



Testimony


Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air
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JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

Restructuring Should Improve Outcomes, but Progress Is Still Lagging Overall

Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management



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Why GAO Did This Study

The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is critical for recapitalizing tactical air forces and will require a long-term commitment to very large annual funding outlays. The estimated total investment cost is currently about \$385 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft. Because of a history of relatively poor cost and schedule outcomes, defense leadership over the past year has directed a comprehensive restructuring of the JSF program that is continuing.

This testimony draws substantially from our extensive body of work on the JSF, including the current annual review mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84 § 244 (2009). Our draft report is being reviewed by the Department and we expect to issue it early next month. That report and this testimony discusses (1) program cost and schedule changes and their implications on affordability; (2) progress made during 2010; (3) design and manufacturing maturity; and (4) test plans and progress. GAO's work included analyses of a wide range of program documents and interviews with defense and contractor officials.

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

Program Restructuring Should Improve Outcomes, but Progress Is Still Lagging Overall

What GAO Found

DOD continues to restructure the JSF program, taking positive, substantial actions that should lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes. Restructuring has consequences—higher up-front development costs, fewer aircraft bought in the near term, training delays, and extended times for testing and delivering capabilities to warfighters. Total development funding is now estimated at \$56.4 billion to complete in 2018, a 26 percent cost increase and a 5-year schedule slip from the current baseline. DOD also reduced procurement quantities by 246 aircraft through 2016, but has not calculated the net effects of restructuring on total procurement costs nor approved a new baseline. Affordability for the U.S. and partners is challenged by a near doubling in average unit prices since program start and higher estimated life-cycle costs. Going forward, the JSF requires unprecedented funding levels in a period of more austere defense budgets.

The program had mixed success in 2010, achieving 6 of 12 major goals and progressing in varying degrees on the rest. Successes included the first flight of the carrier variant, award of a fixed-price aircraft procurement contract, and an accelerated pace in development flight tests that accomplished three times as many flights in 2010 as the previous 3 years combined. However, the program did not deliver as many aircraft to test and training sites as planned and made only a partial release of software capabilities. The short takeoff and landing (STOVL) variant had significant technical problems and deficient flight test performance. DOD directed a 2-year period to evaluate and engineer STOVL solutions.

After more than 9 years in development and 4 in production, the JSF program has not fully demonstrated that the aircraft design is stable, manufacturing processes are mature, and the system is reliable. Engineering drawings are still being released to the manufacturing floor and design changes continue at higher rates than desired. More changes are expected as testing accelerates. Test and production aircraft cost more and are taking longer to deliver than expected. Manufacturers are improving operations and implemented 8 of 20 recommendations from an expert panel, but have not yet demonstrated a capacity to efficiently produce at higher production rates. Substantial improvements in factory throughput and the global supply chain are needed.

Development testing is still early in demonstrating that aircraft will work as intended and meet warfighter requirements. About 4 percent of JSF capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab results, or both. Only 3 of the extensive network of 32 ground test labs and simulation models are fully accredited to ensure the fidelity of results. Software development—essential for achieving about 80 percent of the JSF functionality—is significantly behind schedule as it enters its most challenging phase.

Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and members of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The JSF is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most costly and ambitious aircraft acquisition, seeking to simultaneously develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight international partners. The JSF is the core of DOD's long-term tactical aircraft recapitalization plans as it is intended to replace hundreds of legacy aircraft. Total planned U.S. investment in JSF is now about \$385 billion to develop and acquire 2,457 aircraft through 2035. With such a substantial funding commitment amidst pressing warfighter requirements for this next generation capability, DOD has lately recognized numerous technical, financial, and management shortcomings and continues to significantly restructure the program, adding more time and money and making other changes that we support.

GAO has reported on the JSF acquisition program for a number of years. Our March 2010 report¹ discussed additional cost and schedule pressures, unsatisfactory performance in manufacturing and delivering aircraft, and concerns about not meeting warfighter requirements on time and in quantity. We concluded that DOD's plans to restructure the JSF program, just announced before our report was issued, were well-founded, if overdue. Also in March 2010, the Department declared that the program experienced a breach of the critical cost growth statutory threshold and subsequently certified to Congress in June 2010 that the JSF program should continue.² Appendix I summarizes the evolution of JSF cost and

¹ GAO, *Joint Strike Fighter: Additional Costs and Delays Risk Not Meeting Warfighter Requirements on Time*, [GAO-10-382](#) (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19, 2010). Refer to the related products section for a list of prior GAO reports and testimonies.

² Commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy, 10 U.S.C. § 2433 establishes the requirement for DOD to submit unit cost reports on major defense acquisition programs or designated major subprograms. Two measures are tracked against the current and original baseline estimates for a program: procurement unit cost (total procurement funds divided by the quantity of systems procured) and program acquisition unit cost (total funds for development, procurement, and system-specific military construction divided by the quantity of systems procured). If a program's procurement unit cost or acquisition unit cost increases by at least 25 percent over the current baseline estimate or at least 50 percent over the original baseline estimate, it constitutes a breach of the critical cost growth threshold. When a program experiences a Nunn-McCurdy breach of the critical cost growth threshold, DOD is required to take a number of steps, including reassessing the program and submitting a certification to Congress in order to continue the program, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 2433a.

schedule estimates at key junctures in its acquisition history through the Nunn-McCurdy certification. Since then, in January 2011, the Secretary of Defense announced additional development cost increases and further changes consequent to the ongoing restructure, but has not yet established a new approved acquisition program baseline.

My comments today are focused largely on our latest review. Our draft report is with DOD for comment and we expect to issue it early next month. This will be the second annual JSF report under our current mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.³ For our latest report, we (1) evaluated program cost and schedule changes and their implications on affordability; (2) identified progress made in 2010 against established goals; (3) assessed elements of design stability and manufacturing maturity and reviewed production results; and (4) reported the status of development testing and technical challenges facing the program. To conduct this work, we evaluated DOD's restructuring actions and impacts on the program, tracked cost and schedule changes, and determined factors driving the changes. We reviewed program status reports, manufacturing data, test plans, and internal DOD analyses. We discussed results to date and future plans to complete JSF development and move further into procurement with officials from DOD, the JSF program office, contractor officials, and members of the independent review teams. We toured aircraft and engine manufacturing plants, obtained production and supply performance indicators, and discussed improvements underway with contractors. We conducted this performance audit from May 2010 to March 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

³ Pub. L. No. 111-84 § 244 (2009).

JSF Restructuring Improves Program, but Affordability Is Challenged by Rising Costs and Delays

Over the past year, DOD has substantially restructured the JSF program, taking positive actions that should lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes. Restructuring has consequences—higher development costs, fewer aircraft in the near term, training delays, and extended times for testing and delivering capabilities to warfighters. Key restructuring changes include the following:

- The total system development cost estimate rose to \$56.4 billion and its schedule was extended to 2018. This represents a 26 percent increase in cost and a 5-year slip in schedule compared to the current approved program baseline established in 2007.
- Resources and time were added to development testing. Testing plans were made more robust by adding another development test aircraft and the use of several production aircraft; increasing the number of test flights by one-third; extending development testing to 2016; and reducing its overlap with initial operational testing.
- Near-term procurement quantities were reduced by 246 aircraft through 2016; the annual rate of increase in production was lowered; and the full-rate production decision moved to 2018, a 5-year slip from the current baseline.
- The military services were directed to reexamine their initial operational capability (IOC) requirements, the critical need dates when the warfighter must have in place the first increment of operational forces available for combat. We expect the Marine Corps' IOC will slip significantly from its current 2012 date and that the Air Force's and Navy's IOC dates will also slip from the current dates in 2016.
- To address technical problems and test deficiencies for the short takeoff and landing (STOVL) variant, the Department significantly scaled back its procurement quantities and directed a 2-year period for evaluating and engineering technical solutions to inform future decisions on this variant. DOD also “decoupled” STOVL testing from the other two variants so as not to delay them and to allow all three to proceed at their own speeds.

The fiscal year 2012 Defense Budget reflects the financial effects from restructuring actions through fiscal year 2016. The net effect was increased development funding and decreased procurement funding in the near term. For example, compared to last year's estimate for the same year, DOD for fiscal year 2012 requested an increase of \$520 million for JSF development and a decrease of \$2.6 billion for procurement, reflecting

the reduction of 13 aircraft and associated spares. Table 1 summarizes the revised procurement funding requirements and annual quantities during this 5-year period following the Secretary's reductions. Even after decreasing annual quantities and lowering the production rate of increase, JSF procurement still escalates significantly. Annual procurement funding levels more than double and quantities more than triple during this period. These numbers do not include the additional orders expected from the international partners.

Table 1: JSF Procurement Funding and Quantities Requested in the Fiscal Year 2012 Defense Budget

(Dollars in billions)						
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
Air Force	\$3.8	\$4.1	\$5.6	\$6.5	\$8.5	\$28.5
Navy	1.8	2.5	2.8	3.3	2.9	13.2
Marine Corps	1.3	1.3	1.4	2.0	2.9	9.0
U.S. total	\$6.9	\$7.9	\$9.8	\$11.8	\$14.3	\$50.7
Procurement Quantities						
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
Air Force	19	24	40	50	70	203
Navy	7	12	14	19	20	72
Marine Corps	6	6	8	12	18	50
U.S. total	32	42	62	81	108	325


Source: GAO analysis of fiscal year 2012 President's Budget.

DOD does not yet know the full impact from restructuring actions on future procurement funding requirements beyond this 5-year period. Cost analysts are still calculating the net effects from deferring the near-term procurement of 246 aircraft to future years and from lowering the annual rate of increased procurement. After a Nunn-McCurdy breach of the critical cost growth threshold and DOD certification, the most recent milestone must be rescinded, the program restructured to address the cause of the breach, and a new acquisition program baseline must be approved that reflects the certification approved by the milestone decision authority. The Secretary has not yet granted new milestone B approval for the JSF nor approved a new acquisition program baseline. Future funding requirements could be higher than projected and the quantities, which are considered affordable by the U.S. and allies, could be reduced, further driving up unit costs.

Affordability—in terms of the investment costs to acquire the JSF, the continuing costs to operate and maintain it over the life-cycle, and its impact on other defense programs—is a challenging issue. Including the funding added by the restructuring actions, system development cost estimates have increased 64 percent since program start. (App. II summarizes the increases in target prices on development contracts, and major cost drivers contributing to increased system development funding requirements.) Also, the estimated average unit procurement price for the JSF has about doubled since program start and current forecasts indicate that life-cycle costs will be substantially higher than the legacy aircraft it replaces. Rising JSF costs erode buying power and may make it difficult for the U.S. and its allies to buy and sustain as many aircraft as planned.

Going forward, the JSF will require unprecedented demands for funding in a period of more austere defense budgets where it will have to annually compete with other defense and nondefense priorities for the discretionary federal dollar. Figure 1 illustrates the substantive annual development and procurement funding requirements—almost \$11 billion on average through program completion in 2035. This reflects the program's estimate at the time of the fiscal year 2011 budget submission. These funding levels do not include additional funding increases pursuant to the June 2010 Nunn-McCurdy certification nor funding changes in the fiscal year 2012 budget request. As discussed earlier, defense cost analysts are still computing the long-term procurement funding requirements reflecting the deferral of aircraft to future years.

Figure 1: JSF Annual Development and Procurement Funding Requirements (April 2010 Estimate)



Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Progress In Achieving the JSF Program's 2010 Goals Was Mixed

The JSF program established 12 clearly stated goals in testing, contracting, and manufacturing for completion in calendar year 2010. It had mixed success, achieving 6 goals and making varying degrees of progress on the other 6. For example, the program exceeded its goal for the number of development flight tests but did not deliver as many test and production aircraft as planned. Also, the program awarded its first fixed-price contract on its fourth lot of production aircraft, but did not award the fixed-price engine contract in 2010 as planned. Table 2 summarizes JSF goals and accomplishments for 2010.

Table 2: JSF Progress on Stated Goals for 2010

Key event	Achieved in 2010	Status
Complete 400 development flight tests	Yes	Completed 410 test flights
First vertical landing of STOVL variant	Yes	Achieved March 2010
Carrier variant first flight	Yes	Achieved June 2010
Autonomic logistic information system is operational	Yes	Began limited operations July 2010
Training for 125 maintenance personnel completed	Yes	Trained 138 maintenance personnel
Award contract for fourth aircraft production lot	Yes	Awarded contract November 2010
Eleven test aircraft delivered to test sites	No	Delivered eight aircraft
Flight test rate of 12 flights per aircraft per month demonstrated	No	Achieved flight test rate of 2 to 8 per month
At least 3 aircraft delivered to Eglin Air Force Base	No	None delivered, expected mid-2011
Begin flight training operations at Eglin Air Force Base	No	Expected September 2011
Block 1.0 software delivered to flight test	No	Delivered limited capability November 2010 with full capability expected November 2011
Award contract for fourth engine production lot	No	Expected April 2011

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Although still hampered by the late delivery of test aircraft to testing sites, the development flight test program significantly ramped up operations in 2010, accomplishing 3 times as many test flights as the previous 3 years combined. The Air Force conventional takeoff and landing variant significantly exceeded the annual plan while initial limited testing of the Navy's carrier variant was judged satisfactory, below plans for the number and hours of flight but ahead on flight test points⁴ flown. The Marine Corps STOVL, however, substantially underperformed in flight tests, experienced significant down times for maintenance, and was challenged by several technical issues unique to this variant that could add to its weight and cost. The STOVL's problems were a major factor in the Secretary's decision to give the STOVL a 2-year period to solve engineering issues, assess impacts, and inform a future decision as to whether and how to proceed with this variant. Table 3 summarizes 2010 flight test results for each variant.

⁴ Flight test points are specific, quantifiable objectives in flight plans that are needed to verify aircraft design and performance.

Table 3: Flight Test Performance in 2010

	Conventional takeoff and landing variant	Short takeoff and vertical landing variant	Carrier variant	Total
Flight tests				
Actual	171	212	27	410
Planned	112	251	31	394
Difference	59	(39)	(4)	16
Flight test hours				
Actual	290	286	41	617
Planned	202	409	56	667
Difference	88	(123)	(15)	(50)
Flight test points flown				
Actual	1373	1924	496	3793
Planned	1064	2438	270	3772
Difference	309	(514)	226	21

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.


Program Has Still Not Fully Demonstrated a Stable Design and Mature Manufacturing Processes as It Enters Its Fifth Year of Production

After completing 9 years of system development and 4 years of overlapping production activities, the JSF program has been slow to gain adequate knowledge to ensure its design is stable and the manufacturing process ready for greater levels of annual production. The JSF program still lags in achieving critical indicators of success expected from well-performing acquisition programs. Specifically, the program has not yet stabilized aircraft designs—engineering changes continue at higher than expected rates long after critical design reviews and well into procurement, and more changes are expected as testing accelerates. Also, manufacturing cost increases and delays in delivering test and production aircraft indicate need for substantial improvements in factory throughput and performance of the global supply chain.

Engineering drawings released since design review and the number and rate of design changes exceed those planned at program outset and are not in line with best practices. Critical design reviews were completed on the three aircraft variants in 2006 and 2007 and the designs declared mature, but the program continues to experience numerous changes. Since 2007, the program has produced 20,000 additional engineering drawings, a 50-percent increase in total drawings and about five times more than best practices suggest. In addition, changes to drawings have

not yet decreased and leveled off as planned. Figure 2 tracks and compares monthly design changes and future forecasts against contractor plans in 2007.

Figure 2: Monthly Design Changes for JSF Aircraft




Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

The monthly rate in 2009 and 2010 was higher than expected and the program now anticipates more changes over a longer period of time—about 10,000 more changes through January 2016. With most of development testing still ahead for the JSF, the risk and impact from required design changes are significant. In addition, emerging concerns about the STOVL lift fan and drive shaft, fatigue cracks in a ground test article, and stealth-related issues may drive additional and substantive design changes.

As in prior years, lingering management inefficiencies, including substantial out-of-station work⁵ and part shortages, continued to increase the labor needed to manufacture test aircraft. Although there have been improvements in these factors, final acceptance and delivery of test jets were still delayed. Total labor hours required to produce the test aircraft increased over time. The cumulative actual labor hours through 2010 to complete the 12 test aircraft exceeded the budgeted hours estimated in 2007 by more than 1.5 million hours, a 75 percent increase. Figure 3 depicts forecasted and actual labor hours for building test jets.

Figure 3: JSF Labor Hours for Manufacturing Test Aircraft



Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

DOD began procuring production jets in 2007 and has now ordered 58 aircraft on the first four low-rate initial production lots. The JSF program anticipated the delivery of 14 production aircraft through 2010, but none

⁵ Out of station work occurs when manufacturing steps are not completed at its designated work station and must be finished elsewhere later in production. This is highly inefficient, increasing labor hours, causing delays, and sometimes quality problems.

have been delivered. Delivery of the first two production jets has been delayed several times since the contract was signed and is now expected in April 2011. The prices on the first three cost-reimbursable production contracts have increased from amounts negotiated at contract award and the completion dates for delivering aircraft have been extended over 9 months on average. We are encouraged by DOD's award of a fixed-price incentive fee contract for lot 4 production and the prospects for the cost study to inform lot 5 negotiations, but we have not examined contract specifications. Accumulating a large backlog of jets on order but undelivered is not an efficient use of federal funds, tying up millions of dollars in obligations ahead of the ability of the manufacturing process to produce.

The aircraft and engine manufacturers now have significantly more items in production flow compared to prior years and are making efforts to implement restructuring actions and recommendations from expert defense teams assembled to evaluate and improve production and supply operations. Eight of 20 key recommendations from the independent manufacturing review team have been implemented as of September 2010. Until improvements are fully implemented and demonstrated, the restructuring actions to reduce near term procurement quantities and establish a more achievable ramp rate are appropriate and will provide more time to fully mature manufacturing and supply processes and catch up with aircraft backlogs. Improving factory throughput and controlling costs—driving down labor and material costs and delivering on time—are essential for efficient manufacturing and timely delivery to the warfighter at the increased production rates planned for the future.


Testing Has Been Slow and Has Not Demonstrated That the Aircraft Will Work in Its Intended Environment

Since the first flight in December 2006, only about 4 percent of JSF capabilities have been completely verified by flight tests, lab results, or both. The pace of flight testing accelerated significantly in 2010, but overall progress is still much below plans forecast several years ago. Furthermore, only a small portion of the extensive network of ground test labs and simulation models are fully accredited to ensure the fidelity of results. Software development—essential for achieving about 80 percent of the JSF functionality—is significantly behind schedule as it enters its most challenging phase.

Development flight testing was much more active in 2010 than prior years and had some notable successes, but cumulatively still lagged behind previous expectations. The continuing effects from late delivery of test aircraft and an inability to achieve the planned flying rates per aircraft

substantially reduced the amount and pace of testing planned previously. Consequently, even though the flight test program accelerated its pace last year, the total number of flights accomplished during the first 4 years of the test program significantly lagged expectations when the program's 2007 baseline was established. Figure 4 shows that the cumulative number of flights accomplished by the end of 2010 was only about one-fifth the number forecast by this time in the 2007 test plan.

Figure 4: Actual JSF Flight Tests Completed through 2010 Compared to the 2007 Plan



Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

By the end of 2010, about 10 percent of more than 50,000 planned flight test points had been completed.⁶ The majority of the points were earned on airworthiness tests (basic airframe handling characteristics) and in ferrying the planes to test sites. Remaining test points include more

⁶ According to program officials completion of a test point means that the test point has been flown and that flight engineers ruled that the point has met the need. Further analysis may be necessary for the test point to be closed out.

complex and stringent requirements, such as mission systems, ship suitability, and weapons integration that have yet to be demonstrated.


The JSF test program relies much more heavily than previous weapon systems on its modeling and simulation labs to test and verify aircraft design and subsystem performance. However, only 3 of 32 labs and models have been fully accredited to date. The program had planned to accredit 11 labs and models by now. Accreditation is essential to validate that the models accurately reflect aircraft performance and it largely depends upon flight test data to verify lab results. Moreover, the ability to substitute ground testing for some flight testing is unproven. Contracting officials told us that early results are providing good correlation between ground and flight tests.

Software providing essential JSF capability is not mature and releases to the test program are behind schedule. Officials underestimated the time and effort needed to develop and integrate the software, substantially contributing to the program's overall cost and schedule problems and testing delays, and requiring the retention of engineers for longer periods. Significant learning and development work remains before the program can demonstrate the mature software capabilities needed to meet warfighter requirements. The JSF software development effort is one of the largest and most complex in DOD history, providing functionality essential to capabilities such as sensor fusion, weapons and fire control, maintenance diagnostics, and propulsion. JSF depends on millions more lines of software code than the F-22A Raptor and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. While good progress has been reported on the writing of code, total lines of code have grown by 40 percent since preliminary design review and 13 percent since the critical design review. The amount of code needed will likely increase as integration and testing efforts intensify. A second software integration line added as part of the restructuring will improve capacity and output.

Delays in developing, integrating, and releasing software to the test program have cascading effects hampering flight tests, training, and lab accreditation. While progress is being made, a substantial amount of software work remains before the program can demonstrate full warfighting capability. The program released its second block, or increment, to flight test nearly 2 years later than the plan set in 2006, largely due to integration problems. Each of the remaining three blocks—providing full mission systems and warfighting capabilities—are now projected to slip more than 3 years compared to the 2006 plan. Figure 5

illustrates the actual and projected slips for each of the 5 software blocks in delivering software to the test program.

Figure 5: Software Delivery to Flight Test Slips



Schedule delays require retention of engineering staff for longer periods of time. Also, some capabilities have been moved to future blocks in attempts to meet schedule and mitigate risks. Uncertainties pertaining to critical technologies, including the helmet-mounted display and advanced data links, pose risks for more delays.

Concluding Remarks

The JSF program is at a critical juncture—9 years in development and 4 years in limited production—but still early in flight testing to verify aircraft design and performance. If effectively implemented and sustained, the restructuring DOD is conducting should place the JSF program on a firmer footing and lead to more achievable and predictable outcomes. However, restructuring comes with a price—higher development costs, fewer aircraft received in the near term, training delays, prolonged times for testing and delivering the capabilities required by the warfighter, and impacts on other defense programs and priorities. Reducing near-term

procurement quantities lessens, but does not eliminate the still substantial and risky concurrency of development and production. Development and testing activities will now overlap 11 years of procurement. Flight testing and production activities are increasing and contractors are improving supply and manufacturing processes, but deliveries are still lagging. Slowed deliveries have led to a growing backlog of jets on order but not delivered. This is not a good use of federal funds, obligating millions of dollars well before the manufacturing process can deliver aircraft.

We agree with defense leadership that a renewed and sustained focus on affordability by contractors and the government is critical to moving this important program forward and enabling our military services and our allies to acquire and sustain JSF forces in needed quantities. Maintaining senior leadership's increased focus on program results, holding government and contractors accountable for improving performance, and bringing a more responsible management approach to the JSF to "live within its means" may help limit future cost growth and the consequences for other programs in the portfolio. The JSF acquisition demands an unprecedented share of the Department's future investment funding. The program's size and priority are such that its cost overruns and extended schedules must either be borne by funding cuts to other programs or else drive increases in the top line of defense spending; the latter may not be an option in a period of more austere budgets. Given the other priorities that DOD must address in a finite budget, JSF affordability is critical and DOD must plan ahead to address and manage JSF challenges and risks in the future.

Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and members of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments

For further information on this statement, please contact Michael Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement are Bruce Fairbairn, Charlie Shivers, Julie Hadley, W. Kendal Roberts, LeAnna Parkey, and Matt Lea.

Appendix I: Changes in Reported JSF Program Cost, Quantities, and Deliveries

	October 2001 (system development start)	December 2003 (2004 replan)	March 2007 (approved baseline)	April 2010 (initial program restructure)	June 2010 (Nunn-McCurdy)
Expected quantities					
Development quantities	14	14	15	14	14
Procurement quantities (U.S. only)	2,852	2,443	2,443	2,443	2,443
Total quantities	2,866	2,457	2,458	2,457	2,457
Cost estimates (then-year dollars in billions)					
Development	\$34.4	\$44.8	\$44.8	\$50.2	\$51.8
Procurement	196.6	199.8	231.7	277.5	325.1
Military construction	2.0	0.2	2.0	0.6	5.6
Total program acquisition	\$233.0	\$244.8	\$278.5	\$328.3	\$382.5
Unit cost estimates (then-year dollars in millions)					
Program acquisition	\$81	\$100	\$113	\$134	\$156
Average procurement	69	82	95	114	133
Estimated delivery and production dates					
First operational aircraft delivery	2008	2009	2010	2010	2010
Initial operational capability	2010-2012	2012-2013	2012-2015	2012-2016	TBD
Full-rate production	2012	2013	2013	2016	2016


Source: GAO analysis and DOD data.

Note: Does not reflect cost and schedule effects from additional restructuring actions announced after June 2010.

Appendix II: Systems Development Contracts Target Price History and Engine Schedules

Projected costs for three contracts comprise about 80 percent of total system development funding requirements. The airframe and primary engine development contracts have experienced significant price increases since contract awards—79 percent and 69 percent respectively. The alternate, or second, engine contract price has increased about 12 percent. By design, it began about 4 years after the primary engine contract and has a more limited scope. The primary engine contract includes development of both the common engine and the STOVL lift system while the alternate engine contract develops its version of the conventional common engine. Figures 6, 7, and 8 depict the price histories for these three contracts and the reasons behind major price increases.


Figure 6: JSF Airframe Development Contract Target Price Increases



Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: The Feb. 2011 cost is not the contract target price, but the latest government estimate from the fiscal year 2012 defense budget request.


Figure 7: Primary Engine Development Contract Target Price Increases



Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: The Feb. 2011 cost is not the contract target price, but the latest government estimate from the fiscal year 2012 defense budget request.

Figure 8: Alternate Engine Development Contract Target Price Increases



Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: The Dec. 2009 cost is the contractor's estimate from the 2009 Selected Acquisition Report. The fiscal year 2012 budget includes a DOD estimate of \$2.1 billion for this contract, but it assumes no funding beyond fiscal year 2010.

Table 4 shows changes in engine development schedules. The initial service release milestone usually coincides with low rate initial production. The engine should have completed required verification activities and meet specification requirements. The operational capability release milestone is generally associated with the start of full-rate production when the engine is acceptable for full production release.

Table 4: Engine Development Contracts Milestones

	Initial estimate	Current estimate or actual
F135 primary engine		
Initial service release	November 2007	CTOL/CV March 2010 STOVL December 2010
Operational capability release	November 2008	July 2016
F136 alternate engine		
Initial service release	May 2012	CTOL/CV December 2012 STOVL December 2013
Operational capability release	July 2013	February 2014

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Note: JSF program officials stated that the Department has not requested funding for the F136 engine in FY11 or 12, and progress towards achieving milestone dates is dependent on whether final appropriations for FY11 and 12 include funding for the F136.

Related GAO Products

Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Fighter Force Structure Reports Generally Addressed Congressional Mandates, but Reflected Dated Plans and Guidance, and Limited Analyses. [GAO-11-323R](#). Washington, D.C.: February 24, 2011.

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