No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy
Abstract
A persistent theme in U.S. nuclear weapons policy is that the United States has always retained the option to use nuclear weapons first in conflict. The threat of nuclear first use played a key role in NATO's military strategy throughout the Cold War, and even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, successive U.S. administrations have retained "implicitly or explicitly" the first-use option. Yet, in a speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama pledged to "put an end to Cold War thinking" and to "reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same." This commitment, coupled with President Obama's embrace of the vision of a nuclear weapons-free world, appeared to foreshadow important changes in U.S. nuclear policy--especially declaratory policy--in the administration's much-anticipated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR, however, missed the opportunity to effect meaningful change in U.S. nuclear policy. In reality, the NPR's new declaratory formulation changes little from the past, as the United States can still threaten the first use of nuclear weapons in a variety of circumstances. The NPR declares that the "fundamental role" of U.S. nuclear weapons is for deterrence; that nuclear weapons would be used only "in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners"; and that "the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations." However, to contend that the "fundamental" purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is deterrence does not mean that this is their only purpose.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2010
- Accession Number
- ADA538352
Entities
People
- Michael S. Gerson
Organizations
- Center for Naval Analyses