

AU/ACSC/BIUS/AY09

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

TOUGH AS NAILS: POLICE MENTORING IN A NON-
PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT

by

Joel R. Bius, Major, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Dr. Edwina Campbell

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2009

Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Report Documentation Page		Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.		
1. REPORT DATE APR 2009	2. REPORT TYPE N/A	3. DATES COVERED -
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Tough as Nails: Police Mentoring in a Non-Permissive Environment		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
		5b. GRANT NUMBER
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
	5e. TASK NUMBER	
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Air Command And Staff College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited		
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images.		
14. ABSTRACT In counterinsurgency warfare, training and advising host nation police forces is a key task for the counterinsurgent. Ideally, this task would be assigned to civilian law enforcement agencies. However, in a non-permissive environment where there is a strong insurgent, it is very difficult for civilian agencies to carry out this task. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the task of police force training was eventually assigned to US military police mentor teams (PMTs) starting in the spring of 2007. The military assumption of these duties occurred after other attempts to develop the Afghan police had either failed or were progressing too slowly. This paper addresses the difficulties these PMTs faced, the process by which a plan emerged to utilize these teams, and how PMTs were absolutely essential to COIN execution. Counterinsurgency expert David Galulas model for measuring the strength of the insurgent is used to describe the strength of the insurgency in Southern Afghanistan. Additionally, Galulas COIN operations model is used as a framework to describe the actual police development campaign that ensued. The main method of research is personal experience supported by interviews with senior Army officers who were intimately involved with the 2007-2008 police development campaign. The findings are relatively straight forward. There are several key tasks in police development that require military PMTs in a non-permissive environment, and these tasks must be initiated in a deliberate manner ASAP after expulsion of the insurgent from a given area. Moreover, all development efforts in COIN, be they police, governance, judiciary, etc., are described as tasks requiring hands-on mentoring and over watch by forces on the ground, civilian or military as appropriate. Finally, these forces should be embedded to the maximum extent possible with host nation personnel.		
15. SUBJECT TERMS		

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

Contents

PREFACE	IV
ABSTRACT.....	VI
THE PROBLEM.....	1
BACKGROUND	3
CURRENT SITUATION.....	5
GALULA’S MODEL – MEASURING THE INSURGENCY IN KANDAHAR.....	5
INITIAL POLICE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS	8
DEPLOYMENT OF US MILITARY PMTS	10
GALULA’S COIN OPERATIONS MODEL.....	11
DESTRUCTION OR EXPULSION OF THE INSURGENT FORCES	12
DEPLOYMENT OF THE STATIC UNIT	14
CONTACT WITH AND CONTROL OF POPULATION	16
TESTING THE LOCAL LEADERS.....	16
FINAL THOUGHTS	17
BIBLIOGRAPHY	27

Preface

Training and advising host nation security forces is an integral part of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. The purpose of this paper is to explore the military's role in the development of host nation police forces. Specifically, the question I will seek to answer is how best to utilize the military to develop police capability in a non-permissive environment where there is a strong insurgent. I will use Kandahar Province, Afghanistan (circa 2007) as a case study for this research. My findings will be based upon personal experience in Afghanistan, as well as interviews and personal interaction with the former commander of the Afghan Regional Security Integration Command-South (ARSIC-S), Colonel Thomas McGrath, and the former Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTCA) CJ-7, Colonel Michael McMahon, both of whom were deeply involved with the development of the Afghan national police.¹ I rely heavily on David Galula's COIN theories, supported by various other sources, to include Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24. In exploring this topic and answering this research question, it is my aim to provide military and civilian leaders with ideas that will guide COIN strategy and tactics in future conflicts of this nature. I also hope to paint a clear picture of the incredibly difficult tasks faced by US military professionals charged with rebuilding the security apparatus in failed states such as Afghanistan; tasks that are dangerous and frustrating, but absolutely required in a COIN campaign.

This subject is personal to me, as I had the opportunity to serve in Afghanistan on a tour with the US Army from July 2007 to January 2008. I served as Deputy J5-Police on the ARSIC-S staff headquartered in Kandahar Province in southern Afghanistan – a place where the insurgency was most active. Our mission was to plan and execute a campaign to advise, train, and equip the Afghan National Police (ANP) in the four provinces of southern Afghanistan.

When I arrived, I was briefed that approximately 600 ANP had been murdered in Afghanistan during the first half of 2007, many of these deaths occurring in the south where I was located. The danger was immediately apparent, for soon after I arrived, 14 policemen were either shot or beheaded by Taliban insurgents at a police checkpoint (CP) in Kandahar.² One of the first US Army officers I talked to upon arrival was a Police Mentor Team (PMT) leader, and he told me of his first mission upon arrival in country three months prior. Indeed, he was part of the first wave of military PMTs to arrive and begin embedding with the ANP during the spring of 2007. His team went to a police checkpoint north of the city of Qalat (north of Kandahar Province) to assess the police forces there and begin establishing relationships. Upon arrival, they found that the policemen at the CP had been killed execution style and dogs were eating their remains.

Soon after I arrived, my first mission involved a RECON of an Afghan Standby Police Battalion compound in inner city Kandahar. We found approximately 80 policemen in the compound, most of whom were high on drugs, scantily clothed, and malnourished; many were completely incoherent. It was immediately apparent to me that we were losing the police development aspect of the counterinsurgency and a new plan to stand up a professional police force that could survive the insurgency and secure the population was required. What follows is my attempt to process my Afghanistan experience in an effort to match up COIN doctrine's view of the military advisor's role in police development with the actual ground reality I found in Afghanistan.

Abstract

In counterinsurgency warfare, training and advising host nation police forces is a key task for the counterinsurgent. Ideally, this task would be assigned to civilian law enforcement agencies. However, in a non-permissive environment where there is a strong insurgent, it is very difficult for civilian agencies to carry out this task. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the task of police force training was eventually assigned to US military police mentor teams (PMTs) starting in the spring of 2007. The military assumption of these duties occurred after other attempts to develop the Afghan police had either failed or were progressing too slowly.

This paper addresses the difficulties these PMTs faced, the process by which a plan emerged to utilize these teams, and how PMTs were absolutely essential to COIN execution. Counterinsurgency expert David Galula's model for measuring the strength of the insurgent is used to describe the strength of the insurgency in Southern Afghanistan. Additionally, Galula's COIN operations model is used as a framework to describe the actual police development campaign that ensued. The main method of research is personal experience supported by interviews with senior Army officers who were intimately involved with the 2007-2008 police development campaign.

The findings are relatively straight forward. There are several key tasks in police development that require military PMTs in a non-permissive environment, and these tasks must be initiated in a deliberate manner ASAP after expulsion of the insurgent from a given area. Moreover, all development efforts in COIN, be they police, governance, judiciary, etc., are described as tasks requiring hands-on mentoring and over watch by forces on the ground, civilian or military as appropriate. Finally, these forces should be embedded to the maximum extent possible with host nation personnel.

¹ Colonel Thomas J. McGrath hails from South Boston MA; he graduated and was commissioned as a 2LT of Infantry from Northeastern University in 1981. Col McGrath has served as a rifle platoon leader, Brigade Asst S3, Aide de Camp, BN Ops officer, Maneuver Branch Chief, BN Commander, and has served on the US Army HQ staff. He served on the MNF-I staff in Iraq as the Pol Mil Economic Effects Chief. From May 2007 to August 2008, Colonel McGrath commanded the Afghan Regional Security Integration Command–South (ARSIC-S) in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He was responsible for the mentoring, training and integration of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police into NATO and OEF Operations. Colonel McGrath is currently the Director of the Quick Reaction Test Team for Army Test and Evaluation Command.

COL Mike McMahon was commissioned an infantryman from the US Military Academy in 1981. He served in a variety of command and planning/operations staff positions from platoon through division level, as well as at DA, JFCOM, and USAREUR. He recently served a second tour in Afghanistan as the CJ7 at Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, responsible for planning, programming, and execution of the build of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. COL McMahon currently serves on the faculty of the US Army War College.

² Colonel Thomas McGrath (USA), interview conducted by author, 30 Jan 2009. Colonel McGrath and I agreed in the interview that the number that was being reported on the ground was 600, and that it was widely agreed that most of the police were being killed in the South. The fact that policing was very dangerous in the South was also well known among Afghans themselves. One example involved recruits for the national paramilitary force ANCOP (Afghan National Civil Order Police). Two of these units saw massive attrition (greater than 50%) after training in the north at Mazar-e-Sharif and then deployment to Kandahar. Many simply changed into civilian clothes, left the ANCOP compound in Kandahar soon after arrival, and caught a bus back to their home in the north. They knew the dangers associated with police work in Kandahar.

The Problem

As the US continues to prosecute the war on terror, and specifically Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the training and advising of host nation police has emerged as a key element in our COIN strategy.³ COIN theorists often describe insurgents and terrorists as “the fish” and the host nation population as “the water.” You can either attack the fish directly with a net or spear gun – the direct approach; or try to affect the water in which they swim so they can no longer survive in it – the indirect approach.⁴ In short, history shows that effective indigenous police forces are integral in defeating insurgents who “swim among the population.”⁵

Only host nation police forces are capable of achieving the legitimacy required for policing the population as they can both relate to the population and execute the nation’s laws. Professionally trained police can live among the population, gather human intelligence, and directly attack insurgents. But more importantly, they also provide security and stability for the population and give the population confidence in the central government.⁶ This is a factor that is more devastating to the insurgent in the long run than the police unit kicking in his door. As former US Army officer Fredrick Wilkins wrote regarding destruction of guerilla movements:

If the great mass of the population knows it will be protected by a strong, just government, it has no reason to cooperate with the guerillas [insurgents], and the system of intelligence and supply that sustains all guerilla movements breaks down. Without popular support the mopping up of the hard-core die-hards is fairly easy.⁷

That said, we must also remember Carl Von Clausewitz’s dictum that, “everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean it is very easy.”⁸ Simply stated, Clausewitz’s dictum means - the art is in the implementation. And in Kandahar, Afghanistan, implementation was problematic to say the least.

There were many tough questions to answer as planners began developing a campaign to “stand up” the police force. How does one train a civilian police force whose stated objective is

to provide “community policing” similar to what is found in western societies, in an active combat zone where the insurgent specifically targets police forces with violent and bloody attacks?⁹ Police forces in Afghanistan face a vastly different set of circumstances than most western police forces will ever face; thus an *intensive* training program is required. In a non-permissive environment with a history of poor policing, this program must not only train basic police tasks, but *must* include an emphasis on ethics, values, and combat skills training.¹⁰ Further, how do you secure the host nation population when those charged with this responsibility (the police) are often found beheaded at their posts?¹¹ Murdered policemen do not provide the population with confidence in the “strong, just government” Wilkins mentions above. Walter Ladwig says in an article on police development that “domestic police are one of the most important points of contact between government and its citizens.”¹² How do you garner support and confidence in the central government when the agents of this task, the Afghan Police, are historically corrupt and garner little trust from the community they are supposed to protect?¹³

These are all questions addressed in this paper and are just a sampling of problems military planners faced as they began an intense effort to develop the ANP in 2007. There was much pressure from the international community to allow civilian agents to take on the task of developing the police force, but ground reality in southern Afghanistan dictated that the military would be forced to take the lead.¹⁴ As a result, US military planners had to design tactics to integrate military forces into the police development campaign. Campaign plans of this nature must address ground reality. The Afghan police are targets of the insurgency and they must be trained and equipped in a way that will allow them to survive the combat zone in which they live and fight. But in Kandahar, they were also found to be corrupt, unprofessional, and seriously

deficient in the tasks of securing the local population and providing confidence in the central government of Afghanistan. With the problems defined, the background and Afghan situation as of 2007 will now be provided as context.

Background

There are a few aspects of Afghan history and development that one must first understand before they can fully understand the difficulty inherent in any police development campaign in Afghanistan. Corum and Johnson provide an accurate description of Afghanistan in their book, *Air Power in Small Wars*, when they submit that the chaotic, violent, and complicated power struggles found in Afghanistan are a “perfectly normal state of affairs.”¹⁵ Indeed there is no history of a strong central government in Afghanistan, but there is a history of fracture, tribalism, and wars for power – especially among the Pashtu tribal areas of the south.¹⁶ So we must first understand that Afghanistan has no long history of a central government to which citizens looked for collective security – especially in the rural areas outside Kabul.

Secondly, Afghanistan has a history of corruption among police forces – it seems to be ingrained in the culture. Afghanistan has historically been a “crossroads” country, with travelers and merchants alike passing through its many ancient trade routes. In fact, Kandahar lies at the intersection of one of the ancient trade routes between India and Iran.¹⁷ Safe passage across borders and through the country was dependent upon the traveler’s ability to pay off armed highway patrols that “guarded” the roads.¹⁸ This form of “commerce” by extortion has deep historical roots in Afghanistan.

So the idea of armed mercenaries taking money from the general population is steeped in Afghan history. Thus the cultural perception that security forces in Afghanistan are corrupt, and perception is reality in this case. The author was told by interpreters and those experienced with

Afghan culture that the occupational position of policeman, as opposed to western culture, is looked down upon in Afghanistan. This was shocking considering the American culture where the occupations of policeman or fireman are considered noble, sought after professions. Culturally, police in Afghanistan were often seen as corrupt henchmen who served the local warlords and made their living off of taxes they extracted from travelers.¹⁹ This was the state of policing when the Taliban movement began in the early 1990s. Police, and government in general, were seen as corrupt – a factor that would actually aid the Taliban as they moved to take over Afghanistan.

Interestingly, police and warlord corruption was at the roots of the Taliban's grab for power and their subsequent acceptance by the local population.²⁰ In a daring move, Taliban forces entered southern Afghanistan in September 1994 on the Pakistan border at a place called Spin Boldak and attacked north to Kandahar, clearing the roads of these highwaymen.²¹ They eventually attacked the warlords and their corrupt security and police enforcers in the south, and made Kandahar their de facto capital.²² They were initially lauded as righteous saviors, in part because they cleared the highways of corruption. There was a perception that the Taliban would usher in a new era of peace and ethical justice. The Taliban became their own police force and their movement eventually took over nearly all of Afghanistan, including the capital city of Kabul in 1995.²³

So, a short review of Afghan history reveals that there was no precedent for a strong central government that was looked to for security, and that security forces that did exist were often seen as corrupt by the population they were supposed to protect. These factors, among many others, enabled the successful Taliban takeover of Afghanistan during the 1990's.

Current Situation

After the attacks of 9-11, the Taliban government of Afghanistan and its forces became a prime target in the new Global War on Terror. The Taliban regime was eventually toppled from power as a result of the coalition air and land campaigns and in coordination with various anti-Taliban forces.²⁴ As coalition forces and the international community began the work of rebuilding the country, the existing police were simply assimilated into the new National Police, and new police were, by and large, recruited from the dredges of society. They were corrupt, underpaid, under trained, and unfortunately known for their harassment of local citizens.²⁵ Since they were now the face of the Afghan central government, they also became the target of the insurgents and were the victims of a violent campaign of murder and destruction. Kandahar Province, being the home of the Taliban movement and its leader Mullah Omar, was seen as a decisive point for both the insurgent and the coalition forces.²⁶

This was the state of affairs in 2007. The Taliban movement had manifested itself as a violent insurgency, and Afghan security forces were largely incapable of countering them in the south. Before discussing the circumstances that led to the deployment of military forces to train and advise police in Kandahar in response to this insurgency, Galula's model will now be used to measure the insurgency and provide additional context to give a clear picture of the non-permissive environment these forces would be required to operate in.

Galula's Model – measuring the insurgency in Kandahar

Lieutenant Colonel David Galula was an experienced counterinsurgent who wrote several books on COIN during the 1960s. He is widely hailed by contemporary COIN theorists and practitioners as an expert in the field. Indeed, Colonel McGrath, commander of ARSIC-S from May 2007 to August 2008, stated that Galula's ideas about COIN, in conjunction with US Army

Field Manual (FM) 3-24, are excellent and well thought out guides for anyone faced with fighting an insurgency.²⁷ Galula proposes four conditions that must exist for there to be a strong insurgent and these four conditions will be applied to actual conditions in Kandahar. Ultimately, this comparison will show that there was a strong insurgent environment that led to a non-permissive ground situation where military advisors were required.

Galula identifies the first requirement for an insurgency is a cause for the insurgent to rally behind – something the insurgent will eventually use to garner support from the population.²⁸ In Kandahar in 2007, there was definitely a strong insurgent cause consisting of three elements: religion, culture, and crime. Colonel McGrath felt the cause behind the insurgency in Kandahar was first and foremost Jihad.²⁹ Insurgents believed they were fighting to defend their religion against the infidel, and they were able to use this as a rallying cry for the population. Next, Colonel McGrath identified a tribal aspect central to the cause for the insurgency, which was very difficult to understand.³⁰ But simply stated, there were tribal interests at stake as coalition forces began to exert influence in Kandahar.³¹ The only thing comparable in western terms are complicated Mafia interests and spheres of influence that are “in play” in many of the major cities in the United States.³² Finally, there was simply a criminal element to the insurgency. Colonel McGrath believed this was driven by the opium economy and the fact that many Afghan youth were out of work with nothing better to do than fight coalition forces.³³ Taken in total, 2007 Kandahar presented a complex challenge for COIN forces to address.

Galula’s second condition proposes that the strength or weakness of the counterinsurgent will dictate the relative strength of the insurgent. Of major importance in this area is what he calls the “machine to control the population.”³⁴ This “machine” involves a central political

structure, an administrative bureaucracy that can provide services to the population, and a police and army force that can secure the population. If any one of these aspects is weak or non-existent, it will aid the insurgent in his effort to affect and control the population. In Afghanistan, all these “cogs in the machine” were weak or absent. There was no central, unified political structure there and administrative support could only be found in Kabul. Further, these mechanisms were largely absent in the rest of the country.³⁵ Finally, the army was just reaching a very rudimentary level of proficiency, and as stated, the ANP were not faring well at all.³⁶ So the counterinsurgent, in this case, was very weak – thus the insurgency in Kandahar was alive and well.

Galula next proposes that geographic conditions can aid the insurgent and this was certainly the case in Afghanistan.³⁷ According to Colonel McGrath, the geographic conditions in southern Afghanistan definitely favored the insurgent.³⁸ This area was isolated by natural barriers (mountains and deserts) and had a lengthy border with a country (Pakistan) that was sympathetic to the cause. It possessed rugged terrain, and there was a low-tech, agrarian economy. In such economies, the effects of insurgent disruption on the population are not as pronounced as they would be in a hi-tech, industrial economy, where citizens historically grow weary of insurgency.³⁹ All these geographic conditions favored the insurgent, as he was able to take advantage of geography to conceal his movement and manipulate the population.

Finally, Galula suggests that the insurgent must have outside support in order to operate from a position of strength.⁴⁰ In southern Afghanistan, this support came from the tribal areas of Pakistan that were sympathetic to the insurgent cause and provided safe areas and material support. Coalition forces were largely unable to defend and monitor these border areas, and this

was a major problem as insurgents were afforded freedom of movement to and from these safe areas where they received outside support.⁴¹

In the final analysis, there is no doubt that when measured against Galula's model, the insurgency in Kandahar Province was very powerful. Insurgents had a strong, very popular cause and were facing a weak counterinsurgent. Additionally, terrain favored insurgent movements, and they had strong outside support. It was against this backdrop that police development efforts began soon after the Taliban started the insurgency.

Initial police development problems

The initial plan was for civilian police organizations from the European Union, with Germany in the lead, to establish a formal training program to produce professional ANP police officers. From 2003 to 2007, Germany led this effort and worked hard to develop a professional police service. They built an excellent police academy in the Green Zone in Kabul that would rival any western police academy. Subsequently it was determined that while the German program was strong on quality, it was not able to produce the quantity of police needed to secure the country against the insurgency.⁴²

At this point, the US escalated its involvement in police development, and began providing equipment, weapons, vehicles, facilities, and "quick turn" training programs.⁴³ It was very much an opposite approach, as it focused on quantity and neglected quality. As a result, there was a great number of ANP throughout the country who received equipment and weapons, and training on how to use them, but there was no program that addressed their professionalism, ethical standards, or the insurgent environment they would operate in. The fundamental flaw was assuming that by simply providing equipment and cursory training a professional police corps would emerge.⁴⁴

What ensued was the exact opposite of what planners wanted to occur. As a result of the “shot gun blast” approach to police development, there were many untrained policemen all over Afghanistan, especially outside the capital region in Kabul, with shiny new uniforms (with the Afghan flag on the sleeve), weapons, and trucks, but no clear idea how to secure themselves or the community they policed. Due to administrative problems and corruption inherent in a country emerging from decades of war and revolution, they were not being paid, either. They began to use their weapons and uniforms as leverage to take money from the population. According to Colonel McGrath, this practice was rampant in Kandahar Province. Not only was it in the cultural history of Afghanistan, but the newly minted “policeman” saw it as his right. He was providing security but was not being paid – so the general population, in his mind, owed him money in exchange for protection.⁴⁵

Not only were the police seen as a nuisance by the general population, they now became targets of the insurgency – easy targets. The author was told upon arrival in Kandahar in July 2007 that 600 police had been murdered during the first half of the year by insurgent forces. The actual numbers are grim, indeed. According to figures tallied by the Associated Press, more than 900 police were killed in Afghanistan in 2007.⁴⁶ As a means of comparison, and in accordance with the latest data available from the FBI, 48 law enforcement officers were killed in the United States in 2006. During the 10 year period between 1997 through 2006, 562 officers were killed in the US.⁴⁷ It is not hard to see that police were being killed at an alarming rate in Afghanistan in 2007. This was incredibly detrimental to COIN efforts, especially in Kandahar Province. There, the population was generally sympathetic to the Taliban cause and skeptical about the ability of the government to provide basic needs and security. This was understandable, considering that the most visible government agents were often found “shaking them down”,

high on drugs, or dead at their post.⁴⁸ With the population's confidence in the police waning, and the insurgency growing ever more violent, US military police mentors were sent into action in hopes that they could stop the downward spiral.⁴⁹

Deployment of US Military PMTs

As the campaign entered 2007, it was apparent that more direct action was required to stand up the police force. A centralized training academy coupled with programs to push out equipment and weapons was simply not working. In accordance with US joint doctrine, a request for forces (RFF) went out from CSTC-A to US Joint Forces Command requesting the deployment of US Army teams to embed with and mentor the ANP.⁵⁰ In many ways, it was a last ditch effort to reverse, or at least stabilize the dangerous police situation in Afghanistan – something had to be done.⁵¹ The first US Army PMTs arrived in Kandahar Province during the spring of 2007.

During initial operations, there was much confusion and little consistency in the campaign. PMTs were dispatched with little guidance on how or what they were to accomplish.⁵² Initially, these teams provided confidence and firepower for the district police they embedded with, but there did not appear to be a strategic plan with objectives, end states, and measurements of success in place.⁵³ It appeared that planners had corrected the effect of the “shotgun blast” previously mentioned by pulling the trigger on another “shotgun blast” of US Army PMTs with no strategic plan in place. It was at this point that planners began work to develop a plan to utilize classic COIN concepts.

In the late summer of 2007, planners developed a campaign plan that focused on developing the ANP.⁵⁴ The plan relied heavily on embedded US Army PMTs to execute many of its key features. In the final analysis, the operational plan that was developed was very similar

to the steps laid out by Galula in his model for COIN operations. What emerged is what the author proposes as the answer to the original research question – “how best to utilize the military to develop police capability in a non-permissive environment where there is a strong insurgent.”

Using Galula’s operational model as a framework, it is beneficial to apply it to the actual police development campaign that saw success starting in the fall of 2007. It still remains to be seen if the success will be long term, but there is no doubt that the development plan that was executed task organized the PMTs and focused their time and effort on a coherent strategy.⁵⁵ Before discussing the specific aspects of this plan and how it can be used as a template for future PMT operations, a brief summary of Galula’s COIN operations model is provided to give the reader context for its application in Kandahar Province.

Galula’s COIN operations model

Much of what we do in the military, especially with high tech weapon systems, is tied to a checklist. When it comes to COIN, it is very difficult to boil down operational guidance into a simple checklist. But through much experience, trial, and error, David Galula provides what the author believes is a very useful and complete checklist on how to engage and defeat an insurgency. The steps are as follows: 1) destruction or expulsion of the insurgent forces, 2) deployment of the static unit, 3) contact with and control of the population, 4) destruction of the insurgent political organization, 5) local elections, 6) testing the local leaders, 7) organizing a party, 8) winning over or suppressing the last guerillas.⁵⁶ These steps should be accomplished as part of an overall campaign to defeat the insurgent. As we have found in Iraq and Afghanistan, execution of such a plan requires utilizing all instruments of national power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME); by many players including the DoD, State Department, non-governmental organizations, and inner-governmental organizations.

Rather than expand upon each of these steps or agency requirements in great detail, focus will be on relating Galula's steps to the core research question and show how police advisors were able to successfully apply them in actual operations. After carefully considering what actually occurred during the 2007 police development campaign in Kandahar, as well as extensive interviews with the ARSIC-S commander and the CSTC-A CJ7, the author believes that the PMTs were integral in successful completion of steps 1, 2, 3, and 6 of Galula's COIN operations model.⁵⁷ In these steps, there are several key tasks that only the military advisor team can and must accomplish in a non-permissive environment.

Destruction or expulsion of the insurgent forces

This is obviously a core task for military units, usually carried out through a combined arms campaign by traditional maneuver and special operations forces. In Kandahar Province, this effort was initially led by special forces units embedded with Afghan forces under the control of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, with follow on operations conducted by assault forces from a mixture of other US Army and coalition forces.⁵⁸ After expulsion, the Taliban eventually reorganized and the insurgency ensued – they were wounded, but not defeated. In a perfect world, and with hindsight as a guide, PMTs would have been dispatched soon after expulsion and before the insurgency. As previously mentioned, several police development programs were attempted that did not include embedded military advisors, but as the insurgency intensified, the necessity for these teams was recognized. Due to the delay, PMTs began to arrive in country after the insurgency was mature. Nevertheless, the tasks for the military adviser at this initial step are the same.

As military PMTs deployed and “ground level” police development efforts began, a key task for PMTs was first and foremost to establish relationships with district police leadership,

and then to identify and catalog, as best they could: who the actual police were, how they were equipped, what their strength was, what their command structure was, who was good, who was bad, and who was fit for duty.⁵⁹ This is much more difficult than it may sound and required a “Herculean” effort from the PMTs. Galula speaks of a census of the population occurring at step three (contact with and control of the population), but it is very important that the police *themselves* are identified and vetted at step one *before* moving on to the population at step three.⁶⁰ We must focus on the police first, and do so in a timely manner soon after insurgents are expelled, because the police force is the instrument the counterinsurgent will use to make contact with, win over, and then secure the population.

This is also a very dangerous mission that only military personnel can do in a non-permissive environment.⁶¹ Before starting intensive efforts to train police and provide them with lethal equipment and weaponry, we must be sure of who they are, and more importantly, who they are loyal to. This step is time consuming and dangerous, but is vitally important to the success of the remaining steps. Deployment of the PMT must be done ASAP in conjunction with expulsion of the insurgent force. As Col McMahan pointed out, someone will always fill the security vacuum – the idea here is to make sure it is filled by forces loyal to the government you are supporting.⁶² It will not be perfect in the beginning. Depending on the situation, the host nation military forces, also taking into consideration their level of reliability, may have to make up this initial police unit.⁶³ But the key is to begin police development fast, before the insurgents or a criminal group fills the vacuum.⁶⁴

Deployment of the Static Unit

Galula makes the bold statement that it is at this step that the “war is won or lost.”⁶⁵ As Galula says:

The purpose of deploying static units is to establish a grid of troops so that the population and the counterinsurgent political teams are reasonably well protected, and so that the troops can participate in civic action at the lowest level.⁶⁶

Police in Kandahar Province were not organized and trained to secure the population. Upon initial survey, it was found that police often had a central headquarters at the district or provincial level, and then “rag-tag” CPs along the highways and byways. Police generally stayed in garrison at the headquarters or the small CPs, and did not venture out to patrol and make contact with the population in the villages and markets. In most cases, there was no “static unit” that could defend itself and control/patrol territory and population. This meant that the insurgent was free to move about and conduct operations.⁶⁷ The few static units that did exist were not trained in combat skills, patrol tactics, or how to survive the insurgent environment. This meant that the police were open to insurgent attacks and were often overpowered and overrun. They were simply unable to provide effective security.

To correct this situation, there were several key tasks given to PMTs as part of a strategy called Focused District Development (FDD).⁶⁸ The author proposes that the FDD model for the deployment of Galula’s static unit is the best way to organize, train, and equip police in a COIN environment like Kandahar Province. Again, it may initially have to be host nation military forces providing security through static units, but the tasks for embedded mentor teams are the same, whether they are advising soldiers or police forces.

The FDD campaign identified strategic districts where intense efforts would be made to train and equip the police and then deploy them in static, survivable, mutually supporting units.⁶⁹ Having identified and vetted the police in step one, the PMT now supervised the removal of the

police from the selected districts for intense training at a central location - in this case the Kandahar Regional Training Center (RTC).⁷⁰ While district police were trained by civilian police trainers at the RTC, PMTs, along with Afghan army units and state paramilitary forces, provided district security.⁷¹

The PMTs also supervised the construction and refurbishment of the static units where the police would deploy upon returning to the district. They worked with provincial and district police leadership to develop a policing plan that involved patrolling sectors, command and control concepts, and procedures for police administration, among many other things. Along with the police leadership and other government officials, they conducted meetings (Shuras) with village elders before, during, and after district development to prepare the population for the “new” national police force that would soon be providing district security. This was a very important information operations task for PMTs as they executed the static unit plan.

It was also important for PMTs to be involved in the training regimen at the RTC, where they would supervise combat skills training and collective unit training for the police. Police not only learned basic policing skills from civilian police trainers provided by the US State Department, but they also learned from military advisers how to maneuver as a unit, how to defend themselves in a combat situation, how to react to improvised explosive devices, and combat life saver skills. The police were also given citizenship and ethical training, addressing the vital professional aspect of police development. Most of all, the ANP gained personal confidence in their ability to secure the population. And considering the previously mentioned negative aspect regarding the police profession, a level of pride began to develop among the new national police force that was unseen to that point in the campaign.

Upon completion of the intense training program, the PMTs then supervised the redeployment of the police to the districts as static units.⁷² Now efforts shifted from training to application, under the watchful eye of the PMT.

Contact with and Control of Population

As I have stressed in this paper, positive contact with the host nation populace is essential if the government is to defeat the insurgency. In the police development campaign, this is the point where the efforts in identifying, vetting, *intensively* training, and equipping host nation police forces will pay off as police units begin establishing contact with their fellow citizens. As trained police units are deployed in their district, PMTs entered what we called an “over watch” phase. During this phase, PMTs would ensure police were practicing skills and disciplines they learned in training. They would help them plan and execute patrols, and then actually go on foot patrols with the police in the villages and bazaars. They mentored police leadership at the district level to ensure they were maintaining positive, responsive contact with the population, and proper oversight of their police units and resources provided by the Afghan government.⁷³

Great effort must be exerted in this stage to ensure police represent the government in a positive light so that the population will now see the government, and not the insurgent, as the protector and provider of their most basic need - security. The key task here is for the PMT to be side by side with the local police unit, whatever the situation. This was often a very risky endeavor, but was absolutely necessary in order to develop the police to a level where they could “go it alone” and the PMT could be redeployed to another district.⁷⁴

Testing the Local Leaders

Finally, the PMT must put the police leadership to the test to ensure they are ready to “go solo.”⁷⁵ This testing period can involve exercises, planning and execution of actual missions,

and inspections of police facilities and records, as well as many other measurement tools.⁷⁶ For example, PMTs could observe police reaction to intelligence regarding a weapons cache or suspected insurgent cell. They would observe mission planning, safety considerations, coordination efforts with local army units or other police districts, and then actually accompany police during execution.

The PMTs must ensure police not only accomplish these external tasks, but the internal tasks as well. By internal, I speak of the administration of the police department, to include pay, personnel actions, promotions, training requirements, disciplinary actions, as well as many other tasks.⁷⁷ One of the greatest challenges for PMTs was to ensure pay operations were conducted in a timely and accurate manner, free of corruption.⁷⁸ All of the training and over watch will be wasted if the police force is not paid and administered in a professional manner. Pay operations and police administration was a key center of gravity in the police development campaign, and became a key task for PMTs as they endeavored to deliver fully operational district police units.⁷⁹ Once the PMT feels the district has met all requirements, the district is then considered fully capable of delivering security and resources are shifted to another district.⁸⁰

Final Thoughts

I have expanded upon Galula's COIN model in this paper, applying certain key steps to police development in a non-permissive environment. But I would like to finish with the observation that all the concepts I have proposed in this paper to utilize military forces to develop police are applicable across the COIN campaign and have one thing in common – they all require *hands on* mentors and advisers that should be embedded to the maximum extent possible.⁸¹ The bravery and professionalism displayed by military PMTs as they tirelessly worked on the ground to train and advise police forces must be found at all levels of the DIME

execution. If part of the campaign involves developing courts and corrections, for example, then agencies tasked with their development have to be on the ground, right next to the host nation judge or prison guard.⁸² I cannot overstress the importance of hands on contact and over watch as agencies, military and civilian, strive to develop host nation capability in efforts to crush the insurgency. This must occur not only in the capital region and “green zone,” but in the field as well – which is the district level for police and some aspects of local governance development.⁸³ As we continue to engage failed states and areas at risk for terrorist takeover, we must recognize that success is often dictated by acceptance of risk and decisive, hands on action – traits exhibited to this day by the PMTs in Afghanistan and Iraq.

³ This statement is supported by US Army doctrine. US Army FM 3-24 states that, “the primary front line COIN force is often the police—not the military. The primary COIN objective is to enable local institutions. Therefore, supporting the police is essential.” The regulation goes on to say, “Few military units can match a good police unit in developing an accurate human intelligence picture of their area of operations. Because of their frequent contact with populace, police are often the most appropriate force to counter small insurgent bands that receive support from the civilian population.” See US Army FM 3-24, par. 6-91 and 6-92.

⁴ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press), 28. I had the opportunity to serve under LTC John A. Nagl for 3 months while in combat training at FT Riley, Kansas, before my deployment to Afghanistan. He was the commander of 1/34 Armor, a unit that was tasked to train US military transition teams that were going to Afghanistan and Iraq to advise and mentor Army and Police units. I had several personal conversations with LTC Nagl about the counterinsurgency and his book, as well as his then recent experiences in Iraq.

⁵ Frank Kitson quoted in John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press), 28.

⁶ The importance of gaining the support of the population was highlighted by General Petraeus as a key strategy cornerstone in a recent speech (8 Feb 2009) regarding operations in Afghanistan. He said, “first and foremost, our forces and those of our Afghan partners have to strive to secure and serve the population. We have to recognize that the Afghan people are *the decisive ‘Terrain.’* And together with our Afghan partners, we have to work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support, and to facilitate the provision of basic services, the development of the Afghan Security Forces in the area, the promotion of local economic development, and the establishment of governance that includes links to the traditional leaders in society and is viewed as *legitimate in the eyes of the people.*” See entire speech at

http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2009=&menu_konferenzen=&id=264&sprache=en &

⁷ Fredrick Wilkins quoted in Mark Osanka, ed., *Modern guerilla warfare*, (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 14.

⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. And trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 178.

⁹ Scheider and Chapman, “Community Policing and Terrorism” (April 2003), www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/Scheider-Chapman.html. Scheider and Chapman describe community policing as a model that moves away from only reacting to calls for service, to a model where “active problem solving is centered on the underlying conditions that give rise to crime and disorder and on fostering partnerships between police and the community.” This was the professional standard for police in Afghanistan, but a very difficult standard to meet considering the combat environment, the poor historical trust in the police, difficulty in recruiting high caliber policemen, and lack of proper training.

¹⁰ At http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, US Joint Pub 1 contains no definition of a “non-permissive” environment. But it does state that a “permissive environment” is one where “host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.” Therefore, a non-permissive environment is the opposite of this – one where host country and law enforcement agencies *do not* have control, and a very dangerous situation exists. This was the case in southern Afghanistan during 2007.

¹¹ One example of this terror tactic occurred in Maiwand District in Kandahar Province a month after I arrived. The Taliban insurgents were able to pay off the gate guard at a police checkpoint, and they entered the compound in the middle of the night. The ANP inside were asleep when the insurgents opened fire, killing many in bed. Several were rounded up and were summarily executed in the village the next day after a mock trial. Nineteen total police were killed in that raid, with one surviving by hiding under his bed. This is just one such event among many that discredited the police and produced fear and terror among the population. It also showed why PMTs had to maintain such an aggressive security posture when training police inside their compounds because they never knew how trustworthy the outer security was.

¹² Walter Ladwig, “Training Foreign Police: A Missing Aspect of US Security Assistance to Counterinsurgency,” *Comparative Strategy*, 26, No. 4 (July 2007): 285-293.

¹³ Colonel Thomas McGrath (USA), interview conducted by author, 30 Jan 2009. Colonel McGrath felt corruption was a major problem throughout Afghanistan, especially among the police. He did point out that the corruption that occurred at the “street level” with bribes and checkpoint “tolls” was often a result of police not being paid, thus seeking out alternate forms of income.

¹⁴ Colonel Michael McMahon (USA), interview conducted by author, 5 Feb 2009. Colonel McMahon faced a great deal of pressure from NATO allies not to allow military forces to be involved in police development. There were several reasons for this pressure. He felt one was pride – the Germans (utilizing civilian paramilitary police personnel) were the original country tasked with police development – they were reluctant to give it up. Additionally, there was a fear that military units would use police as “maneuver” units, not for traditional policing tasks. But regardless, something had to be done, especially in the south, where embedded military advisors were eventually deployed despite some opposition.

¹⁵ James Corum and Wray Johnson, *Air Power in Small Wars*, (Lawrence KS: University of KS Press, 2003), 387.

¹⁶ David B. Edwards, *Before Taliban*, (Berkley CA: The University of California Press, 2002), 293. Edwards points out how famously fractious Pashtu tribes are in the south, and how this added to the Taliban mystery, as they were the first group to ever unite these warring tribes behind one cause. Again, this adds to the idea that the Taliban possessed a strong, well supported cause, which led to the eventual strength of their insurgency.

¹⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban*, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 19-20.

¹⁸ Larry Goodson, *Afghanistan’s Endless War*, (Seattle WA: The University of Washington Press, 2001), 38. Goodson explains that not only is this payment system deeply ingrained in Afghanistan’s cultural history, it is also deeply ingrained in its colonial history. The British policy in southern Afghanistan was to pay rather large bribes to key tribal forces for the specific purpose of enticing them to allow traffic to pass on the roads. This led to violence among tribes who wanted a cut in this “game”, and also led to a pattern of extortion and further corruption.

¹⁹ Colonel Thomas McGrath (USA), interview conducted by author, 30 Jan 2009. In interacting with population, especially where there were major highways and road networks, PMTs found that the populace was concerned with policemen taking money from them at CPs. One PMT in the Zabul Province north of Kandahar told of personally

being told by many villagers of how much easier it was to transit to and from Kandahar after the PMT, in coordination with the Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP), removed unauthorized police CPs from the highway where “bad cops” were extracting tolls.

²⁰David B. Edwards, *Before Taliban*, 293. Edwards details how one of the most remarkable features of the Taliban takeover was how little resistance they encountered. He says one of the reasons was a direct result of the rampant corruption that preceded them. One of the Taliban myths was that Mullah Omar decided to form the Taliban movement after coming across a carload of people who had been raped, robbed, and murdered by one of these highway men. These “highwaymen” were often found to be rogue police forces by PMTs who worked in the districts in the ARSIC-S AOR.

²¹ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban*, 17-30.

²² *United States Army in Afghanistan*, (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2004), 15. As detailed in *US Army in Afghanistan*, it is interesting to note that these same corrupt warlords are the same warlords special operations forces eventually worked with to overthrow the Taliban in and around Kandahar.

²³ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban*, 17-30.

²⁴ *United States Army in Afghanistan*, (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2004), 14. According to *US Army in Afghanistan*, the three main groups special forces and CIA teams worked with to overthrow the Taliban were Dostum’s Uzbeks, Massoud’s Northern Alliance, and Karzai’s Pashtu forces in the south.

²⁵ Colonel Thomas McGrath (USA), interview conducted by author, 30 Jan 2009. As previously stated, this corruption was largely driven by lack of professional training and lack of pay for policemen, as well as the cultural and historical context already discussed. Col McGrath talked about several situations where these new police would enlist the help of extended family (brothers and cousins) to man police checkpoints. Upon inspection, PMTs would find one brother wearing the issued pants, a cousin wearing the issued blouse, another with the rifle, and another with the magazine. This was not the professional police force we hoped to develop.

²⁶ *United States Army in Afghanistan*, (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2004), 21. Military planners saw Kandahar as the hardest city in Afghanistan to take because it was the spiritual and political center of the Taliban movement. Unlike the north, there were few opposition leaders for US forces to work with.

²⁷ Colonel Thomas McGrath (USA), interview conducted by author, 30 Jan 2009. Colonel McGrath pointed out that Galula’s book on the Algerian insurgency was particularly helpful to him as he conducted COIN operations in ARSIC-S. Indeed, I remember him giving that book to me to read when I entered the police development cell on the ARSIC-S staff. Galula’s book *Counterinsurgency Operations* is now part of the curriculum at Air Command and Staff College.

²⁸ David Galula, *COIN Warfare*, (Westport CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 11.

²⁹ Colonel Thomas McGrath (USA), interview conducted by author, 30 Jan 2009.

³⁰ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban*, 18. It is instructive to note that the Soviets faced similar problems in Kandahar. In *Taliban*, Rashid claims that the insurgency the Soviets faced in Kandahar was primarily tribal Jihad as opposed to religious Jihad. The insurgency was led by clan chieftains rather than ideological religious leaders. There is no doubt that there is a mixture of both tribal and religious Jihad elements behind the insurgents we are facing two decades after the Soviet withdrawal.

³¹ For example, in preparation to conduct Focused District Development (FDD) campaign in the Zabul Province, we conducted a preparatory mission that included a meeting with the village elders and other military/civilian/police officials in the Shajoy district. In a very cramped room inside the DHQ, we told the local leaders how the police would be pulled from their district to undergo vetting and intense training at KRTC, and then would be redeployed as static units that would patrol, rather than rag tag gangs along the highway. It became apparent that many in the room were very uncomfortable with this. Later, after debriefing and talking to the interpreters and PMTs familiar with the district, we found out that several in the room were using the police (through bribes or coercion) to guard their personal property or compounds, and were not happy about police being re-organized into static units. As another example, two host nation contractors were inserted to begin construction of a helo pad at a border patrol

training center near Spin Boldak. They hired workers, let contracts, and began construction. Two of the workers were assassinated at the work site and the project was stalled as a result. It was later determined that it was as a result of “mafia” related violence (the wrong “family” received the contract) tied to corruption rather than insurgent activity.

³² This idea of insurgent organizational and behavioral patterns often mirroring organized crime patterns is also found in US Army COIN doctrine, which states that, “experience countering organized crime is especially relevant to COIN; as most insurgent groups are more similar to organized crime in their organizational structure and relations with the population than they are to military units.” See US Army FM 3-24, par. 6-98.

³³ Colonel Thomas McGrath (USA), interview conducted by author, 30 Jan 2009.

³⁴ David Galula, *COIN Warfare*, 17

³⁵ Some in the news media referred to President Karzai as the “Mayor of Kabul” because they saw his government as unable to exert administrative control outside of the capital city. For example, see <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,231457,00.html>, where *Time* says, “Just over halfway through his six-month term as the country's first post-Taliban leader, he still looks more like the Mayor of Kabul than the ruler of Afghanistan.”

³⁶ The US Army and coalition forces had been training and advising the Afghan Army for 5 years at that point in the campaign, and were embedded down to the Company level in units throughout Afghanistan. In November 2007, the Afghan 205th Corps, headquartered in Kandahar, executed its first “solo” Brigade sized operation, with close over watch by coalition advisors. This example is included just to reinforce the idea that it takes time and hands on “sweat” to develop security forces in COIN.

³⁷ David Galula, *COIN Warfare*, 23.

³⁸ Colonel Thomas McGrath (USA), interview conducted by author, 30 Jan 2009.

³⁹ David Galula, *COIN Warfare*, 24.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁴¹ Colonel Thomas McGrath (USA), interview conducted by author, 30 Jan 2009. Colonel McGrath detailed how it was incredibly difficult to control the 1200 mile border with Pakistan. There were two brigades of border police in our ARSIC-S sector along the Pakistan border, for which we had only one Border Mentor Team of 18 personnel which was stationed at Spin Boldak. It was very difficult for this team to lend assistance or mentor such a vast territory of border police. For example, one Afghan Border patrol company was ambushed in the extreme Southern part of Afghanistan, and had several killed and wounded, and no way to evacuate. Unable to support them with medevac helos due to sand storms, this team had to mount an 18 hour overland mission to drive to the ambush spot and carry the wounded out, eventually taking them all the way to Kandahar to receive treatment. This story shows the extreme difficulties faced by embedded units and the need for mass when it comes to mounting an effective counterinsurgency.

⁴² Colonel Michael McMahon (USA), follow-up email (11 Mar 09) to interview conducted by author, 5 Feb 2009. Regarding who determined that the German program was not producing the number of police required, thus a different approach would be needed, Col McMahon said that it was common knowledge among both the US and NATO planners that the German method of police training was producing relatively small numbers...one Kabul Academy that produced about 1800 police officers per year was just not sufficient.

⁴³ Colonel Michael McMahon (USA), follow-up email (11 Mar 09) to interview conducted by author, 5 Feb 2009. US policy changed to assign responsibility for police training from DOS to DOD in Nov 2006. It was included in the 07 authorization bill as DOD is normally precluded by law from training police – thus the term “escalation” also reflects a shift in policy, as well as a shift in emphasis to police development. Additionally, by “quick turn”, I mean very short, basic programs to offer police basic weapons procedures like safety, marksmanship and rudimentary tactical training. The training was done in short blocks from small regional training centers, and then the police were sent out to fend for themselves.

⁴⁴ Michael McMahon COL USA and Lew Irwin LTC USA, *Enhancing the Capabilities of the Afghan National Police*, staff report, 6 October 2007, 1.

⁴⁵ Colonel Thomas McGrath (USA), interview conducted by author, 30 Jan 2009.

⁴⁶ “Bomber in Police Uniform Kills 21 Afghan Policemen”, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,486488,00.html>

⁴⁷ “Officers Feloniously Killed”, <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2006/feloniouslykilled.html>

⁴⁸ Colonel Thomas McGrath (USA), interview conducted by author, 30 Jan 2009. Colonel McGrath recalled a mission to inspect CPs along Hwy 1 north of Kandahar where he was shocked at the number of policemen (or men claiming they were police) who were “stoned out of their mind”.

⁴⁹ This concept is supported by US Army COIN doctrine, which states that, “US military police units serve best when operating as a support force for the professional civilian police trainers. However, military forces may be assigned the primary responsibility for police training; they must be prepared to assume that role if required.” See US Army FM 3-24, par. 6-98.

⁵⁰ Colonel Michael McMahon (USA), interview conducted by author, 5 Feb 2009. According to Col McMahon, the PMTs were taken “out of hide” as teams that were being trained to embed with Afghan Army units (ETTs) were re-missioned to embed with police units as PMTs. There was no additional training for the PMT mission, nor was there any guarantee that there were any military policemen on the team. Planners did not receive anywhere near the number of teams requested. On the order of 2400 “bodies” were requested and *zero* were provided. All PMTs (approximately 800) that arrived in 2007 were taken from existing or inbound Embedded Transition Teams (ETTs) assigned to CSTC-A.

⁵¹ Colonel Thomas McGrath (USA), interview conducted by author, 30 Jan 2009. Colonel McGrath was adamant about this point – something had to be done, even if it required risk. He said it often in theatre to the staff, and he reinforced this point in the interview – military campaigns are often won through risk and decisive action, even in the face of danger. One of his favorite stories he often shared with the staff and troops to drive home this point was then Colonel Creighton Abrams’ relief of Bastogne on 26 Dec 1944. As detailed by Lewis Sorley in *Thunderbolt*, Abrams received orders to break through to the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne, which was surrounded by the Germans. This seemed like an impossible order – similar to embedding with and training police forces in the midst of a violent insurgency. Abrams overcame many obstacles, including almost being killed by a mine and intense enemy fire, to move forward to the objective. He eventually caught the Germans by surprise just before dark as he broke through the lines with his four tanks, destroying a section of German soldiers as they stood in the chow line. US soldiers were indeed surprised when Abrams rolled up to their position and peered out of his turret, informing them of their relief. His acceptance of risk and his commitment to decisive action turned the tide of the battle, eventually enabling the allied forces to defeat the German counter-offensive. General Patton eventually called it the most “outstanding achievement of this war.”

⁵² The teams consisted of 12-16 personnel, generally made up of two officers, two NCOs, and the rest a mixture of Specialists and Privates. The personnel were mostly from the combat arms MOS (infantry, artillery, cavalry), but that was not always the case – one PMT leader, for example, was from the chemical warfare MOS. The formation was made up of three to four up armored HMMWVs, and the teams garrisoned at small coalition or US Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in the districts where they were to embed. According to Col McMahon, the first wave of teams were, in retrospect, quickly dispatched with little guidance or operations concept. Their initial task was simply to try and give the police additional fire power and protection, and to try to curb the kill rate the insurgents were achieving on the ANP. A coherent strategy would come months later, as detailed in the rest of this paper.

⁵³ As part of the national police reform efforts led by the coalition forces, the police underwent massive reorganization after the fall of the Taliban. Police were organized into a hierarchical structure of Regions, Provinces, and Districts. At each level, there was a position created called Chief of Police (CoP). So, in the ARSIC-S AOR, there was an RCoP (headquartered in Kandahar), 4 PCoPs for the 4 provinces of Kandahar, Zabul, Helmand, and Uruzghan, and 56 DCoPs for the 56 districts that made up the 4 provinces. A key part of police development success was to embed teams all the way down to the District level. Due to manning shortages, this was never achieved on any large scale basis, and districts were chosen based on strategic importance in the overall campaign.

⁵⁴ I arrived in theatre in July just as it became very apparent that just dispatching PMTs to the districts was not enough. The confusion in the police campaign was very evident. There needed to be a police development campaign plan that completely overhauled the current police apparatus. We planned for and implemented in the

ARSIC-S AOR what became known as the Focused District Development (FDD) plan for district development – a plan developed by CSTCA planning staff. I was part of cycle 1 of this plan – according to Colonel McMahon, they are now on cycle 6.

⁵⁵ Colonel Michael McMahon (USA), interview conducted by author, 5 Feb 2009. Colonel McMahon is now stateside, but is in contact with the staff that replaced him. He said that the strategy that was implemented in the fall of 2007 is still progressing, and though it is hard to quantify success in COIN, ground commanders feel that the ANP are slowly becoming a professional organization capable of securing the population. Such a force is in stark contrast to the force we inherited after the fall of the Taliban. This paper is literally being written in the middle of the Afghan campaign...it remains to be seen how history will judge the relative success or failure of coalition efforts to rebuild the security apparatus in Afghanistan.

⁵⁶ David Galula, *COIN Warfare*, 75-93.

⁵⁷ The other steps not mentioned in this paper are absolutely essential in the overall COIN campaign, but the four steps I discuss in further detail are the ones that I feel are the most tactically applicable to the PMT, and the ones I saw as foundational in the police development campaign.

⁵⁸ *The United States Army in Afghanistan*, (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2004), 14.

⁵⁹ General Petraeus highlighted the importance of this task for military units in COIN as they become familiar with the human terrain. He said that, “Leaders and troopers have to understand the tribal structures, the power brokers, the *good guys and the bad guys*, local cultures and history, and how systems are supposed to work and how they do work. This requires listening and being respectful of local elders and mullahs, of farmers and shopkeepers – and it also requires, of course, many cups of tea.” See entire speech at http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2009=&menu_konferenzen=&id=264&sprache=en &

⁶⁰ Colonel Thomas McGrath (USA), interview conducted by author, 30 Jan 2009. Colonel McGrath pointed out that Galula’s census has become what we call today biometrics. Teams were eventually deployed to the police districts in Kandahar, under the protection of PMTs, with hi tech equipment that would scan finger prints, take pictures, record census data, and feed it all back to a central database. After vetting in Kabul, an ID card was eventually issued to the eligible policeman identifying him as an ANP. This was very important in an environment where Taliban would often disguise themselves as ANP and gain access to police units where they would carry out attacks.

⁶¹ Upon establishing initial operations in a given district, PMTs conducted missions throughout the district to round up, identify, and then inspect individual police officers – this was a risky mission in an insurgent environment. This was absolutely required due to the fact that police records at district headquarters, if they existed at all, could not be counted as accurate. First, their tracking system was often very crude – again, if it existed at all. Secondly, DCoPs often inflated their numbers so they would receive more pay and equipment for their district, and they would keep the extra for themselves. I cannot stress enough how important this task of gaining an accurate snapshot of the police force in a given district is in the COIN campaign.

⁶² Loyalty to the Afghan Government was actually a very ideal standard at that point – often unrealistic. Realistically, you were hoping to have police that at minimum were not active participants in the insurgency. With proper training and indoctrination, we hoped that those police that were neutral would become active supporters of the central government. This was again a vital part of the FDD program, which placed great emphasis on ethics, values, and citizenship training.

⁶³ This statement conforms to US Army COIN doctrine, which states that, “Military forces might have to perform police duties at the start of an insurgency; however, it is best to establish police forces to assume these duties as soon as possible.” See US Army FM 3-24, par. 6-94.

⁶⁴ Colonel Michael McMahon (USA), interview conducted by author, 5 Feb 2009. Colonel McMahon pointed out that filling this vacuum is a “growth industry” for the US military and our nation for the foreseeable future - not only in the security sector, but across the spectrum (governance, judiciary, etc). The level of effort exerted by the military to fill this gap, even in the face of uncertainty and a non-permissive environment, is a level of effort required by all agencies, State Dept included. It must be an integrated approach. Additionally, different parts of the

country may be ready for different levels of development all at the same time. For example, while Southern Afghanistan was in dire need of security development, the North was in need of governance and judiciary development.

⁶⁵ David Galula, *COIN Warfare*, 78.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁶⁷ Our efforts to correct this situation were absolutely in line with US Army COIN doctrine. US Army FM 3-24 states that, “combating insurgency requires a police force that is visible day and night. The host nation will not gain legitimacy if the populace believes that insurgents and criminals control the streets. Well-sited and protected police stations can establish a presence in communities as long as the police do not hide in those stations. Police presence provides security to communities and builds support for the HN government. When police have daily contact with the local populace, they can collect information for counterinsurgents.” See US Army FM 3-24, par. 6-96.

⁶⁸ Michael McMahon COL USA and Lew Erwin LTC USA, Enhancing the Capabilities of the Afghan National Police, staff report, 6 October 2007, 2. According to the FDD concept paper, FDD is a plan that incorporates a “more focused approach toward assessing, training, mentoring, and validating the uniformed district police” that focuses “resources on the district uniformed police as the main effort of the ANP development strategy.” It is also important to note at this point that FDD was not exclusively focused on police. The program focused on all aspects of district governance, policing being just one of many programs. Col McMahon pointed out that the genius behind FDD was that it made all agencies focus their efforts on a handful of strategic districts. Focus is important – if everything is important, nothing is important.

⁶⁹ In Afghanistan, the “strategic districts” were chosen to support the overall campaign objective of securing HWY1, which was known as the “Ring Route”. HWY1 was one of the decisive points in the campaign as it was the only road that circled the entire country, allowing freedom of movement for Afghans and coalition forces as well. Thus key districts that were along this route were chosen first in the FDD campaign, as opposed to districts not along HWY1.

⁷⁰ Completely removing the police from the district was a radical step, but was required in the ARSIC-S AOR due to the level of development and training required to produce a professional, survivable police force. This can be tailored to the situation – some districts may just require “on the job training” in their district. But regardless, there must be an *intense* training regimen led by military and/or civilian advisors, depending on permissiveness, to bring the police forces up to standard. And as previously stated, ethics and loyalty to the central government are topics that must be included in as many lessons as possible.

⁷¹ The US State Department contracted out the police training mission to DynCorp. DynCorp recruited and trained policemen from US and some foreign police forces, and then sent them to Afghanistan. They generally worked at the regional training centers or were mentors to the Ministry of Interior in Kabul. There were many restrictions to their movement “outside the wire” in non-permissive areas such as Kandahar. That is why it was very important to have military PMTs that could embed with the Police at the district level and mentor them in their work environment. It was also very important for military advisors to have a close, professional relationship with civilian police trainers – and vice versa. As we continue to pursue this inner-agency approach to national security, this relationship will become even more critical, as State and DoD personnel will often find themselves working side by side.

Additionally, the movement of the national paramilitary force ANCOP to support this district level training is supported by US Army COIN doctrine. US Army FM 3-24 states that, “in COIN operations, special police strike units may move to different AOs, while patrol police remain in the local area on a daily basis and build a detailed intelligence picture of the insurgent strength, organization, and support.” In this case we were moving “strike units” into place so “patrol police” could be trained to do the daily policing tasks in district. See US Army FM 3-24, par. 6-91.

⁷² It is worth noting at this point that supervising these movements to and from training was not an easy task, and was a very risky mission. Considering the fact the police were the prime targets of the insurgent, a large formation of police moving along the highway to training was a tempting target. The PMTs went to great effort to secure these convoys, often moving at night under NVGs.

⁷³ During FDD, district police units were re-equipped with everything from uniforms to pistols to patrol trucks. Not only was the FDD program a massive operational undertaking, it was also a rather large logistical challenge as well. Logisticians at CSTCA CJ4 and planners at CJ7 worked tirelessly to ensure equipment was in place and properly accounted for. Again, no small task considering that the majority of supplies had to be pushed from Kabul out to the far reaches of Afghanistan where districts were being refitted for FDD. PMTs often had to go on long missions to secure these logistical movements as shipments passed thru insurgent infested areas.

⁷⁴ With limited PMTs, the FDD campaign was conducted in phases. As PMTs progressed through the over watch phase and testing of district leadership, they would eventually be removed from the district to pick up another district slotted for future FDD cycles. There they would embed, establish relationships, and the process would start over. Colonel McGrath was quick to point out that ideally, commanders would have enough PMTs committed to the campaign so they would not have to go to such measures to spread around meager resources, and FDD cycles could be conducted simultaneously throughout the AOR.

⁷⁵ Colonel Michael McMahon (USA), interview conducted by author, 5 Feb 2009. Colonel McMahon said they hoped this oversight and testing could be completed in 3-4 months, but it actually took twice that amount of time in most of the districts. As with all things COIN, one should remember nothing will happen quickly – a general rule of thumb is to double the amount of time you think it will take to accomplish anything.

⁷⁶ As part of the FDD program, District Assessment and Reform Teams (DARTs) would assess the district before it underwent FDD and develop an extensive checklist of items required for a district to be considered “reformed”. This included everything from proper equipping, to administrative controls, to accountability procedures for the policemen as well as the issued equipment. The PMTs were charged with executing this checklist and assigning “go / no-go” judgments to items on the checklist, which was typically completed in the “testing” phase mentioned below.

⁷⁷ The reader must understand that, though these tasks sound like “office jobs” that anyone could train, PMTs executed full-up combat convoys from their garrison or FOB to the DHQ or facility where mentoring of these tasks would take place – not your typical “day at the office”. And their “office” was often in the middle of insurgent infested areas, or places laden with crime and violence. While the officers and senior NCOs were mentoring these “personnel” tasks, the rest of the team would provide outer and inner perimeter security.

⁷⁸ Pay Ops was a very trying time for the PMT. In parts of Afghanistan, police and government officials were set up on electronic funds transfer, very similar to modern pay systems in the west. But most of the districts in the south were not able to be put on that system because there were no banks. Paper money was sent in bags from Kabul and then distributed to the districts where the police received pay once a month in a “pay operation”. PMTs, where available, provided over watch to ensure the pay operation was properly conducted. They often found police leadership skimming pay or engaging in other corrupt practices, and dealt with these situations as best they could. For example, one team was mentoring district police leadership in Zari-Panjway District in west Kandahar on pay operations day (what would seem at face value to be a “paper work drill”) when they discovered the district chief skimming pay. They immediately stopped the operation and called the chief’s “hand” – the chief told the PMT leader he “could not guarantee their safety anymore.” A few tense moments ensued as the perimeter security had to extract the team to safety under gunpoint. The PMT eventually strongly mentored the PCoP to apprehend and remove this man, and he did.

⁷⁹ The importance of pay and integrity in police administration is founded in US Army COIN doctrine, which states that, “Good pay and attractive benefits must be combined with a *strict code of conduct* that follows the rule of law and allows for the immediate dismissal of police officers for gross corruption. Good planning ensures that police pay, housing, benefits, and work conditions attract a high quality of police recruit as well as discourage petty corruption. Such corruption undermines the populace’s confidence in the police and government.” See US Army FM 3-24, par. 6-97.

⁸⁰ As already discussed, the PMTs used a rather extensive checklist to measure the performance of the district police at all levels. This assessment process was a very important task for the PMT because they were intimately involved

with the district leadership and were the only ones able to truly determine if the district was ready to be marked “green”.

⁸¹ The importance of embedding to the maximum extent possible to provide persistent, professional over-watch was recently highlighted in a speech by General Petraeus. He said, “Securing and serving the people requires that our forces be good neighbors. While it may be less culturally acceptable to live among the people in certain parts of Afghanistan than it was in Iraq, it is necessary to locate Afghan and ISAF forces *where they can establish a persistent security presence. You can’t commute to work in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.* Positioning outposts and patrol bases, then, requires careful thought, consultation with local leaders, and the establishment of good local relationships to be effective.” See entire speech at http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2009=&menu_konferenzen=&id=264&sprache=en &

⁸² The idea that police development must be accomplished on multiple levels, to include courts and corrections, is supported by US Army COIN doctrine, which states that, “effective policing also requires an effective justice system...[that] includes trained judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, prison officials, and court personnel...[who] are important to establishing the rule of law.” See US Army FM 3-24, par. 6-102.

⁸³ This statement conforms to US Army COIN doctrine, which states that, “whatever police organization is established, Soldiers and Marines must understand it and help the host nation effectively organize and use it. This often means dealing with several police organizations and developing plans for training and advising *each one.*” PMTs were absolutely crucial in fulfilling this requirement to mentor at each level. See FM 3-24, par. 6-92.

Bibliography

Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24. *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006

Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Corum, James S. and Wray R. Johnson, *Air Power in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*. Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press, 2003.

Edwards, David B. *Before Taliban: The Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad*. Berkley CA: University of California Press, 2002.

Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport CT: Praeger Security International, 2006.

Goodson, Larry P. *Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban*. Seattle WA: University of Washington Press, 2001.

Ladwig, Walter. "Training Foreign Police: A Missing Aspect of US Security Assistance to Counterinsurgency." *Comparative Strategy*, Vol 26, No. 4 (July 2007): 285-293.

McMahon, Michael COL, USA and Lew Erwin LTC, USA. Enhancing the Capabilities of the Afghan National Police: A Focused District Development (FDD) Strategy, staff report, 6 Oct 2007.

Nagl, John A. *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2005.

Osanka, Franklin Mark, ed. *Modern guerilla warfare: Fighting communist guerilla movements 1941-1961*. New York: Free Press of Glenco, 1962.

Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2000.

United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom; October 2001 – March 2002. Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2004.