



NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

THE ARTS
CHILD POLICY
CIVIL JUSTICE
EDUCATION
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
NATIONAL SECURITY
POPULATION AND AGING
PUBLIC SAFETY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TERRORISM AND
HOMELAND SECURITY
TRANSPORTATION AND
INFRASTRUCTURE
WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE

This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation.

[Jump down to document](#) ▼

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis.

Support RAND

[Purchase this document](#)

[Browse Books & Publications](#)

[Make a charitable contribution](#)

For More Information

Visit RAND at www.rand.org

Explore the [RAND National Defense Research Institute](#)

View [document details](#)

Limited Electronic Distribution Rights

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see [RAND Permissions](#).

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

| | | | | | |
|---|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| 1. REPORT DATE 2010 | | 2. REPORT TYPE | | 3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2010 to 00-00-2010 | |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool | | | | 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5b. GRANT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER | |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) | | | | 5d. PROJECT NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5e. TASK NUMBER | |
| | | | | 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Rand Corporation, National Defense Research Institute, 1176 Main Street, PO Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA, 90407-2138 | | | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER | |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | | | | 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) | |
| | | | | 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) | |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited | | | | | |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | | | | | |
| 14. ABSTRACT | | | | | |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS | | | | | |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: | | | 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT | 18. NUMBER OF PAGES | 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON |
| a. REPORT unclassified | b. ABSTRACT unclassified | c. THIS PAGE unclassified | | | |

This product is part of the RAND Corporation technical report series. Reports may include research findings on a specific topic that is limited in scope; present discussions of the methodology employed in research; provide literature reviews, survey instruments, modeling exercises, guidelines for practitioners and research professionals, and supporting documentation; or deliver preliminary findings. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure that they meet high standards for research quality and objectivity.



Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool

Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited



NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

About the DSART

Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool (DSART) consists of six assessments to qualitatively and quantitatively determine the state of a country's defense sector, its institutions and processes, and its capacity to carry out operations for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, border and maritime security, counterpiracy, and postconflict stabilization. While the DSART is ready for use, U.S. goals for defense sector reform may evolve, so it is designed with a flexible architecture that can be adapted to a changing security environment.

For more information about the development, structure, application, and potential evolution of the DSART, see *Developing a Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool*, by Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Lynn E. Davis, Ely Ratner, Molly Dunigan, Jeremiah Goulka, Heather Peterson, and K. Jack Riley, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-864-OSD, 2010, which is available online at http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR864/.

The research that produced the DSART was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

Questions or comments are welcome and may be directed to the project co-leaders:

Agnes Gereben Schaefer
RAND Corporation
4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
(412) 683-2300 x4488
Agnes_Schaefer@rand.org

Lynn E. Davis
RAND Corporation
1200 South Hayes Street
Arlington, VA 22202
(703) 413-1100 x5399
Lynn_Davis@rand.org

More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org.

Contents

| | |
|--|-----|
| About the DSART | iii |
| Introduction | vii |
| SECTION ONE | |
| Characteristics of the Defense Sector | 1 |
| SECTION TWO | |
| Assessment of Defense Institutions and Processes | 11 |
| SECTION THREE | |
| Assessment of Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Capabilities | 15 |
| SECTION FOUR | |
| Assessment of Counternarcotics Capabilities | 19 |
| SECTION FIVE | |
| Assessment of Border and Maritime Security Capabilities | 23 |
| SECTION SIX | |
| Assessment of Counterpiracy Capabilities | 27 |
| SECTION SEVEN | |
| Assessment of Capabilities to Stabilize Postconflict Situations | 31 |

Introduction

Background

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has a number of assistance programs to build the capacity of foreign partners in order to promote a variety of different U.S. security goals.

One overall goal could be to support a country in its efforts to reform its defense institutions and processes in ways to reflect what the United States views as important for effective military planning and operations, e.g., civilian control of the military, military professionalism. Through such efforts, the country would be better able to manage its own security problems and potentially partner with the United States and other countries in international military operations.

Another set of goals could be to improve a country's capability to counter specific internal security threats, such as terrorism and insurgency, drug trafficking, porous land or sea borders, piracy, and instability in the aftermath of a conflict.

An understanding of a country's defense sector can help policymakers promote any or all of these goals, as well as prioritize DoD programs and allocate scarce resources for an individual country or among different countries. The Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool (DSART) is designed to provide policymakers with such an understanding.

For the purposes of this tool, the defense sector in a country is defined as the uniformed military plus the military and civilian management, accountability, and oversight systems, mechanisms, and processes that sustain it.

The DSART begins with a section that asks a series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an understanding of the general characteristics of the defense sector in the country. This provides background for undertaking the assessments in the six sections that follow.

The questions in Section One (Characteristics of the Defense Sector) focus first on the military forces themselves and then on the various institutions and processes that sustain and exercise control over them. The section ends with questions aimed at understanding the country's overall political, economic, and security environment. What the assessor is seeking through these questions is a general understanding of the defense sector in the country and enough information for the assessments that follow.

Section Two (Defense Institutions and Processes) involves an assessment of how the country's institutions and processes match what the United States views as the "critical" capacities of a defense sector. These critical capacities are derived from U.S. government documents that address defense and security sector reform.

This assessment involves a qualitative appraisal and then a quantitative scoring of the country's capacities, on a scale of 1 (entirely lacking) to 5 (strong and no major improvement

needed). Having revealed where deficiencies exist, Section Two then poses a series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an overall assessment of the prospects in the country for reforming those areas in which deficiencies were found.

The next five sections of the DSART focus on specific internal security threats and involve an assessment of the country's capabilities for responding:

- Section Three (Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency)
- Section Four (Counternarcotics)
- Section Five (Border and Maritime Security)
- Section Six (Counterpiracy)
- Section Seven (Stabilize Postconflict Situations).

Each section includes a series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an assessment of the country's overall capabilities to respond to the specific threat. The answers serve as a basis for an assessment of the country's capabilities to carry out the "critical" functions necessary to respond to each of the specific types of security threat. Again, the assessment involves a qualitative appraisal and then quantitative scoring. Each section ends with an assessment of the country's prospects for improving its capabilities in the areas in which deficiencies were found.

How to Use the DSART

The U.S. government has a number of assessment tools, e.g., the Criminal Justice Sector Assessment Rating Tool. The DSART could be used in conjunction with other tools or on its own.

Once a country is chosen for a defense sector assessment, the next step for policymakers is to specify their reasons for wanting such an assessment as well as the potential goals the United States has for the country.

With that guidance, the assessor then begins to use the DSART. In *all* cases, the assessor answers the questions in Section One (Characteristics of the Defense Sector). Then, depending on the potential goals for the country, the assessor completes the assessment in the subsequent section or sections of the DSART. For example, if the goal is to reform the country's defense institutions and processes, the assessor would complete the assessment in Section Two. If the goal is to improve the country's counterterrorism capabilities, the assessor would complete the assessment in Section Three. If the United States has multiple goals in the country, then the assessor would complete multiple assessments in the appropriate sections.

The DSART may not include all the security goals the United States might have for a country. However, the architecture of the tool is flexible enough to allow an assessor to introduce additional questions and sections.

The DSART provides a baseline assessment of the defense sector in a country. The initial assessment of a country's defense sector should be viewed as only the starting point for what will be a series of activities, potentially over many years, that will involve programs and follow-on assessments. For example, political power, social network, and stakeholder analyses will all be useful, but it will likely take months or even years of engagement to fully understand the often complex and highly sensitive relationships among officials. So, the DSART could be used systematically, over time, to measure progress in enhancing the capacities of the country's defense institutions and processes and improving the country's military capabilities to respond to security threats.

The DSART, in its structured set of questions and assessments of critical defense sector capacities and of the capabilities needed to meet different types of internal security threats, is similar to the assessment tools of other U.S. government agencies and multinational organizations. The DSART does, however, lend itself to being used for a more formal and systematic assessment of these capacities and capabilities. To this end, the assessor could take additional steps to validate the information that is collected, e.g., answering the questions in the DSART through structured interviews, using workshops with a cross-section of local experts, or conducting tabletop exercises for the qualitative evaluations.

Moreover, historical experiences with defense sector reform in different countries suggest that approaches to planning and managing reforms need to be evolutionary, drawing on pilot programs and close monitoring over time. Thus, initial assessments will often be, at best, a set of initial hypotheses to be tested and revised over the course of a program, especially as local capability grows. Success often depends on a commitment to learning from initiatives and revisiting initial assumptions and strategies. Any initial DSART assessment must be viewed in this light and serve not only as one input into government decisionmaking but also as the starting point for continuing efforts to reform a country's defense sector.

Characteristics of the Defense Sector

This section poses a series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an understanding of the characteristics of the defense sector in the country. This information serves as background for undertaking the assessments in the sections of the DSART that follow. The questions focus first on the military forces and then on the various institutions and processes that sustain and exercise control over them. The section ends with questions aimed at providing the context for the assessment of the defense sector in terms of understanding the country's overall political, economic, and security environment.

I. Military Forces

A. Role of the Military

What is the role of the military in society? Has it changed over time?

What roles and responsibilities does the military have, and what functions does it carry out? Are they codified in law? What are the major challenges faced by the military?

Does the military have peacetime internal security responsibilities and functions, and, if so, what are they? Are they distinguished from those of the national and local police? How are the respective responsibilities managed, coordinated, and resourced? Are there any overlaps, ambiguities, and redundancies?

Is there a gendarme-type force? Are its roles and authorities clearly understood? If not, who fills the role of the gendarme?

Does the country have paramilitary or other security forces? If so, does the military provide leadership or support to that force, and to what extent? What percentage of the military is seconded to positions outside traditional military organizations?

What are the rules and procedures for triggering a military response to an internal security crisis? How do the military and other elements of the security system cooperate in such situations?

Who is responsible for border management in the country? Does the military play a major or supporting role?

Does the military perform police missions, and, if so, what are they and why?

Is the military involved in illicit activities, such as counternarcotics, and, if so, does it play a major or supporting role?

What is the role of the military in foreign and internal intelligence collection, and how does this role relate to those of the civilian intelligence services and the police? Have mechanisms been established for their cooperation and coordination?

Is the military involved in private sector activities, i.e., owning and running businesses, and, if so, what are they?

Is the military engaged in international peacekeeping operations, and, if so, are there positive and/or negative effects on the military overall?

Does the military have a role in providing social benefits, such as health or engineering services?

Is there corruption in the military, and, if so, is it widespread? What are the sources?

How politicized is the military in its leadership as well as among the rank and file, i.e., is the military (or particular groups within the military) linked to powerful political groups?

B. Composition of Military

What is the size of the military, and what services make up the military? Is the force designed, trained, and deployed to respond to the country's external and internal threats?

What is the rank structure in the different services? What is the salary structure in the different services? How do those salaries compare with jobs in the private sector?

Does the country have a conscript system? If so, what are the policies in terms of age and education?

What is the level of human capital (e.g., levels of literacy and education and prevalence of health conditions, such as HIV)?

Are there policies in place to ensure compliance with international legal obligations regarding child recruitment and child protection? What are they?

What is the ethnic and social composition of the military, and how representative is the military of society?

C. Military Organization

How is national command of the military structured in terms of command relationships and specific authorities? Is there a joint operational command?

Is there a general staff/joint staff/main staff? Is it organized to deal with issues at the military strategic level?

Do intelligence agencies fall under the general staff or under a civilian ministry?

D. Military Capabilities

What are the operational capabilities of the military overall and of each of the military services? Is the military able to operate throughout the country's territory? Is it able to support, sustain, and deploy forces outside its national borders?

What is the state of the military's equipment in each service? What types of mobility does the military have? Are ground, water, and air operations integrated?

Is the military interoperable with NATO and/or relevant regional or international forces (e.g., African Union, UN)?

Does the military have capabilities for the following:

- rapid reaction
- nighttime operations
- transport of personnel and naval amphibious operations
- satellite communication
- air interdiction operations, including maritime patrols
- integrated intelligence collection and analysis
- peacekeeping operations?

E. Military Readiness

What is the overall readiness of military personnel, including the following:

- How many military forces are on duty?
- How well are they trained?
- How many military forces are in reserve status?
- How well are they trained?

How robust is the military's command-and-control system? Is it being exercised? If not, would it be ready to be exercised if necessary?

What is the overall readiness of the military's logistics infrastructure?

How much equipment does the military have on hand and what are the equipment readiness rates?

What is the overall readiness of equipment in the military, including the following:

- vehicles
- radios
- weapons
- ammunition
- uniforms
- body armor
- helmets?

F. Military Logistics

Is there a logistics planning process/methodology? What are its characteristics?

Is there a process to manage the deployment of military forces, equipment, and cargo within the country? What are its characteristics? Is there a process to recover forces, equipment, and cargo? What are its characteristics?

Is there a process to manage the repair and maintenance of weapons, equipment, and vehicles? What are its characteristics?

Is adequate funding getting to units to conduct resupply and maintenance of equipment?

Does the military have accountability for supplies?

Is there a process to manage and administer fixed installations and locations that support the infrastructure for movement and transportation, supply, and accommodation inside the country as well as for deployments outside the country? What are its characteristics?

Is there a national logistics concept, and, if so, what functions does it include?

Has an inventory of critical infrastructure been prepared, and is there a plan to protect the critical logistics infrastructure?

G. Military Personnel Policies

Is there an established military recruitment system in place and functioning? What are its characteristics?

What accession standards are used for the selection of personnel (e.g., education, medical, age)? Do they differ for active and reserve forces? Do they differ for the different services?

What are the recruitment sources, policies, and incentives for officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted personnel?

Is there a process of promotion, career management, and dismissals to ensure that the best-qualified military personnel are retained? Is there evidence of “ghost soldiers” in the military?

How are former combatants integrated into the military?

Are military personnel regularly receiving their full paychecks?

What arrangements for pensions are in place for military personnel upon retirement or leaving the military?

Does the military have a social welfare system for its members?

Does the military have a professional military training and education system? What are its characteristics? Is there a policy document that describes it?

Is there training in international humanitarian law and human rights standards?

What is the attitude and response of the military toward HIV within its ranks? Is there consistently available counseling and testing? Is treatment available? What are the policies for HIV-positive soldiers?

H. Military Justice Policies

Is there a military justice system? Does it have a statutory basis? Are military personnel assigned and trained in military justice occupations?

Is the military justice system connected to the civilian justice system?

Does the military control areas of the country and impose military law?

Do pretrial facilities and prisons comprise a mixed civilian and military population? What role does the military have with regard to civilian prisons?

Does the military have jurisdiction over civilians?

Can a civilian law-enforcement officer arrest military service members?

Is the justice system applied equally to all members of the military?

What processes does the military have in place to respond to allegations of human rights violations by its personnel, including those relating to sexual and domestic violence?

Are there problems with corruption in the military justice system?

I. Military Doctrine

Is there a national military doctrine, a doctrine for each of the military services, or a joint military doctrine?

If there is a doctrine, is it based on a validated national security concept, national security strategy, and/or national military strategy?

Is there doctrine for how to work with other security agencies?

II. Conduct of Defense Policy

A. Role of Political Officials

What is the role of the president/prime minister in defense policymaking?

What ministries and agencies (e.g., foreign affairs, finance, justice) are involved in the conduct of defense policy, and have they been established in the constitution, law, policy, and/or regulation? Have these roles and missions been documented, clarified, and/or deconflicted?

Is there a role for officials in parliament in determining defense policy and expenditures? How is this accomplished (e.g., through a parliamentary commission or committee)? Does parliament have the authority and ability to carry out audits of defense expenditures? Does the parliament have adequate expertise in military matters to make informed decisions with respect to military policy and expenditures?

How transparent are military policy, spending, and management to parliamentarians, the media, and the general public?

What is the chain of command and division of responsibilities among political officials and military personnel? How does the actual exercise of control compare with the legal requirements?

What are the respective responsibilities of political officials and military leaders for the selection of senior military officers?

What mechanisms does the military have to raise legitimate concerns to its political leadership?

Are serving members of the military appointed to political positions within the government (e.g., ministerial positions, ambassadorships, directorships of nonmilitary organizations)?

Is there expertise among NGOs on military matters, and do NGOs participate in public discussion about military policy?

B. Ministry of Defense (MoD)

Organization

Is there a functioning MoD, and what is its size and organization?

Is the minister of defense a politically appointed civilian? What is the role of civilians in the ministry? What is the ratio of civilians to military personnel in the MoD? Is there an established civilian recruitment system in place and functioning? What are its characteristics?

How many civilian officials are recently retired military personnel?

What role does the MoD play in defense policy, strategic planning, financial management, weapon procurement, personnel recruitment, and logistics?

Responsibilities

Does the MoD have a strategic task list outlining its responsibilities and relationships to other organizations?

Does the MoD have the authority and processes to audit defense expenditures?

What are the roles of civilians and the military in defense strategy, planning, and budgeting? Are the respective responsibilities in the budgeting process clearly established in law, regulation, and procedures?

Does the MoD have a human resource policy and structure, and what are its characteristics?

C. Defense Strategy, Planning, and Budget

How are defense budgets prepared and implemented?

What budgeting methodology is used (e.g., zero-based budgeting or other)? What is the overall structure of defense budget (e.g., unit-based, activity-based, mixed)? For what time frame are financial resources preplanned or allocated (e.g., one year, two years, five years ahead)?

Is defense planning linked to programming and budgeting, and, if so, what techniques are used?

How are policy development, planning, programming, and management organized? Who is responsible for making decisions?

Is there a defense strategy? How is it formulated? What planning methodology is used (e.g., threat-based, resource-based, capability-based)?

Are there policy documents—long-term (e.g., national security strategy, white papers) and medium-term (e.g., national military strategy, national defense concept)—that influence funding decisions?

Are there financial management systems and procedures in place for accountability, anti-corruption, auditing, etc.? What are their characteristics? Are these procedures in law, directives, or regulations?

Does the military, branches of it, or local commanders control any revenue-generating operations, and, if so, which ones? Are all the incomes and expenditures from such operations part of the overall government budget?

What are the rules for procurement of major items of equipment, and how are these rules implemented?

Are there issues with corruption in the procurement process? What is being done to prevent and detect corruption?

III. Overall Political, Economic, and Security Environment

A. Political and Justice Systems

Does the government have a legal and security presence throughout the entire country, or are there ungoverned territories?

Does the government exercise control of the main lines of transportation, including rivers and roads? Is key infrastructure (e.g., energy) protected?

What type for political system does the country have, and what is the level of democratization in the country? Has there been a peaceful transfer of power from a ruling establishment to elected officials?

What are the characteristics and capacity of the country's criminal justice system? Have roles and missions among ministries and agencies been established in the constitution, law, policy, and regulations?

Does the justice system exist throughout the entire country? Are there alternative sources of justice outside the government?

What is the state of the judiciary? Are there sufficient judges, public defenders, investigators, prosecutors, and forensic experts? Is there evidence of bias in the decisions of the justice system?

How widespread is corruption, bribery, intimidation, and violence in the government and the justice sector? What mechanisms are in place to prevent, detect, and combat corruption?

Do security personnel receive human rights and international law training?

Does the justice system prosecute past human rights violators? Are human rights workers protected? Is there a witness protection program?

How are the law-enforcement agencies equipped?

Do law-enforcement agencies have adequate training and education to fulfill their missions?

Do the law-enforcement agencies have cooperative agreements or arrangements with regional or global law-enforcement organizations, such as INTERPOL?

Does the general populace see the law-enforcement agencies as protectors of the people or instruments of oppression?

B. Economic Situation

What is the state of the country's economic development? What type of economy does the country have, and what is the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the country? What percent of GDP is spent on the defense sector?

Is the government able to sustain military and civilian personnel, equipment, training, and operations without international financial assistance? If not, is there a plan for achieving financial sustainability? What are the government's potential sources of revenue collection?

What is the state of the country's physical infrastructure (e.g., electricity, roads, water)? How does this infrastructure affect the capabilities of the military?

C. Internal Conflicts

Are there internal conflicts? What are the current sources and status? Are there potential conflicts on the horizon?

What are the characteristics of these conflicts, including the social and ethnic components?

Who is involved in the conflicts (identify both governmental and nongovernmental groups and their social networks)?

Has there been a military role in the conflict, and has it changed over time?

Are nongovernmental security organizations (e.g., militias, paramilitaries) involved in the conflicts?

D. External Threats

Is there support from outside states for groups threatening the governments, e.g., terrorists, drug cartels, pirates?

What has been the role of the military in responding to these threats?

Assessment of Defense Institutions and Processes

This section involves an assessment of how the country's defense institutions and processes match up to what the United States views as the critical capacities of a defense sector. Based on the information collected in Section One, the assessment involves a qualitative appraisal of each of these capacities and then a quantitative scoring of each based on the following scale:

1. *Very Low*: entirely lacking
2. *Low*: beginning to develop
3. *Neither Low nor High*: Minimal but functioning
4. *High*: functional but room for improvement
5. *Very High*: strong and no major improvement needed.

Having outlined where deficiencies exist, the section poses another series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an overall assessment of the prospects in the country for improving its capacities in the areas in which deficiencies were found.

I. Assessment of Needs for Reform

| Critical Capacities of the Defense Sector | Qualitative Assessment | Quantitative Assessment (Score 1 to 5) |
|---|------------------------|--|
| Civilian control of military in practice, not just organization | | |
| Systems of defense planning, procurement, budgeting, and financial management, including contracting and auditing | | |
| Professionalism of military forces in terms of education and training | | |
| Military personnel policies capable of recruiting, training, and retaining high-quality soldiers and officers representative of society as a whole | | |
| Effective military command-and-control and logistics organizations | | |
| Incorporation of rule of law and human rights components into military and MoD training programs | | |
| Security forces carry out their functions in accordance with the principles of accountability, transparency, public participation, and respect for human rights | | |

II. Assessment of Prospects for Reform

The next step is to assess the prospects in the country for reforming the areas of deficiency identified in the first part of Section Two.

Has defense reform been undertaken in the past? Has it been part of an overall reform effort that includes the military, police, border guards, intelligence services, those government agencies that monitor such organizations, and those institutions charged with upholding the rule of law, including the judiciary and the penal system? Has defense sector reform been integrated within a larger state-building or democratization strategy? What have been the results? Are other countries or international organizations involved in reform efforts in the country?

Is the country's government willing to engage with the United States to reform the specific areas in which deficiencies were found?

Is the military willing to engage with the United States to reform the specific areas in which deficiencies were found? Are parts of the government supportive of reform and other parts opposed?

Are there groups outside the defense sector that are potentially supportive of (e.g., civil society groups) or opposed to (e.g., organized crime syndicates) such reforms?

Are there political, fiscal, or social constraints to such reforms?

What degree of public support is expected for such reforms?

Are other countries engaged in activities to reform the defense sector? What can be learned from their experiences?

Assessment of Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Capabilities

This section begins with a series of questions. The answers to these questions will provide an assessment of the country's overall counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities. The section then involves a qualitative assessment of the country's capabilities to carry out the "critical" functions necessary to respond to a terrorism or insurgency threat. It then calls for a quantitative scoring of the country's capabilities based on the following scale:

1. *Very Low*: entirely lacking
2. *Low*: beginning to develop
3. *Neither Low nor High*: minimal but functioning
4. *High*: functional but room for improvement
5. *Very High*: strong and no major improvement needed.

Having outlined where deficiencies exist, the section poses another series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an overall assessment of the prospects in the country for improving its capabilities in the areas in which deficiencies were found.

I. Capabilities Assessment

Is the military involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activities?

How well does the military operate with law-enforcement agencies in counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency operations?

Are sufficient numbers of military forces involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activities?

Does the military have planning, doctrine, and logistics support geared toward counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations?

Are the military and police adequately trained in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics?

Does the military have adequate equipment to conduct counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency operations?

Does the government have the right type of information on terrorists or insurgents (e.g., what areas they are operating in, their prospects for expanding their operations, how they align themselves, their grievances)?

Does the government have an understanding of the support given to terrorists and insurgents by other states or international groups?

Is the military able to combat the tactics used by terrorists and insurgents from inside and outside the country?

Is the military able to process and share intelligence with other states effectively and quickly?

Does the government have sufficient ties to the domestic and international financial sector to disrupt terrorist financing?

Does the military include civil affairs units to conduct civil-military reconstruction/infrastructure projects aimed at winning over local civilians' support?

II. Assessment of Areas for Improvement in Capabilities

| Critical Counterterrorism/ Counterinsurgency Functions | Qualitative Assessment | Quantitative Assessment (Score 1 to 5) |
|---|------------------------|--|
| Maintain security throughout the country | | |
| Collect and analyze intelligence | | |
| Provide policing and law enforcement | | |
| Protect critical infrastructure | | |
| Carry out military surveillance and interdiction | | |
| Integrate strategic communication | | |
| Hold territory and control roadways, waterways, and airspace | | |
| Contribute to the design and delivery of an overall integrated government strategy and operations | | |
| Train military forces for counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations | | |
| Control corruption | | |
| Disrupt financing by terrorist or insurgent groups from within or outside the country | | |
| Deny support to terrorist or insurgent groups from domestic populations or from outside the country | | |

III. Assessment of Prospects for Improvement

The next step is to assess the prospects in the country for improving its capabilities in the areas of deficiency identified in the second part of Section Three.

Is the country's government willing to engage with the United States to improve its capabilities in the specific areas in which deficiencies were found?

Is the military willing to engage with the United States to improve its capabilities in the specific areas in which deficiencies were found?

Are there groups outside the defense sector that are potentially supportive of or opposed to such improvements?

Are there political, fiscal, or social constraints to such improvements?

What degree of public support is expected for such improvements?

Assessment of Counternarcotics Capabilities

This section begins with a series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an assessment of the country's overall counternarcotics capabilities. The section then involves a qualitative assessment of the country's capabilities to carry out the "critical" functions necessary to respond to the threat posed by drug trafficking. It then calls for a quantitative scoring of the country's capabilities based on the following scale:

1. *Very Low*: entirely lacking
2. *Low*: beginning to develop
3. *Neither Low nor High*: minimal but functioning
4. *High*: functional but room for improvement
5. *Very High*: strong and no major improvement needed.

Having outlined where deficiencies exist, the section then poses another series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an overall assessment of the prospects in the country for improving its capabilities in the areas in which deficiencies were found.

I. Capabilities Assessment

Is the military involved in counternarcotics activities?

Are there sufficient numbers of military forces to support the country's planned counternarcotics activities?

Does the military have planning, doctrine, and logistics support geared toward counternarcotics operations?

Are counternarcotics intelligence capabilities integrated across government agencies?

Does the military receive sufficient counternarcotics training? Does that include sufficient human rights and international law training?

Does the military have adequate counternarcotics equipment?

Is the size of the police force sufficient for counternarcotics operations, given the size and population of the country?

Does the police force have adequate equipment in the areas of communication and transportation?

Do the police receive sufficient training for counternarcotics operations?

Are police and military strategies and operations well integrated?

Does the government have the right type of information on the nature and dynamics of drug trafficking (e.g., what drugs are involved; what part of the production process is done in country; how the drugs are moved into, through, and out of the country; where traffickers operate; how heavily armed the traffickers are)?

Is the government able to adequately address crime and violence caused by drug trafficking?

Are there programs to demobilize and disarm those involved in the drug trade, and are these programs successful and sufficiently funded?

Are sufficient funds available for drug eradication, and does the public and military support these programs?

Are regional and bordering countries supportive of the counternarcotics efforts? Are any complicit in the drug trade?

Are there international donors (either other countries or international organizations) that are willing to contribute to the counternarcotics effort, and can they be expected to provide a long-term, sustained commitment?

Are there international efforts (e.g., air/coastal interdiction) to stop the import of unprocessed drugs or precursor elements?

II. Assessment of Areas for Improvement in Capabilities

| Critical Counternarcotics Functions | Qualitative Assessment | Quantitative Assessment (Score 1 to 5) |
|--|------------------------|--|
| Police, prosecute, and incarcerate drug traffickers | | |
| Maintain law and order (public safety) | | |
| Integrate military and law-enforcement operational support | | |
| Maintain border and coastal security | | |
| Collect intelligence on narcotics traffickers | | |
| Control corruption | | |
| Establish drug eradication and interdiction programs | | |
| Develop rapid and mobile reaction capabilities based on real-time intelligence | | |
| Train civilians and military forces in counternarcotics operations | | |
| Control roadways, airspace, and waterways | | |

III. Assessment of Prospects for Improvement

The next step is to assess the prospects in the country for improving its capabilities in the areas of deficiency identified in the second part of Section Four.

Is the country's government willing to engage with the United States to improve its capabilities in the specific areas in which deficiencies were found?

Is the military willing to engage with the United States to improve its capabilities in the specific areas in which deficiencies were found?

Are there groups outside the defense sector that are potentially supportive of or opposed to such improvements?

Are there political, fiscal, or social constraints to such improvements?

What degree of public support is expected for such improvements?

Assessment of Border and Maritime Security Capabilities

This section begins with a series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an assessment of the country's overall border and maritime security capabilities. The section then involves a qualitative assessment of the country's capabilities to carry out the "critical" functions necessary to respond to a border or maritime security threat. It then calls for a quantitative scoring of the country's capabilities based on the following scale:

1. *Very Low*: entirely lacking
2. *Low*: beginning to develop
3. *Neither Low nor High*: minimal but functioning
4. *High*: functional but room for improvement
5. *Very High*: strong and no major improvement needed.

Having outlined where deficiencies exist, the section poses another series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an overall assessment of the prospects in the country for improving its capabilities in the areas in which deficiencies were found.

I. Capabilities Assessment

Who is responsible for border and maritime security? Are there sufficient numbers of military forces supporting such activities?

Do the army, coast guard, and navy have sufficient resources?

Are the army, coast guard, and navy able to respond adequately to incidents on the border, and are their interdiction capabilities adequate?

What is the relationship among the military, border police, and customs officials?

Does the military have the equipment it needs to conduct border and maritime security activities (e.g., small boats for maritime border security, helicopters for land border security, vehicles to patrol borders and ports)?

Does the military have effective onshore, offshore, and air intelligence, including surveillance, reconnaissance assets, and radar systems? Does it have adequate training and technical assistance with intelligence assets?

Is the military trained to conduct border and maritime security activities, or is additional training needed? Has the military received international training in border and maritime security activities?

Does the country have an effective computerized (automated) lookout/watch-list system for border control? Is it functional and being used?

Is there effective coordination between government institutions that conduct border and maritime security activities?

Do government institutions share information and intelligence?

Is there sufficient coordination between independent international or regional border and maritime security activities?

Does the international community provide support to the country to improve border and maritime security?

II. Assessment of Areas for Improvement in Capabilities

| Critical Border and Maritime Security Functions | Qualitative Assessment | Quantitative Assessment (Score 1 to 5) |
|--|------------------------|--|
| Patrol and secure land and marine borders | | |
| Track people and goods entering and leaving the country | | |
| Control corruption | | |
| Coordinate with neighboring states and international community on border security | | |
| Collect intelligence and conduct border surveillance | | |
| Train military forces on border and maritime security while border security tasks are transitioned to nonmilitary border management agency | | |

III. Assessment of Prospects for Improvement

The next step is to assess the prospects in the country for improving its capabilities in the areas of deficiency identified in the second part of Section Five.

Is the country's government willing to engage with the United States to improve its capabilities in the specific areas in which deficiencies were found?

Is the military willing to engage with the United States to improve its capabilities in the specific areas in which deficiencies were found?

Are there groups outside the defense sector that are potentially supportive of or opposed to such improvements?

Are there political, fiscal, or social constraints to such improvements?

What degree of public support is expected for such improvements?

Assessment of Counterpiracy Capabilities

This section begins with a series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an assessment of the country's overall counterpiracy capabilities. The section then involves a qualitative assessment of the country's capabilities to carry out the "critical" functions necessary to respond to a piracy threat. It then calls for a quantitative scoring of the country's capabilities based on the following scale:

1. *Very Low*: entirely lacking
2. *Low*: beginning to develop
3. *Neither Low nor High*: minimal but functioning
4. *High*: functional but room for improvement
5. *Very High*: strong and no major improvement needed.

Having outlined where deficiencies exist, the section poses another series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an overall assessment of the prospects in the country for improving its capabilities in those areas in which deficiencies were found.

I. Capabilities Assessment

Does the military have adequate staff, boats, equipment, and training to successfully conduct counterpiracy operations?

Does it have an adequate command-and-control center for counterpiracy?

Does the military or a civilian organization have screening protocols and systems aimed at identifying arriving and departing vessels, the crews that staff the ships, and/or the companies that own and run them?

Does the military have capabilities to respond to incidents at sea: interdict and board suspected pirate vessels, intervene against attacks in progress, communicate after ships have been seized, and retake ships?

Does the country have what it needs in terms of onshore, offshore, and air intelligence, including surveillance, reconnaissance assets, and radar systems? Do military and civilian organizations have adequate training and technical assistance with intelligence assets?

Does the government have adequate knowledge about the pirates (e.g. motivation, age, income, ethnicity/religion, education level)?

Does the government have the ability to gather, assess, and share intelligence on pirate financial operations, including information about onshore investors? Is the government able to track and freeze ransoms?

Is the government undertaking activities to dismantle active safe havens that the pirates occupy on land?

Is the government able to stop the flow of weapons, equipment, and funds to the pirates?

Is the government combating other illegal maritime activities, such as illegal fishing, drug smuggling, or trafficking in arms and persons?

Are other security priorities diverting potential resources and equipment away from counterpiracy operations?

Are there mechanisms in place for military coordination with the justice sector for prosecution, including collection of evidence, information sharing, transfer of custody, potential extradition to another country, etc.?

Does the country have the requisite legal foundation aside from customary international law and universal jurisdiction over piracy to investigate and prosecute such cases?

II. Assessment of Areas for Improvement in Capabilities

| Critical Counterpiracy Functions | Qualitative Assessment | Quantitative Assessment (Score 1 to 5) |
|--|------------------------|--|
| Patrol shorelines and waterways | | |
| Respond to incidents at sea, including boarding and retaking pirated vessels | | |
| Collect and analyze intelligence on pirate financing | | |
| Conduct surveillance and reconnaissance of ships at sea | | |
| Identify vessels arriving and departing from territorial waters | | |
| Disrupt and dismantle pirate bases ashore | | |
| Prosecute and incarcerate pirates | | |
| Communicate with private vessels, international security forces, and own military forces | | |
| Coordinate with regional and international military forces | | |
| Conduct counterpiracy training and exercises | | |

III. Assessment of Prospects for Improvement

The next step is to assess the prospects in the country for improving its capabilities in the areas of deficiency identified in the second part of Section Six.

Is the country's government willing to engage with the United States to improve its capabilities in the specific areas in which deficiencies were found?

Is the military willing to engage with the United States to improve its capabilities in the specific areas in which deficiencies were found?

Are there groups outside the defense sector that are potentially supportive of or opposed to such improvements?

Are there political, fiscal, or social constraints to such improvements?

What degree of public support is expected for such improvements?

Assessment of Capabilities to Stabilize Postconflict Situations

This section begins with a series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an assessment of the country's overall capabilities to stabilize postconflict situations. The section then involves a qualitative assessment of the country's capabilities to carry out the "critical" functions necessary to respond to the instability arising from postconflict situations. It then calls for a quantitative scoring of the country's capabilities based on the following scale:

1. *Very Low*: entirely lacking
2. *Low*: beginning to develop
3. *Neither Low nor High*: minimal but functioning
4. *High*: functional but room for improvement
5. *Very High*: strong and no major improvement needed.

Having determined where deficiencies exist, the section then poses another series of questions. The answers to these questions provide an overall assessment of the prospects in the country for improving its capabilities in the areas in which deficiencies were found.

I. Capabilities Assessment

Has there been a clear resolution of the conflict, through a peace treaty, peace process, or political reconciliation?

Have the military forces involved in the prior conflict been disbanded, disarmed, and/or merged into existing military? Are there personnel records or statistics on these individuals, such as education, medical history, and criminal records, to assist the process?

Have there been successful efforts to stem the illegal and legal proliferation of weapons, such as weapon buyback programs or new gun laws?

If the military is responsible for demilitarization activities, does it have the capabilities to destroy the munitions? If not, what additional capabilities are needed?

Are there sufficient programs and funds to reintegrate the military into civil society, including through education or employment?

Are there adequate processes in place to deal with those who committed human rights abuses during the conflict, such as transitional justice systems or the prosecution of war crimes?

Are there adequate programs for soldiers wounded in action or for families of those killed in action?

Are there sufficient efforts to deal with ethnic/religious issues in the security sector, such as ensuring geographic and ethnic inclusiveness in the military and police?

Has the government been successful in reducing the role of alternative sources of insecurity, including paramilitaries, private armies, local civil defense forces, guerilla forces, or warlords?

If private military contractors are providing security, have there been efforts to address potentially problematic contractual issues with the U.S. government or issues related to secrecy?

Are adequate systems in place to address the issue of displaced persons and refugees?

Are there programs to rebuild basic infrastructure destroyed during the conflict?

Are there sufficient efforts to combat sources of instability, including regional threats, organized crime, violent street crime, smuggling (drugs and otherwise), human trafficking, and youth unemployment?

II. Assessment of Areas for Improvement in Capabilities

| Critical Postconflict Stabilization Functions | Qualitative Assessment | Quantitative Assessment (Score 1 to 5) |
|--|------------------------|--|
| Maintain internal peace and security | | |
| Ensure rule of law through effective judicial system | | |
| Defend against international threats | | |
| Restore or provide basic government services | | |
| Repair critical infrastructure | | |
| Introduce civilian control of the military | | |
| Demobilize, disarm, and reintegrate former soldiers | | |
| Control the proliferation of weapons | | |
| Train and recruit new military and police forces | | |

III. Assessment of Prospects for Improvement

The next step is to assess the prospects in the country for improving its capabilities in the areas of deficiency identified in the second part of Section Seven.

Is the country's government willing to engage with the United States to improve its capabilities in the specific areas in which deficiencies were found?

Is the military willing to engage with the United States to improve its capabilities in the specific areas in which deficiencies were found?

Are there groups outside the defense sector that are potentially supportive of or opposed to such improvements?

Are there political, fiscal, or social constraints to such improvements?

What degree of public support is expected for such improvements?

What can be expected in terms of public support for such improvements?