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SECURING AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE AGAINST OPIUM

by

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Abstract

Since 2001, the United States and its NATO allies have been committed to helping the Afghani government build a stable and democratic country. However, the insurgency led by the Taliban and fueled by Afghanistan's illicit opium industry is unraveling these positive developments, undermining the central government and threatening to make Afghanistan once again, a safe haven for terrorists and their organizations. Efforts by coalition forces have been hampered due to a shortage of funding and manpower mostly attributed to the simultaneous operations and attention given to the operations in Iraq. The lack of troops and resources has resulted in a security vacuum which the Taliban has filled. Regaining and establishing security while simultaneously interdicting opium after it has been harvested are the coalition's best means of significantly reducing the Taliban's funding source and weakening the insurgency. In achieving the objectives of security and opium reduction, coalition forces must be keenly aware of both the desired and undesired effects that their military operations have on the Afghani peoples and how those effects contribute towards Afghanistan's strategic political end state of winning the support of the Afghani people and defeating the insurgency.

Introduction

Either Afghanistan destroys opium or opium will destroy Afghanistan.¹

-- President Hamid Karzai

Over the last seven years, the United States and its NATO allies have been committed to helping the Afghani government build a stable and democratic country. However, the insurgency led by the Taliban and fueled by Afghanistan's illicit opium industry is unraveling these positive developments, undermining the central government and threatening to make Afghanistan once again, a safe haven for terrorists and their organizations. In order to reverse this course, this paper proposes a synchronized strategy to reduce Afghanistan's opium industry. This long-term objective can only be met by first establishing the secure and stable conditions required to enable alternative livelihoods programs aimed at farmers who grow poppy, and secondly, aggressively interdicting opium as it is either being trafficked out of the country or converted into morphine inside processing centers. Efforts to eradicate opium by Afghani Eradication Forces (AEF) have had limited success and have been met by fierce resistance by local opium farmers as well as Taliban forces who have a vested interest in ensuring the opium crops are grown and harvested. Ultimately, this resistance has been due to a lack of secure and stable conditions that must be in place in order to communicate the benefits of alternative lifestyles directly to the farmer and being able to enforce the consequences of not following the law, through a legitimate legal system, when they do not. Reducing the opium industry within Afghanistan will begin to take away the Taliban's ability to fund their insurgency and their influence over the Afghani people.

Coalition forces cannot and realistically will not stay and support this campaign indefinitely. Therefore, coalition's efforts to recruit, train, equip, integrate and most importantly

transition the roles and responsibilities of securing and stabilizing Afghanistan must focus on Afghanistan's own military and police forces. The insurgency cannot be won by military means alone but the coalition's actions play a major role in either building or destroying support for the Afghani central government. The coalition's efforts to establish and maintain security and interdict opium must always consider the desired and undesired effects of their actions and how the larger Afghani populace perceives them.

Situation

According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan's opium market now accounts for 93% of the world's production and is worth a cash value of \$732 million, equating to over 53% of the country's licit GDP.² The Taliban, recognizing opium's enormous profits, have exploited the industry by taxing the opium farmers' crop directly. It is estimated that the Taliban receive between \$60 to \$80 million annually from the opium industry, with which they purchase weapons, recruit new members, bribe Afghani officials, and threaten the Afghani people, all of which are means to support their insurgency.³ NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Allied Command Operations, General John Craddock, noted the link between the insurgency and opium profits: "The money from the narcotics trade is feeding the insurgency. It buys weapons and pays fighters - the weapons and fighters that kill soldiers and Afghani citizens alike. It is a cancer, fuelling the insurgency, contributing to corruption, impeding legitimate commerce, and undermining governance."⁴

Although the opium situation is alarming, there have been improvements. Since 2007, the number of opium-free provinces has increased from 13 to 18 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, and total opium production has receded by 19 percent from 193,000 hectares to 157,000 hectares.⁵ Although there has been progress nationwide, the amount of opium production is

increasing in the south. The southern province of Helmand alone accounts for 53 percent of Afghanistan's opium cultivation.⁶ According to UNODC, "If Helmand were a country, it would once again be the world's biggest producer of illicit drugs."⁷ Indeed, 98 percent of the opium cultivation mainly occurs in the seven southern provinces, which are the area's most dangerous and heavily infested with Taliban insurgents.⁸ It is safe to assume that where there are Taliban there is opium, and where both of these conditions exist, there exists extreme danger.

The pervasiveness of opium and its dependence on this crop as a means of survival for impoverished Afghans places Afghanistan in danger of becoming a 'Narco-State', "where all legitimate institutions have been penetrated by the power and wealth of drug-traffickers."⁹ Over 2.38 million Afghans rely on the opium industry as a source of labor, which equates to 10.3 percent of the population of 31 million.¹⁰ In fact, The World Bank reported that "the opium economy has produced significant rural wages, remains a source of credit for rural households and has become a dominant source of income that fuels the consumption of domestic products and imports for high value goods such as automobiles from abroad."¹¹ This reliance and dependence on opium as a source of income and livelihood for much of the country and its influence in penetrating economic institutions places Afghanistan in a precarious and difficult situation.

To better understand why opium has become so prevalent, it is important to understand Afghanistan's agricultural challenges. Afghanistan is a landlocked, rugged, mountainous territory offering few natural resources, and it often experiences long periods of drought. Even though only 12 percent of its land is arable, the overwhelming majority of Afghans make their living by farming, and therefore farmers have tended to grow a crop that is the easiest to grow and the most profitable.¹² Opium poppy is a hardy, drought-resistant plant that is easily grown in

Afghanistan. Unlike other crops that need to be harvested, refrigerated and quickly moved to market, opium requires no refrigeration and can be stored for a period of up to eight years before any signs of spoilage.

The profits from growing poppy versus growing licit alternative crops, such as wheat, also make it the crop of choice. With a gross income ratio of opium to wheat of 10:1 in 2007, growing wheat or any other alternative crop is not as profitable and more difficult from the standpoint of harvesting and spoilage.¹³ UNODC surveyed farmers who chose to grow poppy and when asked why they chose poppy, the number one reason given was to alleviate poverty.¹⁴ When farmers decide not to grow poppy, they have found threatening letters on their doors from the Taliban stating that they will either grow poppy or face repercussions.¹⁵ Another factor that ties the farmer to the Taliban is the informal credit system known as *salaam*. Here the Taliban, as creditors, only offer advance payments of *salaam* to those farmers who agree to grow poppy.¹⁶

The enticement of the profits of opium has also been a significant problem that has led to corruption in government sectors. It has been reported by the Congressional Research Service that, “high government officials, police commanders, and governors are involved in the drug trade . . . and have been identified as the main problem with regard to corruption.”¹⁷ The former governor of Hilmand province, Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, was removed from office after authorities found nine metric tons of opium in his offices.¹⁸

Although it has only been seven years since the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan’s infrastructure continues to remain devastated, its economy poor and the security environment, particularly in the south, virtually chaos. The security situation has continued to deteriorate and the number of attacks against coalition forces has dramatically increased, from an estimated 1,500 attacks in 2005 to over 6,800 in 2007.¹⁹ Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of

UNODC, described the situation in the south this way: “There is no rule of law in most of the southern parts of Afghanistan—the bullets rule.”²⁰ It is this inextricable link between the Taliban, lack of security, and opium that is at the root of the problem. The reality for Afghans in the southern part of the country in particular is a sense of lawlessness resulting in an absence of involvement by the central government in their daily lives. The lack of basic services and support that should be provided by the central government is a void that the Taliban fill and exploit. It is not surprising that in the absence of law and government and the prevalence of systemic poverty as well as pressure by the Taliban to grow poppy, Afghanistan leads the world in opium production.

Even if efforts by the coalition to clear the Taliban from areas in the south are successful, the continued ability of the insurgents to seek refuge in a neighboring country such as Pakistan makes it difficult for coalition forces to maintain security. When testifying to the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte pointed out in 2007, “They can continue their insurgency indefinitely, making it virtually impossible to secure and provide a stable Afghanistan.”²¹ Coalition forces cannot hope to defeat an insurgency if the enemy is allowed to take refuge in sanctuaries. NATO and the U.S. must make stronger diplomatic efforts toward Pakistan to resolve this growing and contentious issue.

The situation in Afghanistan is as complex and challenging as ever and the prevalence of opium cultivation and instability in the country threaten to turn Afghanistan once again into a safe haven for terrorists.²² In order to reverse this course, a synchronized strategy that uses military forces to establish and maintain secure conditions as well as interdict opium while it is being trafficked and in conversion to morphine, will enable other non-military programs, whose aim is to reduce opium cultivation through offering alternative livelihoods, to take hold.

Security & Stability

Security is the single most important condition that must be achieved and maintained as it provides the conditions necessary for all other programs to be implemented and fostered. The greatest failures by the coalition and international community have been their continued efforts at promoting reconstruction and development in areas where there exists very little security and not providing the proper amount of troops and funds required to maintain and establish security.²³ The end result has been that the Taliban have been able to destroy reconstruction projects once completed and initiate hostile actions against reconstruction efforts underway.²⁴ In comparative terms, during 2003, there were 0.5 American or coalition soldier providing security for every 1,000 Afghans whereas in Iraq, the number was 6.1.²⁵ Since 2003, Iraq has been supplied with over eight times more American troops and seven times more money than Afghanistan has received.²⁶ As Ambassador James F. Dobbins, former Special Envoy to Afghanistan puts it, “When one applies low levels of military manpower and economic assistance to the tasks of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, one reaps the low levels of security and economic growth.”²⁷ Secretary of Defense Gates, told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the operations in Afghanistan, “We have not had enough troops to provide a baseline level of security in some of the most dangerous areas – a vacuum that increasingly has been filled by the Taliban.”²⁸ Security sets the conditions critical to implement other programs aimed at rebuilding and reconstructing Afghanistan.

The security strategy is composed of two elements: clear and hold. Coalition forces must be able to not only clear areas infested with Taliban, but more importantly, able to hold the areas and prevent the Taliban from returning. By analyzing the provinces where security is at its

lowest and opium cultivation is at its highest, it is clear that the seven southern provinces of Afghanistan require the most attention.²⁹ In order to clear the insurgents out of these areas, a significant increase in the number of NATO International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), U.S. military forces, as well as the continued funding and support for the development of a credible Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) should be implemented immediately. President Barak Obama's decision to approve an estimated 30,000 U.S. troop increase to Afghanistan is an important step towards securing Afghanistan.³⁰ By increasing the number of troops and focusing on clearing and holding the southern regions, where the predominance of opium and Taliban coexist, the coalition can then begin to implement efforts at reducing opium cultivation and furthering reconstruction and development projects.

In order to hold these remote territories permanently, the reorganization of existing coalition troops into smaller Forward Operating Bases (FOB) throughout Afghanistan must be implemented. Currently, coalition forces total 55,100 and are organized into five Regional Commands (RC): RC North, RC South, RC East, RC West and RC Central.³¹ Of these forces, the majorities are sheltered within large bases and operate using a "bunker-mentality"³² that emphasizes moving forces from one secure fortified location to another. The negative result of this strategy is that these forces are providing very little security and assistance directly to the Afghani people. For example, Bagram Air Base alone has over 4,000 troops, located over 225 miles away from the southern areas where they are needed most, and few soldiers from this base have any face-to-face contact with the Afghani people.³³ In order to change the current security strategy, a smaller and more pervasive FOB concept will provide security in areas that otherwise have no coalition or Afghani government presence. This strategy will begin to provide the

security needed to reduce the opium industry as well as provide the daily interactions between the coalition forces and local people.

The importance of holding the area from Taliban reoccupation is essential. Coalition forces should examine all means available to meet this objective. Doing so will discourage the Taliban from reappearing and reestablishing the conditions that lead to instability and increases in opium cultivation. Majors John Dyke and John Crisafulli proposed an unconventional model for rural security that espouses the development of an organic Afghani Constabulary Force and Self Defense Force, whose purpose is to provide security for their village.³⁴

In the interim period between a large coalition force and fully developed ANSF, burden sharing of troops and funding among NATO participants has become an issue of contention. Duncan Hunter, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services, described the situation in 2007 this way: “In many of these NATO operations, the United States brings the T-bone steaks and others bring the plastic forks.”³⁵ When comparing the number of U.S. troops of 23,200 to the next largest contributor, the United Kingdom at 8,910 troops, burden sharing will continue to be a controversial issue. Diplomatic efforts should be under taken by the U.S. to urge other NATO members that a system of burden sharing must be instituted towards equitably sharing in the involvement of NATO operations concerning specifically troop participation and funding. New diplomatic efforts thus far have already been seen by President Obama’s administration. While speaking at the 45th Munich Security Conference, Vice President Joe Biden encouraged NATO members that the U.S. had opened a new willingness to engage in dialog and urged other nations to do more towards supporting the security efforts in Afghanistan.³⁶

Regardless of which nations are sharing the burden within NATO, the Taliban realize that coalition forces cannot stay in Afghanistan indefinitely. Until a mature ANSF is capable of

taking over security operations independently, the presence and participation of a large number of coalition troops will be required. The development of the Afghani National Security Forces (ANSF) is critical so that coalition forces can transition the roles and responsibilities of security and stability to Afghanistan's own defense forces. Placing Afghani defense forces in leadership roles will build confidence within ANSF forces as well as build confidence amongst the local Afghani people as they see their own defense forces in charge and out front. Efforts at building a national army and police force have been slower than expected due to a host of factors such as recruitment, training, equipment and low pay,³⁷ the continued development of a credible and legitimate ANSF is Afghanistan's long-term security solution.

Security will enable government and non-governmental organizations to reach farmers and implement programs aimed at reducing opium cultivation and rebuilding and reconstructing Afghanistan. Without security all other actions are futile. A 2007 Congressional report that outlined Afghanistan's counternarcotics policy concluded, "U.S. officials have identified rural security and national rule of law as prerequisites for effective counternarcotics policy implementation, while simultaneously identifying narcotics as a primary threat to security and stability."³⁸ Until stable and secure conditions are established within remote tribal villages, particularly in the south where violence currently dominate, programs aimed at counternarcotics, alternative livelihoods or reconstruction and development, will be difficult to implement and will likely not take hold.

Tackling Opium

Opium cultivation, heroin production is more dangerous than the invasion and the attack of the Soviets in our country, it is more dangerous than the factional fighting in Afghanistan, it is more dangerous than terrorism....just as some people fought a holy war against the Soviets, so we will wage jihad against poppies.

--Afghanistan President Karzai³⁹

The central government has identified opium as one of the most dangerous issues for the future of Afghanistan. Afghan authorities developed a National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) in 2003 that declared their commitment to reducing opium poppy cultivation and completely eliminating poppy cultivation and drug trafficking.⁴⁰ The United Kingdom has acted as the lead coalition nation for counternarcotics and has supported the Afghanistan government by helping it develop basic eradication, interdiction, and alternative livelihood programs. However, counternarcotics forces have not had significant success due to the rampant insecurity that exists in areas such as in the south, where opium has proliferated the most. Security was highlighted in a recent 2007 congressional report concerning the relationship between narcotics and insecurity, “U.S. officials have identified narcotics trafficking as a primary barrier to the establishment of security and consider insecurity to be a primary barrier to successful counternarcotics operations.”⁴¹ Thus, by refocusing the coalition’s efforts to clear and hold areas that otherwise experienced insecurity and violence, while simultaneously operating a comprehensive counternarcotics program, these actions will increase the ability to positively reduce opium cultivation.

Once the farmer has harvested the opium, coalition forces should focus their efforts on interdicting the opium, as it is either being processed into heroin or trafficked out of the country. The decision by NATO in October 2008, allowing ISAF forces to take offensive military action against drug lords and opium processing centers, should have positive effects in increasing opium seizures. General Craddock points out, “We now have the ability to move forward in an area that affects the security and stability of Afghanistan. It will allow us to reduce the funding and income to the insurgents -- which will enhance the force protection of all ISAF and Afghan

National Security Force personnel.”⁴² Limited ISAF offensive actions against drug lords have already been taken thus far and have begun to help in destroying the drug networks.

Using ISAF’s advanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities should be leveraged to its maximum advantage. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) could also be used to provide surveillance and provide limited direct attack on shipments of opium, as it is either being trafficked out of the country, or being processed into morphine within processing labs. Prior to 2007, the process of converting opium to heroin and morphine was done primarily outside of the country, but recent trends indicate an increase in the number of processing centers within Afghanistan.⁴³ The increases in opium processing centers in remote areas are targets of opportunity that should be either raided or destroyed. Using UAVs, coalition forces have already begun targeting and destroying known opium processing centers by air attack.

Eradication is another method that has been used to reduce and eliminate poppy cultivation. It is essential that eradication never take place until viable alternative livelihoods and subsidies are provided to the farmers.⁴⁴ By cutting down farmers’ crops and not offering them other means to support their families, coalition forces only risk causing the farmers to revolt and join the Taliban’s insurgency. The negative effects of eradication, such as the resentment of the farmer towards the eradication forces, far outweigh the positive effects of cutting the fields. Two national programs are currently accomplishing eradication in Afghanistan: Governor Led Eradication (GLE) and Poppy Eradication Force (PEF). Of the two, GLE has had a more significant impact in reducing poppy cultivation as it is being done at the grass roots level by governors’ persuading their own people not to grow poppy. The PEF, by contrast, employs a military raid style effort to eradicate the fields.⁴⁵ Some have advocated the use of aerial herbicide spraying to combat the proliferation of opium cultivation; however,

Afghan President Karzai categorically opposes this spraying, citing health and environmental concerns.⁴⁶

Coalition forces should also focus on eliminating the pre-cursor chemical acetic anhydride (AA) as it is being trafficked into Afghanistan from neighboring countries like Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. AA is used to convert opium into heroin and morphine. It has no licit purposes; therefore, AA should be aggressively pursued by strengthening border security around well known trafficking points. AA has only one purpose and that is obviously illegal.⁴⁷ Because it has only one purpose, any AA found within the country or found trying to come into the country should be immediately impounded.

Alternative livelihood program are essential towards reducing opium cultivation. Programs that are aimed at persuading farmers to grow crops like wheat instead of opium have failed to recognize their lack of profitability and the farmers' dependence on opium to alleviate poverty. USAID and the Afghani government should provide initiatives in the form of subsidies to farmers that choose not to grow poppy. These subsidies directly offset the difference in profits from growing poppy and growing alternatives. Although alternatives like wheat have had limited success, the Pomegranate fruit is proving to be a better alternative. The U.S has invested over \$12 million dollars in an initiative to update and revive Afghanistan's once popular fruit industry.⁴⁸ Depending on the current market price for pomegranates and opium, the price between the two is about equal. The market price is due in large part to the large demand of pomegranates in Europe and India. Unfortunately, the larger challenge is developing a means of commercial export to market the fruit worldwide. As of 2009, most of the trial shipments of pomegranate have been exported by means of military airlift.⁴⁹ The development of an Afghanistan commercial airlines that has the capacity to be used as an export means, would great

enhance the farmers' ability to export pomegranates and really become an alternative to growing poppy.

The question of where and how long the funding will remain for short-term solutions like subsidies and financial aid is dependent upon the international community's continued interest in this region. Certainly, Europe has a major interest in seeing Afghanistan's opium industry dissolve as opium's addictive effects have affected Europeans most of all.⁵⁰ Out of the 11 million heroin addicts around the world, Europe accounts for 3.3 million of them. Certainly, the abundance of heroin coming from Afghanistan into Europe's markets has a high correlating effect.⁵¹ Not all the blame can fall just on Afghanistan. The international community should take more aggressive actions to reduce addiction to heroin, which if successful, will begin to reduce the demand for the drug on the streets. Although these efforts will not immediately affect Afghanistan's opium market, the continued decline in opium demand could reduce the global addiction thus resulting in reducing the demand and profitability of the opium markets.

In areas where opium reduction has occurred, local governors and villages should be monetarily rewarded by the Afghani central government. Rewarding those farmers, villages and governors with a cash subsidy to choose not to grow poppy recognizes the powerful lure of the lucrative opium market and provides them a monetary incentive to choose the legal path. It also must be followed up to ensure that farmers are not taking subsidies and then still continuing to grow poppy.

Desired & Undesired Effects

Defeating an insurgency is about winning the war of ideas and winning popular support.⁵² Although coalition forces do not directly execute operations aimed at winning the people, the desired and undesired effects of their operations can significantly affect the support or revolt of

the Afghani people. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is an example of a program that continues to have positive desired effects. These teams operate within remote rural villages, where very little central government presence exists, and provide basic goods, services and development to the Afghani people.

Capitalizing on their successes, the team's operations should be both strengthened and standardized. As of today, PRTs throughout Afghanistan lack a standardized composition of people and skill sets. By increasing the number of Afghani National Army (ANA) security forces within the PRTs, it would provide a much more robust security capability which PRTs today lack. Additionally, PRTs should have more Afghani central government personnel on the PRTs. The addition of central government personnel as well as ANA would place an Afghan-led face on the efforts and the local Afghani people would see their own people working to provide goods and services throughout Afghanistan. The number of PRTs operating throughout Afghanistan and where they are operating within Afghanistan is also disproportionate. For example, there are currently 26 PRTs operating within Afghanistan, however not every province has a PRT. As Figure 1 illustrates, the number of PRTs operating in the East, where the most stable conditions exist, is 14, whereas in the south, where the most instability and need for PRTs exist, there are only four. The number of PRTs operating within Afghanistan should be increased to ensure that every one of Afghanistan's 34 provinces has an operational PRT and in the short-term, PRTs from other regions should be redeployed to the south to help stabilize and reconstruct that region.

Some countries have refused to allow their PRT-led team to operate in areas they deem to be too dangerous. This is another NATO challenge to immediately begin to abolish any countries national caveats when supporting NATO operations. Only by maintaining an active

presence in these remote areas and interacting with the local populace will the coalition be able to maintain a secure environment, positively influence the Afghani people and farmers, and begin to both reduce opium cultivation, gain the trust of the Afghani people, and help them build a new Afghanistan.



Coalition forces must also understand the undesired effects that collateral damage has on the political goals of winning the people. Air strikes have been increasingly used to fight the insurgency, but the accidental deaths of civilians during these strikes have damaged the support for the coalitions by the Afghani people.⁵³ There have been numerous incidents of collateral damage but the most serious incident occurred in July 2002 when an AC-130 Gunship attack on anti-aircraft batteries killed approximately 48 civilians and wounded an additional 117, including members of a wedding party.⁵⁴ As President Karzai stated in Feb 2009, when addressing the

parliament at an opening session, he state the U.S. and other Western military allies have not heeded his calls to stop air strikes in civilian areas in Afghanistan, but without popular support from Afghans, the fight against insurgents cannot be won.⁵⁵ Coalitions operations must take every precaution to avoid the accidental death of Afghani civilians.

Military night raids conducted by coalition task forces aimed at removing suspected insurgents and or terrorists within rural villages also have undesired effects and must be carefully weighed against the potential political backlash amongst the Afghani people.⁵⁶ According to Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission that regularly monitors coalition activities and their undesired effects, "military night raids frequently involved abusive behavior and violent breaking and entry at night, which stoke almost as much anger as the more lethal air strikes. In areas where night raids are prevalent, they were a significant cause of fear, intimidation, and resentment toward PGF."⁵⁷ Additionally, the local people never have closure on these events because they are never informed as to who actually perpetrated the night raid acts against them or whether or not any of those soldiers were punished or prevented from doing them again. Ultimately, the net gain of capturing a suspected insurgent, using these night raids, might not compare to net loss of the Afghani peoples support for the coalition and the Afghani central government.

Conclusion

Afghanistan's opium industry is fueling an insurgency, led by the Taliban, who use opium's lucrative profits to purchase weapons, recruit new members, bribe government and local officials, and threaten the Afghani people. In order to reduce opium cultivation, coalition forces must first provide the security and stability necessary for other programs aimed at offering the farmers' other means of livelihoods. Additionally, coalition forces must leverage their

technological prowess in areas such as Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, which will help to identify and interdict the opium as it is being either processed into morphine or being trafficked out of the country. Defeating an insurgency is a complex and extremely challenging mission that will not be accomplished by military might alone. By establishing smaller bases, but at the same time, increasing the number of forward operating bases in areas that have had little to no coalition or government presence, coalition forces will begin to establish the relationships and friendships necessary to build support for the coalition and Afghani centralized government. The continued integration and placing of ANSF forces within security and stability operations and in leadership positions is the long-term solution. Lastly, past coalition forces' actions, in the form of air strikes and night raids, have had extremely damaging effects by decreasing the support of the Afghani people for the coalition as well as the Afghani central government. Coalition forces must always be aware of the repercussions of their actions as they relate to the strategic and national end state of which they support. Only then can we help Afghanistan reduce the opium industry and create the conditions necessary to rebuild and develop.

¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2008* (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, 2008), iv.

² Ibid., 1.

³ Phillip Smith, "NATO, US Deepen Anti-Drug Operations in Afghanistan in Bid to Throttle Taliban," *Drug War Chronicle*, 17 October 2008, http://www.stophthedrugwar.org/chronicle/556/NATO_US_Afghanistan_opium_Taliban.

⁴ North American Treaty Organization, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), "SHAPE Quotes, General John Craddock, 2008," <http://www.nato.int/shape/opinions/quotes/index.htm>.

⁵ UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey*, vii.

⁶ Ibid., vii.

⁷ Ibid., vii.

⁸ Ibid., vii.

⁹ Matt Weiner, *An Afghan 'Narco-State'? Dynamics Assessment and Security Applications of the Afghan Opium Industry* (Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 2004), 48.

¹⁰ UNODC, *Afghanistan Opium Survey*, 12.

¹¹ The World Bank and Department for International Development, *Afghanistan Economic Incentives and Development Initiatives to Reduce Opium Production*. (New York, N.Y.: February 2008), 4.

- ¹² U.S. Department of State official Web site, *Background Note: Afghanistan*, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.html>.
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