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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO IRREGULAR
WARFARE AT THE EMBASSY LEVEL

by

Russell H. Norris, Major, U.S. Marine Corps

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Dr. John Reese

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2009

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE APR 2009		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Whole Of Government Approach To Irregular Warfare At The Embassy Level				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Air Command And Staff College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.					
14. ABSTRACT The US Governments struggles in the current COIN battle have shed greater light into the seams of the interagency planning process. Dwindling finances, resources, and competing interests- now more than ever- necessitate a whole of government approach to addressing irregular warfare. Although numerous honest attempts have been made to provide a framework for a unity of action, all have fallen short of the mark. This paper examines the roots of insurgencies, the institutions and agencies that must leverage each other within a COIN struggle, sources of friction in the interagency, the laws and directives that guide this effort, and three approach models. Although each of the approach models is valid when applied with the proper scale and scope, this paper focuses on synergizing at the embassy level and how to best incorporate Department of Defense Special Operations Forces into the State Departments country team. This paper utilizes the problem solution method of evaluation. The problem is ad hoc planning efforts at the embassy level with regard to DoD SOF integration of capabilities. The solution examines three ways to plug a SOF liaison officer into the embassys country team to effectively assist in planning an interagency effort to address a crisis.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 39	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank several people for their assistance and insight into this paper. Below is a list of individuals without whom I would not have accomplished this journey:

My WIFE, Cyndie, mother of 3, CINCHOUSE

Dr. John Reese, Research Advisor, Air Command and Staff College

Mrs. Wendy Webb, Foreign Service Officer, U.S. State Department

LtCol Jeff Devlin, USCENTCOM JIACG, USAid

LtCol James Elseth, USCENTCOM JIACG, Treasury Department

LtCol Barry Wardlaw, SOC USJFCOM

Mrs Elizabeth Sterrett, SOC USJFCOM

Mr Todd Bolger, Joint Special Operations University

Mr Homer Harkins, Joint Special Operations University

Abstract

The US Government's struggles in the current COIN battle have shed greater light into the seams of the interagency planning process. Dwindling finances, resources, and competing interests- now more than ever- necessitate a whole of government approach to addressing irregular warfare. Although numerous honest attempts have been made to provide a framework for a unity of action, all have fallen short of the mark. This paper examines the roots of insurgencies, the institutions and agencies that must leverage each other within a COIN struggle, sources of friction in the interagency, the laws and directives that guide this effort, and three approach models. Although each of the approach models is valid when applied with the proper scale and scope, this paper focuses on synergizing at the embassy level and how to best incorporate Department of Defense Special Operations Forces into the State Department's country team. This paper utilizes the problem solution method of evaluation. The problem is ad hoc planning efforts at the embassy level with regard to DoD SOF integration of capabilities. The solution examines three ways to plug a SOF liaison officer into the embassy's country team to effectively assist in planning an interagency effort to address a crisis.

Part 1

The interagency process is in such obvious need for adjustment and so vital to current efforts, why is it so difficult to instigate the necessary reform?

—Jay W. Boggs

Introduction

The quote above is borrowed from the opening lines of a December 2007 Strategic Studies Institute study on the interagency and counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare.¹ Heated debates over the past several years have focused on the U.S. Government's (USG) perceived inability to achieve a unity of effort and focus in prosecuting the Long War. This paper addresses the question of how U.S. interagency professionals and Department of Defense (DoD) Special Operations Forces (SOF), fighting an irregular war (IW), synergize at the embassy level to better achieve U.S. interests. In answering this question, it is important to take a look at a few models for the U.S. to use in its approach to irregular warfare operations. Three models discussed in this paper are the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) model from Vietnam, the Joint Task Force (JTF) model from DoD Joint Doctrine, and the State Department Country team model. Each approach has its merits when applied within the appropriate scope and scale of conflict. However, this paper argues that U.S. security interests in prosecuting COIN operations in an IW environment are most effectively achieved at the embassy level by an interagency focused effort led by Department of State (DoS) country teams augmented with DoD SOF capabilities. It proposes a working arrangement in which level of SOF support to the ambassador and his country team would be tailored to the nature and persistence of the terrorist threat in that country. In so doing, it explores the following questions: How does counterinsurgency theory and doctrine shape the U.S. government's response to terrorism? To what extent is the country team involved in that response today? How does SOF

work with the ambassador and his country team today? Would an expanded interagency effort with enhanced SOF support at the embassy level strengthen this response? How would this work in practice? What are the major obstacles- political, legal, bureaucratic, doctrinal, organizational and cultural- to making this a reality? In answering these questions, the author evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the organizations that might serve as models for embassy level COIN operations. This study concludes by proposing a few simple measures that could serve as first steps to making this a reality.

The Long War has been mischaracterized as a War on Terror. Although terror is the preferred method of attack employed by our enemies, the actual target of our efforts is the radical Islamists that push strict adherence to their distorted interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia). These radicals- such as Al Qaeda, Jamah Islamiyah, and Abu Sayaf Group- seek the establishment of a theocratic world order based on their misguided enforcement of Sharia. Therefore, the War on Terror is actually a war on ideas. Ideas can take years and decades, if not generations, to change. This proposition is more nebulous and does not fall easily into the military mindset of categorizing and arranging operations against a conventional state actor. How does the military attack an idea? How should forces be trained and employed to attack an idea? Should those forces be military to begin with? What is the proper balance of military forces capabilities and skill sets with other governmental and nongovernmental organizations? These questions and many more are the backdrop for the basis of this journey into the application of a whole of government approach to irregular warfare.

Only through a comprehensively applied effort, utilizing all the instruments of national power, can the U.S. hope to achieve its goals. Due to dwindling resources, finances and competing domestic issues, this process must not only be joint in nature, but must also be an

interagency and collaborative effort focused on leveraging all contributors. These contributors extend well beyond USG agencies. They include nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), intergovernmental organizations (IGO's), alliances, and coalition partners. Words have meanings and a foundational discussion of terms is necessary.

Terms

For the purposes of this paper, the term “irregular warfare” (IW) refers to all forms of conflict not encompassed in the traditional state versus state clash of conventional forces. Under this definition, IW includes insurgency, counterinsurgency (COIN), terrorism, counterterrorism (CT), low intensity conflict (LIC), and unconventional warfare (UW)- all may be used interchangeably in this study. The author is aware of the myriad of arguments surrounding the nuances of each of these terms, but is avoiding that debate. The DoD IW Joint Operating Concept (JOC) specifically defines IW as: “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”² Further, it recognizes that IW (COIN) is a mission that the U.S. military cannot win alone. The U.S. must employ a whole of government approach to addressing the foundational causes of an insurgency.

For the purposes of this discussion, “synergize” means to capitalize on the talents of all participants of an operation such that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Within these definitions, the first step into exploring what is the best way for the U.S. to *synergize* IW efforts at the Embassy is to look at some causal factors of interagency friction.

The problem of an interagency approach to IW at the embassy level is multidimensional. It consists of complex planning apparatuses, bureaucratic agency fiefdoms, legitimate legal

separations of roles responsibilities, and congressional funding delineations. One of the primary sources of friction within the interagency is a common vision on the levels of war.

Levels of War

The American position of limiting military authority and mandating civilian oversight is deeply engrained in our society and any infringement on the part of the military usually draws extreme scrutiny and discouragement. The military has traditionally planned for conflict at three levels: 1) Strategic, 2) Operational, 3) Tactical. Of late, other non DoD agencies have started to look at conflict and plan at five levels: 1) Policy (POL-MIL), 2) Strategic (Agency), 3) Operational, 4) Mission-level “Whole of Government”, 5) Tactical.³ Since these two planning constructs don’t necessarily correlate at exact points, where to plug in the appropriate subject matter expertise is a significant source of friction. This disjuncture is where the military’s operational and tactical levels mesh with the other governmental organization’s (OGO) organizational, mission-whole of government, and tactical levels. Depending on the scope of the operation, a SOF planner may have interfaced with another organization’s planners well in advance of the event, or may have only interfaced with the Defense Attaché (DAT) for that embassy. This highlights an important takeaway in that the scope and scale of an operation has a direct effect on the amount of interface a SOF package will have during the planning and execution phases of an operation. The larger the scale, scope, and persistence of the threat (i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq), the more intensive the coordination between SOF and the other agency members.

Another source of friction is intelligence and information sharing.⁴ The ability to develop a common operational picture for all participants with integrated sourcing and dissemination of information and intelligence has proven a major obstacle. During the Tsunami relief effort,

information came pouring into the JTF (later CSF (Consolidated Support Force))- 536 headquarters from all kinds of organizations. This raw information had to be processed and classified into whatever system was used by the target audience. The sheer volume of data was staggering, and the number of organizations that needed it was equally as impressive. A multitude of organizations- the US military had little control over most of them- swooped into the AOR. Examples of important information went well beyond the normal area assessments; it went deep into World Health Organization (WHO) reports, schools/hospitals/other structures left standing, roads and airstrips remaining, and civil governance frameworks still operating. This was truly an amazing operation to witness. It showcased a whole of government approach to a crisis that went far beyond the U.S. interagency and reinforced the superior results that can be achieved by leveraging and synergizing the capabilities of the U.S., IGO's, NGO's, coalition members, and the host nations.

Insurgencies & COIN

First, every insurgency is unique and context is everything when assessing a potential insurgent environment.⁵ A cookie cutter approach to insurgent warfare will not work. Intelligence, specifically human intelligence (HUMINT), is critical to effective COIN operations. The British seem to have developed a good model for counterinsurgency. Although the British have been successful in colonial counterinsurgencies such as Malay, Borneo, Oman and Northern Ireland, and their model has been refined through experiences in Palestine, Aden, and Cyprus, their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan are much the same as the Americans.⁶ Why? Because although numerous indicators can be defined in insurgencies, the contextual factors of each insurgency are unique and negate any attempt to prescribe COIN actions. Never forget that your enemy has a vote. A notional insurgency model is suggested below.

Insurgencies form when national governments fail to provide essential services, stability and security, a viable economy, and governance.⁷ A portion or portions of a society feel disenfranchised by the ruling government. The ruling government may not have sufficient strength or resources to resolve the dispute, and the radical party exerts enough strength to gain some freedom of action to institute its own solutions. In most cases, this solution involves the formation of a militia security system (often fomented by a criminal network) and functioning shadow governance. A kind of “street justice” starts to emerge. At first, actions of the insurgents may go unnoticed or written off as criminal activity. If left unaddressed, this movement spreads to others who are either sympathetic to the cause, or have been sufficiently coerced into no longer supporting the legal government. Now the legal government is in a full blown insurgency. The support of the populous becomes the main struggle. Because of the focus on the struggle for the support of the people, insurgencies are fought at the grass roots level. The center of gravity, for both sides, is the people. It’s the 10-80-10 rule; 10% of the people are the insurgents, 10% are loyal to the government, it’s the 80% middle populous that must be won over in order to break an insurgency. Two truths have emerged in reference to the US whole of government approach to COIN operations. First, it’s the people stupid.⁸ Secondly, “We cannot kill our way to victory.”⁹

The first statement clearly affirms that the focus is on the people, but that does not mean that all USG operations directly target the people. However, it does imply that a unity of effort from all entities within COIN operations is directed towards gaining the peoples trust and support in the legal government’s rule of law, belief in its economy’s strength, and ability to provide services and security. These efforts, in a post conflict environment, have been woven into the USG’s security, stabilization, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) framework.

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)- 44 tasked the State Department to lead interagency efforts in the SSTR arena. To this end, Secretary of State Powell formed the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).¹⁰

The second quote has been echoed from numerous military leaders over the past several years. Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff (Admiral Mike Mullen) recently reaffirmed this position in harmony with Secretary of Defense Gates and the commander of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Admiral Olson. Their mantra is rooted in the long standing belief that the military instrument of power (IOP) exists to provide the security environment necessary for the other IOP's (diplomacy, information, and economy) to be effective. There are many pitfalls to relying too heavily on the military IOP in SSTR operations.

First, for any COIN operation to be successful it must be through, by and with the host nation's government. That said, the entire goal of COIN is to gain/regain popular confidence in the legal government. All efforts must have the host nation's face on them. General David Petraeus, CDR USCENTCOM, has been quoted stating that it is far better to have a host nation to do something tolerably is normally better than external forces doing it well.¹¹ It does little good to have elections in Iraq if all the polls are guarded by foreigners. It does little good to provide food to hungry villages if the bags are delivered by a heavily armored convoy of foreign uniformed occupiers. The local authorities (not warlords and bullies) must be the ones providing the governance, services and security; not the occupier. In these cases, the military face detracts from the strategic COIN operation and can actually impede or reverse your desired end state. However, a whole of government effort, coordinated by the State Department's embassy country team, staffed by an appropriate mix of interagency professionals and DoD SOF, can effectively execute support for COIN operations without compromising host nation stature.

Imagine a humanitarian outreach mission in an “at risk” Muslim country. The effort is funded and logistically supported an S/CRS initiative, security provided by host nation and SOF forces, and medical assistance provided by the International Red Crescent working with host nation . By leveraging all IOP’s to help put the host nation face on the operation (while keeping U.S. agents in the background) the operation is executed smoothly, the host nation garners more support from its people, and the U.S. build’s trust with the host nation that we are indeed a friend in the region. The operations are much more operational art than design, and the interagency relationships are loosely framed by numerous guiding laws and directives throughout the U.S.




Figure 1. Whole of USG Approach to IW

Notes

¹ Cerami and Boggs, *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 1.

² DoD IW JOC, 11 Sept 07, 6.

³ JP 513, 29 Jan 09.

⁴ Based on my personal experiences as the Deputy Information Management Officer for CSF-536 (Tsunami relief in Utophao, Thailand in 2005) and as the Deputy J-4, Ministry of Defense Maintenance Officer, Multi-National Security Transition Command- Iraq in 2006.

Notes

⁵ Havoll, *COIN Revisited*, 8.

⁶ Chin, *Why Did It All Go Wrong?*, 120.

⁷ Ibid, 124.

⁸ Distinguished ACSC professor on COIN

⁹ Speaker from USSOCOM, speech at AWC on 16 September 2008.

¹⁰ Perito, *An Example of Integrated Security Assistance: The 1207 Program*, 1.

¹¹ FM 3-24, 1-26 1-28.

Part 2

Laws and Directives

Importance of cooperation.—a. One of the principal obstacles with which the naval forces are confronted in small war situations is the one that has to do with the absence of a clean cut line of demarcation between State Department authority and military authority.

—Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, 1940

Many efforts have been made and initiatives launched to codify the relationships between the myriad of organizations that contribute to an effective National Strategic campaign. In the early years, USG organizations sought to cohabitate in a shared environment. Little was done to link organizational capabilities and resources to a jointly agreed upon end state. The quotation in the foundational document cited above, is followed by some general sets of guidelines for the military commander. It is clear that the State department is to be consulted with prior to a military engagement. The principles state that the military commander should use the embassy's expertise in the AOR in developing the military strategy.¹ The implication is that the State department will be used by the military in a supporting role. This implies that the military has taken control of the strategic mission much like the Joint Task Force (JTF) model discussed later in Part 4 of this paper. The infighting and stove piping not only within the DoD, but the U.S. government as a whole, led to inefficiencies and ineffectiveness that the American taxpayer was no longer willing to bear.

Law

Since the failure of "Desert One" and the military's performance in Grenada, the signing into law of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols act drove American leaders to find ways to capitalize on the wealth of talent resident throughout all branches of the DoD. The current interagency

process in prosecuting IW with non-state militants is a framework of supporting agencies coordinated by a lead entity- usually the Department of State. There have been numerous guidelines published by the U.S. government's executive leadership to prod interagency collaboration and integrated planning along.

Goldwater- Nichols

The Goldwater-Nichols Act spawned a complete overhaul of DoD structure and realigned the service chiefs, functional and geographic combatant commands (COCOM's) to provide a better unity of effort. Service chiefs were now responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces to be presented to the COCOM's to fight within their respective areas of responsibility (AOR).² This act established statutory responsibilities that enhance the strategy-to-task links between US National Security Strategy (ends), joint strategic and operational planning and execution (ways), and defense-wide requirements, budget, and programs (means).³

Goldwater-Nichols also brought about the requirements for the President to produce the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the CJCS to produce the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NSS serves as the cornerstone of the military's planning processes.

Directives

During the recent Bush administration, several forms of guidance have been issued to direct the interagency towards more jointness. They build on a body of thought that resonates throughout the current administration that values integrated, short and long range interagency planning to maximize efficient use of resources while producing maximum effect on areas of interest. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56 was a seminal document for the Clinton

administration that – while earnestly conceived, failed to gain traction and produce the desired interagency results.

NSPD-1 was signed by President Bush on 13 February 2001.⁴ As the foundational document for the Bush administration, it was directive in mandating a more interagency approach to achieving national security policy objectives. In addition to the six new geographic Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCC's), it also established eleven new functional PCC's whose topics range throughout all of the IOP's. The PCC's are chaired as directed are designed to be the grunts in the trenches producing solid staff work. These PCC's produce recommendations to the Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) and/or Principles Committee (NSC/PC) for review or approval before Presidential approval (unless the President delegates approval to a lower level). Although not specifically addressed in NSPD-1, presumably, the responsibility to designate lead and subordinate relationships would lie within the appropriate PCC. Further




Figure 2. Interagency Structure

skewing the intent, NSPD-1 closes by stating, “This is not intended to, and does not affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense or the command relationships established for the Armed Forces of the United States.”⁵ Enter NSPD-44.

NSPD-44 was signed by President Bush on 7 December 2005.⁶ That's right, *four years and nearly eleven months after*

NSPD-1. This directive was to clarify lead and support agency roles in stability and reconstruction activities. To this end, both DoD and DoS instituted their visions by establishing

policy and structure before NSPD-44 could be signed. The DoS stood up the S/CRS office and places three activities under its control (the Active Response Corps (ARC), the Standby Response Corps (SRC), and the Reserve Response Corps (RRC)). These activities constitute contingency response packages that can be globally deployable in three tiers, immediate (ARC), 45-60 days from call-up (SRC), and two months from call-up (RRC).⁷ The ARC has a standing force of about 250 federal employees, the SRC roughly 2000 more, and the RRC has roughly 2000 people from the private sector, state and local governments to respond in a crisis. The support packages are tailorable to the crisis and can produce immediate, non-kinetic effects in support of USG policy initiatives. Not to be outdone, the DoD issues Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05.

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 was signed by Gordon England effective 28 November 2005.⁸ It makes planning and executing Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction operations (SSTRO) a core competency for the military and declares them equally as important as combat operations. It clearly states that the US military is a supporting agency for reconstruction and stabilization operations. However, it also states, “Nonetheless, US military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”⁹ It goes on to delineate specific duties and reporting requirements to DoD staffs to ensure success of this mission. Military staffs on a mission- this will be discussed in the analysis.




Figure 3. IW JOC Relationships

IW JOC was signed by CDR USSOCOM (General Brown), CJCS (General Pace), and Secretary of Defense Gates on 11 September 2007.¹⁰ IW normally occurs in areas under crisis or conflict. Both IW and SSTRO focus primarily on gaining the support of the population. In both missions the joint force normally plays a supporting role to the efforts of other governmental organizations. The State Department country team usually is already on the ground with the resident expertise in local customs, traditions, and key players. As such, the IW JOC says the military should be a supporter of their efforts, but again, be prepared to step up and lead as necessary.




Figure 4. 2006 QDR "Shifting our Weight"

Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 was signed by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on 6 Feb 2006.¹¹ This QDR talked a big game on modernizing the force. That means two things, big money and high technology. The 2006 QDR had a little of both. Although it emphasized programs that would keep a technological edge against any near peer competitors, it also recognized the present need for an integrated IW capability. No real cuts in programs were suggested to offset the growing need for personnel, training, and technologies for the burgeoning IW environment. "The ability to integrate the Total Force with personnel from other Federal Agencies will be important to reach many U.S. objectives."¹² This is another piece of guidance that wants its cake and to eat it too. The "other federal agencies" may or may not want the military's personnel "integrated" into their operations. These other agencies have a vote in the interagency as well and the author was unable to find a QDR equivalent on their end.

Analysis

Goldwater-Nichols is the gold standard for congressional guidance. It provided structure and accountability. Organizations knew what was expected and when it was to be delivered. By connecting ends, ways, and means, Goldwater-Nichols was able to produce unprecedented unity

of command. PDD-56 was a good start, but it lacked real structure and enforcement mechanisms, so it just drifted to the wayside. NSPD-1 provided clear structure for National Security Council organization, but left the interagency to PCC working groups. NSPD-1 identified the State Department as the lead agent for stabilization and reconstruction efforts, but didn't give it the authority to compel other agencies cooperation. NSPD-44 sufficiently muddled the waters by stating in its closing paragraph, "In addition, this Directive is not intended to, and does not (1) affect the authority of the Secretary of Defense or the command relationships established for the Armed Forces of the United States:..."¹³ A theme throughout the literature is that NSPD-44 falls short of delivering real authority and resources to the State department to carry out its mission. Also, with the publishing of DoDD 3000.05, the military seems to be getting more traction in funding and resources than DoS for the same mission set. That puts DoS at a disadvantage to take the lead in a mission that – although expressly directed to accomplish – they are consistently being underfunded and under resourced to conduct. So much so that in 2006, congress authorized the DoD to transfer up to \$100 million per year to the DoS to support SSTR operations around the globe. Subsequent congressional sessions have continued the program despite interagency squabbling. These funds (called 1206/1207/1210 funds) provide a back door for funding critical DoS led initiatives that can assist weak and failing governments before they become destabilized and insurgent breeding grounds. The drawback is that the funds are dispersed at the discretion of the DoD- which disperses these funds at the end of the fiscal year after DoD decides it does not need the funds for its own SSTR operations. Obviously, DoS would like the \$100 million per year allocated in its annual budget, but this is proving difficult in the halls of congress. While interviewing Ms Webb, she made a solid point. She said that the American taxpayer sees the Marines and soldiers on the ground. They see the planes, MRAPS,

and flag draped coffins on the news. They don't see the State department agents out in the field making the world safer for America; and while that can be a good thing, it makes competing for funding in Congress harder.¹⁴ One thing is clear, if directives or legislation are to truly place the DoS in the leadership role of American SSTR operations, they must also direct Congress to allocate appropriate funds and resources for it to accomplish the task.

Does there need to be a Goldwater-Nichols II? In this author's opinion- *absolutely*. The current piecemeal effort to lash together organizations with differing cultural backgrounds and differing expectations and desired end states into interagency planning cells is not producing the synergy necessary for a cohesive whole of government approach to IW. Goldwater-Nichols II must empower the appropriate lead agency and provide the teeth for enforcement to achieve unity of effort. Goldwater-Nichols II must clearly define a framework that directly links strategy to tasks; an interagency effort that is linked from DC, to Kabul and Baghdad, to the PRT and embassy country teams out in the field. Our interagency reach must extend all the way down to impact the daily lives of the host nation's people (not just DC or Qatar). Goldwater-Nichols II must empower and provide the resources necessary for success in the field- where the battles and wars are won.

Notes

¹ NAVMC 2890, *Marine Corps Small Wars Manual*, 33-34.

² Nichols, Bill, Goldwater, Barry. "H.R.3622". 1986.

³ Holt, Said, *A Time For Action*, 38.

⁴ NSPD 1

⁵ Ibid, 5.

⁶ NSPD 44

⁷ Department of State, *Weak and failing States: Evolving Security Threats and US Policy*, Report for Congress(Washington, DC: Foreign Defense and Trade Division, August 2008), 17.

Notes

⁸ DoDD 3000.05, 1.

⁹ Ibid, 2.

¹⁰ IW JOC, 2.

¹¹ 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, p iii.

¹² Ibid, 77.

¹³ NSPD-44, 6.

¹⁴ Webb, interview.

Part 3

The Players

Though military forces will never be enough to achieve a stable Afghanistan, we all agree that the security they provide is a necessary component to that success. And we all agree that this security is best achieved through and with the Afghan people with them in the lead, them ultimately in control. The Afghan people, not the Taliban, not the extremists, are the real centers of gravity in this war.

—Admiral Mike Mullen

CJCS Admiral Mullen made the above statement on 27 January 2009 while giving a National Security Strategy update to the national press club after meeting with Secretary of Defense Gates and President Obama. He also recognized the need for assistance across a broad group of requirements, not just military, to assist in moving coalition efforts forward in a positive direction. It is clear that the DoD is looking to the interagency and a collaborative effort writ large to address the COIN operation in Afghanistan. This section looks some of the actors that contribute to the US interagency planning and execution framework in confronting IW at the embassy level.

State Department

The Department of State (DoS) is the President's eyes, ears, and mouth around the world with regard to Foreign Policy. To this end, the DoS expended \$22.2 billion in 2008 on foreign aid and strategic projects.¹ The DoS only has 11,000 Foreign Service Officers to cover seven geographical regional bureaus, 30 functional and management bureaus, and more than 260 embassies, consulates, and posts around the world.² It is clear that DoS is understaffed to meet emerging global requirements necessary in the global IW struggle. In 2004, with the Bush administration getting ready to release NSPD-44, Secretary of State Powell developed the Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). S/CRS established developed the interagency

management system (IMS) consisting of the country reconstruction & stabilization group (CRSG), the integration planning cell (IPC), and the advance civilian team (ACT).³ The integration planning cell (IPC) is made up of interagency planners, regional and functional experts. The IPC deploys to GCC's or multinational (MNF) headquarters to assist in harmonizing operations and planning between military and civilian agencies and/or the U.S. and the MNF HQ.

Transformational diplomacy is the new buzzword around the State department. The idea is that American foreign policy will better resonate with audiences abroad if our diplomats get out of the big embassies in the capitols and disperse into small offices amongst the people. This method is what the DoD has been preaching for decades about effective COIN operations. In order for your message to get traction with the people, it must be *with the people*- not in some inaccessible, bureaucratic fortress. Behavioral influence occurs *by, through, and with the populous*. The State department is closely aligned with the US Agency for Internal Development (USAid). The two organizations have a complimentary relationship in planning and resource management and stove pipes between the two and the DoD are beginning to melting away.




Figure 5. DoS Top 5 Expenditures 2008 & 2009 (in millions)

USAid

The US Agency for Aid and Internal Development (USAid) has a new mission statement: “USAID accelerates human progress in developing countries by reducing poverty, advancing democracy, building market economics, promoting security, responding to crises, and improving quality of life. Working with governments, institutions, and civil society, we assist individuals to build their own futures by mobilizing the full range of America’s public and private resources through our expert presence overseas.”⁴ DoD has a vested interest in the success of USAid programs in weak and failing states. USAid programs focus in those areas the DoD notes as vulnerabilities in weak states which can be exploited by insurgents to destabilize a legitimate government. Congress has realized the important link between DoS, USAid and the DoD and has facilitated interagency planning and allocation of resources by allowing 1206, 1207/1210 funds.




Figure 6. USAid Top 5 Expenditures 2008 & 2009 (in millions)

Department of Defense

The DoD has the largest, most flexible and robust capability to respond to global IW threats. With a DoD total budget of \$1,206,354,000,000 dollars in fiscal year 2008, and a persistent troop strength of roughly 200,000 in the USCENTCOM AOR, the DoD is poised to lead the current SSTRO missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have adopted variants on the Vietnam era CORDS model for Civil-Military action teams. Called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), they are an interagency team usually led by a military officer that consists of agents from across the USG and private sector. Depending on the needs of the province, the team may consist of economic advisors, teachers, engineers, and security experts. Although NSPD-44 appointed the DoS as the lead agency for post-conflict stability operations, where the rubber meets the road, it's the military that's been paying the bill. All governmental agencies must address the 800 pound gorilla and restructure to meet today's global security threats. These threats are not going away and a whole of government approach is necessary to achieve a better state of peace.

USSOCOM

As the DoD's synchronizer of global IW operations, USSOCOM has service like responsibilities under Title 10, USC, to organize, train, and equip forces. These forces are tasked with numerous missions that are part of Foreign Internal Development (FID), and Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). They operate by, through, and with indigenous forces to bolster host nation strength. They have unique skill sets like language proficiency, cultural awareness, negotiation and behavior influence. They also bring a wealth of planning expertise, resources, and motivation in addressing politically ambiguous crisis situations where

conventional forces would prove counterproductive to the political objectives. They have an incestuous relationship with the intelligence community and habitually operate with DoS entities.

Part 4

Approach Models

Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population.

—David Galula

CORDS Model

Vietnam provided the first backdrop for an attempt at an interagency approach to IW. In the scope of interagency coordination and planning, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) model is the maco-model. Growing frustrated with ineffective and disjointed civilian pacification efforts, in 1967, President Johnson placed those efforts under the direct control of General Westmorland. At the time, Westmorland was the Commanding General of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). This move was interpreted as the final sign that Johnson had lost hope in the US Embassy to effect progress in Vietnam.

This shift gave the pacification effort access to military money and people. Andrade notes that in 1966, the effort only had 1,000 advisors and a budget of \$582 million; by 1969 the effort had 7,600 advisors and a budget of \$1.5 billion.⁵ This lesson was not capitalized on by the DoS as witnessed in the current battles for funding for SSTR operations. Congress has not been effectively lobbied by the DoS for appropriate funding and resources to execute its duties under NSPD-44.

In an attempt to provide a unity of effort in Afghanistan, an Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group (ICMAG) has been developed bears a striking resemblance to the CORDS approach. Two of the stated functions of the ICMAG are to maintain a common operating picture for governance, security, development, and information lines of effort and to translate national-level guidance into operational guidance for down-range operations.⁶

Joint Task Force Model

This model is used by a GCC to quickly respond to a crisis with a structured, tailored force package that can produce immediate effects. GCC's have a standing joint force headquarters that that trains and functions as the deployable JTF HQ in the event of a crisis. JTF composition is a JTF Commander with appropriate service representatives (Marines, Army, Navy, Air Force, and SOF). SOF's high demand and low density nature complicates the GCC's challenge.

A constant challenge at the GCC level is to define the relationships between the Theater SOCs and established JTFs. The GCC has to optimize SOF for AOR-wide flexibility while also attempting to provide JTF commanders unity of command over those forces operating in their JOAs. The GCC often opts to focus the Theater SOC on AOR-wide threats that may cut across JTF AO's while attaching requisite SOF capabilities in the form of JSOTFs under the appropriate control of the JTFs. The Theater SOC is usually tasked with AOR-wide missions and is designated as the supported command for those missions. The GCC also designates the SOC as a supporting command to JTFs (whom are designated as supported commanders) and further directs the attachment of JSOTF to the JTFs in an OPCON or TACON role for unity of command.

This understanding is critical to assessing how to appropriately plug-in SOF LNO's at the embassy level. A JTF is usually activated because the president desires an immediate military intervention in a crisis. The JTF joint planning group (JPG) serves as the ringmaster for all operations within the JTF mission. The JTF Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) serves at the interface arm linking the people to the host nation government, strategies to tasks.




Figure 7. Notional CMOC from JP 3-08

Country Team Model

The most effective means of synergizing US planning and execution capabilities at the tactical level is the embassy country team. While discussing a time tested IW model, MG(ret) Lambert notes, “This is the US ambassador’s interagency country team and its tailored US military component working as an interagency team nearest the problem and closest to the principal actors in the host nation.”⁷ The embassy country team is composed of the principles from every bureau and agency operating under the embassy’s umbrella. When the country team meets (usually on a weekly basis), it is a mandatory event for attendance. As Mrs. Webb conveyed, you’d better be on your death bed if you’re not going to be there, and your deputy must attend in your absence.⁸ The country team meeting provides the common operating picture for a whole of government approach to planning operations within the Ambassador’s purview. As such, it is the premier forum for interagency dialogue and operational planning for successful strategy to task linkages.

Persistent SOF Mission Embassy

This mission would resemble a crisis environment such as post conflict Iraq and Afghanistan. It may also include countries of persistent interest such as the Philippines, India, Columbia and Pakistan. Here the SOF mission is so deeply engaged in achieving the U.S.'s foreign policy interests that it necessitates a dedicated USSOCOM SOF officer posted to the embassy and detailed specifically to the country team. On the country team, he provides planning expertise to the Ambassador or Chief of Mission throughout the life cycle of an operation and is the military's direct link to USSOCOM.

Frequent SOF Mission Embassy

This mission would resemble a potential crisis environment such as Kosovo, Nigeria, Kenya, or Sudan. Here the SOF mission is a habitual FID type operation. Frequent SOF actions like MEDCAPS and advisor/trainer missions necessitate an LNO from the respective GCC's TSOC. This operator, although not posted at the embassy directly, has cultivated a mature relationship with the embassy county team and is plugged into their planning process from cradle to grave. He provides planning expertise to the Ambassador or Chief of Mission and a direct link back to the TSOC, GCC, and USSOCOM.

Infrequent SOF Mission Embassy

This mission would resemble a crisis environment or time sensitive target set. This may occur in any country the US has diplomatic ties. Here the SOF mission is an infrequent High Value Target (HVT) type operation. Infrequent SOF actions like special reconnaissance, civil affairs, humanitarian, counterterrorism, and psychological operations. These politically sensitive missions necessitate an LNO from the respective GCC's TSOC. Preferably, this LNO will have

a SOF background; however, either way, he is required to be briefed into the appropriate program and possess the planning expertise in proper application of SOF. Although not posted at the embassy directly, has developed a relationship with the embassy county team and is plugged into their planning process from start to finish. He provides critical planning expertise to the Ambassador or Chief of Mission and a direct link to the TSOC, GCC, and USSOCOM.

Notes

¹ DoS, “Citizen’s Report FY 2008”, 4.

² Ibid.

³ Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization, “About S/CRS”.

⁴ USAid, “Citizen’s Report FY 2008”, 2.

⁵ Andrade, *Three Lessons from Vietnam*.

⁶ Devlin, Interview.

⁷ IW JOC, H-1.

⁸ Webb, Interview.

Part 5

First Steps

Changes in organizational lines and bar charts, authorities, and resources, while useful, are not the key to success. Leadership is the key.

—Homer Harkins

This paper has shown the breadth and range in perspectives in current literature addressing USG structure and the whole of government approach to COIN operations. The history and often ambiguous nature of strategic guidance (in regards to COIN lead and supporting agency roles) has left the interagency scrambling to define its own frameworks. In scoping the complexity of interagency operations in COIN, there were three avenues to approach an insurgency depending on the size of the operation. The Vietnam CORDS model serves as an outline for current COIN efforts in Afghanistan. The military's JTF model was evaluated as it applied to crisis planning at the GCC areas of responsibility. Finally, the State Department country team approach was assessed as it applied to weak and failing states.

Depending on the frequency of interaction between the interagency and DoD SOF, three approaches are recommended to address how USG interagency professionals and Department of Defense Special Operations Forces can synergize at the Embassy level to better achieve US interests. For the persistent SOF requirement, a dedicated SOF operator needs to be detailed to the embassy country team for full-time planning, coordination, and integration of SOF capabilities. For a habitual SOF relationship with a particular embassy, A SOF LNO (presumably from the GCC TSOC) can serve as adjunct member of the embassy country team as necessary for planning, coordination, and integration of SOF capabilities. For the embassy that infrequently necessitates a SOF capability, a GCC LNO (fully read into the specific program and preferably with a SOF background) can be dispatched to ensure SOF planning, coordination, and integration.

Small wars, specifically COIN operations, seem to be the operational environment the USG will find itself in over the coming decade. Deteriorating economic conditions coupled with transnational, non-state actors spreading ideologies hostile to western values pose the greatest threat to USG interests. Although only one of several models to address this 800 pound gorilla, the recommended country team approaches allow for the greatest level of interagency cooperation at the lowest level of execution. A State Department led, whole of government approach that capitalizes on the capabilities and planning expertise within DOD SOF, is the best framework for evolving USG IW efforts.

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Mrs. Wendy Webb, State Department, Foreign Service Officer
 LtCol James Elseth, USMC, Joint Interagency Coordination Group, Treasury Department
 LtCol Jeff Devlin, USMC, Joint Interagency Coordination Group, USAID
 LtCol Barry Wardlaw, USAF, SOCJFCOM Training and Information Operations
 Mr Todd Bolger, Joint Special Operations University Analyst
 Mr Homer Harkins, Interagency Team, Joint Special Operations University
 Major Ray Rich, USMC, SOCJFCOM Training and Exercise
 Major David Mills, USMC, USSOCOM, IW Division (J10)