the success of the position holder and for the accomplishment of the functions described in answer to the subsequent questions and their associated answers, in other words, the *capability*. The IPE is a top-tier planner, coordinator, and executor. As such, the IPE must hold DAWIA CON Level III and other complementary DAWIA certifications, such as logistics, acquisition, finance, etc., which will strengthen his or her credential and capability. All IPEs must have a Master's degree or higher, preferably within contracting, business, or a related field. In addition, and of particular importance, the IPE is required to be fully Joint Professional Military

¹⁰ The author will present the “right positions” aspect in more detail later in this chapter and in Chapter V.



Education (JPME) Phase I and II credentialed. The rank or position of the IPE should be limited to senior military officers, O-6 or above, and/or senior civilians at the GS-13+ or SES level. Those in the IPE position should also have key experience components in contracting, business operations, joint billets. If the IPE is a civilian, vice military, a joint civilian position in operational or strategic level planning and operations and/or joint contracting and/or logistics—diversity and depth should be strongly considered.¹¹

Table 2. Credential of the Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE)

Credential Category	Credential Description (Desired Attributes)
Education/Degree	Master's degree(s) or higher. Preference for degrees in contracting, business disciplines, and military strategy. Multiple degrees an asset.
Joint Qualification	JPME Phase I and II.
Security Clearance	Top Secret (based on mission—may be compartmentalized) or Secret, minimum.
DAWIA Certifications	CON Level III mandatory with LOG, FIN, ACQ, and PMT highly desirable additions. Multiple certification paths desirable.
Military Rank/ Civilian Grade	Military rank of O-6 or higher. Civilian grade GS-13 or higher. SES preferable.
Experience & Tour History	Combined experience to include: contracting, joint planning, business operations, logistics, and financial management. Concentration in contracting most desired along with joint tour or position experience.

¹¹ The reader should be cognizant of the force structure implications with the credentialed IPE. Force structure, career and billet/position management, education, and training are all affected by the credential. These implications will be addressed in Chapter V.



2. Question 2: Where must IPEs be placed, and where must planning be conducted?

Ideally, the IPE, being the highest level planner and executor, should reside within the Unified Combatant Command (COCOM) staff. The individual Services normally provide uniformed officers for joint billet assignment within COCOMs, whereas civilians may be more permanently assigned within the COCOM. Working groups who participated in this research indicated that within current planning structures at the COCOMs, there were not enough credentialed personnel meeting the IPE criteria, and for those with some of the credentials, they were often military officers with limited billet duration. Additionally, the officers were assigned to COCOM and Joint Planning positions on a temporary, short-term basis, and often were of much lower rank or position than the YTTM IPE requirement calls for. Having no IPE resulted in a capability gap that hindered the integrative analytical capability that the IPE is particularly designed to address. Because the individual Services assign uniformed officers to Joint staff positions, and because those same Services are the warrant authority providers (through flow-down authority), the Services must create the credentialed billets and career progression to ensure credentialed personnel are in the pipeline to fill critical joint billets designated with IPE credential.¹²

In addition to COCOM staff, IPE-credentialed personnel must be embedded and working within any strategic J-4 Logistics staff and/or associated Army G-4 and Navy N-4 staff elements, and wherever Operational Contacting Support groups are planning and executing the higher level strategic plan integration and synchronization. This provision will also allow for the IPE to be groomed and to be capable of integrating across Services into the joint environment and vice versa.

¹² See recommendations in Chapter V for specific IPE coded Joint and Service specific billet coding.



It is imperative to place the IPE in a position long enough to complete at least one, and preferably more than one, full planning and exercising cycle. As the research working groups indicated, most often personnel who were in positions roughly approximate to what is being proposed as the IPE have been in place for less than a full planning and exercise cycle. Consequently, there has been insufficient continuity to allow for detailed and proper functioning in the areas, which are described below.

3. Question 3: What must the IPE strategic planner accomplish?

The IPE must be credentialed and experienced to effectively accomplish myriad tasks for effective and efficient joint contingency contract planning and execution. Some of the most critical tasks and functions include, but are not limited to those presented and discussed in the following paragraphs.

a. OPLAN and CONPLAN Review and Analysis.

The IPE must be able to conduct a comprehensive analysis and assessment of COCOM and/or service-component Operations Plans and Concept of Operations Plans. This analysis is imperative in order to ensure that any associated Contract Support Integration Plan (CSIP) or Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) can complement and enhance the desired effect and end-state objectives of the broader plan.¹³ Assessment and analysis of the OPLAN and CONPLAN should include all engineering plans (provided by joint engineering planners), Time-Phased Force & Deployment Data (TPFDD) modeling and movement plans, supporting and supported elements and their associated static and mobilization plans, and a host of other elements embedded in sound planning documents. Without a comprehensive assessment and analysis of the broader elements of the COCOM and Service plans,

¹³ CSIP and CCSPs are the OPLAN and CONPLAN documents created and designed to provide all contract supporting elements that are necessary to achieve the OPLAN objectives. Basic CSIP/CCSP plan content areas are provided in Annex X. This chapter discusses the functions of the IPE, not the elements of the CSIP/CCSP.



any associated contracting plans may, and in most cases will, be suboptimized and may actually work contrary to the overarching plan.

4. Operation Schema and Objective Analysis.

Closely related to the overarching OPLAN and CONPLAN analysis is operation schema and objective analysis. The schema and objective represent the primary mode and nature of the forces utilized to accomplish the mission, and the objective is the end-state desired, including those at specific phases of the operation. Often times, the schema and objectives shift when entering different phases of military operations. Hence, the IPE strategic planner and executor must have plans that complement the pace and synchronization of the overall plan. Effective contract provisioning of goods and services should work to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the overarching force. The IPE must ascertain the order of battle and the scheme and develop courses of action (COA) for use in planning OPLANs and OPORDs—the actual order to execute a specific OPLAN with any required modifications for a current crisis. As emphasized earlier, without the proper credential, the IPE may not have the capability to examine the OPLAN and CONPLAN with the understanding required to complement it with a sound CSIP or CCSP.

a. Stakeholder Analysis and Integration.

Stakeholder analysis that uses a sound analytical approach such as SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat) will better allow the IPE to determine the internal and external resources and constraints that may complement or hinder plan development and integration.





Calls for Better Planning and Coordination



Integrated Planner and Executor Model




Figure 7. **Calls for Better Planning and Coordination Integrated Planner and Executor Model**
(Yoder, 2004)

Within the contingent environment, several key functions may be accomplished. Among prominent functions that require analysis and integration are diplomatic negotiations; host-nation support agreements; humanitarian operations; economic restoration; security and dewatering; democratization and provision of essential services for food, shelter, safety, and security; medical provisioning and others. Identifying key participants and capabilities within the sphere of operations can and should be further integrated into actual plans, exercises, and, if required, actual contingency response. Traditional players in the warfighters' and COCOMs' arena include those identified in the Joint Planning and Execution Community, as specified in joint doctrine and as published in numerous sources, including the *Joint*



Contingency Contracting Handbook. The traditional players are presented in Figure 8. However, in order to effectively integrate contracting into the JPEC roles and to ensure that a comprehensive CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD include fully integrative analysis, other non-traditional players must be included and participate in the SWOT assessment.




Figure 8. **Players in the Planning Process**
(JCCHB, 2009)

Which outside organizations and stakeholders can perform some of the desired missions? The Yoder Three-Tier Model calls for more comprehensive stakeholder inclusion and incorporation into assessment planning and SWOT analysis. Examples of more comprehensive stakeholder participation include, but are certainly not limited to, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private

volunteer organizations (PVOs) developing disaster response plans or humanitarian aid operations, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Several, if not hundreds, of organizations and other nations may be at work within a contingent environment. Examples of other organizations include the United Nations (UN) and its Department of Human Affairs (UNDHA), the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN International Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN Development Program, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. There may also be a need to integrate interests and capabilities from NATO and coalition countries. Strategic-level planning, including complementary contract planning, can capitalize on the capabilities of all available participants, potentially optimizing the desired effect.

In addition to those entities external to the DoD, an internal stakeholder assessment must be conducted. Internal stakeholders include all of the joint operations codes, and, of particular importance, include the contracting support networks that will be essential for the seamless award and administration of contracts. This includes Service command requirements generators, service organic contracting such as the Army Contracting Command (ACC), Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC), the Naval Expeditionary Contracting Command (NECC) and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Defense Contract Management Agency – International (DCMA-I), and Defense Contract Audit Agency.

The advantages of integrating all of the stakeholders into comprehensive planning is that it will allow for better determination of requirements in phase zero prior to the manifestation of any actual event requiring a response, and it will ensure that lines of authority, financing, establishment of support hierarchy, and all the other universal questions and themes presented herein are properly addressed.



b. Existing & Proposed Annex W – CSIP (Contract Support Integration Plan) and Logistics/Contracting Annexes.

Analysis must include any existing CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORDs. Annex W and CSIP should be in place for any existing overarching plans. However, because the mandate for Operational Contract Support and Annex W/CSIP protocols is relatively new, it is essential to utilize the IPE and associated staff to review, revise, or create these documents in harmony with the broader recommendations for SWOT assessments and integration presented therein.




Figure 9. Upstream/Downstream Perspective OV-1: Refine and Influence the Joint OCS Planning Process
 (OCS, March 2010)

Annex W requires the inputs from all of the Joint sections J-1 through J-7 and, in particular, the J-4 and J-5 staffs. The protocols utilized should be in compliance with *Joint Publication 4-0*, *Joint Publication 5-0*, and *Joint Publication 4-10*, along with governing instructions including *DoDI 3020.49*. Joint planners are currently



creating the relational networks mandated under the newer Joint doctrinal and DoD instruction along with the design flow as presented in Figure 7. As part of this integration, the researcher contends that the IPE is an integral position that must be in place in order to perform all of the coordination and assessments necessary for comprehensive planning.

c. Capability Gap Analysis (CGA).

Capability gap analysis includes the processes of examining all requirements in the context of what must be accomplished and how it must be accomplished, and it includes determining critical gaps in logistic and organic provisioning that must be addressed through contracted support. The IPE must identify all stakeholders, supporting and supported units, the overarching scheme of operations in harmony with the CONPLAN, OPLAN, and where appropriate the OPORD from the perspective of the warfighter and logistician. The IPE must then develop specifics as to what capabilities are required for the effective and efficient conduct of the contingency/expeditionary mission. Ultimately, the goal of CGA is to clearly identify gaps with clear courses of action (COAs) developed for satisfying those gaps. The COAs determined to be most tenable should be embedded within existing CONPLANS, OPLANs and OPORDs. OPLANs should be exercised with the selected COA examined for its efficacy within the broader mission plan. This is a broad step forward in the existing JOPES Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning systems, in which contracting is seldom designed and built into exercise planning in any truly significant manner. The IPE is the critical position to ensure that this function is occurring.

d. Basic Life Support (BLS) and Higher Order Forward Post Ops analysis.

Basic Life Support (BLS) and associated higher-order forward-post operations require assessment of all the aforementioned issues, with the addition of personnel, platforms, and protocols for establishing, growing, and maintaining forward-post



presence. This includes a strategic assessment of all camp or post sites as to the engineering, construction, logistic, and sustainment capabilities required to create and operate forward posts and camps. Personnel skill set and credential inventory must be conducted by the IPE. The IPE role is to ascertain the total requirement and ensure that proper manning is available organically or via contract provisioning.

e. Spend Analysis and Integration.

The IPE should conduct macro-level spend analysis by utilizing any recent, pertinent historical data. This data may be obtained from a variety of sources and may include the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), consultancy analysts such as RAND, and any organic sources such as purchase and contract histories in SPS/DP2 systems. This information can then be used to identify those goods and services that would normally be used to fill existing capability gaps. According to the JEBCEs project researchers (Poree et al., 2008a , 2008b), this information can be utilized further to create pre-awarded IDIQ contracts for those items and services most in demand for specific CONPLANS and OPLANs. Poree et al. (2008a, 2008b) noted that a significant reduction in response time and improved support resulted from the spend analysis and integration into planning and exercising—phase zero—and being correctly postured in the event that an actual contingent event manifests. Integrating spend analysis criteria into the IPE JOPES deliberate planning process phase zero exercise cycle—provided that JOPES is revised to include a more robust contracting support analytical framework—will enhance potential capability and support effect if it is used correctly.

f. Creating Multiple Award Contracts (MAC) and Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) for Strategic Capability Fulfillment.

Multiple Award Contracts (MAC) and Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity type contracts (IDIQ) can and should be established at the strategic level by the IPE. Spend analysis in combination with the other factors indicated herein, including, but not limited to, CONPLAN and OPLAN analysis, as mentioned in subparagraph “g”



above, can and should indicate those goods and services not available organically from existing service support or inter-service agreement. Those goods and services identified as high usage, critical, or recurring for a particular mission or missions can then be contracted on a regional or theater basis via MAC or IDIQ. Any good or service not available organically, and fitting IPE established criteria for inclusion as a MAC or IDIQ, can and should be a significant IPE function.

g. Phase Synchronization with the OPLAN via JOPES.

Phase synchronization is necessary to optimize the availability of essential goods and services in time sequence with the warfighters' and operational commanders' key event schedule or phase. The warfighters' phasing may be, and often is, expressed in different terminology and different sequence than the traditional contracting four-step phasing in support of operations. Traditionally, contract planners utilize a four-phase system for planning operations support. Phase I is the initial deployment, Phase II is the build-up, Phase III is the stabilization, and Phase IV is the termination and redeployment. The operations side of the planning staffs utilize, most often, a five- or even six-phase system that includes, for example, kinetic battle operations. The IPE must examine the exercise and execution plans, CONPLANS, OPLANS, and OPORDS in order to synchronize and optimize the timing of contract provisioning to best serve the interests of the associated plans.

The JOPES system is the hardware/software systems utilized in the planning and exercise of CONPLANS and OPLANS and in the execution of associated OPORDS. JOPES relies on a robust logistics and mobilization system model called the Time-phased Forced Deployment Data (TPFDD). The TPFDD system contains real-time capital transportation asset information for every ship, aircraft, rail, and operation unit, to include size, capacity, exact location, port, and airfield capacities as well as embarkation and debarkation points and capabilities, to name just some of its data. Figure 10 shows how TPFDD modeling accounts for the essential elements of mobilization and movement.






Figure 10. **The Strategic Deployment Problem**
(CCH, 2006)

Again, this information is real-time and allows the planner to create movement plans and phase the movement capability to synchronize with the COCOMs' objectives. The TPFDD is an essential tool in determining constraints, in that it allows for assessments to be made at mobilization and deployments given the current state of force and transportation location and movement capability in association with capacity and time constraints. The IPE can and should be well versed in the utilization and analysis of overarching CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD design and in what TPFDD modeling does, and potentially can do, for structuring the most appropriate contracting posture and response for exercise and actual operations.

The IPE can structure contract support to complement results of TPFDD mobilization in the JOPES system. This function is currently not being accomplished in any consistent or comprehensive manner as part of doctrine and/or actual practice.

h. Creating the Contract Support Integration Plan (CSIP) and/or the Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP).

The overall objective of the IPE mission is to create a comprehensive, executable contracting plan that is fully integrated and synchronized with the CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD. The contracting plan, by the newer title Contracting Support Integration Plan (CSIP), is embedded into Annex W of the overarching PLAN. Recent doctrine replaces the Contingency Contracting Support Plan (CCSP) moniker under Annex D. The newest doctrine calls for a separate annex called Annex W – Operational Contract Support. Regardless of which title is utilized, the plan should be appropriately exercised, validated, and updated as required.¹⁴

i. IPE Unique Metrics and Assessment for Phase Zero.

Integral to the entire phase zero concept is the establishment of sound business and operational metrics associated with contract support and their effect on operational plan and event success. Metrics should measure across the platform, personnel, and protocol pillars, with crosscutting metrics for efficiency and effectiveness, in addition to the identification and analysis of specific functional areas herein.¹⁵ These metrics should be in place and utilized throughout the planning and exercise phase zero as a mechanism to test the CSIP and associated plans. As part of a sound analysis, the continuous feedback loop—plan, do, check, and act—must be fully integrated into the assessment and refinement of any contract support plan.

¹⁴ CSIP should be developed with all the aforementioned and should include details as indicated in paragraph D.

¹⁵ Effectiveness is paraphrased by the author as doing the right things, whereas efficiency is defined as doing the right things with the least amount of resources.



5. Question 4: When must strategic planning take place?

a. Phase Zero—Planning and Exercise Cycle

It should be clear to the reader that comprehensive and integrative planning must take place in Phase Zero. The author contends and proposes that all doctrine and planning directives must include phase zero as the planning and exercise phase prior to an actual crisis event requiring an actual deployment of forces, and must include sound contract planning and integration into the warfighters' systems for planning and execution within JOPES.¹⁶

The IPE contracting must be integral to the Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning cycles that create the CONPLAN, OPLAN and OPORD. Within the JOPES system framework, the JPEC develops the comprehensive plans for potential future events based on likely threats and/or the National Military Strategy and directives from the CJCS for each Area of Responsibility (AOR) assigned to a particular COCOM. The products or documents created by the planning event timeline are simplified and presented in Figure 11.

¹⁶ This will be reiterated in Chapter V.






Figure 11. **The Planning Summary**
(CCH, 2006)

During phase zero, the IPE will perform all of the aforementioned assessments, SWOT, strategic spend analysis, etc., and will incorporate and integrate these into formal elements of the CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD as appropriate.

b. Continuous Pre-Crisis Event Validation and Feedback.

Phase zero planning must be done in the Deliberate Planning Process, as identified in the top part of Figure 9. Phase zero must include all of the planning and exercising normally associated with COCOM Joint and Combined operations and must include robust development, exercising, and assessment of the Contract Support Integration Plan (CSIP) as well as further refinement of the same. This

continuous feedback loop of plan, do, check, act can take place in as little as 12 to 24 months (a typical exercise cycle within a COCOM) to over several years. Additionally, the plans can be exercised and reviewed over several successive cycles, constantly being assessed and updated to meet doctrinal, force structure, threat, and other changes that may affect elements of the plan.

c. Crisis Action Planning (CAP)—Real-world Event OPORD.

In the event that an actual real-world crisis manifests, the CONPLAN or OPLAN, depending on their availability and appropriateness, will be selected for revision and tailoring, including developing real-event tailored Courses of Action (COA) to effectively and efficiently respond to the real-life event requiring DoD force response. This process is called Crisis Action Planning and must include the IPE.

Several key differences exist between routine phase-zero planning and exercising under the Deliberate Planning Process and the real-life response to an actual crisis. Time is one of the foremost differences of note; during an actual crisis, time is of the essence, but there are others factors as well. Specifically, the author contends that without a well-vetted, IPE-generated plan during the phase zero cycle, contracting will be forced to develop support in a hasty, ad hoc, and reactionary manner that will potentially hinder operational support, waste resources, and potentially cost lives.

Clearly, comprehensive plan development and assessment will not occur without the credentialed IPE called for by the Yoder Three-tier Model.

6. Question 5: Why must strategic planning take place?

The IPE must conduct strategic planning for some obvious reasons, most of which should be clear at this point but which are summarized within the context of the YTTM, JEBCES, and Phase Zero Operations.



a. Creating Desired Effect.

The ultimate goal of any operational support plan, including the CSIP, is to create an executable framework for force provisioning of goods and services required by operational forces for optimally achieving the mission defined in the CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD. As JEBCES research (Poree et al., 2008a, 2008b) indicates, a greater and contracted support effect can occur with comprehensive planning by the YTTM IPE, creating and implementing sound business plans. This includes creation of IDIQ and/or dormant turnkey-ready contracts for support in the event that an actual crisis occurs.

b. Meeting Tenets of War—In a Business Sense!

The author contends that the main purpose of the contracting function is to support the warfighter and his associated missions. Hence, the IPE should develop, exercise, and implement plans in harmony with the warfighter's tenets. Specifically, the Army's *FM-30* includes a discussion on objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity-of-command, security, surprise, and simplicity. While the tenets of war iterated in *FM-30* are clearly focused on warfighting design, there are clear and important implications for the IPE in developing the contract plans that will complement the warfighter. Specifically, the tenets' applicability to contracting and business operations includes, but is not limited to those indicated below.

(1) Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The IPE must accomplish this through sound analysis, structure, planning, exercising, and employment of plans and schema that complement the COCOM objective.

(2) Offensive. This term means to seize and hold the initiative. Warfighters normally associate this term with battle operations, but the IPE can employ the "seize the initiative" concept through forward planning and execution strategies designed for specific operations. This term also means being ready in phase zero for a potential crisis.



(3) **Mass.** Mass is providing overwhelming power at the decisive place and time. It includes synchronizing all the elements of power, combat, and contracting where they will have a decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time in order to achieve mass. Massing effects, rather than a concentration of forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results while limiting exposure to the enemy, including enemy fire. The IPE can leverage the functional analysis and resulting MAC, IDIQ, phasing, strategic spend analysis, and all the other functions presented herein to create the greatest effect.

(4) **Economy of Force.** This term means the employment of all combat and contracting power available in the most effective way possible; it also means to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary or non-essential efforts and functions. Inclusive in economy of force is to judiciously employ and distribute forces, with no force left without purpose, and the measurement of effectiveness and efficiency in utilizing scarce resources.

(5) **Maneuver.** Maneuver is the movement of forces to gain positional advantage. It is used to exploit successes, preserve freedom of action, and reduce vulnerability. The IPE can utilize this tenet for creating the contract support schema to complement force maneuver and for maximum effect. Knowing in time-phase when, where, and how operations will be conducted can be advantageous in creating support plans that posture support where and when it is required.

(6) **Unity of Command.** Unity of command is a clearly defined hierarchy with singular message. At all levels of war, employment of military forces in a manner that masses combat power and contracting power toward a common objective requires unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all of the forces are under the direction and control of one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces pursuant to a unified purpose. Note that contracting, and contracting officers by warranted authority, in an operational setting will have two commanders! One commander exists in the operational chain of command, while the other is via the



warrant issuant's chain of command. This does not mean that unity of command is impossible. Integrating the IPE into strategic-level planning and exercising and creating plans in harmony with the COCOM (CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD) objectives helps to ensure unity of command and can help to eliminate friction in control and communication, making contracting responsive to the commanders' intent.

(7) Security. Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Knowledge and understanding of potential enemy threats combined with adequate security measures embedded in the contracting plan design can reduce security threats to all operating forces. Proper design can include compartmentalization of security access, including those with Top Secret and Secret classifications. Designing, exercising, and implementing compartmentalized structure to maintain critical information barriers and limit access to the entire design scheme to only those at the top IPE level must be incorporated into mission and contracting design.

(8) Surprise. Surprise, according to *FM-30*, means the capability to strike the enemy at a time, in a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power. By seeking surprise, forces can achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. How can surprise be incorporated into business and contracting plans? Simply put, surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or location of the main effort, or timing. The IPE can create robust plans with feints or false business intelligence indicators that are utilized by design to create uncertainty in the enemy's intelligence estimates. Note that this type of planning may be required in combat operations, but most likely would not be required in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), or the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). However, when needed, deception can aid the probability of achieving surprise.



(9) Simplicity. Simplicity is the clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Everything in war is very simple, but the simple thing is difficult. To the uninitiated, military operations are not difficult. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors being equal, parsimony is preferred. (Adopted and revised by the researcher from Department of the Army -- Field Manual (FM – 30).

D. Time-Phase Integrated Product—The Contracting Support Integration Plan (CSIP)

The CSIP is the primary tangible hard-copy product that the IPE must create. The CSIP is the written plan that, when properly constructed and vetted, will complement the CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD and create the desired effect for the COCOM. The tangible plan is nothing more than words on paper, but it is what it can accomplish—given proper IPE authorities and empowerment—in the context of broader mission planning where it gains its true power to enhance a capability.

To be an effective instrument, the CSIP must be created with all the factors and considerations iterated previously, including all of the tenets of war being considered. Additionally, the plan must be properly exercised in phase zero via JOPES with robust metrics for effectiveness and efficiency across personnel platforms and protocols.

What exactly is contained in the CSIP? A sound CSIP should include, at a minimum, all of the elements listed in the following paragraphs, with particular tailoring to meet the specific CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD mission requirements and functions that were addressed in the previous sections. Essential elements include, but are certainly not limited to, the following:

- Command and control relationships.
- Location and structure of the contracting office and suboffices, including which customers will be supported by each.



- Procedures for appointing, training, and employing OOs, CORs, Disbursing Agents, and GCPC holders.
- Manpower, equipment, and supplies required for contracting support and the deployment sequence.
- Types of supplies, services, and construction customers can expect to receive through contingency contracting; list any special prioritization or control measures for scarce commodities or services.
- Procedures for defining, validating, processing, and satisfying customer requirements.
- Procedures for budgeting and payments to vendors.
- Procedures for closing out contracting operations and redeployment.
- Security requirements and procedures for contracting and contractor personnel.
- Specific statutory/regulatory constraints or exemptions, which apply to the supported operation.
- Description of the concept of contracting operations that is phased and synchronized with the supported plan.
- Description and assessment of host-nation agreements, customs, laws, culture, language, religion, and business practices that will impact contracting operations.

Another area that needs to be addressed is the environmental impact of the operation. Specifically, what environmental laws must be followed? This area could have a significant impact on the CCO because these laws may need to be incorporated into some of the service contracts. The general rule of thumb is that the U.S. will abide by the host nation's environmental laws unless U.S. laws are more stringent. The CCO should review Annex L (Environmental Considerations) of the OPLAN to become familiar with any special considerations for the operation. This issue is likely to take an even bigger role in future operations due to increasing national and international attention focused on the environmental impacts of military operations (CSIP from JCCHB, First Edition, pg. 7-17 and 7-18 and excerpt from JCCHB Second Edition Chapter IV).



E. Process Mapping—Laying Out the Integrated Concept

The author has presented many concepts, factors, and requirements for the IPE at the strategic level. It is important to assimilate the IPE into standard business practices that incorporate a very basic logic flow to generating and vetting plans. Each specific CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD will require specific process mapping, but the author proposes a basic stepped design for conceptual ease and simplicity in putting these concepts into action.¹⁷

Step 1: Identify and analyze the most critical, or the most likely, CONPLAN, OPLAN, or OPORD that requires a comprehensive CSIP to be created, exercised, and validated/vetted.

Step 2: Perform analysis as described in paragraph C-3 (a through g) and C-4 of this chapter, wherein each subparagraph element is a sub-step or check in the analytical process and design of the CSIP.

Step 3: Create and exercise (phase zero) the CSIP to include robust effectiveness and efficiency metrics. Utilize integrated feedback loops to make corrections and adjustments to plans as exercised in JOPES.

Following this simple logic will help to ensure that the IPE incorporates the elements necessary for synchronized and optimized support.

F. Chapter Summary and Conclusion

This chapter proposed and provided the conceptual models for fully integrative contingency and expeditionary contract planning in the joint environment. While previous chapters, particularly chapter 2 and 3, have demonstrated that there has been a significant amount of forward movement in doctrine, directives, and

¹⁷ Note that in order to perform these steps, the author contends that all the recommendations in Chapter V be adopted and fully operational.



practice—particularly since 2008—a thorough review of these materials reveals that currently, there is no single integrative model or framework fully embracing all of the elements necessary for successful integrative planning. This chapter defined and expanded on these elements, which the researcher considered imperative for integrative contract planning in the joint environment. Chapter V presents the researcher's conclusions, recommendations, and implications for policy makers and practitioners.



V. Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications for Policy Makers: Phase Zero Contracting Operations

A. Introduction

1. Summary.

The Department of Defense use of contractors has increased dramatically in the past decade. In Iraq alone, the number of contractor personnel now exceeds the number of uniformed military personnel. Congress has recently increased scrutiny of and expressed concern over the significant challenges that the DoD faces in planning, executing, and managing operational contract support. Among the many challenges are, for example, failure to adequately integrate contracting into operation planning, exercising, and employment and difficulty in managing the same. To address these concerns, Congress enacted an amendment to title 10 U.S.C. and added section 2333, which directs the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint policy for contingency and Operational Contract Support requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency operations during combat and post-conflict operations. The Operational Contract Support mandate, in addition to concepts presented herein, create the framework for a better structure for planning and executing joint planning that properly integrates contract support into comprehensive plans for effective and efficient utilization of contractors in supporting roles across the full spectrum of war, peacetime, and other operations in which contractors will be integral to mission success.

GAO reports to date indicate that some progress has been made in Operational Contract Support. However, additional progress must be made to ensure effective and efficient integration of contracted support into operations plans (OPLANS) and operations orders (OPORDs). This integration is essential to meeting



the increasing demands of the warfighter, congressional overseers, and for the increased and continued support and confidence of the American taxpayer.

The Naval Postgraduate School has published several works that highlight significant progress in the planning and execution of Operational Contract Support. For example, the Yoder Three-tier Model (YTTM) (Yoder, 2004), the Joint Effects-based Contracting project (Poree, et. al., 2008a, 2008b), and many others are recently published works that may be instrumental in shaping public and military policy related to the structure, planning, and execution of Operational Contract Support.

Of particular note is the NPS Joint Effects-based Contracting project (Poree, et. al., 2008a, 2008b), that created a new concept of operational contract support and developed and exercised simulation modeling to demonstrate the efficacy of the concepts. Among the key elements of the work was the identification and creation of a Phase Zero operational model. The results are that with the Phase “0” concept in operation, significant efficiencies and greater effectiveness can be achieved in planning and executing any operation requiring Operational Contract Support.

This sponsored research examined in detail, recent doctrinal, policy, and practice changes to determine the extent and ability to which strategic-level integrative planning is established and in practice, and any deficiencies in the same. Additionally, this paper examined the Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) credentialed strategic-level personnel, originally proposed in the *Yoder Three-tier Model for Optimal Planning and Execution of Contingency Contracting* (Yoder, 2004), along with key elements of the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System (JEBCEs) originally authored by Kelly Poree, Karina Curtiss, Jeremy Morrill, and Steve Sherwood and funded by the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) (Poree, et al., 2008a, 2008b). This paper integrated the IPE and JEBCEs concepts along with expanding these prior models to include greater details of the functional integration in existing warfighter exercising and execution systems, including the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Lastly, and importantly,



this paper defined critical functions to bring those prior models up to a fully executable status.

2. Primary and Subsidiary Questions Addressed.

This chapter addresses and answers the final subsidiary question, What policy implications are inherent if the research conclusions and recommendations are followed? The primary and subsidiary research questions are answered within the report chapters and summarized in the conclusions, implications, and recommendations.

B. Conclusions and Implications

The research design and objective was to integrate the Yoder Three-tier Model strategic top tier, the Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE), with the Joint Effects-based Contract Execution System and Effects-based Contracting into current strategic planning processes. The results of this research highlight several conclusions.

1. Lack of Strategic Integrated Planning.

There exists a solid and recent history of calls for better strategic-level planning for contingency and expeditionary contracting such as the Yoder-three Tier Model (Yoder, 2004), GAO reports, and ongoing efforts by the Congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWCIA, 2009). The implications are clearly evident—the DoD does not currently perform strategic integrated contract planning well, if at all in some cases. Lack of integrated planning results in suboptimization, less effectiveness, and loss of efficiency. Given the tenets of war presented in Chapter IV, failure to “plan as you fight” can erode the key tenets of war, which are so essential to Unified Combatant Commanders.



2. Solid Contract Planning Framework Virtually Non-Existent.

Doctrine and policy examination and analysis revealed that while extensive improvements have been made in incorporating contracting into strategic-level planning, including establishment of Joint Doctrine for Operational Contract Support (OCS) under *Joint Publication 4-10*, they fail to provide the necessary framework of primary enablers, defined by the researcher as personnel, platforms, and protocols, to provide a sound doctrinal framework for the structure and execution of integrated planning. The lack of a single, solid foundation, including the basic pillars of personnel, platforms and protocols as proposed within this paper, as an initial framework will result in suboptimized and/or ad hoc planning. Without the required pillars and framework it will be difficult to have optimized mission attainment. Robust contract capability must be designed and incorporated into Joint and Combined exercises.

3. Utilizing Existing Warfighter Planning and Exercising Platforms Will Facilitate Contract Planning Integration and Assimilation.

Utilizing existing warfighter and joint planning doctrine, including *Joint Publication 4-10*, *Joint Publication 5-0*, and *Joint Publication 4-0*, to name three primary sources, and existing warfighter exercising and execution system platforms, including the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the robust mobilization tool, the Time Phased Forced Deployment Data (TPFDD) systems, will allow for a construct of integrated plans that can be properly vetted prior to the occurrence of an actual crisis event. An advantage of utilizing JOPES and associated platforms is that the warfighter community is already seasoned with this system. It is already well integrated into the command and control networks established globally for the DoD. Integrating more robust contract planning into the JOPES Deliberate Planning Process (DPP) and Crisis Action Planning (CAP) processes through IPE functional integration will result in an optimized CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD.



4. Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) billets or positions within both Joint and Service Commands Have Not Been Established.

The Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) position with the YTTM credential, including JPME qualification, must be assigned and responsible for the execution of the development, exercise, revision, and employment of robust, integrated Contract Support Integration Plans (CSIP) in accordance with the design pillars—personnel, platforms and protocols—and within the functional guidance presented in Chapter IV. While the Gansler Report (Gansler, 2007) was instrumental in establishing strategic flag/SES-level contracting positions with the Army, ultimately driving the establishment of the Army Contracting Command (ACC), it did not specify the functional requirements discussed in this paper, nor are the Army's joint counterpart IPE positions established at the UCC to integrate the pillars and functions required to connect contracting to specific CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPROD. In order for the YTTM IPE to function properly, both the Joint and Service communities must have IPE billets and must be tasked with conducting the integrated planning as outlined here. Obviously, having the right person with the best credentials at the strategic level is imperative. The functions required at this level of planning are too complex and challenging for anything less than the properly credentialed and tasked IPE. Currently, both in Joint and Service commands, there is a huge gap in the credential and functional assignment of duties that the IPE is envisioned to fulfill. Filling this gap with credentialed IPE will have a large impact on community career paths for a finite number of those individuals desiring or designated to obtain the credential and accept IPE positions, if established.

5. Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) Complements Tenets of War and Sound Business Practices.

The functional IPE, when established, can and should create contract integration plans squarely within the established tenets of war. This is an important selling feature to the warfighter community to willingly accept and utilize the IPE in strategic planning. Currently, the contracting community has failed to prove



themselves as an enabling asset within the tenets of war construct. This failure results in a misunderstanding and often a marginalization of contracting as a key enabler of the warfighter. With credentialed IPE positions functioning in and on behalf of the warfighter's circles, a true value-added synergy and complement of the tenets of war will occur. Additionally, spend analysis, Multiple Award Contract/Indefinite Delivery Type Contract award for theater support, better command and control and battle space management of personnel and contractors, determining sound business cost estimates for missions, determining spend profiles, etc. are all hallmarks of sound business planning that need to be incorporated into the DoD planning structure.

6. Costs versus Benefits: Up-front Costs with Potentially Huge Payout.

There is clearly a huge cost to bringing the IPE position into the DoD and to conducting fully integrated joint contracting planning within JOPES. Although a specific dollar-cost analysis is not within the scope of this research, cost is an area that all participants in the research working group indicated was a barrier to successful implementation. Career-path training and education for the IPE, clearly more comprehensive than most senior-level contracting officers and/or 1102 series contract specialists receive, will take more time and more money than is currently expended. Additionally, developing and implementing robust integrated modeling and simulation into the JOPES framework will also require a large investment in human and monetary capital. For example, as a rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimate, if Congress authorized 10 IPE flag/SES-level positions—one for each Unified Combatant Command (UCC), both regional and functional, and one for each major service—and properly staffed the IPE position with three credentialed supporting staff members at the O-5/O-6 level, the price tag per UCC would be approximately \$750,000 per year. Using this rough order of magnitude estimate, the result is \$7.5 million for all 10 UCC and \$3 million per year for the military Service



counterparts, totaling \$10.5 million for the complete UCC and Service structure as proposed.

The personnel price of implementation can be far outweighed by the tangible benefits from the proper functioning of the IPE. As the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System research proved (see Chapter III), a properly structured IPE combined with phase zero peacetime planning can and does have huge payoff in terms of reduced response time, greater utilization of competitively awarded contracts such as MAC/IDIQ, full compliance with the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), better battle space management, command and control, and greater harmony and achievement of mission objectives while incorporating the tenets of war, synchronized with the CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD and within the constructs of sound business planning. Ultimately, and most important, better planning and management may result in placing fewer personnel in harm's way or at risk of casualty or death, something desirable to everyone and something it is difficult to place a monetary value on.

C. Recommendations

Logically, several recommendations follow from the research and are as follows in order of implementation priority.

1. Congressional Action Required.

Congress must formally establish and fund Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) billets/positions within each and every Unified Combatant Command (UCC) and military Service component. Establishing the IPE will require Congressional authorization and funding because these are flag/SES-level positions. Additionally, initial staffs should be assigned with appropriate credential. Without this critical piece, integrative strategic-level planning will not effectively or optimally occur.



2. IPE Analysis and Integration Mandatory.

Once established, the IPE must conduct analysis and develop integrated and synchronized strategic-level Contract Support Integration Plans (CSIP) for all critical CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD. The IPE and staff must conduct comprehensive analyses, design robust exercises incorporated into the JOPES and TPFDD systems, and properly assess and refine the CSIP on a continuous basis. They must also ensure that comprehensive metrics for effectiveness and efficiency are embedded in assessments of plan formulation, exercise, and execution.

3. Establish Phase Zero IDIQ and MAC Contracts.

The IPE, once in place and having conducted sound analysis, must establish IDIQ and MAC contracts. Establishing competitively awarded, Competition in Contracting Act (CICA)–compliant Multiple Award Contracts (MAC) and Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity Type Contracts (IDIQ) that are in harmony with theater support warfighter and operational plans can be fully exercised and vetted in the Deliberate Planning Process cycle of war planning. This will result in greater effectiveness and efficiency, and allow for faster and more targeted reaction capability.

D. Areas for Additional Research

Additional areas of research include, but are certainly not limited to:

1. Identification and assignment of IPE to Unified Combatant Commands (UCC) and Service components—specifically, development of the career paths and a model for actual education, billet structure, and associated details.
2. Design and construct of robust strategic contract planning models for incorporation into JOPES and TPFDD systems. This will likely include more than a few research, consulting, and staffing missions. As envisioned, all of the functional elements



described in Chapter IV must be incorporated. How to best model and simulate these in a parametric manner will be a major undertaking.

E. Final Summary

This research makes the case for formally establishing the Integrated Planner and Executor position as the primary enabler of zero operations. Phase Zero is the operational phase actually occurring during the Deliberate Planning Process, prior to an actual crisis event occurring requiring formal Crisis Action Planning. What is clear is that the DoD continues to suboptimize its contract support due to a lack of integrated, strategic-level planning and a concurrent lack of synchronization with CONPLAN, OPLAN, and OPORD. Most often, contracting has been an ad hoc reaction to emerging warfighter requirements. However, the author contends that establishing the credentialed IPE, assigning specific tasks for plan development and exercising, and establishing pre-awarded contracts in phase zero based on sound analysis, will optimize contract support capability.



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- Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research
- The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository

Contract Management

- Commodity Sourcing Strategies
- Contracting Government Procurement Functions
- Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone
- Joint Contingency Contracting
- Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution
- Navy Contract Writing Guide
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- Strategic Contingency Contracting
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- Capital Budgeting for the DoD
- Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets
- Financing DoD Budget via PPPs
- Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition Budgeting Reform
- PPPs and Government Financing
- ROI of Information Warfare Systems
- Special Termination Liability in MDAPs
- Strategic Sourcing
- Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates

Human Resources

- Indefinite Reenlistment
- Individual Augmentation
- Learning Management Systems
- Moral Conduct Waivers and First-term Attrition
- Retention
- The Navy's Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System
- Tuition Assistance

Logistics Management

- Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance
- Army LOG MOD
- ASDS Product Support Analysis
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