Defeating Terrorist Groups
Abstract
There has been a great deal of work on why individuals or groups resort to terrorism. There has also been a growing literature on whether terrorism "works." But there has been virtually no systematic analysis by policymakers or academics on how terrorism ends. This gap is troubling. Seven years after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States cannot continue conducting an effective counter-terrorism campaign against al Qa'ida without understanding how terrorist groups end. To help fill this gap, Martin Libicki and I examined 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006. We found that they ended for two major reasons: members decided to adopt non-violent tactics and join the political process (43 percent of the time), or local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members of the group (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason how terrorist groups have ended (10 percent), and few groups have ever achieved victory (7 percent). The results are also revealing for religious groups, as shown in Figure 2. Only 16 percent have ended because of military force, and another 11 percent have ended because they joined the political process. By far the most effective strategy against religious groups has been the use of local police and intelligence services, which were responsible for the end of 73 percent of groups since 1968.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 18, 2008
- Accession Number
- ADA538885
Entities
People
- Seth Jones
Organizations
- RAND Corporation