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BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY
BY LEVERAGING THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD

by

Steven M. Boatright, Maj, USAF

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Advisor(s):

Maj Gen Lawrence Stutzriem
CHECKMATE

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

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Abstract

The Department of Defense is transforming to meet a changing strategic environment. A prime example of this transformation is a strategic shift from the US military performing specific wartime tasks to a focus on building partner capacity (BPC). This shift is visible in the Air Force Irregular Warfare Strategy, which emphasizes the need to build the capabilities of US partner nations. While it is clear that BPC is a critical emerging mission that the Air Force should embrace, the real question is how? Security cooperation is an inherently complex and difficult undertaking. Regardless of the countries involved, these programs require years of effort and vast amounts of resources to deliver measurable returns, and continuity is critical. Leveraging the unique capabilities of the Air National Guard (ANG) to build the capacity of nation-states in critical regions of the world is a smart option for several reasons. Most notably, the ANG can establish enduring relationships with partner nations and ANG airmen have civilian competencies that are compatible with the BPC mission set.

Chapter 1

Building Partnership Capacity

America faces adaptive enemies. We must also be adaptive and seize emerging opportunities in the Global War on Terrorism. One such opportunity is the building of the capacity of partner nations to fight the Global War on Terrorism: Although the United States possesses the finest military force in the world, this war will not be won without the help of partner nations.¹

—Honorable Eric Edelman
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
April 7, 2006

The concept of Building Partnerships (BP) is attracting significant attention today as the current strategic environment requires the US to work with partners more than ever. The US is involved in an enduring conflict where nontraditional approaches are required and a major focus of effort needs to be placed on partnering with foreign governments and institutions and building their capacity. The US can't fight this protracted conflict around the globe alone, and needs to leverage the capacities and capabilities of its partners. Prevailing in today's fight will require enduring partnerships with government agencies, sister Services and nations of varying socio-economic levels and types of governance. This more proactive approach could also serve to reduce and potentially eliminate conflict.

The partnerships will lay the foundation for success by assuring our allies and partners that the US is willing and able to support its national security agenda. These partnerships may also persuade adversaries and competitors to engage in constructive international behavior, with an understanding that the US will counter actions and words that negatively affect the US and the

interests of its partners. By fostering cooperation and mutual trust with our allies and partners, especially those at strategic crossroads, the US can attempt to prevent future conflict and address current and future challenges. Ultimately, the US must rely on other countries in today's fight, and building partnerships needs to be an integral part of US security cooperation strategy.

BP is not, however, synonymous with Building Partnership Capacity (BPC). BP is a Joint Capabilities Area (JCA) and is defined as “the ability to set the conditions for interaction with partner, competitor or adversary leaders, military forces or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior and capabilities.”² Through strategic communication at home and abroad, the US attempts to inform, persuade and influence both partners and adversaries. At the same time, the US conducts activities (partnering, building capabilities and capacities and providing aid) to influence the perceptions and behaviors of nations. These partnerships set the *conditions* to establish the *relationships* that are the key to BPC.

While partnerships lay the foundation of goodwill, trust, access and influence, BPC goes beyond a relationship to actually helping grow a partner's ability to accomplish a given task or mission. While it is important to build partners around the world from an interoperability standpoint, often the US must first build their capacity, especially in regions that it deems are of strategic importance. As Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates stated, “arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries.”³

BPC is described as targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense (DoD) and its partners.⁴ The DoD's partners include all those with whom it cooperates to achieve its national goals, to include allies, coalition

members, host nations and others. Partnership capacity includes (but is not limited to) the capability to defeat terrorist networks; defend the US homeland in depth; shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction (WMD); conduct IW and stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations; enable host countries to provide good governance and conduct “military diplomacy.”⁵ Across the Services, there have been numerous attempts at adding new capabilities to increase our ability to build the capacity of others. The ANG already possesses unique capabilities in many of these areas and is an ideal organization to accomplish the BPC mission. These capabilities, resident in units re-tooled to accomplish the BPC mission, should be strengthened and incorporated under a “Total Force” BPC strategy.

The Strategy and Doctrine of BPC

*Security cooperation is not altruistic, nor is it conducted without purpose. With this definition, security cooperation has three objectives: to build relationships so that the United States can influence other countries and their military forces, to develop capabilities of foreign military forces so they can conduct operations on behalf of or in coalition with the United States, and to provide access so that the US military has strategic flexibility to conduct its own operations. Security cooperation is, at its core, specifically intended to achieve specific US national-security objectives.*⁶

—LtCol Michael J. McCarthy, USAF

BP has been a key component of US strategy since the 2002 version of *The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America*. The 2002 NSS, which highlighted the need for a long-term strategy to fight the war on terror, stated that to succeed, the US needed to “encourage our regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates the terrorists” and it needed to “help ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary to finish the task.”⁷ While outsiders generally can’t impose solutions on groups that

aren't ready to embrace them, they can help create the conditions that would enable host nations to take action. Those sentiments were echoed four years later in the next addition of the NSS. Stressing the importance of international cooperation, the 2006 NSS highlighted US dependence on the capabilities of others. It specifically states that the US will work to bolster threatened states, provide relief in times of crisis, and build capacity in developing nations, arguing that weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals.⁸

Following the NSS guidance, the DoD committed itself to the principle of building capacity in developing states. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stated that “maintaining a long-term, low visibility presence in many areas of the world where US forces do not traditionally operate will be required. Building and leveraging partner capacity is an essential part of this approach, and the employment of surrogates is necessary to achieve our goals.”⁹ Building on lessons learned and insights from previous operations and strategic reviews, *The National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America* (2008) outlines how the DoD will contribute to achievement of US national security objectives. The NDS re-emphasized the objectives of the NSS, including the need to strengthen alliances and build new partnerships to defeat global terrorism.¹⁰ It stated that for the foreseeable future, to win the Long War against violent extremist movements “the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists isn't the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves.”¹¹ Our partners must be capable of applying military and non-military power when and where needed.

The Air Force addresses the concept of BPC from multiple avenues. One of the top priorities of the Air Force, as outlined in the 2008 Air Force Strategic Plan, is to partner with the Joint and Coalition team to win today's fight. The plan states that the Air Force "will enhance the long-term capability and capacity of special operations and general purpose forces to work by, with, and through host nations to bolster security and reduce the scale and scope of ungoverned spaces while expanding governmental legitimacy and the rule of law."¹²

Notes

¹ Edelman, Testimony HASC

² Deputy's Advisory Working Group, "Joint Capability Areas Tiers 1-3," 7

³ Gates, Association of the United States Army

⁴ BPC QDR Execution Roadmap, 4

⁵ Ibid., 4

⁶ McCarthy, Limits of Friendship Security Cooperation, 6

⁷ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2002, 6

⁸ Ibid., 33

⁹ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 23

¹⁰ US Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States*, 2

¹¹ Ibid., 8

¹² US Air Force, *2008 Air Force Strategic Plan*, 7

Chapter 2

Airpower and Security Assistance

One of the most pressing problems the US faces today is the dilemma of how to handle fragile states. While the definition of “fragile states” varies among sources, they all have a common theme; they lack a level of governance, control, and legitimacy sufficient to ensure stability and growth.¹ It is typically understood that a fragile state is one that lacks either the capacity or the will to provide basic government functions. Fragile states are therefore unable to provide the security necessary for their citizens and territory, and are typically organized in a fashion that makes political participation, provision of the rule of law, and effective and accountable public administration challenging.² Fragile states are generally more likely to become unstable and fall prey to criminal and terrorist networks; terrorists can find sanctuary inside the borders of a weak nation and strength within the chaos that ensues when a government is inadequate or illegitimate.³ It is in these locations that the terrorist or insurgent application of various forms of low-cost tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) are not only practiced, but perfected.⁴ Tactics like kidnapping, hostage taking, hijacking and bombing can lead to a sense of enduring insecurity and instability, and zones of chronic insecurity serve not only as training grounds but double as test beds for new tactics and theories.⁵ Ungoverned areas are exploited by terrorists as they plan, organize, train and prepare for operations. If not addressed, they may pose a grave threat to US national security while leading to the spread of instability, ideas and

methods which can be infectious to neighboring nations.⁶ It is therefore important that weak states are identified, and appropriate steps are taken to prevent them from sliding further along the scale of failure. Early intervention is crucial; once a state has failed, it can affect the well being and security of many others.

According to Stephen Krasner, the former Director of Policy Planning at the US Department of State and Carlos Pascual, the former Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the US Department of State, over the long run the only way to create a lasting peace is to promote better governance and the rule of law.⁷ In addition, the goal of any intervention must be to promote economic development, increase state capacity to deliver services, and reform state security without infringing on the rights of its citizens.⁸ The overarching goal of Air Force security assistance is to help a nation establish the foundations of good governance by establishing a secure environment that will enable it to pursue its social, economic and political initiatives. Helping a nation acquire, maintain and employ a self-defense capability will eventually reduce its reliance on US support, enabling it to defend its sovereign territory and potentially assist other nations in a conflict.

For a fragile country (whether facing an insurgency or terrorist problem or not), the impact of focused assistance can be tremendous. The unique security assistance that the Air Force can offer in the domains of air, space and cyber provide critical capabilities for governmental institutions and the private sector. Detractors commonly consider air forces as a costly investment with associated educational requirements limiting the ability to build an effective force.⁹ While this may initially appear to be the case, air, space and cyber capabilities can have a tremendous impact on a nation's ability to provide good governance. Almost every benefit that arises out of the military application of air, space and cyber has a corresponding impact in the

civil sector. At the same time, in contrast to other traditional forms of security assistance, the second and third order effects of airpower on a nation's government, populations and private enterprises are considerable.¹⁰

Meaningful effects can be delivered by airmen with as little as one airplane. Airpower's characteristics of speed, range and flexibility allow a nation to project power to ungoverned and isolated spaces unconstrained by geography or borders. Such flexibility, in terms of both kinetic and non-kinetic effects, and the ability to react in minutes or hours in times of natural disasters, cannot be matched by other methods. Recent operations have demonstrated that in opposing insurgents or terrorists in a low-level guerilla war, the support role of aviation invariably proves critical to operational success.¹¹ Often the first to arrive and the last to leave, airpower can also overcome the adaptability and initiative that is normally a guerilla force's greatest advantage. The ability to airlift security forces to remote locations, resupply them by air, and perform reconnaissance is crucial to gaining and maintaining the advantage, preventing insurgents from massing, and denying them sanctuary.¹² Airpower does not remove the need for ground forces in counterinsurgency and counter terror operations, but it provides a key capability to enhance their effectiveness.¹³ The critical enablers resident in air, space and cyber are necessary tools of a twenty-first century military force, and without them, the abilities of ground forces are limited, possibly even hamstrung.

For fragile nations that might not be facing an insurgency, the dual use (civil and military) of aviation and its associated infrastructure can be an economic catalyst that bolsters all instruments of national power. Aviation also promotes technological and intellectual progress, helps establish critical infrastructure, enhances political administration, governance, security, and

even supports social needs during humanitarian or natural disasters.¹⁴ As stated in the Air Force's Irregular Warfare Strategy, aviation enables governments to:¹⁵

- Provide political leaders unimpeded access to all territory
- Provide humanitarian relief through delivery of goods and services
- Strengthen internal security
- Complement / extend the reach of ground forces
- Deter / defeat external aggression
- Promote civil sector advancement (air and cyber; dual use enables technology and economic advancement)

The dual use concept is even more pronounced in cyber operations. Previously considered an enabler to meeting warfighting objectives, cyber is now a domain in its own right with the capability to generate global effects at little cost. The cyber domain is crucial to modern militaries, but its potential impact on fledgling and fragile militaries may not be as obvious. Although US military command and control systems, which rely heavily on the cyber domain, are increasingly complex and expensive, even the poorest nation can take advantage of cell phones, internet communications, and the connectivity that cyber brings. In addition, the government is the largest service provider in any economy, making governmental initiatives in the cyber domain critical to setting the pace for e-commerce development in a nation.¹⁶ The capabilities of a nation's cyber infrastructure (to include networks, data storage, data management, data integration, and data mining) are critical to its economic viability. Cyber infrastructure is crucial to a nation's ability to efficiently connect people, computers and data.

The development of an increasingly integrated global economy has also made information and communication technology (ICT) integral to a nation's development. While most advanced countries have benefited from ICT, similar developments are not as evident in underdeveloped and developing countries.¹⁷ These countries now face the threat of being separated by a digital divide due to a lack of access to ICT. Those that don't fall behind typically feel the cut of

cyber's double edged sword; cyber allows industry and organizations to develop, yet at the same time opens opportunities for crime. Developing countries stand to suffer more from criminal internet activities than the developed world due to inadequate technology and infrastructure, as well as insufficient law enforcement and legal expertise. These aspects of cyber make the problems of a developing nation a global issue. The developing world and its unprotected computer infrastructure have become a safe haven for those seeking to attack systems in the developed world. Additionally, lapses in computer protection in developing countries provide criminals and hostile actors staging grounds for their illicit activities.¹⁸

Space considerations are just as crucial to fragile governments as they are with larger more stable governments. Space is a conduit for connecting personnel through secure global satellite communications. Space is also the source of critical environmental information and the Global Positioning System (GPS) is a linchpin to almost anything that requires precise positional and timing reference. Everything from civil engineering, to farming, to mapping and tracking forces relies on GPS. The timing signal alone is important since it is used to synchronize networks, communications equipment, electrical power grids, banking systems, cell phone towers, phones and encryption equipment.¹⁹

In addition to GPS, the imagery space systems provide can be utilized by all nations, regardless of their development level. Oil, gas and mining companies use imagery for well site location, facilities planning and management, monitoring of pipelines and area mapping. Space imagery is also used in the development of rural areas, planning for infrastructure facilities such as airports and dams, accomplishing vegetation analysis, performing counter narcotics operations, monitoring refugees and controlling borders. Weather forecasting is reliant on imagery from space and is critical to planning operations, whether military or civilian. Access to

space assets is also useful in disaster response and in search and rescue operations around the world. Partnerships in this domain are particularly important since few nations have the capacity to develop their own indigenous systems and capabilities.

The infrastructure associated with air, space and cyber has a greater impact than that associated with ground forces in that access that is gained is not only geographic, but political and economic as well. Airpower infrastructure includes airfields, weather information, communications, command and control and air traffic control, all essential elements from a military as well as a civilian perspective. Similarly, the education that is required to build and operate an air force can help spur the economic engine of a nation, and air, space and cyber capabilities enable a nation to better withstand political and economic crises arising from natural disasters and terrorism. Airpower enables a nation to better monitor borders and domestic activity accurately and to project power, especially over ungoverned areas, lending legitimacy to a government. It is a visible projection of a nation's authority, a key enabler and a tangible presence that is necessary to remove civil support for insurgencies. Ultimately, air, space and cyber power enhance the security and stability of a nation and help bring legitimacy to its government.

Developing cooperative programs with other nations can benefit the US as well. Agreements on overflight rights, enroute access and logistical support can be essential to US aims, as can access to energy and combat support provided by foreign governments. In the future, the intelligence sharing aspect of partnerships could be crucial, enabling unique access to data the US might otherwise not have had.²⁰

Notes

¹ Schneckener, *International State Building*, 7

² Ibid., 7

Notes

- ³ Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” 30
- ⁴ Simons, “The Misleading Problem of Failed States,” 193
- ⁵ Ibid., 194
- ⁶ Henry, “Transforming the US Global Defense Posture,” 14
- ⁷ Krasner, “Addressing State Failure”
- ⁸ Ottaway, *States at Risk and Failed States*, 2
- ⁹ CHECKMATE “Global Community of Airmen,” 1
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 5
- ¹¹ Corum, *Airpower in Small Wars*, 427
- ¹² Ibid., 427
- ¹³ Ibid., 435
- ¹⁴ US Air Force, *Air Force Global Partnership Strategy*, 2
- ¹⁵ US Air Force, *Air Force The 21st Century Air Force Irregular Warfare Strategy*, 4
- ¹⁶ Nair, *A Longitudinal Study on the Global Digital Divide Problem*, 319
- ¹⁷ Ibid., 315
- ¹⁸ Macan-Markar, “Technology: Poor Countries More Open to Cyber Crime, 1
- ¹⁹ Single, “Space Support to Security and Stability Operations,” 51
- ²⁰ US Air Force, *Air Force Global Partnership Strategy*, 12

Chapter 3

BPC and the Air National Guard – The Best Fit

“...irregular threats seem to be better solved by developing capacity and legitimacy at the lower levels. This represents an indirect route towards achieving policy objectives. Bottom-up solutions, where US cadres are integrated with local counterparts, produce measurable and, more importantly, durable results. This strategy is more effective and efficient if initiated before a problem that affects US interests or allies reaches critical mass.”¹

—Hy S. Rothstein

The 2008 Air Force Strategy reaffirmed the need for the general purpose forces (GPF) to be involved in the IW fight, and to build a capability to perform the BPC mission.² The necessity to include GPF in what is typically a special operations forces (SOF) mission is even more evident when considered against the potential BPC requirement in the coming years.³ The problem we now face is that the GPF have the capacity, but lack the necessary experience while SOF have the experience but lack the capacity.⁴ With an understanding that it is important to use the Air Force to build the capacity of foreign partners, one additional option facing force planners is to use the ANG as a conduit for some of our BPC efforts. Leveraging the unique capabilities of the ANG to build the capacity of nation-states in critical regions of the world is a smart option for several reasons.

Capitalize on ANG's Low Turnover Rate

Enduring Partnerships

A distinct advantage of using the ANG in BPC is the continuity it can provide, which can lead to more developed and enduring relationships. A major problem with typical security assistance programs in the Regular Air Force (RegAF) is that engagements are episodic in nature and aren't sustained over time, resulting in a lack of empowerment and limited impact. This is compounded by a lack of personnel continuity; the RegAF typically assigns individuals to two to three-year tours, constantly shuffling them between assignments. In contrast, it is common for a Guardsman to spend his entire military career with the same unit, often because of close ties to the local community and civilian employment. With such stability, the ANG is not only able to build personal and professional relationships, but their continuity and predictability affords them an ability to sustain these relationships which, along with consistent and visible commitment, are important in bringing about reciprocal behavior.⁵ This in turn can generate an atmosphere of trust that is necessary to sustain working relationships and achieve the goals that we may have while working with another nation.

Another benefit is that Guardsmen will typically remain with that unit in some capacity, offering greater return on any training investment. Since members of the ANG aren't as likely to relocate as RegAF forces, they can help institutionalize the cultural concept more easily, especially if building partnerships with foreign countries becomes a permanent part of that unit's mission.

Mature, Experienced Instructor Cadre

Another distinct advantage of the ANG is their experience levels, which are necessary for creating lasting impressions and desired results. Instructor qualifications and abilities are

particularly important. In an ANG unit, unlike the RegAF, rank isn't always indicative of age or experience. Additionally, the ANG is home to many personnel who have left the Air Force and offers a vital repository of the experience necessary for BPC missions.

Overcome the Cultural Divide Faced by the Air Force

The ANG also has the unique ability to overcome the cultural divide faced by the Air Force. One of the limitations of the Air Force's force development system is that it has been focused on large-scale warfighting and hasn't adapted to the IW environment. There is a lack of training on regional security issues and regional cultural considerations along with a lack of persistence in the training that is conducted.⁶ A select few are highly trained in such areas, but typically the GPF isn't and Professional Military Education (PME) doesn't incorporate IW concepts to the required level. This results in airmen who lack the requisite skills and cultural expertise necessary to interact with fragile nations.

There are numerous ongoing initiatives in place to build a culturally adroit Air Force. These are taking place at almost all levels with the goal of developing cross-culturally competent (C3) airmen. While there are numerous ideas and plans in place, the greatest concern now is that it may be too little, too late. For years, we have been living under the premise that we don't need to be culturally aware. During the Cold War we were preoccupied with one nation, the Soviet Union. As one Air Force Colonel stated, "In a bygone era, Air Force people raining down fire and steel had few motives for cross-cultural understanding. In the future, a lack of cross-cultural perspective will, at best, create obstacles to Global Engagement and, at worst, lead to disengagement and isolation—fostering the kind of regional instability we seek to combat."⁷

The cultural education necessary for success in the Long War will take time to develop and mature. In 2007, the Air University's Culture and Language Center at Maxwell AFB was

established as an Air Force-wide institution, becoming the Air Force Culture and Language Center.⁸ Although designed to ensure a systemic approach to the subject, it could take years and possibly decades for airmen to receive and internalize the training they need. Current training programs for new recruits, pre-deployment training and select courses at Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) and Air War College (AWC) offer only short-term solutions challenging the creation of a new “culture” in the Air Force. The risk is that by the time these new programs are developed and internalized by airmen it will be too late for meaningful engagement with some fragile nations. In contrast, the ANG can make an immediate impact.

Access to Culturally Aware Populations

First, capitalizing on the role of traditional Guardsman could simplify attempts to hire already culturally aware personnel. Most ANG units are located near state universities and have access to scholars and faculty. These personnel are an immediate source of Americans that are diverse, have expertise in the study of cultures, and are more culturally aware, and could be recruited as traditional guardsman. In addition, universities provide immediate access to classes, forums and academic conferences to increase a unit’s cultural awareness.

Capitalize on the Potential Ethnic Recruiting Base

Most states also offer specific ethnic recruiting bases. Michigan is an ideal example; between 1990 and 2000 the State’s Arabic population grew by 51%. The city of Dearborn, within Wayne County, has the highest percentage of Arab population in the US, at 29.85%.⁹ A city of almost 100,000 people in the year 2000, Dearborn’s Arab population is second only to that of New York.¹⁰ With over 4,400 immigrants from Iraq alone between 2004 and 2007, Michigan’s Arab population continues to grow at a rate much faster than any other state.¹¹ As a result, 2.7 percent¹² of Wayne County’s population is of Arabic descent. Another city that had a

high concentration of people of Arab ancestry was Jersey City, New Jersey, a city of over 240,000. In the year 2000, almost 3% of its inhabitants were Arab.¹³ These cities present a pool of people with entrenched cultural awareness of the Middle East. (For a graphical representation of Arabic ancestry in the US, reference Appendix C.)

The close proximity to a culture center makes the learning and understanding of it that much easier. Units in states with high Arab populations have a potential advantage over other units since they can engage in crucial and specific training in their own backyard by working with people in those locales. This cultural awareness could even be advantageous if required to execute missions within the state, whether in disaster response or homeland defense. While some within the Arab population of Michigan and New Jersey do not qualify for US military service, there are numerous assimilated second and third generation Arabs, with citizenship in the US, that could be recruited for roles in the ANG.

Experts in the Interagency Environment

Support to fragile nations must be accomplished with a whole of government approach; military efforts alone are insufficient to achieve the desired effect and the diplomatic aspect of national power must be incorporated. The ANG is skilled at working alongside other agencies within the US government. Cooperative efforts within and outside the US have enabled the development of a military organization that is adept at working with agencies from the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Transportation, Department of Justice and Department of Health and Human Services.

The experiences that the ANG has gained working with agencies in various departments of the US government make it a perfect candidate for operations involving security assistance. The interagency experience has lead to a force that is able to work alongside both civil security and

response forces, inculcating them with more of the necessary skills to build the capacity of a fragile state's air force. Combining these skills with an Airman who has close ties to civilian employment creates a unique set of capabilities that can't be replicated in the RegAF.

The Citizen Airman

The ANG as a Militia

A very appealing aspect of the ANG is that it is separate from the RegAF. The fact that the ANG is part of our nation's militia, not its standing Armed Forces is an important distinction. While a few RegAF Airmen work in the ANG; the majority of Guardsmen are civil servants, working for the state and are "called up" to serve on active duty. These civil servants may be full time (working in technician status) or part time, and maintain jobs in the civil sector, doing everything from farming to finance. It is this distinction of a militia that was fundamental to General Shalikashvili's decision to have the National Guard staff the newly devised Military Liaison Teams when the State Partnership Program (SPP) was first introduced in 1993. At the time, it was an attempt to engage with the newly formed countries of the Baltic region without provoking the Russian Federation. The use of the militia isn't as threatening to fragile states that may have come out from under the reach of a military dictator or oppressive regime, or to their neighbors, yet at the same demonstrates US commitment and support. The National Guard represents both military capability and the peacetime application of military skills and equipment.¹⁴

The unique civil-military status of ANG members has other advantages as well. Among the components of the Total Force, the ANG has the flexibility to engage partner nations on a military-to-military, military-to-civilian and civilian-to-civilian basis.¹⁵ The National Guard has

a civil-military and civil-civil aspect that isn't found in the standing military. This civil aspect of the Guard can be fundamental in building support for the military outside of defense circles. The ANG has greater access (by law, custom and opportunity) to law enforcement, civil government or private sector contracts that could inhibit or limit the RegAF's ability to accomplish the mission.¹⁶ When trying to establish foundations for good governance, the support of local governments and private industry are a must, and the dual nature of the ANG gives it inroads to these key sectors of a nation.¹⁷ Also, any investment in a fragile state must somehow incorporate securing the goodwill of local populations, and one of the best ways to achieve that is with the citizen airman, a National Guardsman who can readily identify with civilian as well as those in the nation's military.

Civilian Competencies of the ANG

Military-civil interaction is key to BPC efforts, and from a relationship building perspective, perhaps more important than military-to-military relationships. The ANG's ability to establish ties to civilian and military alike could be the key to a fragile nation's survival. One of the primary concerns in many fragile nations is whether or not the government is able to provide the legitimacy and control necessary to sustain itself. A nation must be able to provide the essential services to sustain its population and the civilian competencies that US National Guardsmen bring to a struggling nation can support these key services.

This concept was evident in El Salvador in 1981 when the US became involved in an effort to prevent a leftist takeover similar to that of Cuba and Nicaragua. At the time, deficiencies in the Salvadoran Government and its Armed Forces made a guerilla victory likely. Eventual success in El Salvador came about by engaging in programs designed to establish local security, such as civil defense in villages, civic action projects, psychological warfare and social and

economic reforms.¹⁸ Although not a National Guard operation, military objectives couldn't have been achieved without the civic actions that underpinned them.

Today, Agricultural Development Teams (ADTs) from the National Guard are on the ground in Afghanistan. In their civilian capacity, these soldiers are farmers, agricultural extension agents, academics and engineers that are helping the Afghan people improve the water and power supplies needed for farming.¹⁹ Guardsmen are able to bring their civilian skills to bear on the economic development of Afghanistan, furthering that nation's ability to sustain itself.

Leveraging the ANG to help build a nation's capacity is crucial, since unlike the RegAF, they bring civilian competencies that can be of benefit to the population of a struggling nation attempting to build legitimacy. Not only can they build the capacity of the host nation (HN) military, they can help to educate local government and civic leaders as they interact with their counterparts, from bankers to computer specialists to policemen and lawyers. The skills a guard member gains through his civilian profession affords him the ability to build personal and professional relationships with both military and civilian personnel in the crucial infrastructure of a nation.

Experts in Civil-Military Relations and Local Level Governments

There is a clearer link between military and politics in IW than in traditional warfare. The final political goal is paramount; military force might lead to short term gains, but the end result will be failure if the actions are unpopular with the people within that nation.²⁰ Military operations must be secondary, with political and economic programs in the lead.²¹ At the same time, irregular threats are best solved at the lowest levels, by developing capacity and legitimacy at the grass roots, a level at which the ANG is comfortable working.²² Policy objectives in a

Security Assistance environment are best achieved when bottom-up solutions are implemented that incorporate US servicemen integrated with counterparts at the local level.²³

Political considerations are central to any capacity building effort, and the very nature of the ANG makes it more readily adaptable to the environment than the RegAF. These considerations also need to be addressed from the ground up. First and foremost, National Guardsmen work for the state government and they have an inherent understanding of politics at the local level. Their experience in Homeland Defense missions places Guardsmen in direct interaction between military members and local politics. Natural disasters like the Midwest floods in the 1990s, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and even the fires that have swept across the west in recent years have made them aware of the command and control challenges that arise from working with local government officials. Natural and man-made disasters can pose a huge challenge for governments at all levels. In the BP environment, the challenge is to set up the institutional framework so that government's limited resources can be applied to a crisis. Policies, procedures and personal relationships must be in place and the National Guard is home to our most capable military units for handling such events.

BPC Missions Are Similar To Those Required by a State

Air Force missions that are best suited for BPC are almost identical to those that are required by the state in the homeland defense role. Transportable hospital capabilities, heavy construction units capable of building airports and runways and even expeditionary wings specializing in humanitarian operations are ideally suited for the ANG. These activities are not required on a daily basis, take advantage of civilian competencies, and are available in a domestic crisis as well as foreign crisis and are valuable areas in which to build partner capacity. Specific Air Force missions like command and control, airlift, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

(ISR), combat search and rescue (CSAR) and weather services also have direct applicability at the Federal and State level, making them suitable missions for the ANG and BPC.

This does not, however, mean that current wings must align their missions to bring about effects in BPC efforts. Although each nation we support will have different requirements, and assessment of those requirements is necessary prior to any BPC activities, the mission of combat support applies across the spectrum of partner capabilities. Although current Counterair, Counterspace and most of the Counterland wings incorporate technology that typically isn't suitable for the BPC effort in a HN, the Combat Support functions within those wings are suitable, and those functions can also have an impact on the BPC mission.

The future may bring opportunities for more ANG units to get involved in other aspects of BPC. Counterinsurgency (COIN) and airlift platforms, even those currently in development, are typically not as technically advanced as fourth and fifth generation fighters and aren't as costly, making them suitable for some partners, and their ISR properties make them suitable for missions in both homeland defense and disaster response.

Notes

- ¹ Rothstein, "Less is More," 97
- ² US Air Force, *2008 Air Force Strategic Plan*, 7
- ³ Grissom, *Train, Equip, Advise, Assist*, 42
- ⁴ Grillone, "Aviation SFA Conop"
- ⁵ Rothstein, "Less is More," 81
- ⁶ Austin, "Development of US Irregular Warfare Capabilities," 1
- ⁷ Mueller, "Global Skills: Vital Components of Global Engagement," 67
- ⁸ Wright, "Cultural and Language Center Expands Air Force Wide"
- ⁹ De La Cruz, *The Arab Population : 2000*, 8
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 7
- ¹¹ Department of Homeland Security, "Yearbook of Immigrations Statistics"
- ¹² De La Cruz, *The Arab Population : 2000*, 4
- ¹³ Ibid., 7
- ¹⁴ Prawdzik, "Peace Dividends," 22
- ¹⁵ Pagan, "The State Partnership Program," 23
- ¹⁶ Ibid., 23

Notes

¹⁷ Ibid., 23

¹⁸ Rothstein, “Less is More,” 84

¹⁹ Greenhill, “Agriculture Teams Call for Equal Parts Citizen and Soldier”

²⁰ Need a reference for this (Doctrine?)

²¹ Corum, *Airpower in Small Wars*, 426

²² Rothstein, “Less is More,” 97

²³ Ibid., 97

Chapter 4

Other Considerations

Capitalize on the State Partnership Program

The SPP was established in 1993 to fill the void left when the former Soviet Union removed its troops from Eastern Europe, and began with three states (Maryland, Maine, and Pennsylvania) partnering three countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) respectively. The Guard component was chosen for this mission because US officials did not want to provoke the new Russian Federation by sending in RegAF and Army personnel. These newly devised military liaison teams initially engaged the young nations of Eastern Europe on a military-to-military level and were essential in bridging the gap between east and west. The SPP subsequently expanded all over Eastern Europe, and by 1998 there were twenty-four US states partnered with nations in the European Command area of responsibility (AOR).¹

The SPP continues to build on its initial successes in EUCOM, and has partnered with nations in US Central Command (CENTCOM), US Pacific Command (PACOM) and US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). There are currently 61 partnerships with additional expansion under consideration in the PACOM and AFRICOM AORs. (Reference Appendix A for current SPP pairings).

Although initial contact is at the tactical level, as the partnership grows the relationship expands to cover military-to-civilian and civilian-to-civilian relationships. Interaction typically

begins with small unit exchanges, and usually evolves to more meaningful relationships. Typical focus areas among partners are:²

- Emergency preparedness and disaster response
- Military exercises and peacekeeping operations
- Border, port and aviation defense and security
- Leadership; officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) development
- Military media relations
- Medical
- Defense and democratic institutions and reform
- Natural resources protection
- Economic security
- University and education exchange programs

The SPP has been a successful program; of the fifteen Eastern European countries that were paired in the first three years of the program, ten of them are now members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).³ The unique characteristics of the ANG have enabled the SPP to overcome some of the challenges that the RegAF would have faced. The programs are personal, cover a wide range of activities and each partnership is tailored to the needs of the state or the partner nation.

Limitations of the SPP

There are, however, some limitations to the SPP that detract from its ability to accomplish the BPC mission. The SPP is more about establishing *relationships* and building *partnerships* with other nations than about building their *capacity*. The original goals of the program have recently been modified with emphasis on BPC in an effort to match US NSS and DoD priorities, but although its goals have evolved, there has been little change in how the mission is conducted. Granted, programs that contribute to building capabilities typically result in stronger relationships, and programs designed to establish relationships can contribute to developing capabilities. However, the capacity building that takes place in the SPP is very limited in nature and typically occurs in the civil arena.⁴

In addition, partnership activities are tailored to the needs of the state and its partner nation and these activities aren't necessarily coherent with the AF Global Partnership Strategy. Because those in the state that run the program are Army National Guard servicemen, the majority of partnership activities that take place involve the Army National Guard, not the ANG. This has also lead to a lack of understanding and realization of ANG potential, which inadvertently has set aside a vast resource.

Another limitation to the SPP is how states are paired. With the exception of the initial pairings in Eastern Europe, state pairings aren't developed from a national strategy that emphasizes where the US wants to build partners. Part of the problem is that apart from the *Guidance for the Employment of the Force* (GEF), there is an apparent lack of concentrated effort at the national level to build a strategic plan for security cooperation down to the component level. This problem is compounded by the fact that the initial desire for a partner doesn't originate in the US, but with the partnering nation. Once a nation indicates a desire, a request is coordinated through the local ambassador and the regional theater security cooperation (TSC) plan. It is then forwarded to the National Guard Bureau (NGB) for matching to a state.⁵ The result is that current pairings involve nations that don't fit the criteria of a fragile or failing state. A comparison of current SPP pairings with a list of defined fragile states indicates the scale of this issue. This mismatch will remain after the states that decline or don't qualify for US security assistance are filtered out (Reference Appendix B for the list of state pairings and how it equates to the Failed State Index).

The SPP is also severely limited by a lack of funding. Until recently, spending for the program according to the NGB J5 International Affairs (NGB J5 IA) was roughly \$5,000 to \$7,000 per event.⁶ Additionally, in order to enable the program to continue, funding was

withdrawn from various other sources. However, the budget increased significantly in 2008 with renewed emphasis on the program.

Limitations aside, the SPP has been successful and a positive influence on Eastern Europe and the world. Engagements have been small, frequent, and over time, they have reaped benefits and laid the foundation for future partnership activities by the ANG. The SPP has generated goodwill and built the trust of its partner nations resulting in both access and influence, through which the AF can develop capabilities.⁷

The SPP Compared to Today's BPC Requirements

In May of 2008, the RAND Corporation published a study entitled *Train, Equip, Advise, Assist: The USAF and the Indirect Approach to Countering Terrorist Groups Abroad*. In it, they attempted to determine potential candidate countries for indirect operations and prioritize them based on their link to the Long War.⁸ Their results are in Table 1. Countries in the upper left (red) quadrant are considered to be afflicted by active instability linked to militant jihadism, and were designated the first priority for indirect operations. Countries in the lower left (orange) were listed as second priority. These countries are thought to have latent instability linked to jihadism. The right half of the table depicts countries that are thought to have active and latent instability that is not linked to jihadism, and were listed as third (yellow) and fourth (green) priority respectively.

In determining which nations are in need of security assistance, the RAND results can be validated by a comparison to the Failed State Index that is developed by the Fund for Peace, a nonprofit research and advocacy organization based in Washington DC with the mission of preventing war and alleviating the conditions that cause it. The Failed State Index provides a listing of states and depicts their vulnerability to failure (on a rank ordered scale). Of the 60

most vulnerable states, 51 of them are also RAND's candidate countries for Indirect Operations (Reference Appendix B for additional information on the Failed State Index and the listing).

Table 1. Candidate Countries for Indirect Operations

	Jihadism		Other Causes		
Active	Afghanistan	Nigeria	Angola	Laos	
	Algeria	Pakistan	Burundi	Mexico	
	Bangladesh	Philippines	Central African	Nepal	
	Ethiopia	Saudi Arabia	Republic	Sri Lanka	
	Georgia	Somalia	Colombia	Turkey	
	Indonesia	Thailand	DRC	Uganda	
	Iraq	Yemen	CDI		
	Malaysia				
Latent	Albania	Kuwait	Argentina	Eq Guinea	Nicaragua
	Azerbaijan	Lebanon	Armenia	Grenada	Niger
	Bahrain	Mali	Benin	Guatemala	PNG
	BiH	Morocco	Bolivia	Guinea	Paraguay
	Djibouti	Serbia	Brazil	G-Bissau	Peru
	Egypt	South Africa	Burkina	Guyana	Rwanda
	Jordan	Tajikistan	Cambodia	Haiti	Senegal
	Kazakhstan	Turkmenistan	Cameroon	Honduras	Sierra Leone
	Kenya		Chad	Jamaica	Solomons
			Chile	Kyrgyzstan	Tanzania
			Comoro	Liberia	Togo
			Congo-B	Madagascar	Zambia
			Cyprus	Malawi	
			East Timor	Mauritania	
			Ecuador	Mozambique	
			El Salvador	Namibia	

Source: RAND. *Train, Equip, Advise, Assist: The USAF and the Indirect Approach to Countering Terrorist Groups Abroad*

Table 1 defines in simple terms RAND's recommended priorities for engagement. Although, it is a snapshot in time and requires additional research prior to establishing policy, it provides a useful baseline for describing the potential need for Indirect Operations. The underlying requirements are potentially staggering; according to RAND's research, our present capacity for train, equip, advise and assist (TEAA) functions will only accomplish 8% of the required demand.⁹

As the Cold War wound down and the Soviet Union collapsed, there was a definite need to fill the void left behind. Our current guidance has us looking at other areas of the world in an attempt to deny terrorists sanctuary, develop long term, low visibility presence in many areas,

and build the capacity of our partners in the Long War.¹⁰ It might be time to shift our focus elsewhere. The time is ripe to build new partnerships or even build tri-lateral engagements with other nations that are deemed essential to the Long War. Comparison of the candidate countries for Indirect Operations (Table 1) with nations participating in the SPP provides some interesting results. The US already engages with 27 nations that are at the initial stages of BPC; goodwill has been established, and they are already postured to make the next step.

Table 2. Candidate Nations and Associated SPP Partner

	Jihadism		Other Causes	
Active	Bangladesh (Oregon) Georgia (Georgia) Indonesia (Hawaii)	Nigeria (California) Philippines (Guam/Hawaii) Thailand (Washington)		
Latent	Albania (New Jersey) Azerbaijan (Oklahoma) Jordan (Colorado) Kazakhstan (Arizona)	Morocco (Utah) South Africa (New York) Tajikistan (Virginia) Turkmenistan (Nevada)	Armenia (Kansas) Bolivia (Mississippi) Chile (Texas) Ecuador (Kentucky) El Salvador (New Hampshire) Guatemala (Arkansas) Guyana (Florida) Honduras (Puerto Rico)	Jamaica (DC) Kyrgyzstan (Montana) Nicaragua (Wisconsin) Paraguay (Massachusetts) Peru (West Virginia) Senegal (Vermont)

Options for Establishing BPC in the ANG

The simplest method with the smallest impact on how the ANG does business would be to reinvigorate the SPP under a new charter with new objectives. A more sophisticated method would be to build a dedicated squadron within an ANG wing with the primary mission of BPC. A third option would require select wings in the ANG to adjust current missions to support BPC. Along with this change in mission, these units would transition from supporting the SPP part-

time to having BPC as a primary focus with part-time support from other units. Either option is ready to take advantage of the groundwork that has been laid by the SPP.

Reinvigorate the SPP

The simplest option would involve reformatting the SPP. To be successful, the current program would need to be brought under a dedicated partnership strategy that was more integrated and relevant to today's concerns. It needs to take advantage of the Air Force and the capabilities that air, space and cyber have in the BPC environment. In addition, the SPP would need to be aligned with the realities of the Long War with nation-pairings tailored to current ethnic realities. This option is relatively easy to accomplish today and wouldn't require significant structural changes to the existing system. It would, however, potentially have the smallest impact.

Build Dedicated BPC Squadrons within the Current Wing Structure

The ANG could reasonably accomplish security assistance missions by building a squadron with personnel from the support, maintenance and operations functions of a wing.¹¹ As a separate squadron, this unit could specialize in the air advisory role while building the regional cultural expertise necessary to work with partner nations. At the same time, individuals could maintain proficiency in their primary mission by remaining attached to their previous units. Teams within the squadron could then be tailored to meet the needs of the country of interest, as determined by Theatre Security Cooperation guidelines. Primary missions of these units don't necessarily have to change, since it is the support functions that are often just as important as the operations or maintenance functions in BPC.¹²

Re-tool Select Wings in the ANG with the Primary Mission of BPC

Operating under the premise that the ANG is the best fit for the BPC mission, an ideal option would involve bringing the ANG to the forefront of any AF BPC strategy. This would require re-tooling select wings with hardware that is relevant to the BPC environment in conjunction with updating their primary mission to BPC. Instead of the current system that has all of the Guard supporting the SPP program on a part-time basis, the ANG would have wings with BPC as their full time mission, with support from other wings as needed or on a part-time basis.

Units that are ideal for this change are those that are near geographic ethnic recruiting areas, like Michigan and New Jersey, that could tap into this base along with wings that are looking for new missions to remain relevant with their state and federal requirements. The Air Force is currently investigating a light attack/observation aircraft, the OA-X, to support Combatant Commanders' close air support (CAS), armed reconnaissance, BPC and combat air forces (CAF) training requirements.¹³ The OA-X will be cheaper to operate, and more suitable for state requirements than some of the front line tactical fighters in operation today and needs to be reviewed for positioning within the ANG. With an understanding that the future will bring a need for ANG wings to change hardware and possibly even missions, this is an opportunity for units to take advantage of Air Force initiatives aimed at acquiring lower technology platforms and convert to the mission of BPC.

Recommendations

To enhance the success of any BPC program in the ANG, a number of things must happen. First, there needs to be an inventory of civilian skill sets that Guardsmen bring to bear. This database would need to be indexed, accurate, and accessible. Statutory authority already exists

for this in Title 10 US Code 10204(a)(4) which outlines the requirements of the Services to maintain a record of civilian occupational skills.¹⁴ There would also need to be incentives for ANG personnel to periodically update their current civilian skills. Options for this include special pay similar to language or flight pay or annual bonuses.¹⁵ Although the ANG can make an immediate impact due to advantages that it has culturally, there also needs to be support from Air University to establish programs uniquely designed to develop Guardsmen that are involved in this mission area, along with incentives for Guardsmen to maintain perishable skills.

Air Force leadership also needs to be aware of this untapped capacity that resides in the ANG. We are currently struggling to adapt and reshape RegAF forces to operate in the IW environment while there is already access to personnel that are a natural fit for this mission. The capability that is already resident in the Total Force could possibly even take the lead in AF BPC efforts. CORONA is an ideal time to increase the awareness of AF leaders.

Within the QDR that is being developed, serious consideration should be given to evaluating current ANG mission areas and how the ANG should be more involved in the BPC role. The SPP has been highlighted by the Joint Staff due to the positive effect that it has had in Eastern Europe, and there is a desire to replicate it elsewhere. However, a lack of understanding of the capabilities that the ANG has in the BPC arena by many in the DoD is having a negative impact on the ANG's inclusion in future BPC events. The unique security assistance that an air force can offer is generally misunderstood by those outside the AF, and education of the Joint Staff and sister Services must be communicated effectively.

Finally, the US has entered an era that is characterized by limited resources and it is time to take advantage of a capability that is inherent to our force structure. We are going to be in the mission of building partners and their capacity for a long time and consequently we should look

to re-tool a couple of ANG wings, outfit them with hardware suitable for BPC and enable them to take a leadership role in AF BPC efforts. The ANG is, at its very heart, an organization that is built on military discipline and structure. At the same time, it is centered on the community, and can execute at the grass-roots civilian level. The source of the Guard's effectiveness is that a Guard Soldier or Airman is first a community member and secondly a military serviceman.¹⁶ Ultimately, this gives the ANG a unique characteristic that can underpin any BPC mission, and these characteristics can't be replicated in the RegAF. The CSAF and Director, NGB should fast track a comprehensive initiative to capture the value of leveraging the ANG in BPC.

Notes

¹ Dubie, "The National Guard: Promoting US National Security," 80

² Bour, "National Guard Security Cooperation," Slide 17

³ Ibid., Slide 10

⁴ McCarthy, *The Limits of Friendship*, 5

⁵ Morgan, "National Guard Bureau's State Partnership Program," 12

⁶ Pappalardo, "Guard Rediscovered Diplomatic Role," 30

⁷ US Air Force, *Air Force Global Partnership Strategy*, 2

⁸ Grissom, *Train, Equip, Advise, Assist*, 35

⁹ Ibid., 42

¹⁰ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 22

¹¹ Norton, "Patient Angler: ANG Air Advisory Operating Concept"

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Air Combat Command, OA-X Enabling Concept, 1

¹⁴ Kropp, "SSTR Proposal," 1

¹⁵ Ibid., 4

¹⁶ Ibid., 3

Chapter 5

Conclusion

For the US to be successful in the Long War, it must continue to foster the development of civil society and effective governance in ungoverned and undergoverned areas. At the same time, as the 2008 NDS states, we must continue to develop partners; the Long War won't be winnable without them. Both of these concepts are complementary, and the ANG clearly has much to offer for any USAF involvement in such efforts.

A recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) highlighted the fact that the Reserve Component should remain multi-mission capable, but also should broaden its focus to include IW and preparing for catastrophic or disruptive challenges. Just like the RegAF is doing, the study states that more emphasis needs to be placed on missions like stability operations, homeland defense and civil support.¹ The ANG leadership is also ready to look at some of the emerging core missions, like IW, realizing that in order to remain viable they need to get involved in these missions while maintaining a strategic reserve capability.²

The ANG is able to capitalize on its low turnover rate, while taking advantage of its unique experience levels. The result is permanence and credibility, both of which are important when involved in missions that require the training of partner nations. Although it will take years and possibly decades for the RegAF to overcome its cultural limitations, the close proximity of ANG units to ethnic recruiting bases within the US offer an immediate solution.

When engaging in capacity building activity, military efforts are insufficient if they are isolated from diplomatic and economic efforts. The interagency understanding and the citizen-airman relationship inherent in the ANG are advantages that the RegAF can't replicate. The ANG is adept at working alongside other agencies within the US government, and this experience is crucial. Also, the unique status of Guardsmen and their ability to affect relationships on a military-to-military, civilian-to-military and civilian-to-civilian level make them ideal in the BPC environment.

The problem of BPC needs attention from the whole of government, but some of the solutions reside in the Total Force. The ANG is the best fit for the BPC mission. Similar to almost all of the other missions the ANG performs, they bring a unique blend of skills and attributes that make them a necessary part of our BPC strategy. They bring community solutions to community problems while operating in a military environment. They have capabilities that can't be replicated in the RegAF and it would be a waste of resources if they weren't enabled to lead the Air Force in national BPC efforts. The need is now, and we must take advantage of this untapped power and potential in an effort to support one of DoD's top priorities. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated, "We must rebalance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and finance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead."³

Notes

¹ Wormuth, *The Future of the National Guard and Reserves*, ix

² Reed, "Air Guard Seeking Role in as Many New Mission Areas as Possible," 44

³ Gates, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement

Appendix A

State Partnership Partnerships

Table 3. Current SPP Nation-State Pairings

USSOUTHCOM	
Arkansas	Guatemala
Connecticut	Uruguay
Delaware	Tobago
District of Columbia	Jamaica
Florida	Venezuela
Florida	Guyana
Florida	RegSecSysE. Carib. Islands
Kentucky	Ecuador
Louisiana	Belize
Massachusetts	Paraguay
Mississippi	Bolivia
Missouri	Panama
New Hampshire	El Salvador
New Mexico Rica	Costa Rica
Puerto Rico	Honduras
Puerto Rico	Dominican Rep.
Rhode Island	Bahamas
South Dakota	Suriname
Texas	Chile
West Virginia	Peru
Wisconsin	Nicaragua

USPACOM	
Alaska	Mongolia
Guam/Hawaii	Philippines
Hawaii	Indonesia
Washington	Thailand
Oregon	Bangladesh

USAFRICOM	
California	Nigeria
New York	South Africa
North Carolina	Botswana
North Dakota	Ghana
Utah	Morocco
Vermont	Senegal
Wyoming	Tunisia

USCENTCOM	
Arizona	Kazakhstan
Colorado	Jordan
Louisiana	Uzbekistan
Montana	Kyrgyzstan
Nevada	Turkmenistan
Virginia	Tajikistan

USEUCOM	
Alabama	Romania
California	Ukraine
Colorado	Slovenia
Georgia	Georgia
Illinois	Poland
Indiana	Slovakia
Kansas	Armenia
Maine	Montenegro
Maryland	Estonia
Maryland	Bosnia
Michigan	Latvia
Minnesota	Croatia
New Jersey	Albania
North Carolina	Moldova
Ohio	Hungary
Ohio	Serbia
Oklahoma	Azerbaijan
Pennsylvania	Lithuania
Tennessee	Bulgaria
Texas/Nebraska	Czech Republic
Vermont	Macedonia

Source: NGB J5IA.

Appendix B

Failed State Index 2008

The table below is a comparison of three sets of data. First, it is rank ordered by a listing of 60 of the 177 nations with the highest risk of failure. These nations have the highest vulnerability to collapse or conflict (Somalia, with a ranking of one, has the highest potential for failure in the 177-nation study). The second column shows how the SPP fits into the 60 nations of the Failed State Index, indicating which nations in the Failed State Index have an associated partner in the SPP. Finally, the last column shows how the 60 nations compared to RAND's priorities of candidate countries for security assistance.

There are 177 states included in the 2008 index, and the Fund for Peace uses its Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) to rank order nations. The CAST is a flexible model that has the capability to employ a four-step trend-line analysis, consisting of (1) rating 12 social, economic, political, and military indicators; (2) assessing the capabilities of five core state institutions considered essential for sustaining security; (3) identifying idiosyncratic factors and surprises; and (4) placing countries on a conflict map that shows the risk history of countries being analyzed. It is important to note that these ratings do not necessarily predict when states may experience violence or collapse. Rather, they measure vulnerability to collapse or conflict.

Table 4. Failed State Index Rankings Compared to RAND Study and SPP


Rank	Country	SPP Pair	RAND	Rank	Country	SPP Pair	RAND
1	Somalia		Priority 1	31	Sierra Leone		Priority 4
2	Sudan		Priority 3	32	Guinea-Bissau		Priority 4
3	Zimbabwe		Priority 4	33	Cameroon		Priority 4
4	Chad		Priority 4	34	Liberia		Priority 4
5	Iraq		Priority 1	35	Syria		Priority 2
6	Dem Rep of the		Priority 3	36	Burkina Faso		Priority 4
7	Afghanistan		Priority 1	37	Colombia		Priority 3
8	Ivory Coast			38	Tajikistan	Virginia	Priority 2
9	Pakistan		Priority 1	39	Kyrgyzstan	Montana	Priority 4
10	Central African		Priority 3	40	Laos		Priority 3
11	Guinea		Priority 4	41	Egypt		Priority 2
12	Bangladesh	Oregon	Priority 1	42	Rwanda		Priority 4
13	Burma			43	Equatorial Guinea		Priority 4
14	Haiti		Priority 4	44	Eritrea		Priority 3
15	North Korea			45	Togo		Priority 4
16	Ethiopia		Priority 1	46	Turkmenistan	Nevada	Priority 2
17	Uganda		Priority 3	47	Mauritania		Priority 4
18	Lebanon		Priority 2	48	Cambodia		Priority 4
19	Nigeria	California	Priority 1	49	Moldova	North Carolina	
20	Sri Lanka		Priority 3	50	Iran		Priority 3
21	Yemen		Priority 1	51	Bhutan		
22	Niger		Priority 4	52	Papua New		Priority 4
23	Nepal		Priority 3	53	Belarus		Priority 4
24	Burundi		Priority 3	54	Bosnia		
25	East Timor		Priority 4	55	Bolivia	Mississippi	Priority 4
26	Rep of Congo		Priority 4	56	Angola		Priority 3
27	Kenya		Priority 2	57	Georgia		Priority 1
28	Uzbekistan	Louisiana	Priority 2	58	Israel		Priority 1
29	Malawi		Priority 4	59	Philippines	Guam/Hawaii	Priority 1
30	Solomon Islands		Priority 4	60	Indonesia	Hawaii	Priority 1

Source: Fund for Peace's Failed State Index (<http://www.fundforpeace.org>) and RAND's *Train, Equip, Advise, Assist: The USAF and the Indirect Approach to Countering Terrorist Groups Abroad*.

Appendix C

Ethnic Recruiting Base

Figure 1. Proportion of People Identified With Arab Ancestry (By County)



Source: De La Cruz, G. Patricia and Angela Brittingham. *The Arab Population: 2000*. C2KBR-23. Washington, DC: US Census Bureau. 2003.

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