The Credibility of America's Extended Nuclear Deterrent: The Case of the Republic of Turkey
Abstract
In 2009 the United States completed an 80% reduction of its operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons from Cold War highs. Since 1991, the United States also reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapons by over 90%. Additionally, the United States removed much of its nuclear arsenal from alert status and continues to drawdown its nuclear weapons stockpiles. However, nuclear weapons may still play an important role in deterring an adversary attack against the United States and in providing a nuclear umbrella to allies. In fact, an extended nuclear deterrent for protecting allies also may contribute significantly to nonproliferation efforts-the nuclear umbrella provides an assurance to allies so they do not perceive the need to develop nuclear weapons arsenals for themselves. This paper explores the impact of US nuclear weapons policy on the current and future effectiveness of extended nuclear deterrence for the Republic of Turkey. It concludes that the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey depends on many factors and not just the quality and quantity of the US nuclear arsenal.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 2009
- Accession Number
- ADA540271
Entities
People
- William G. Eldridge
Organizations
- Air University